People V. Estrada

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 Digest – XV Right of Accused
Bautista, Delos Santos, Fangon, Gamboa, Garcia, Guanga, Medes, Nethercott, Salvador 1
1. PEOPLE V. ESTRADA
Criminal Due Process: By depriving appellant of a mental examination, the trial court effectively deprived appellant of a fair trial.
The trial courts negligence was a violation of the basic requirements of due process; and for this reason, the proceedings before
the said court must be nullified.
PUNO, J.:
In an Information dated December 29, 1994, accused-appellant Roberto Estrada y Lopez was charged with the crime of
murder for the killing of one Rogelio P. Mararac, a security guard.
FACTS:
That on or about the 27th day of December 1994 in the City of Dagupan, ROBERTO ESTRADA Y LOPEZ, being then armed with
a butchers knife, with intent to kill one ROGELIO P. MARARAC with treachery and committed in a holy place of worship, did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the latter by stabbing him, hitting him
on vital parts of his body with the said weapon, thereby causing his death shortly thereafter due to Cardiorespiratory Arrest,
Massive Intrathoracic Hemorrhage, Stab Wound as per Autopsy Report and Certificate of Death both issued by Dr. Tomas G.
Cornel, Assistant City Health Officer, this City, to the damage and prejudice of the legal heirs of said deceased ROGELIO P.
MARARAC in the amount of not less than FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), Philippine currency, and other consequential
damages.
Thereafter, accused-appellants counsel, the Public Attorneys Office, filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend Arraignment and to
Commit Accused to Psychiatric Ward at Baguio General Hospital. It was alleged that accused-appellant could not properly and
intelligently enter a plea because he was suffering from a mental defect; that before the commission of the crime, he was confined
at the psychiatric ward of the Baguio General Hospital in Baguio City. He prayed for the suspension of his arraignment and the
issuance of an order confining him at the said hospital.
The motion was opposed by the City Prosecutor. The trial court, motu proprio, propounded several questions on accused-
appellant. Finding that the questions were understood and answered by him intelligently, the court denied the motion that same
day.
The arraignment proceeded and a plea of not guilty was entered by the court on accused-appellants behalf.
The prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, namely: (1) Dr. Tomas Cornel, the Assistant Health Officer of Dagupan City
who issued the death certificate and conducted the autopsy on the victim; (2) Crisanto Santillan, an eyewitness to the incident; (3)
SPO1 Conrado Francisco, one of the policemen who apprehended accused-appellant; and (4) Rosalinda Sobremonte, the victims
sister. The prosecution established the following facts:
In the morning of December 27, 1994, at the St. Johns Cathedral, Dagupan City, the sacrament of confirmation was being
performed by the Roman Catholic Bishop of Dagupan City on the children of Dagupan. The cathedral was filled with more than a
thousand people. At 11:00 A.M., nearing the close of the rites, the Bishop went down the altar to give his final blessing to the
children in the front rows. While the Bishop was giving his blessing, a man from the crowd went up and walked towards the center
of the altar. He stopped beside the Bishops chair, turned around and, in full view of the Catholic faithful, sat on the Bishops
chair. The man was accused-appellant. Crisanto Santillan, who was assisting the Bishop at the rites, saw accused-
appellant. Santillan approached accused-appellant and requested him to vacate the Bishops chair. Gripping the chairs armrest,
accused-appellant replied in Pangasinese: No matter what will happen, I will not move out! Hearing this, Santillan moved away.
Some of the churchgoers summoned Rogelio Mararac, the security guard at the cathedral. Mararac went near accused-appellant
and told him to vacate the Bishops chair. Accused-appellant stared intensely at the guard. Mararac grabbed his nightstick and
used it to tap accused-appellants hand on the armrest. Appellant did not budge. Again, Mararac tapped the latters hand. Still no
reaction. Mararac was about to strike again when suddenly accused-appellant drew a knife from his back, lunged at Mararac and
stabbed him, hitting him below his left throat. Mararac fell. Accused-appellant went over the victim and tried to stab him again but
Mararac parried his thrust. Accused-appellant looked up and around him. He got up, went to the microphone and shouted:
Anggapuy nayan dia! (No one can beat me here!). He returned to the Bishops chair and sat on it again. Mararac, wounded and
bleeding, slowly dragged himself down the altar.
Meanwhile, SPO1 Conrado Francisco, who was directing traffic outside, received a report of a commotion inside the
cathedral. Rushing to the cathedral, SPO1 Francisco saw a man, accused-appellant, with red stains on his shirt and a knife in one
hand sitting on a chair at the center of the altar. He ran to accused-appellant and advised him to drop the knife. Accused-appellant
obeyed. He dropped the knife and raised his hands. Thereupon, Chief Inspector Wendy Rosario, Deputy Police Chief, Dagupan
City, who was attending the confirmation rites at the Cathedral, went near accused-appellant to pick up the knife. Suddenly,
accused-appellant embraced Chief Inspector Rosario and the two wrestled with each other. Chief Inspector Rosario was able to
subdue accused-appellant. The police came and when they frisked appellant, they found a leather scabbard tucked around his
waist.[8] He was brought to the police station and placed in jail.
In the meantime, Mararac, the security guard, was brought to the hospital where he expired a few minutes upon arrival. He died
of cardio-respiratory arrest, massive, intra-thoracic hemorrhage, stab wound.[9] He was found to have sustained two (2) stab
wounds: one just below the left throat and the other on the left arm. The autopsy reported the following findings:
After the prosecution rested its case, accused-appellant, with leave of court, filed a Demurrer to Evidence. He claimed that the
prosecution failed to prove the crime of murder because there was no evidence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery; that
there was unlawful aggression by the victim when he tapped accused-appellants hand with his nightstick; and that accused-
appellant did not have sufficient ability to calculate his defensive acts because he was of unsound mind.
The Demurrer to Evidence was opposed by the public prosecutor. He alleged that the accused pretended to be weak, tame and
of unsound mind; that after he made the first stab, he furiously continued stabbing and slashing the victim to finish him off
undeterred by the fact that he was in a holy place where a religious ceremony was being conducted; and the plea of unsound
mind had already been ruled upon by the trial court.
On February 21, 1995, a letter was sent by Inspector Wilfredo F. Valdez, Jail Warden of Dagupan City to the trial court. Inspector
Valdez requested the court to allow accused-appellant, who was confined at the city jail, to be treated at the Baguio General
Hospital to determine whether he should remain in jail or be transferred to some other institution. The other prisoners were
allegedly not comfortable with appellant because he had been exhibiting unusual behavior. He tried to climb up the jail roof so he
could escape and see his family.
As ordered by the trial court, the public prosecutor filed a Comment to the jail wardens letter. He reiterated that the mental condition
of accused-appellant to stand trial had already been determined; unless a competent government agency certifies otherwise, the
trial should proceed; and the city jail warden was not the proper person to determine whether accused-appellant was mentally ill
or not.
In an order dated August 21, 1995, the trial court denied the Demurrer to Evidence, ]Accused-appellant moved for reconsideration.
While the motion for reconsideration was pending, on February 26, 1996, counsel for accused-appellant filed a Motion to Confine
Accused for Physical, Mental and Psychiatric Examination. Appellants counsel informed the court that accused-appellant had
been exhibiting abnormal behavior for the past weeks; he would shout at the top of his voice and cause panic among the jail
inmates and personnel; that appellant had not been eating and sleeping; that his co-inmates had been complaining of not getting
enough sleep for fear of being attacked by him while asleep; that once, while they were sleeping, appellant took out all his personal
effects and waste matter and burned them inside the cell which again caused panic among the inmates. Appellants counsel prayed
that his client be confined at the National Center for Mental Health in Manila or at the Baguio General Hospital. [16] Attached to the
motion were two (2) letters from the inspector of the jail warden and the other one is from the association of inmates.
The trial court denied reconsideration of the order denying the Demurrer to Evidence. The court ordered accused-appellant to
present his evidence.
Accused-appellant did not take the witness stand. Instead, his counsel presented the testimony of Dr. Maria Soledad
Gawidan,[20] a resident physician at the Baguio General Hospital, and accused-appellants medical and clinical records at the said
hospital.[21] Dr. Gawidan testified that appellant had been confined at the BGH from February 18, 1993 to February 22, 1993 and
that he suffered from Schizophrenic Psychosis, Paranoid Typeschizophrenia, paranoid, chronic, paranoid type; [22] and after four
(4) days of confinement, he was discharged in improved physical and mental condition. [23]
The trial court rendered a decision on June 23, 1997. It upheld the prosecution evidence and found accused-appellant guilty
of the crime charged and thereby sentenced him to death and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of 50,000.
The accused is ordered to pay the sum of P18,870.00 representing actual expenses and P100,000.00 as moral damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court erred in finding accused- appellant guilty of the crime charged, despite clear and convincing
evidence on record, supporting his plea of insanity.
RULING:
YES. The basic principle in our criminal law is that a person is criminally liable for a felony committed by him. [37] Under the classical
theory on which our penal code is mainly based, the basis of criminal liability is human free will. [38] Man is essentially a moral
creature with an absolutely free will to choose between good and evil. [39] When he commits a felonious or criminal act (delito
doloso), the act is presumed to have been done voluntarily,[40] i.e., with freedom, intelligence and intent.[41] Man, therefore, should
be adjudged or held accountable for wrongful acts so long as free will appears unimpaired. [42]
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the law presumes that every person is of sound mind [43] and that all acts are
voluntary.[44] The moral and legal presumption under our law is that freedom and intelligence constitute the normal condition of a
person.[45] This presumption, however, may be overthrown by other factors; and one of these is insanity which exempts the actor
from criminal liability.[46]
The Revised Penal Code in Article 12 (1) provides:
ART. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability.The following are exempt from criminal liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.
When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a felony (delito), the court shall order
his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to
leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court.
An insane person is exempt from criminal liability unless he has acted during a lucid interval. If the court therefore finds the accused
insane when the alleged crime was committed, he shall be acquitted but the court shall order his confinement in a hospital or
asylum for treatment until he may be released without danger. An acquittal of the accused does not result in his outright release,
but rather in a verdict which is followed by commitment of the accused to a mental institution. [47]
In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act. Mere abnormality
of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. [48] The accused must be so insane as to be incapable of entertaining a criminal
intent.[49] He must be deprived of reason and act without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of the power
to discern or a total deprivation of freedom of the will. [50]
Since the presumption is always in favor of sanity, he who invokes insanity as an exempting circumstance must prove it by clear
and positive evidence.[51] And the evidence on this point must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very
moment of its execution.[52]
To ascertain a persons mental condition at the time of the act, it is permissible to receive evidence of the condition of his mind
within a reasonable period both before and after that time. [53]Direct testimony is not required.[54] Neither are specific acts of
derangement essential to establish insanity as a defense. [55] Circumstantial evidence, if clear and convincing, suffices; for the
unfathomable mind can only be known by overt acts. A persons thoughts, motives, and emotions may be evaluated only by
outward acts to determine whether these conform to the practice of people of sound mind. [56]
In the case at bar, there is no direct proof that accused-appellant was afflicted with insanity at the time he killed Mararac. The
absence of direct proof, nevertheless, does not entirely discount the probability that appellant was not of sound mind at that time.
From the affidavit of Crisanto Santillan[57] attached to the Information, there are certain circumstances that should have placed the
trial court on notice that appellant may not have been in full possession of his mental faculties when he attacked Mararac. It was
highly unusual for a sane person to go up to the altar and sit on the Bishops chair while the Bishop was administering the Holy
Sacrament of Confirmation to children in a jampacked cathedral. It goes against normal and ordinary behavior for appellant,
without sufficient provocation from the security guard, to stab the latter at the altar, during sacramental rites and in front of all the
Catholic faithful to witness. Appellant did not flee, or at least attempt to flee after the stabbing. He nonchalantly approached the
microphone and, over the public address system, uttered words to the faithful which no rational person would have made. He then
returned to the Bishops chair and sat there as if nothing happened.
Accused-appellants history of mental illness was brought to the courts attention on the day of the arraignment. Counsel for
accused-appellant moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that his client could not properly and intelligently enter
a plea due to his mental condition. The Motion for Suspension is authorized under Section 12, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure which provides:
Sec. 12. Suspension of arraignment. The arraignment shall be suspended, if at the time thereof:
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively renders him unable to fully understand
the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if
necessary, his confinement for such purpose.
(b) x x x.
Under these circumstances, the court must suspend the proceedings and order the mental examination of the accused, and if
confinement be necessary for examination, order such confinement and examination. If the accused is not in full possession of
his mental faculties at the time he is informed at the arraignment of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, the
process is itself a felo de se, for he can neither comprehend the full import of the charge nor can he give an intelligent plea
thereto.[58]
The question of suspending the arraignment lies within the discretion of the trial court. [59]And the test to determine whether
the proceedings will be suspended depends on the question of whether the accused, even with the assistance of counsel, would
have a fair trial. This rule was laid down as early as 1917, thus:
In passing on the question of the propriety of suspending the proceedings against an accused person on the ground of present
insanity, the judges should bear in mind that not every aberration of the mind or exhibition of mental deficiency is sufficient to
justify such suspension. The test is to be found in the question whether the accused would have a fair trial, with the assistance
which the law secures or gives.
In determining a defendants competency to stand trial, the test is whether he has the capacity to comprehend his position,
understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to conduct his defense in a rational manner, and to cooperate,
communicate with, and assist his counsel to the end that any available defense may be interposed. [64] This test is prescribed by
state law but it exists generally as a statutory recognition of the rule at common law
There are two distinct matters to be determined under this test: (1) whether the defendant is sufficiently coherent to provide his
counsel with information necessary or relevant to constructing a defense; and (2) whether he is able to comprehend the
significance of the trial and his relation to it. [67] The first requisite is the relation between the defendant and his counsel such that
the defendant must be able to confer coherently with his counsel. The second is the relation of the defendant vis-a-vis the court
proceedings, i.e., that he must have a rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings. [68]
The rule barring trial or sentence of an insane person is for the protection of the accused, rather than of the public. [69] It has been
held that it is inhuman to require an accused disabled by act of God to make a just defense for his life or liberty.[70] To put a legally
incompetent person on trial or to convict and sentence him is a violation of the constitutional rights to a fair trial [71]and due process
of law;[72] and this has several reasons underlying it. [73] For one, the accuracy of the proceedings may not be assured. Moreover,
he is not in a position to exercise many of the rights afforded a defendant in a criminal case, e.g., the right to effectively consult
with counsel, the right to testify in his own behalf, and the right to confront opposing witnesses, which rights are safeguards for
the accuracy of the trial result. Second, the fairness of the proceedings may be questioned, as there are certain basic decisions
in the course of a criminal proceeding which a defendant is expected to make for himself, and one of these is his plea. Third, the
dignity of the proceedings may be disrupted, for an incompetent defendant is likely to conduct himself in the courtroom in a manner
which may destroy the decorum of the court. Even if the defendant remains passive, his lack of comprehension fundamentally
impairs the functioning of the trial process. A criminal proceeding is essentially an adversarial proceeding. If the defendant is not
a conscious and intelligent participant, the adjudication loses its character as a reasoned interaction between an individual and
his community and becomes an invective against an insensible object. Fourth, it is important that the defendant knows why he is
being punished, a comprehension which is greatly dependent upon his understanding of what occurs at trial. An incompetent
defendant may not realize the moral reprehensibility of his conduct.
Mere allegation of insanity is insufficient. There must be evidence or circumstances that raise a reasonable doubt [76] or a bona
fide doubt[77] as to defendants competence to stand trial. Among the factors a judge may consider is evidence of the defendants
irrational behavior, history of mental illness or behavioral abnormalities, previous confinement for mental disturbance, demeanor
of the defendant, and psychiatric or even lay testimony bearing on the issue of competency in a particular case.[78]
In the case at bar, when accused-appellant moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground of accuseds mental
condition, the trial court denied the motion after finding that the questions propounded on appellant were intelligently answered by
him.
The fact that accused-appellant was able to answer the questions asked by the trial court is not conclusive evidence that he was
competent enough to stand trial and assist in his defense.
The trial court took it solely upon itself to determine the sanity of accused-appellant. The trial judge is not a psychiatrist or
psychologist or some other expert equipped with the specialized knowledge of determining the state of a persons mental health.
To determine the accused-appellants competency to stand trial, the court, in the instant case, should have at least ordered the
examination of accused-appellant, especially in the light of the latters history of mental illness.
If the medical history was not enough to create a reasonable doubt in the judges mind of accused-appellants competency to stand
trial, subsequent events should have done so
Section 12, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure speaks of a mental examination.[86] The human mind is an entity,
and understanding it is not purely an intellectual process but depends to a large degree upon emotional and psychological
appreciation.[87] Thus, an intelligent determination of an accuseds capacity for rational understanding ought to rest on a deeper
and more comprehensive diagnosis of his mental condition than laymen can make through observation of his overt behavior. Once
a medical or psychiatric diagnosis is made, then can the legal question of incompetency be determined by the trial court. By this
time, the accuseds abilities may be measured against the specific demands a trial will make upon him. [88]
In the case at bar, the crime in the instant case was committed way back in December 1994, almost six (6) years ago. At this late
hour, a medical finding alone may make it impossible for us to evaluate appellants mental condition at the time of the crimes
commission for him to avail of the exempting circumstance of insanity.[91] Nonetheless, under the present circumstances, accused-
appellants competence to stand trial must be properly ascertained to enable him to participate in his trial meaningfully.
By depriving appellant of a mental examination, the trial court effectively deprived appellant of a fair trial. The trial courts negligence
was a violation of the basic requirements of due process; and for this reason, the proceedings before the said court must be
nullified.
2. ISIDRO T. HILDAWA vs. ENRILE
FACTS:
Petitioners Isidro T. Hildawa and Ricardo C. Valmonte in these Special Civil Actions pray that a "preliminary injunction
issue directing respondents to recall the crime busters and restraining them from fielding police teams or any of this sort with
authority/license to kill and after hearing, declaring the order of respondents fielding crime busters null and void and making the
injunction permanent." They alleged that the formation and fielding of secret marshals and/or crime busters with absolute authority
to kill thieves, hold uppers, robbers, pickpockets and slashers are violative of the provisions of the New Constitution under
Sections 1, 17,19, 20 and 21 of Article III (Bill of Rights).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the creation and deployment of special operations team to counter the resurgence of criminality is violative
of the provisions of the Constitution.
HELD:
YES. The Supreme held that there is nothing wrong in the creation and deployment of special operation teams to counter
the resurgence of criminality, as there is nothing wrong in the formation by the police of special teams/squads to prevent the
proliferation of vices, prostitution, drug addiction, pornography and the like. That is the basic job of the police. It is the alleged use
of violence in the implementation of the objectives of the special squads that the court is concerned about. It is our way of life that
a man is entitled to due process which simply means that before he can be deprived of his life, liberty or property, he must be
given an opportunity to defend himself. Due process of law requires that the accused must be heard in court of competent
jurisdiction, proceeded against under the orderly process of law, and only punished after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to
him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded within the authority of a constitutional law. We repeat that it is lawful
on the part of respondents to form special operation teams of whatever name they may be called to combat the upsurge of crimes
against passengers of public utility vehicles. What is disagreeable and cannot be tolerated, for it is uncivilized, is the license to kill
because it is violative of our fundamental law and the universal human right. In fact, "no violence or unnecessary force shall be
used in making an arrest, and the person arrested shall not be subject to any greater restraint that is necessary for his detention.
3. Francisco Guerrero, petitioner v. Military Commission No. 34, respondent

