G.R. No.

198680               July 8, 2013

HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON, NAMELY, ALVARO YPON, ERUDITA Y. BARON, CICERO YPON, WILSON YPON,
VICTOR YPON, AND HINIDINO Y. PEÑALOSA, PETITIONERS,
vs.
GAUDIOSO PONTERAS RICAFORTE A.K.A. "GAUDIOSO E. YPON," AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF TOLEDO
CITY, RESPONDENTS.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This is a direct recourse to the Court from the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Branch 59 (RTC), through a petition for review
on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising a pure question of law. In particular, petitioners assail the July 27,
20112 and August 31, 20113 Orders of the RTC, dismissing Civil Case No. T-2246 for lack of cause of action.

The Facts

On July 29, 2010, petitioners, together with some of their cousins, 4 filed a complaint for Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance
with Damages (subject complaint) against respondent Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte a.k.a. "Gaudioso E. Ypon" (Gaudioso), docketed
as Civil Case No. T-2246.5 In their complaint, they alleged that Magdaleno Ypon (Magdaleno) died intestate and childless on June
28, 1968, leaving behind Lot Nos. 2-AA, 2-C, 2-F, and 2-J which were then covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-
44 and T-77-A.6 Claiming to be the sole heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and caused the
cancellation of the aforementioned certificates of title, leading to their subsequent transfer in his name under TCT Nos. T-2637 and
T-2638,7 to the prejudice of petitioners who are Magdaleno’s collateral relatives and successors-in-interest.8

In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno as evidenced by: (a) his certificate of Live Birth; (b) two (2)
letters from Polytechnic School; and (c) a certified true copy of his passport. 9 Further, by way of affirmative defense, he claimed
that: (a) petitioners have no cause of action against him; (b) the complaint fails to state a cause of action; and (c) the case is not
prosecuted by the real parties-in-interest, as there is no showing that the petitioners have been judicially declared as Magdaleno’s
lawful heirs.10

The RTC Ruling

On July 27, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed July 27, 2011 Order, 11 finding that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of
action against Gaudioso. It observed that while the plaintiffs therein had established their relationship with Magdaleno in a previous
special proceeding for the issuance of letters of administration, 12 this did not mean that they could already be considered as the
decedent’s compulsory heirs. Quite the contrary, Gaudioso satisfactorily established the fact that he is Magdaleno’s son – and
hence, his compulsory heir – through the documentary evidence he submitted which consisted of: (a) a marriage contract between
Magdaleno and Epegenia Evangelista; (b) a Certificate of Live Birth; (c) a Letter dated February 19, 1960; and (d) a passport.13

The plaintiffs therein filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied on August 31, 2011 due to the counsel’s failure
to state the date on which his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificate of Compliance was issued.14

Aggrieved, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. T-2246, 15 sought direct recourse to the Court through the
instant petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The core of the present controversy revolves around the issue of whether or not the RTC’s dismissal of the case on the ground that
the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action was proper.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition has no merit.

Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. 16 It is well-settled that the existence
of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint. 17 In this relation, a complaint is said to assert a sufficient
cause of action if, admitting what appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed
for.18Accordingly, if the allegations furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be
dismissed, regardless of the defenses that may be averred by the defendants.19

As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs therein, alleged that they are the lawful heirs of
Magdaleno and based on the same, prayed that the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Gaudioso be declared null and void
and that the transfer certificates of title issued in the latter’s favor be cancelled. While the foregoing allegations, if admitted to be
true, would consequently warrant the reliefs sought for in the said complaint, the rule that the determination of a decedent’s lawful
heirs should be made in the corresponding special proceeding20 precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action for cancellation of title and
reconveyance, from granting the same. In the case of Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v. CA,21 the Court, citing several other precedents,
held that the determination of who are the decedent’s lawful heirs must be made in the proper special proceeding for such
purpose, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and/or possession, as in this case:

Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in the proper special
proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property.1âwphi1 This must take
precedence over the action for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot
make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding.
Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a
party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made
only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.

In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera, this Court ruled that the declaration of heirship must be made in a special proceeding,
and not in an independent civil action. This doctrine was reiterated in Solivio v. Court of Appeals x x x:

In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes, the Court reiterated its ruling that matters relating to the rights of
filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of
determining such rights. Citing the case of Agapay v. Palang, this Court held that the status of an illegitimate child who claimed to
be an heir to a decedent's estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action which, as in this case, was for the recovery of
property.22 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the determination of heirship may be dispensed with
for the sake of practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and already
presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment thereon, 23 or when a
special proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened.24

In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear to exist. Hence, there lies the need to institute
the proper special proceeding in order to determine the heirship of the parties involved, ultimately resulting to the dismissal of Civil
Case No. T-2246.

Verily, while a court usually focuses on the complaint in determining whether the same fails to state a cause of action, a court
cannot disregard decisions material to the proper appreciation of the questions before it.25 Thus, concordant with applicable
jurisprudence, since a determination of heirship cannot be made in an ordinary action for recovery of ownership and/or possession,
the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 was altogether proper. In this light, it must be pointed out that the RTC erred in ruling on
Gaudioso’s heirship which should, as herein discussed, be threshed out and determined in the proper special proceeding. As such,
the foregoing pronouncement should therefore be devoid of any legal effect.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 is hereby AFFIRMED, without prejudice to any
subsequent proceeding to determine the lawful heirs of the late Magdaleno Ypon and the rights concomitant therewith.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 109373 March 20, 1995

PACIFIC BANKING CORPORATION EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION, PAULA S. PAUG, and its officers and
members, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VITALIANO N. NAÑAGAS II, as Liquidator of Pacific Banking
Corporation, respondents.

G.R. No. 112991 March 20, 1995

THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, as Liquidator of the Pacific Banking
Corporation , petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE REGINO T. VERIDIANO II, DEPUTY SHERIFF RAMON ENRIQUEZ and ANG ENG
JOO, ANG KEONG LAN and E.J ANG INT'L. LTD., represented by their Attorney-in-fact, GONZALO C. SY, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

These cases have been consolidated because the principal question involved is the same: whether a petition for liquidation under
§29 of Rep. Act No. 265, otherwise known as the Central Bank Act, is a special proceeding or an ordinary civil action. The Fifth and
the Fourteenth Divisions of the Court of Appeals reached opposite results on this question and consequently applied different
periods for appealing.

The facts are as follows:

I.

Proceedings in the CB and the RTC

On July 5, 1985, the Pacific Banking Corporation (PaBC) was placed under receivership by the Central Bank of the Philippines
pursuant to Resolution No. 699 of its Monetary Board. A few months later, it was placed under liquidation1 and a Liquidator was
appointed.2

On April 7, 1986, the Central Bank filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch 31, a petition entitled "Petition for
Assistance in the Liquidation of Pacific Banking Corporation." 3 The petition was approved, after which creditors filed their claims
with the court.

On May 17, 1991, a new Liquidator, Vitaliano N. Nañagas, 4 President of the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC), was
appointed by the Central Bank.

On March 13, 1989 the Pacific Banking Corporation Employees Organization (Union for short), petitioner in G.R. No. 109373, filed a
complaint-in-intervention seeking payment of holiday pay, 13th month pay differential, salary increase differential, Christmas
bonus, and cash equivalent of Sick Leave Benefit due its members as employees of PaBC. In its order dated September 13, 1991,
the trial court ordered payment of the principal claims of the Union.5

The Liquidator received a copy of the order on September 16, 1991. On October 16, 1991, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration
and Clarification of the order. In his order of December 6, 1991, the judge modified his September 13, 1991 6 but in effect denied
the Liquidator's motion for reconsideration. This order was received by the Liquidator on December 9, 1991. The following day,
December 10, 1991, he filed a Notice of Appeal and a Motion for Additional Time to Submit Record on Appeal. On December 23,
1991, another Notice of Appeal was filed by the Office of the Solicitor General in behalf of Nañagas.

In his order of February 10, 1992, respondent judge disallowed the Liquidator's Notice of Appeal on the ground that it was
late, i.e., more than 15 days after receipt of the decision. The judge declared his September 13, 1991 order and subsequent orders
to be final and executory and denied reconsideration. On March 27, 1992, he granted the Union's Motion for issuance of a writ of
Execution.

Ang Keong Lan and E.J. Ang Int'l., private respondents in G.R. No. 112991, likewise filed claims for the payment of investment in
the PaBC allegedly in the form of shares of stocks amounting to US$2,531,632.18. The shares of stocks, consisting of 154,462
common shares, constituted 11% of the total subscribed capital stock of the PaBC. They alleged that their claim constituted foreign
exchange capital investment entitled to preference in payment under the Foreign Investments Law.
In his order dated September 11, 1992, respondent judge of the RTC directed the Liquidator to pay private respondents the total
amount of their claim as preferred creditors.7

The Liquidator received the order on September 16, 1992. On September 30, 1992 he moved for reconsideration, but his motion
was denied by the court on October 2, 1992. He received the order denying his Motion for Reconsideration on October 5, 1992. On
October 14, 1992 he filed a Notice of Appeal from the orders of September 16, 1992 and October 2, 1992. As in the case of the
Union, however, the judge ordered the Notice of Appeal stricken off the record on the ground that it had been filed without
authority of the Central Bank and beyond 15 days. In his order of October 28, 1992, the judge directed the execution of his
September 11, 1992 order granting the Stockholders/ Investors' claim.

II.

Proceedings in the Court of Appeals

The Liquidator filed separate Petitions for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus  in the Court of Appeals to set aside the orders of
the trial court denying his appeal from the orders granting the claims of Union and of the Stockholders/Investors. The two Divisions
of the Court of Appeals, to which the cases were separately raffled, rendered conflicting rulings.

In its decision of November 17, 1992 in CA-G.R. SP No. 27751 (now G.R. No. 09373) the Fifth Division8 held in the case of the
Union that the proceeding before the trial court was a special proceeding and, therefore, the period for appealing from any
decision or final order rendered therein is 30 days. Since the notice of appeal of the Liquidator was filed on the 30th day of his
receipt of the decision granting the Union's claims, the appeal was brought on time. The Fifth Division, therefore, set aside the
orders of the lower court and directed the latter to give due course to the appeal of the Liquidator and set the Record on Appeal he
had filed for hearing.

On the other hand, on December 16, 1993, the Fourteenth Division 9 ruled in CA-G.R. SP No. 29351 (now G.R. No. 112991) in the
case of the Stockholders/Investors that a liquidation proceeding is an ordinary action. Therefore, the period for appealing from any
decision or final order rendered therein is 15 days and that since the Liquidator's appeal notice was filed on the 23rd day of his
receipt of the order appealed from, deducting the period during which his motion for reconsideration was pending, the notice of
appeal was filed late. Accordingly, the Fourteenth Division dismissed the Liquidator's petition.

III.

Present Proceedings

The Union and the Liquidator then separately filed petitions before this Court.

In G.R. No. 109373 the Union contends that:

1. The Court of Appeals acted without jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the suit.

2. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in taking cognizance of the petition for certiorari filed by Nañagas who was
without any legal authority to file it.

3. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the case is a special proceeding governed by Rules 72 to 109 of
the Revised Rules of Court.

4. The Court of Appeals erred seriously in concluding that the notice of appeal filed by Nañagas was filed on
time.

5. The Court of Appeals erred seriously in declaring that the second notice of appeal filed on December 23, 1991
by the Solicitor General is a superfluity.

On the other hand, in G.R. No. 112991 the Liquidator contends that:

1. The Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of the Pacific Banking Corporation s a Special Proceeding case
and/or one which allows multiple appeals, in which case the period of appeal is 30 days and not 15 days from
receipt of the order/judgment appealed from.

2. Private respondents are not creditors of PaBC but are plain stockholders whose right to receive payment as
such would accrue only after all the creditors of the insolvent bank have been paid.

3. The claim of private respondents in the amount of US$22,531,632.18 is not in the nature of foreign
investment as it is understood in law.
 4. The claim of private respondents has not been clearly established and proved.

5. The issuance of a writ of execution against the assets of PaBC was made with grave abuse of discretion.

The petitions in these cases must be dismissed.

First. As stated in the beginning, the principal question in these cases is whether a petition for liquidation under §29 of Rep. Act
No. 265 is in the nature of a special proceeding. If it is, then the period of appeal is 30 days and the party appealing must, in
addition to a notice of appeal, file with the trial court a record on appeal in order to perfect his appeal. Otherwise, if a liquidation
proceeding is an ordinary action, the period of appeal is 15 days from notice of the decision or final order appealed from.

BP Blg. 129 provides:

§39. Appeals. — The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any
court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award,
judgment or decision appealed from: Provided, however, that in habeas corpus  cases the period for appeal shall
be forty-eight (48) hours from the notice of the judgment appealed from.

No record on appeal shall be required to take an appeal. In lieu thereof, the entire record shall be transmitted
with all the pages prominently numbered consecutively, together with an index of the contents thereof.

This section shall not apply in appeals in special proceedings and in other cases wherein multiple appeals are
allowed under applicable provisions of the Rules of Court.

The Interim Rules and Guidelines to implement BP Blg. 129 provides:

19. Period of Appeals. —

(a) All appeals, except in habeas corpus  cases and in the cases referred to in paragraph (b)
hereof, must be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment, order, resolution
or award appealed from.

(b) In appeals in special proceedings in accordance with Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and
other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed, the period of appeals shall be thirty (30)
days, a record on appeal being required.

The Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals held that the proceeding is an ordinary action similar to an action for interpleader
under Rule 63. 10 The Fourteenth Division stated:

The petition filed is akin to an interpleader under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court where there are conflicting
claimants or several claims upon the same subject matter, a person who claims no interest thereon may file an
action for interpleader to compel the claimants to "interplead" and litigate their several claims among
themselves. (Section I Rule 63).

An interpleader is in the category of a special civil action under Rule 62 which, like an ordinary action, may be
appealed only within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or order appealed from. Under Rule 62, the
preceding rules covering ordinary civil actions which are not inconsistent with or may serve to supplement the
provisions of the rule relating to such civil actions are applicable to special civil actions. This embraces Rule 41
covering appeals from the regional trial court to the Court of Appeals.

xxx xxx xxx

Thus, under Section 1 Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, an action is defined as "an ordinary suit in a court of justice
by which one party prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress
of a wrong." On the other hand, Section 2 of the same Rule states that "every other remedy including one to
establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact shall be by special proceeding."

To our mind, from the aforequoted definitions of an action and a special proceeding, the petition for assistance
of the court in the liquidation of an asset of a bank is not "one to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact." Contrary to the submission of the petitioner, the petition is not intended to establish the fact of
insolvency of the bank. The insolvency of the bank had already been previously determined by the Central Bank
in accordance with Section 9 of the CB Act before the petition was filed. All that needs to be done is to liquidate
the assets of the bank and thus the assistance of the respondent court is sought for that purpose.
 It should be pointed out that this petition filed is not among the cases categorized as a special proceeding under
Section 1, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court, nor among the special proceedings that may be appealed under Section
1, Rule 109 of the Rules.

We disagree with the foregoing view of the Fourteenth Division. Rule 2 of the Rules of Court provide:

§1. Action defined. — Action means an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by which the party prosecutes another
for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.

§2. Special Proceeding Distinguished. — Every other remedy, including one to establish the status or right of a
party or a particular fact, shall be by special proceeding.

Elucidating the crucial distinction between an ordinary action and a special proceeding, Chief Justice Moran states:" 11

Action is the act by which one sues another in a court of justice for the enforcement or protection of a right, or
the prevention or redress of a wrong while special proceeding is the act by which one seeks to establish the
status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Hence, action is distinguished from special proceeding in that the
former is a formal demand of a right by one against another, while the latter is but a petition for a declaration of
a status, right or fact. Where a party litigant seeks to recover property from another, his remedy is to file an
action. Where his purpose is to seek the appointment of a guardian for an insane, his remedy is a special
proceeding to establish the fact or status of insanity calling for an appointment of guardianship.

Considering this distinction, a petition for liquidation of an insolvent corporation should be classified a special proceeding and not
an ordinary action. Such petition does not seek the enforcement or protection of a right nor the prevention or redress of a wrong
against a party. It does not pray for affirmative relief for injury arising from a party's wrongful act or omission nor state a cause of
action that can be enforced against any person.

What it seeks is merely a declaration by the trial court of the corporation's insolvency so that its creditors may be able to file their
claims in the settlement of the corporation's debts and obligations. Put in another way, the petition only seeks a declaration of the
corporation's debts and obligations. Put in another way, the petition only seeks a declaration of the corporation's state of
insolvency and the concomitant right of creditors and the order of payment of their claims in the disposition of the corporation's
assets.

Contrary to the rulings of the Fourteenth Division, liquidation proceedings do not resemble petitions for interpleader. For one, an
action for interpleader involves claims on a subject matter against a person who has no interest therein. 12 This is not the case in a
liquidation proceeding where the Liquidator, as representative of the corporation, takes charge of its assets and liabilities for the
benefit of the creditors.13 He is thus charged with insuring that the assets of the corporation are paid only to rightful claimants and
in the order of payment provided by law.

Rather, a liquidation proceeding resembles the proceeding for the settlement of state of deceased persons under Rules 73 to 91 of
the Rules of Court. The two have a common purpose: the determination of all the assets and the payment of all the debts and
liabilities of the insolvent corporation or the estate. The Liquidator and the administrator or executor are both charged with the
assets for the benefit of the claimants. In both instances, the liability of the corporation and the estate is not disputed. The court's
concern is with the declaration of creditors and their rights and the determination of their order of payment.

Furthermore, as in the settlement of estates, multiple appeals are allowed in proceedings for liquidation of an insolvent
corporation. As the Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals, quoting the Liquidator, correctly noted:

A liquidation proceeding is a single proceeding which consists of a number of cases properly classified as
"claims." It is basically a two-phased proceeding. The first phase is concerned with the approval and disapproval
of claims. Upon the approval of the petition seeking the assistance of the proper court in the liquidation of a
close entity, all money claims against the bank are required to be filed with the liquidation court. This phase may
end with the declaration by the liquidation court that the claim is not proper or without basis. On the other hand,
it may also end with the liquidation court allowing the claim. In the latter case, the claim shall be classified
whether it is ordinary or preferred, and thereafter included Liquidator. In either case, the order allowing or
disallowing a particular claim is final order, and may be appealed by the party aggrieved thereby.

The second phase involves the approval by the Court of the distribution plan prepared by the duly appointed
liquidator. The distribution plan specifies in detail the total amount available for distribution to creditors whose
claim were earlier allowed. The Order finally disposes of the issue of how much property is available for disposal.
Moreover, it ushers in the final phase of the liquidation proceeding — payment of all allowed claims in
accordance with the order of legal priority and the approved distribution plan.

Verily, the import of the final character of an Order of allowance or disallowance of a particular claim cannot be
overemphasized. It is the operative fact that constitutes a liquidation proceeding a "case where multiple appeals
are allowed by law." The issuance of an Order which, by its nature, affects only the particular claims involved,
 and which may assume finality if no appeal is made therefrom, ipso facto creates a situation where multiple
appeals are allowed.

A liquidation proceeding is commenced by the filing of a single petition by the Solicitor General with a court of
competent jurisdiction entitled, "Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of e.g., Pacific Banking Corporation. All
claims against the insolvent are required to be filed with the liquidation court. Although the claims are litigated in
the same proceeding, the treatment is individual. Each claim is heard separately. And the Order issued relative to
a particular claim applies only to said claim, leaving the other claims unaffected, as each claim is considered
separate and distinct from the others. Obviously, in the event that an appeal from an Order allowing or
disallowing a particular claim is made, only said claim is affected, leaving the others to proceed with their
ordinary course. In such case, the original records of the proceeding are not elevated to the appellate court.
They remain with the liquidation court. In lieu of the original record, a record of appeal is instead required to be
prepared and transmitted to the appellate court.

Inevitably, multiple appeals are allowed in liquidation proceedings. Consequently, a record on appeal is necessary
in each and every appeal made. Hence, the period to appeal therefrom should be thirty (30) days, a record on
appeal being required. (Record pp. 162-164).

In G.R. No. 112991 (the case of the Stockholders/Investors), the Liquidator's notice of appeal was filed on time, having been filed
on the 23rd day of receipt of the order granting the claims of the Stockholders/Investors. However, the Liquidator did not file a
record on appeal with the result that he failed to perfect his appeal. As already stated a record on appeal is required under the
Interim Rules and Guidelines in special proceedings and for cases where multiple appeals are allowed. The reason for this is that
the several claims are actually separate ones and a decision or final order with respect to any claim can be appealed. Necessarily
the original record on appeal must remain in the trial court where other claims may still be pending.

Because of the Liquidator's failure to perfect his appeal, the order granting the claims of the Stockholders/Investors became final.
Consequently. the Fourteenth Division's decision dismissing the Liquidator's Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus  must
be affirmed albeit for a different reason.

On the other hand, in G.R. No. 109373 (case of the Labor Union), we find that the Fifth Division correctly granted the Liquidator's
Petition for Certiorari. Prohibition and Mandamus. As already noted, the Liquidator filed a notice of appeal and a motion for
extension to file a record on appeal on December 10, 1991, i.e., within 30 days of his receipt of the order granting the Union's
claim. Without waiting for the resolution of his motion for extension, he filed on December 20, 1991 within the extension sought a
record on appeal. Respondent judge thus erred in disallowing the notice on appeal and denying the Liquidator's motion for
extension to file a record on appeal.

The Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals correctly granted the Liquidator's Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus and
its decision should, therefore, be affirmed.

Second. In G.R. No. 109373, The Union claims that under §29 of Rep. Act No. 265, the court merely assists  in adjudicating the
claims of creditors, preserves  the assets of the institution, and implements  the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board
and that, therefore, as representative of the Monetary Board, the Liquidator cannot question the order of the court or appeal from
it. It contends that since the Monetary Board had previously admitted PaBC's liability to the laborers by in fact setting aside the
amount of P112,234,292.44 for the payment of their claims, there was nothing else for the Liquidator to do except to comply with
the order of the court.

The Union's contention is untenable. In liquidation proceedings, the function of the trial court is not limited to assisting in the
implementation of the orders of the Monetary Board. Under the same section (§29) of the law invoked by the Union, the court has
authority to set aside the decision of the Monetary Board "if there is a convincing proof that the action is plainly arbitrary and made
in bad faith." 14 As this Court held in Rural Bank of Buhi, Inc. v. Court of Appeals: 15

There is no question, that the action of the monetary Board in this regard may be subject to judicial review.
Thus, it has been held that the Court's may interfere with the Central Bank's exercise of discretion in determining
whether or not a distressed bank shall be supported or liquidated. Discretion has its limits and has never been
held to include arbitrariness, discrimination or bad faith (Ramos v. Central Bank of the Philippines, 41 SCRA 567
[1971]).

In truth, the Liquidator is the representative not only of the Central Bank but also of the insolvent bank. Under §§28A-29 of Rep.
Act No. 265 he acts in behalf of the bank "personally or through counsel as he may retain, in all actions or proceedings or against
the corporation" and he has authority "to do whatever may be necessary for these purposes." This authority includes the power to
appeal from the decisions or final orders of the court which he believes to be contrary to the interest of the bank.

Finally the Union contends that the notice of appeal and motion for extension of time to file the record on appeal filed in behalf of
the Central Bank was not filed by the office of the Solicitor General as counsel for the Central Bank. This contention has no merit.
On October 22, 1992, as Assistant Solicitor General Cecilio O. Estoesta informed the trial court in March 27, 1992, the OSG had
previously authorized lawyers of the PDIC to prepare and sign pleadings in the case. 16 Conformably thereto the Notice of Appeal
and the Motion for Additional Time to submit Record on Appeal filed were jointly signed by Solicitor Reynaldo I. Saludares in behalf
of the OSG and by lawyers of the PDIC. 17

WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 109373 and G.R. No 112991, the decisions appealed from are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 174975               January 20, 2009

LUISA KHO MONTAÑER, ALEJANDRO MONTAÑER, JR., LILLIBETH MONTAÑER-BARRIOS, AND RHODORA ELEANOR
MONTAÑER-DALUPAN, Petitioners,
vs.
SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT, FOURTH SHARI'A JUDICIAL DISTRICT, MARAWI CITY, LILING DISANGCOPAN, AND
ALMAHLEEN LILING S. MONTAÑER, Respondents.

DECISION

PUNO, C.J.:

This Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeks to set aside the Orders of the Shari’a District Court, Fourth Shari’a Judicial District,
Marawi City, dated August 22, 20061 and September 21, 2006.2

On August 17, 1956, petitioner Luisa Kho Montañer, a Roman Catholic, married Alejandro Montañer, Sr. at the Immaculate
Conception Parish in Cubao, Quezon City.3 Petitioners Alejandro Montañer, Jr., Lillibeth Montañer-Barrios, and Rhodora Eleanor
Montañer-Dalupan are their children.4 On May 26, 1995, Alejandro Montañer, Sr. died.5

On August 19, 2005, private respondents Liling Disangcopan and her daughter, Almahleen Liling S. Montañer, both Muslims, filed a
"Complaint" for the judicial partition of properties before the Shari’a District Court. 6 The said complaint was entitled "Almahleen
Liling S. Montañer and Liling M. Disangcopan v. the Estates and Properties of Late Alejandro Montañer, Sr., Luisa Kho Montañer,
Lillibeth K. Montañer, Alejandro Kho Montañer, Jr., and Rhodora Eleanor K. Montañer," and docketed as "Special Civil Action No. 7-
05."7 In the said complaint, private respondents made the following allegations: (1) in May 1995, Alejandro Montañer, Sr. died; (2)
the late Alejandro Montañer, Sr. is a Muslim; (3) petitioners are the first family of the decedent; (4) Liling Disangcopan is the
widow of the decedent; (5) Almahleen Liling S. Montañer is the daughter of the decedent; and (6) the estimated value of and a list
of the properties comprising the estate of the decedent.8 Private respondents prayed for the Shari’a District Court to order, among
others, the following: (1) the partition of the estate of the decedent; and (2) the appointment of an administrator for the estate of
the decedent.9

Petitioners filed an Answer with a Motion to Dismiss mainly on the following grounds: (1) the Shari’a District Court has no
jurisdiction over the estate of the late Alejandro Montañer, Sr., because he was a Roman Catholic; (2) private respondents failed to
pay the correct amount of docket fees; and (3) private respondents’ complaint is barred by prescription, as it seeks to establish
filiation between Almahleen Liling S. Montañer and the decedent, pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code.10

On November 22, 2005, the Shari’a District Court dismissed the private respondents’ complaint. The district court held that
Alejandro Montañer, Sr. was not a Muslim, and its jurisdiction extends only to the settlement and distribution of the estate of
deceased Muslims.11

On December 12, 2005, private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration. 12 On December 28, 2005, petitioners filed an
Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration, alleging that the motion for reconsideration lacked a notice of hearing.13 On January
17, 2006, the Shari’a District Court denied petitioners’ opposition. 14 Despite finding that the said motion for reconsideration "lacked
notice of hearing," the district court held that such defect was cured as petitioners "were notified of the existence of the pleading,"
and it took cognizance of the said motion.15 The Shari’a District Court also reset the hearing for the motion for reconsideration.16

In its first assailed order dated August 22, 2006, the Shari’a District Court reconsidered its order of dismissal dated November 22,
2005.17 The district court allowed private respondents to adduce further evidence. 18 In its second assailed order dated September
21, 2006, the Shari’a District Court ordered the continuation of trial, trial on the merits, adducement of further evidence, and pre-
trial conference.19

Seeking recourse before this Court, petitioners raise the following issues:

I.