(G.R. Nos. 54558 & 69822 | May 22, 1987)
Due process of law demands that in all criminal prosecutions (where the accused stands to lose either his life or his liberty), the
accused shall be entitled to, among others, a trial. The trial contemplated by the due process clause of the Constitution, in
relation to the Charter as a whole, is a trial by judicial process, not by executive or military process. Military commissions or
tribunals, by whatever name they are called, are not courts within the Philippine judicial system.
Facts:
On December 24, 1979, the herein petitioners Eduardo B. Olaguer, Othoniel V. Jimenez, Ester Misa-Jimenez, Carlos
Lazaro, Reynaldo Maclang, Magdalena De Los Santos-Maclang, Teodorico N. Diesmos, Rene J. Marciano, Danilo R. De Ocampo
and Victoriano C. Amado were arrested by the military authorities. They were all initially detained at Camp Crame in Quezon City.
They were subsequently transferred to the detention center at Camp Bagong Diwa in Bicutan except for petitioner Olaguer who
remained in detention at Camp Crame. Petitioner Mac Aceron voluntarily surrendered to the authorities sometime in June,1980
and was, thereafter, also incarcerated at Camp Bagong Diwa. All of the petitioners are civilians.
On May 30, 1980, the petitioners were charged for subversion upon the recommendation of the respondent Judge
Advocate General and the approval of the respondent Minister of National Defense. On June 13, 1980, the respondent Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines created the respondent Military Commission No. 34 to try the criminal case filed
against the petitioners. On July 30, 1980, an amended charge sheet was filed for seven (7) offenses, namely: (1) unlawful
possession of explosives and incendiary devices; (2) conspiracy to assassinate President and Mrs. Marcos; (3) conspiracy to
assassinate cabinet members Juan Ponce Enrile, Francisco Tatad and Vicente Paterno; (4) conspiracy to assassinate Messrs.
Arturo Tangco, Jose Roño and Onofre Corpus; (5) arson of nine buildings; (6) attempted murder of Messrs. Leonardo Perez,
Teodoro Valencia and Generals Romeo Espino and Fabian Ver; and (7) conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, and inciting
to rebellion. Sometime thereafter, trial ensued.
In the course of the proceedings, particularly on August 19, 1980, the petitioners went to this Court and filed the instant
Petition for prohibition and habeas corpus. They sought to enjoin the respondent Military Commission No. 34 from proceeding
with the trial of their case. They likewise sought their release from detention by way of a writ of habeas corpus. The thrust of their
arguments is that military commissions have no jurisdic-tion to try civilians for offenses alleged to have been committed during the
period of martial law. They also maintain that the proceedings before the respondent Military Commission No. 34 are in gross
violation of their constitutional right to due process of law.
On September 23, 1980, the respondents filed their Answer to the Petition. On November 20, 1980, the petitioners
submitted their Reply to the Answer. In a Motion filed with this Court on July 25, 1981, petitioner Olaguer requested that the
Petition be considered withdrawn as far as he is concerned. In the Resolution of this Court dated July 30, 1981, the said prayer
was granted. On August 31, 1984, the respondents filed a Rejoinder to the Reply submitted by the petitioners.
On December 4, 1984, pending the resolution of the Petition, the respondent Military Commission No. 34 passed
sentence convicting the petitioners and imposed upon them the penalty of death by electrocution. Thus, on February 14, 1985,
petitioners Olaguer, Maclang and Othoniel and Ester Jimenez went to this Court and filed the other instant Petition, this time for
habeas corpus, certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. They also sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
The issue on the jurisdiction of military commissions or tribunals to try civilians for offenses allegedly committed before,
and more particularly during a period of martial law, as well as the other issues raised by the petitioners, have been ruled upon by
a divided Supreme Court in Aquino, Jr. v. Military Commission No. 2:
"We hold that the respondent Military Commission No. 2 has been lawfully consti-tuted and validly vested with jurisdiction
to hear the cases against civilians, including the petitioner.
"1. The Court has previously declared that the proclamation of Martial Law xxx on September 21, 1972, xxx is valid and
constitutional and that its continuance is justified by the danger posed to the public safety.
"2. To preserve the safety of the nation in times of national peril, the President of the Philippines necessarily possesses
broad authority compatible with the imperative requirements of the emergency. On the basis of this, he has authorized
in General Order No. 8 xxx the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, to create military tribunals to try and
decide cases 'of military personnel and such other cases as may be referred to them.' In General Order No. 12 xxx, the
military tribunals were vested with jurisdiction 'exclusive of the civil courts', among others, over crimes against public
order, violations of the Anti-Subversion Act, violations of the laws on firearms, and other crimes which, in the face of the
emergency, are directly related to the quelling of the rebellion and preserva-tion of the safety and security of the Republic.
xxx. These measures he had the authority to promulgate, since this Court recognized that the incumbent President
(President Marcos), under paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section 3 of Article XVII of the new (1973) Constitution, had the authority
to 'promulgate proclamations, orders and decrees during the period of martial law essential to the security and
preservation of the Republic, to the defense of the political and social liberties of the people and to the institution of
reforms to prevent the resurgence of the rebellion or insurrection or secession or the threat thereof xxx'.
"3. Petitioner nevertheless insists that he, being a civilian, his trial by military commission deprives him of his right to due
process, since in his view the due process guaranteed by the Constitution to persons accused of 'ordinary' crimes means
judicial process. This argument ignores the reality of the rebellion and the exis-tence of martial law. It is, of course,
essential that in a martial law situation, the martial law administra-tor must have ample and sufficient means to quell the
rebellion and restore civil order. Prompt and effective trial and punishment of offenders have been considered as
necessary in a state of martial law, as a mere power of detention may be wholly inadequate for the exigency. 'xxx martial
law xxx creates an exception to the general rule of exclusive subjection to the civil jurisdiction, and renders offenses
against the laws of war, as well as those of a civil character, triable, xxx by military tribunals.' 'Public danger warrants the
substitution of executive process for judicial process.' xxx. 'The immunity of civilians from military jurisdiction must,
however, give way in areas governed by martial law. When it is absolutely imperative for public safety, legal processes
can be super-seded and military tribunals authorized to exercise the jurisdiction normally vested in courts.' xxx."
"xxx.
"5. xxx. The guarantee of due process is not a guarantee of any parti-cular form of tribunal in criminal cases. A military
tribunal of competent juris-diction, accusation in due form, notice and opportunity to defend and trial before an impartial
tribunal, adequately meet the due process requirement. Due process of law does not necessarily mean a judicial
proceeding in the regular courts. xxx."
This ruling has been affirmed, although not unanimously, in at least six other cases. These rulings notwithstanding, the petitioners
anchor their argument on their prayer that the ruling in Aquino, Jr. be appraised anew and abandoned or modified accordingly.
Issue:
Whether military tribunal has the jurisdiction to try civilians while the civil courts are open and functioning.
Held:
No, the military tribunal has no jurisdiction.
The Court agrees with the dissenting views of then Justice, now Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee and Madame Justice
Cecilia Muñoz-Palma in Aquino, Jr. in so far as they hold that military commissions or tribunals have no jurisdiction to try civilians
for alleged offenses when the civil courts are open and functioning.
Due process of law demands that in all criminal prosecutions (where the accused stands to lose either his life or his
liberty), the accused shall be entitled to, among others, a trial. The trial contemplated by the due process clause of the Constitution,
in relation to the Charter as a whole, is a trial by judicial process, not by executive or military process. Military commissions or
tribunals, by whatever name they are called, are not courts within the Philippine judicial system.
Moreover, military tribunals pertain to the Executive Department of the Government and are simply instrumentalities of
the executive power, provided by the legislature for the President as Commander-in-Chief to aid him in properly commanding the
army and navy and enforcing dis-cipline therein, and utilized under his orders or those of his authorized military representatives.
Following the principle of separation of powers underlying the existing constitutional organization of the Government of
the Philippines, the power and the duty of interpreting the laws (as when an individual should be considered to have violated the
law) is primarily a function of the judiciary. It is not, and it cannot be the function of the Executive Department, through the military
authorities.
And as long as the civil courts in the land remain open and are regularly functioning, as they do so today and as they did during
the period of martial law in the country, military tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for offenses committed
by them and which are properly cognizable by the civil courts. To have it otherwise would be a violation of the constitutional right
to due process of the civilian concerned. We take this opportunity to reiterate that as long as the civil courts in the land are open
and functioning, military tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for offenses committed by them. Whether or
not martial law has been proclaimed throughout the country or over a part thereof is of no moment. The imprimatur for this
observation is found in Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
"A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil
courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over
civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.”
Indeed, it is well settled that once a deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to exist, the tribunal that rendered the judgment
in question is deemed ousted of jurisdiction.
Accordingly, it is the Court’s considered opinion, and We so hold, that a military commission or tribunal cannot try and exercise
jurisdiction, even during the period of martial law, over civilians for offenses allegedly committed by them as long as the civil courts
are open and functioning, and that any judgment rendered by such body relating to a civilian is null and void for lack of jurisdiction
on the part of the military tribunal concerned. For the same reasons, the Court’s pronouncement in Aquino, Jr. v. Military
Commission No. 2 and all decided cases affirming the same, in so far as they are inconsistent with this pronouncement, should
be deemed abandoned.
The petitions for habeas corpus are DISMISSED for having become moot and academic. The Petitions for certiorari and
prohibition are hereby GRANTED. The creation of the respondent Military Commission No. 34 to try civilians like the petitioners
is hereby declared unconstitutional and all its proceedings are deemed null and void.
4. GALMAN VS SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts:
An investigating committee was created to determine the facts on the case involving the assassination of Ninoy Aquino. It appears
that majority and minority reports showed that they are unconvinced on the participation of Galman as the assassin of late Sen.
Aquino and branded him instead as the fall guy as opposed to the military reports. Majority reports recommended the 26 military
respondents as indictable for the premeditated killing of Aquino and Galman which the Sandiganbayan did not give due
consideration.The office of the Tanod Bayan was originally preparing a resolution charging the 26 military accused as principal to
the crime against Aquino but was recalled upon the intervention of President Marcos who insist on the innocence of the accused.
Marcos however recommended the filing of murder charge and to implement the acquittal as planned so that double jeopardy may
be invoked later on.The petitioners filed an action for miscarriage of justice against the Sandiganbayan and gross violation of
constitutional rights of the petitioners for failure to exert genuine efforts in allowing the prosecution to present vital documentary
evidence and prayed for nullifying the bias proceedings before the Sandiganbayan and ordering a re-trial before an impartial
tribunal.
Issue:
Whether or not there was due process in the acquittal of the accused from the charges against them.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that the prosecution was deprived of due process and fair opportunity to prosecute and prove their case
which grossly violates the due process clause. There could be no double jeopardy since legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a
valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851). The lower court
that rendered the judgment of acquittal was not competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the
prosecution to due process. In effect the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal case for further
hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused
to a second jeopardy.The court further contends that the previous trial was a mock trial where the authoritarian President ordered
the Sandiganbayan and Tanod Bayan to rig and closely monitor the trial which was undertaken with due pressure to the judiciary.
The court’s decision of acquittal is one void of jurisdiction owing to its failure in observing due process during the trial therefore
the judgment was also deemed void and double jeopardy cannot be invoked. More so the trial was one vitiated with lack of due
process on the account of collusion between the lower court and Sandiganbayan for the rendition of a pre-determined verdict of
the accused.The denial on the motion for reconsideration of the petitioners by the court was set aside and rendered the decision
of acquittal of the accused null and void. An order for a re-trial was granted.
5. ANAMER SALAZAR vs . THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

and J.Y. BROTHERS MARKETING CORPORATION
FACTS:
On October 15, 1996, petitioner Anamer Salazar purchased 300 cavans of rice from J.Y. Brothers Marketing Corporation,
through Mr. Jerson Yao. As payment for these cavans of rice, the petitioner gave the private complainant Check No. 067481
drawn against the Prudential Bank, Legazpi City Branch, dated October 15, 1996, by one Nena Jaucian Timario in the amount of
P214,000. Jerson Yao accepted the check upon the petitioner's assurance that it was a good check. The cavans of rice were
picked up the next day by the petitioner. Upon presentment, the check was dishonored because it was drawn under a closed
account ("Account Closed"). The petitioner was informed of such dishonor. She replaced the Prudential Bank check with Check
No. 365704 drawn against the Solid Bank, Legazpi Branch, which, however, was returned with the word "DAUD" (Drawn Against
Uncollected Deposit).
After the prosecution rested its case, the petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence with Leave of Court 5 alleging that she
could not be guilty of the crime as charged for the following reasons: (a) she was merely an indorser of the check issued by Nena
Timario, and Article 315, paragraph 2(d) on estafa penalizes only the issuer of the check and not the indorser thereof; (b) there
is no sufficient evidence to prove that the petitioner conspired with the issuer of the check, Nena Jaucian Timario, in
order to defraud the private complainant; (c) after the first check was dishonored, the petitioner replaced it with a second one.
The first transaction had therefore been effectively novated by the issuance of the second check. Unfortunately, her personal
check was dishonored not for insufficiency of funds, but for "DAUD," which in banking parlance means "drawn against uncollected
deposit." According to the petitioner, this means that the account had sufficient funds but was still restricted because the deposit,
usually a check, had not yet been cleared.
The prosecution filed its comment/opposition to the petitioner's demurrer to evidence.
On November 19, 2001, the trial court rendered judgment acquitting the petitioner of the crime charged but ordering her to remit
to the private complainant the amount of the check as payment for her purchase. The trial court ruled that the evidence for the
prosecution did not establish the existence of conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt between the petitioner and the issuer of the
check, her co-accused Nena Jaucian Timario, for the purpose of defrauding the private complainant. In fact, the private
complainant, Jerson Yao, admitted that he had never met Nena Jaucian Timario who remained at large. As a mere indorser of the
check, the petitioner's breach of the warranty that the check was a good one is not synonymous with the fraudulent act of falsely
pretending to possess credit under Article 315(2)(d). The decretal portion of the trial court's judgment reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused Anamer D. Salazar is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of
estafa but is hereby held liable for the value of the 300 bags of rice. Accused Anamer D. Salazar is therefore
ordered to pay J.Y. Brothers Marketing Corporation the sum of P214,000.00. Costs against the accused.
Within the reglementary period therefor, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the civil aspect of the decision with a
plea that he be allowed to present evidence pursuant to Rule 33 of the Rules of Court. On January 14, 2002, the court issued an
order denying the motion.
In her petition at bar, the petitioner assails the orders of the trial court claiming that after her demurrer to evidence was
granted by the trial court, she was denied due process as she was not given the opportunity to adduce evidence to prove
that she was not civilly liable to the private respondent. The petitioner invokes the applicability of Rule 33 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure in this case, contending that before being adjudged liable to the private offended party, she should
have been first accorded the procedural relief granted in Rule 33.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused was denied due process as she was not given the opportunity to adduce evidence to prove that she
was not civilly liable to the private respondent.
RULING:
The court held that YES. The accused was denied due process.
According to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure —
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. — (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for
the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless
the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to
the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts
presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such
reservation.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate,
or exemplary damages without specifying the amount thereof in the complaint or information, the filing fees therefor shall
constitute a first lien on the judgment awarding such damages.
Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or information, the corresponding
filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court. cCAIaD
Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual damages.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any
cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action.
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding
civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based
on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or
information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall
pay additional filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these
damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien
on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated
with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both
actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.
The last paragraph of Section 2 of the said rule provides that the extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the
extinction of the civil action. Moreover, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a
final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
The criminal action has a dual purpose, namely, the punishment of the offender and indemnity to the offended party. The
dominant and primordial objective of the criminal action is the punishment of the offender. The civil action is merely incidental to
and consequent to the conviction of the accused. The reason for this is that criminal actions are primarily intended to vindicate an
outrage against the sovereignty of the state and to impose the appropriate penalty for the vindication of the disturbance to the
social order caused by the offender. On the other hand, the action between the private complainant and the accused is intended
solely to indemnify the former. 8
Unless the offended party waives the civil action or reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action
prior to the criminal action, there are two actions involved in a criminal case. The first is the criminal action for the punishment of
the offender. The parties are the People of the Philippines as the plaintiff and the accused. In a criminal action, the private
complainant is merely a witness for the State on the criminal aspect of the action. The second is the civil action arising from the
delict. The private complainant is the plaintiff and the accused is the defendant. There is a merger of the trial of the two cases to
avoid multiplicity of suits.
The quantum of evidence on the criminal aspect of the case is proof beyond reasonable doubt, while in the civil aspect
of the action, the quantum of evidence is preponderance of evidence. 9 Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the said rules shall govern the procedure to be observed in action, civil or criminal.
The prosecution presents its evidence not only to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt but also to
prove the civil liability of the accused to the offended party. After the prosecution has rested its case, the accused shall adduce its
evidence not only on the criminal but also on the civil aspect of the case. At the conclusion of the trial, the court should render
judgment not only on the criminal aspect of the case but also on the civil aspect thereof:
SEC. 2. Contents of the judgment. — If the judgment is of conviction, it shall state (1) the legal
qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating
circumstances which attended its commission; (2) the participation of the accused in the offense, whether as
principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil
liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended
party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been reserved
or waived.
In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely
failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either
case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not
exist. 10
The acquittal of the accused does not prevent a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case where (a) the
acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) where the court declared that the liability
of the accused is only civil; (c) where the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which
the accused was acquitted. Moreover, the civil action based on the delict is extinguished if there is a finding in the final judgment
in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not
commit the acts or omission imputed to him.
If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal case,
the prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of acquittal as it would place the accused in double jeopardy. However, the
aggrieved party, the offended party or the accused or both may appeal from the judgment on the civil aspect of the case within
the period therefor.
After the prosecution has rested its case, the accused has the option either to (a) file a demurrer to evidence with or
without leave of court under Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, or to (b) adduce his evidence
unless he waives the same. The aforecited rule reads:
Sec. 23. Demurrer to evidence. — After the prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the
action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the
opportunity to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court.
If the court denies the demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may adduce
evidence in his defense. When the demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the accused waives
his right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the
prosecution.
The motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence shall specifically state its grounds and shall
be filed within a non-extendible period of five (5) days after the prosecution rests its case. The prosecution
may oppose the motion within a non-extendible period of five (5) days from its receipt.
If leave of court is granted, the accused shall file the demurrer to evidence within a non-extendible
period of ten (10) days from notice. The prosecution may oppose the demurrer to evidence within a similar
period from its receipt.
The order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself
shall not be reviewable by appeal or, by certiorari before the judgment.
In criminal cases, the demurrer to evidence partakes of the nature of a motion to dismiss the case for failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In a case where the accused files a demurrer to evidence without leave
of court, he thereby waives his right to present evidence and submits the case for decision on the basis of the evidence of the
prosecution. On the other hand, if the accused is granted leave to file a demurrer to evidence, he has the right to adduce evidence
not only on the criminal aspect but also on the civil aspect of the case if his demurrer is denied by the court.
If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to adduce evidence on the
civil aspect of the case , unless the court also declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
If the trial court issues an order or renders judgment not only granting the demurrer to evidence of the accused and acquitting him
but also on the civil liability of the accused to the private offended party, said judgment on the civil aspect of the case would be a
nullity for the reason that the constitutional right of the accused to due process is thereby violated. As we held in Alonte v.
Savellano, Jr.: 11
Section 14, paragraphs (1) and (2), of Article III, of the Constitution provides the fundamentals.
"(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
"(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved,
and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to
have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf.
However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has
been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable."
Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in particular, require (a) that the court
or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (b) that
jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused; (c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be
heard; and (d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing.
The above constitutional and jurisprudentially postulates, by now elementary and deeply imbedded in our own
criminal justice system, are mandatory and indispensable. The principles find universal acceptance and are tersely
expressed in the oft-quoted statement that procedural due process cannot possibly be met without a "law which hears
before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." 12
This is so because when the accused files a demurrer to evidence, the accused has not yet adduced evidence both on
the criminal and civil aspects of the case. The only evidence on record is the evidence for the prosecution. What the trial court
should do is to issue an order or partial judgment granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused; and set the case
for continuation of trial for the petitioner to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case, and for the private complainant to
adduce evidence by way of rebuttal after which the parties may adduce their sur-rebuttal evidence as provided for in Section 11,
Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure:
Sec. 11. Order of trial. — The trial shall proceed in the following order:
(a) The prosecution shall present evidence to prove the charge and, in the proper case, the civil
liability.
(b) The accused may present evidence to prove his defense and damages, if any, arising from the
issuance of a provisional remedy in the case.
(c) The prosecution and the defense may, in that order, present rebuttal and sur-rebuttal evidence
unless the court, in furtherance of justice, permits them to present additional evidence bearing upon the main
issue.
(d) Upon admission of the evidence of the parties, the case shall be deemed submitted for decision
unless the court directs them to argue orally or to submit written memoranda.
(e) When the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or information but
interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be modified.
Thereafter, the court shall render judgment on the civil aspect of the case on the basis of the evidence of the prosecution
and the accused.
In this case, the petitioner was charged with estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code. The
civil action arising from the delict was impliedly instituted since there was no waiver by the private offended party of the civil liability
nor a reservation of the civil action. Neither did he file a civil action before the institution of the criminal action.
The petitioner was granted leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence. The court issued an order granting the demurrer
on its finding that the liability of the petitioner was not criminal but only civil. However, the court rendered judgment on the civil
aspect of the case and ordered the petitioner to pay for her purchases from the private complainant even before the petitioner
could adduce evidence thereon. Patently, therefore, the petitioner was denied her right to due process.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated November 19, 2001 and January 14,
2002 are SET ASIDE AND NULLIFIED. The Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, Branch 5, is hereby DIRECTED to set Criminal
Case No. 7474 for the continuation of trial for the reception of the evidence-in-chief of the petitioner on the civil aspect of the case
and for the rebuttal evidence of the private complainant and the sur-rebuttal evidence of the parties if they opt to adduce any.
06. People vs. Valdez

Facts: This is a petition for certioriari seeking to nullify and set aside the October 10, 2014 Resolution of Sandiganbayan that
states:
WHEREFORE, the (i) Motion to Set Aside No Bail Recommendation and to Fix the Amount of Bail and the (ii)
Urgent Supplemental Motion to the Motion to Set Aside No Bail Recommendation and to Fix the Amount of Bail
with Additional Prayer to Recall/List Warrant of Arrest filed by accused Luzviminda S. Valdez, are GRANTED.
Let the Order of Arrest issued in Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM- 0321, 0322 and 0324 adopting the "no bail"
recommendation of the Office of the Ombudsman be RECALLED. Instead, let an Order of arrest in said cases be
issued anew, this time, fixing the bail for each offense charged in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P200,000.00). SO ORDERED.
The case stemmed from a Joint Affidavit of Sheila S. Velmonte-Portal and Mylene T. Romero, both State Auditors of the
Commission on Audit Region IV in Iloilo, who conducted a post-audit of the disbursement vouchers of the Bacolod City
Government. Among the subjects thereof were reimbursements of expenses of respondent Luzviminda S. Valdez, a former mayor
of Bacolod City.
Based on the verification conducted in the establishments that issued the official receipts, it was alleged that the cash slips were
altered/falsified to enable Valdez to claim/receive reimbursement from the Government the total amount of P279,150.00 instead
of only P4,842.25; thus an aggregate claim overclaim of P274,306.75.
Consequently, Valdez was charged with eight cases four of which (SB-14-CRM-0317 to 0320) were for Violation of Section 3 (e)
of Republic Act No. 3019, while the remaining half (SB-14-CRM-0321 to 0324) were for the complex crime of Malversation of
Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents under Articles 217 and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC). All the cases were raffled before public respondent Sandiganbayan.
Ombudsman recommended "no bail" in 3 cases, Valdez, caused the filing of a Motion to Set Aside No Bail Recommendation and
to Fix the Amount of Bail. She argued that the 3 cases are bailable as a matter of right because no aggravating or modifying
circumstance was alleged; the maximum of the indeterminate sentence shall be taken from the medium period that ranged from
18 years, 8 months and 1 day to 20 years; and applying Article 48 of the RPC, the imposable penalty is 20 years, which is the
maximum of the medium period.
Petitioner countered that the ISL is inapplicable as the attending circumstances are immaterial because the charge constituting
the complex crime have the corresponding penalty of reclusion perpetua. Since the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua,
bail is discretionary.
Due to the issuance and release of a warrant of arrest, Valdez subsequently filed an Urgent Supplemental Motion to the Motion
to Set Aside No Bail Recommendation and to Fix the Amount of Bail with Additional Prayer to Lift Warrant of Arrest, public
respondent granted the motions of Valdez. It recalled the arrest order issued in 3 criminal Case. In lieu thereof, a new arrest order
was issued, fixing the bail for each offense charged in said cases in the amount of P200,000.00.
Issue: Whether or not Valdez is entitled to bail as a matter of right despite being indicted for the complex crime of Malversation of
Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents.
Held:
On the procedural issue:
The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non before a petition for certiorari may lie, its purpose
being to grant an opportunity for the court a quo to correct any error attributed to it by a re-examination of the legal and factual
circumstances of the case. However, the rule is not absolute and jurisprudence has laid down the following exceptions when the
filing of a petition for certiorari is proper notwithstanding the failure to file a motion for reconsideration:
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the
same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the
Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the petition is perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due
process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable;
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
(h) where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and,
(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved.
On the substantive issue:

The issue being raised here is one purely of law and all the argument, pros and cons were already raised in and passed upon by
public respondent; thus, filing a motion for reconsideration would be an exercise in futility. Likewise, as petitioner claims, the
resolution of the question raised in this case is of urgent necessity considering its implications on similar cases filed and pending
before the Sandiganbayan. As it appears, there have been conflicting views on the matter such that the different divisions of the
anti-graft court issue varying resolutions. Undeniably, the issue is of extreme importance affecting public interest. It involves not
just the right of the State to prosecute criminal offenders but, more importantly, the constitutional right of the accused to bail.
Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states:
SECTION 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right
to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
Pursuant thereto, Sections 4 and 7, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provide:
SEC. 4.
Bail, a matter of right; exception. - All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or
released on recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule (a) before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal
Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of
an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. (4a)
SEC. 7. Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. - No person charged
with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence
of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. (7a)
The pivotal question is: How should We construe the term "punishable" under the provisions above-quoted? In Our mind, the term
"punishable" should refer to prescribed, not imposable, penalty. People vs. Temporada, which was even cited by petitioner,
perceptibly distinguished these two concepts: The RPC provides for an initial penalty as a general prescription for the felonies
defined therein which consists of a range of period of time. This is what is referred to as the "prescribed penalty." For instance,
under Article 249 of the RPC, the prescribed penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal which ranges from 12 years and 1 day to
20 years of imprisonment. Further, the Code provides for attending or modifying circumstances which when present in the
commission of a felony affects the computation of the penalty to be imposed on a convict. This penalty, as thus modified, is referred
to as the "imposable penalty." In the case of homicide which is committed with one ordinary aggravating circumstance and no
mitigating circumstances, the imposable penalty under the RPC shall be the prescribed penalty in its maximum period. From this
imposable penalty, the court chooses a single fixed penalty (also called a straight penalty) which is the "penalty actually imposed"
on a convict, i.e., the prison term he has to serve.
Petitioner contends that the imposable penalty is the one provided by the RPC before conviction to determine whether the charge
is bailable or not, while the penalty actually imposed pertains to the prison sentence upon conviction. Hence, it is maintained that
the penalty imposable for the offense charged against private respondent is reclusion perpetua, which makes Criminal Case Nos.
SB-14-CRM-0321, 0322 and 0324 non-bailable.
In these cases, the offenses charged are the complex crimes of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public
Documents. In determining the penalty imposable, it is the penalty for the most serious crime which is considered. Between
Malversation and Falsification, it is Malversation which provides the graver penalty. As thus provided under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code, "[i]f the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua."
The penalty, however, cannot be immediately applied in its maximum period, orreclusion perpetua, since this will already consider
the application of the penalty in the event of a conviction. At this point, there is no certainty that Valdez would be found guilty of
Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents involving an amount that exceeds P22,000.00.
Falsification, like an aggravating circumstance, must be alleged and proved during the trial. For purposes of bail proceedings, it
would be premature to rule that the supposed crime committed is a complex crime since it is only when the trial has terminated
that falsification could be appreciated as a means of committing malversation. Further, it is possible that only the elements of one
of the constituent offenses, i.e., either malversation or falsification, or worse, none of them, would be proven after full-blown trial.
It would be the height of absurdity to deny Valdez the right to bail and grant her the same only after trial if it turns out that there is
no complex crime committed. Likewise, it is unjust for Us to give a stamp of approval in depriving the accused person's
constitutional right to bail for allegedly committing a complex crime that is not even considered as inherently grievous, odious and
hateful. To note, Article 48 of the RPC on complex crimes does not change the nature of the constituent offenses; it only requires
the imposition of the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law. When committed through falsification of official/public
documents, the RPC does not intend to classify malversation as a capital offense. Otherwise, the complex crime of Malversation
of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents involving an amount that exceeds P22,000.00 should have been
expressly included in Republic Act No. 7659. If truly a non-bailable offense, the law should have already considered it as a special
complex crime like robbery with rape, robbery with homicide, rape with homicide, and kidnapping with murder or homicide, which
have prescribed penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Just to stress, the inequity of denying bail as a matter of right to an accused charged with Malversation of Public Funds thru
Falsification of Official/Public Documents involving an amount that exceeds P22,000.00 is palpable when compared with an
accused indicted for plunder, which is a heinous crime punishable under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by R.A. No. 7659 and R.A.
No. 9346.
Observe that bail is not a matter of right in plunder committed through malversation of public funds, but the aggregate amount or
total value of ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired must be at least Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00). In contrast,
an accused who is alleged to have committed malversation of public funds thru falsification of official/public documents, which is
not a capital offense, is no longer entitled to bail as a matter of right if the amount exceeds P22,000.00, or as low as P22,000.01.
Such distinction is glaringly unfair and could not have been contemplated by the law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Private respondent Luzviminda S. Valdez is entitled
to bail, as a matter of right, in Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-0321, 0322 and 0324. Public respondent Sandiganbayan Fifth
Division should be guided by the latest Bailbond Guide. In any case, the amount should correspond to the medium penalty
multiplied by Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for every year of imprisonment.
Rights of Accused - Bail

7. ENRILE v. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division)
Admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua is subject to judicial discretion. Such
discretion may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of
whether or not he should be granted provisional liberty. The decision whether to detain or release an accused before and during
trial is ultimately an incident of the judicial power to hear and determine his criminal case. The strength of the Prosecution's
case, albeit a good measure of the accused's propensity for flight or for causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary
objective of bail, which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial
Facts:
The Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several others with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their
purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF).
Enrile respectively filed his Omnibus Motion and Supplemental Opposition, praying, among others, that he be allowed to post bail
should probable cause be found against him.
On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its resolution denying Enrile's motion, particularly on the matter of bail, on
the ground of its prematurity considering that Enrile had not yet then voluntarily surrendered or been placed under the custody of
the law. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered the arrest of Enrile. On the same day that the warrant for his arrest was issued,
Enrile voluntarily surrendered to Director Benjamin Magalong of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) in Camp
Crame, Quezon City, and was later on confined at the Philippine National Police (PNP) General Hospital following his medical
examination.
Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital, and his Motion to Fix Bail. In support of the
motions, Enrile argued that he should be allowed to post bail because: (a) the Prosecution had not yet established that the
evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) although he was charged with plunder, the penalty as to him would only be reclusion temporal,
not reclusion perpetua; and (c) he was not a flight risk, and his age and physical condition must further be seriously considered.
On July 14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its first assailed resolution denying Enrile's Motion to Fix Bail, disposed that
:(a) it is only after the prosecution shall have presented its evidence and the Court shall have made a determination that the
evidence of guilt is not strong against accused Enrile can he demand bail as a matter of right. Then and only then will the Court
be duty-bound to fix the amount of his bail. To be sure, no such determination has been made by the Court. In fact, accused Enrile
has not �led an application for bail. Necessarily, no bail hearing can even commence. It is thus exceedingly premature for accused
Enrile to ask the Court to fix his bail; (b) Enrile anchors this that Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080, and on the allegation that he is over
seventy (70) years old and that he voluntarily surrendered, hence be reclusion temporal, and thus bailable. But, for purposes of
bail, the presence of mitigating circumstance/s is not taken into consideration. These circumstances will only be appreciated in
the imposition of the proper penalty after trial should the accused be found guilty of the offense charged; and (c) Admittedly, the
accused's age, physical condition and his being a flight risk are among the factors that are considered in fixing a reasonable
amount of bail. However, as explained above, it is premature for the Court to fix the amount of bail without an anterior showing
that the evidence of guilt against accused Enrile is not strong.
Enrile claims that, an accused is entitled to bail as matter of right; that it is the duty and burden of the Prosecution to
show clearly and conclusively that Enrile comes under the exception and cannot be excluded from enjoying the right to bail; that
the Prosecution has failed to establish that Enrile, if convicted of plunder, is punishable by reclusion perpetua considering the
presence of two mitigating circumstances – he was already over 70 years at the time of the alleged commission of the
offense and his voluntary surrender; that the Prosecution has not come forward with proof showing that his guilt for the crime
of plunder is strong; and that he should not be considered a flight risk taking into account that he is already over the age of 90, his
medical condition, and his social standing.
Issue:
Whether Enrile may be granted bail based on account that Enrile’s right to bail is discretionary.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled YES.
Bail protects the right of the accused to due process and to be presumed innocent. In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. The presumption of innocence is rooted in the guarantee of
due process, and is safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on bail, and further binds the court to wait until after trial
to impose any punishment on the accused.
It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent the accused from committing additional crimes. The purpose of bail
is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the trial court. The amount of bail should
be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when so required, but it should be no higher than is reasonably calculated
to fulfill this purpose. Thus, bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accused's interest in his provisional
liberty before or during the trial, and the society's interest in assuring the accused's presence at trial.
Bail may be granted as a matter of right or of discretion The general rule following Section, 13, Article 3 of the
Constitution and Section 7, Rule 114: any person, before conviction of any criminal offense, shall be bailable. The exception is
when such person is charged with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua [or life imprisonment] and the evidence of his
guilt is strong. Thus, denial of bail should only follow once it has been established that the evidence of guilt is strong. W here
evidence of guilt is not strong, bail may be granted according to the discretion of the court.
As a result, all criminal cases within competence of the lower courts are bailable as matter of right because these courts
have no jurisdiction to try capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Likewise, bail is a
matter of right prior to conviction by RTC for any offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, or
even prior to conviction for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment when evidence of guilt is not
strong. On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by RTC of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment; or (2) if RTC has imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six years, provided none
of the circumstances enumerated under par. 3 of Sec. 5, Rule 114 is present, as follows:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance
of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without valid
justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.
Admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua is subject to judicial
discretion. Such discretion may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the
purpose of whether or not he should be granted provisional liberty. Bail hearing with notice is indispensable. The hearing should
primarily determine whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. Even before its pronouncement in the Lim case,
this Court already ruled in People vs. Dacudao, that a hearing is mandatory before bail can be granted to an accused who is
charged with a capital offense
In Aguirre v. Belmonte it has been ruled that certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the presentation of
evidence and reasonable opportunity for the prosecution to refute it. Among them are the nature and circumstances of the crime,
character and reputation of the accused, the weight of the evidence against him, the probability of the accused appearing at the
trial, whether or not the accused is a fugitive from justice, and whether or not the accused is under bond in other cases. (Section
6, Rule 114, Rules of Court) It is highly doubtful if the trial court can appreciate these guidelines in an ex-parte determination
where the Fiscal is neither present nor heard. This method is thereby found in summary hearing, which is a brief and speedy
method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of hearing which is
merely to determine the weight of evidence for purposes of bail.
In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to comply with the guidelines outlined in Cortes v. Catral:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or
require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution
refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its
sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise
petition should be denied.
In addition, Enrile’s poor health justifies his admission to bail. Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the
crime charged, should be allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown
to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his health and life would not serve
the true objective of preventive incarceration during the trial.
It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable him to have his medical condition be
properly addressed and better attended to by competent physicians in the hospitals of his choice. This will not only aid in his
adequate preparation of his defense but, more importantly, will guarantee his appearance in court for the trial.
The Supreme Court took note of the Philippines’ responsibility to the international community arising from its commitment
to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Court therefore has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of
every person to liberty and due process and for detainees to avail of such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to
liberty.
8. Leviste v. CA
(2010)
Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. On the other hand, upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of discretion.
**Supreme Court:
Our rules authorize the proper courts to exercise discretion in the grant of bail pending appeal. In the exercise of that discretion,
the proper courts are to be guided by the fundamental principle that theallowance of bail pending appeal should be exercised
not with laxity but with grave caution and only for strong reasons, considering that the accused has been in fact convicted
by the trial court.
FACTS:
Petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste, charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, was convicted by the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision
mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum. He appealed his conviction to the Court of
Appeals.
Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health
condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s
application for bail. It invoked the bedrock principle in the matter of bail pending appeal, that the discretion to extend bail during
the course of appeal should be exercised “with grave caution and only for strong reasons.”
Petitioner now questions as grave abuse of discretion the denial of his application for bail, considering that none of the
conditions justifying denial of bail under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present. Petitioner’s
theory is that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not more than 20 years and the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail must be granted to an appellant pending appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, in an application for bail pending appeal by an appellant sentenced by the trial court to a penalty of
imprisonment for more than six years, the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail should
automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court.
RULING:
NO, the discretionary nature of bail mentioned in Section 5 of Rule 114 does not mean automatic grant of bail in case of
appeal.
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and
acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the
appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-
bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on provisional liberty during the pendency
of the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be
denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused,
of the following or other similar circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions
of his bail without a valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court after
notice to the adverse party in either case. (emphasis supplied)
The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where the penalty imposed on the appellant applying for bail
is imprisonment exceeding six years:
The first scenario deals with the circumstances enumerated in the said paragraph (namely, recidivism, quasi-recidivism, habitual
delinquency or commission of the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; previous escape from legal confinement,
evasion of sentence or violation of the conditions of his bail without a valid justification; commission of the offense while under
probation, parole or conditional pardon; circumstances indicating the probability of flight if released on bail; undue risk of
committing another crime during the pendency of the appeal; or other similar circumstances) not present.
The second scenario contemplates the existence of at least one of the said circumstances.
The implications of this distinction are discussed with erudition and clarity in the commentary of retired Supreme Court
Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an authority in remedial law:
Under the present revised Rule 114, the availability of bail to an accused may be summarized in the following rules:
xxxxxxxxx
e. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court wherein a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years
but not more than 20 years is imposed, and not one of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar
circumstance is present and proved, bail is a matter of discretion (Sec. 5);
f. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court imposing a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years
but not more than 20 years, and any of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar circumstance is
present and proved, no bail shall be granted by said court (Sec. 5); x x x (emphasis supplied)
The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where the penalty imposed on the appellant applying for bail
is imprisonment exceeding six years. The first scenario deals with the circumstances enumerated in the said paragraph (namely,
recidivism, quasi-recidivism, habitual delinquency or commission of the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
previous escape from legal confinement, evasion of sentence or violation of the conditions of his bail without a valid justification;
commission of the offense while under probation, parole or conditional pardon; circumstances indicating the probability of flight if
released on bail; undue risk of committing another crime during the pendency of the appeal; or other similar circumstances) not
present. The second scenario contemplates the existence of at least one of the said circumstances.
The implications of this distinction are discussed with erudition and clarity in the commentary of retired Supreme Court
Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an authority in remedial law:
Under the present revised Rule 114, the availability of bail to an accused may be summarized in the following rules:
xxxxxxxxx
e. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court wherein a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years
but not more than 20 years is imposed, and not one of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar
circumstance is present and proved, bail is a matter of discretion (Sec. 5);
f. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court imposing a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years
but not more than 20 years, and any of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar circumstance is
present and proved, no bail shall be granted by said court (Sec. 5); x x x
Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. Herrera, another authority in remedial law, is of the same thinking:
Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is not punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. On the other hand, upon conviction by the Regional Trial
Court of an offense not punishable death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of
discretion.
Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years then bail is a matter of
discretion, except when any of the enumerated circumstances under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114
is present then bail shall be denied.
In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This means that, if none of the circumstances mentioned in the
third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate court has the discretion to grant or deny bail. An application for
bail pending appeal may be denied even if the bail-negating circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are
absent. In other words, the appellate courts denial of bail pending appeal where none of the said circumstances exists does not,
by and of itself, constitute abuse of discretion.
On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court exercises a more stringent discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain
whether any of the enumerated circumstances in fact exists. If it so determines, it has no other option except to deny or revoke
bail pending appeal. Conversely, if the appellate court grants bail pending appeal, grave abuse of discretion will thereby be
committed.
Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail pending appeal should be viewed from the perspective of
two stages: (1) the determination of discretion stage, where the appellate court must determine whether any of the circumstances
in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will establish whether or not the appellate court will exercise sound
discretion or stringent discretion in resolving the application for bail pending appeal and (2) the exercise of discretion stage where,
assuming the appellants case falls within the first scenario allowing the exercise of sound discretion, the appellate court may
consider all relevant circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including
the demands of equity and justice; on the basis thereof, it may either allow or disallow bail.
On the other hand, if the appellants case falls within the second scenario, the appellate courts stringent discretion requires
that the exercise thereof be primarily focused on the determination of the proof of the presence of any of the circumstances that
are prejudicial to the allowance of bail. This is so because the existence of any of those circumstances is by itself sufficient to
deny or revoke bail. Nonetheless, a finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not automatically result in
the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the less stringent sound discretion approach.
As a matter of fact, endorsing the reasoning quoted above and relying thereon, the Court declared in Yap v. Court of
Appeals (promulgated in 2001 when the present rules were already effective), that denial of bail pending appeal is a matter of
wise discretion.
Section 13, Article II of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. x x x (emphasis supplied)
After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends.
From then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion. At the risk of being repetitious, such discretion must be exercised
with grave caution and only for strong reasons. Considering that the accused was in fact convicted by the trial court, allowance of
bail pending appeal should be guided by a stringent-standards approach. This judicial disposition finds strong support in the history
and evolution of the rules on bail and the language of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. It is likewise consistent with the
trial courts initial determination that the accused should be in prison. Furthermore, letting the accused out on bail despite his
conviction may destroy the deterrent effect of our criminal laws. This is especially germane to bail pending appeal because long
delays often separate sentencing in the trial court and appellate review. In addition, at the post-conviction stage, the accused
faces a certain prison sentence and thus may be more likely to flee regardless of bail bonds or other release conditions. Finally,
permitting bail too freely in spite of conviction invites frivolous and time-wasting appeals which will make a mockery of our criminal
justice system and court processes.
9. Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region vs Olalia, Jr.

Facts:
Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of "accepting an advantage as agent”. He
also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. Warrants of
arrest were thereafter issued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge.
The DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of Muñoz. The DOJ then
forwarded the request to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which, in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila an application for
Muñoz’s provisional arrest. RTC Manila thereafter issued an Order of Arrest. That same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained
him. The Supreme Court affirmed the validity of the Order of Arrest against Muñoz.
Meanwhile, petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of Muñoz,
presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr. For his part, Muñoz filed, in the same case,- a petition for bail which was opposed by
petitioner.
After hearing, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting
bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk." Thereafter, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from
further hearing the case. It was then raffled off and presided by Judge Olalia, Jr. Muñoz filed a motion for reconsideration denying
his application for bail and was granted by Judge Olalia, Jr.
Issue:
Whether there is in the Constitution or statutory law that provides an extraditee a right to bail; and that such right to bail is not
limited solely to criminal proceeding.
Ruling:
IT DEPENDS. (Case-to-case basis siya guys.)
----------
According to previous jurisprudence, bail does not apply to extradition cases.
In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark
B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo, this Court, speaking through then Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, later Chief
Justice, held that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings. It is "available only in criminal
proceedings," thus:
x x x. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as
Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of
Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings because extradition courts do not render judgments
of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be
subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable
doubt" (De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1, 6, September 17, 1971, per Fernando, J., later CJ). It follows that the constitutional
provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It
must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application "only to persons judicially charged
for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion" (Sec. 18, Art. VIII, Constitution). Hence, the second
sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned
offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature.
-----end-----
However, the right to be granted bail may be found in our recognition to international law.
The United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which the right to life, liberty and all
the other fundamental rights of every person were proclaimed. While not a treaty, the principles contained in the said
Declaration are now recognized as customarily binding upon the members of the international community. Thus, in Mejoff
v. Director of Prisons, this Court, in granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that under the Constitution, the principles
set forth in that Declaration are part of the law of the land. The UN General Assembly also adopted the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights which the Philippines signed and ratified. Fundamental among the rights enshrined therein are the rights
of every person to life, liberty, and due process. The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed
to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person.
The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco is illustrative. In this case, a Chinese facing deportation for failure to secure the necessary
certificate of registration was granted bail pending his appeal. After noting that the prospective deportee had committed no crime,
the Court opined that "To refuse him bail is to treat him as a person who has committed the most serious crime known to law;"
and that while deportation is not a criminal proceeding, some of the machinery used "is the machinery of criminal law." Thus, the
provisions relating to bail was applied to deportation proceedings.
In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons6 and Chirskoff v. Commission of Immigration, this Court ruled that foreign nationals against whom
no formal criminal charges have been filed may be released on bail pending the finality of an order of deportation. As previously
stated, the Court in Mejoff relied upon the Universal declaration of Human Rights in sustaining the detainee’s right to bail.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise,
considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be
invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is
not in issue.
Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty
obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the
presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not
impaired.
-----end----
But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation of liberty on the
part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also "the machinery of
criminal law." This is shown by Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates the "immediate
arrest and temporary detention of the accused" if such "will best serve the interest of justice." We further note that Section 20
allows the requesting state "in case of urgency" to ask for the "provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the
request for extradition;" and that release from provisional arrest "shall not prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused if a
request for extradition is received subsequently."
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A potential
extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state
following the proceedings. "Temporary detention" may be a necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time
of the detention should be reasonable.
Records show that private respondent was arrested and remained incarcerated when the trial court ordered his admission to
bail. In other words, he had been detained for over two (2) years without having been convicted of any crime. By any
standard, such an extended period of detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this
prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the extradition court to grant him bail.
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting
him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution.
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty
it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in our
foreign relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty
obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditee’s rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these
rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We
should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily
met.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be the proof
beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While
administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the
object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion
in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear
and convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be
lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by
"clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently,
this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on the basis
of "clear and convincing evidence." If not, the trial court should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate
detention; and thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch.
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
10. People v. Frago

232 SCRA 563 (1994)
The prosecution must draw its strength from its own evidence. As has been oft-repeated, every circumstance favoring the
innocence of the accused must be taken into account and the proof against him must survive the test of reason. Only when
the conscience is satisfied that the crime has been committed by the person on trial should the sentence be for conviction.
Facts:
Jicelyn Lansap was boarding in the house of one Fausto Morales in the poblacion of Quezon, Palawan together with her
cousins Susan and Adea Bansil. The version of the prosecution is that before proceeding to the boarding house of Jicelyn Lansap,
the accused, an ice cream vendor, first went to the residence of Ronalyn Pastera at around three forty-five in the morning and
surreptitiously entered Ronalyn's bedroom where she was sleeping. He fanned her face with his handkerchief and then lifted her
bodily from the floor. He was about to take her out of the room when she suddenly woke up and screamed for help thus prompting
her father to respond immediately by switching on the lights. As a consequence, the accused had to drop Ronalyn on the floor
and run out of the house. The prosecution would seem to infer that from the house of Ronalyn where he failed in his alleged
attempt to defile her, the accused next went to the boarding house of Jicelyn some fifty meters away.
According to Jicelyn, she and her cousins went to bed at about eight o'clock in the evening of 25 September 1990. Then
at around five-thirty the following morning, she was awakened by appellant who was already strangling her. She shouted for help
so that he immediately ran away. She felt pain all over her body, more particularly in her private part, and discovered that she was
no longer wearing her skirt and underwear. To her consternation, she found herself in the vacant house of a certain Dado Andor.
So she lost no time looking for her way home. Upon reaching her boarding house, she narrated her harrowing experience to her
cousins who in turn related the incident to her mother.
At eight o'clock that morning, Jicelyn and her mother went to the hospital where she was examined by Dr. Marcela
Remegio who found Jicelyn with "Labia Majora and Minora still coaptated and with sign of external struggle . . . contusion, abrasion
all over face . . . around neck . . . scratch marks on both medial surface of thigh . . . vulva swollen . . . presence of fresh hymenal
laceration at six o'clock . . . [e]xamination for the presence of spermatoza was positive . . . physical virginity lost."
On the same day, Ronalyn's father and Jicelyn reported the incidents to the police authorities. Both Ronalyn and Jicelyn
identified the accused as their attacker in the police line-up on 28 September and 8 October 1990, respectively, and then filed
their formal complaints against him.
Appellant’s alibi: He claims that at nine o'clock in the evening of 25 September 1990, he was already asleep with his wife
and children. He woke up at six o'clock the following morning. He was very tired that night because he was vending ice cream in
the poblacion the whole day.
After trial, he was acquitted of the attempted rape charge by Ronalyn, he was found guilty of rape charged by Jicelyn.
In his appeal, appellant imputes error to the trial court in convicting him on the basis of an identification which was made
without the assistance of counsel and according credence to the story of Jicelyn, which he considers fantastic, thereby denying
his constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Appellant argues that it was during his detention, when he was not assisted by counsel, that he was identified by Jicelyn.
Thus he invokes People v. Hassan where this Court affirmed the right of an accused to counsel at all stages of the proceedings,
the most crucial of which is his identification, and denial thereof entitles him to acquittal.
Issue: Whether or not appellant’s constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty beyond reasonable doubt was
violated when he was not assisted by counsel at all stages of proceedings, the most crucial of which is his identification
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that NO, The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e., when the
investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the respondent/accused.
At such point or stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting
false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation, for the commission of an offense.
Accordingly, no custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel, engaged by the person arrested,
or by any person in his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself, or by anyone in his behalf,
and that, while the right may be waived, the waiver shall not be valid unless made in writing and in the presence of counsel.
Orlando Frago was singled out by Jicelyn in a police line-up composed of ten persons. Some were stout while others
were slim, but almost all of them were mustachioed and five were long-haired. When petitioner was identified by the complainant
at the police line-up, he had not been held yet to answer for a criminal offense. The police line-up is not a part of the custodial
inquest, hence, he was not yet entitled to counsel. Thus, it was held that when the process had not yet shifted from the investigatory
to the accusatory as when police investigation does not elicit a confession the accused may not yet avail of the services of his
lawyer. Since petitioner in the course of his identification in the police line-up had not yet been held to answer for a criminal offense,
he was, therefore, not deprived of his right to be assisted by counsel because the accusatory process had not yet set in. In fact,
when he was identified in the police line-up by complainant he did not give any statement to the police. He was, therefore, not
interrogated at all as he was not facing a criminal charge.
There is nothing in the records which shows that in the course of the identification from the police line-up the police
investigator sought to extract any admission or confession from appellant. The Court also ruled on the insufficiency of the
identification of appellant Orlando Frago.
A careful dissection of the testimony of Jicelyn herself indubitably shows that she has no reliable basis for pointing to the
accused as the person who raped her. She says that his face was covered; that he had long hair; that while the person who raped
her had high nose (matangos) his nose is just "katamtaman"; that she did not have the opportunity to observe the height of the
rapist; and, that the only evidence of sexual intercourse is the result of the medical examination.
Appellant argues that the "contusion, abrasion all over the face, around the neck, presence of scratch marks on both medial
surface of thigh" did not necessarily indicate resistance on her part, contending further that it is a matter of judicial notice that
passionate kissing and petting could normally produce "injuries." According to him, Jicelyn herself disclosed that she had a suitor
for whom she had "feelings of affection," thus concluding that she may have submitted herself to him.
As a general rule, the Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in passing upon the credibility of opposing
witnesses unless there appears in the record some fact or substance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the
significance of which has been misinterpreted. This is due to the fact that the trial court is in a better position to weigh conflicting
testimonies, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying.
There seems to be no question that, on the part of the Pastera sisters, they may have recognized appellant positively
because their room was lighted with a wick/gas lamp and he was not wearing anything on his face. They identified him on 28
September 1990, whereas Jicelyn pointed him out only on 8 October 1990. The possibility that Jicelyn had conferred with the
Pastera sisters regarding the identity of the accused before she testified is not remote because they were neighbors. As a
consequence, when Jicelyn testified on 13 August 1991, she gave the same description of her attacker as that given by Ronalyn
Pastera.
Under the circumstances, we are inevitably drawn to the conclusion that Jicelyn's identification of Orlando Frago was
merely patterned after the identification made by the Pastera sisters. This is then a derivative, not positive, identification. The
identification then of appellant by Jicelyn is doubtful. Her testimony, standing alone, does not satisfy that quantum of proof required
to support a judgment of conviction. The material discrepancies therein engender perplexity as to its veracity and reliability.
Besides, it appears highly incredible that Jicelyn could be bodily lifted from her room in her boarding house and taken
some three hundred meters away to the vacant house of Dado Andor where she was supposedly abused without awakening her
and her two cousins who were all sleeping side by side with her.
Appellant's denial and alibi are inherently weak, but the prosecution cannot rely on their frailty to enhance its cause. The
prosecution must draw its strength from its own evidence. As has been oft-repeated, every circumstance favoring the innocence
of the accused must be taken into account and the proof against him must survive the test of reason. Only when the conscience
is satisfied that the crime has been committed by the person on trial should the sentence be for conviction. Unfortunately for the
prosecution, its evidence has miserably failed to pass that conscience test.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo finding accused-appellant ORLANDO FRAGO guilty of rape in Crim. Case
No. 9144 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and he is ACQUITTED as his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. It
appearing that he is detained, his immediate release from custody is ordered unless he is held for another cause.
11. PEOPLE V. GODOY