RESPONDENT SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT – MARAWI CITY LACKS JURISDICTION OVER PETITIONERS WHO ARE ROMAN
CATHOLICS AND NON-MUSLIMS.

II.

RESPONDENT SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT – MARAWI CITY DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER "THE ESTATES AND
PROPERTIES OF THE LATE ALEJANDRO MONTAÑER, SR." WHICH IS NOT A NATURAL OR JURIDICAL PERSON WITH CAPACITY TO
BE SUED.

III.
RESPONDENT SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE COMPLAINT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
AGAINST PETITIONERS DUE TO NON-PAYMENT OF THE FILING AND DOCKETING FEES.

IV.

RESPONDENT SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT—MARAWI CITY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT DENIED THE OPPOSITION OF PETITIONERS AND THEN GRANTED THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF RESPONDENTS LILING DISANGCOPAN, ET AL. WHICH WAS FATALLY DEFECTIVE FOR LACK OF A
"NOTICE OF HEARING."

V.

RESPONDENT SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT—MARAWI CITY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT SET SPL. CIVIL ACTION 7-05 FOR TRIAL EVEN IF THE COMPLAINT PLAINLY REVEALS THAT
RESPONDENT ALMAHLEEN LILING S. MONTAÑER SEEKS RECOGNITION FROM ALEJANDRO MONTAÑER, SR. WHICH CAUSE OF
ACTION PRESCRIBED UPON THE DEATH OF ALEJANDRO MONTAÑER, SR. ON MAY 26, 1995.

In their Comment to the Petition for Certiorari, private respondents stress that the Shari’a District Court must be given the
opportunity to hear and decide the question of whether the decedent is a Muslim in order to determine whether it has
jurisdiction.20

Jurisdiction: Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Muslims

Petitioners’ first argument, regarding the Shari’a District Court’s jurisdiction, is dependent on a question of fact, whether the late
Alejandro Montañer, Sr. is a Muslim. Inherent in this argument is the premise that there has already been a determination
resolving such a question of fact. It bears emphasis, however, that the assailed orders did not determine whether the decedent is a
Muslim. The assailed orders did, however, set a hearing for the purpose of resolving this issue.

Article 143(b) of Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, provides
that the Shari’a District Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims:

ARTICLE 143. Original jurisdiction. — (1) The Shari'a District Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over:

xxxx

(b) All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims, probate of wills, issuance of
letters of administration or appointment of administrators or executors regardless of the nature or the aggregate value of the
property.

The determination of the nature of an action or proceeding is controlled by the averments and character of the relief sought in the
complaint or petition.21 The designation given by parties to their own pleadings does not necessarily bind the courts to treat it
according to the said designation. Rather than rely on "a falsa descriptio or defective caption," courts are "guided by the
substantive averments of the pleadings."22

Although private respondents designated the pleading filed before the Shari’a District Court as a "Complaint" for judicial partition of
properties, it is a petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the decedent. It
contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required for the settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim,23 such as the fact of Alejandro
Montañer, Sr.’s death as well as the allegation that he is a Muslim. The said petition also contains an enumeration of the names of
his legal heirs, so far as known to the private respondents, and a probable list of the properties left by the decedent, which are the
very properties sought to be settled before a probate court. Furthermore, the reliefs prayed for reveal that it is the intention of the
private respondents to seek judicial settlement of the estate of the decedent. 24 These include the following: (1) the prayer for the
partition of the estate of the decedent; and (2) the prayer for the appointment of an administrator of the said estate.

We cannot agree with the contention of the petitioners that the district court does not have jurisdiction over the case because of
an allegation in their answer with a motion to dismiss that Montañer, Sr. is not a Muslim. Jurisdiction of a court over the nature of
the action and its subject matter does not depend upon the defenses set forth in an answer25 or a motion to dismiss.26 Otherwise,
jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the defendant27 or result in having "a case either thrown out of court or its
proceedings unduly delayed by simple stratagem.28 Indeed, the "defense of lack of jurisdiction which is dependent on a question of
fact does not render the court to lose or be deprived of its jurisdiction."29

The same rationale applies to an answer with a motion to dismiss.30 In the case at bar, the Shari’a District Court is not deprived of
jurisdiction simply because petitioners raised as a defense the allegation that the deceased is not a Muslim. The Shari’a District
Court has the authority to hear and receive evidence to determine whether it has jurisdiction, which requires an a
priori determination that the deceased is a Muslim. If after hearing, the Shari’a District Court determines that the deceased was not
in fact a Muslim, the district court should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Special Proceedings

The underlying assumption in petitioners’ second argument, that the proceeding before the Shari’a District Court is an ordinary civil
action against a deceased person, rests on an erroneous understanding of the proceeding before the court a quo. Part of the
confusion may be attributed to the proceeding before the Shari’a District Court, where the parties were designated either as
plaintiffs or defendants and the case was denominated as a special civil action. We reiterate that the proceedings before the
court a quo are for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the deceased, which is a
special proceeding. Section 3(c) of the Rules of Court (Rules) defines a special proceeding as "a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." This Court has applied the Rules, particularly the rules on special proceedings, for
the settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim.31 In a petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and
distribution of estate, the applicants seek to establish the fact of death of the decedent and later to be duly recognized as among
the decedent’s heirs, which would allow them to exercise their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of
the decedent.32 Here, the respondents seek to establish the fact of Alejandro Montañer, Sr.’s death and, subsequently, for private
respondent Almahleen Liling S. Montañer to be recognized as among his heirs, if such is the case in fact.

Petitioners’ argument, that the prohibition against a decedent or his estate from being a party defendant in a civil action33 applies
to a special proceeding such as the settlement of the estate of the deceased, is misplaced. Unlike a civil action which has definite
adverse parties, a special proceeding has no definite adverse party. The definitions of a civil action and a special proceeding,
respectively, in the Rules illustrate this difference. A civil action, in which "a party sues another for the enforcement or protection
of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong" 34 necessarily has definite adverse parties, who are either the plaintiff or
defendant.35 On the other hand, a special proceeding, "by which a party seeks to establish a status, right, or a particular
fact,"36 has one definite party, who petitions or applies for a declaration of a status, right, or particular fact, but no definite adverse
party. In the case at bar, it bears emphasis that the estate of the decedent is not being sued for any cause of action. As a special
proceeding, the purpose of the settlement of the estate of the decedent is to determine all the assets of the estate, 37 pay its
liabilities,38 and to distribute the residual to those entitled to the same.39

Docket Fees

Petitioners’ third argument, that jurisdiction was not validly acquired for non-payment of docket fees, is untenable. Petitioners point
to private respondents’ petition in the proceeding before the court a quo, which contains an allegation estimating the decedent’s
estate as the basis for the conclusion that what private respondents paid as docket fees was insufficient. Petitioners’ argument
essentially involves two aspects: (1) whether the clerk of court correctly assessed the docket fees; and (2) whether private
respondents paid the correct assessment of the docket fees.

Filing the appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket fees vest a trial court with jurisdiction over the
subject matter.40 If the party filing the case paid less than the correct amount for the docket fees because that was the amount
assessed by the clerk of court, the responsibility of making a deficiency assessment lies with the same clerk of court. 41 In such a
case, the lower court concerned will not automatically lose jurisdiction, because of a party’s reliance on the clerk of court’s
insufficient assessment of the docket fees.42 As "every citizen has the right to assume and trust that a public officer charged by law
with certain duties knows his duties and performs them in accordance with law," the party filing the case cannot be penalized with
the clerk of court’s insufficient assessment.43 However, the party concerned will be required to pay the deficiency.44

In the case at bar, petitioners did not present the clerk of court’s assessment of the docket fees. Moreover, the records do not
include this assessment. There can be no determination of whether private respondents correctly paid the docket fees without the
clerk of court’s assessment.

Exception to Notice of Hearing

Petitioners’ fourth argument, that private respondents’ motion for reconsideration before the Shari’a District Court is defective for
lack of a notice of hearing, must fail as the unique circumstances in the present case constitute an exception to this requirement.
The Rules require every written motion to be set for hearing by the applicant and to address the notice of hearing to all parties
concerned.45 The Rules also provide that "no written motion set for hearing shall be acted upon by the court without proof of
service thereof."46 However, the Rules allow a liberal construction of its provisions "in order to promote [the] objective of securing
a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding."47 Moreover, this Court has upheld a liberal construction
specifically of the rules of notice of hearing in cases where "a rigid application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of
justice especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final and executory judgment is not
apparent on its face or from the recitals contained therein."48 In these exceptional cases, the Court considers that "no party can
even claim a vested right in technicalities," and for this reason, cases should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits rather
than on technicalities.49

The case at bar falls under this exception. To deny the Shari’a District Court of an opportunity to determine whether it has
jurisdiction over a petition for the settlement of the estate of a decedent alleged to be a Muslim would also deny its inherent power
as a court to control its process to ensure conformity with the law and justice. To sanction such a situation simply because of a
lapse in fulfilling the notice requirement will result in a miscarriage of justice.
In addition, the present case calls for a liberal construction of the rules on notice of hearing, because the rights of the petitioners
were not affected. This Court has held that an exception to the rules on notice of hearing is where it appears that the rights of the
adverse party were not affected.50 The purpose for the notice of hearing coincides with procedural due process,51 for the court to
determine whether the adverse party agrees or objects to the motion, as the Rules do not fix any period within which to file a reply
or opposition.52 In probate proceedings, "what the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice, but the absolute absence
thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard."53 In the case at bar, as evident from the Shari’a District Court’s order dated January
17, 2006, petitioners’ counsel received a copy of the motion for reconsideration in question. Petitioners were certainly not denied
an opportunity to study the arguments in the said motion as they filed an opposition to the same. Since the Shari’a District Court
reset the hearing for the motion for reconsideration in the same order, petitioners were not denied the opportunity to object to the
said motion in a hearing. Taken together, these circumstances show that the purpose for the rules of notice of hearing, procedural
process, was duly observed.

Prescription and Filiation

Petitioners’ fifth argument is premature. Again, the Shari’a District Court has not yet determined whether it has jurisdiction to settle
the estate of the decedent. In the event that a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a decedent is pending,
questions regarding heirship, including prescription in relation to recognition and filiation, should be raised and settled in the said
proceeding.54 The court, in its capacity as a probate court, has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of the decedent.55 In the
case at bar, the determination of the heirs of the decedent depends on an affirmative answer to the question of whether the
Shari’a District Court has jurisdiction over the estate of the decedent.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The Orders of the Shari’a District Court, dated August 22, 2006 and September 21,
2006 respectively, are AFFIRMED. Cost against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 157912               December 13, 2007

ALAN JOSEPH A. SHEKER, Petitioner,

vs.
ESTATE OF ALICE O. SHEKER, VICTORIA S. MEDINA-Administratrix, Respondent.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the reversal of the Order1 of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City,
Branch 6 (RTC) dated January 15, 2003 and its Omnibus Order dated April 9, 2003.

The undisputed facts are as follows.

The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice O. Sheker and thereafter issued an order for all the creditors to file their
respective claims against the estate. In compliance therewith, petitioner filed on October 7, 2002 a contingent claim for agent's
commission due him amounting to approximately ₱206,250.00 in the event of the sale of certain parcels of land belonging to the
estate, and the amount of ₱275,000.00, as reimbursement for expenses incurred and/or to be incurred by petitioner in the course
of negotiating the sale of said realties.

The executrix of the Estate of Alice O. Sheker (respondent) moved for the dismissal of said money claim against the estate on the
grounds that (1) the requisite docket fee, as prescribed in Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, had not been paid; (2)
petitioner failed to attach a certification against non-forum shopping; and (3) petitioner failed to attach a written explanation why
the money claim was not filed and served personally.

On January 15, 2003, the RTC issued the assailed Order dismissing without prejudice the money claim based on the grounds
advanced by respondent. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied per Omnibus Order dated April 9, 2003.

Petitioner then filed the present petition for review on certiorari, raising the following questions:

(a) must a contingent claim filed in the probate proceeding contain a certification against non-forum shopping, failing
which such claim should be dismissed?

(b) must a contingent claim filed against an estate in a probate proceeding be dismissed for failing to pay the docket fees
at the time of its filing thereat?

(c) must a contingent claim filed in a probate proceeding be dismissed because of its failure to contain a written
explanation on the service and filing by registered mail?2

Petitioner maintains that the RTC erred in strictly applying to a probate proceeding the rules requiring a certification of non-forum
shopping, a written explanation for non-personal filing, and the payment of docket fees upon filing of the claim. He insists that
Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court provides that rules in ordinary actions are applicable to special proceedings only in a
suppletory manner.

The Court gave due course to the petition for review on certiorari although directly filed with this Court, pursuant to Section 2(c),
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.3

The petition is imbued with merit.

However, it must be emphasized that petitioner's contention that rules in ordinary actions are only supplementary to rules in
special proceedings is not entirely correct.

Section 2, Rule 72, Part II of the same Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of Civil Actions. - In the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions
shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings.

Stated differently, special provisions under Part II of the Rules of Court govern special proceedings; but in the absence of special
provisions, the rules provided for in Part I of the Rules governing ordinary civil actions shall be applicable to special proceedings, as
far as practicable.
The word "practicable" is defined as: possible to practice or perform; capable of being put into practice, done or
accomplished.4 This means that in the absence of special provisions, rules in ordinary actions may be applied in special proceedings
as much as possible and where doing so would not pose an obstacle to said proceedings. Nowhere in the Rules of Court does it
categorically say that rules in ordinary actions are inapplicable or merely suppletory to special proceedings. Provisions of the Rules
of Court requiring a certification of non-forum shopping for complaints and initiatory pleadings, a written explanation for non-
personal service and filing, and the payment of filing fees for money claims against an estate would not in any way obstruct
probate proceedings, thus, they are applicable to special proceedings such as the settlement of the estate of a deceased person as
in the present case.

Thus, the principal question in the present case is: did the RTC err in dismissing petitioner's contingent money claim against
respondent estate for failure of petitioner to attach to his motion a certification against non-forum shopping?

The Court rules in the affirmative.

The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints and other initiatory pleadings. The RTC erred in
ruling that a contingent money claim against the estate of a decedent is an initiatory pleading. In the present case, the whole
probate proceeding was initiated upon the filing of the petition for allowance of the decedent's will. Under Sections 1
and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, after granting letters of testamentary or of administration, all persons having money claims
against the decedent are mandated to file or notify the court and the estate administrator of their respective money claims;
otherwise, they would be barred, subject to certain exceptions.5

Such being the case, a money claim against an estate is more akin to a motion for creditors' claims to be recognized and taken into
consideration in the proper disposition of the properties of the estate. In Arquiza v. Court of Appeals,6 the Court explained thus:

x x x The office of a motion is not to initiate new litigation, but to bring a material but incidental matter arising in
the progress of the case in which the motion is filed. A motion is not an independent right or remedy, but is confined to
incidental matters in the progress of a cause. It relates to some question that is collateral to the main object of the
action and is connected with and dependent upon the principal remedy.7 (Emphasis supplied)

A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the settlement of the decedent's estate; more so if the claim is
contingent since the claimant cannot even institute a separate action for a mere contingent claim. Hence, herein petitioner's
contingent money claim, not being an initiatory pleading, does not require a certification against non-forum
shopping.

On the issue of filing fees, the Court ruled in Pascual v. Court of Appeals,8 that the trial court has jurisdiction to act on a money
claim (attorney's fees) against an estate for services rendered by a lawyer to the administratrix to assist her in fulfilling her duties
to the estate even without payment of separate docket fees because the filing fees shall constitute a lien on the judgment pursuant
to Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, or the trial court may order the payment of such filing fees within a reasonable
time.9 After all, the trial court had already assumed jurisdiction over the action for settlement of the estate. Clearly, therefore, non-
payment of filing fees for a money claim against the estate is not one of the grounds for dismissing a money claim against the
estate.

With regard to the requirement of a written explanation, Maceda v. De Guzman Vda. de Macatangay10 is squarely in point. Therein,
the Court held thus:

In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort, this Court, passing upon Section 11 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, held that a
court has the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if said rule is not complied with.

Personal service and filing are preferred for obvious reasons. Plainly, such should expedite action or resolution on a pleading,
motion or other paper; and conversely, minimize, if not eliminate, delays likely to be incurred if service or filing is done by mail,
considering the inefficiency of the postal service. Likewise, personal service will do away with the practice of some lawyers who,
wanting to appear clever, resort to the following less than ethical practices: (1) serving or filing pleadings by mail to catch
opposing counsel off-guard, thus leaving the latter with little or no time to prepare, for instance, responsive pleadings or an
opposition; or (2) upon receiving notice from the post office that the registered mail containing the pleading of or other paper from
the adverse party may be claimed, unduly procrastinating before claiming the parcel, or, worse, not claiming it at all, thereby
causing undue delay in the disposition of such pleading or other papers.

If only to underscore the mandatory nature of this innovation to our set of adjective rules requiring personal service whenever
practicable, Section 11 of Rule 13 then gives the court the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if the other modes
of service or filing were not resorted to and no written explanation was made as to why personal service was not done in the first
place. The exercise of discretion must, necessarily consider the practicability of personal service, for Section 11 itself begins with
the clause "whenever practicable".

We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, personal service and
filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes of service and filing, the exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or
filing is practicable, in the light of the circumstances of time, place and person, personal service or filing is mandatory.  Only when
personal service or filing is not practicable may resort to other modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a written
explanation as to why personal service or filing was not practicable to begin with. In adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a
court shall likewise consider the importance of the subject matter of the case or the issues involved therein, and the prima facie
merit of the pleading sought to be expunged for violation of Section 11. (Emphasis and italics supplied)

In Musa v. Amor, this Court, on noting the impracticality of personal service, exercised its discretion and liberally applied Section 11
of Rule 13:

"As [Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court] requires, service and filing of pleadings must be done personally whenever
practicable. The court notes that in the present case, personal service would not be practicable. Considering the distance between
the Court of Appeals and Donsol, Sorsogon  where the petition was posted, clearly, service by registered mail [sic] would have
entailed considerable time, effort and expense. A written explanation why service was not done personally might have been
superfluous. In any case, as the rule is so worded with the use of "may", signifying permissiveness, a violation
thereof gives the court discretion whether or not to consider the paper as not filed. While it is true that procedural
rules are necessary to secure an orderly and speedy administration of justice, rigid application of Section 11, Rule 13
may be relaxed in this case in the interest of substantial justice. (Emphasis and italics supplied)1âwphi1

In the case at bar, the address of respondent’s counsel is Lopez, Quezon, while petitioner Sonia’s counsel’s is Lucena City. Lopez,
Quezon is 83 kilometers away from Lucena City. Such distance makes personal service impracticable. As in Musa v. Amor, a written
explanation why service was not done personally "might have been superfluous."

As this Court held in Tan v. Court of Appeals, liberal construction of a rule of procedure has been allowed where, among other
cases, "the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the
procedure prescribed."11 (Emphasis supplied)

In the present case, petitioner holds office in Salcedo Village, Makati City, while counsel for respondent and the RTC which
rendered the assailed orders are both in Iligan City. The lower court should have taken judicial notice of the great distance
between said cities and realized that it is indeed not practicable to serve and file the money claim personally. Thus,
following Medina v. Court of Appeals,12 the failure of petitioner to submit a written explanation why service has not been done
personally, may be considered as superfluous and the RTC should have exercised its discretion under Section 11, Rule 13, not to
dismiss the money claim of petitioner, in the interest of substantial justice.

The ruling spirit of the probate law is the speedy settlement of estates of deceased persons for the benefit of creditors and those
entitled to residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and expenses of administration have been paid.13 The ultimate
purpose for the rule on money claims was further explained in Union Bank of the Phil. v. Santibañez,14 thus:

The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate court is mandatory. As we held in the vintage case of Py
Eng Chong v. Herrera:

x x x This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the executor or
administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one
which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the
early delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. The law strictly requires the prompt presentation and
disposition of the claims against the decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as
possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue.15 (Emphasis supplied)

The RTC should have relaxed and liberally construed the procedural rule on the requirement of a written explanation for non-
personal service, again in the interest of substantial justice.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6 dated January 15, 2003
and April 9, 2003, respectively, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6, is
hereby DIRECTED to give due course and take appropriate action on petitioner's money claim in accordance with Rule 82 of the
Rules of Court.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 164108               May 8, 2009

ALFREDO HILADO, LOPEZ SUGAR CORPORATION, FIRST FARMERS HOLDING CORPORATION, Petitioners,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE AMOR A. REYES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 21 and ADMINISTRATRIX JULITA CAMPOS BENEDICTO, Respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15 May 2000. He was survived by his wife, private
respondent Julita Campos Benedicto (administratrix Benedicto), and his only daughter, Francisca Benedicto-Paulino. 1 At the time of
his death, there were two pending civil cases against Benedicto involving the petitioners. The first, Civil Case No. 95-9137, was
then pending with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioner Alfredo Hilado as one of the plaintiffs
therein. The second, Civil Case No. 11178, was then pending with the RTC of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioners Lopez Sugar
Corporation and First Farmers Holding Corporation as one of the plaintiffs therein.2

On 25 May 2000, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court. The petition was raffled to Branch 21,
presided by respondent Judge Amor A. Reyes. Said petition acknowledged the value of the assets of the decedent to be ₱5 Million,
"net of liabilities."3 On 2 August 2000, the Manila RTC issued an order appointing private respondent as administrator of the estate
of her deceased husband, and issuing letters of administration in her favor. 4 In January 2001, private respondent submitted an
Inventory of the Estate, Lists of Personal and Real Properties, and Liabilities of the Estate of her deceased husband.5 In the List of
Liabilities attached to the inventory, private respondent included as among the liabilities, the above-mentioned two pending claims
then being litigated before the Bacolod City courts.6 Private respondent stated that the amounts of liability corresponding to the
two cases as ₱136,045,772.50 for Civil Case No. 95-9137 and ₱35,198,697.40 for Civil Case No. 11178.7 Thereafter, the Manila
RTC required private respondent to submit a complete and updated inventory and appraisal report pertaining to the estate.8

On 24 September 2001, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela,9 praying that they be
furnished with copies of all processes and orders pertaining to the intestate proceedings. Private respondent opposed the
manifestation/motion, disputing the personality of petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings of her husband. Even before
the Manila RTC acted on the manifestation/motion, petitioners filed an omnibus motion praying that the Manila RTC set a deadline
for the submission by private respondent of the required inventory of the decedent’s estate. 10 Petitioners also filed other pleadings
or motions with the Manila RTC, alleging lapses on the part of private respondent in her administration of the estate, and assailing
the inventory that had been submitted thus far as unverified, incomplete and inaccurate.

On 2 January 2002, the Manila RTC issued an order denying the manifestation/motion, on the ground that petitioners are not
interested parties within the contemplation of the Rules of Court to intervene in the intestate proceedings. 11 After the Manila RTC
had denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, a petition for certiorari was filed with the Court of Appeals. The petition argued
in general that petitioners had the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the latter being the
defendant in the civil cases they lodged with the Bacolod RTC.

On 27 February 2004, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision12 dismissing the petition and declaring that the Manila RTC did
not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings. The allowance or disallowance of a
motion to intervene, according to the appellate court, is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. The Court of Appeals cited
the fact that the claims of petitioners against the decedent were in fact contingent or expectant, as these were still pending
litigation in separate proceedings before other courts.

Hence, the present petition. In essence, petitioners argue that the lower courts erred in denying them the right to intervene in the
intestate proceedings of the estate of Roberto Benedicto. Interestingly, the rules of procedure they cite in support of their
argument is not the rule on intervention, but rather various other provisions of the Rules on Special Proceedings.13

To recall, petitioners had sought three specific reliefs that were denied by the courts a quo. First, they prayed that they be
henceforth furnished "copies of all processes and orders issued" by the intestate court as well as the pleadings filed by
administratrix Benedicto with the said court.14 Second, they prayed that the intestate court set a deadline for the submission by
administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified and complete inventory of the estate, and upon submission thereof, order the
inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to assist in the appraisal of the fair market value of the same. 15 Third,
petitioners moved that the intestate court set a deadline for the submission by the administrator of her verified annual account,
and, upon submission thereof, set the date for her examination under oath with respect thereto, with due notice to them and other
parties interested in the collation, preservation and disposition of the estate.16

The Court of Appeals chose to view the matter from a perspective solely informed by the rule on intervention. We can readily
agree with the Court of Appeals on that point. Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an intervenor
"has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so
situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court x x x" While the
language of Section 1, Rule 19 does not literally preclude petitioners from intervening in the intestate proceedings, case law has
consistently held that the legal interest required of an intervenor "must be actual and material, direct and immediate, and not
simply contingent and expectant."17

Nonetheless, it is not immediately evident that intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure necessarily comes into operation in
special proceedings. The settlement of estates of deceased persons fall within the rules of special proceedings under the Rules of
Court,18 not the Rules on Civil Procedure. Section 2, Rule 72 further provides that "[i]n the absence of special provisions, the rules
provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable to special proceedings."

We can readily conclude that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set forth under Rule 19 does not extend to
creditors of a decedent whose credit is based on a contingent claim. The definition of "intervention" under Rule 19 simply does not
accommodate contingent claims.

Yet, even as petitioners now contend before us that they have the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of Roberto
Benedicto, the reliefs they had sought then before the RTC, and also now before us, do not square with their recognition as
intervenors. In short, even if it were declared that petitioners have no right to intervene in accordance with Rule 19, it would not
necessarily mean the disallowance of the reliefs they had sought before the RTC since the right to intervene is not one of those
reliefs.

To better put across what the ultimate disposition of this petition should be, let us now turn our focus to the Rules on Special
Proceedings.

In several instances, the Rules on Special Proceedings entitle "any interested persons" or "any persons interested in the estate" to
participate in varying capacities in the testate or intestate proceedings. Petitioners cite these provisions before us, namely: (1)
Section 1, Rule 79, which recognizes the right of "any person interested" to oppose the issuance of letters testamentary and to file
a petition for administration;" (2) Section 3, Rule 79, which mandates the giving of notice of hearing on the petition for letters of
administration to the known heirs, creditors, and "to any other persons believed to have interest in the estate;" (3) Section 1, Rule
76, which allows a "person interested in the estate" to petition for the allowance of a will; (4) Section 6 of Rule 87, which allows an
individual interested in the estate of the deceased "to complain to the court of the concealment, embezzlement, or conveyance of
any asset of the decedent, or of evidence of the decedent’s title or interest therein;" (5) Section 10 of Rule 85, which requires
notice of the time and place of the examination and allowance of the Administrator’s account "to persons interested;" (6) Section
7(b) of Rule 89, which requires the court to give notice "to the persons interested" before it may hear and grant a petition seeking
the disposition or encumbrance of the properties of the estate; and (7) Section 1, Rule 90, which allows "any person interested in
the estate" to petition for an order for the distribution of the residue of the estate of the decedent, after all obligations are either
satisfied or provided for.