Presumption of Innocence: It must be remembered that the existence of a presumption indicating guilt does not in itself destroy
the presumption against innocence unless the inculpating presumption, together with all of the evidence, or the lack of any
evidence or explanation, is sufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence by proving the defendant's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Until the defendant's guilt is shown in this manner, the presumption of innocence continues.
REGALADO, J.:
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Danny Godoy was charged in two separate informations filed before the Regional Trial Court, for Palawan and
Puerto Princesa City, Branch 47, with rape and kidnapping with serious illegal detention, respectively punished under Articles 335
and 267 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
In Criminal Case No. 11640 for Rape:
That on or about the evening of the 21st day of January, 1994, at Barangay Pulot Center, Municipality of
Brooke's Point, Province of Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused by means of force, threat and intimidation, by using a knife and by means of deceit, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one Mia Taha to her damage and prejudice. 1
In Criminal Case No. 11641 for Kidnapping with Serious Illegal Detention:
That on or about the 22nd day of January, 1994, at Barangay Ipilan, Municipality of Brooke's Point, Province of
Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, a private individual,
and being a teacher of the victim, Mia Taha, and by means of deceit did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously kidnap or detained (sic) said Mia Taha, a girl of 17 years old (sic), for a period of five (5) days thus
thereby depriving said Mia Taha of her liberty against her will and consent and without legal justification, to the
damage and prejudice of said Mia Taha.2
During the arraignment on both indictments, appellant pleaded not guilty to said charges and, after the pre-trial was terminated, a
joint trial of the two cases was conducted by the trial court.3
According to complainant Mia Taha, at around 7:00 P.M. of January 21, 1994, she went to the boarding house of her cousin.
When she saw that the house was dark, she decided to pass through the kitchen door at the back because she knew that there
was nobody inside. As soon as she opened the door, somebody suddenly grabbed her, poked a knife on her neck, dragged her
by the hand and told her not to shout. She was then forced to lie down on the floor. Although it was dark, complainant was able to
recognize her assailant, by the light coming from the moon and through his voice, as accused-appellant Danny Godoy who was
her Physics teacher at PNS.
When she was already on the floor, appellant removed her panty with one hand while holding the knife with the other hand, opened
the zipper of his pants, and then inserted his private organ inside her private parts against her will. She felt pain because it was
her first experience and she cried. Throughout her ordeal, she could not utter a word. She was very frightened because a knife
was continually pointed at her. She also could not fight back nor plead with appellant not to rape her because he was her teacher
and she was afraid of him. She was threatened not to report the incident to anyone or else she and her family would be killed.
Thereafter, while she was putting on her panty, she noticed that her skirt was stained with blood. Appellant walked with her to the
gate of the house and she then proceeded alone to the boarding house where she lived. She did not see where appellant went
after she left him at the gate. When she arrived at her boarding house, she saw her landlady but she did not mention anything
about the incident.
The following morning, January 22, 1994, complainant went home to her parents' house. She likewise did not tell her parents
about the incident for fear that appellant might make good his threat. At around 3:00 P.M. of that same day, appellant arrived at
the house of her parents and asked permission from the latter if complainant could accompany him to solicit funds because she
was a candidate for "Miss PNS Pulot." When her parents agreed, she was constrained to go with appellant because she did not
want her parents to get into trouble.
Appellant and complainant then left the house and they walked in silence, with Mia following behind appellant, towards the highway
where appellant hailed a passenger jeep which was empty except for the driver and the conductor. She was forced to ride the
jeep because appellant threatened to kill her if she would not board the vehicle. The jeep proceeded to the Sunset Garden at the
poblacion, Brooke's Point where they alighted.
At the Sunset Garden, appellant checked in and brought her to a room where they stayed for three days. During the entire duration
of their stay at the Sunset Garden, complainant was not allowed to leave the room which was always kept locked. She was
continuously guarded and constantly raped by appellant. She was, however, never drunk or unconscious. Nonetheless, she was
forced to have sex with appellant because the latter was always carrying a knife with him.
In the early morning of January 25, 1994, appellant brought her to the house of his friend at Edward's Subdivision where she was
raped by him three times. She was likewise detained and locked inside the room and tightly guarded by appellant. After two days,
or on January 27, 1994, they left the place because appellant came to know that complainant had been reported and indicated as
a missing person in the police blotter. They went to see a certain Naem ** from whom appellant sought help. On that same day,
she was released but only after her parents agreed to settle the case with appellant.
Immediately thereafter, Mia's parents brought her to the District Hospital at Brooke's Point where she was examined by Dr. Rogelio
Divinagracia who testified that the complainant had participated in sexual intercourse. On the basis of the inflicted laceration which
was downward at 6 o'clock position, he could not say that there was force applied because there were no scratches or bruises,
but only a week-old laceration. He also examined the patient bodily but found no sign of bruises or injuries. The patient told him
that she was raped.
During the cross-examination, complainant narrated that when appellant went to their house the following day, she did not know
if he was armed but there was no threat made on her or her parents. On the contrary, appellant even courteously asked permission
from them in her behalf and so they left the house with appellant walking ahead of her. When she was brought to the Sunset
Garden, she could not refuse because she was afraid. However, she admitted that at that time, appellant was not pointing a knife
at her. She only saw the cashier of the Sunset Garden but she did not notice if there were other people inside. She likewise did
not ask the appellant why he brought her there.
Complainant described the lock in their room as an ordinary doorknob, similar to that on the door of the courtroom which, even if
locked, could still be opened from the inside, and she added that there was a sliding lock inside the room. According to her, they
stayed at Sunset Garden for three days and three nights but she never noticed if appellant ever slept because everytime she woke
up, appellant was always beside her. She never saw him close his eyes.
Helen Taha, the mother of complainant, testified that when the latter arrived at their house in the morning of January 22, 1994,
she noticed that Mia appeared weak and her eyes were swollen. When she asked her daughter if there was anything wrong, the
latter merely kept silent. That afternoon, she allowed Mia to go with appellant because she knew he was her teacher.
Early the next morning, she and her husband went to the Philippine National Police (PNP) station at Pulot, Brooke's Point and had
the incident recorded in the police blotter. The following day, they went to the office of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
at Puerto Princess City, then to the police station near the NBI, and finally to the radio station airing the Radyo ng Bayan program
where she made an appeal to appellant to return her daughter. When she returned home, a certain Naem was waiting there and
he informed her that Mia was at Brooke's Point. He further conveyed appellant's willingness to become a Muslim so he could
marry Mia and thus settle the case. Helen Taha readily acceded because she wanted to see her daughter.
In the morning of January 27, 1994, she went to the house of Naem who sent somebody to fetch complainant. She testified that
when Mia arrived, she was crying as she reported that she was raped by appellant, and that the latter threatened to kill her if she
did not return within an hour. Because of this, she immediately brought Mia to the hospital where the latter was examined and
then they proceeded to the municipal hall to file a complaint for rape and kidnapping. Both Mia and Helen Taha executed separate
sworn statements before the PNP at Brooke's Point.
Later, Fruit Godoy, the wife of appellant, went to their house and offered P50,000.00 for the settlement of the case. On their part,
her husband insisted that they just settle, hence all three of them, Adjeril, Helen and Mia Taha, went to the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor where they met with the mother of appellant who gave them P30,000.00. Adjeril and Helen Taha subsequently
executed an affidavit of desistance in Criminal Case No. 7687 for kidnapping pending in the prosecutor's office, which was sworn
to before Prosecutor II Chito S. Meregillano. Helen Taha testified that she agreed to the settlement because that was what her
husband wanted. Mia Taha was dropped from the school and was not allowed to graduate. Her father died two months later,
supposedly because of what happened.
The defense presented a different version of what actually transpired.
According to appellant, he first met Mia Taha sometime in August, 1993 at the Palawan National School (PNS). Although he did
not court her, he fell in love with her because she often told him "Sir, I love you." What started as a joke later developed into a
serious relationship which was kept a secret from everybody else. It was on December 20, 1993 when they first had sexual
intercourse as lovers.
Exactly a month thereafter, specifically in the evening of January 20, 1994, Erna Baradero, a teacher at the PNS, was looking
inside the school building for her husband, who was a security guard of PNS, when she heard voices apparently coming from the
Orchids Room. She went closer to listen and she heard a girl's voice saying "Mahal na mahal kita, Sir, iwanan mo ang iyong
asawa at tatakas tayo." Upon hearing this, she immediately opened the door and was startled to see Mia Taha and Danny Godoy
holding hands. She asked them what they were doing there at such an unholy hour but the two, who were obviously caught by
surprise, could not answer. She then hurriedly closed the door and left. According to this witness, complainant admitted to her that
she was having an affair with appellant. Desirous that such illicit relationship must be stopped, Erna Baradero informed appellant's
wife about it.
Upon the request of appellant's wife, Erna Baradero executed an affidavit in connection with the present case, but the same was
not filed then because of the affidavit of desistance which was executed and submitted by the parents of complainant. In her sworn
statement, Erna Baradero alleged that on January 21, 1994, she confronted Mia Taha about the latter's indiscretion and reminded
her that appellant is a married man, but complainant retorted, "Ano ang pakialam mo," adding that she loves appellant very much.
Appellant testified that on January 21, 1994, at around 7:00 P.M., Mia Taha went to his office asking for help with the monologue
that she would be presenting for the Miss PNS contest. He agreed to meet her at the house of her cousin, Merlylyn Casantosan.
However, when he reached the place, the house was dark and he saw Mia waiting for him outside. Accordingly, they just sat on a
bench near the road where there was a lighted electric post and they talked about the matter she had earlier asked him about.
They stayed there for fifteen minutes, after which complainant returned to her boarding house just across the street while appellant
headed for home some fifteen meters away.
It appears that while complainant was then waiting for appellant, Filomena Pielago, a former teacher of Mia at PNS and who was
then on her way to a nearby store, saw her sitting on a bench and asked what she was doing there at such a late hour. Complainant
merely replied that she was waiting for somebody. Filomena proceeded to the store and, along the way, she saw Inday Zapanta
watering the plants outside the porch of her house. When Filomena Pielago returned, she saw complainant talking with appellant
and she noticed that they were quite intimate because they were holding hands. This made her suspect that the two could be
having a relationship. She, therefore, told appellant that his wife had finished her aerobics class and was already waiting for him.
She also advised Mia to go home.
Prior to this incident, Filomena Pielago already used to see them seated on the same bench. Filomena further testified that she
had tried to talk appellant out of the relationship because his wife had a heart ailment. She also warned Mia Taha, but to no avail.
She had likewise told complainant's grandmother about her activities. At the trial, she identified the handwriting of complainant
appearing on the letters marked as Exhibits "1" and "2", claiming that she is familiar with the same because Mia was her former
student.
In the afternoon of the following day, January 22, 1994, appellant met Mia's mother on the road near their house and she invited
him to come up and eat "buko," which invitation he accepted. Thirty minutes thereafter, complainant told him to ask permission
from her mother for them to go and solicit funds at the poblacion, and he did so. Before they left, he noticed that Mia was carrying
a plastic bag and when he asked her about it, she said that it contained her things which she was bringing to her cousin's house.
Appellant and Mia went to the poblacion where they solicited funds until 6:30 P.M. and then had snacks at the Vic Tan Store.
Thereafter, complainant told appellant that it was already late and there was no more available transportation, so she suggested
that they just stay at Sunset Garden. Convinced that there was nothing wrong in that because they already had intimate relations,
aside from the fact that Mia had repeatedly told him she would commit suicide should he leave her, appellant was prevailed upon
to stay at the hotel. Parenthetically, it was complainant who arranged their registration and subsequently paid P400.00 for their
bill from the funds they had solicited. That evening, however, appellant told complainant at around 9:00 P.M. that he was going
out to see a certain Bert Dalojo at the latter's residence. In truth, he borrowed a motorcycle from Fernando Rubio and went home
to Pulot. He did not bring complainant along because she had refused to go home.
The following morning, January 23, 1994, appellant went to the house of complainant's parents and informed them that Mia spent
the night at the Sunset Garden. Mia's parents said that they would just fetch her there, so he went back to Sunset Garden and
waited for them outside the hotel until 5:00 P.M. When they did not arrive, he decided to go with one Isagani Virey, whom he saw
while waiting near the road, and they had a drinking session with Virey's friends. Thereafter, Virey accompanied him back to
Sunset Garden where they proceeded to Mia's room. Since the room was locked from the inside, Virey had to knock on the door
until it was opened by her.
Appellant denied that they had sexual intercourse during their entire stay at Sunset Garden, that is, from January 22 to 24, 1994,
because he did not have any idea as to what she really wanted to prove to him. Appellant knew that what they were doing was
wrong but he allegedly could not avoid Mia because of her threat that she would commit suicide if he left her. Thus, according to
appellant, on January 24, 1994 he asked Isagani Virey to accompany him to the house of Romy Vallan, a policeman, to report the
matter.
Nevertheless, Vallan verified from the police station whether a complaint had been filed against appellant and after finding out that
there was none, he told appellant to just consult a certain Naem who is an "imam." Appellant was able to talk to Naem at Vallan's
house that same day and bared everything about him and Mia. Naem suggested that appellant marry complainant in Muslim rites
but appellant refused because he was already married. It was eventually agreed that Naem would just mediate in behalf of
appellant and make arrangements for a settlement with Mia's parents. Later that day, Naem went to see the parents of complainant
at the latter's house.
The following day, January 25, 1994, allegedly because complainant could no longer afford to pay their hotel bills, the couple were
constrained to transfer to the house of appellant's friend, Fernando Rubio, at Edward's Subdivision where they stayed for two
days. They just walked along the national highway from Sunset Garden to Edward's Subdivision which was only five hundred to
seven hundred meters away. The owner of the house, Fernando Rubio, as well as his brother Benedicto Rubio, testified that the
couple were very happy, they were intimate and sweet to each other, they always ate together, and it was very obvious that they
were having a relationship.
On cross-examination, Fernando Rubio declared that appellant was merely an acquaintance of his; that it was Naem who went to
the lodging house to arrange for Mia to go home; that complainant's mother never went to his house; and that it was Chief of
Police Eliseo Crespo who fetched appellant from the lodging house and brought him to the municipal hall.
Shortly before noon of January 26, 1994, Naem again met with appellant at Edward's Subdivision and informed him that
complainant's parents were willing to talk to him at Naem's house the next day. The following morning, or on January 27, 1994,
appellant was not able to talk to complainant's parents because they merely sent a child to fetch Mia at Edward's Subdivision and
to tell her that her mother, who was at Naem's house, wanted to see her. Appellant permitted complainant to go but he told her
that within one hour he was be going to the police station at the municipal hall so that they could settle everything there.
After an hour, while appellant was already on his way out of Edward's Subdivision, he was met by Chief of Police Eliseo Crespo
who invited him to the police station. Appellant waited at the police station the whole afternoon but when complainant, her parents
and relatives arrived at around 5:00 P.M., he was not given the chance to talk to any one of them. That afternoon of January 27,
1994, appellant was no longer allowed to leave and he was detained at the police station after Mia and her parents lodged a
complaint for rape and kidnapping against him.
Appellant likewise declared that he had been detained at the provincial jail since January 27, 1994 but the warrant for his arrest
was issued only on January 28, 1994.
On rebuttal, Lorna Casantosan, the cousin of Mia Taha, denied that she delivered any letter to appellant when the latter was still
detained at the provincial jail. She admitted, on cross-examination, that she was requested by Mia Taha to testify for her, although
she clarified that she does not have any quarrel or misunderstanding with appellant.
Mia Taha was again presented on rebuttal and she denied the testimonies of the appellant’s witnesses and claims.However, on
cross-examination, complainant identified her signature on her test paper marked as Exhibit "4" and admitted that the signature
thereon is exactly the same as that appearing on Exhibits "1" and "2". Then, contradicting her previous disclaimers, she also
admitted that the handwriting on Exhibits "1" and "2" all belong to her.
On sur-rebuttal, Armando Pasion, a provincial guard of the Provincial Jail, Palawan who volunteered to testify in these cases,
identified Lorna Casantosan as the person who visited appellant in jail. Another sur-rebuttal witness, Desmond Selga, a jeepney
driver, testified that in the afternoon of January 22, 1994, he was plying his regular route in going to Brooke's Point and, when he
passed by Ipilan, he picked up appellant and Mia Taha. At that time, there were already several passengers inside his jeepney.
The two got off at the poblacion market. He denied that he brought them to the Sunset Garden.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant (of) the crime of rape despite the fact that the prosecution
failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING:
YES. A rape charge is a serious matter with pernicious consequences. It exposes both the accused and the accuser to humiliation,
fear and anxieties, not to mention the stigma of shame that both have to bear for the rest of their
lives.13 By the very nature of the crime of rape, conviction or acquittal depends almost entirely on the credibility of the complainant's
testimony because of the fact that usually only the participants can testify as to its occurrence. 14This notwithstanding, the basic
rule remains that in all criminal prosecutions without regard to the nature of the defense which the accused may raise, the burden
of proof remains at all times upon the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If the accused raises a sufficient
doubt as to any material element, and the prosecution is then unable to overcome this evidence, the prosecution has failed to
carry its burden of proof of the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt and the accused must be acquitted. 15
The rationale for the rule is that, confronted by the full panoply of State authority, the accused is accorded the presumption of
innocence to lighten and even reverse the heavy odds against him. Mere accusation is not enough to convict him, and neither is
the weakness of his defense. The evidence for the prosecution must be strong per se, strong enough to establish the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt.16 In other words, the accused may be convicted on the basis of the lone uncorroborated
testimony of the offended woman, provided such testimony is clear, positive, convincing and otherwise consistent with human
nature and the normal course of things.
There are three well-known principles that guide an appellate court in reviewing the evidence presented in a prosecution for the
crime of rape. These are: (1) while rape is a most detestable crime, and ought to be severely and impartially punished, it must be
borne in mind that it is an accusation easy to be made, hard to be proved, but harder to be defended by the party accused, though
innocent;17 (2) that in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony
of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; 18 and (3) that the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on
its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.19
In the case at bar, several circumstances exist which amply demonstrate and ineluctably convince this Court that there was no
rape committed on the alleged date and place, and that the charge of rape was the contrivance of an afterthought, rather than a
truthful plaint for redress of an actual wrong.
I. Two principal facts indispensably to be proven beyond reasonable doubt for conviction of the crime of rape under paragraph (1),
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code are, first, that the accused had carnal knowledge of the complainant; and, second, that the
same was accomplished through force or intimidation.
1. The prosecution has palpably failed to prove beyond peradventure of doubt that appellant had sexual congress with complainant
against her will. Complainant avers that on the night of January 21, 1994, she was sexually assaulted by appellant in the boarding
house of her cousin, Merlelyn Casantosan. Appellant, on the other hand, denied such a serious imputation and contends that on
said date and time, he merely talked with complainant outside that house. We find appellant's version more credible and sustained
by the evidence presented and of record.
According to complainant, when she entered the kitchen of the boarding house, appellant was already inside apparently waiting
for her. If so, it is quite perplexing how appellant could have known that she was going there on that particular day and at that
time, considering that she does not even live there, unless of course it was appellant's intention to satisfy his lustful desires on
anybody who happened to come along. But then this would be stretching the imagination too far, aside from the fact that such a
generic intent with an indeterminate victim was never established nor even intimated by the prosecution.
Moreover, any accord of credit to the complainant's story is precluded by the implausibility that plagues it as regards the setting
of the supposed sexual assault.20 It will be noted that the place where the alleged crime was committed is not an ordinary residence
but a boarding house where several persons live and where people are expected to come and go. The prosecution did not even
bother to elucidate on whether it was the semestral break or that the boarding house had remained closed for some time, in order
that it could be safely assumed that nobody was expected to arrive at any given time.
Appellant, on the other hand, testified that on that fateful day, he went to the boarding house upon the invitation of complainant
because the latter requested him to help her with her monologue for the Miss PNS contest. However, they were not able to go
inside the house because it was locked and there was no light, so they just sat on a bench outside the house and talked. This
testimony of appellant was substantially corroborated by defense witness Filomena Pielago. She affirmed that in the evening of
January 21, 1994, she saw both appellant and complainant seated on a bench outside the boarding house, and that she even
advised them to go home because it was already late and appellant's wife, who was the head teacher of witness Pielago, was
waiting for him at the school building. On rebuttal, complainant could only deny that she saw Pielago that night. Doctrinally, where
the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations one of which is consistent with the innocence of
the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient
to support a conviction.21
It was further alleged by complainant that after her alleged ravishment, she put on her panty and then appellant openly
accompanied her all the way to the gate of the house where they eventually parted ways. This is inconceivable. It is not the natural
tendency of a man to remain for long by the side of the woman he had raped, 22and in public in a highly populated area at that.
Given the stealth that accompanies it and the anxiety to end further exposure at the scene, the logical post-incident impulse of the
felon is to distance himself from his victim as far and as soon as practicable, to avoid discovery and apprehension. It is to be
expected that one who is guilty of a crime would want to dissociate himself from the person of his victim, the scene of the c rime,
and from all other things and circumstances related to the offense which could possibly implicate him or give rise to even the
slightest suspicion as to his guilt. Verily, the guilty flee where no man pursueth.
It is of common knowledge that facts which prove or tend to prove that the accused was at the scene of the crime are admissible
as relevant, on the theory that such presence can be appreciated as a circumstance tending to identify the
appellant.23 Consequently, it is not in accord with human experience for appellant to have let himself be seen with the complainant
immediately after he had allegedly raped her.24 It thus behooves this Court to reject the notion that appellant would be so foolhardy
as to accompany complainant up to the gate of the house, considering its strategic location vis-a-vis complainant's boarding house
which is just across the street,25 and the PNS schoolbuilding which is only around thirty meters away. 26
Complainant mentioned in her narration that right after the incident she went directly to her boarding house where she saw her
landlady. Yet, the landlady was never presented as a witness to corroborate the story of complainant, despite the fact that the
former was the very first person she came in contact with from the time appellant allegedly left her at the gate of the Casantosan
boarding house after her alleged traumatic ordeal. Even though they supposedly did not talk, the landlady could at least have
testified on complainant's physical appearance and to attest to the theorized fact that indeed she saw complainant on said date
and hour, possibly with dishevelled hair, bloody skirt and all.
We are, therefore, justifiedly inclined to believe appellant's version that it was Mia Taha who invited him to the boarding house to
help her with the monologue she was preparing for the school contest. This is even consonant with her testimony that appellant
fetched her the following day in order to solicit funds for her candidacy in that same school affair.
In contrast, complainant's professed reason for going to the boarding house is vague and tenuous. At first, she asserted that she
was at the boarding house talking with a friend and then, later, she said it was her cousin. Subsequently, she again wavered and
said that she was not able to talk to her cousin. Furthermore, she initially stated that on January 21, 1994 at around 7:00 P.M.,
she was at the boarding house conversing with her cousin. Then in the course of her narration, she gave another version and said
that when she reached the boarding house it was dark and there was nobody inside.
2. Complainant testified that appellant raped her through the use of force and intimidation, specifically by holding a knife to her
neck. However, the element of force was not sufficiently established. The physical facts adverted to by the lower court as
corroborative of the prosecution's theory on the use of force are undoubtedly the medico-legal findings of Dr. Rogelio Divinagracia.
Upon closer scrutiny, however, we find that said findings neither support nor confirm the charge that rape was so committed
through forcible means by appellant against complainant on January 21, 1994.
Thus, on the basis of the laceration inflicted, which is superficial at 6 o'clock position, the aforesaid medico-legal expert opined
that it could not be categorically stated that there was force involved. On further questioning, he gave a straightforward answer
that force was not applied.31 He also added that when he examined the patient bodily, he did not see any sign of bruises. 32 The
absence of any sign of physical violence on the complainant's body is an indication of complainant's consent to the act. 33 While
the absence in the medical certificate of external signs of physical injuries on the victim does not necessarily negate the
commission of rape,34 the instant case is clearly an exception to this rule since appellant has successfully cast doubt on the
veracity of that charge against him.
Complainant's explanation for her failure to shout or struggle is too conveniently general and ruefully unconvincing to make this
Court believe that she tenaciously resisted the alleged sexual attack on her by appellant. And, if ever she did put up any struggle
or objected at all to the involuntary intercourse, such was not enough to show the kind of resistance expected of a woman
defending her virtue and honor.37 Her failure to do anything while allegedly being raped renders doubtful her charge of
rape,38 especially when we consider the actual mise-en-scene in the context of her asseverations.
There is a rule that the rape victim's panty and blood-stained dress are not essential, and need not be presented, as they are not
indispensable evidence to prove rape.39 We incline to the view, however, that this general rule holds true only if there exist other
corroborative evidence sufficiently and convincingly proving the rape charge beyond reasonable doubt. The rule should go the
other way where, as in the present case, the testimony of complainant is inherently weak and no other physical evidence has been
presented to bolster the charge of sexual abuse except for the medical report which, as earlier discussed, even negated the
existence of one of the essential elements of the crime. We cannot, therefore, escape the irresistible conclusion that the deliberate
non-presentation of complainant's blood-stained skirt, if it did exist, should vigorously militate against the prosecution's cause.
II. The conduct of the outraged woman immediately following the alleged assault is of the utmost importance as tending to establish
the truth or falsity of the charge. It may well be doubted whether a conviction for the offense of rape should even be sustained
from the uncorroborated testimony of the woman unless the court is satisfied beyond doubt that her conduct at the time when the
alleged rape was committed and immediately thereafter was such as might be reasonably expected from her under all the
circumstances of the
case. 40
Complainant said that on the day following the supposed rape, appellant went to her parents' house and asked permission from
them to allow her to go with him to solicit funds for her candidacy. Nowhere throughout her entire testimony did she aver or imply
that appellant was armed and that by reason thereof she was forced to leave with him. In brief, she was neither threatened nor
intimidated by appellant. Her pretense that she was afraid of the supposed threat previously made by appellant does not inspire
belief since appellant was alone and unarmed on that occasion and there was no showing of any opportunity for him to make good
his threat, even assuming that he had really voiced any. On the contrary, complainant even admitted that appellant respectfully
asked permission from her parents for her to accompany him.
III. Rape is a very emotional word, and the natural human reactions to it are categorical: admiration and sympathy for the
courageous female publicly seeking retribution for her outrageous violation, and condemnation of the rapist. However, being
interpreters of the law and dispensers of justice, judges must look at a rape charge without those proclivities, and deal with it with
extreme caution and circumspection. Judges must free themselves of the natural tendency to be overprotective of every woman
decrying her having been sexually abused, and demanding punishment for the abuser. While they ought to be cognizant of the
anguish and humiliation the rape victim goes through as she demands justice, judges should equally bear in mind that their
responsibility is to render justice based on the law. 44
The trial court here unfortunately relied solely on the lone testimony of complainant regarding the January 21, 1994 incident.
Indeed, it is easy to allege that one was raped by a man. All that the victim had to testify to was that appellant poked a knife at
her, threatened to kill her if she shouted and under these threats, undressed her and had sexual intercourse with her. The question
then that confronts the trial court is whether or not complainant's testimony is credible. 47 The technique in deciphering testimony
is not to solely concentrate on isolated parts of that testimony. The correct meaning of the testimony can often be ascertained only
upon a perusal of the entire testimony. Everything stated by the witness has to be considered in relation to what else has been
stated.48
Complainant's denial that she and appellant were lovers is belied by the evidence presented by the defense, the most telling of
which are her two handwritten letters, Exhibits "1" and "2", which she sent to the latter while he was detained at the provincial jail.
For analysis and emphasis, said letters are herein quoted in full:
27 Feb. 94
Dane,
Kumusta kana? Kong ako hito hindi na makatiis sa sakit.
Sir, sumulat ako sa inyo dahil gusto kong malaman mo ang situation ko. Sir, kong mahal mo ako gagawa kang paraan
na mailayo ako dito sa bahay. nalaman ng nanay at tatay ko na delayed ang mens ko ng one week. pinapainom nila ako
ng pampalaglag pero ayaw ko. pagnalaman nila na hindi ko ininom ang gamot sinasaktan nila ako.
Sir, kong maari ay huwag ng maabutan ng Martes. dahil naabutan nila akong maglayas sana ako. kaya ngayon hindi
ako makalabas ng bahay kong wala akong kasama, kong gaano sila kahigpit noon doble pa ngayon. ang mga gamit ko
ngayon ay wala sa lalagyan ko. tinago nila hindi ko makita, ang narito lang ay ang bihisan kong luma. Sir kong manghiram
ka kaya ng motor na gagamitin sa pagkuha sa akin. Sa lunes ng gabi manonood kami Ng Veta eksakto alas 9:00 ay
dapat dito ka sa lugar na may Veta. tanungin mo lang kay Lorna kong saan ang Veta nila Navoor Lozot. Mag busina ka
lang ng tatlo bilang senyas na lalabas na ako at huwag kang tatapat ng bahay dahil nandoon ang kuya ko. kong ano ang
disisyon mo maari bang magsulat ka at ipahatid kay Lorna.
alang-alang sa bata. Baka makainon ako ng gamot dahil baka pagkain ko hahaluan nila.
Please sir . . .
(Sgd.) Mia Taha70
3/1/94
Dane,
I'm sorry kong problem ang ipinadala o sinulat sa iyo sa halip sa kasiyahan. oo nag usap na tayo nagawa ko lang naman
ang sumulat sa iyo dahil naiinis na ako sa pagmumukha ng mga magulang kong suwapang. Ang paglayas ko sana ay
dahil sa narinig ko. Sir narinig ko na magreklamo si nanay kay Arquero yong superentende sa Palawan high tapos ang
sabi ay magreklamo itong si Arquero sa DECS para matanggal ka sa pagtuturo yan ang dahilan kong bakit naisipan kong
lumayas ng wala sa oras at wala akong tensyon na masama laban so iyo. hindi ko sinabi sa kanila na delayed ako ay
sinabi sa iyo ni Eden na sa harap niya mismo binigyan ako ng gamot samantalang noong Sabado ng gabi lang nalaman
dahil gusto kong masuka. Oo aaminin ko nagkasala ako sa iyo, pinabilanggo kita dahil nagpanig ako sa mga magulang
ko nadala nila ako sa sulsul nila. hindi ko naipaglaban ang dapat kong ipaglaban ngunit kong iniisip mong minahal lang
kita dahil sa may kailangan lang ako sa iyo nagkakamali ka. alam ng Diyos na hindi ganon ang hangarin ko sa iyo. higit
pa sa binilanggo ang kalagayan ko kong alam mo. kinukunsinsiya, nagtitiis na saktan at pagsasakripisyo ng damdamin
ko na gusto kang makita at yakapin ka pero ano ang magagawa ko kong ang paglabas ko ng bahay ay hindi ako
makalabas ng mag isa may guardiya pa. tanungin mo si Lorna kong ano ginagawa nilang pagbantay sa akin para akong
puganti. hindi ito ayon sa kagustuhan ng mga magulang ko sarili kong plano ito. Magtitiis pa ba akong hindi makakain
maghapon tubig lang ang laman ng tiyan, kong may masama akong hangarin sa iyo.
Oo, magtiis ako para maipakita kong mahal rin kita. March 2 darating ako sa bahay na sinasabi mo. hindi ko matiyak
kong anong oras dahil kukuha pa ako ng tiyempo na wala rito ang tatay ko. Alam mo bang pati ang kapatid kong si
Rowena ay inuutusan akong lumayas dahil naawa no siya sa situation ko. siya lang ang kakampi ko rito sa bahay malaki
ang pag-asa kong makalabas ako ng bahay sa tulong niya.
There is absolutely nothing left to the imagination. The letters eloquently speak for themselves. It was complainant's handwriting
which spilled the beans, so to speak.
Well-entrenched by now is the rule that resort to questioned document examiners, more familiarly called handwriting experts, is
not mandatory. Handwriting experts, while probably useful, are not indispensable in examining or comparing handwriting. 72 This
is so since under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who
believes it to be the handwriting of such person, because he has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his
upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person. The said
section further provides that evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the
court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered or proved to be genuine to
the satisfaction of the judge.73
The defense witnesses were able to identify complainant's handwriting on the basis of the examination papers submitted to them
by her in their respective subjects. This Court has likewise carefully examined and compared the handwriting on the letters with
the standard writing appearing on the test papers as specimens for comparison and, contrary to the observations and conclusions
of the lower court, we are convinced beyond doubt that they were written by one and the same person. More importantly,
complainant herself categorically admitted that the handwriting on the questioned letters belongs to her.
V. The prosecution insists that the offer of compromise made by appellant is deemed to be an admission of guilt. This inference
does not arise in the instant case. In criminal cases, an offer of compromise is generally admissible as evidence against the party
making it. It is a legal maxim, which assuredly constitutes one of the bases of the right to penalize, that in the matter of public
crimes which directly affect the public interest, no compromise whatever may be entered into as regards the penal action. It has
long been held, however, that in such cases the accused is permitted to show that the offer was not made under a consciousness
of guilt, but merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other reason which would justify a claim by the accused
that the offer to compromise was not in truth an admission of his guilt or an attempt to avoid the legal consequences which would
ordinarily ensue therefrom.75
A primary consideration here is that the evidence for the defense overwhelmingly proves appellant's innocence of the offense
charged. Further, the supposed offer of marriage did not come from appellant but was actually suggested by a certain Naem, who
is an imam or Muslim leader and who likewise informed appellant that he could be converted into a Muslim so he could marry
complainant. As a matter of fact, when said offer was first made to appellant, he declined because of the fact that he was already
married. On top of these, appellant did not know, not until the trial proper, that his mother actually paid P30,000.00 for the
settlement of these cases. Complainant's own mother, Helen Taha, testified that present during the negotiations were herself, her
husband, Mia, and appellant's mother. Appellant himself was never present in any of said meetings. 76
It has been held that where the accused was not present at the time the offer for monetary consideration was made, such offer of
compromise would not save the day for the prosecution. 77 In another case, this Court ruled that no implied admission can be
drawn from the efforts to arrive at a settlement outside the court, where the accused did not take part in any of the negotiations
and the effort to settle the case was in accordance with the established tribal customs, that is, Muslim practices and traditions, in
an effort to prevent further deterioration of the relations between the parties. 78
VI. Generally, an affidavit of desistance by the complainant is not looked upon with favor. It may, however, create serious doubts
as to the liability of appellant, especially if it corroborates appellant's explanation about the filing of criminal charges. 79
In the cases at bar, the letters written by complainant to appellant are very revealing. Most probably written out of desperation and
exasperation with the way she was being treated by her parents, complainant threw all caution to the winds when she wrote: "Oo,
aaminin ko nagkasala ako sa iyo, pinabilanggo kita dahil nagpanig ako sa mga magulang ko nadala nila ako sa sulsul nila, hindi
ko naipaglaban ang dapat kong ipaglaban," obviously referring to her ineptitude and impotence in helping appellant out of his
predicament. It could, therefore, be safely presumed that the rape charge was merely an offshoot of the discovery by her parents
of the intimate relationship between her and appellant. In order to avoid retribution from her parents, together with the moral
pressure exerted upon her by her mother, she was forced to concoct her account of the alleged rape.
The Court takes judicial cognizance of the fact that in rural areas in the Philippines, young ladies are strictly required to act with
circumspection and prudence. Great caution is observed so that their reputations shall remain untainted. Any breath of scandal
which brings dishonor to their character humiliates their entire families. 80 It could precisely be that complainant's mother wanted
to save face in the community where everybody knows everybody else, and in an effort to conceal her daughter's indiscretion and
escape the wagging tongues of their small rural community, she had to weave the scenario of this rape drama.
VII. The trial court, in holding for conviction, relied on the presumptio hominis that a young Filipina will not charge a
person with rape if it is not true. In the process, however, it totally disregarded the more paramount constitutional
presumption that an accused is deemed innocent until proven otherwise.
It frequently happens that in a particular case two or more presumptions are involved. Sometimes the presumptions
conflict, one tending to demonstrate the guilt of the accused and the other his innocence. In such case, it is necessary
to examine the basis for each presumption and determine what logical or social basis exists for each presumption, and
then determine which should be regarded as the more important and entitled to prevail over the other. It must, however,
be remembered that the existence of a presumption indicating guilt does not in itself destroy the presumption against
innocence unless the inculpating presumption, together with all of the evidence, or the lack of any evidence or
explanation, is sufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence by proving the defendant's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Until the defendant's guilt is shown in this manner, the presumption of innocence continues. 84
The rationale for the presumption of guilt in rape cases has been explained in this wise:
In rape cases especially, much credence is accorded the testimony of the complaining witness, on the
theory that she will not choose to accuse her attacker at all and subject herself to the stigma and
indignities her accusation will entail unless she is telling the truth. The rape victim who decides to speak
up exposes herself as a woman whose virtue has been not only violated but also irreparably sullied. In
the eyes of a narrow-minded society, she becomes a cheapened woman, never mind that she did not
submit to her humiliation and has in fact denounced her assailant. At the trial, she will be the object of
lascivious curiosity. People will want to be titillated by the intimate details of her violation. She will
squirm through her testimony as she describes how her honor was defiled, relating every embarrassing
movement of the intrusion upon the most private parts of her body. Most frequently, the defense will
argue that she was not forced to submit but freely conjoined in the sexual act. Her motives will be
impugned. Her chastity will be challenged and maligned. Whatever the outcome of the case, she will
remain a tainted woman, a pariah because her purity has been lost, albeit through no fault of hers. This
is why many a rape victim chooses instead to keep quiet, suppressing her helpless indignation rather
than denouncing her attacker. This is also the reason why, if a woman decides instead to come out
openly and point to her assailant, courts
are prone to believe that she is telling the truth regardless of its consequences. . . .85
The presumption of innocence, on the other hand, is founded upon the first principles of justice, and is not a mere form
but a substantial part of the law. It is not overcome by mere suspicion or conjecture; a probability that the defendant
committed the crime; nor by the fact that he had the opportunity to do so. 86 Its purpose is to balance the scales in what
would otherwise be an uneven contest between the lone individual pitted against the People and all the resources at
their command. Its inexorable mandate is that, for all the authority and influence of the prosecution, the accused must
be acquitted and set free if his guilt cannot be proved beyond the whisper of a doubt.87 This is in consonance with the
rule that conflicts in evidence must be resolved upon the theory of innocence rather than upon a theory of guilt when it
is possible to do so.88
On the basis of the foregoing doctrinal tenets and principles, and in conjunction with the overwhelming evidence in favor
of herein appellant, we do not encounter any difficulty in concluding that the constitutional presumption on the
innocence of an accused must prevail in this particular indictment.
12. Re: Conviction of Judge Adoracion G. Angeles

Facts:
Respondent was convicted for violation of RA 7610. Senior State Prosecutor Emmanuel Y. Velasco (SSP Velasco) of
the Department of Justice (DOJ) wrote a letter to then CJ Panganiban inquiring whether it is possible to order the immediate
suspension of the respondent. The matter was referred to the OCA for comment and recommendation where they recommended
that respondent be indefinitely suspended. The Court's Second Division approved all of these recommendations, thus, suspending
respondent from performing her judicial functions while awaiting the final resolution of her criminal cases. Respondent filed an
Urgent Motion for Reconsideration; he claimed that the suspension order was wielded against her without affording her the
opportunity to be heard since she was not furnished copies of SSP Velasco's letter and OCA's Administrative Complaint. Thus,
respondent submitted that her suspension is essentially unjust. Moreover, respondent manifested that the two criminal cases
against her are on appeal before the CA and have, therefore, not yet attained finality. As such, respondent still enjoys the
constitutional presumption of innocence and her suspension clashes with this presumption and is tantamount to a prejudgment of
her guilt. SSP Velasco filed an Urgent Appeal/Manifestation manifesting that respondent continuously defied the court’s
Resolution. Velasco reiterated that due to her conviction on two counts of child abuse, respondent no longer enjoys the
constitutional presumption of innocence and should remain suspended in order to erase any suspicion that she is using her
influence to obtain a favorable decision and in order to maintain and reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the judiciary.
Issues: Whether or not grounds exist to preventively suspend the respondent pending the resolution of this administrative case.
Held:
No. The Court cannot fully agree with the recommendation of the OCA. By parity of reasoning, the fact of respondent's
conviction by the RTC does not necessarily warrant her suspension. We agree with respondent's argument that since her
conviction of the crime of child abuse is currently on appeal before the CA, the same has not yet attained finality. As such, she
still enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence. It must be remembered that the existence of a presumption indicating the
guilt of the accused does not in itself destroy the constitutional presumption of innocence unless the inculpating presumption,
together with all the evidence, or the lack of any evidence or explanation, proves the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Until the accused's guilt is shown in this manner, the presumption of innocence continues. Moreover, it is established that any
administrative complaint leveled against a judge must always be examined with a discriminating eye, for its consequential effects
are, by their nature, highly penal, such that the respondent judge stands to face the sanction of dismissal or disbarment. As
aforementioned, the filing of criminal cases against judges may be used as tools to harass them and may in the long run create
adverse consequences. The OCA, as well as SSP Velasco, failed to prove that other than the fact that a judgment of conviction
for child abuse was rendered against the respondent, which is still on appeal, there are other lawful grounds to support the
imposition of preventive suspension. Based on the foregoing disquisition, the Court is of the resolve that, while it is true that
preventive suspension pendente lite does not violate the right of the accused to be presumed innocent as the same is not a
penalty, the rules on preventive suspension of judges, not having been expressly included in the Rules of Court, are amorphous
at best. Likewise, we consider respondent's argument that there is no urgency in imposing preventive suspension as the criminal
cases are now before the CA, and that she cannot, by using her present position as an RTC Judge, do anything to influence the
CA to render a decision in her favor. The issue of preventive suspension has also been rendered moot as the Court opted to
resolve this administrative case.
However, even as we find that the OCA and SSP Velasco have not clearly and convincingly shown ample grounds to warrant the
imposition of preventive suspension, we do note the use of offensive language in respondent's pleadings, not only against SSP
Velasco but also against former CA Lock. To reiterate our previous ruling involving the respondent, her use of disrespectful
language in her Comment is certainly below the standard expected of an officer of the court. The esteemed position of a magistrate
of the law demands temperance, patience and courtesy both in conduct and in language. Illustrative are the following statements:
"CA Lock's hostile mindset and his superstar complex"; "In a frenzied display of arrogance and power"; "(CA Lock's) complaint is
merely a pathetic echo of the findings of the trial court"; and "when (CA Lock) himself loses his objectivity and misuses the full
powers of his Office to persecute the object of his fancy, then it is time for him to step down." In the attempt to discredit CA Lock,
respondent even dragged CA Lock's son into the controversy, to wit:
It is noteworthy to mention that CA Lock's hostile attitude was aggravated by his embarrassment when the
undersigned mentioned to him that she knew how he used his influence to secure a position for his son at the
RTC Library of Pasay City which was then managed by Judge Priscilla Mijares. CA Lock had made sure that
his son be assigned to the library to enable the latter to conveniently adjust his schedule in reviewing for the
bar examination.
Neither was SSP Velasco spared. Of him, the respondent said: "A reading of the motion for reconsideration readily discloses that
it is mainly anchored on SSP Velasco's malicious speculations about the guilt of the undersigned. Speculations, especially those
that emanate from the poisonous intentions of attention-seeking individuals, are no different from garbage that should be rejected
outright"; and "His malicious insinuation is no less than a revelation of his warped mindset that a person's position could cause
pressure to bear among government officials. This brings forth a nagging question. Did SSP Velasco use his position at the DOJ
to 'cause pressure to bear' and obtain a favorable disposition of the administrative cases lodged against him by the undersigned?
Is he afraid of his own ghost?" It must be stressed again that, as a dispenser of justice, respondent should exercise judicial
temperament at all times, avoiding vulgar and insulting language. She must maintain composure and equanimity. The judicial
office circumscribes the personal conduct of a judge and imposes a number of restrictions. This is the price that judges have to
pay for accepting and occupying their exalted positions in the administration of justice. One final word. The parties herein have
admitted in their various pleadings that they have filed numerous cases against each other. We do not begrudge them the
prerogative to initiate charges against those who, in their opinion, may have wronged them. But it is well to remind them that this
privilege must be exercised with prudence, when there are clearly lawful grounds, and only in the pursuit of truth and justice. This
prerogative does not give them the right to institute shotgun charges with reckless abandon, or allow their disagreement to
deteriorate into a puerile quarrel, not unlike that of two irresponsible children.
13. UNITED STATES, PETITIONER V. ASH, RESPONDENT