Had the claims of petitioners against Benedicto been based on contract, whether express or implied, then they should have filed
their claim, even if contingent, under the aegis of the notice to creditors to be issued by the court immediately after granting
letters of administration and published by the administrator immediately after the issuance of such notice. 19 However, it appears
that the claims against Benedicto were based on tort, as they arose from his actions in connection with Philsucom, Nasutra and
Traders Royal Bank. Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict do not fall within the class of claims to be filed under the notice to creditors
required under Rule 86.20 These actions, being as they are civil, survive the death of the decedent and may be commenced against
the administrator pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87. Indeed, the records indicate that the intestate estate of Benedicto, as
represented by its administrator, was successfully impleaded in Civil Case No. 11178, whereas the other civil case 21 was already
pending review before this Court at the time of Benedicto’s death.

Evidently, the merits of petitioners’ claims against Benedicto are to be settled in the civil cases where they were raised, and not in
the intestate proceedings. In the event the claims for damages of petitioners are granted, they would have the right to enforce the
judgment against the estate. Yet until such time, to what extent may they be allowed to participate in the intestate proceedings?

Petitioners place heavy reliance on our ruling in Dinglasan v. Ang Chia,22 and it does provide us with guidance on how to proceed.
A brief narration of the facts therein is in order. Dinglasan had filed an action for reconveyance and damages against respondents,
and during a hearing of the case, learned that the same trial court was hearing the intestate proceedings of Lee Liong to whom
Dinglasan had sold the property years earlier. Dinglasan thus amended his complaint to implead Ang Chia, administrator of the
estate of her late husband. He likewise filed a verified claim-in-intervention, manifesting the pendency of the civil case, praying
that a co-administrator be appointed, the bond of the administrator be increased, and that the intestate proceedings not be closed
until the civil case had been terminated. When the trial court ordered the increase of the bond and took cognizance of the pending
civil case, the administrator moved to close the intestate proceedings, on the ground that the heirs had already entered into an
extrajudicial partition of the estate. The trial court refused to close the intestate proceedings pending the termination of the civil
case, and the Court affirmed such action.

If the appellants filed a claim in intervention in the intestate proceedings it was only pursuant to their desire to protect their
interests it appearing that the property in litigation is involved in said proceedings and in fact is the only property of the estate left
subject of administration and distribution; and the court is justified in taking cognizance of said civil case because of the
unavoidable fact that whatever is determined in said civil case will necessarily reflect and have a far reaching consequence in the
determination and distribution of the estate. In so taking cognizance of civil case No. V-331 the court does not assume general
jurisdiction over the case but merely makes of record its existence because of the close interrelation of the two cases and cannot
therefore be branded as having acted in excess of its jurisdiction.
Appellants' claim that the lower court erred in holding in abeyance the closing of the intestate proceedings pending determination
of the separate civil action for the reason that there is no rule or authority justifying the extension of administration proceedings
until after the separate action pertaining to its general jurisdiction has been terminated, cannot be entertained. Section 1, Rule 88,
of the Rules of Court, expressly provides that "action to recover real or personal property from the estate or to enforce a lien
thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against the
executor or administrator." What practical value would this provision have if the action against the administrator cannot be
prosecuted to its termination simply because the heirs desire to close the intestate proceedings without first taking any step to
settle the ordinary civil case? This rule is but a corollary to the ruling which declares that questions concerning ownership of
property alleged to be part of the estate but claimed by another person should be determined in a separate action and should be
submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction. These rules would be rendered nugatory if we are to hold that an
intestate proceedings can be closed by any time at the whim and caprice of the heirs x x x 23 (Emphasis supplied) [Citations
omitted]

It is not clear whether the claim-in-intervention filed by Dinglasan conformed to an action-in-intervention under the Rules of Civil
Procedure, but we can partake of the spirit behind such pronouncement. Indeed, a few years later, the Court, citing Dinglasan,
stated: "[t]he rulings of this court have always been to the effect that in the special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
a deceased person, persons not heirs, intervening therein to protect their interests are allowed to do so to protect the same, but
not for a decision on their action."24

Petitioners’ interests in the estate of Benedicto may be inchoate interests, but they are viable interests nonetheless. We are mindful
that the Rules of Special Proceedings allows not just creditors, but also "any person interested" or "persons interested in the
estate" various specified capacities to protect their respective interests in the estate. Anybody with a contingent claim based on a
pending action for quasi-delict against a decedent may be reasonably concerned that by the time judgment is rendered in their
favor, the estate of the decedent would have already been distributed, or diminished to the extent that the judgment could no
longer be enforced against it.

In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do not provide a creditor or any person interested in the estate, the
right to participate in every aspect of the testate or intestate proceedings, but instead provides for specific instances when such
persons may accordingly act in those proceedings, we deem that while there is no general right to intervene on the part of the
petitioners, they may be allowed to seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court not explicitly provided for under the
Rules, if the prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect their interest in the estate, and there is no other modality under the
Rules by which such interests can be protected. It is under this standard that we assess the three prayers sought by petitioners.

The first is that petitioners be furnished with copies of all processes and orders issued in connection with the intestate proceedings,
as well as the pleadings filed by the administrator of the estate. There is no questioning as to the utility of such relief for the
petitioners. They would be duly alerted of the developments in the intestate proceedings, including the status of the assets of the
estate. Such a running account would allow them to pursue the appropriate remedies should their interests be compromised, such
as the right, under Section 6, Rule 87, to complain to the intestate court if property of the estate concealed, embezzled, or
fraudulently conveyed.

At the same time, the fact that petitioners’ interests remain inchoate and contingent counterbalances their ability to participate in
the intestate proceedings. We are mindful of respondent’s submission that if the Court were to entitle petitioners with service of all
processes and pleadings of the intestate court, then anybody claiming to be a creditor, whether contingent or otherwise, would
have the right to be furnished such pleadings, no matter how wanting of merit the claim may be. Indeed, to impose a precedent
that would mandate the service of all court processes and pleadings to anybody posing a claim to the estate, much less contingent
claims, would unduly complicate and burden the intestate proceedings, and would ultimately offend the guiding principle of speedy
and orderly disposition of cases.

Fortunately, there is a median that not only exists, but also has been recognized by this Court, with respect to the petitioners
herein, that addresses the core concern of petitioners to be apprised of developments in the intestate proceedings. In Hilado v.
Judge Reyes,25 the Court heard a petition for mandamus filed by the same petitioners herein against the RTC judge, praying that
they be allowed access to the records of the intestate proceedings, which the respondent judge had denied from them. Section 2
of Rule 135 came to fore, the provision stating that "the records of every court of justice shall be public records and shall be
available for the inspection of any interested person x x x." The Court ruled that petitioners were "interested persons" entitled to
access the court records in the intestate proceedings. We said:

Petitioners' stated main purpose for accessing the records to—monitor prompt compliance with the Rules governing the
preservation and proper disposition of the assets of the estate, e.g., the completion and appraisal of the Inventory and the
submission by the Administratrix of an annual accounting —appears legitimate, for, as the plaintiffs in the complaints for sum of
money against Roberto Benedicto, et al., they have an interest over the outcome of the settlement of his estate. They are in fact
"interested persons" under Rule 135, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court x x x26

Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the records of the intestate proceedings is an eminently preferable precedent
than mandating the service of court processes and pleadings upon them. In either case, the interest of the creditor in seeing to it
that the assets are being preserved and disposed of in accordance with the rules will be duly satisfied. Acknowledging their right to
access the records, rather than entitling them to the service of every court order or pleading no matter how relevant to their
individual claim, will be less cumbersome on the intestate court, the administrator and the heirs of the decedent, while providing a
viable means by which the interests of the creditors in the estate are preserved.1awphi1
Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special Proceedings do require notice to any or all "interested parties" the
petitioners as "interested parties" will be entitled to such notice. The instances when notice has to be given to interested parties
are provided in: (1) Sec. 10, Rule 85 in reference to the time and place of examining and allowing the account of the executor or
administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b) of Rule 89 concerning the petition to authorize the executor or administrator to sell personal estate, or
to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber real estates; and; (3) Sec. 1, Rule 90 regarding the hearing for the application for an
order for distribution of the estate residue. After all, even the administratrix has acknowledged in her submitted inventory, the
existence of the pending cases filed by the petitioners.

We now turn to the remaining reliefs sought by petitioners; that a deadline be set for the submission by administratrix Benedicto to
submit a verified and complete inventory of the estate, and upon submission thereof: the inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue be required to assist in the appraisal of the fair market value of the same; and that the intestate court set a
deadline for the submission by the administratrix of her verified annual account, and, upon submission thereof, set the date for her
examination under oath with respect thereto, with due notice to them and other parties interested in the collation, preservation
and disposition of the estate. We cannot grant said reliefs.

Section 1 of Rule 83 requires the administrator to return to the court a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal
estate of the deceased within three (3) months from appointment, while Section 8 of Rule 85 requires the administrator to render
an account of his administration within one (1) year from receipt of the letters testamentary or of administration. We do not doubt
that there are reliefs available to compel an administrator to perform either duty, but a person whose claim against the estate is
still contingent is not the party entitled to do so. Still, even if the administrator did delay in the performance of these duties in the
context of dissipating the assets of the estate, there are protections enforced and available under Rule 88 to protect the interests
of those with contingent claims against the estate.

Concerning complaints against the general competence of the administrator, the proper remedy is to seek the removal of the
administrator in accordance with Section 2, Rule 82. While the provision is silent as to who may seek with the court the removal of
the administrator, we do not doubt that a creditor, even a contingent one, would have the personality to seek such relief. After all,
the interest of the creditor in the estate relates to the preservation of sufficient assets to answer for the debt, and the general
competence or good faith of the administrator is necessary to fulfill such purpose.

All told, the ultimate disposition of the RTC and the Court of Appeals is correct. Nonetheless, as we have explained, petitioners
should not be deprived of their prerogatives under the Rules on Special Proceedings as enunciated in this decision.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, subject to the qualification that petitioners, as persons interested in the intestate estate of
Roberto Benedicto, are entitled to such notices and rights as provided for such interested persons in the Rules on Settlement of
Estates of Deceased Persons under the Rules on Special Proceedings. No pronouncements as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976

VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, and HONORABLE SEVERO A. MALVAR, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Laguna,
Branch Vl, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, * PRECIOSA B. GARCIA and AGUSTINA B. GARCIA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-42670 November 29, 1976

VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE ERNANI C. PAÑO, Presiding Judge of Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII, and
PRECIOSA B. GARCIA, respondents.

MARTIN, J.:

These two interrelated cases bring to Us the question of what the word "resides" in Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules Of
Court, referring to the situs of the settlement of the estate of deceased persons, means. Additionally, the rule in the appointment
of a special administrator is sought to be reviewed.

On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court of First Instance of Laguna, at Calamba, presided over by Judge Severo A.
Malvar, a petition for letters of administration, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 27-C, alleging, inter alia, "that on April 26, 1973, Amado
G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in
Calamba, Laguna, and in other places, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court." At the same time, she moved
ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the estate. On even date, May 2, 1973, Judge Malvar granted the
motion.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on May 8, 1973, contending that the order appointing Virginia G. Fule
as special administratrix was issued without jurisdiction, since no notice of the petition for letters of administration has been served
upon all persons interested in the estate; there has been no delay or cause for delay in the proceedings for the appointment of a
regular administrator as the surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia, she should be preferred in the appointment of a special
administratrix; and, Virginia G. Fule is a debtor of the estate of Amado G. Garcia. Preciosa B. Garcia, therefore, prayed that she be
appointed special administratrix of the estate, in lieu of Virginia G. Fule, and as regular administratrix after due hearing.

While this reconsideration motion was pending resolution before the Court, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on May 29, 1973 a motion to
remove Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix alleging, besides the jurisdictional ground raised in the motion for reconsideration
of May 8, 1973 that her appointment was obtained through erroneous, misleading and/or incomplete misrepresentations; that
Virginia G. Fule has adverse interest against the estate; and that she has shown herself unsuitable as administratrix and as officer
of the court.

In the meantime, the notice of hearing of the petition for letters of administration filed by Virginia G. Fule with the Court of First
Instance of Calamba, Laguna, was published on May 17, 24, and 31, 1973, in the Bayanihan, a weekly publication of general
circulation in Southern Luzon.

On June 6, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia received a "Supplemental Petition for the Appointment of Regular Administrator ' filed by
Virginia G. Fule. This supplemental petition modified the original petition in four aspects: (1) the allegation that during the lifetime
of the deceased Amado G. Garcia, he was elected as Constitutional Delegate for the First District of Laguna and his last place of
residence was at Calamba, Laguna; (2) the deletion of the names of Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina Garcia as legal heirs of
Amado G. Garcia; (3) the allegation that Carolina Carpio, who was simply listed as heir in the original petition, is the surviving
spouse of Amado G. Garcia and that she has expressly renounced her preferential right to the administration of the estate in favor
of Virginia G. Fule; and (4) that Virginia G. Fule be appointed as the regular administratrix. The admission of this supplemental
petition was opposed by Preciosa B. Garcia for the reason, among others, that it attempts to confer jurisdiction on the Court of
First Instance of Laguna, of which the court was not possessed at the beginning because the original petition was deficient.

On July 19, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed an opposition to the original and supplemental petitions for letters of administration,
raising the issues of jurisdiction, venue, lack of interest of Virginia G. Fule in the estate of Amado G. Garcia, and disqualification of
Virginia G Fule as special administratrix.

An omnibus motion was filed by Virginia G. Fule on August 20, 1973, praying for authority to take possession of properties of the
decedent allegedly in the hands of third persons as well as to secure cash advances from the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative
Marketing Association, Inc. Preciosa B. Garcia opposed the motion, calling attention to the limitation made by Judge Malvar on the
power of the special administratrix, viz., "to making an inventory of the personal and real properties making up the state of the
deceased."
However, by July 2, 1973, Judge Malvar and already issued an order, received by Preciosa B. Garcia only on July 31, 1973, denying
the motion of Preciosa B. Garcia to reconsider the order of May 2, 1973, appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, and
admitting the supplementation petition of May 18,1973.

On August 31, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia moved to dismiss the petition, because (1) jurisdiction over the petition or over the parties
in interest has not been acquired by the court; (2) venue was improperly laid; and (3) Virginia G. Fule is not a party in interest as
she is not entitled to inherit from the deceased Amado G. Garcia.

On September 28, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed a supplemental motion to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix,
reasoning that the said Virginia G. Fule admitted before before the court that she is a full-blooded sister of Pablo G. Alcalde, an
illegitimate son of Andrea Alcalde, with whom the deceased Amado G. Garcia has no relation.

Three motions were filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on November 14, 1973, one, to enjoin the special administratrix from taking
possession of properties in the hands of third persons which have not been determined as belonging to Amado G. Garcia; another,
to remove the special administratrix for acting outside her authority and against the interest of the estate; and still another, filed in
behalf of the minor Agustina B. Garcia, to dismiss the petition for want of cause of action, jurisdiction, and improper venue.

On November 28, 1973, Judge Malvar resolved the pending omnibus motion of Virgina G. Fule and the motion to dismiss filed by
Preciosa B. Garcia. Resolving the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the powers of the special administratrix are those
provided for in Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, 1 subject only to the previous qualification made by the court that the
administration of the properties subject of the marketing agreement with the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing
Association should remain with the latter; and that the special administratrix had already been authorized in a previous order of
August 20, 1973 to take custody and possession of all papers and certificates of title and personal effects of the decedent with the
Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. Ramon Mercado, of the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative
Marketing Association, Inc., was ordered to deliver to Preciosa B. Garcia all certificates of title in her name without any qualifying
words like "married to Amado Garcia" does not appear. Regarding the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the issue of
jurisdiction had already been resolved in the order of July 2, 1973, denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motion to reconsider the
appointment of Virginia G. Fule and admitting the supplemental petition, the failure of Virginia G. Fule to allege in her original
petition for letters of administration in the place of residence of the decedent at the time of his death was cured. Judge Malvar
further held that Preciosa B. Garcia had submitted to the jurisdiction of the court and had waived her objections thereto by praying
to be appointed as special and regular administratrix of the estate.

An omnibus motion was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on December 27, 1973 to clarify or reconsider the foregoing order of Judge
Malvar, in view of previous court order limiting the authority of the special administratrix to the making of an inventory. Preciosa B.
Garcia also asked for the resolution of her motion to dismiss the petitions for lack of cause of action, and also that filed in behalf of
Agustina B. Garcia. Resolution of her motions to substitute and remove the special administratrix was likewise prayed for.

On December 19, 1973, Judge Malvar issued two separate orders, the first, denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motions to substitute and
remove the special administratrix, and the second, holding that the power allowed the special administratrix enables her to conduct
and submit an inventory of the assets of the estate.

On January 7, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia moved for reconsideration of the foregoing orders of November 28, 1973 and December
19, 1973, insofar as they sustained or failed to rule on the issues raised by her: (a) legal standing (cause of action) of Virginia G.
Fule; (b) venue; (c) jurisdiction; (d) appointment, qualification and removal of special administratrix; and (e) delivery to the special
administratrix of checks and papers and effects in the office of the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.

On March 27, 1973, Judge Malvar issued the first questioned order denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motion for reconsideration of
January 7, 1974. On July 19, 1974, Judge Malvar issued the other three questioned orders: one, directing Ramon Mercado, of the
Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., to furnish Virginia G. Fule, as special administratrix, copy of the
statement of accounts and final liquidation of sugar pool, as well as to deliver to her the corresponding amount due the estate;
another, directing Preciosa B. Garcia to deliver to Virginia G. Fule two motor vehicles presumably belonging to the estate; and
another, directing Ramon Mercado to deliver to the court all certificates of title in his possession in the name of Preciosa B. Garcia,
whether qualified with the word "single" or "married to Amado Garcia."

During the hearing of the various incidents of this case (Sp. Proc. 27-C) before Judge Malvar, 2 Virginia G. Fule presented the death
certificate of Amado G. Garcia showing that his residence at the time of his death was Quezon City. On her part, Preciosa B. Garcia
presented the residence certificate of the decedent for 1973 showing that three months before his death his residence was in
Quezon City. Virginia G. Fule also testified that Amado G. Garcia was residing in Calamba, Laguna at the time of his death, and that
he was a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention for the first district of Laguna.

On July 26, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina B. Garcia commenced a special action for certiorari and/or prohibition and
preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 03221-SP. primarily to annul the proceedings before
Judge Malvar in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, or, in the alternative, to vacate the questioned four
orders of that court, viz., one dated March 27, 1974, denying their motion for reconsideration of the order denying their motion to
dismiss the criminal and supplemental petitions on the issue, among others, of jurisdiction, and the three others, all dated July 19,
1974, directing the delivery of certain properties to the special administratrix, Virginia G. Fule, and to the court.
On January 30, 1975, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment annulling the proceedings before Judge Severo A. Malvar in Sp.
Proc. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, for lack of jurisdiction.

Denied of their motion for reconsideration on March 31, 1975, Virginia G. Fule forthwith elevated the matter to Us on appeal by
certiorari. The case was docketed as G.R. No. L-40502.

However, even before Virginia G. Fule could receive the decision of the Court of Appeals, Preciosa B. Garcia had already filed on
February 1, 1975 a petition for letters of administration before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, docketed as
Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, over the same intestate estate of Amado G. Garcia. On February 10, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia urgently
moved for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate. Judge Vicente G. Ericta granted the motion and appointed
Preciosa B. Garcia as special administratrix upon a bond of P30,000.00. Preciosa B. Garcia qualified and assumed the office.

For the first time, on February 14, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia informed Judge Ericta of the pendency of Sp. Proc. No. 27-C before
Judge Malvar of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, and the annulment of the proceedings therein by the Court of Appeals on
January 30, 1975. She manifested, however, her willingness to withdraw Sp. Proc. Q-19738 should the decision of the Court of
Appeals annulling the proceedings before the Court of First Instance of Laguna in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C have not yet become final, it
being the subject of a motion for reconsideration.

On March 10, 1973, Judge Ericta ordered the suspension of the proceedings before his court until Preciosa B. Garcia inform the
court of the final outcome of the case pending before the Court of Appeals. This notwithstanding, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on
December 11, 1975, an "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations."

On December 13, 1975, Virginia G. Fule filed a "Special Appearance to Question Venue and Jurisdiction" reiterating the grounds
stated in the previous special appearance of March 3, 1975, and calling attention that the decision of the Court of Appeals and its
resolution denying the motion for reconsideration had been appealed to this Court; that the parties had already filed their
respective briefs; and that the case is still pending before the Court.

On December 17, 1975, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano, who succeeded Judge Ericta, issued an order granting Preciosa B. Garcia's
"Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" in that the payments were for the benefit of the estate and that there
hangs a cloud of doubt on the validity of the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Laguna.

A compliance of this Order was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on January 12,1976.

On February 4,1974, VIRGINIA G. FULE instituted G.R. No. L-42670, a petition for certiorari with temporary restraining order, to
annul the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738 and to restrain Judge Ernani Cruz Paño from further acting in the case. A
restraining order was issued on February 9, 1976.

We dismiss the appeal in G.R. No. L-40502 and the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. L-42670 for the reasons and considerations
hereinafter stated.

1. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his
death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the
Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country,
the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate
of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it
depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding,
except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record." With particular
regard to letters of administration, Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court demands that the petition therefor should
affirmatively show the existence of jurisdiction to make the appointment sought, and should allege all the necessary facts, such as
death, the name and last residence of the decedent, the existence, and situs if need be, of assets, intestacy, where this is relied
upon, and the right of the person who seeks administration, as next of kin, creditor, or otherwise, to be appointed. The fact of
death of the intestate and his last residence within the country are foundation facts upon which all subsequent proceedings in the
administration of the estate rest, and that if the intestate was not an inhabitant of the state at the time of his death, and left no
assets in the state, no jurisdiction is conferred on the court to grant letters of administration. 3

The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically the clause "so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location of the estate," is in reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates:
"Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes. 4 It could not have been intended to define the jurisdiction over
the subject matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters.
Procedure is one thing; jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. The power or authority of the court over the subject matter
"existed and was fixed before procedure in a given cause began." That power or authority is not altered or changed by procedure,
which simply directs the manner in which the power or authority shall be fully and justly exercised. There are cases though that if
the power is not exercised conformably with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses
the power to exercise it legally. However, this does not amount to a loss of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Rather, it means
that the court may thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or that the judgment may thereby be rendered defective for lack of
something essential to sustain it. The appearance of this provision in the procedural law at once raises a strong presumption that it
has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. In plain words, it is just a matter of method, of
convenience to the parties. 5

The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of
the place of residence of the deceased. Because of the existence of numerous Courts of First Instance in the country, the Rules of
Court, however, purposedly fixes the venue or the place where each case shall be brought. A fortiori, the place of residence of the
deceased in settlement of estates, probate of will, and issuance of letters of administration does not constitute an element of
jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is merely constitutive of venue. And it is upon this reason that the Revised Rules of Court
properly considers the province where the estate of a deceased person shall be settled as "venue." 6

2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term "resides" mean? Does it refer to the actual residence or domicile of the
decedent at the time of his death? We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence"
as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like, the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and
should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. 7 In the application of
venue statutes and rules — Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature — residence rather than domicile is
the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in
the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes
fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." 8 In other words, "resides"
should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual
residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means
merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. 9 Residence simply requires bodily presence as
an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's
domicile. 10 No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary. 11

3. Divergent claims are maintained by Virginia G. Fule and Preciosa B. Garcia on the residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia at
the time of his death. In her original petition for letters of administration before the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna,
Virginia G. Fule measely stated "(t)hat on April 26,1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in
the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court." Preciosa B. Garcia assailed the petition for failure to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement and improper laying of
venue. For her, the quoted statement avers no domicile or residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia. To say that as "property
owner of Calamba, Laguna," he also resides in Calamba, Laguna, is, according to her, non sequitur. On the contrary, Preciosa B.
Garcia claims that, as appearing in his death certificate presented by Virginia G. Fule herself before the Calamba court and in other
papers, the last residence of Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Parenthetically, in her
amended petition, Virginia G. Fule categorically alleged that Amado G. Garcia's "last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna."

On this issue, We rule that the last place of residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel
Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to prove the residence of the decedent at
the time of his death. 12 As it is, the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia, which was presented in evidence by Virginia G. Fule
herself and also by Preciosa B. Garcia, shows that his last place of residence was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon
City. Aside from this, the deceased's residence certificate for 1973 obtained three months before his death; the Marketing
Agreement and Power of Attorney dated November 12, 1971 turning over the administration of his two parcels of sugar land to the
Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.; the Deed of Donation dated January 8, 1973, transferring part of
his interest in certain parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna to Agustina B. Garcia; and certificates of titles covering parcels of land in
Calamba, Laguna, show in bold documents that Amado G. Garcia's last place of residence was at Quezon City. Withal, the
conclusion becomes imperative that the venue for Virginia C. Fule's petition for letters of administration was improperly laid in the
Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna. Nevertheless, the long-settled rule is that objection to improper venue is subject to
waiver. Section 4, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court states: "When improper venue is not objected to in a motion to dismiss, it is
deemed waived." In the case before Us the Court of Appeals had reason to hold that in asking to substitute Virginia G. Fule as
special administratrix, Preciosa B. Garcia did not necessarily waive her objection to the jurisdiction or venue assumed by the Court
of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, but availed of a mere practical resort to alternative remedy to assert her rights as surviving
spouse, while insisting on the enforcement of the Rule fixing the proper venue of the proceedings at the last residence of the
decedent.

4. Preciosa B. Garcia's challenge to Virginia G. Fule's appointment as special administratrix is another issue of perplexity. Preciosa
B. Garcia claims preference to the appointment as surviving spouse. Section 1 of Rule 80 provides that "(w)hen there is delay in
granting letters testamentary or of administration by any cause including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will,
the court may appoint a special administrator to take possession and charge of the estate of the deceased until the questions
causing the delay are decided and executors or administrators appointed. 13 Formerly, the appointment of a special administrator
was only proper when the allowance or disallowance of a will is under appeal. The new Rules, however, broadened the basis for
appointment and such appointment is now allowed when there is delay in granting letters testamentary or administration by any
cause e.g., parties cannot agree among themselves. 14 Nevertheless, the discretion to appoint a special administrator or not lies in
the probate court. 15 That, however, is no authority for the judge to become partial, or to make his personal likes and dislikes
prevail over, or his passions to rule, his judgment. Exercise of that discretion must be based on reason, equity, justice and legal
principle. There is no reason why the same fundamental and legal principles governing the choice of a regular administrator should
not be taken into account in the appointment of a special administrator. 16 Nothing is wrong for the judge to consider the order of
preference in the appointment of a regular administrator in appointing a special administrator. After all, the consideration that
overrides all others in this respect is the beneficial interest of the appointee in the estate of the decedent. 17 Under the law, the
widow would have the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, besides her share in the
conjugal partnership. For such reason, she would have as such, if not more, interest in administering the entire estate correctly
than any other next of kin. The good or bad administration of a property may affect rather the fruits than the naked ownership of a
property. 18

Virginia G. Fule, however, disputes the status of Preciosa B. Garcia as the widow of the late Amado G. Garcia. With equal force,
Preciosa B. Garcia maintains that Virginia G. Fule has no relation whatsoever with Amado G. Garcia, or that, she is a mere
illegitimate sister of the latter, incapable of any successional rights. 19 On this point, We rule that Preciosa B. Garcia is prima
facie entitled to the appointment of special administratrix. It needs be emphasized that in the issuance of such appointment, which
is but temporary and subsists only until a regular administrator is appointed, 20 the appointing court does not determine who are
entitled to share in the estate of the decedent but who is entitled to the administration. The issue of heirship is one to be
determined in the decree of distribution, and the findings of the court on the relationship of the parties in the administration as to
be the basis of distribution. 21 The preference of Preciosa B. Garcia is with sufficient reason. In a Donation Inter Vivos executed by
the deceased Amado G. Garcia on January 8, 1973 in favor of Agustina B. Garcia, he indicated therein that he is married to
Preciosa B. Garcia. 22 In his certificate of candidacy for the office of Delegate to the Constitutional Convention for the First District
of Laguna filed on September 1, 1970, he wrote therein the name of Preciosa B. Banaticla as his spouse. 23 Faced with these
documents and the presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage, Preciosa B. Garcia can be reasonably believed to be the surviving spouse of the late Amado G.
Garcia. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. 24

5. Under these circumstances and the doctrine laid down in Cuenco vs. Court of Appeals, 25 this Court under its supervisory
authority over all inferior courts may properly decree that venue in the instant case was properly assumed by and transferred to
Quezon City and that it is in the interest of justice and avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City court's exercise of
jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of the deceased Amado G. Garcia and the appointment of special administratrix over
the latter's estate be approved and authorized and the Court of First Instance of Laguna be disauthorized from continuing with the
case and instead be required to transfer all the records thereof to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City for the continuation of
the proceedings.