Facts:
On the morning of August 26, 1965, a man with a stocking mask entered a bank in Washington D.C., and began waving
a pistol. He ordered an employee to hang up the telephone and instructed all others present not to move. Seconds later, another
man entered, also wearing a mask and took the money, placed it inside a bag and left. The gunman followed suit and they both
escaped into the alley. The robbery lasted three to four minutes.
A Government informer, Clarence McFarland, told authorities that he had discussed the robbery with Charles J. Ash, Jr.,
the respondent here. Acting on this information, an FBI agent, in February, 1966, showed five black-and-white mug shots of Black
males of generally the same age, height, and weight, one of which was of Ash, to four witnesses. All four made uncertain
identifications of Ash's picture. At this time, Ash was not in custody, and had not been charged. On April 1, 1966, an indictment
was returned charging Ash and a codefendant, John L. Bailey, in five counts related to this bank robbery.
It was only almost three years later, in 1968, that the case was set on trial. In preparing for trial, the prosecutor decided
to use a photographic display to determine whether the witnesses he planned to call would be able to make in-court identifications.
Shortly before the trial, an FBI agent and the prosecutor showed five color photographs to the four witnesses who previously had
tentatively identified the black-and-white photograph of Ash. Three of the witnesses selected the picture of Ash, but one was
unable to make any selection. None of the witnesses selected the picture of Bailey which was in the group.
This post-indictment identification provides the basis for respondent Ash's claim that he was denied the right to counsel
at a "critical stage" of the prosecution.
The five-member majority of the Court of Appeals held that Ash's right to counsel, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment,
was violated when his attorney was not given the opportunity to be present at the photographic displays conducted in May, 1968,
before the trial. The majority relied on this Court's lineup cases, United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218 (1967), and Gilbert v.
California, 388 U. S. 263 (1967), and on Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293 (1967).
In Wade, the Court explained the process of expanding the counsel guarantee to these confrontations:
"When the Bill of Rights was adopted, there were no organized police forces as we know them today. The accused confronted the
prosecutor and the witnesses against him, and the evidence was marshalled, largely at the trial itself. In contrast, today's law
enforcement machinery involves critical confrontations of the accused by the prosecution at pretrial proceedings where the results
might well settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality. In recognition of these realities of modern criminal
prosecution, our cases have construed the Sixth Amendment guarantee to apply to 'critical' stages of the proceedings."
Issue:
Whether or not the Sixth Amendment grants an accused the right to have counsel present whenever the Government
conducts a post-indictment photographic display, containing a picture of the accused, for the purpose of allowing a witness to
attempt an identification of the offender.
Held:
No. The US Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment does not grant the right to counsel at photographic displays
conducted by the Government for the purpose of allowing a witness to attempt an identification of the offender. The Court is not
persuaded that the risks inherent in the use of photographic displays are so pernicious that an extraordinary system of safeguards
is required.
The Court concludes that the dangers of mistaken identification, mentioned in Wade, were removed from context by the
Court of Appeals and were incorrectly utilized as a sufficient basis for requiring counsel. Although Wade did discuss possibilities
for suggestion and the difficulty for reconstructing suggestivity, this discussion occurred only after the Court had concluded that
the lineup constituted a trial-like confrontation, requiring the "Assistance of Counsel" to preserve the adversary process by
compensating for advantages of the prosecuting authorities.
The above discussion of Wade has shown that the traditional Sixth Amendment test easily allowed extension of counsel
to a lineup. The similarity to trial was apparent, and counsel was needed to render "assistance" in counterbalancing any
"overreaching" by the prosecution. After the Court in Wade held that a lineup constituted a trial-like confrontation requiring counsel,
a more difficult issue remained in the case for consideration. The same changes in law enforcement that led to lineups and pretrial
hearings also generated other events at which the accused was confronted by the prosecution. The Government had argued in
Wade that, if counsel was required at a lineup, the same forceful considerations would mandate counsel at other preparatory steps
in the "gathering of the prosecution's evidence.”
That adversary mechanism remains as effective for a photographic display as for other parts of pretrial interviews. No
greater limitations are placed on defense counsel in constructing displays, seeking witnesses, and conducting photographic
identifications than those applicable to the prosecution. Selection of the picture of a person other than the accused, or the inability
of a witness to make any selection, will be useful to the defense in precisely the same manner that the selection of a picture of the
defendant would be useful to the prosecution. In this very case, for example, the initial tender of the photographic display was by
Bailey's counsel, who sought to demonstrate that the witness had failed to make a photographic identification. Although the
Court does not suggest that equality of access to photographs removes all potential for abuse, it does remove any
inequality in the adversary process itself, and thereby fully satisfies the historical spirit of the Sixth Amendment's
counsel guarantee.
Pretrial photographic identifications, however, are hardly unique in offering possibilities for the actions of the prosecutor
unfairly to prejudice the accused. Evidence favorable to the accused may be withheld; testimony of witnesses may be manipulated;
the results of laboratory tests may be contrived. In many ways, the prosecutor, by accident or by design, may improperly subvert
the trial. The primary safeguard against abuses of this kind is the ethical responsibility of the prosecutor, who, as so often has
been said, may "strike hard blows," but not "foul ones."
14. ROCK VS ARKANSAS

Facts:
Vickie Rock was charged with manslaughter for the death of her husband, Frank Rock. Vickie and Frank had argued after Frank
refused to let Vickie eat pizza and prevented her from leaving the apartment to get something else to eat. As the fight escalated,
Vickie picked up a handgun and at some point Frank received a fatal gunshot wound to the chest. The police arrived and arrested
Vickie. Because Vickie was unable to recall the shooting in any detail, on the advice of her attorney, she submitted to hypnosis in
an attempt to refresh her memory. During one session, Vickie recalled that her finger had not been on the trigger and the gun had
discharged accidentally when Frank had grabbed her arm. A gun expert examined the gun and found that it was defective and
prone to fire when dropped or hit, even without the trigger being pulled, supported this revelation.
Because an Arkansas rule of evidence prohibited the admittance of any evidence obtained through hypnosis, the trial court barred
Vickie from testifying to her memory of the shooting because it had been “hypnotically refreshed.” She was found guilty and
sentenced to 10 years imprisonment. Vickie appealed to the Supreme Court of Arkansas, which affirmed her conviction. The
Supreme Court of Arkansas held that, in the absence of a general consensus on the accuracy of evidence obtained through
hypnosis, case-by-case inquiry into the accuracy of the evidence would be too burdensome on courts. In this case, the exclusion
of Vickie Rock’s hypnotically refreshed memory did not infringe on her constitutional rights because her right to testify in her own
defense was only limited by generally applicable rules of evidence intended to exclude confusing or misleading evidence.
Issue:
Whether or not Arkansas’s blanket ban on all hypnotically refreshed testimony infringe on Vickie Rock’s Fourteenth, Fifth, and
Sixth Amendment right to testify on her own behalf?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth
Amendment, and the Fifth Amendment protect the right of the individual to testify on one’s own behalf at a criminal trial. Because
the Arkansas rule was a blanket ban, it did not allow a trial court to consider the particular circumstances of individual cases.
Although Arkansas has a state interest in preventing unreliable testimony from being admitted into evidence at trial, that interest
does not justify a blanket ban on testimony that may be reliable in an individual case. Therefore the exclusion of the hypnotically
refreshed testimony, without exploring the reliability of the testimony, infringed on the petitioner’s Constitutional right to testify in
her own defense.
15. People v. Liwanag

FACTS:
Accused-appellant Lope Liwanag y Buenaventura, and his co-accused Randy Simbulan and Ramil Vendibil, were
charged with the crime of highway robbery with multiple rape in an Information which reads, thus:
That on or about the 27th day of April, 1992, in the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with an
icepick, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent to
gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
take, rob and divest from the complainant, Corazon Hernandez y Delfin the amount of P60.00; That on the
occasion thereof, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and each of them
mutually helping and aiding one another and by means of force and intimidation, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously one at a time have carnal knowledge of the said complainant, inside the Levitown
Subdivision, Parañaque, Metro Manila, against her will and consent;
That accused Randy Simbulan y Garcia, who is allegedly 14 years old, has acted with discernment
in the commission of the offense; and
That the aggravating circumstance of that means employed or circumstance brought about which
add ignominy to the natural effect of the act where one of the accused, by means of force and intimidation,
caused the victim to suck his penis made the effect of the crime more humiliating to the victim, attended the
commission of the offense.
During the arraignment, all of them pleaded "not guilty" to the charge. Accused Randy Simbulan and Ramil Vendibil were
earlier released on recognizance, and were later ordered rearrested for their failure to appear at the scheduled hearings. However,
the warrants for their arrest were not implemented. Trial on the merits, thus, ensued only against accused-appellant
Lope Liwanag y Buenaventura.
Complainant Corazon Hernandez was on her way home to Parañaque at around 1:00 o'clock in the early morning of
April 27, 1992. Upon reaching the tricycle terminal at Doña Soledad St.,Better Living Subdivision, Parañaque, Metro Manila, she
was offered by tricycle driver Ramil Vendibil a "special trip",which means that she would be brought right in front of her house.
She agreed and boarded the tricycle. While they were about to leave, Randy Simbulan and Lope Liwanag also rode the tricycle
behind the driver. When they reached India Street, Lope Liwanag entered the sidecar and sat beside complainant. He immediately
grabbed complainant's shoulder, pointed an instrument at the side of her neck, and declared a hold-up. Surprised and fearing for
her life, complainant told accused-appellant that she only had sixty pesos (P60.00) in her bag. Accused-appellant
Lope Liwanag instructed Randy Simbulan to get her bag. DcAaSI
While the tricycle was traversing the road leading to the municipal building of Parañaque, accused-appellant informed
complainant that since they could not get anything from her anyway, she might as well submit herself to them. Then, accused-
appellant began kissing complainant and touching her private parts. Randy Simbulan, meanwhile, inserted his finger into
complainant's vagina.
As they were entering Levitown Subdivision, accused-appellant ordered complainant to act naturally while they passed
the guardhouse. Once they got through, accused-appellant asked her to give in to his desire, and then, he again began touching
her private parts. Complainant answered that she would rather be killed than accede to his desire. This prompted accused-
appellant to hit her with an icepick on the abdomen.
Upon reaching a vacant lot, accused-appellant ordered Vendibil to stop the tricycle. He then tried to strangle complainant,
causing her to fall down from her seat and lose consciousness. When she regained consciousness, she was forced to board the
tricycle. Again, they rode around the village. Accused-appellant tried to strangle her with a bandana and ordered her to remove
her underwear. When she refused, accused-appellant himself removed her underwear, opened his pant zipper and forced her to
sit on his lap. Complainant struggled, so accused-appellant ordered the tricycle to stop and dragged complainant out. Accused-
appellant then brought complainant to a grassy vacant lot and forced himself on her. After satisfying his lust, they again boarded
the tricycle and accused-appellant informed complainant that his companions would follow. Complainant's pleas were in vain.
After a few minutes of driving around, they came upon another vacant lot where accused-appellant and Vendibil dragged
complainant. There, Vendibil forced complainant to put his penis into her mouth. Unsatisfied, Vendibil forced her to lie down and
succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her while accused-appellant and Simbulan watched. Thereafter, Simbulan took his
turn. After he satisfied his lust, they talked of killing complainant.
Complainant pleaded for her life and, in desperation, she offered them money in exchange for her life. Accused-appellant
asked her if she can produce P10,000.00, but she said she could not. Accused-appellant lowered his demand to P5,000.00. They
negotiated until they finally agreed on the sum of P2,000.00. Accused-appellant instructed complainant to deliver the money at
Guadalupe, Makati. She was to place the amount inside a bag together with a sandwich she was to buy at Burger Machine. They
agreed to meet at 11:30 that same morning. When they finally let go of her, complainant proceeded to a church. At daybreak, she
went home and told her mother the whole incident. Together, they proceeded to the Fort Bonifacio police station and reported the
matter. The police, in turn, devised an entrapment operation. DcICEa
At the appointed hour, complainant went to Guadalupe, Makati, bringing with her an envelope containing pieces of plain
paper. Accused-appellant arrived after 45 minutes. Complainant handed the envelope to him, then she ran away. Accused-
appellant also ran and boarded a bus, but he was collared and arrested by the police.
Dr. Louella Nario, Medico Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation conducted an examination on the
complainant and issued a medical certificate 2with the following findings:
Extragenital Physical Injuries:
Abrasions, linear, leg, right, upper third, anterior aspect, 4.8 cms.,in length and left, lower third, anterior aspect,
4.7 cm. in length.
Contused abrasion, epigastric region, 2.4 x 0.3 cm.
Contusions, reddish, mandibular region, right side, 1.8 x 1.5 cm. and left side, 2.0 x 1.0 cms.;neck, lateral aspect,
right side, 5.5 x 0.5 cms.,and 9.8 x 0.5 cms. and 2.5 x 0.5 cms. deltoid region, left side, 2.4 x 1.3 cms. purplish, deltoid
region, left side, 4.2 x 2.5 cms.
Genital Examination:
Pubic hair, fully grown, abundant. Labia majora and minora, gaping. Fourchette, lax. Vestibular mucosa,
congested, with fresh superficial abrasion at the fossa navicularis. Hymen, thick, short, intact. Hymenal orifice, annular,
admits a tube, 2.0 cms.,in diameter with moderate resistance. Vagina walls, tight. Rugosities, prominent.
Conclusion:
1. The above-described extragenital physical injuries noted on the body of the subject at the time of examination.
2. Genital injury present.
Accused-appellant denied the accusation against him. He claimed that at around 12:00 o'clock midnight of April 27, 1992, he was
at his house at Texas Street, Better Living Subdivision, Parañaque, Metro Manila. His uncle, Emilio Changco, dropped by and,
together with Ponciano Buenaventura and Hermenegildo Liwanag, they had a drinking session up to 3:00 o'clock in the morning.
At around 4:00 o'clock in the morning, Changco left and accused-appellant went to sleep. He woke up at 7:30 in the morning to
prepare for his trip to San Miguel, Bulacan to see his grandfather. acIHDA
He alleged that while waiting for a ride in front of Jollibee at Guadalupe, Makati, he was arrested by policemen in civilian
clothes for being a rebel soldier, based on a mark on his right fist indicating his membership in the Guardians Luzon, an association
of soldiers. He was brought to Fort Bonifacio where he allegedly met for the first time Randy Simbulan and Ramil Vendibil. He
claimed that the three of them were beaten and subjected to electric shocks. He also claimed that policemen forced his co-accused
to point to him.
On April 17, 1995, a decision 3 was rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 138, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Lope Liwanag y Buenaventura GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of having violated Presidential Decree No. 532, known as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery
Law of 1974. Considering that on the occasion of the highway robbery, rape was committed, a situation which
calls for the imposition of death penalty under Presidential Decree No. 532 but which penalty was still
proscribed at the time of the commission of the offense alleged in the Information, said accused is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,the penalty next lower in degree (People v. Miranda,235
SCRA 202).He is further ordered to indemnify the complainant Corazon Hernandez of the amount of One
Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) representing moral damages; P20,000.00 as litigation expenses and attorney's
fees and to return the P60.00 taken from her. Filing fees due on the award shall be a lien on the amount which
may be recovered by the complainant from the accused.
Accused-appellant maintains that the trial court erred in convicting him because: 1) the prosecution failed to provide
sufficient evidence positively identifying him as the perpetrator of the crime; 2) inconsistencies tainted the prosecution evidence;
3) the manner by which the crime was committed was improbable; and, 4) complainant failed to offer any resistance prior to and
even during her alleged rape. HIaTCc
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused-appellant was denied his constitutionally guaranteed right to be heard by himself and counsel.
He argues that his right to be heard through his counsel means that he should be effectively assisted by counsel throughout the
proceedings, from the time he was arrested up to the time judgment is rendered.
RULING:
The court ruled that NO.
The records show that at the start of the proceedings before the trial court, accused-appellant was represented by
counsel de officio,Atty. William T. Uy of the Public Attorney's Office. In the middle of the trial, accused-appellant retained the
services of counsel de parte Atty. Bienvenido R. Brioso, replacing Atty. Uy. After the trial court rendered the judgment of conviction,
Atty. Brioso filed the Notice of Appeal on behalf of accused-appellant. Atty. Brioso, however, failed to file the appellant's brief
because of the refusal of accused-appellant's mother to transmit the entire records of the case to him. Thus, accused-appellant
was required to manifest whether he still desired to be represented by Atty. Brioso in this appeal. Upon accused-appellant's failure
to reply, Atty. Francis Ed. Lim was appointed counsel de officio. CAHaST
There is no dispute that accused-appellant was provided with a counsel de officio who assisted him during the
arraignment and conducted the cross examination of all prosecution witnesses as well as his direct examination. Thereafter, from
the time he was cross-examined up to the presentation of other defense witnesses, he was assisted by a counsel of his choice.
In essence, the right to be heard by counsel simply refers to the right to be assisted by counsel for the purpose of ensuring
that an accused is not denied the collateral right to due process, a fundamental right which cannot be waived by an accused. The
underlying basis for due process is the concept of fairness, without which there can be no justice. In other words, there can be no
due process accorded an accused if he is not given the right to be heard through counsel or assisted by counsel. It follows that in
order to be heard, and therefore be accorded due process, the assistance given by counsel must be "effective" as implied in the
rationale of Article III, Section 14 (2).In this sense, this Court subscribes to American jurisprudence when it held that "[t]he right of
an accused to counsel is beyond question a fundamental right. Without counsel, the right to a fair trial itself would be of little
consequence, for it is through counsel that the accused secures his other rights. In other words, the right to counsel is the right to
effective assistance of counsel."
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 138, finding accused-
appellant Lope Liwanag guilty of violating P.D. No. 532 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,to indemnify
complainant Corazon Hernandez P20,000.00 as litigation expenses and attorney's fees and to return the P60.00 is AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that the amount of moral damages is reduced to P50,000.00. Costs against accused-appellant.
16. PEOPLE VS. TULIN

M/T Tabangao, a cargo vessel owned by the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation was sailing off the coast of Mindoro near
Silonay Island. It was loaded with 2,000 barrels of kerosene, 2,600 barrels of regular gasoline, and 40,000 barrels of diesel oil,
with a total value of P40,426,793.87.
The vessel was manned by 21 crew members, was later boarded, with the use of an aluminum ladder, by seven fully armed pirates
led by Emilio Changco, older brother of accused-appellant Cecilio Changco. The pirates, including Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr.
were armed with M-16 ri�es, .45 and .38 caliber handguns, and bolos. They detained the crew and took complete control of the
vessel. Thereafter, accused-appellant Loyola ordered three crew members to paint over, using black paint, the name "M/T
Tabangao" on the front and rear portions of the vessel, as well as the PNOC logo on the chimney of the vessel. The vessel was
then painted with the name "Galilee," with registry at San Lorenzo, Honduras. The crew was forced to sail to Singapore, all the
while sending misleading radio messages to PNOC that the ship was undergoing repairs.
PNOC, after losing radio contact with the vessel, reported the disappearance of the vessel to the Philippine Coast Guard and
secured the assistance of the Philippine Air Force and the Philippine Navy. However, search and rescue operations yielded
negative results.
Appellants were charged with qualified piracy in connection with the seizure of M/T Tabangao in Batangas where the officers and
crew were forced to sail to Singapore and transfer its loaded petroleum products to another Vessel Navi Pride off the coast of
Singapore. Appellants pleaded not guilty with appellant Hiong claiming that he merely followed the orders of his superiors to buy
bunker fuel. However, it was disclosed that he connived, through falsification of documents, to prevent the Singapore ports
authority to detect the sale, the amount of the sale was less than one-half of the amount of the cargo transferred, that there was
no evidence of the sale, with receipts not issued and the sale was made 66 nautical miles away in the dead of the night. The
officers and crew of M/T Tabangao with whom the appellants were with for more than a month, positively identified appellants as
the seajackers. Appellants, except Hiong, were represented by Tomas Posadas who was later found to be a non-lawyer. They
were, however, assisted by Atty. Abdul Basar who manifested that they were adopting the evidence adduced by Posadas. Their
extrajudicial statements obtained without assistance of counsel were introduced as evidence for the prosecution. The trial court
found all appellants except Hiong to have acted in conspiracy. According to the trial court, Hiong's act was not indispensable in
the attack and seizure of the vessel. He was found guilty as a mere accomplice. Hence, this
appeal.
Issue: Whether the extrajudicial confession of the appellants are admissible in evidence.
Held: An accused is entitled to be present and to defend himself in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings since
an ordinary layman is not versed on the technicalities of trial. In this case, appellants' representative, Mr. Posadas, knew the
technical rules of procedure, coupled with their manifestation that they adopted the evidence adduced by him constitute waiver,
and with the full assistance of a bonafide lawyer, Atty. Basar and cannot serve as a basis for a claim of denial of due process. The
extrajudicial confessions made without assistance of counsel are inadmissible in evidence. Piracy is an exception to the rule on
territoriality in criminal law. If there is lack of complete evidence of conspiracy, the liability is that of an accomplice and not as
principal. An individual is justified in performing an act in obedience to an order issued by a superior, if such order is for some
lawful purpose and that the means used by the subordinate to carry out said order is lawful.
On the first issue, the record reveals that a manifestation (Exhibit "20", Record) was executed by accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola,
Changco, and Infante, Jr. on February 11, 1991, stating that they were adopting the evidence adduced when they were
represented by a non-lawyer. Such waiver of the right to sufficient representation during the trial as covered by the due process
clause shall only be valid if made with the full assistance of a bona fide lawyer. During the trial, accused-appellants, as represented
by Atty. Abdul Basar, made a categorical manifestation that said accused-appellants were apprised of the nature and legal
consequences of the subject manifestation, and that they voluntarily and intelligently executed the same. They also affirmed the
truthfulness of its contents when asked in open court. It is true that an accused person shall be entitled to be present and to defend
himself in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of judgment (Section 1,
Rule 115, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure). This is hinged on the fact that a layman is not versed on the technicalities of trial.
However, it is also provided by law that "[r]ights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy,
morals, or good customs or prejudicial to a third person with right recognized by law. (Article 6, Civil Code of the Philippines).
Thus, the same section of Rule 115 adds that " [u]pon motion, the accused may be allowed to defend himself in person when it
sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly protect his rights without the assistance of counsel." By analogy, but without
prejudice to the sanctions imposed by law for the illegal practice of law, it is amply shown that the rights of accused-appellants
were sufficiently and properly protected by the appearance of Mr. Tomas Posadas. An examination of the record will show that he
knew the technical rules of procedure. Hence, we rule that there was a valid waiver of the right to sufficient representation during
the trial, considering that it was unequivocally, and intelligently made and with the full assistance of a bona fide lawyer, Atty. Abdul
Basar. Accordingly, denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a valid waiver of rights has been made (People
vs. Serzo, 274 SCRA 553 [1997]; Sayson vs. People, 166 SCRA 680 [1988]).
[T]he right to counsel during custodial investigation may not be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. Such
rights originated from Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436 [1966]) which gave birth to the so-called Miranda doctrine which is to the
effect that prior to any questioning during custodial investigation, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent,
that any statement he gives may be used as evidence against him, and that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, either
retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly,
and intelligently. The Constitution even adds the more stringent requirement that the waiver must be in writing and made in the
presence of counsel.
[T]he absence of counsel during the execution of the so-called confessions of the accused-appellants make them invalid. In fact,
the very basic reading of the Miranda rights was not even shown in the case at bar. Paragraph [3] of the aforestated Section 12
sets forth the so-called "fruit from the poisonous tree doctrine," a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated
case of Nardone vs. United States (308 U.S. 388 [1939]). According to this rule, once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to
have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible. The rule is
based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because the originally
illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained (People vs. Alicando, 251 SCRA 293 [1995]). Thus, in this
case, the uncounselled extrajudicial confessions of accused-appellants, without a valid waiver of the right to counsel, are
inadmissible and whatever information is derived therefrom shall be regarded as likewise inadmissible in evidence against them.
Rights of Accused – Right to be Informed
17. PECHO v. PEOPLE

Right of Accused to be informed, an ancient bulwark of the liberties of men, has its origin in the Bill of Rights which the people of
Great Britain demanded and received from the Prince and Princess of Orange on 13 February 1688. It was adopted by the
Constitution of the United States and was extended to the Philippine Bill of 1902. It was later carried into the Jones Law and,
ultimately, enshrined in the Constitutions of 1935, 1973, and 1987. It has the following objectives: First. To furnish the accused
with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense; second, to avail himself of his conviction
or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so
that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had (United States vs. Cruikshank).
In order that this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated; not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain
acts and intent; these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff or defendant),
and circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute
the crime charged.
Facts:
In SC decision of 14 November 1994, SC modified the appealed judgment of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No.
14844 by holding the petitioner guilty of the complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of official and commercial
documents. SC held that although the petitioner could not be convicted of the crime charged, violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019, because the said section penalizes only consummated offenses and the offense charged in this case was not consummated
-- he could, nevertheless, be convicted of the complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of official and commercial
documents, which is necessarily included in the crime charged.
Unable to accept our verdict, the petitioner seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that after having
been acquitted of the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, a special law, he could not be convicted anymore of attempted
estafa through falsification of official and commercial documents, an offense punishable under the Revised Penal Code, a general
law; otherwise, the constitutional provision on double jeopardy would be violated. In other words, his acquittal of the crime charged
precludes conviction for the complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of official and commercial documents, because
both offenses arose from the same overt act as alleged in the information in Criminal Case No. 14844..
Pecho assailed the decision on the ground that he may not be convicted of that crime because the information
was for a violation of RA 3019. He thus alleged violation of his right to be informed of this charge against him in the filing
of the information.
SC then required the parties to submit their respective memoranda on the following issues: (a) the sufficiency of the
evidence for the complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents, and (b) the validity
of the conviction therefor under an information for the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, vis-a-vis the
constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
As to the second issue, the Office of the Solicitor General rejects the theory of the petitioner and submits that the
information in this case contains the essential ingredients of estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents;
therefore, assuming there is sufficient evidence, the petitioner could be convicted of the complex crime of attempted estafa through
falsification of public and commercial documents without violating Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution on the right of
the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused was informed of the nature and cause of the crime to which he is convicted
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled YES.
On the assumption that the prosecution’s evidence had satisfied the quantum of proof for conviction for the complex
crime of attempted estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents, there is absolutely no merit in the petitioners
claim that he could not be convicted of the said crime without offending his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, however, as the SC’s discussion in this case goes by, the case
was acquitted because SC finds lack of sufficient evidence that would establish the guilt of the accused as conspirator.
The court presented the objectives of the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the crime he is
charged with as follows:
1. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense;
2. To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause;
3. To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a
conviction, if one should be had.
In order that this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated; not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up
of certain acts and intent; these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff or
defendant), and circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance
necessary to constitute the crime charged.
What determines the real nature and cause of accusation against an accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the
information or complaint and not the caption or preamble of the information or complaint nor the specification of the provision
of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law. An incorrect caption is not a fatal mistake. It follows then that
an accused may be convicted of a crime which although not the one charged, is necessarily included in the latter. It has been
shown that the information filed in court is considered as charging for two offenses which the counsel of the accused failed to
object therefore he can be convicted for both or either of the charges.
The succeeding Section 5 prescribes the rule in determining when an offense includes or is included in another. We have
shown in the challenged decision why the complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of public and commercial
documents is included in the offense charged. Moreover, we held that the information in this case can also be considered as
charging two offenses: the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and the complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification
of official and commercial documents, and since the petitioner failed to object before trial to such duplicity, he could be validly
convicted of both or either of the offenses charged and proved.
However by reviewing the case at bar the SC finds lack of sufficient evidence that would establish the guilt of the accused
as conspirator to the crime of estafa beyond reasonable doubt, the prior decision of the SC was deemed to be based merely on
circumstantial evidence. The concordant combination and cumulative effect of the acts of the petitioner as proven by the
prosecutions evidence fails to satisfy the requirements of Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court. There is reasonable doubt as
to his guilt. And since his constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty can be overthrown only by proof beyond
reasonable doubt, the petitioner must then be acquitted even though his innocence may be doubted.
18. Andaya v. People