6. Accordingly, the Order of Judge Ernani Cruz Pano of December 17, 1975, granting the "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay
Estate Obligations" filed by Preciosa B. Garcia in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, subject matter of G.R. No. L-42670, and ordering the
Canlubang Sugar Estate to deliver to her as special administratrix the sum of P48,874.70 for payment of the sum of estate
obligations is hereby upheld.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions of petitioner Virginia Garcia Fule in G.R. No. L-40502 and in G.R. No. L42670 are
hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-3039          December 29, 1949

VICTORIA REYNOSO and JUAN REYNOSO, petitioners,

vs.
VICENTE SANTIAGO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, PIA REYNOSO, AGUSTINA REYNOSO, MELITON
PALABRICA, LEONCIO CADIZ, ET AL., respondents.

TUASON, J.:

Victorio Reynoso and Juan Reynoso apply for a writ of mandamus to compel Judge Vicente Santiago of the Court of the First
Instance of Quezon to order the opening of a testate estate of the deceased Salvadora Obispo in the place of special intestate
proceeding No. 2914, and to appoint Victorio Reynoso as executor of the decedent's last will and testament.

Briefly, the facts are as follows: On April 29, 1947, Leoncio Cadiz and other heirs of Salvadora Obispo presented an application in
the Court of the First Instance of Quezon for the administration of the property of the deceased, application which was docketed as
intestate proceeding No. 2914. Victorio Reynoso and Juan Reynoso, Salvadora Obispo's surviving spouse and eldest son
respectively, opposed the application and filed a document, which purported to be the last will and testament of Salvadora Obispo,
with a counter petition for its probate. Upon trial the court rejected that instrument as a forgery, but on the appeal the Court of
Appeals reversed the finding of the court below, found the will authentic and drawn with all the formalities of Law. The dispository
part of the decision of the Appellate Court, promulgated November 27, 1948, read as follows:

Se revoca la sentencia de que se apela, y reuniendo el exhibito A los requisitos exigidos por la ley, se ordena, (a) la
legalizacion de dich documento como testamento y ultima voluntad de la finada Salvadora Obispo, para que surta todos
sus efectos legales; (b) la apertura de la testamentaria de dicha finada; y (c) el nombramiento de un albacea de la misma
testamentaria de conformidad con el precepto del articulo 6, de la Regla 70 de los Reglamentos de los Tribunales.

Thereafter Victorio Reynoso And Juan Reynoso filed two petitions, one in special proceeding No. 2914 and another under a
separate and new docket number (3107) and with a different title (Testate Estate of the deceased Salvadora Obispo ). The first
prayed that the special administrator, Meliton Palabrica, who had theretofore been appointed in special proceeding No. 2914, be
ordered to turn over the properties of the deceased and the proceeds of coprax, nuts and other agricultural products to Victorio
Reynoso, and to render an accounting within a reasonable time, It also asked for the closing of the intestate proceeding. The other
petition prayed that the estate be administered and settled in special proceeding No. 3107 and that Victorio Reynoso be appointed
executor of Salvadora Obispo's last will and testament. It also contained a prayer for an accounting by Palabrica and delivery by
him to the new executor of the properties that came into possession including the proceeds from the sales of coprax, nuts, etc.

The two petitions were decided separately by Judge Santiago on April 20,1949. With respect to the opening of another expediente,
His Honor believed that the proposed change or substitution was " not only unnecessary but inconvenient and expensive." An
intestate proceeding like special proceeding like special proceeding No. 2914, he said, could and should and should be converted
into a testate proceeding in the same original expediente without the necessity of changing its number, name or title.

The petition has no merit. Whether the intestate proceeding already commenced should be discontinued and a new proceeding
under a separate number and title should be constituted is entirely a matter of form and lies within the sound discretion of the
court. In no manner does it prejudice the substantial rights of any heirs or creditors. Amor propio is perhaps the only thing is at
stake on this phase of the controversy.

As to the appointment of the deceased's husband as executor or administrator the court said that action on the petition should be
withheld for the time being, because of the pendency on appeal of a case in which the special administrator in special proceeding
No. 2914 is plaintiff and appellee and Victorio Reynoso defendant and appellant. It involves the question whether an extensive
parcel of coconut land is conjugal property or the exclusive property of the husband.

On this feature of the second petition we disagree with the respondent judge. If one other than the surviving spouse is appointed,
which is possible, the feared conflict will not materialize. If Victorio Reynoso is chosen, a special administrator may be named to
represent the estate in the suit against him. Section 8 of Rule 87 provides that "If the executor or administrator has a claim against
the estate he represents, he shall give notice thereof, in writing, to the court, and the court shall appoint a special administrator
who shall, in the adjustment of such claim, have the same power and be subject to the same liability as the general administrator
or executor in the settlement of the claims." The situation in which Victorio Reynoso is found with reference to the land within the
spirit if not exactly within the letter of this provision.

Subject to this observation, an administrator should be appointed without delay in accordance with the final decision of the Court
of Appeals. The appointment of a special administrator is justified only when there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of
administration occasioned by an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will or some other cause. The Court of Appeals
having decreed the probate of the will and the appointment of an albacea, there is no valid reason for the further retention of a
special administrator. The appointment of a regular administrator is necessary for the prompt settlement and distribution of the
estate. There are important duties devolving on a regular administrator which a special administrator can not perform, and there
are many actions to be taken by the court which could not be accomplished before a regular administrator is appointed.
But whether or not Victorio Reynoso should be appointed as administrator we do not and cannot of course decide in a petition for
mandamus. While the surviving spouse is entitled to preference in the appointment (section 6, Rule 79), circumstances might
warrant his rejection and the appointment of someone else. Mandamus lies where the duty is specific and ministerial. It does not
lie where judgment or discretion is exercised in the performance of the act. Applying the rule to this case, it is proper to command
the court below to appoint a regular administrator, but it is not proper to tell it whom to appoint.

The petition for the constitution of a separate proceeding for the administration of the estate under the will is denied. The petition
for the appointment of a regular administrator is granted subject to the provision of section 6 Rule 79 in the selection of the person
to be appointed. Without costs.
G.R. No. L-55509 April 27, 1984

ETHEL GRIMM ROBERTS, petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE TOMAS R. LEONIDAS, Branch 38, Court of First Instance of Manila; MAXINE TATE-GRIMM, EDWARD MILLER
GRIMM II and LINDA GRIMM, respondents.

AQUINO, J.:

The question in this case is whether a petition for allowance of wills and to annul a partition, approved in an  intestate proceeding
by Branch 20  of the Manila Court of First Instance, can be entertained by its Branch 38  (after a probate in the Utah district court).

Antecedents. — Edward M. Grimm an American resident of Manila, died at 78 in the Makati Medical Center on November 27, 1977.
He was survived by his second wife, Maxine Tate Grimm and their two children, named Edward Miller Grimm II (Pete) and Linda
Grimm and by Juanita Grimm Morris and Ethel Grimm Roberts (McFadden), his two children by a first marriage which ended in
divorce (Sub-Annexes A and B. pp. 36-47, Rollo).

He executed on January 23, 1959 two wills in San Francisco, California. One will disposed of his Philippine estate which he
described as conjugal property of himself and his second wife. The second win disposed of his estate outside the Philippines.

In both wills, the second wife and two children were favored. The two children of the first marriage were given their legitimes in
the will disposing of the estate situated in this country. In the will dealing with his property outside this country, the testator said:

I purposely have made no provision in this will for my daughter, Juanita Grimm Morris, or my daughter, Elsa
Grimm McFadden (Ethel Grimm Roberts), because I have provided for each of them in a separate will disposing
of my Philippine property. (First clause, pp. 43-47, Rollo).

The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate by Maxine Tate Grimm and E. LaVar Tate on March 7, 1978 in Probate No.
3720 of the Third Judicial District Court of Tooele County, Utah. Juanita Grimm Morris of Cupertino, California and Mrs. Roberts of
15 C. Benitez Street, Horseshoe Village, Quezon City were notified of the probate proceeding (Sub-Annex C, pp. 48-55, Rollo).

Maxine admitted that she received notice of the intestate petition  filed in Manila by Ethel in January, 1978 (p. 53, Rollo). In its
order dated April 10, 1978, the Third Judicial District Court admitted to probate  the two wills and the codicil It was issued upon
consideration of the stipulation dated April 4, 1978 "by and between the attorneys for Maxine Tate Grimm, Linda Grimm, Edward
Miller Grimm II, E. LaVar Tate, Juanita Kegley Grimm (first wife), Juanita Grimm Morris and Ethel Grimm Roberts" (Annex C, pp.
48-51, Rollo).

Two weeks later, or on April 25, 1978, Maxine and her two children Linda and Pete, as the first parties, and Ethel, Juanita Grimm
Morris and their mother Juanita Kegley Grimm as the second parties, with knowledge of the intestate proceeding in Manila , entered
into a compromise agreement in Utah regarding the estate. It was signed by David E. Salisbury and Donald B. Holbrook, as lawyers
of the parties, by Pete and Linda and the attorney-in-fact of Maxine and by the attorney-in-fact of Ethel, Juanita Grimm Morris and
Juanita Kegley Grimm.

In that agreement, it was stipulated that Maxine, Pete and Ethel would be designated as personal representatives (administrators)
of Grimm's Philippine estate (par. 2). It was also stipulated that Maxine's one-half conjugal share in the estate should be reserved
for her and that would not be less than $1,500,000 plus the homes in Utah and Santa Mesa, Manila (par. 4). The agreement
indicated the computation of the "net distributable estate". It recognized that the estate was liable to pay the fees of the Angara
law firm.

It was stipulated in paragraph 6 that the decedent's four children "shall share equally in the Net Distributable Estate" and that
Ethel and Juanita Morris should each receive at least 12-1/2% of the total of the net distributable estate and marital share. A
supplemental memorandum also dated April 25, 1978 was executed by the parties (Sub-Annex F, pp. 49-61, Annex, F-1, pp. 75-76,
Testate case).

Intestate proceeding No. 113024.-At this juncture, it should be stated that forty- three days after Grimm's death, or January 9,
1978, his daughter of the first marriage, Ethel, 49, through lawyers Deogracias T. Reyes and. Gerardo B. Macaraeg, filed with
Branch 20 of the Manila Court of First Instance intestate proceeding No. 113024 for the settlement of his estate. She was named
special administratrix.

On March 11, the second wife, Maxine, through the Angara law office, filed an opposition and motion to dismiss the intestate
proceeding on the ground of the pendency of Utah of a proceeding for the probate of Grimm's will. She also moved that she be
appointed special administratrix, She submitted to the court a copy of Grimm's will disposing of his Philippine estate. It is found in
pages 58 to 64 of the record.
The intestate court in its orders of May 23 and June 2 noted that Maxine, through a new lawyer, William C. Limqueco (partner of
Gerardo B. Macaraeg, p. 78, testate case withdrew that opposition and motion to dismiss and, at the behest of Maxine, Ethel and
Pete, appointed them joint administrators. Apparently, this was done pursuant to the aforementioned Utah compromise
agreement. The court ignored the will already found in the record.

The three administrators submitted an inventory. With the authority and approval of the court, they sold for P75,000 on March 21,
1979 the so-called Palawan Pearl Project, a business owned by the deceased. Linda and Juanita allegedly conformed with the sale
(pp. 120-129, Record). It turned out that the buyer, Makiling Management Co., Inc., was incorporated by Ethel and her husband,
Rex Roberts, and by lawyer Limqueco (Annex L, p. 90, testate case).

Also with the court's approval and the consent of Linda and Juanita, they sold for P1,546,136 to Joseph Server and others 193,267
shares of RFM Corporation (p. 135, Record).

Acting on the declaration of heirs and project of partition signed and filed by lawyers Limqueco and Macaraeg (not signed by
Maxine and her two children), Judge Conrado M. Molina in his order of July 27, 1979 adjudicated to Maxine onehalf (4/8) of the
decedent's Philippine estate and one-eighth (1/8) each to his four children or 12-1/2% (pp. 140-142, Record). No mention at all
was made of the will in that order.

Six days later, or on August 2, Maxine and her two children replaced Limqueco with Octavio del Callar as their lawyer  who on
August 9, moved to defer approval of the project of partition. The court considered the motion moot considering that it had already
approved the declaration of heirs and project of partition (p. 149, Record).

Lawyer Limqueco in a letter to Maxine dated August 2, 1979 alleged that he was no longer connected with Makiling Management
Co., Inc. when the Palawan Pearl Project was sold: that it was Maxine's son Pete who negotiated the sale with Rex Roberts and
that he (Limqueco) was going to sue Maxine for the lies she imputed to him (Annex H, p. 78, testate case).

Ethel submitted to the court a certification of the Assistant Commissioner of Internal Revenue dated October 2, 1979. It was stated
therein that Maxine paid P1,992,233.69 as estate tax and penalties and that he interposed no objection to the transfer of the
estate to Grimm's heirs (p. 153, Record). The court noted the certification as in conformity with its order of July 27, 1979.

After November, 1979 or for a period of more than five months, there was no movement or activity in the intestate case. On April
18, 1980 Juanita Grimm Morris, through Ethel's lawyers, filed a motion for accounting "so that the Estate properties can be
partitioned among the heirs and the present intestate estate be closed." Del Callar, Maxine's lawyer was notified of that motion.

Before that motion could be heard, or on June 10, 1980, the Angara law firm filed again its appearance in collaboration with Del
Callar as counsel for Maxine and her two children, Linda and Pete. It should be recalled that the firm had previously appeared in
the case as Maxine's counsel on March 11, 1978, when it filed a motion to dismiss the intestate proceeding and furnished the court
with a copy of Grimm's will. As already noted, the firm was then superseded by lawyer Limqueco.

Petition to annul partition and testate proceeding No. 134559. —  On September 8, 1980, Rogelio A. Vinluan of the Angara law firm
in behalf of Maxine, Pete and Linda, filed in Branch 38 of the lower court a petition praying for the probate of Grimm's two wills
(already probated in Utah), that the 1979 partition approved by the intestate court be set aside and the letters of administration
revoked, that Maxine be appointed executrix and that Ethel and Juanita Morris be ordered to account for the properties received by
them and to return the same to Maxine (pp. 25-35, Rollo).

Grimm's second wife and two children alleged that they were defraud due to the machinations of the Roberts spouses, that the
1978 Utah compromise agreement was illegal, that the intestate proceeding is void because Grimm died testate and that the
partition was contrary to the decedent's wills.

Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition. Judge Leonidas denied it for lack of merit in his order of October 27, 1980. Ethel then
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in this Court, praying that the testate proceeding be dismissed, or. alternatively that
the two proceedings be consolidated and heard in Branch 20 and that the matter of the annulment of the Utah compromise
agreement be heard prior to the petition for probate (pp. 22-23, Rollo).

Ruling. — We hold that respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in
denying Ethel's motion to dismiss.

A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and "no will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed" (Art. 838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court).

The probate of the will is mandatory (Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98 Phil. 249; Baluyot vs. Panio, L-42088, May 7, 1976,
71 SCRA 86). It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore,
the intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should
continue hearing the two cases.
Ethel may file within twenty days from notice of the finality of this judgment an opposition and answer to the petition unless she
considers her motion to dismiss and other pleadings sufficient for the purpose. Juanita G. Morris, who appeared in the intestate
case, should be served with copies of orders, notices and other papers in the testate case.

WHEREFORE the petition is dismissed. The temporary restraining order is dissolved. No costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. L-21938-39 May 29, 1970

VICENTE URIARTE, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL (12th Judicial District) THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
OF MANILA, BRANCH IV, JUAN URIARTE ZAMACONA and HIGINIO URIARTE, respondents.

Norberto J. Quisumbing for petitioner.

Tañada, Teehankee & Carreon for respondents.

DIZON, J.:

On October 3, 1963 petitioner Vicente Uriarte filed an original petition for certiorari  — docketed as G.R. L-21938 — against the
respondents Juan Uriarte Zamacona, Higinio Uriarte, and the Courts of First Instance of Negros Occidental and of Manila, Branch
IV, who will be referred to hereinafter as the Negros Court and the Manila Court, respectively — praying:

... that after due proceedings judgment be rendered annulling the orders of 19 April 1963 (Annex 'H') and 11
July 1963 (Annex 'I') of respondent Negros court dismissing the first instituted Special Proceeding No. 6344,
supra, and the order of 1 July 1963 (Annex 'K') of respondent Manila court denying petitioner's omnibus  motion
to intervene and to dismiss the later-instituted Special Proceeding No. 51396, supra, both special proceedings
pertaining to the settlement of the same estate of the same deceased, and consequently annulling all
proceedings had in Special Proceeding No. 51396; supra, of the respondent Manila court as all taken without
jurisdiction.

For the preservation of the rights of the parties pending these proceedings, petitioner prays for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction enjoining respondents Manila court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona and Higinio Uriarte
from proceeding with Special Proceeding No. 51396, supra, until further orders of this Court.

Reasons in support of said petition are stated therein as follows:

6. Respondent Negros court erred in dismissing its Special Proceeding No. 6344, supra, and failing to declare
itself 'the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of' the deceased Don Juan Uriarte y Goite
as prescribed in Rule 75 section 1 of the Rules of Court. Respondent Manila court erred in failing to dismiss its
Special Proceeding No. 51396, supra, notwithstanding proof of prior filing of Special Proceeding No. 6344, supra,
in the Negros court.

The writ of preliminary injunction prayed for was granted and issued by this Court on October 24, 1963.

On April 22, 1964 petitioner filed against the same respondents a pleading entitled SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION FOR MANDAMUS —
docketed in this Court as G.R. No. L-21939 — praying, for the reasons therein stated, that judgment be rendered annulling the
orders issued by the Negros Court on December 7, 1963 and February 26, 1964, the first disapproving his record on appeal and
the second denying his motion for reconsideration, and further commanding said court to approve his record on appeal and to give
due course to his appeal. On July 15, 1964 We issued a resolution deferring action on this Supplemental Petition until the original
action for certiorari (G.R. L-21938) is taken up on the merits.

On October 21, 1963 the respondents in G.R. L-21938 filed their answer traversing petitioner's contention that the respondent
courts had committed grave abuse of discretion in relation to the matters alleged in the petition for certiorari.

It appears that on November 6, 1961 petitioner filed with the Negros Court a petition for the settlement of the estate of the late
Don Juan Uriarte y Goite (Special Proceeding No. 6344) alleging therein, inter alia, that, as a natural son of the latter, he was his
sole heir, and that, during the lifetime of said decedent, petitioner had instituted Civil Case No. 6142 in the same Court for his
compulsory acknowledgment as such natural son. Upon petitioner's motion the Negros Court appointed the Philippine National
Bank as special administrator on November 13, 1961 and two days later it set the date for the hearing of the petition and ordered
that the requisite notices be published in accordance with law. The record discloses, however, that, for one reason or another, the
Philippine, National Bank never actually qualified as special administrator.

On December 19, 1961, Higinio Uriarte, one of the two private respondents herein, filed an opposition to the above-mentioned
petition alleging that he was a nephew of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite who had "executed a Last Will and Testament in
Spain, a duly authenticated copy whereof has been requested and which shall be submitted to this Honorable Court upon receipt
thereof," and further questioning petitioner's capacity and interest to commence the intestate proceeding.
On August 28, 1962, Juan Uriarte Zamacona, the other private respondent, commenced Special Proceeding No. 51396 in the
Manila Court for the probate of a document alleged to be the last will of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, and on the same date
he filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344 of the Negros Court a motion to dismiss the same on the following grounds: (1) that, as
the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite had left a last will, there was no legal basis to proceed with said intestate proceedings, and (2)
that petitioner Vicente Uriarte had no legal personality and interest to initiate said intestate proceedings, he not being an
acknowledged natural son of the decedent. A copy of the Petition for Probate and of the alleged Will were attached to the Motion
to Dismiss.

Petitioner opposed the aforesaid motion to dismiss contending that, as the Negros Court was first to take cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, it had acquired exclusive jurisdiction over same pursuant to Rule 75,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court.

On April 19, 1963, the Negros Court sustained Juan Uriarte Zamacona's motion to dismiss and dismissed the Special Proceeding
No. 6344 pending before it. His motion for reconsideration of said order having been denied on July 27, 1963, petitioner proceeded
to file his notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal for the purpose of appealing from said orders to this court on
questions of law. The administrator with the will annexed appointed by the Manila Court in Special Proceeding No. 51396 objected
to the approval of the record on appeal, and under date of December 7, 1963 the Negros Court issued the following order:

Oppositor prays that the record on appeal filed by the petitioner on July 27, 1963, be dismissed for having been
filed out of time and for being incomplete. In the meantime, before the said record on appeal was approved by
this Court, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court entitled Vicente Uriarte,
Petitioner, vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, et al., G.R. No. L-21938, bringing this case squarely
before the Supreme Court on questions of law which is tantamount to petitioner's abandoning his appeal from
this Court.

WHEREFORE, in order to give way to the certiorari, the record on appeal filed by the petitioner is hereby
disapproved.

In view of the above-quoted order, petitioner filed the supplemental petition for mandamus mentioned heretofore.

On April 15, 1963 Vicente Uriarte filed an Omnibus Motion in Special Proceeding No. 51396 pending in the Manila Court, asking for
leave to intervene therein; for the dismissal of the petition and the annulment of the proceedings had in said special proceeding.
This motion was denied by said court in its order of July 1 of the same year.

It is admitted that, as alleged in the basic petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344 of the Negros Court, Vicente Uriarte filed in
the same court, during the lifetime of Juan Uriarte y Goite, Civil Case No. 6142 to obtain judgment for his compulsory
acknowledgment as his natural child. Clearly inferrable from this is that at the time he filed the action, as well as when he
commenced the aforesaid special proceeding, he had not yet been acknowledged as natural son of Juan Uriarte y Goite. Up to this
time, no final judgment to that effect appears to have been rendered.

The record further discloses that the special proceeding before the Negros Court has not gone farther than the appointment of a
special administrator in the person of the Philippine National Bank who, as stated heretofore, failed to qualify.

On the other hand, it is not disputed that, after proper proceedings were had in Special Proceeding No. 51396, the Manila Court
admitted to probate the document submitted to, it as the last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite, the petition for probate appearing not to
have been contested. It appears further that, as stated heretofore, the order issued by the Manila Court on July 1, 1963 denied
petitioner. Vicente Uriarte's Omnibus Motion for Intervention, Dismissal of Petition and Annulment of said proceedings.

Likewise, it is not denied that to the motion to dismiss the special proceeding pending before the Negros Court filed by Higinio
Uriarte were attached a copy of the alleged last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite and of the petition filed with the Manila Court for its
probate. It is clear, therefore, that almost from the start of Special Proceeding No. 6344, the Negros Court and petitioner Vicente
Uriarte knew of the existence of the aforesaid last will and of the proceedings for its probate.

The principal legal questions raised in the petition for certiorari are (a) whether or not the Negros Court erred in dismissing Special
Proceeding No. 6644, on the one hand, and on the other, (b) whether the Manila Court similarly erred in not dismissing Special
Proceeding No. 51396 notwithstanding proof of the prior filing of Special Proceeding No. 6344 in the Negros Court.

Under the Judiciary Act of 1948 [Section 44, paragraph (e)], Courts of First Instance have original exclusive jurisdiction over "all
matters of probate," that is, over special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of deceased persons — whether they died
testate or intestate. While their jurisdiction over such subject matter is beyond question, the matter of venue, or the particular
Court of First Instance where the special proceeding should be commenced, is regulated by former Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules
of Court, now Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that the estate of a decedent inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, shall be in the court of first instance in the province in which he
resided at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the court of first instance of any province in which
he had estate. Accordingly, when the estate to be settled is that of a non-resident alien — like the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite —
the Courts of First Instance in provinces where the deceased left any property have concurrent jurisdiction to take cognizance of
the proper special proceeding for the settlement of his estate. In the case before Us, these Courts of First Instance are the Negros
and the Manila Courts — province and city where the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite left considerable properties. From this premise
petitioner argues that, as the Negros Court had first taken cognizance of the special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
said decedent (Special Proceeding No. 6344), the Manila Court no longer had jurisdiction to take cognizance of Special Proceeding
No. 51396 intended to settle the estate of the same decedent in accordance with his alleged will, and that consequently, the first
court erred in dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344, while the second court similarly erred in not dismissing Special Proceeding
No. 51396.

It cannot be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the distribution of the estate of a deceased person, whether in
accordance with the law on intestate succession or in accordance with his will, is a "probate matter" or a proceeding for the
settlement of his estate. It is equally true, however, that in accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate
proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same
purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate proceedings pending before a court of first instance it
is found it hat the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the intestate proceedings
even if at that stage an administrator had already been appointed, the latter being required to render final account and turn over
the estate in his possession to the executor subsequently appointed. This, however, is understood to be without prejudice that
should the alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. As already adverted to, this
is a clear indication that proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.

Upon the facts before Us the question arises as to whether Juan Uriarte Zamacona should have filed the petition for the probate of
the last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite with the Negros Court — particularly in Special Proceeding No. 6344 — or was entitled to
commence the corresponding separate proceedings, as he did, in the Manila Court.

The following considerations and the facts of record would seem to support the view that he should have submitted said will for
probate to the Negros Court, either in a separate special proceeding or in an appropriate motion for said purpose filed in the
already pending Special Proceeding No. 6344. In the first place, it is not in accord with public policy and the orderly and
inexpensive administration of justice to unnecessarily multiply litigation, especially if several courts would be involved. This, in
effect, was the result of the submission of the will aforesaid to the Manila Court. In the second place, when respondent Higinio
Uriarte filed an opposition to Vicente Uriarte's petition for the issuance of letters of administration, he had already informed the
Negros Court that the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite had left a will in Spain, of which a copy had been requested for submission to
said court; and when the other respondent, Juan Uriarte Zamacona, filed his motion to dismiss Special Proceeding No. 6344, he
had submitted to the Negros Court a copy of the alleged will of the decedent, from which fact it may be inferred that, like Higinio
Uriarte, he knew before filing the petition for probate with the Manila Court that there was already a special proceeding pending in
the Negros Court for the settlement of the estate of the same deceased person. As far as Higinio Uriarte is concerned, it seems
quite clear that in his opposition to petitioner's petition in Special Proceeding No. 6344, he had expressly promised to submit said
will for probate to the Negros Court.

But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid will being presented for probate to the Negros Court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed the
petition for the purpose with the Manila Court. We cannot accept petitioner's contention in this regard that the latter court had no
jurisdiction to consider said petition, albeit we say that it was not the proper venue  therefor.

It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue  is merely a waiveable  procedural defect, and, in the light of the
circumstances obtaining in the instant case, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that petitioner has waived the right to raise such
objection or is precluded from doing so by laches. It is enough to consider in this connection that petitioner knew of the existence
of a will executed by Juan Uriarte y Goite since December 19, 1961 when Higinio Uriarte filed his opposition to the initial petition
filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344; that petitioner likewise was served with notice of the existence (presence) of the alleged last
will in the Philippines and of the filing of the petition for its probate with the Manila Court since August 28, 1962 when Juan Uriarte
Zamacona filed a motion for the dismissal of Special Proceeding No. 6344. All these notwithstanding, it was only on April 15, 1963
that he filed with the Manila Court in Special Proceeding No. 51396 an Omnibus motion asking for leave to intervene and for the
dismissal and annulment of all the proceedings had therein up to that date; thus enabling the Manila Court not only to appoint an
administrator with the will annexed but also to admit said will to probate more than five months earlier, or more specifically, on
October 31, 1962. To allow him now to assail the exercise of jurisdiction over the probate of the will by the Manila Court and the
validity of all the proceedings had in Special Proceeding No. 51396 would put a premium on his negligence. Moreover, it must be
remembered that this Court is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was not the proper
venue  therefor, if the net result would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some other court of similar jurisdiction; more
so in a case like the present where the objection against said proceedings is raised too late.

In his order of April 19, 1963 dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344, Judge Fernandez of the Negros Court said that he was "not
inclined to sustain the contention of the petitioner that inasmuch as the herein petitioner has instituted Civil Case No. 6142 for
compulsory acknowledgment by the decedent such action justifies the institution by him of this proceedings. If the petitioner is to
be consistent with the authorities cited by him in support of his contention, the proper thing for him to do would be to intervene in
the testate estate proceedings entitled Special Proceedings No. 51396 in the Court of First Instance of Manila instead of
maintaining an independent action, for indeed his supposed interest in the estate of the decedent is of his doubtful character
pending the final decision of the action for compulsory acknowledgment."

We believe in connection with the above matter that petitioner is entitled to prosecute Civil Case No. 6142 until it is finally
determined, or intervene in Special Proceeding No. 51396 of the Manila Court, if it is still open, or to ask for its reopening if it has
already been closed, so as to be able to submit for determination the question of his acknowledgment as natural child of the
deceased testator, said court having, in its capacity as a probate court, jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of the deceased
testator and whether or not a particular party is or should be declared his acknowledged natural child (II Moran on Rules of Court,
1957 Ed., p. 476; Conde vs. Abaya, 13 Phil. 249; Severino vs. Severino, 44 Phil. 343; Lopez vs. Lopez, 68 Phil. 227, and Jimoga-on
vs. Belmonte, 47 O. G. 1119).

Coming now to the supplemental petition for mandamus  (G.R. No. L-21939), We are of the opinion, and so hold, that in view of
the conclusions heretofore stated, the same has become moot and academic. If the said supplemental petition is successful, it will
only result in compelling the Negros Court to give due course to the appeal that petitioner was taking from the orders of said court
dated December 7, 1963 and February 26, 1964, the first being the order of said court dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344,
and the second being an order denying petitioner's motion for the reconsideration of said order of dismissal. Said orders being, as
a result of what has been said heretofore beyond petitioner's power to contest, the conclusion cannot be other than that the
intended appeal would serve no useful purpose, or, worse still, would enable petitioner to circumvent our ruling that he can no
longer question the validity of said orders.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, judgment is hereby rendered denying the writs prayed for and, as a result, the
petition for certiorari  filed in G.R. No. L-21938, as well as the supplemental petition for mandamus  docketed as G.R. No. L-21939,
are hereby dismissed. The writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued is set aside. With costs against petitioner.
G.R. No. L-33929 September 2, 1983

PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK, Petitioner,

v.
HON. GREGORIO T. LANTIN, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VII, and CANDIDO
RAMOS, Respondents.

Jose Diokno for Petitioner.

Romeo C . Carlos for Private Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; CREDIT TRANSACTION; CONCURRENCE AND PREFERENCE OF CREDITS; INSUFFICIENT ASSETS OF DEBTOR
RAISES QUESTION OF PREFERENCE AS WELL AS QUESTION OF CONSEQUENCE IN CONCURRENCE OF CREDITS. — Concurrence
of credits occurs when the same specific property of the debtor or all of his property is subjected to the claims of several creditors.
The concurrence of credits raises no questions of consequence were the value of the property or the value of all assets of the
debtor is sufficient to pay in fall all the creditors. However, it becomes material when said assets are insufficient for then some
creditors of necessity will not be paid or some creditors will not obtain the full satisfaction of their claims. In this situation, the
question of preference will then arise, that is to say who of the creditors will be paid the all of the others (Caguioa, Comments and
Cases on Civil Law, 1970 ed., Vol. VI, p. 472).

2. ID.; ID.; PREFERENCE OF CREDITS; ARTICLES 2249 AND 2242 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES; CONSTRUED.
— Under the system established by Article 2249 of the civil Code of the Philippines, only taxes and assessments upon immovable
property enjoy absolute preference. All the remaining specified classes of preferred creditors under Article 2242 enjoy no priority
among themselves. Their credits shall be satisfied pro-rata, i.e., in proportion to the amount of the respective credits.

3. ID.; ID.; ARTICLE 2249 AND 2242 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE; PAIL REQUISITE TO THEIR FULL APPLICATION UNDER THE DE
BARRETO CASE. — Under the De Barreto decision, the full application of Articles 2242 and 2249 demands that there must first be
some proceeding where the class of all the preferred creditors may be bindingly adjudicated, such as insolvency, the settlement of
a decedent’s estate under Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, or other liquidation proceedings of similar import.

4. REMEDIAL LAW; INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS AND SETTLEMENT OF A DECEDENT’S ESTATE; BOTH PROCEEDINGS IN REM,
OTHER EQUIVALENT GENERAL LIQUIDATION OF SIMILAR NATURE. — Insolvency proceedings end settlement of a decedent’s
estate are both proceedings in rem which are binding the whole world. All persons having interest in the subject matter involved,
whether they were notified or not, are equally bound. Consequently, a liquidation of similar import or other equivalent general
liquidation must also necessarily be a proceeding in rem so that all interested persons whether known to the parties or not may be
bound by such proceeding.

3. ID.; ACTION FOR COLLECTION OF UNPAID CONTRACTOR’S FEE; NOT AN ACTION IN REM. — The proceedings in the court
below do not partake of the insure of insolvency proceedings or settlement of a decedent’s estate. The action filed by Ramos was
only to collect the unpaid cost of the construction of the duplex apartment. It is far from being a general liquidation of the estate of
the Tabligan spouses.

6. CIVIL LAW; CREDIT TRANSACTION; ANNOTATION OF CLAIMS AND CREDITS AS STATUTORY LIENS; RELEVANCE TO THE
STABILITY OF THE TORRENS SYSTEM. — In the case at bar, although the lower court found that "there were no known creditors
other than the plaintiff and the defendant herein," this cannot be conclusive. It will not bar other creditors in the event they show
up and present their claims State petitioner bank, claiming that they also have preferred liens against the property involved.
Consequently, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 101864 issued in favor of the bank which is supposed to be indefeasible would
remain constantly unstable and questionable. Such could not have been the intention of Article 2243 of the Civil Code although it
considers claims and credits under Article 2242 as statutory liens. Neither does the De Barreto case sanction such instability. In
fact, an annotation, as suggested above, would insure to the benefit of the public, particularly those who may subsequently wish to
buy the property in question or who have a business transaction in connection therewith. It would facilitate the enforcement of a
legal statutory right which cannot be barred by laches (See Manila Railroad Co. v. Luzon Stevedoring Co., 100 Phil. 135).

7. ID.; SALE; BUYER IN GOOD FAITH OF REALTY; TAKES IT FEE FROM LIENS AND ENCUMBRANCES OTHER THAN STATUTORY
LIENS AND THOSE ANNOTATED IN THE TITLE; CASE AT BAR. — Since the action filed by the private respondent is not one which
can be considered as "equivalent general liquidation" having the same import as an insolvency or settlement of the decedent’s
estate proceeding, the well established principle must be applied that a purchaser in good faith and for value takes register land
free from liens and encumbrances other than statutory liens and those recorded in the Certificate of Title. It Is an limited fact that
at the time the deeds of real estate mortgage in favor of the petitioner bank were constituted, the transfer certificate of title of the
spouses Tabligan was free from any recorded lien and encumbrances, so that the only registered liens in the title were deeds in
favor of the petitioner.
 DECISION

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VII, presided over by respondent Judge
Gregorio T. Lantin, in Civil Case No. 79914 entitled Candido Ramos v. Philippine Savings Bank and of the order denying a motion
for its reconsideration. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant ordering the defendant to pay the
plaintiff the sum of P15,000.00 as his pro-rata share in the value of the duplex-apartment house which was built by the plaintiff for
the spouses likewise Filomeno Tabligan and Socorro Espiritu, which is now registered in the name of the defendant under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 101864 issued by the Register of Deeds of the City of Manila, on August 6, 1970, with legal interest from the
date of the filing of the complaint until fully paid; to pay the sum of P500.00 as attorney’s fees; and to pay the costs.

"The counterclaim interposed by the defendant is hereby dismissed."

Involved in this case is a duplex-apartment house on a lot covered by TCT No. 86195 situated at San Diego Street, Sampaloc,
Manila, and owned by the spouses Filomeno and Socorro Tabligan.

The duplex-apartment house was built for the spouses by private respondent Candido Ramos, a duly licensed architect and
building contractor, at a total cost of P32,927.00. The spouses paid private respondent the sum of P7,139.00 only. Hence, the
latter used his own money, P25,788.50 in all, to finish the construction of the duplex-apartment.

Meanwhile, on December 16, 1966, February 1, 1967, and February 28, 1967, the spouses Tabligan obtained from petitioner
Philippine Savings Bank three (3) loans in the total amount of P35,000.00, the purpose of which was to complete the construction
of the duplex-apartment. To secure payment of the l2oans, the spouses executed in favor of the petitioner three (3) promissory
notes and three (3) deeds of real estate mortgages over the property subject matter of this litigation.

On December 19, 1966, the petitioner registered the December 16, 1966 deed of real estate mortgage with the Register of Deeds
of Manila. The subsequent mortgages of February 1, 1967, and February 28, 1967, were registered with the Register of Deeds of
Manila on February 2, 1967 and March 1, 1967, respectively. At the time of the registration of these mortgages, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 86195 was free from all liens and encumbrances.

The spouses failed to pay their monthly amortizations. As a result thereof, the petitioner bank foreclosed the mortgages, and at the
public auction held on July 23, 1969, was the highest bidder.

On August 5, 1969, the petitioner bank registered the certificate of sale issued in its favor. On August 9, 1970, the bank
consolidated its ownership over the property in question, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 101864 was issued by the Register of
Deeds of Manila in the name of the petitioner bank.

Upon the other hand, the private respondent filed an action against the spouses to collect the unpaid cost of the construction of
the duplex-apartment before the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch I, which case was docketed therein as Civil Case No.
69228. During its pendency, the private respondent succeeded in obtaining the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, and
pursuant thereto, had the property in question attached. Consequently, a notice of adverse claim was annotated at the back of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 86195.

On August 26, 1968, a decision was rendered in Civil Case No. 69228 in favor of the private respondent and against the spouses. A
writ of execution was accordingly issued but was returned unsatisfied.

As the spouses did not have any properties to satisfy the judgment in Civil Case No. 69228, the private respondent addressed a
letter to the petitioner for the delivery to him (private respondent) of his pro-rata share in the value of the duplex-apartment in
accordance with Article 2242 of the Civil Code. The petitioner refused to pay the pro-rata value prompting the private respondent
to file the instant action. As earlier stated, a decision was rendered in favor of the private Respondent.

The parties are agreed that the only issue is whether or not the private respondent is entitled to claim a pro-rata share in the value
of the property in question. The applicable provision, Article 2242 of the Civil Code, reads as follows:

"ART. 2242. With reference to specific immovable property and real rights of the debtor, the following claims, mortgages and liens
shall be preferred, and shall constitute an encumbrance on the immovable or real right:

"(1) Taxes due upon the land or building;

"(2) For the unpaid price of real property sold, upon the immovable sold;

"(3) Claims of laborers, masons, mechanics and other workmen, as well as of architects, engineers and contractors, engaged in the
construction, reconstruction or repair of buildings, canals or other works, upon said buildings, canals or other works;

"(4) Claims of furnishers of materials used in the construction reconstruction, or repair of buildings, canals or other works upon
said buildings, canals or other works;

"(5) Mortgage credits recorded in the Registry of Property, upon the real estate mortgaged;

"(6) Expenses for the preservation or improvement of real property when the law authorizes reimbursement, upon the immovable
preserved or improved;

"(7) Credits annotated in the Registry of Property, in virtue of a judicial order, by attachments or executions, upon the property
affected, and only as to later credits;

"(8) Claims of co-heirs for warranty in the partition of an immovable among them, upon the real property thus divided;

"(9) Claims of donors of real property for pecuniary charges or other conditions imposed upon the donee, upon the immovable
donated;

"(10) Credits of insurers upon the property insured, for the insurance premium for two years."

Both the petitioner bank and private respondent Ramos rely on the case of De Barreto v. Villanueva (6 SCRA 928).

The petitioner bank would impress upon this Court that the proceedings had before the court below is not one of the proceedings
contemplated in the De Barreto case that will sustain the authority of the respondent court to adjudicate the claims of all preferred
creditors under Article 2242 of the Civil Code. Petitioner argues that for Article 2242 of the Civil Code to apply, there must have
been an insolvency proceeding or other liquidation proceedings of similar import. And under the facts then obtaining, there could
have been no insolvency proceeding as there were only two known creditors. ** Consequently, it is argued that private
respondent’s unpaid contractor’s claim did not acquire the character of a statutory lien equal to the petitioner’s registered
mortgage.

Upon the other hand, private respondent Ramos maintains that the proceedings had before the court below can qualify as a
general liquidation of the estate of the spouses Tabligan because the only existing property of said spouses is the property subject
matter of this litigation.

Concurrence of credits occurs when the same specific property of the debtor or all of his property is subjected to the claims of
several creditors. The concurrence of credits raises no questions of consequence where the value of the property or the value of all
assets of the debtor is sufficient to pay in full all the creditors. However, it becomes material when said assets are insufficient for
then some creditors of necessity will not be paid or some creditors will not obtain the full satisfaction of their claims. In this
situation, the question of preference will then arise, that is to say who of the creditors will be paid ahead of the others. (Caguioa,
Comments and Cases on Civil Law, 1970 ed., Vol. VI, p. 472.)

Under the system established by Article 2249 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, only taxes and assessments upon immovable
property enjoy absolute preference. All the remaining specified classes of preferred creditors under Article 2242 enjoy no priority
among themselves. Their credits shall be satisfied pro-rata, i.e., in proportion to the amount of the respective credits.

Under the De Barreto decision, the full application of Articles 2242 and 2249 demands that there must first be some proceeding
where the claims of all the preferred creditors may be bindingly adjudicated, such as insolvency, the settlement of a decedent’s
estate under Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, or other liquidation proceedings of similar import.

The pertinent ruling reads:

"Thus, it becomes evident that one preferred creditor’s third-party claim to the proceeds of a foreclosure sale (as in the case now
before us) is not the proceeding contemplated by law for the enforcement of preferences under Article 2242, unless the claimant
were enforcing a credit for taxes that enjoy absolute priority. If none of the claims is for taxes, a dispute between two creditors will
not enable the Court to ascertain the pro rata dividend corresponding to each because the rights of the other creditors likewise
enjoying preference under Article 2242 cannot be ascertained. Wherefore, the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila now
appealed from, decreeing that the proceeds of the foreclosure sale be apportioned only between appellant and appellee, is
incorrect and must be reversed.

"In the absence of insolvency proceedings (or other equivalent general liquidation of the debtor’s estate), the conflict between the
parties now before us must be decided pursuant to the well-established principle concerning registered lands; that a purchaser in
good faith and for value (as the appellant concededly is) takes registered property free from liens and encumbrances other than
statutory liens and those recorded in the certificate of title. There being no insolvency or liquidation, the claim of the appellee, as
unpaid vendor, did not acquire the character and rank of a statutory lien co-equal to the mortgagee’s recorded encumbrance, and
must remain subordinate to the latter."

The resolution of this petition, therefore, hinges on the determination of whether an insolvency proceeding or other liquidation
proceeding of similar import may be considered to have been conducted in the court below.

The respondent court ruled in the affirmative holding that:

"There were no known creditors, other than the plaintiff and defendant herein, and the proceedings in the present case may
ascertain and bindingly adjudicate the respective claims of the plaintiff and the defendant, serving as a substantial compliance with
what the Supreme Court stated:

"‘. . . it is thus apparent that the full application of Articles 2242 and 2249 demands that there must be first some proceeding
where the claims of all the preferred creditors may be bindingly adjudicated, such as insolvency, the settlement of a decedent’s
estate under Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, or other liquidation proceedings of similar import. (de Barretto v. Villanueva, Et Al.,
G.R. No. L-14938, December 29, 1962).’"

A careful considering of this petition leads us to agree with the petitioner. The conclusions of the lower court are not supported by
the law and the facts.

The proceedings in the court below do not partake of the nature of the insolvency proceedings or settlement of a decedent’s
estate. The action filed by Ramos was only to collect the unpaid cost of the construction of the duplex apartment. It is far from
being a general liquidation of the estate of the Tabligan spouses.

Insolvency proceedings and settlement of a decedent’s estate are both proceedings in rem which are binding against the whole
world. All persons having interest in the subject matter involved, whether they were notified or not, are equally bound.
Consequently, a liquidation of similar import or "other equivalent general liquidation’ must also necessarily be a proceeding in rem
so that all interested persons whether known to the parties or not may be bound by such proceeding.

In the case at bar, although the lower court found that "there were no known creditors other than the plaintiff and the defendant
herein", this can not be conclusive. It will not bar other creditors in the event they show up and present their claims against the
petitioner bank, claiming that they also have preferred liens against the property involved. Consequently, Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 101864 issued in favor of the bank which is supposed to be indefeasible would remain constantly unstable and
questionable. Such could not have been the intention of Article 2243 of the Civil Code although it considers claims and credits
under Article 2242 as statutory liens. Neither does the De Barretto case sanction such instability. It emphasized the following:

"We are understandably loath (absent a clear precept of law so commanding) to adopt a rule that would undermine the faith and
credit to be accorded to registered Torrens titles and nullify the beneficient objectives sought to be obtained by the Land
Registration Act. No argument is needed to stress that if a person dealing with registered land were to be held to take it in every
instance subject to all the fourteen preferred claims enumerated in Article 2242 of the new Civil Code, even if the existence and
import thereof can not be ascertained from the records, all confidence in Torrens titles would be destroyed, and credit transactions
on the faith of such titles would be hampered, if not prevented, with incalculable results. Loans on real estate security would
become aleatory and risky transactions, for no prospective lender could accurately estimate the hidden liens on the property
offered as security, unless he indulged in complicated, tedious investigations. The logical result might well be a contraction of
credit to unforeseable proportions that could lead to economic disaster.

"Upon the other hand, it does not appear excessively burdensome to require the privileged creditors to cause their claims to be
recorded in the books of the Register of Deeds should they desire to protect their rights even outside of insolvency or liquidation
proceedings.

In fact, an annotation, as suggested above, would inure to the benefit of the public, particularly those who may subsequently wish
to buy the property in question or who have a business transaction in connection therewith. It would facilitate the enforcement of
a legal statutory right which cannot be barred by laches. (See Manila Railroad Co. v. Luzon Stevedoring Co., 100 Phil. 135).

Respondent Ramos admitted in the partial stipulation of facts submitted by both parties that at the time of the loans to the
spouses, the petitioner’s bank had no actual or constructive knowledge of any lien against the property in question. The duplex
apartment house was built for P32,927.00. The spouses Tabligan borrowed P35,000.00 for the construction of the apartment
house. The bank could not have known of any contractor’s lien because, as far as it was concerned, it financed the entire
construction even if the stated purpose of the loans was only to "complete" the construction.

Since the action filed by the private respondent is not one which can be considered as "equivalent general liquidation" having the
same import as an insolvency or settlement of the decedent’s estate proceeding, the well-established principle must be applied that
a purchaser in good faith and for value takes registered land free from liens and encumbrances other than statutory liens and
those recorded in the Certificate of Title. It is an admitted fact that at the time the deeds of real estate mortgage in favor of the
petitioner bank were constituted, the transfer certificate of title of the spouses Tabligan was free from any recorded lien and
encumbrances, so that the only registered liens in the title were deeds in favor of the petitioner.

Prescinding from the foregoing, the private respondent’s claim must remain subordinate to the petitioner bank’s title over the
property evidenced by TCT No. 101864.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VII is, hereby, reversed and set
aside. The complaint and the counterclaim are dismissed.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 174489               April 11, 2012

ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR, SEBASTIAN M. BALTAZAR, ANTONIO L. MANGALINDAN, ROSIE M. MATEO, NENITA A.

PACHECO, VIRGILIO REGALA, JR., and RAFAEL TITCO, Petitioners,
vs.
LORENZO LAXA, Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

It is incumbent upon those who oppose the probate of a will to clearly establish that the decedent was not of sound and disposing
mind at the time of the execution of said will. Otherwise, the state is duty-bound to give full effect to the wishes of the testator to
distribute his estate in the manner provided in his will so long as it is legally tenable.1

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari2 of the June 15, 2006 Decision3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
80979 which reversed the September 30, 2003 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 52, Guagua, Pampanga in
Special Proceedings No. G-1186. The assailed CA Decision granted the petition for probate of the notarial will of Paciencia Regala
(Paciencia), to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the appeal to be impressed with merit, the decision in SP. PROC. NO. G-1186 dated 30
September 2003, is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one entered GRANTING the petition for the probate of the will of PACIENCIA
REGALA.

SO ORDERED.5

Also assailed herein is the August 31, 2006 CA Resolution6 which denied the Motion for Reconsideration thereto.

Petitioners call us to reverse the CA’s assailed Decision and instead affirm the Decision of the RTC which disallowed the notarial will
of Paciencia.

Factual Antecedents

Paciencia was a 78 year old spinster when she made her last will and testament entitled "Tauli Nang Bilin o Testamento Miss
Paciencia Regala"7 (Will) in the Pampango dialect on September 13, 1981. The Will, executed in the house of retired Judge
Ernestino G. Limpin (Judge Limpin), was read to Paciencia twice. After which, Paciencia expressed in the presence of the
instrumental witnesses that the document is her last will and testament. She thereafter affixed her signature at the end of the said
document on page 38 and then on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof.9

The witnesses to the Will were Dra. Maria Lioba A. Limpin (Dra. Limpin), Francisco Garcia (Francisco) and Faustino R. Mercado
(Faustino). The three attested to the Will’s due execution by affixing their signatures below its attestation clause10 and on the left
margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof,11 in the presence of Paciencia and of one another and of Judge Limpin who acted as notary
public.

Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her properties to respondent Lorenzo R. Laxa (Lorenzo) and
his wife Corazon F. Laxa and their children Luna Lorella Laxa and Katherine Ross Laxa, thus:

xxxx

Fourth - In consideration of their valuable services to me since then up to the present by the spouses LORENZO LAXA and
CORAZON F. LAXA, I hereby BEQUEATH, CONVEY and GIVE all my properties enumerated in parcels 1 to 5 unto the spouses
LORENZO R. LAXA and CORAZON F. LAXA and their children, LUNA LORELLA LAXA and KATHERINE LAXA, and the spouses
Lorenzo R. Laxa and Corazon F. Laxa both of legal age, Filipinos, presently residing at Barrio Sta. Monica, [Sasmuan], Pampanga
and their children, LUNA LORELLA and KATHERINE ROSS LAXA, who are still not of legal age and living with their parents who
would decide to bequeath since they are the children of the spouses;

xxxx

[Sixth] - Should other properties of mine may be discovered aside from the properties mentioned in this last will and testament, I
am also bequeathing and giving the same to the spouses Lorenzo R. Laxa and Corazon F. Laxa and their two children and I also
command them to offer masses yearly for the repose of my soul and that of D[ñ]a Nicomeda Regala, Epifania Regala and their
spouses and with respect to the fishpond situated at San Antonio, I likewise command to fulfill the wishes of D[ñ]a Nicomeda
Regala in accordance with her testament as stated in my testament. x x x12
The filial relationship of Lorenzo with Paciencia remains undisputed. Lorenzo is Paciencia’s nephew whom she treated as her own
son. Conversely, Lorenzo came to know and treated Paciencia as his own mother.13 Paciencia lived with Lorenzo’s family in
Sasmuan, Pampanga and it was she who raised and cared for Lorenzo since his birth. Six days after the execution of the Will or on
September 19, 1981, Paciencia left for the United States of America (USA). There, she resided with Lorenzo and his family until her
death on January 4, 1996.

In the interim, the Will remained in the custody of Judge Limpin.

More than four years after the death of Paciencia or on April 27, 2000, Lorenzo filed a petition14 with the RTC of Guagua,
Pampanga for the probate of the Will of Paciencia and for the issuance of Letters of Administration in his favor, docketed as Special
Proceedings No. G-1186.

There being no opposition to the petition after its due publication, the RTC issued an Order on June 13, 200015 allowing Lorenzo to
present evidence on June 22, 2000. On said date, Dra. Limpin testified that she was one of the instrumental witnesses in the
execution of the last will and testament of Paciencia on September 13, 1981.16 The Will was executed in her father’s (Judge Limpin)
home office, in her presence and of two other witnesses, Francisco and Faustino.17 Dra. Limpin positively identified the Will and her
signatures on all its four pages.18 She likewise positively identified the signature of her father appearing thereon.19 Questioned by
the prosecutor regarding Judge Limpin’s present mental fitness, Dra. Limpin testified that her father had a stroke in 1991 and had
to undergo brain surgery.20 The judge can walk but can no longer talk and remember her name. Because of this, Dra. Limpin stated
that her father can no longer testify in court.21

The following day or on June 23, 2000, petitioner Antonio Baltazar (Antonio) filed an opposition22 to Lorenzo’s petition. Antonio
averred that the properties subject of Paciencia’s Will belong to Nicomeda Regala Mangalindan, his predecessor-in-interest; hence,
Paciencia had no right to bequeath them to Lorenzo.23

Barely a month after or on July 20, 2000, Antonio, now joined by petitioners Sebastian M. Baltazar, Virgilio Regala, Jr., Nenita A.
Pacheco, Felix B. Flores, Rafael Titco, Rosie M. Mateo (Rosie) and Antonio L. Mangalindan filed a Supplemental
Opposition24 contending that Paciencia’s Will was null and void because ownership of the properties had not been transferred
and/or titled to Paciencia before her death pursuant to Article 1049, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code.25 Petitioners also opposed the
issuance of Letters of Administration in Lorenzo’s favor arguing that Lorenzo was disqualified to be appointed as such, he being a
citizen and resident of the USA.26 Petitioners prayed that Letters of Administration be instead issued in favor of Antonio.27

Later still on September 26, 2000, petitioners filed an Amended Opposition28 asking the RTC to deny the probate of Paciencia’s Will
on the following grounds: the Will was not executed and attested to in accordance with the requirements of the law; that Paciencia
was mentally incapable to make a Will at the time of its execution; that she was forced to execute the Will under duress or
influence of fear or threats; that the execution of the Will had been procured by undue and improper pressure and influence by
Lorenzo or by some other persons for his benefit; that the signature of Paciencia on the Will was forged; that assuming the
signature to be genuine, it was obtained through fraud or trickery; and, that Paciencia did not intend the document to be her Will.
Simultaneously, petitioners filed an Opposition and Recommendation29 reiterating their opposition to the appointment of Lorenzo as
administrator of the properties and requesting for the appointment of Antonio in his stead.