To convict him of a ground not alleged while he is concentrating his defense against the ground alleged would plainly be unfair
and underhanded. The rule is that a variance between the allegation in the information and proof adduced during trial
shall be fatal to the criminal case if it is material and prejudicial to the accused so much so that it affects his substantial
rights.
FACTS:
Complainant Armed Forces and Police Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) is a non-stock and non-profit
association authorized to engage in savings and loan transactions. In 1986, petitioner Noe S. Andaya was elected as president
and general manager of AFPSLAI. During his term, he sought to increase the capitalization of AFPSLAI to boost its lending
capacity to its members. Consequently, the Board of Trustees of AFPSLAI passed and approved a Resolution setting up a
Finders Fee Program whereby any officer, member or employee, except investment counselors, of AFPSLAI who could solicit
an investment of not less than P100,000.00 would be entitled to a finders fee equivalent to one percent of the amount solicited.
An information for estafa through falsification of commercial document was filed against petitioner. Noe S. Andaya, being
then the President and General Manager of the AFPSLAI, was accused of having caused and approved the disbursement of the
sum of P21,000.00, from the funds of the association, by making it appear in Disbursement Voucher No. 58380 that said amount
represented the 1% finders fee of one DIOSDADO J. GUILLAS [Guilas]; that by virtue of said falsification, said accused was able
to encash and receive a MBTC Check for the said amount.
The facts alleged in the information are sufficient to constitute the crime of falsification of private document. Specifically,
the allegations in the information can be broken down into the three essential elements of this offense as follows: (1) petitioner
caused it to appear in Disbursement Voucher No. 58380 that Diosdado Guillas was entitled to a finders fee from AFPSLAI in the
amount of P21,000.00 when in truth and in fact no finders fee was due to him; (2) the falsification wascommitted on Disbursement
Voucher No. 58380; and (3) the falsification caused damage to AFPSLAI in the amount of P21,000.00.
Petitioner denied all the charges against him. He claimed that the P21,000.00 finders fee was in fact payable by AFPSLAI
because of the P2,100,000.00 investment of Rosario Mercader solicited by Ernesto Hernandez. He denied misappropriating the
P21,000.00 finders fee for his personal benefit as the same was turned over to Ernesto Hernandez who was the true solicitor of
the aforementioned investment.
The trial court ruled that all the elements of falsification of private document were present. First, petitioner caused it to
appear in the disbursement voucher, a private document, that Guilas, instead of Hernandez, was entitled to a P21,000.00 finders
fee. Second, the falsification of the voucher was done with criminal intent to cause damage to the government because it was
meant to lower the tax base of Hernandez and, thus, evade payment of taxes on the finders fee.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner’s conviction for the crime of falsification of private document is valid.
RULING:
NO, it is not valid. The Supreme Court finds itself unable to agree with this ratiocination of the trial court because it
violates the constitutional right of petitioner to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
As early as the 1904 case of U.S. v. Karelsen the rationale of this fundamental right of the accused was already explained
in this wise:
The object of this written accusation was First. To furnish the accused with such a description of the
charge against him as will enable him to make his defense; and second, to avail himself of his conviction or
acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and third, to inform the court of the
facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be
had. (United States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542.) In order that this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be
stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent; these must be set forth in the
complaint with reasonable particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances. In
short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstances necessary to constitute
the crime charged. (Emphasis supplied)
It is fundamental that every element constituting the offense must be alleged in the information. The main purpose of requiring the
various elements of a crime to be set out in the information is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense because he
is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. The allegations of facts constituting the
offense charged are substantial matters and an accuseds right to question his conviction based on facts not alleged in the
information cannot be waived. No matter how conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may be, an accused cannot be
convicted of any offense unless it is charged in the information on which he is tried or is necessarily included therein. To convict
him of a ground not alleged while he is concentrating his defense against the ground alleged would plainly be unfair and
underhanded. The rule is that a variance between the allegation in the information and proof adduced during trial shall be
fatal to the criminal case if it is material and prejudicial to the accused so much so that it affects his substantial rights.
Similarly, in the case of Burgos v. Sandiganbayan, the SC upheld the constitutional right of the accused to be informed
of the accusation against him in a case involving a variance between the means of committing the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
3019 alleged in the information and the means found by the Sandiganbayan:
Common and foremost among the issues raised by petitioners is the argument that the Sandiganbayan erred
in convicting them on a finding of fact that was not alleged in the information. They contend that the information
charged them with having allowed payment of P83,850 to Ricardo Castaeda despite being aware and knowing
fully well that the surveying instruments were not actually repaired and rendered
functional/operational. However, their conviction by the Sandiganbayan was based on the finding that the
surveying instruments were not repaired in accordance with the specifications contained in the job orders.
xxxx
In criminal cases, where the life and liberty of the accused is at stake, due process requires that the accused
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. An accused cannot be convicted of an
offense unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or information. To convict him of an offense other than that
charged in the complaint or information would be a violation of this constitutional right.
The important end to be accomplished is to describe the act with sufficient certainty in order that the accused
may be appraised of the nature of the charge against him and to avoid any possible surprise that may lead to
injustice. Otherwise, the accused would be left in the unenviable state of speculating why he is made the object
of a prosecution.
xxxx
There is no question that the manner of commission alleged in the information and the act the Sandiganbayan
found to have been committed are both violations of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. Nonetheless, they are and
remain two different means of execution and, even if reference to Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 has been made in
the information, appellants conviction should only be based on that which was charged, or included, in the
information. Otherwise, there would be a violation of their constitutional right to be informed of the nature of
the accusation against them.
As in the Burgos case, the information in the case at bar is valid, however, there is a variance between the allegation in
the information and proof adduced during trial with respect to the third essential element of falsification of private
document, i.e., the falsification caused damage or was committed with intent to cause damage to a third party.
To reiterate, petitioner was charged in the information with causing damage to AFPSLAI in the amount of P21,000.00
because he caused it to appear in the disbursement voucher that Guilas was entitled to a P21,000.00 finders fee when in truth
and in fact AFPSLAI owed no such amount to Guilas. However, he was convicted by the trial court of falsifying the voucher with
criminal intent to cause damage to the government because the trial court found that petitioners acts were designed to lower the
tax base of Hernandez and aid the latter in evading payment of taxes on the finders fee.
We find this variance material and prejudicial to petitioner which, perforce, is fatal to his conviction in the instant case. By
the clear and unequivocal terms of the information, the prosecution endeavored to prove that the falsification of the voucher by
petitioner caused damage to AFPSLAI in the amount of P21,000.00 and not that the falsification of the voucher was done with
intent to cause damage to the government. It is apparent that this variance not merely goes to the identity of the third party but,
more importantly, to the nature and extent of the damage done to the third party. Needless to state, the defense applicable for
each is different.
Per the SC, If they were to convict petitioner now based on his intent to cause damage to the government, they would
be riding roughshod over his constitutional right to be informed of the accusation because he was not forewarned that he was
being prosecuted for intent to cause damage to the government.It would be simply unfair and underhanded to convict petitioner on
this ground not alleged while he was concentrating his defense against the ground alleged.
The trial court deduced the intent to cause damage to the government from the testimony of petitioner and his three other
witnesses, namely, Arevalo, Hernandez and Madet, that the substitution of the names in the voucher was intended to lower the
tax base of Hernandez to avoid payment of taxes on the finders fee. In other words, the trial court used part of the defense of
petitioner in establishing the third essential element of the offense which was entirely different from that alleged in the
information. Under these circumstances, petitioner obviously had no opportunity to defend himself with respect to the charge that
he committed the acts with intent to cause damage to the government because this was part of his defense when he explained
the reason for the substitution of the names in the voucher with the end goal of establishing that no actual damage was done to
AFPSLAI. If we were to approve of the method employed by the trial court in convicting petitioner, then we would be sanctioning
the surprise and injustice that the accuseds constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him precisely seeks to prevent. It would be plain denial of due process.
In view of the foregoing, the Supreme Court ruled that it was error to convict petitioner for acts which purportedly constituted the
third essential element of the crime but which were entirely different from the acts alleged in the information because it violates in
no uncertain terms petitioners constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
19.
RIGHT TO BE INFORMED
20.People v. Delfin
729 SCRA 617 (2014)
…variance in the dates does not invalidate the information under which the appellant was tried, and convicted. In
crimes where the date of commission is not a material element, like murder, it is not necessary to allege such date
with absolute specificity or certainty in the information. The Rules of Court merely requires, for the sake of properly
informing an accused, that the date of commission be approximated…
Facts:
On the night of 27 September 2000, one Emilio Enriquez (Emilio)—a 51-year-old fisherman from Navotas City—was
killed after being gunned down at a store just across his home. Suspected of killing Emilio was Rael Delfin, appellant. On 13 March
2001, the appellant was formally charged with the murder of Emilio before the RTC of Malabon.
During trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of one Joan Cruz (Joan) and a certain Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez
(Dr. Marquez). Joan is an eyewitness to the gunning of Emilio. She is also the live-in partner of the victim. The substance of her
testimony is as follows:
1. At about 10:45 p.m. of 27 September 2000, Joan was standing outside Emilio’s house at R. Domingo St., Tangos,
Navotas City. From there, Joan was able to see Emilio talking over the telephone at a store just across his house. Also
at the store during that time was the appellant who was seated on a bench to the left of Emilio.
2. Joan then went inside Emilio’s house. Almost immediately after going inside the house, Joan heard the sound of a
gunshot. Joan rushed outside of the house and saw Emilio shot in the head and sprawled on the ground. Joan then saw
the appellant, now holding a gun, firing another shot at Emilio.
3. Joan said that she was not aware of any previous misunderstanding between Emilio and the appellant; neither did she
observe any altercation brewing nor hear any word spoken between Emilio and appellant prior to the shooting.
Dr. Marquez, on the other hand, is a PNP physician who examined post mortem the corpse of Emilio. He revealed that
Emilio died as a consequence of two (2) gunshot wounds: one that penetrated the left side of his head and another that penetrated
his chest. Dr. Marquez testified to affirm the contents of his report.
Rene initially corroborated on all points the testimony of appellant. However, Rene later admitted that the, the appellant
and their other companions actually left for their fishing trip at 3:00 p.m. of 26 September 2000—not the 27th ; and returned to
shore at 4:00 p.m. of 27 September 2000—not the 28th.
RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of murder. Based on its assessment and evaluation
of the evidence on record, the RTC was convinced that it was the appellant who killed Emilio and who did so with the use of
treachery. CA affirmed.
Hence, this appeal. Appellant assails the validity of the information under which he was tried and convicted. He
specifically points out to the discrepancy between the date of the commission of the murder as alleged in the information i.e., "on
or about the 27th day of November 2000" and the one actually established during the trial i.e., 27 September 2000. Appellant
protests that the failure of the information to accurately allege the date of the commission of the murder violated his right to be
properly informed of the charge against him and consequently impaired his ability to prepare an intelligent defense thereon.
Appellant also insists on the credibility of his alibi over and above the version of the prosecution.
Issue: Whether or not the variance in the date of the commission of the murder as alleged
in the information and as established during the trial invalidates the information and violates his right to be properly informed of
the charge against him and impaired his ability to prepare an intelligent defense thereon.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that NO, the variance in the dates does not invalidate the information under which the appellant
was tried, and convicted. In crimes where the date of commission is not a material element, like murder, it is not necessary to
allege such date with absolute specificity or certainty in the information. The Rules of Court merely requires, for the sake of properly
informing an accused, that the date of commission be approximated:
Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. – A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the
accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the
offense was committed.
When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or information.
Since the date of commission of the offense is not required with exactitude, the allegation in an information of a date of
commission different from the one eventually established during the trial would not, as a rule, be considered as an error fatal to
prosecution. In such cases, the erroneous allegation in the information is just deemed supplanted by the evidence presented
during the trial or may even be corrected by a formal amendment of the information.
The foregoing rule, however, is concededly not absolute. Variance in the date of commission of the offense as alleged in
the information and as established in evidence becomes fatal when such discrepancy is so great that it induces the perception
that the information and the evidence are no longer pertaining to one and the same offense. In this event, the defective allegation
in the information is not deemed supplanted by the evidence nor can it be amended but must be struck down for being violative
of the right of the accused to be informed of the specific charge against him.
In this case however, the general rule shall apply. Despite their disparity as to the date of the alleged murder, we believe
that there is no mistaking that both the information and the evidence of the prosecution but pertain to one and the same offense
i.e., the murder of Emilio. We find implausible the likelihood that the accused may have been caught off-guard or surprised by the
introduction of evidence pointing to commission of the murder on 27 September 2000, considering that all documentary
attachments to the information (such as the Resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Malabon-Navotas sub-station and
the Sworn Statement of Joan) all referred to the murder as having been committed on that date. Indeed, appellant never objected
to such evidence during the trial and was even able to concoct an intelligent alibiin direct refutation thereof.
What clearly appears to this Court, on the other hand, is that the inaccurate allegation in the information is simply the product of a
mere clerical error. This is obvious from the fact that, while all its supporting documents point to the murder ashaving been
committed on the 27th of September2000, the information’s mistake is limited only to the month when the crime was
committed. Such an error is evidently not fatal; it is deemed supplanted by the evidence presented by the prosecution.
Hence, we sustain the information for murder, under which the appellant was tried and convicted, as valid.
21. CONDE V. RIVERA

SPEEDY TRIAL (one page lang talaga yung case)
MALCOLM, J.:
Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal midwife in Lucena, Tayabas, has been forced to respond to no less than five informations for
various crimes and misdemeanors, has appeared with her witnesses and counsel at hearings no less than on eight different
occasions only to see the cause postponed, has twice been required to come to the Supreme Court for protection, and now, after
the passage of more than one year from the time when the first information was filed, seems as far away from a definite resolution
of her troubles as she was when originally charged.
Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to have
a speedy trial. Aurelia Conde, like all other accused persons, has a right to a speedy trial in order that if innocent she may go free,
and she has been deprived of that right in defiance of law. Dismissed from her humble position, and compelled to dance attendance
on courts while investigations and trials are arbitrarily postponed without her consent, is palpably and openly unjust to her and a
detriment to the public. By the use of reasonable diligence, the prosecution could have settled upon the appropriate information,
could have attended to the formal preliminary examination, and could have prepared the case for a trial free from vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays.
Once before, as intimidated, the petitioner had to come to us for redress of her grievances. We thought then we had pointed out
the way for the parties. But it seems not. Once again therefore and finally, we hope, we propose to do all in our power to assist
this poor woman to obtain justice. On the one hand has been the petitioner, of humble station, without resources, but fortunately
assisted by a persistent lawyer, while on the other hand has been the Government of the Philippine Islands which should be the
last to set an example of delay and oppression in the administration of justice. The Court is thus under a moral and legal obligation
to see that these proceedings come to an end and that the accused is discharged from the custody of the law.
We lay down the legal proposition that, where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a
defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a year, the accused is entitled
to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas
corpus to obtain his freedom. (16 C.J., 439 et seq.; In the matter of Ford [1911], 160 Cal., 334; U.S. vs. Fox [1880], 3 Montana,
512. See further our previous decision in Conde vs. Judge of First Instance, Fourteenth Judicial District, and the Provincial Fiscal
of Tayabas, No. 21236.1
The writ prayed for shall issue and the Provincial Fiscal of Tayabas shall abstain from further attempts to prosecute the accused
pursuant to informations growing out of the facts set forth in previous informations, and the charges now pending before the justice
of the peace of Lucena, Tayabas, are ordered dismissed, with cost against the respondent fiscal. We append to our order the
observation that, without doubt, the Attorney-General, being fully cognizant of the facts of record, will take such administrative
action as to him seems proper to the end that incidents of this character may not recur. So ordered.
22. MAGAT V. CA
Facts:
Petitioner-accused was charged with robbery for divesting an American businessman who came to Olongapo as a tourist of his
money. Within 24 hours after trial, where rebuttal and sur-rebuttal was presented by the prosecution and the defense, respectively,
the Court of First Instance rendered its judgment of conviction. Petitioner-accused appealed. petitioner-accused claims lack of due
process because of the unusual speed with which the Trial Court disposed of his case. The record does show that the accused
was arraigned at 4:35 P.M. on July 26, 1979. The request of defense counsel for one hour within which to confer with his client
was deferred by the Trial Court till after the prosecution had presented its evidence, but the Court clarified that it would allow
counsel to consult his client from time to time during cross-examination. Trial commenced thereafter and continued until 7:30 in
the evening, with the prosecution resting its case. The following day, trial was resumed, for the presentation of evidence for the
defense, at 8:30 A.M., and judgment was promulgated at 11:35 that same morning. The Solicitor General, instead of filing a Brief,
filed a Motion and Manifestation joining the accused's cause and recommending the reversal of the trial Court's judgment on the
grounds that complainant was not a transient visitor; that the trial Court acted with unusual haste in the arraignment, trial and
rendition of the judgment of conviction; and that the evidence adduced failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction but modified the penalty.
Issue: WoN Magat was not afforded the right to Due Process
Held: No. Supreme Court held that petitioner-accused was not denied procedural due process, because the unusual speed with
which the trial Court disposed of the case was in consonance with General Order No. 39 amending General Order No. 12, dated
September 30, 1972 which mandates that cases involving tourists be disposed of within 24 hours from the filing of the complaint.
The rendition of the judgment not long after the trial was terminated was not necessarily indicative of inordinate haste especially
where petitioner-accused was duly and amply heard in his defeat. Moreover, the guilt of petitioner-accused had been sufficiently
established beyond reasonable doubt as complainant was categorical in his identification of the accused and emphatic in his direct
and active involvement in the robbery. The conclusions of the trial Court on the question of credibility is entitled to the utmost
respect and will remain undisturbed on appeal. Petition for review denied.
23. Francisco Guerrero, petitioner v. Court of Appeals, respondent