On January 29, 2001, the RTC issued an Order30 denying the requests of both Lorenzo and Antonio to be appointed administrator
since the former is a citizen and resident of the USA while the latter’s claim as a co-owner of the properties subject of the Will has
not yet been established.

Meanwhile, proceedings on the petition for the probate of the Will continued. Dra. Limpin was recalled for cross-examination by the
petitioners. She testified as to the age of her father at the time the latter notarized the Will of Paciencia; the living arrangements of
Paciencia at the time of the execution of the Will; and the lack of photographs when the event took place. 31

Aside from Dra. Limpin, Lorenzo and Monico Mercado (Monico) also took the witness stand. Monico, son of Faustino, testified on
his father’s condition. According to him his father can no longer talk and express himself due to brain damage. A medical certificate
was presented to the court to support this allegation. 32

For his part, Lorenzo testified that: from 1944 until his departure for the USA in April 1980, he lived in Sasmuan, Pampanga with
his family and his aunt, Paciencia; in 1981 Paciencia went to the USA and lived with him and his family until her death in January
1996; the relationship between him and Paciencia was like that of a mother and child since Paciencia took care of him since birth
and took him in as an adopted son; Paciencia was a spinster without children, and without brothers and sisters; at the time of
Paciencia’s death, she did not suffer from any mental disorder and was of sound mind, was not blind, deaf or mute; the Will was in
the custody of Judge Limpin and was only given to him after Paciencia’s death through Faustino; and he was already residing in
the USA when the Will was executed.33 Lorenzo positively identified the signature of Paciencia in three different documents and in
the Will itself and stated that he was familiar with Paciencia’s signature because he accompanied her in her transactions.34 Further,
Lorenzo belied and denied having used force, intimidation, violence, coercion or trickery upon Paciencia to execute the Will as he
was not in the Philippines when the same was executed.35 On cross-examination, Lorenzo clarified that Paciencia informed him
about the Will shortly after her arrival in the USA but that he saw a copy of the Will only after her death.36

As to Francisco, he could no longer be presented in court as he already died on May 21, 2000.
For petitioners, Rosie testified that her mother and Paciencia were first cousins.37 She claimed to have helped in the household
chores in the house of Paciencia thereby allowing her to stay therein from morning until evening and that during the period of her
service in the said household, Lorenzo’s wife and his children were staying in the same house.38 She served in the said household
from 1980 until Paciencia’s departure for the USA on September 19, 1981.39

On September 13, 1981, Rosie claimed that she saw Faustino bring "something" for Paciencia to sign at the latter’s house.40 Rosie
admitted, though, that she did not see what that "something" was as same was placed inside an envelope.41 However, she
remembered Paciencia instructing Faustino to first look for money before she signs them.42 A few days after or on September 16,
1981, Paciencia went to the house of Antonio’s mother and brought with her the said envelope.43 Upon going home, however, the
envelope was no longer with Paciencia.44 Rosie further testified that Paciencia was referred to as "magulyan" or "forgetful" because
she would sometimes leave her wallet in the kitchen then start looking for it moments later.45 On cross examination, it was
established that Rosie was neither a doctor nor a psychiatrist, that her conclusion that Paciencia was "magulyan" was based on her
personal assessment,46 and that it was Antonio who requested her to testify in court.47

In his direct examination, Antonio stated that Paciencia was his aunt.48 He identified the Will and testified that he had seen the said
document before because Paciencia brought the same to his mother’s house and showed it to him along with another document on
September 16, 1981.49 Antonio alleged that when the documents were shown to him, the same were still unsigned.50 According to
him, Paciencia thought that the documents pertained to a lease of one of her rice lands,51 and it was he who explained that the
documents were actually a special power of attorney to lease and sell her fishpond and other properties upon her departure for the
USA, and a Will which would transfer her properties to Lorenzo and his family upon her death.52 Upon hearing this, Paciencia
allegedly uttered the following words: "Why will I never [return], why will I sell all my properties?" Who is Lorenzo? Is he the only
[son] of God? I have other relatives [who should] benefit from my properties. Why should I die already?"53 Thereafter, Antonio
advised Paciencia not to sign the documents if she does not want to, to which the latter purportedly replied, "I know nothing about
those, throw them away or it is up to you. The more I will not sign them."54 After which, Paciencia left the documents with Antonio.
Antonio kept the unsigned documents and eventually turned them over to Faustino on September 18, 1981.55

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On September 30, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision56 denying the petition thus:

WHEREFORE, this court hereby (a) denies the petition dated April 24, 2000; and (b) disallows the notarized will dated September
13, 1981 of Paciencia Regala.

SO ORDERED.57

The trial court gave considerable weight to the testimony of Rosie and concluded that at the time Paciencia signed the Will, she
was no longer possessed of sufficient reason or strength of mind to have testamentary capacity.58

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC Decision and granted the probate of the Will of Paciencia. The appellate court did not agree
with the RTC’s conclusion that Paciencia was of unsound mind when she executed the Will. It ratiocinated that "the state of being
‘magulyan’ does not make a person mentally unsound so [as] to render [Paciencia] unfit for executing a Will."59 Moreover, the
oppositors in the probate proceedings were not able to overcome the presumption that every person is of sound mind. Further, no
concrete circumstances or events were given to prove the allegation that Paciencia was tricked or forced into signing the Will.60

Petitioners moved for reconsideration61 but the motion was denied by the CA in its Resolution62 dated August 31, 2006.

Hence, this petition.

Issues

Petitioners come before this Court by way of Petition for Review on Certiorari ascribing upon the CA the following errors:

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT ALLOWED THE PROBATE OF PACIENCIA’S WILL
DESPITE RESPONDENT’S UTTER FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH SECTION 11, RULE 76 OF THE RULES OF COURT;

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN MAKING CONCLUSIONS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
EVIDENCE ON RECORD;

III.
 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONERS FAILED TO PROVE THAT
PACIENCIA WAS NOT OF SOUND MIND AT THE TIME THE WILL WAS ALLEGEDLY EXECUTED63

The pivotal issue is whether the authenticity and due execution of the notarial Will was sufficiently established to warrant its
allowance for probate.

Our Ruling

We deny the petition.

Faithful compliance with the formalities laid down by law is apparent from the face of the Will.

Courts are tasked to determine nothing more than the extrinsic validity of a Will in probate proceedings.64 This is expressly provided
for in Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which states:

Rule 75

Production of Will. Allowance of Will Necessary.

Section 1. Allowance necessary. Conclusive as to execution. – No will shall pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved
and allowed in the proper court. Subject to the right of appeal, such allowance of the will shall be conclusive as to its due
execution.

Due execution of the will or its extrinsic validity pertains to whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.65 These formalities are enshrined in Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil Code,
to wit:

Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's
name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more
credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.

The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as
aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in
letters placed on the upper part of each page.

The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will
and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the
instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator
and of one another.

If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them.

Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be
required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the Office of the Clerk of Court.

Here, a careful examination of the face of the Will shows faithful compliance with the formalities laid down by law. The signatures
of the testatrix, Paciencia, her instrumental witnesses and the notary public, are all present and evident on the Will. Further, the
attestation clause explicitly states the critical requirement that the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses signed the Will in the
presence of one another and that the witnesses attested and subscribed to the Will in the presence of the testator and of one
another. In fact, even the petitioners acceded that the signature of Paciencia in the Will may be authentic although they question
her state of mind when she signed the same as well as the voluntary nature of said act.

The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will lies on the shoulders of the
petitioners.

Petitioners, through their witness Rosie, claim that Paciencia was "magulyan" or forgetful so much so that it effectively stripped her
of testamentary capacity. They likewise claimed in their Motion for Reconsideration66 filed with the CA that Paciencia was not only
"magulyan" but was actually suffering from paranoia.67

We are not convinced.

We agree with the position of the CA that the state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as
to render him unfit to execute a Will.68 Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind. Besides, Article 799 of the New
Civil Code states:
Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his
mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other cause.

It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the
proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.

In this case, apart from the testimony of Rosie pertaining to Paciencia’s forgetfulness, there is no substantial evidence, medical or
otherwise, that would show that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the Will. On the other hand, we
find more worthy of credence Dra. Limpin’s testimony as to the soundness of mind of Paciencia when the latter went to Judge
Limpin’s house and voluntarily executed the Will. "The testimony of subscribing witnesses to a Will concerning the testator’s mental
condition is entitled to great weight where they are truthful and intelligent."69 More importantly, a testator is presumed to be of
sound mind at the time of the execution of the Will and the burden to prove otherwise lies on the oppositor. Article 800 of the New
Civil Code states:

Art. 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary.

The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making his dispositions is on the person who opposes
the probate of the will; but if the testator, one month, or less, before making his will was publicly known to be insane, the person
who maintains the validity of the will must prove that the testator made it during a lucid interval.

Here, there was no showing that Paciencia was publicly known to be insane one month or less before the making of the Will.
Clearly, thus, the burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind lies upon the shoulders of petitioners. However, and as
earlier mentioned, no substantial evidence was presented by them to prove the same, thereby warranting the CA’s finding that
petitioners failed to discharge such burden.

Furthermore, we are convinced that Paciencia was aware of the nature of her estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of her
bounty and the character of the testamentary act. As aptly pointed out by the CA:

A scrutiny of the Will discloses that [Paciencia] was aware of the nature of the document she executed. She specially requested
that the customs of her faith be observed upon her death. She was well aware of how she acquired the properties from her
parents and the properties she is bequeathing to LORENZO, to his wife CORAZON and to his two (2) children. A third child was
born after the execution of the will and was not included therein as devisee.70

Bare allegations of duress or influence of fear or threats, undue and improper influence and pressure, fraud and trickery cannot be
used as basis to deny the probate of a will.

An essential element of the validity of the Will is the willingness of the testator or testatrix to execute the document that will
distribute his/her earthly possessions upon his/her death. Petitioners claim that Paciencia was forced to execute the Will under
duress or influence of fear or threats; that the execution of the Will had been procured by undue and improper pressure and
influence by Lorenzo or by some other persons for his benefit; and that assuming Paciencia’s signature to be genuine, it was
obtained through fraud or trickery. These are grounded on the alleged conversation between Paciencia and Antonio on September
16, 1981 wherein the former purportedly repudiated the Will and left it unsigned.

We are not persuaded.

We take into consideration the unrebutted fact that Paciencia loved and treated Lorenzo as her own son and that love even
extended to Lorenzo’s wife and children. This kind of relationship is not unusual. It is in fact not unheard of in our culture for old
maids or spinsters to care for and raise their nephews and nieces and treat them as their own children. Such is a prevalent and
accepted cultural practice that has resulted in many family discords between those favored by the testamentary disposition of a
testator and those who stand to benefit in case of intestacy.

In this case, evidence shows the acknowledged fact that Paciencia’s relationship with Lorenzo and his family is different from her
relationship with petitioners. The very fact that she cared for and raised Lorenzo and lived with him both here and abroad, even if
the latter was already married and already has children, highlights the special bond between them. This unquestioned relationship
between Paciencia and the devisees tends to support the authenticity of the said document as against petitioners’ allegations of
duress, influence of fear or threats, undue and improper influence, pressure, fraud, and trickery which, aside from being factual in
nature, are not supported by concrete, substantial and credible evidence on record. It is worth stressing that bare arguments, no
matter how forceful, if not based on concrete and substantial evidence cannot suffice to move the Court to uphold said
allegations.71 Furthermore, "a purported will is not [to be] denied legalization on dubious grounds. Otherwise, the very institution of
testamentary succession will be shaken to its foundation, for even if a will has been duly executed in fact, whether x x x it will be
probated would have to depend largely on the attitude of those interested in [the estate of the deceased]."72

Court should be convinced by the evidence presented before it that the Will was duly executed.

Petitioners dispute the authenticity of Paciencia’s Will on the ground that Section 11 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court was not
complied with. It provides:
 RULE 76

Allowance or Disallowance of Will

Section 11. Subscribing witnesses produced or accounted for where will contested. – If the will is contested, all the subscribing
witnesses, and the notary in the case of wills executed under the Civil Code of the Philippines, if present in the Philippines and not
insane, must be produced and examined, and the death, absence, or insanity of any of them must be satisfactorily shown to the
court. If all or some of such witnesses are present in the Philippines but outside the province where the will has been filed, their
deposition must be taken. If any or all of them testify against the due execution of the will, or do not remember having attested to
it, or are otherwise of doubtful credibility, the will may nevertheless, be allowed if the court is satisfied from the testimony of other
witnesses and from all the evidence presented that the will was executed and attested in the manner required by law.

If a holographic will is contested, the same shall be allowed if at least three (3) witnesses who know the handwriting of the
testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator; in the absence of any competent
witnesses, and if the court deem it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to. (Emphasis supplied.)

They insist that all subscribing witnesses and the notary public should have been presented in court since all but one witness,
Francisco, are still living.

We cannot agree with petitioners.

We note that the inability of Faustino and Judge Limpin to appear and testify before the court was satisfactorily explained during
the probate proceedings. As testified to by his son, Faustino had a heart attack, was already bedridden and could no longer talk
and express himself due to brain damage. To prove this, said witness presented the corresponding medical certificate. For her part,
Dra. Limpin testified that her father, Judge Limpin, suffered a stroke in 1991 and had to undergo brain surgery. At that time, Judge
Limpin could no longer talk and could not even remember his daughter’s name so that Dra. Limpin stated that given such
condition, her father could no longer testify. It is well to note that at that point, despite ample opportunity, petitioners neither
interposed any objections to the testimonies of said witnesses nor challenged the same on cross examination. We thus hold that
for all intents and purposes, Lorenzo was able to satisfactorily account for the incapacity and failure of the said subscribing witness
and of the notary public to testify in court. Because of this the probate of Paciencia’s Will may be allowed on the basis of Dra.
Limpin’s testimony proving her sanity and the due execution of the Will, as well as on the proof of her handwriting. It is an
established rule that "[a] testament may not be disallowed just because the attesting witnesses declare against its due execution;
neither does it have to be necessarily allowed just because all the attesting witnesses declare in favor of its legalization; what is
decisive is that the court is convinced by evidence before it, not necessarily from the attesting witnesses, although they must
testify, that the will was or was not duly executed in the manner required by law."73 

Moreover, it bears stressing that "[i]rrespective x x x of the posture of any of the parties as regards the authenticity and due
execution of the will x x x in question, it is the mandate of the law that it is the evidence before the court and/or [evidence that]
ought to be before it that is controlling."74 "The very existence of [the Will] is in itself prima facie proof that the supposed [testatrix]
has willed that [her] estate be distributed in the manner therein provided, and it is incumbent upon the state that, if legally
tenable, such desire be given full effect independent of the attitude of the parties affected thereby."75 This, coupled with Lorenzo’s
established relationship with Paciencia, the evidence and the testimonies of disinterested witnesses, as opposed to the total lack of
evidence presented by petitioners apart from their self-serving testimonies, constrain us to tilt the balance in favor of the
authenticity of the Will and its allowance for probate.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated June 15, 2006 and the Resolution dated August 31, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80979 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 230751

ESTRELLITA TADEO-MATIAS, Petitioner
vs
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

This is an appeal1 assailing the Decision2 dated November 28, 2016 and Resolution3 dated March 20, 2017 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 129467.

The facts are as follows:

On April 10, 2012, petitioner Estrellita Tadco-Matias filed before the Regional Trail Court (RTC) of Tarlac City a petition for the
declaration of presumptive death of her husband, Wifredo N. Matias (Wilfredo).4 The allegations of the petition read:

1. [Petitioner] is of legal age, married to [Wilfredo], Filipino and curr[e]ntly a residnet of 106 Molave street, Zone B. San Miguel
Tarlac City;

2. [Wifredo] is of legal age, a member of the Philippine Constabulary and was assigned in Araya, Pampanga since August 24,
1967[;]

3. The[p]etitioner and [Wilfredo] entered into a lawful marriage on January 7, 1968 in Imbo, Anda, Pangasinan x x x;

4. After the solemnization of their marriage vows, the couple put up their conjugal home at 106 Molave street, Zone B. San Miguel,
Tarlac City;

5. [Wilfredo] continued to serve the Philippines and on September 15, 1979, he set out from their conjugal home to again serve as
a member of the Philippine Constabulary;

6. [Wilfredo] never came back from his tour of duty in Arayat, Pampanga since 1979 and he never made contact or communicated
with the [p]etitioner nor to his relatives;

7. That according to the service record of [Wilfredo] issued by the National Police Commission, [Wilfredo] was already declared
missing since 1979 x x x;

8. Petitioner constantly pestered the then Philippine Constabulary for any news regarding [her] beloved husband [Wilfredo], but
the Philippine Constabulary had no answer to his whereabouts, [neither] did they have any news of him going AWOL, all they know
was he was assigned to a place frequented by the New People's Army;

9. [W]eeks became years and years became decades, but the [p]etitioner never gave up hope, and after more than three (3)
decades of awaiting, the [p]etitioner is still hopeful, but the times had been tough on her, specially with a meager source of
income coupled with her age, it is now necessary for her to request for the benefits that rightfully belong to her in order to survive;

10. [T]hat one of the requirements to attain the claim of benefits is for a proof of death or at least declaration of presumptive
death by the Honorable Court;

11. That this petition is being filed not for any other purpose but solely to claim for the benefit under P.D. No. 1638 as amended.

The petition was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 4850 and was raffled to Branch 65 of the Tarlac City RTC. A copy of the petition was
then furnished to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)_.

Subsequently, the OSG filed its notice of appearance on behalf of herein respondent Republic of the Philippines (Republic).5

On January 15, 2012, the RTC issued a Decision6 in Spec. Proc. No. 4850 granting the petition. The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads:7

WHEREFORE in view of the foregoing the Court hereby declared (sic) WILFREDO N. MATIAS absent or presumptively dead under
Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines for purpose of claiming financial benefits due to him as former military
officer.
 xxxx

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)

The Republic questioned the decision of the RTC via a petition for certiotrari.8

On November 28, 2012, the CA rendered a decision granting the certiorari petition of the Republic and setting aside the decision of
the RTC. It accordingly disposed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 15, 2012 of the Regional
Trial Court, branch 65, Tarlac City, in Special Proceeding no. 4850 is ANNULED and SET ASIDE, and the petition is DISMISSED.

The CA premised its decision on the following ratiocinations:

1. The RTC erred when it declared Wilfredo presumptively dead on the basis of Article 41 of the Family Code (FC). Article 41 of the
FC does not seek to remarry. If anything, the petition was invoking the presumption of death established under Articles 390 and
391 of the Civil Code, and not that provided for under Article 41 of the FC.

2. Be that it may, the petition to declare Wilfredo presumptively dead should have been dismissed by the RTC. The RTC is without
authority to take cognizance of a petition whose sole purpose is to have a person declared presumptively dead under either Article
390 or Article 391 of the Civil Code. As been held by jurisprudence, Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of
evidence that allow a court or a tribunal to presume that a person is dead-which presumption may be invoked in any action or
proceeding, but itself cannot be the subject of an independent action or proceeding.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the CA remained steadfast. Hence, this appeal.

Our Ruling

We deny the appeal

The CA was correct. The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by the petitioner is not an authorized suit and
should have been dismissed by the RTC. The RTC's decision must, therefore, be set aside.

RTC Erred I Declaring the Presumptive Death of Wilfredo under Article 41 of the FC; Petitioner's
Petition for the Declaration of Presumptive Death is Not Based on Article 41 of the FC, but on the Civil Code

A conspicuous error in the decision of the RTC must first be addressed.

It can be recalled that the RTC, in fallo of its January 15, 2012 Decision, granted the petitioner's petition by declaring Wilfredo
presumptively dead "under Article 41 of the FC." By doing so, RTC gave the impression that the petition for the declaration of
presumptive death filed by petitioner was likewise filed pursuant to Article 41 of the FC.9 This is wrong.

The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by petitioner is not an action that would have warranted the application
of Article 41 of the FC shows that the presumption of death established therein is only applicable for the purpose of contracting a
valid subsequent marriage under the said law. Thus:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a
summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the
effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.

Here, petitioner was forthright that she was not seeking the declaration of the presumptive death Wilfredo as a prerequisite for
remarriage. In her petition for the declaration of presumptive death, petitioner categorically stated that the same was filed "not for
any other purpose but solely to claim for the benefit under P.D. No. 1638 a amended.10

Given that her petition for the declaration of presumptive death was not filed for the purpose of remarriage, petitioner was
clearly relying on the presumption of death under either Article 390 or Article 391 of the Civil Code 11 as the basis of
her petition. Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code express the general rule regarding presumption s of death for any civil
purpose, to wit:
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absence still lives, he shall be presumed dead for
all purposes except for those of succession.

The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of five years shall be
sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.

Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate among the heirs:

(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has not been heard of for four
years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;

(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four years;

(3) a person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not been known for four years.

Verily, the RTC's use of Article 41 of the FC as its basis in declaring the presumptive death of Wilfredo was misleading and grossly
improper.The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by the petitioner was based on the Civil Code,
and not on Article 41 of the FC.

Petitioner's Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death Ought to Have Been Dismissed; A Petition Whose Sole
Objective is To Declare a Person Presumptively Dead Under the CivilCode, Like that Filed by the Petitioner
Before the RTC, Is Not a Viable Suit in Our Jurisdiction

The true fault in the RTC's decision, however, goes beyond its misleading fallo. The decision itself is objectionable.

Since the petition filed by the petitioner merely seeks the declaration of presumptive death of Wilfredo under the Civil Code, the
RTC should have dismissed such petition outright. This is because, in our jurisdiction, a petition whose sole objective  is to have a
person declared presumptively dead under the Civil Code is not regarded as a valid suit and no court has any authority to take
cognizance of the same.

The above norm had its conceptual roots in the 1948 case of In re: Petition for the Presumption of Death of Nicolai Szatraw.12 In
the said case, we held that a rule creating a presumption of death13 is merely one of the evidence that-while may be invoked in any
action or proceeding-cannot be the lone subject of an independent action or proceeding. Szatraw explained:

The rule invoked by the latter is merely one of the evidence which permits the court to presume that a person had been unheard
from in seven years had been established. This presumption may arise and be invoked and made in a case, either in an action or in
a special proceeding, which is tried or heard by, and submitted for decision to, a competent court. Independently of such an
action or special proceeding, the presumption of death cannot be invoked, nor can it be made the subject of an
action or special proceeding. In this case, there is no right ti be enforced nor is there a remedy prayed for by the
petitioner against her absent husband. Neither is there a prayer for the final determination of his right or status or for the
ascertainment of particular fact, for the petition does not pray for the declaration that the petitioner 's husband us dead, but
merely asks for a declaration that he be presumed dead because he had been unheard from in seven years. If there is any
pretense at securing a declaration that the petitioner's husband os dead, such a pretension cannot be granted because it is
unauthorized. The petition is for a declaration, even if judicially made, would not improve the petitioner's situation,
because such a presumption is already established by law. A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and
executory, would be a prima facie presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the
subject of judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is tha only question or matter involved in a case, or upon
which a competent court has to pass. The latter must decide finally the controversy between the parties, or determine finally
the right or status of a party or establish finally a particular fact, out of which certain rights and obligations arise or may arise; and
once such controversy is decided by a final decree, then the judgement on the subject of the controversy, or the decree upon the
right or status of a party or upon the existence of a particular fact, becomes res judicata, subject to no collateral attack, except in a
few rare instances especially provided by law. It is, therefore, clear that judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead,
because he had been unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum  only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach
the stage of finality or become final. (Citations omitted and emphasis supplied)

The above ruling in Szatraw has since been ussed by the subsequent cases of Lukban v. Republic14 and Gue v. Republic15 in
disallowing petitions for declaration of presumptive death based on Article 390 of the Civil Code (and, implicity, also those based on
the Civil based on Article 391 of the Civil Code).

Dissecting the rulings of Szatraw, Gue and Lukban collectively, we are able to ascertain the considerations why a petition for
declaration of presumptive death based on the Civil Code was disallowed in our jurisdiction, viz:16

1. Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of evidence that only allow a court or a tribunal to presume that a
person is dead upon the establishment of certain facts.
2. Since Articles 390 an d 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of evidence, an action brought exclusively to declare a
person presumptively dead under either of the said articles actually presents

no actual controversy that a court could decide. In such action, there would be no actual rights to be enforces, no wrong to
be remedied nor any status to be established.

3. A judicial pronouncement declaring a person presumptively dead under Article 390 or Article 391 of the Civil Code, in an action
exclusively based thereon, would never really become "final" as the same only confirms tha existence of a prima facie or disputable
presumption. The function of a court to render decisions that is supposed to be final and binding between litigants is thereby
compromised.

4. Moreove, a court action to declare a person presumptively dead under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code would be
unnecessary. The presumption in the said articles is already established by law.

Verily, under prevailing case law, courts are without any authority to take cognizance of a petition that-like the one filed by the
petitioner in the case at bench-only seeks to have a person declared presumptively dead under the Civil Code. Such a petition is
not authorized by law.17 Hence, by acting upon and eventually granting the petitioner's petition for the declaration of presumptive
death, the RTC violated prevailing jurisprudence and thereby committed grave abuse of discretion. The CA, therefore, was only
correct in setting aside the RTC's decision.

II

Before bringing this case to its logical conclusion, however, there are a few points the Court is minded to make.

It is not lost on this Court that much of the present controversy stemmed from the misconception that a court declaration
is required in order to establish a person is presumptively dead for purposes of claiming his death benefits as a military serviceman
under pertinent laws.18 This misconception is what moved petitioner to file her misguided petition for the declaration of
presumptive death of Wilfredo and what ultimately exposed her to unnecessary difficulties in prosecuting an otherwise simple claim
for death benefits either before the Philippine Veterans' Affair Office (PVAO) of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).

What the Court finds deeply disconnecting, however, is the possibility that such misconception may have been peddles by no less
than the PVAO and the AFP themselves; that such agencies, as a matter of practice, had been requiring claimants, such as the
petitioner, to first secure a court declaration of presumptive death before processing the death before processing the death
benefits of missing serviceman.

In view of the foregoing circumstances, the Court deems it necessary to issue the following guidelines-culled from relevant law and
jurisprudential pronouncements-to aid the public, PVAO and the AFP in making or dealing with claims of death benefits which are
similar to that of the petitioner:

1. The PVAO and the AFP can decide claims of death benefits of a missing soldier without requiring the claimant to
first produce a court declaration of the presumptive death of such soldier. In such claims, the PVAO and the AFP can
make their own determination, on the basis of the evidence presented by the claimant, whether the presumption of death under
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code may be applied or not.

It must be stressed that the presumption of death under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code arises by operation of law, without
need of a court declaration, once the factual conditions mentioned in the said articles are established.19 Hence, requiring the
claimant to further secure a court declaration in order to establish the presumptive death of a missing soldier is not proper and
contravenes established jurisprudence on the matter.20

2. In order to avail of the presumption, therefore, the claimant need only present before the PVAO or the appropriate office of the
AFP, as the case may be, any "evidence"21 which shows that the concerned soldier had been missing for such number of years and
or under the circumstances prescribed under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. Obviously, the "evidence" referred to
here excludes a court declaration of presumptive death.

3. The PVAO or the AFP, as the case may be, may then weigh the evidence submitted by the claimant and determine their
sufficiency to establish the requisite factual conditions specified under Article 390 or 391 of the Civil Code in order for the
presumption of death to arise. If the PVAO or the AFP determines that the evidence submitted by the claimant is
sufficient, they should not hesitate to apply the presumption of death and pay the latter's claim.

4. If the PVAO or the AFP determines that the evidence submitted by the claimant is not sufficient to invoke the presumption of
death under the Civil Code and denies the latter's claim by reason thereof, the claimant may file an appeal with the Office of the
President (OP) pursuant to the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

If the OP denies the appeal, the claimant may next seek recourse via a petition for review with the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules
of the Court. And finally, shold such recourse still fail, the claimant may file an appeal by certiorari with the Supreme Court.
While we are constrained by case law to deny the instant petition, the Court is hopeful that, by the foregoing guidelines, the
unfortunate experience of the petitioner would no longer be replicated in the future.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated November 28, 2016 and Resolution dated March 20, 2017 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 129467 are AFFIRMED. The Court declares that a judicial decision of a court of law that a
person is presumptively dead is not requirement before the Philippine Veterans' Affairs Office and the Armed Forces of the
Philippines for their consideration.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 209527 February 14, 2018

THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner

vs.
VIRGIE (VIRGEL) L. TIPAY, Respondent

DECISION

REYES, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari1 brought under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the October
9, 2013 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) that denied the appeal of petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) from the
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lupon, Davao Oriental. The trial court, in turn, granted respondent Virgie (Virgel) L.
Tipay's (Virgel) petition for the correction of certain entries in his birth certificate.4

Factual Antecedents

In a petition dated February 13, 2009, Virgel sought the correction of several entries in his birth certificate. Attached to the petition
are two (2) copies of his birth certificate, respectively issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Govemor Generoso, Davao Oriental
and the National Statistics Office5 (NSO). Both copies reflect his gender as "FEMALE' and his first name as "Virgie." It further
appears that the month and day of birth in the local civil registrar's copy was blank, while the NSO-issued birth certificate indicates
that he was born on May 12, 1976.6 Virgel alleged that these entries are erroneous, and sought the correction of his birth
certificate as follows: (a) his gender, from "FEMALE" to "MALE;" (b) his first name, from "VIRGIE" to "VIRGEL;" and (c) his month
and date of birth to "FEBRUARY 25, 1976."7

The petition was found sufficient in form and substance, and the case proceeded to trial. Aside from his own personal testimony,
Virgel's mother, Susan L. Tipay, testified that she gave birth to a son on February 25, 1976, who was baptized as "Virgel." The
Certificate of Baptism, including other documentary evidence such as a medical certificate stating that Virgel is phenotypically male,
were also presented to the trial court.8

Ruling of the RTC

There was no opposition to the petition. Soon after, the RTC rendered its Decision9 dated July 27, 2010 granting Virgel's petition:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, an Order is hereby issued:

1. Directing the Local Civil Registrar of Governor Generoso, Davao Oriental to cause the appropriate change in the Certificate of
Live Birth of VIRGIE L. TIPA Y upon payment of the required legal fees, particularly:

First Name : From: VIRGIE

  To: VIRGEL
 
Sex : From: Female
  To: MALE
 
Date of Birth of Child : From: no entry
  To: FEBRUARY 25, 1976

SO ORDERED.10

From this decision, the Republic filed a Notice of Appeal, which was given due course by the trial court.11 The Republic, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argued that the change of Virgel's name from Virgie should have been made through a
proceeding under Rule 103, and not Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. This argument was premised on the assumption that the
summary procedure under Rule 108 is confined to the correction of clerical or innocuous errors, which excludes one's name or date
of birth. Since the petition lodged with the RTC was not filed pursuant to Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, the Republic asserted that
the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case.12

Virgel refuted these arguments, alleging that changes of name are within the purview of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. He further
disagreed with the position of the Republic and asserted that substantial errors may be corrected provided that the proceedings
before the trial court were adversarial. He also argued that the proceedings before the RTC were in rem, which substantially
complies with the requirements of either Rule 103 or Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.13

Ruling of the CA

The CA denied the Republic's appeal in its Decision14 dated October 9, 2013, the dispositive of which reads:

ACCORDINGLY, the appeal is DENIED. The July 27, 2010 Decision of the [RTC], 11th Judicial Region, Branch No. 32, Lupon, Davao
Oriental, in Special Proceedings Case No. 243-09 is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.15

In its assailed decision, the CA ruled in favor of Virgel, stating that while the correction of the entry on his gender is considered a
substantial change, it is nonetheless within the jurisdiction of the trial court under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The CA also held
that the petition filed with the trial court fully complied with the jurisdictional requirements of Rule 108 because notices were sent
to the concerned local civil registrar and the OSG. Since Virgel was able to establish that he is indeed male, a fact which remains
undisputed, the CA upheld the trial court's decision.16

As to the change of Virgel's name from "Virgie" to "Virgel," the CA did not find any reason to depart from the decision of the RTC
because it was more expeditious to change the entry in the same proceeding. The CA found that the correction of Virgel's name
was necessary to avoid confusion, especially since his correct gender is male. In the same vein, the CA ruled that even if the
petition with the RTC was considered a Rule 103 proceeding, the requirements under Rule 108 are substantially the same as that
under Rule 103. Thus, the CA already deemed these requirements complied with.17 Finally, regarding the month and date of
Virgel's birth, the CA found the documentary evidence credible enough to establish that he was indeed born on February 25,
1976.18

Unsatisfied with the ruling of the CA, the Republic appealed to this Court insisting that the entries sought to be corrected are
substantial changes outside the jurisdiction of the trial court. The Republic also reiterated its earlier arguments, adding that the CA
should not have equated the procedural requirements under Rule 103 with that of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.19

Ruling of the Court

The Court denies the petition. However, this Court finds that the evidence is insufficient to establish that Virgel was born on
February 25, 1976.

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court governs the procedure for the
correction of substantial changes in the civil registry.

It is true that initially, the changes that may be corrected under the summary procedure of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are
clerical or harmless errors. Errors that affect the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a person, are considered substantial errors
that were beyond the purview of the rule.20

Jurisprudence on this matter later developed, giving room for the correction of substantial errors. The Court ultimately recognized
that substantial or controversial alterations in the civil registry are allowable in an action filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court,
as long as the issues are properly threshed out in appropriate adversarial proceedings effectively limiting the application of
the summary procedure to the correction of clerical or innocuous errors.21 The Court's ruling in Republic v. Valencia,22 explained the
adversarial procedure to be followed in correcting substantial errors in this wise:

It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous
nature, but one involving nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as well as controverted, affirmative relief
cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in nature. However, it is also true that a right in law may be enforced and a wrong
may be remedied as long as the appropriate remedy is used. This Court adheres to the principle that even substantial
errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error
avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. As a matter of fact, the opposition of the Solicitor General dated
February 20, 1970 while questioning the use of Article 412 of the Civil Code in relation to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court
admits that "the entries sought to be corrected should be threshed out in an appropriate proceeding."

xx xx

Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
register are-(1) the civil registrar, and (2) all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby. Upon the
filing of the petition, it becomes the duty of the court to-(1) issue an order fixing the time and place for the hearing of the petition,
and (2) cause the order for hearing to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province. The following are likewise entitled to oppose the petition: (1) the civil registrar, and (2) any person
having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought.
If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction and/or cancellation of entries in the record of
birth even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can no longer be described as "summary". There
can be no doubt that when an opposition to the petition is filed either by the Civil Registrar or any person having or claiming any
interest in the entries sought to be cancelled and/or corrected and the opposition is actively prosecuted, the proceedings thereon
become adversary proceedings.23 (Emphasis Ours)

Evidently, the Republic incorrectly argued that the petition for correction under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is
limited to changes in entries containing harmless and innocuous errors. 24 The cited cases in the petition were already
superseded by much later jurisprudence.25 Most importantly, with the enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 904826 in 2001, the
local civil registrars, or the Consul General as the case may be, are now authorized to correct clerical or typographical errors in the
civil registry, or make changes in the first name or nickname, without need of a judicial order.27 This law provided an administrative
recourse for the correction of clerical or typographical errors, essentially leaving the substantial corrections in the civil registry to
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.28

The RTC was correct in taking

cognizance of the petition for
correction of entries in Virgel's birth
certificate.

R.A. No. 9048 defined a clerical or typographical error as a mistake committed in. the performance of clerical work, which is
harmless and immediately obvious to the understanding.29 It was further amended in 2011, when R.A. No. 1017230 was passed to
expand the authority of local civil registrars and the Consul General to make changes in the day and month in the date of birth, as
well as in the recorded sex of a person when it is patently clear that there was a typographical error or mistake in the entry.31

Unfortunately, however, when Virgel filed the petition for correction with the RTC in 2009, R.A. No. 10172 was not yet in effect. As
such, to correct the erroneous gender and date of birth in Virgel's birth certificate, the proper remedy was to commence the
appropriate adversarial proceedings with the RTC, pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.32 The changes in the entries
pertaining to the gender and date of birth are indisputably substantial corrections, outside the contemplation of a clerical or
typographical error that may be corrected administratively.

The records of this case show that Virgel complied with the procedural requirements under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. He
impleaded the local civil registrar of Governor Generoso, Davao Oriental, the Solicitor General, and the Provincial Prosecutor of
Davao Oriental as parties to his petition for correction of entries.33 The RTC then issued an order, which set the case for hearing on
July 10, 2009. In compliance with Rule 108, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, the order was published for three (3) consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province of Davao Oriental. Additionally, the local civil registrar and the OSG
were notified of the petition through registered mail.34

The OSG entered its appearance and deputized the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Mati, Davao City for purposes of the
proceedings before the RTC. Accordingly, the prosecutor assigned to the case was present during the hearing but opted not to
cross-examine Virgel or his mother after their respective testimonies. There was also no opposition filed against the petition of
Virgel before the RTC.35

From the foregoing, it is clear that the parties who have a claim or whose interests may be affected were notified and granted an
opportunity to oppose the petition. Two sets of notices were sent to potential oppositors-through registered mail for the persons
named in the petition, and through publication, for all other persons who are not named but may be considered interested or
affected parties.36 A hearing was scheduled for the presentation of Virgel's testimonial and documentary evidence, during which
time, the deputized prosecutor of the OSG was present, and allowed to participate in the proceedings. While none of the parties
questioned the veracity of Virgel's allegations, much less present any controverting evidence before the trial court,37 the RTC
proceedings were clearly adversarial in nature. It dutifully complied with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court.

Notably, the Republic does not assail whether the proceedings before the trial court were adversarial, but merely insists on the
erroneous premise that a Rule 108 proceeding is limited to the correction of harmless, clerical or typographical errors in the civil
registry.38 Having established that the proper recourse for the correction of substantial changes in the civil registry is Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court, the Court cannot sustain the Republic's assertion on this matter. The Court has long settled in Republic v.
Olaybar39 that as long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108 were observed, substantial corrections and changes in the civil
registry, such as those involving the entries on sex and date of birth, may already be effected, viz.:

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings
may either be summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification
affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary.
Since the promulgation of Republic v. Valencia in 1986, the Court has repeatedly ruled that "even substantial errors in a civil
registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the true facts established and the parties aggrieved by the
error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding." An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the
trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel
have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party's case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and
considered.
It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed with, and the remedy [is] granted upon
mere application or motion. However, a special proceeding is not always summary. The procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a
summary proceeding per se. It requires publication of the petition; it mandates the inclusion as parties of all persons who may
claim interest which would be affected by the cancellation or correction; it also requires the civil registrar and any person in
interest to file their opposition, if any; and it states that although the court may make orders expediting the proceedings, it is after
hearing that the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the same. Thus, as long as the procedural
requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections and changes in
entries of the civil register.40 (Emphases Ours)

Since the Republic was unable to substantiate its arguments, or even cite a specific rule of procedure that Virgel failed to follow,
the Court has no reason to depart from the factual findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA. Furthermore, in the absence of
evidence refuting Virgel' s assertion that he is indeed phenotypically male, the correction of the entry on Virgel's sex in his birth
certificate, from "FEMALE' to "MALE," was correctly granted.

With respect to the change of his name to "Virgel," the Court does not agree with the CA that the requirements under Rule 103 of
the Rules of Court may be substituted with that of Rule 108. These remedies are distinct and separate from one another, and
compliance with one rule cannot serve as a fulfillment of the requisites prescribed by the other.41 Nonetheless, the Court has
settled in Republic v. Mercadera42 that changes in one's name are not necessarily confined to a petition filed under Rule 103 of the
Rules of Court. Rule 108, Section 2 of the Rules of Court include "changes of name" in the enumeration of entries in the civil
register that may be cancelled or corrected. Thus, the name "Virgie" may be corrected to "Virgel," as a necessary consequence of
the substantial correction on Virgel's gender, and to allow the record to conform to the truth.

With respect to the date of Virgel's birth, the Court again disagrees with the CA that the alleged date (i.e., February 25, 1976) is
undisputed. The NSO copy of Virgel's birth certificate indicates that he was born on May 12, 1976, a date obviously different from
that alleged in the petition for correction.43 As a public document, the date of birth appearing in the NSO copy is presumed valid
and prima facie evidence of the facts stated in it.

Virgel bore the burden of proving its supposed falsity.44 Virgel failed to discharge this burden. The police clearance presented to the
trial court corroborates the entry in the NSO copy, indicating Virgel's date of birth as May 12, 1976.45 The Court is also unconvinced
by the other documentary evidence supposedly showing that Virgel was born on February 25, 1976 because the information
indicated in the identification card from the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Member Data Record from the Philippine Health
Insurance Corporation, were all supplied by Virgel.46 These are self-serving information, which do not suffice to overcome the
presumption of validity accorded to the date of birth reflected in the NSO copy of Virgel's birth certificate.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated October 9, 2013 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 02286 is AFFIRMED, only insofar as the corrections of the following entries in the birth
certificate are concerned: (a) first name, from "Virgie" to "Virgel;" and (b) gender, from "FEMALE' to "MALE."

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 187524               August 5, 2015

SPOUSES MARIA BUTIONG and VILLAFRlA, DR. RUEL B. SPOUSES MARIA FRANCISCO substituted by VILLAFRIA,
Petitioners,
vs.
MA. GRACIA RINOZA PLAZO and MA. FE RINOZA ALARAS, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision 1 and Resolution, 2 dated March 13, 2009 and April 23, 2009·, respectively, of the Court Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
107347, Which affirmed the Judgment 3 dated October 1, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Nasugbu, Batangas, Branch 14,
in Civil Case No. 217.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

On November 16, 1989, Pedro L. Rifioza died intestate, leaving several heirs, including his_ children with his first wife, respondents
Ma. Gracia R. Plazo and Ma. Fe Alaras, as well as several properties including a resort covered by Transfer Certificates of Title
(TCT) No. 51354 and No. 51355, each with an area of 351 square meters, and a family home, the land on which it stands is
covered by TCT Nos. 40807 and 40808, both located in Nasugbu, Batangas. 4

In their Amended Complaint for Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery of Possession 5 dated September 15, 1993,
respondents alleged that sometime in March 1991, they discovered that their co-heirs, Pedro’s second wife, Benita"Tenorio and
other children, had sold the subject properties to petitioners, spouses Francisco Villafria and Maria Butiong, who are now deceased
and substituted by their son, Dr. Ruel B. Villafria, without their knowledge and consent. When confronted about the sale, Benita
acknowledged the same, showing respondents a document she believed evidenced receipt of her share in the sale, which,
however, did not refer to any sort of sale but to a previous loan obtoiined by Pedro and Benita from a bank. 6 The document
actually evidenced receipt from Banco Silangan of the amount of ₱87, 352.62 releasing her and her late husband’s indebtedness
therefrom. 7 Upon inquiry, the Register of Deeds of Nasugbu informed respondents that he has no record of any transaction
involving the subject properties, giving them certified true copies of the titles to the same. When respondents went to the subject
properties, they discovered that 4 out of the 8 cottages in the resort had been demolished. They were not, however, able to enter
as the premises were padlocked.

Subsequently, respondents learned that on July 18, 1991, a notice of an extra-judicial settlement of estate of their late father was
published in a tabloid called Balita. Because of this, they caused the annotation of their adverse claims over the subject properties
before the Register of Deeds of Nasugbu and filed their complaint praying, among others, for the annulment of all documents
conveying the subject properties to the petitioners and certificates of title issued pursuant thereto. 8

In their Answer, 9 petitioners denied the allegations of the complaint on the groun_d of lack of personal knowledge and good faith
in acquiring the subject properties. In the course of his testimony during trial, petitioner Francisco further contended that what
they purchased was only the resort. 10 He also presented an Extra-Judicial Settlement with Renunciation, Repudiations and Waiver
of Rights and Sale which provides, among others, that respondents' co-heirs sold the family home to the spouses Rolando and Ma.
Cecilia Bondoc for Pl million as well as a Deed of Sale whereby Benita sold the resort to petitioners for ₱650, 000.00. 11

On October 1, 2001, the trial court nullified the transfer of the subject Properties to petitioners and spouses Bondoc due to
irregularities in the Documents of conveyance offered by petitioner’s .as well as the circumstances Surrounding the execution of
the same. Specifically, the Extra-Judicial Settlement was notarized by a notary public that was not duly commissioned as such on
the date it was executed. 12 The Deed of Sale was Undated, the date of the acknowledgment therein was left blank, and the
Typewritten name "Pedro Rifioza, Husband" on the left side of the document Was not signed. 13 The trial court also observed that
both documents were Never presented to the Office of the Register of Deeds for registration and That the titles to the subject
properties were still in the names of Pedro and His second wife Benita. In addition, the supposed notaries and buyers of the
Subject properties were not even presented as witnesses whom supposedly witnessed the signing and execution of the documents
of conveyance. 14 On The basis thereof, the triaI court ruled in favor of respondents, in its Judgment, the pertinent portions of its
fallo provide:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, judgment is Hereby rendered as follows:

xxxx

4. A) Declaring as a nullity the ~'Extra-Judicial Settlement with Renunciation, Repudiation and Waiver of Rights and Sale" (Ex. "l ",
Villafria) notarized on December 23, 1991 by Notary Public Antonio G. Malonzo of Manila, Doc. No. 190, Page No. 20, Book No.
IXII, Series of 1991. .
 b) Declaring as a nullity the Deed of Absolute Sale (Ex. "2", Villafria), purportedly executed by Benita T. Rifioza in favor of
spouses Francisco Villafria and Maria Butiong, purportedly notarized by one Alfredo de Guzman marked Doc. No. 1136,
Page No. 141, and Book. No. XXX, Series of 1991.

c) Ordering the forfeiture of any and all improvements introduced By defendants Francisco Villafria and Maria Butiong in
the properties Covered by TCT No. 40807, 40808, 51354 and 51355 of the Register of Deeds for Nasugbu, Batangas. .

5. Ordering defendant Francisco Villafria and all persons, whose Occupancy within the premises of the four- (4) parcels of land
described in Par. 4-c above is derived from the rights and interest of defendant Villafria, to vacate its premises and to deliver
possession thereof, and all improvements existing thereon to plaintiffs, for and in behalf of the estate of decedent Pedro L. Rifioza.

6. Declaring the plaintiffs and the defendants-heirs in the Amended Complaint to be the legitimate heirs of decedent Pedro L.
Rifioza, each in the capacity and degree established, as well as their direct successors-in interest, and ordering the defendant
Registrar of Deeds to issue the co1Tesponding titles in their names in the proportion established by law, pro in division, in TCT
Nos. 40807, 40808, 51354, 51355 and 40353 (after restoration) within ten (10) days from finality of this Decision, 4pon payment
of lawful fees, except TCT No. 40353, which shall be exempt from all expenses for its restoration.

With no costs.

SO ORDERED. 15

On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial ‘court’s Judgment in its Decision 16 dated October 31, 2006 in the following wise:

The person before whom the resort deed was acknowledged, Alfredo de Guzman, was not commissioned as a notary public from
1989 to July 3, 1991, the date the certification was issued. Such being the case, the resort deed is not a public document and the
presumption of regularity accorded to public documents will not apply to the same. As laid down in Tigno, et al. v. Aquino, et al.:

The validity of a notarial certification necessarily derives from the authority of the notarial officer. If the notary public docs net
have the capacity to notarize a document, but does so anyway, then the document should be treated as A. Unnotarized. The rule
may strike as rather harsh, and perhaps may prove to be prejudicial to parties in good faith relying on the proferred authority of
the notary public or the person pretending to be one. Still, to admit otherwise would render merely officious the elaborate process
devised by this Court in order that a lawyer may receive a notarial commission. Without such a rule,

The notarization of a document by a duly appointed notary public will have the same legal effect as one accomplished by a non-
lawyer engaged in pretense. The notarization of a document carries considerable legal effect. Notarization of a private document
converts such document into a public one, and renders it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. Thus,
notarization is not an empty routine; to the contrary, it engages public interest in a substantial degree and the protection of that
interest requires preventing those who are not qualified or authorized to act as notaries public from imposing upon the public and
the courts and administrative offices generally.

Parenthetically, the settlement/family home deed cannot be considered a public document. This is because the following cast doubt
on the document's authenticity, to wit: J.

1.) The date of its execution was not indicated;

2.) The amount of consideration was superimposed;

3.) It was not presented to the Registry of Deeds of Nasugbu, Batangas for annotation; and

4.) Not even the supposed notary public," Alfredo de Guzman, or the purported buyer, the Spouses Rolando and Ma. Cecilia
Bondoc, were presented as witnesses. · Concededly, the absence of notarization in the resort deed and/or the lacking details in the
settlement/family home deed did not necessarily invalidate the transactions evidenced by the said documents. However, since the
said deeds are private documents, perforce, their due execution and authenticity becomes subject to the requirement of proof
under the Rules on Evidence, Section 20, Rule 132 of which provides: Sec. 20. Proof of private document. - Before any private.
Document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution a"Q.d. authenticity must be proved either:

(a). By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or

(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

The Complaining Heirs insist that the settlement/family home and the resort deed are void, as their signatures thereon are
forgeries as opposed to the Villafrias who profess the deeds' enforceability. After the Complaining Heirs presented proofs in support
of their claim that their signatures were forged, the burden then fell upon the Villafrias to disprove the ~ame2 or conversely, to
prove the authenticity and due execution of the said deeds. The Villafrias failed in this regard.
As forestalled, the Villafrias did not present as witnesses (a) the notary public who purportedly notarized the questioned
instrument, (b) the witnesses who appear [Ed] in the instruments as eyewitnesses to the signing, or (c) an expert to prove the
authenticity and genuineness of all the signatures appearing on the said instruments. Verily, the rule that, proper foundation must
be laid for the admission of documentary evidence; that is, the identity and authenticity of the document must be reasonably
established as a pre requisite to its admission, was prudently observed by the lower court when it refused to admit the
settlement/family home and the resort deeds as their veracity are doubtful. 17

Aggrieved, petitioners, substituted by their son Ruel Villafria, filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 24, 2006 raising
the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction. It was alleged that when the Complaint for Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title and
Recovery of Possession was filed, there was yet no settlement of Pedro's estate, determination as to the nature thereof, nor was
there an identification of the number of legitimate heirs. As such, the trial court ruled on the settlement of the intestate estate of
Pedro in its ordinary· jurisdiction when the action filed was for Judidal Partition. Considering that the instant action is really one for
settlement of intestate estate, the trial court, sitting merely in its probate jurisdiction, exceeded its jurisdiction when it ruled upon
the issues of forgery and ownership. Thus, petitioner argued that. Said ruling is void and has no effect for having been rendered
without jurisdiction. The Motion for Reconsideration was, however, denied by the appellate court on February 26, 2007.

On appeal, this Court denied on June 20, 2007, petitioner's Petition for Review on Certiorari for submitting a verification of the
petition, a certificate of non-forum shopping and an affidavit of service that failed to comply with the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice regarding competent evidence of affiant' s identities. 18 In its Resolution 19 dated September 26, 2007, this Court also
denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in the absence of any compelling reason to warrant a modification of the previous
denial. Thus, the June 20, 2007 Resolution became final and executors on October 31, 2007 as certified by the Entry of Judgment
issued by the Court. 20 On January 16, 2008, the Court further denied petitioner' s motion for leave to admit a second motion for
reconsideration of its September 26, 2007 Resolution, considering that the same is a prohibited pleading under Section 2, Rule 52,
in relation to Section 4, Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Furthennore, petitioner's letter dated December
18, 2007 pleading the Court to take a second. Look at his petition for review on certiorari and that a decision thereon be rendered
based purely on its merits was noted without action. 21

Unsatisfied, petitioner wrote a letter dated March 24, 2008 addressed to then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno praying that a decision
on the case be rendered based on the. Merits and not on formal requirements "as he stands to lose everything his parents had left
him just because the verification against non-forum shopping is formally defective." However, in view of the Entry of Judgment
having been made on October 31, 2007, the Court likewise noted said letter without action. 22

On November 27, 2008, the RTC issued an Order, issuing a Part Writ of Execution of its October 1, 2001 Decision with respect to
the portions disposing of petitioner's claims as affirmed by the CA.

The foregoing notwithstanding, petitioner filed, on February 11, 200 a Petition for Annulment of Judgment and· Order before the
CA assailing October 1, 2001 Decision as well as the November 27, 2008 Order of the RTC on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and
lack of jurisdiction. In Decision dated March 13, 2009, however, the CA dismissed the petition a affirmed the rulings of the trial
court in the following wise: Although the assailed Decision of the Court a quo has already become final and executory and in fact
entry of judgment was issued on 31 October 2007, supra, nevertheless, to put the issues to rest,·We deem it apropos to tackle the
same.

The Petitioner argues that the assailed Decision and Order of the Court a quo, supra, should be annulled and set aside on the
grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.

We are not persuaded.

xxxx

Section 2 of the Rules as stated above provides that the annulment of a judgment may "be based only on grounds of extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction." In RP v. The Heirs of Sancho Magdato, the High Tribunal stressed that: There is extrinsic fraud
when "the unsuccessful party had been ·prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his
opponent, as by keeping him away from court, ... or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being kept in
ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; ... "

Otherwise put, extrinsic or collateral fraud pertains to such fraud, which prevents the aggrieved party ·from having a trial or
presenting his case to the court, or is used to procure the judgment without fair submission of the controversy. This refers to acts
intended to keep the unsuccessful party away from the courts as when there is a false promise of compromise or when one is kept
in ignorance of the suit. The pivotal issues before us are (1) whether. There was a time during the proceedings below that the
Petitioners ever prevented from exhibiting fully their case, by fraud or deception, practiced on them by Respondents, and (2)
whether the Petitioners were kept away from the court or kept in ignorance by the acts of the Respondent?

We find nothing of that sort. Instead, what we deduced as We carefully delved. Into the evidentiary facts surrounding the instant
case as well as the proceedings below as shown in the 36-page Decision of the Court a quo, is that the Petitioners were given
ample time to rebut the allegations of the Respondents and had in fact addressed every detail of. Respondent's cause of action
against them. Thus, Petitioners' allegation of the Court a quo ‘s lack of jurisdiction is misplaced.
Our pronouncement on the matter finds support in the explicit ruling of the Supreme Court in Sps. Santos, et al. v. Sps. Lumbao,
thus: It is elementary that' the active participation of a party in a case pending against him before a court is tantamount to
recognition of that court's jurisdiction and willingness to abide by the resolution of the case which will bar said party from later on
impugning the court’s jurisdiction. ' In fine, under the circumstances obtaining in this case the Petitioners are stopped from
assailing the Court a quo 's lack of jurisdiction. Too, We do not find merit in the Petitioners' second issue, supra. As mentioned
earlier, entry of judgment had already been made on the assailed Decision and Order as early as 31 October 2007.

xxxx

It maybe that the doctrine of finality of judgments permits certain equitable remedies such as a petition for annulment. But the I.
Rules are clear. The annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of the Regional
Trial Courts is resorted to only where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies
are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner, supra.

If Petitioners lost their chance to avail themselves of the appropriate remedies or appeal before the Supreme Court, that is their
own look out. The High Tribunal has emphatically pointed out in Mercado, et al. v. Security Bank Corporation, thus:

A principle almost repeated to satiety is that "an action for annulment of judgment cannot and is not a substitute for the lost
remedy of·appeal." A party must have first availed of appeal, a motion for new trial or a petition for relief before an action for
annulment can prosper. Its obvious rationale is to prevent the party from benefiting from his inaction or negligence. Also, the
action for annulment of judgment must be based either on (a) extrinsic fraud or (b) lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process.
Having failed to avail of the remedies and there being 'a Clear showing that neither of the grounds was present, the petition must
be dismissed. Only a disgruntled litigant would find such legal disposition unacceptable. 23 When the appellate court denied
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution dated April 23, 2009, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review on
Certiorari on June 10, 2009, invoking the following ground:

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT RULING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 14,
NASUGBU, BATANGAS, ACTED WITHOUT JURISDCITION IN ENTERTAINING THE SPECIAL PROCEEDING FOR THE SETTLEMENT
OF ESTATE OF PEDRO RINOZA AND THE CIVIL ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF TITLE OF THE HEIRS AND THIRD PERSONS IN ONE
PROCEEDING. 24

Petitioner asserts that while the complaint filed by respondents was captioned as "Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title and
Recovery of Possession," the allegations therein show that the cause of action is actually one for settlement of estate of decedent
Pedro. Considering that settlement of estate is a special proceeding cognizable by a probate court of limited jurisdiction while
judicial partition with annulment of title and recovery of possession are ordinary civil actions cognizable by a court of general
jurisdiction, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in entertaining the latter while it was sitting merely in its probate jurisdiction.
This is in view of the prohibition found in the Rules on the joiner of special civil actions and ordinary civil actions. 25 Thus, petitioner
argued that the ruling of the trial court is void and has no effect for having been rendered in without jurisdiction.

Petitioner also reiterates the arguments raised before the appellate court that since the finding of forgery relates only to the
signature of respondents and not to their co-heirs, who assented to the conveyance, the transaction should be considered valid as
to them. Petitioner also denies the indings of the courts below that his parents are builders in bad faith for they only took
possession of the subject properties after the execution of the transfer documents and after they paid the consideration on the
sale.

The petition is bereft of merit. Petitioner maintains that since. Respondents’ complaint alleged the following causes of action, the
same is actually one for settlement of estate and not of judicial partition: FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

1. That Pedro L. Rifi.oza, Filipino and resident of Nasugbu, Batangas at the time of his death, died intestate on November
16, 1989. Copy of his death certificate is hereto attached as Annex "A";

2. That Plaintiffs together with the Defendants enumerated from paragraph 2-A to 2-J are the only known heirs of the
above-mentioned decedent. The plaintiffs and the Defendants Rolando, Rafael, Antonio, Angelita, Loma all surnamed
Rifioza, and Myrna R. Limon or Myrna R. Rogador, Epifania Belo and Ma. Theresa R. Demafelix are the decedent’s
legitimate children with his first wife, while Benita Tenorio Rifioza, is the decedent’s widow and Bernadette Rifioza, the
decedent's daughter with said widow. As such, said parties are co-owners by virtue of an intestate inheritance from the
decedent, of the properties enumerated in the succeeding paragraph; ‘

3. That the decedent left the following real properties all located in Nasugbu, Batangas:

xxxx

16. That the estate of decedent Pedro L. Rifioza has no known legal indebtedness;
 17. That said estate remains undivided up to this date and it will be to the best interest of all heirs that it be partitioned
judicially. 26.

Petitioner is mistaken. It is true that some of respondents' causes of action pertaining to the properties left behind by the decedent
Pedro, his known heirs, and the nature and extent of their interests thereon may fall under an action for settlement of estate.
However, a complete reading of the complaint would readily show that, based on the nature of the suit, the llegations therein, and
the relief’s prayed for, the action, is clearly one for udicial partition with annulment of title and recovery of possession.

Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court proyides:

RULE 74
Summary Settlement of Estate

Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. - If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of
age5 or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may
without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed
in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only
one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filled in the office of the register of deeds. The
parties to an Extrajudicial settlement, whether by public instrument or by stipulation in a pending action for partition, or the sole
heir who adjudicates the entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit shall file, simultaneously with and as a condition
precedent to the filing of the public instrument, or stipulation in the action for partition, or of the affidavit in the office of the
register of deeds, a bond with the said register of deeds, in an amount equivalent to the value of the personal property involved as
certified to under oath by the parties concerned and conditioned upon the payment of any just claim that may be filed under
section 4 of this rule. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of administration
within two (2) years after the death of the decedent.

The fact of the Extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be Published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner
provided in the next succeeding section; but no Extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated
therein or had no notice thereof. 27

In this relation, Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. - A person having the right to compel the partition of real estate may do
so as provided in this Rule, setting forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his title and an adequate description of the real
estate of which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all other persons interested in the property. 28

As can be gleaned from the foregoing provisions, the allegations of respondents in their complaint are but customary, in fact,
mandatory, to a complaint for partition of real estate. Particularly, the complaint alleged: (1) that Pedro died intestate; (2) that
respondents, together with their co-heirs, are all of legal age, with the exception of one who is represented by a judicial
representative duly authorized for the purpose; (3) that the heirs enumerated are the only known heirs of Pedro; (4) that there is
an account and description of all real properties left by Pedro; (5) that Pedro's estate has no known indebtedness; and (6) that
respondents, as rightful heirs to the decedent’s estate, pray for the partition of the same in accordance with the laws of intestacy.
It is clear, therefore, that based on the allegations of the complaint, the case is one for judicial partition. That the complaint
alleged causes of action identifying the heirs of the decedent, properties of the estate, and their rights thereto, does not perforce
make it an action for settlement of estate.

It must be recalled that the general rule is that when a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an executor in his will or
the executor o named is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or. Fails to furnish the bond equipped by the Rules of Court, then the
decedent's estate shall be judicially administered and the competent court shall appoint a qualified administrator the order
established in Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. 29 An exception to this rule, however, is found in the aforequoted Section
1 of Rule 4 wherein the heirs of a decedent, who left no will and no debts due from is estate, may divide the estate either
extrajudicially or in an ordinary action or partition without submitting the same for judicial administration nor applying for the
appointment of an administrator by the court. 30 The reasons that where the deceased dies without pending obligations, there is no
necessity for the appointment of an administrator to administer the. Estate for hem and to deprive the real owners of their
possession to which they are immediately entitled. 31

In this case, it was expressly alleged in the complaint, and was not isputed, that Pedro died without a will, leaving his estate
without any ending obligations. Thus, contrary to petitioner’s contention, respondents were under no legal obligation to submit the
subject properties of the estate of a special proceeding for settlement of intestate estate, and are, in fact, encouraged to have the
same partitioned, judicially or extrajudicially, by ereira v. Court of Appeals: 32

Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however, does not preclude the heirs from instituting administration proceedings,
even if the estate has no· debts or obligations, if they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary action for partition.
While Section 1 allows the heirs to divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit, qr. to resort to an ordinary action for
partition, the said provision does not compel them to do so if they have good reasons to take a different course of action. It should
be noted that recourse to an administration proceeding even if the estate has no debts is sanctioned only if the heirs have good
reasons for not resorting to an action for partition. Where partition is possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be
burdened with an administration proceeding without good and compelling reasons.

Thus, it has been repeatedly 4eld that when a person dies without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age
or not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for the
appointment of an administrator by the Court. It has been uniformly held that in such case the judicial administration and the
appointment of an administrator are superfluous and unnecessary proceedings. 33

Thus, respondents committed no error in. filing an action for judicial partition instead of a special proceeding for the settlement of
estate as law expressly permits the same. That the complaint contained allegations inherent in an action for settlement of estate
does not. Mean that there was a prohibited joined of causes of action for questions as to the estate's properties as well as a
determination of the heirs, their status as such, and the nature and extent of their titles to the estate, may also be properly
ventilated in partition proceedings alone.34 In fact, a complete inventory of the estate may likewise be done during the partition
proceedings, especially since the estate has no debts.~5 Indeed, where the more expeditious remedy 9f partition is available to the
heirs, then they may not be compelled to submit to administration proceedings, dispensing of the risks of delay and of the
properties being dissipated. 36

Moreover, the fact that respondents' complaint also prayed for the annulment of title and recovery of possession does not strip the
trial court off of its jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Asking for the annulment of certain transfers of property could very
well be achieved in an action for partition, 37 as can be seen in cases where 1-ourts determine the parties' rights arising from
complaints asking not only for the partition of estates but also for the annulment of titles and recovery of ownership and
possession of property. 38 In fact, in Bagayas v. Bagayas, 39 ·wherein a complaint for annulment of sale and partition was dismissed
by the trial court due to the impropriety of an action for annulment as it constituted a collateral attack on the certificates of title of
the respondents therein, this Court found the dismissal to be improper in the following manner:

In Lacbayan v. Samoy, Jr. (Lacbayan) which is an action. For partition premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership
between the parties, the Court categorically pronounced that a resolution on the issue of ownership does not subject the Torrens
title issued over the disputed realties 'to a collateral attack. It must be borne in mind that what cannot be collaterally attacked is
the certificate of title and not the title itself. As pronounced in Lacbayan:

There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked, but that rule is not material to the case at bar.
What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title itself. The' certificate referred to is that -document
issued by the Register of Deeds known as the TCT. In contrast, the title referred to by law means ownership, which is, more often
than not, represented by that document. Petitioner c.pparently confuses title with the certificate of title. Title as a concept of
ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such ownership although both are interchangeably
used. (Emphases supplied)

Thus, the RTC erroneously dismissed petitioner's petition for annulment of sale on the ground that it constituted a collateral attack
since she was actually assailing Rogelio and Orlando's title to the subject lands and not any Torrens certificate oftitle over the
same.

Indeed, an action for partition does not preclude the settlement of the issue of ownership. In fact, the determination as to the
existence of the same is necessary in the resolution of an action for partition, as held in Municipality of Bifzan·v. Garcia: 40

The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact
exists, and a partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties
interested in the property. This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either because a
co-ownership does not exist, or partition is_ legally prohibited. It may end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-
ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the premises and an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant
from the real estate in question is in order. x x x

The second phase commences when it appears that "the parties are unable to agree upon the partition" directed by the court. In
that event [,] partition shall be done for the parties by the [c] ourt with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners.
This second stage may well also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the [c] ourt after the. Parties
have been accorded opportunity to be heard Thereon, and an award for the recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of
their just share in the rents and profits of the real estate in question. xx x. 41 ·

An action for partition, therefore, is premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the parties. 42 Unless and
until the issue of co-ownership is definitively resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of an estate. 43

In view of the foregoing, petitioner' s argument that the trial court acted without jurisdiction in entertaining the action of
settlement of estate and annulment of title in a single proceeding is clearly erroneous for the instant complaint is precisely one for
judicial partition with annulment of title and recovery of possession, filed within the confines of applicable law and jurisprudence.
Under Section 144 of Republic Act No. 7691 (RA 7691),45 amending Batas Pambansa Big. 129, the RTC shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Since the action
herein was not merely for partition and recovery of ownership but also for annulment of title and documents, the action is
incapable of pecuniary estimation and thus cognizable by the RTC. Hence, considering that the trial court clearly had jurisdiction in
rendering its decision, the instant petition for annulment of judgment must necessarily fail.

Note that even if the instant action was one for annulment of title alone, without the prayer for judicial partition, the requirement
of instituting a separate special proceeding for the determination of the status and rights of the respondents as putative heirs may
be dispensed with, in light of the fact that the parties had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and had already
presented evidence regarding the issue of heirship. 46 In Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran, 47 the Court explained:

In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was the sole heir to Portugal's estate, executed on February
15, 1988 the questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the second sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Said rule is an exception to the general rule that when a person dies leaving a property, it should be judicially administered and the
competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no
will, or in case he did, he failed to name an executor therein.

xxxx

It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land,
to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to
establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an
administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the evil case - subject of the present case,
could and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it
defined during pre-trial.

In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still subject · Portugal’s estate to
administration proceedings since a determination of petitioners’ status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by
petitioners, the trial court should proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial and render a decision
thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial, x x x. 48

Thus, in view of the clarity of respondents' complaint and the causes of action alleged therein, as well as the fact that the trial
court, in arriving at its decision, gave petitioner more than ample opportunity to advance his claims, petitioner cannot now be
permitted to allege lack of jurisdiction just because the judgment rendered was adverse to them. To repeat, the action filed herein
is one for judicial partition and not for settlement of intestate estate. Consequently, that respondents also prayed for the
annulment of title and recovery of possession in the same proceeding does not strip the court off of its jurisdiction for asking for
'the annulment of certain transfers of property could very well be achieved in an action for partition.

As for petitioner's contention that the sale must be considered valid as to the heirs who assented to the conveyance as well as
their allegation of good faith, this Court does not find any compelling reason to deviate from the ruling of the appellate court. As
sufficiently found by both courts below, the authenticity and due execution of the documents on which petitioner’s claims are
based were inadequately proven. They were undated, forged, and acknowledged before a notary public who was not
commissioned as such on the date they were executed. They were never presented to the Register of Deeds for registration.
Neither were the supposed notaries and buyers of the subject properties presented as witnesses.

While it may be argued that Benita, one of the co-heirs to the estate, actually acknowledged the sale of the resort, the
circumstances surrounding the same militate against the fact of its occurrence. Not only was the Deed of Sale supposedly executed
by Benita undated and unsigned by Pedro, but the document she presented purportedly evidencing her receipt of her share in the
sale, did not refer to any sort of sale but to a previous loan obtained by Pedro and Benita from a bank.

Moreover, credence must be given on the appellate court’s observations as to petitioners' actuations insofar as the transactions
alleged herein are concerned. First, they were seemingly uncertain as to the number and/or identity of the properties bought by
them. 49 In their Answer, they gave the impression 'that· they bought both the resort and the family home and yet, during trial,
Francisco Villafria claimed they only bought the resort. In fact, it was only then that they presented the subject Extra Judicial
Settlement and Deed of Sale. 50 Second, they never presented any other document which w0uld evidence their actual payment of
consideration to the selling heirs. 51 Third, in spite of the. Blatant legal infirmities of the subject documents of conveyance,
petitioners still took possession of the properties, demolished several cottages, and introduced permanent improvements thereon.

In all, the Court agrees with the appellate court: that petitioners failed to adequately substantiate, with convincing, credible and
independently verifiable proof, their claim that they had, in fact, purchased the subject properties. The circumstances surrounding
the purported transfers cast doubt on whether they actually took place. In substantiating their claim, petitioners relied solely on the
Extra-Judicial Settlement and Deed of Sale, who utterly failed to prove their authenticity and due execution. They cannot,
therefore, be permitted to claim. Absolute ownership of the subject lands based on the same.

Neither can they be considered as innocent purchasers for value and builders in good faith. Good faith consists in the belief of title
builder that the land the latter is building on is one's own without knowledge of any defect or flaw in one's. Title. 52 However, in
view of .the manifest defects in the instruments conveying their titles, petitioners should have been placed on guard. Yet, they still
demolished several cottages and constructed improvement on the properties. Thus, their claim of. Good faith cannot be given
credence.
Indeed, a judgment which has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, hence, may no longer be modified in any
respect except to correct clerical errors or mistakes, all the issues between the parties being deemed resolved and. laid to rest. 53 it
is a fundamental principle in our judicial system and essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a
judgment has become final, the winning party be, not through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the
verdict. 54 Exceptions to the immutability of final judgment is allowed only under the most extraordinary of circumstances. 55 Yet,
when petitioner is given more than • ample opportunity to be heard, unbridled access to the appellate courts, as well as unbiased
judgments rendered after a consideration of evidence presented by the parties, as in the case at hand, the Court shall refrain from
reversing the rulings of the courts below in the absence of any showing that the same were rendered with fraud or lack of
jurisdiction. ·

WHEREFORE, premises considered, .the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution, dated March 13, 2009 and April
23, 2009, respectively, of the Court Appeals for CA-G.R. SP No. 107347, which affirmed the Judgment dated October 1, 2001 of
the Regional Trial Court of Nasugbu, Batangas, Branch 14, in Civil Case No. 217, insofar as it conce1ns the resort covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title No. 513 54 and No. 51355, and family home covered by TCT No. 40807 and 40808, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 167979             March 15, 2006

WILSON S. UY, as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the Deceased JOSE K. C. UY, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ANASTACIO C. RUFON, As Presiding Judge of Branch 52, of the Regional Trial
Court, Sixth Judicial Region, sitting at Bacolod City, and JOHNNY K. H. UY, Respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Petitioner assails the August 20, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72678,1 affirming the January 22, 2002
Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52 of Bacolod City in Special Proceedings No. 97-241,2 as well as the April 29, 2005
Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.3

The facts of the case show that Jose K.C. Uy (Deceased) died intestate on August 20, 1996 and is survived by his spouse, Sy Iok
Ing Uy, and his five children, namely, Lilian S. Uy, Lilly S. Uy, Livian S. Uy-Garcia , Lilen S. Uy and Wilson S. Uy (Petitioner).

On February 18, 1997, Special Proceedings No. 97-241 was instituted and Lilia Hofileña was appointed as special administrator of
the estate of the deceased. Petitioner moved to reconsider the order appointing Lilia Hofileña as special administrator with prayer
that letters of administration be issued to him instead.4

On June 9, 1998, Judge Ramon B. Posadas revoked Lilia Hofileña’s appointment as special administrator and denied her petition to
be appointed as regular administrator. Meanwhile, letters of administration were granted to petitioner, who took his oath of office
as administrator on June 23, 1998.

On February 17, 1999, Johnny K. H. Uy (Private Respondent) filed a motion to intervene, praying that he be appointed as
administrator of the estate in lieu of petitioner. He alleged that he is the brother and a creditor of the deceased, and has
knowledge of the properties that should be included in the estate.

The trial court initially denied private respondent’s motion to intervene,5 but on March 16, 2000,6 it reconsidered its earlier order
and appointed private respondent as co-administrator of the estate. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

Petitioner then moved that private respondent bring into the estate properties belonging to the deceased, which motion was
granted by the trial court. Not satisfied with the compliance of private respondent, petitioner reiterated his motion for removal of
the former as co-administrator, but the same was denied.

The trial court found that private respondent substantially complied with the order directing him to bring into the estate properties
owned by or registered in the name of the deceased not subject of any adverse claim or controversy when he listed the alleged
properties suspected to be concealed, embezzled or conveyed away by the persons named therein. Thus, it found no cogent
reason to remove private respondent as co-administrator.7

Thereafter, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for certiorari which however, dismissed the petition.

The Court of Appeals held that the refusal of the trial court to remove private respondent as co-administrator of the estate is
neither an error of jurisdiction nor a grave abuse of discretion; that the appointment of private respondent was justified; that the
order of preference under Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court does not rule out the appointment of co-administrators; that
the institution of a case for annulment of title and reconveyance against respondent does not justify private respondent’s removal
as co-administrator.

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied, hence, this petition on the following grounds:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAVE ACTED WITHOUT
JURISDICTION OR IN GRAVE ABUSE OF THEIR DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF JURISDICTION (sic), IN VIOLATION [OF]
THE ESTABLISHED AND ACCEPTED RULE OF LAW AND IN COMPLETE DISREGARD OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE AND EQUITY IN
APPOINTING A CO-ADMINISTRATOR OF AN ESTATE (IN THE PROCESS OF SETTLEMENT) WHERE THERE IS AN INCUMBENT
ADMINISTRATOR WHOSE APPOINTMENT IS FIRM, FINAL, IMPLEMENTED AND INAPPEALABLE, AND WHICH (sic) APPOINTMENT
HAS NOT BEEN CANCELLED, RECALLED, REVOKED OR RESCINDED BY APPOINTING, AT THAT, A PERSON

(a)

ALIEN TO THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, WITH VARIOUS SERIOUS INTERESTS (ACTUAL JUDICIAL CONTROVERSIES) IN
CONFLICT WITH THOSE OF THE ESTATE, AND
(B)

WITH NO PROPER INTEREST IN THE ESTATE AND WHO IS PERSONALLY UNFIT, UNSUITABLE, UNWORTHY, UNDESERVING OF
THE TRUST INHERENT IN THE POSITION OF CO-ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE, AND UNACCEPTABLE AND REPULSIVE TO
THE FAMILY OF THE LEGAL HEIRS OF THE DECEASED; AND THEN REFUSING TO REMOVE HIM AS CO-ADMINISTRATOR AFTER IT
WAS SHOWN THAT HIS REPRESENTATIONS ON WHICH HE WAS APPOINTED CO-ADMINISTRATOR WERE EMPTY AND FALSE;
AND

WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS DENIED PETITIONER HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO DUE
PROCESS OF LAW AND HIS RIGHT TO PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES BY NOT ADDRESSING AND
RESOLVING THE ISSUES BROUGHT TO IT BY THE PETITIONER, MORE ESPECIFICALLY THE ISSUES OF

(1)

RES JUDICATA AND STABILITY OF THE JUDGMENT APPOINTING THE PETITIONER HEREIN AS JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE IN QUESTION, AND

(2)

DECIDING THE ISSUES INVOLVED IN A MANNER CONTRARY TO THE RULES SET DOWN BY THE SUPREME COURT ON
THE MATTER.8

The main issues for resolution are: (1) whether the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in appointing private respondent
as co-administrator to the estate of the deceased; and (2) whether the Court of Appeals deprived petitioner of his constitutional
right to due process and his right to petition the government for redress of grievances by not addressing the issues raised before
it.

The petition is without merit.

Petitioner asserts that his appointment as a regular administrator is already final, unassailable or res judicata; that the inferior
court has no authority to re-open the issue of the appointment of an administrator without removing the incumbent administrator;
that private respondent is not only alien to the estate, but has a conflict of interest with it; that the trial court’s appointment of
private respondent as co-administrator constitutes grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.

There is no question that petitioner was appointed as regular administrator of the estate of the deceased Jose K. C. Uy on June 9,
1998. However, private respondent in his motion to intervene sought to be appointed as administrator as he is not only the brother
of the decedent but also a creditor who knows the extent of the latter’s properties. Thus, the trial court, while retaining petitioner
as administrator, appointed private respondent as co-administrator of the estate.

The main function of a probate court is to settle and liquidate the estates of deceased persons either summarily or through the
process of administration.9 In the case at bar, the trial court granted letters of administration to petitioner and thereafter to private
respondent as co-administrator. Under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the preference to whom letters of administration
may be granted are as follows:

SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors
are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such
person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent
or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply
for administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of
the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may
select.

The order of preference in the appointment of an administrator depends on the attendant facts and circumstances.10 In Sioca v.
Garcia,11 this Court set aside the order of preference, to wit:

It is well settled that a probate court cannot arbitrarily and without sufficient reason disregard the preferential rights of the
surviving spouse to the administration of the estate of the deceased spouse. But, if the person enjoying such preferential
rights is unsuitable, the court may appoint another person. The determination of a person’s suitability for the office of
administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment and such judgment
will not be interfered with on appeal unless it appears affirmatively that the court below was in error.

x x x Unsuitableness may consist in adverse interest of some kind or hostility to those immediately interested in the
estate. x x x.12 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

In the instant case, the order of preference was not disregarded by the trial court. Instead of removing petitioner, it appointed
private respondent, a creditor, as co-administrator since the estate was sizeable and petitioner was having a difficult time attending
to it alone. In fact, petitioner did not submit any report regarding the estate under his administration. In its March 16, 2000
Order,13 the trial court found thus:

Going over all the arguments of the parties, after hearing has been set relative thereto, this Court has observed that indeed the
judicial administrator had not submitted to the Court any report about the Estate under his administration except those involving
the cases he filed and/or intervened in other branches. This may be due to his being inexperienced, but this fact will not be reason
enough to remove him from the administration of the Estate as Judicial Administrator thereof. However, considering that the
Intervenor is claiming to be the patriarch of the Uy family and who claims to have enormous knowledge of the businesses and
properties of the decedent Jose K.C. Uy, it is the feeling of this Court that it will be very beneficial to the Estate if he be appointed
co-administrator (without removing the already appointed Judicial Administrator) of the Estate of Jose K.C. Uy, if only to shed more
light to the alleged enormous properties/businesses and to bring them all to the decedent’s Estate pending before this Court.14

A co-administrator performs all the functions and duties and exercises all the powers of a regular administrator, only that he is not
alone in the administration.15 The practice of appointing co-administrators in estate proceedings is not prohibited. In Gabriel v.
Court of Appeals,16 this Court reaffirmed that jurisprudence allows the appointment of co-administrators under certain
circumstances, to wit:

Under both Philippine and American jurisprudence, the appointment of co-administrators has been upheld for various reasons, viz:
(1) to have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have different interests represented; (2) where justice and
equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estate of the deceased; (3) where the
estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexing one to settle; (4) to have all interested persons satisfied
and the representatives to work in harmony for the best interests of the estate; and (5) when a person entitled to the
administration of an estate desires to have another competent person associated with him in the office.17 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, petitioner’s argument that the trial court cannot re-open the issue of the appointment of an administrator without removing
the incumbent administrator is erroneous. In probate proceedings, considerable latitude is allowed a probate court in modifying or
revoking its own orders as long as the proceedings are pending in the same court and timely applications or motions for such
modifications or revocations are made by the interested parties.18 In the instant case, the estate of the deceased has not yet been
settled and the case is still within the jurisdiction of the court.

The foregoing discussion renders moot the second issue raised by petitioner. We see no cogent reason to set aside the findings of
the Court of Appeals, because its findings of fact is conclusive and binding on the parties and not subject to review by this Court,
unless the case falls under any of the exceptions to the rule.19

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The August 20, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72678 affirming the
January 22, 2002 Order of the Regional Trial Court in Special Proceedings No. 97-241, as well as the April 29, 2005 Resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.