(G.R. No. 107211 | June 28, 1996)
In the determination of whether or not the right to a 'speedy trial' has been violated, certain factors may be considered and
balanced against each other. These are length of delay, reason for the delay, assertion of the right or failure to assert it, and
prejudice caused by the delay. The same factors may also be considered in answering judicial inquiry whether or not a person
officially charged with the administration of justice has violated the 'speedy disposition of cases' guarantee.
Facts:
On November 16, 1971, an Information for Triple Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence was filed against Guerrero
before the Court of First Instance, Branch XXXV, Caloocan City. It was said that on or about the 13th day of May,1969, in the
Municipality of Malabon, Guerrero being then the pilot of non-commercial Aircraft, type Camanche PA-24-250 with registration
marking PI-C515, then in-charge of, and has complete responsibility for, the maintenance and operation of said aircraft, without
taking the necessary care and precaution to avoid accidents or injuries to persons, and without ascertaining as to whether the
quantity of fuel in the tanks of said aircraft was sufficient for the flight from Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija to MIA, Parañaque, Rizal, did,
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously operate, fly, pilot, maneuver and/or conduct the flight of said aircraft from the
airport at Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija with four (4) passengers on board, and while the said aircraft was already airborne after several
minutes, the engine quitted twice indicating that there was no more fuel, prompting the accused to make an emergency manner
landing on a fishpond which he executed in a careless, negligent and imprudent manner in the Piper Camanche Owner's
Handbook, and as a result of the improper execution of said emergency landing, the aircraft's landing gear collided with a dike
and trees near the fishpond in Malabon, Rizal, resulting to the fatal injuries in three (3) passengers, namely, Cpl. Teodoro Neric,
Jose Mari Garcia and Lourdes Garcia which directly caused their deaths.
Due to several postponements, all filed by the petitioner, the prosecution was finally able to start presenting its evidence
on September 29, 1972 after petitioner entered his pleas of 'Not Guilty.' On August 19, 1975, the prosecution finally, rested its
case, and February 7, 1978, the defense rested its case. The hearing was terminated and the parties were ordered by Judge
Argel to submit their respective memoranda. On January 19, 1979, Judge Bernardo P. Pardo who ostensibly took over as presiding
judge vice Judge Argel, granted private prosecutor's omnibus motion to file memorandum up to January 29, 1979.
On December 21, 1979, petitioner filed his memorandum. It would appear that from the RTC of Caloocan City, Branch
XXXV, the case was subsequently, assigned to Branch CXXV presided over by Judge Alfredo Gorgonio who apparently, did not
take action thereon.
On January 30, 1989, Court Administrator Meynardo Tiro ordered the re-raffling of the case from the RTC of Caloocan
City, Branch CXXV to the RTC of Navotas-Malabon which, under the provisions of B.P. 129, had jurisdiction over the case. The
case, now docketed as Criminal Case No. 7356-MN, was raffled to presiding Judge Benjamin N. Aquino of the RTC, Navotas
Malabon, Branch 72.
On March 14,1990, Judge Aquino ordered the parties to follow-up and complete the transcript of stenographic notes
within 30 days considering that the same was found to be incomplete.
On April 29, 1990, since the parties were not able to complete the transcript of stenographic notes, the court ordered the
retaking of the testimonies of the witnesses.
On May 15, 1990, the private prosecutor submitted copies of the duplicate originals of the testimonies of Eusebio Garcia
and Elena Obidosa (December 11, 1969), Celestino Nazareno (March 16, 1973), Cenen Miras (April 27, 1973), Ariston Agustin
(February 10, 1977) and Francisco Guerrero (December 5 and 19, 1977). The private prosecutor manifested that he had
communicated with one of the stenographers on record, Ms. Remedios S. Delfin, who promised to look into her files and hopefully
complete the transcription of her stenographic notes.
The presiding Judge set the retaking of the witnesses' testimony, but it was reset due to petitioner's failure to appear on
the scheduled hearing.
The petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that his right to speedy trial has been violated. The presiding Judge
denied the motion to dismiss and reset the retaking of the testimonies. The petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration which
was denied on and the presiding judge set anew the retaking of the testimonies.
Hence, petitioner filed petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus for the review of the orders of the Regional Trial
Court dated November 9, 1990 and November 20, 1990 anent petitioner's motion to dismiss, as well as his motion for
reconsideration. The petition was anchored on the alleged violation of petitioner's constitutional right to speedy trial.
In its decision which was promulgated on February 18, 1992, the Honorable Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. In
a resolution dated September 10, 1992, petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied.
(Basically, na-raffle ng na-raffle yung case sa iba’t ibang trial courts, kasi hindi nagawan nung unang judge ng decision
during his tenure. 1979 yung huling filing ng memorandum, 1989 lang uli nag-retake ng testimony yung bagong appointed
judge sa case)
Issue:
Whether or not the right of Guerrero to speedy trial was violated.
Held:
No, it was not violated.
The 1987 Constitution provides the right not only to a speedy trial but also to a speedy judgment after trial when in Section 16,
Article III, it provides:
"All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative
bodies."
Hence, the Constitution mandates dispatch not only in the trial stage but also in the disposition thereof, warranting dismissals in
case of violations thereof without the fault of the party concerned, not just the accused.
In the determination of whether or not the right to a 'speedy trial' has been violated, certain factors may be considered and balanced
against each other. These are length of delay, reason for the delay, assertion of the right or failure to assert it, and prejudice
caused by the delay. The same factors may also be considered in answering judicial inquiry whether or not a person officially
charged with the administration of justice has violated the 'speedy disposition of cases' guarantee.
In the case before us, the petitioner merely sat and waited after the case was submitted for resolution in 1979. It was
only in 1989 when the case below was re-raffled from the RTC of Caloocan City to the RTC of Navotas-Malabon and only after
respondent trial judge of the latter court ordered on March 14, 1990 the parties to follow-up and complete the transcript of
stenographic notes that matters started to get moving towards a resolution of the case. More importantly, it was only after the new
trial judge reset the retaking of the testimonies to November 9, 1990 because of petitioner's absence during the original setting on
October 24, 1990 that the accused suddenly became zealous of safeguarding his right to speedy trial and disposition.
While it may be said that it was not petitioner's fault that the stenographic notes of the testimonies of the witnesses were not
transcribed, yet neither was it the prosecution's. The respondent trial judge can hardly be faulted either because he could not have
rendered the decision without the transcripts in question. Let it be remembered that he was not the judge who conducted the trial
and hence he would not have had sufficient basis to make a disposition in the absence of the said transcripts.
Respondent Court of Appeals noted:
"Indeed, it can be gleaned from the pleadings on file that the case was assigned to respondent Judge only in late 1989
or early 1990, and that he took prompt action thereon by setting the case for retaking of testimonies, obviously as a
prelude to judgment. The case then was finally making progress toward termination. For such dispatch and diligence,
respondent Judge hardly deserves condemnation. Petitioner also faults the prosecution for its failure 'to follow up the
status of the case.'"
As regards the other judges to whom the case was assigned prior to 1989, the accused himself could not pinpoint the cause of
the problem:
"2) Reason for the delay - No one knows why the Presiding Judge (Manuel A. Argel) of the respondent court who heard
the trial did not render a decision during his tenure. No one knows either why another former Presiding Judge (Alfredo
Gorgonio) failed to turn over the case to the Malabon court during the Judiciary Reorganization under B.P. Blg. 129.
It appears later on that the case became a victim of neglect and languished in the court docket. Not surprisingly, since
the risk of such loss through neglect and other causes grew with each passing year, part of the records and several
transcripts were lost in the time the case lay unattended. Before being finally assigned to the respondent trial court, the
case was shuttled from court to court through various endorsements of Executive Judges and the Court Administrator of
the Supreme Court as a result of the confusion as to which court had territorial jurisdiction over it."
In the present case, there is no question that petitioner raised the violation against his own right to speedy disposition only when
the respondent trial judge reset the case for rehearing. It is fair to assume that he would have just continued to sleep on his right-
a situation amounting to laches - had the respondent judge not taken the initiative of determining the non-completion of the records
and of ordering the remedy precisely so he could dispose of the case. The matter could have taken a different dimension if
during all those ten years between 1979 when accused filed his memorandum and 1989 when the case was re-raffled,
the accused showed signs of asserting his right which was granted him in 1987 when the new constitution took effect,
or at least made some overt act (like a motion for early disposition or a motion to compel the stenographer to transcribe
stenographic notes) that he was not waiving it. As it is, his silence would have to be interpreted as a waiver of such right.
While this Court recognizes the night to speedy disposition quite distinctly from the right to a speedy trial, and although
this Court has always zealously espoused protection from oppressive and vexatious delays not attributable to the party involved,
at the same time, we hold that a party's individual rights should not work against and preclude the people's equally important right
to public justice. In the instant case, three people died as a result of the crash of the airplane that the accused was flying. It appears
to us that the delay in the disposition of the case prejudiced not just the accused but the people as well. Since the accused has
completely failed to assert his right seasonably and inasmuch as the respondent judge was not in a position to dispose of the case
on the merits due to the absence of factual basis, we hold it proper and equitable to give the parties fair opportunity to obtain (and
the court to dispense) substantial justice in the premises.
24. People vs Lacson
Facts:
On May 18, 1995 , at around 4:00 A.M., eleven (11) known members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang (KBG) figured in a shootout
with the police forces during an operation conducted by the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG) near the
fly-over along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City. All of the 11 perished that fateful day.
Later, two members of the police team alleged that the killing was in reality a summary execution, or, in popular parlance, a rubout.
On November 2, 1995, the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan eleven (11) informations for murder against Senator Panfilo
Lacson who was, at the time the alleged murders took place, Chief Superintendent and head of the Presidential Anti-Crime
Commission (PACC). He was charged, along with 25 other accused, for the wrongful killing of the 11 members of the KBG. Upon
motion of Lacson, the criminal cases were remanded to the Ombudsman for reinvestigation. Subsequently, his participation in the
crime was downgraded from principal to accessory. He pleaded not guilty when arraigned.
On account of the downgrading of his criminal liability, Lacson consequently questioned the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to
hear the criminal cases against him, considering that, as stated in the amended information, none of the principal accused was a
government official with a salary grade (SG) of 27 or higher, as required by Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7975 which was then in
force. Finding Lacson’s contention meritorious, the Sandiganbayan ordered the cases transferred to the Regional Trial Court.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration of the order to transfer. Pending resolution of the motion,
R.A. No. 8429 took effect on February 23, 1997, amending R.A. No. 7975 , which deleted the word principal from Section 2 of the
earlier law. The amendment effectively expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to include all cases where at least one of
the accused, whether charged as principal, accomplice or accessory, is a government official with SG 27 or higher. The
amendment applied to all cases pending in any court in which the trial is yet to begin as of the new law’s enactment.
Lacson challenged the constitutionality of the amendment. The Supreme Court dismissed the constitutional challenge but still
ordered the transfer of the criminal cases to the Regional Trial Court, holding that the amended informations for murder failed to
indicate that the offenses charged therein were committed in relation to, or in discharge of, the official functions of respondent, as
required by R.A. No. 8249.
The criminal cases against respondent were raffled off to Branch 81 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, then presided by
Judge Wenceslao Agnir, now retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals.
Before Lacson could be arraigned, prosecution witnesses recanted their affidavits implicating him in the murder cases. Likewise,
seven (7) of the 11 complainants executed separate affidavits of desistance declaring lack of interest to prosecute the cases.
Accordingly, Lacson, along with his co-accused, filed identical motions asking the court to: (1) make a judicial determination of the
existence of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest; (2) hold in abeyance the issuance of the warrants; and (3)
dismiss the cases should the trial court find lack of probable cause.
On March 29, 1999, Judge Agnir issued a resolution dismissing the criminal cases against all the accused for lack of probable
cause.
On March 27, 2001, then PNP Director Leandro Mendoza endorsed the affidavits executed by new witnesses Police Insp. Ysmael
S. Yu and Police Sr. Insp. Abelardo Ramos to the Department of Justice for preliminary investigation. Based on this endorsement,
then Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez formed a panel to investigate the matter. On April 17, 2001, Lacson was subpoenaed
to attend the investigation. On May 28, 2001, Lacson and his co-accused, invoking, among others, their constitutional right against
double jeopardy, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a petition for prohibition with application for temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the State prosecutors from conducting the preliminary investigation. The
petition, docketed as Civil Case No. 01-100933,11 was raffled off to Branch 40, presided by Judge Herminia Pasamba.
Judge Pasamba, in an Order dated June 5, 2001, denied the petition.

On June 6, 2001, 11 informations for murder involving the killing of the same members of the KBG were filed before the RTC of
Quezon City and were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112. Lacson and his 25 co-accused were charged
as principals in the wrongful killing of the KBG members. The criminal cases were raffled to the sala of Judge Theresa Yadao of
RTC-Quezon City, Branch 81.
Meanwhile, Lacson filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review on certiorari of the denial of his petition for prohibition by
Judge Pasamba. He stressed therein the applicability in his case of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure. He claims, among others, that cases similar to those filed against him (where the penalty imposable is imprisonment
of six [6] years or more) cannot be revived after the lapse of two years from the date the order of provisional dismissal was issued.
On June 8, 2001, Lacson also filed in the criminal cases before RTC Quezon City, Branch 81 a motion for judicial determination
of probable cause and in the absence thereof, for the outright dismissal of the case. On June 13, 2001, he filed a manifestation
and motion to suspend the proceedings before the trial court. In the interim, the Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining Judge Yadao from issuing a warrant of arrest or conducting any proceeding or hearing in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-
101102 to 01-1011112. The TRO was made permanent on August 24, 2001, after the Court of Appeals granted Lacson’s petition
for review. The appellate court held that the proceedings conducted by the State prosecutors with respect to the criminal cases
filed in Quezon City are null and void, and consequently ordered the dismissal of the new informations filed before the RTC-
Quezon City.
Thereafter, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court assailing the decision
of the Court of Appeals.
For its part, the Supreme Court, in an en banc resolution, held that Lacson can invoke Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure. However, it added that due to lack of sufficient factual bases, it could not itself determine whether or not
said rule applied to Lacson’s case. It then ordered the remand of the case to the RTC-Quezon City, Branch 81, “so that the State
prosecutor and respondent Lacson can adduce evidence and be heard on whether the requirements of Section 8, Rule 117 have
been complied with on the basis of the evidence of which the trial court should make a ruling on whether the Informations in
Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 should be dismissed or not.” The OSG thereafter moved for the reconsideration of
the en banc resolution.
Issue:
1. WON the two-year period to revive the cases as provided under the new rules already lapsed?
2. WON there is a justification for the filing of the cases beyond the two-year period?
Ruling:
Lacson invokes Section 8, Rule 117 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure to bar the re-filing of the criminal cases against him.
He supports this argument by invoking his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of his case. On the other hand, the State
posits that Section 8, Rule 117 should not be retroactively applied as it deprives it of a reasonable opportunity to fairly indict
criminals. The query then should be: absent Section 8, Rule 117, can the state still prosecute Lacson despite the dismissal by
Judge Agnir of the original criminal cases filed against him? This writer submits that the answer is in the affirmative.
The dismissal by then Judge Agnir of the cases against Lacson was premised on Section 2, Article III21 of the 1987 Constitution.
In his Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and for Examination of Witnesses filed with Judge Agnir, Lacson prayed
for the following relief:
1) That a judicial determination of probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article 111 of the Constitution be conducted by
this Honorable Court, and for this purpose, an order be issued directing the prosecution to present the private
complainants and their witnesses at a hearing scheduled therefor; and
2) That warrants for the accused-movants be withheld, or, if issued, recalled in the meantime until the resolution of this
incident.
Lacson’s motion had the effect of a quashal, since he clearly filed the same prior to his arraignment before Judge Agnir’s court.
Judge Agnir held that:
“xxx the documents attached to the Informations in support thereof have been rendered meaningless, if not absurd, with
the recantation of the principal prosecution witnesses and the desistance of the private complainants. There is no more
evidence to show that a crime has been committed and that the accused are probably guilty thereof. xxx” (Underscoring
Supplied)
Under the circumstances then obtaining, the prosecution had to its disposal certain remedies against the order of dismissal. Prior
to its amendment, the Rules on Criminal Procedure, under Section 6, Rule 117 provides that the quashal of the Information is not
a bar to another prosecution for the same offense except when the motion was based on the extinction of criminal action or liability
or on the fact that the accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being convicted, or acquitted of the offense
charged.(Underscoring Supplied)
There is no dispute that the dismissal by Judge Agnir of the information filed against Lacson does not fall under any of the above
stated exceptions.
As of the time of the re-filing on June 6, 2001 of the 11 informations for murder, a little over two years have elapsed since the
original informations were dismissed on March 29, 1999. If one added to that the four years that have elapsed from the time the
crime happened on May 18, 1995 until the dismissal of the cases by Judge Agnir on March 29, 1999, then only six years would
have passed since the crime happened. The period of six years is computed without even taking into consideration the suspension
of the running of the period due to the filing of the informations.
This period of six years is well within the 20-year period of prescription, under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, for prosecution
for murder. Denying to the State the right to prosecute Lacson and his coaccused after March 29, 2001, two years from the date
the original cases were dismissed, effectively nullifies the right of the State to prosecute the accused. This cuts short the
prescriptive period for murder from 20 years to a mere six years.
The filing of the complaint or information interrupts the period of prescription of offenses, but said period shall commence to run
again after such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any
reason not imputable to the accused. Undeniably, the proceedings before the trial court was terminated without Lacson being
convicted or acquitted, hence the period of prescription for his offense commenced to run again after the date of termination.
However, by the time the prosecution filed new informations against him, based on new investigations conducted thereon, only
six years (as computed above) have passed, which is clearly still within the prescriptive period of the crime for which Lacson is
being charged.
Lacson cannot invoke his right against double jeopardy since, as previously pointed out, Judge Agnir dismissed the informations
against him before Lacson could be arraigned. It is elementary that without a valid arraignment, the first jeopardy does not attach.
Prior to the amendment of the rules, the State may gather enough evidence to support its case, as it did in the cases against
Lacson when new witnesses emerged, and to file new informations for the same offense, pursuant to Section 6 of Rule 117.
The rule on prescription of crimes recognizes this right of the State to be given ample opportunity to prosecute violators of its laws,
on one hand, and, on the other, the right of the accused to have the case against him disposed of within the soonest possible
time. It cannot be gainsaid that both these rights are substantive.
25. WEBB vs. PEOPLE

Facts:
Petitioners were charged with the crime of rape with homicide for allegedly raping Carmela Vizconde and on the occasion
thereof, killing Carmela herself and her mother, Estrellita, and her sister, Jennifer. The crime was committed in the evening of
June 29 up to the early morning of June 30, 1991 at the Vizconde residence in BF Homes, Parañaque. 6
The case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 95-404, was raffled to Branch 274 of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque
presided by respondent judge. aisadc
Prior to their arraignment, petitioner Webb and his co-accused, Gerardo Biong, had sought the disqualification of
respondent judge in Criminal Case No. 95-404. In his motion of August 21, 1995, petitioner Webb relied on the ground that
respondent judge allegedly told the media that "failure of the accused to surrender following the issuance of the warrant of arrest
is an indication of guilt." Respondent judge denied the motion. Two days later, on August 23, 1995, petitioner Webb filed a second
motion to disqualify respondent judge as the latter allegedly told the media that the accused "should not expect the comforts of
home," pending the resolution of his motion to be committed to the custody of the Philippine National Police at Camp Ricardo
Papa, Bicutan, Parañaque. Respondent judge again denied the motion to inhibit. On September 4, 1995, Gerardo Biong filed
another motion to disqualify respondent judge on the ground of bias and partiality. This was likewise denied by respondent judge.
The petitioners were arraigned on September 4, 1995. They then filed separate petitions for bail.
On September 21, 1995, petitioner Webb filed an Urgent Motion for Hospitalization. He alleged that he was sick of
dermatitis or asthma of the skin which aggravated due to his continuous commitment at the Parañaque Municipal Jail. The motion
was denied by respondent judge on October 16, 1995.
On October 9, 1995, the hearing on petitioners' petitions for bail commenced. The prosecution presented its "star
witness," Jessica Alfaro, who identified petitioners as the perpetrators of the crime. During the cross-examination, the defense
counsel tried to impeach Alfaro's credibility by asking her questions regarding the contents of an affidavit she executed at the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on April 28, 1995. The defense tried to show that some of her statements in said affidavit
are inconsistent with her statements in a subsequent affidavit executed on May 21, 1995 and with her testimony in court. The
prosecution objected and moved that all questions relating to the contents of Alfaro's April 28 affidavit be expunged from the
records for being inadmissible in evidence under Article III Section 12(1) and (3) of the 1987 Constitution. 7 Respondent judge
sustained the objection and on October 30, 1995, she issued an order holding that Alfaro cannot be cross examined on the
contents of her April 28 affidavit because said affidavit was inadmissible in evidence as it was not executed in the presence of a
counsel. 8
The defense also tried to prove Alfaro's motive in testifying against petitioners. She was questioned about her brother,
Patrick Alfaro, and her uncle, Roberto Alfaro. Jessica Alfaro allegedly admitted that her brother, Patrick, was a drug addict and
was arrested once by the NBI for illegal possession of drugs and that he is presently in the United States. When defense counsel
inquired about the circumstances of Patrick's departure for the United States, the prosecution objected to the questions on the
ground of irrelevancy. Respondent judge sustained the objection.
The defense also cross-examined Alfaro on her educational attainment to show that she lied in her direct testimony. The
defense presented her transcript of records to prove that she only enrolled for a year and earned nine (9) academic units, contrary
to her claim that she finished second year college. The prosecution again objected on the ground that Alfaro's educational
attainment was irrelevant. Respondent judge sustained the objection.
On November 9, 1995, petitioners filed a motion to disqualify or inhibit respondent judge due to bias and prejudice.
Respondent judge denied the motion for lack of merit on November 28, 1995.
On November 15, 1995, petitioners filed two separate petitions with this Court. Petitioners Webb, Lejano, Fernandez,
together with their co-accused, Gerardo Biong, filed a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside (1) the order of respondent judge
dated October 16, 1995 denying petitioner Webb's motion for hospitalization and (2) the order of respondent judge dated October
30, 1995 disallowing the defense to cross-examine Alfaro on the contents of her April 28 affidavit. Petitioners Gatchalian and
Estrada filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus assailing respondent judge's order prohibiting the cross-
examination of Alfaro on the contents of her April 28 affidavit.
On December 8, 1995, petitioners filed with this Court a supplemental petition to set aside the November 28, 1995 order
of respondent judge denying their motion for inhibition.
In a resolution dated January 22, 1996, we referred both petitions and the supplemental petition to the Court of Appeals
for proper disposition.
In the meantime, the hearing on petitioners' petitions for bail continued. The prosecution presented Mila Gaviola, a former
maid at the Webb residence, who testified that she saw petitioner Webb in their house in the early morning of June 30, 1991. On
December 5, 1995, respondent judge, over the objection of the petitioners, ordered an ocular inspection of the
former Webb residence in BF Homes, Parañaque to verify Gaviola's testimony about a secret door through which she peeped to
see petitioner Webb.
On January 12, 1996, petitioner Webb filed a motion for deposition of witnesses residing in the United States who shall
testify on his presence in the United States on the date of the commission of the crime. On February 6, 1996, respondent judge
denied the motion for the reason that petitioner Webb failed to allege that the witnesses do not have the means to go to the place
of the trial. Hence, on January 12, 1996, petitioner Webb filed another supplemental petition to the Court of Appeals challenging
the said order.
Petitioners made their Formal Offer of Evidence upon conclusion of the hearings on the petitions for bail. On September
25, 1995, the prosecution filed its Comment/Objection to the Formal Offer of Evidence. On October 1, 1996, respondent judge
ruled on petitioner's formal offer of evidence. She admitted only ten (10) out of the one hundred forty two (142) exhibits offered by
petitioner.
On October 11, 1996, respondent judge denied petitioners' petitions for bail.
On June 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision on the various petitions and supplemental petitions. It
reversed respondent judge's ruling refusing to admit Alfaro's April 28 affidavit but denied all the other reliefs prayed for by
petitioners. It also denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated November 15, 1996.
On December 12, 1996, petitioners filed the present petition contending, among others, that the Court of Appeals erred
in not honoring that the right to a fair trial requires that the case be tried by an impartial judge.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent judge should inhibit herself from hearing Criminal Case No. 95-404 on the ground of bias and prejudice.
We rule in the negative.
The Bill of Rights guarantees that "(n)o person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of
law." 19 A critical component of due process is a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal. We have ingrained the
jurisprudence that every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge for all the other elements of
due process, like notice and hearing, would be meaningless if the ultimate decision would come from a partial and biased
judge. 20 Hence, the Rules of Court allows a judge to voluntarily inhibit himself from hearing a case for "just or valid reasons"
other than those referring to his pecuniary interest, relation, previous connection, or previous rulings or decisions. Section 1 Rule
137 of the Revised Rules of Court states:
SEC. 1. Disqualification of judges.— No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or
his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to
either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree,
computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian,
trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject
of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just
or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
Under the second paragraph, a party has the right to seek the inhibition or disqualification of a judge who does not appear
to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent in handling the case. This right must be weighed with the duty of
a judge to decide cases without fear of repression. Hence, to disqualify a judge on the ground of bias and prejudice the
movant must prove the same by clear and convincing evidence. This is a heavy burden and petitioners failed to discharge
their burden of proof.
To prove bias and prejudice on the part of respondent judge, petitioners harp on the alleged adverse and erroneous
rulings of respondent judge on their various motions. By themselves, however, they do not sufficiently prove bias and prejudice to
disqualify respondent judge. To be disqualifying, the bias and prejudice must be shown to have stemmed from an extrajudicial
source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case.
Opinions formed in the course of judicial proceedings, although erroneous, as long as they are based on the evidence presented
and conduct observed by the judge, do not prove personal bias or prejudice on the part of the judge. 21 As a general rule, repeated
rulings against a litigant, no matter how erroneous and vigorously and consistently expressed, are not a basis for disqualification
of a judge on grounds of bias and prejudice. 22 Extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose,
in addition to the palpable error which may be inferred from the decision or order itself. Although the decision may seem so
erroneous as to raise doubts concerning a judge's integrity, absent extrinsic evidence, the decision itself would be insufficient to
establish a case against the judge. 23 The only exception to the rule is when the error is so gross and patent as to produce an
ineluctable inference of bad faith or malice.
A perusal of the records will reveal that petitioners failed to adduce any extrinsic evidence to prove that respondent judge
was motivated by malice or bad faith in issuing the assailed rulings. Petitioners simply lean on the alleged series of adverse rulings
of the respondent judge which they characterized as palpable errors. This is not enough. We note that respondent judge's rulings
resolving the various motions filed by petitioners were all made after considering the arguments raised by all the parties. It is true
that the respondent judge erred in some of her rulings such as her rejection of petitioners' one hundred thirty two (132) pieces of
evidence. It appears, however, that respondent judge reversed this erroneous ruling and already admitted these 132 pieces of
evidence after finding that "the defects in (their) admissibility have been cured through the introduction of additional evidence
during the trial on the merits." 24 This correction diminishes the strength of petitioners' charge that respondent judge is hopelessly
biased against them. To be sure, the respondent judge did not score a complete cipher in her rulings against the petitioners. Just
last June 11, 1997, the Third Division of this Court dismissed an administrative complaint against the respondent judge on the
ground that ". . . it is within the respondent judge's right to conduct an ocular inspection since it is an exercise of her judicial
prerogative . . ." 25 There is still another reason why we should observe caution in disqualifying respondent judge. The trial of the
petitioners is about to end and to assign a new judge to determine the guilt or innocence of petitioners will not be for the best
interest of justice. The records of the case at bar run into volumes. These voluminous records cannot capture in print the complete
credibility of witnesses when they testified in court. As the respondent judge observed the demeanor of witnesses while in the
witness chair, she is in the best position to calibrate their credibility. The task of evaluating the credibility of witnesses includes
interpreting their body language and their meaningful nuances are not expressed in the transcripts of their testimonies.
We hasten to stress that a party aggrieved by erroneous interlocutory rulings in the course of a trial is not without remedy.
The range of remedy is provided in our Rules of Court and we need not make an elongated discourse on the subject. But certainly,
the remedy for erroneous rulings, absent any extrinsic evidence of malice or bad faith, is not the outright disqualification of the
judge. For there is yet to come a judge with the omniscience to issue rulings that are always infallible. The courts will close shop
if we disqualify judges who err for we all err.
We again remind respondent judge of our counsel in the first Webb case 26 ". . . that our ability to dispense impartial
justice is an issue in every trial, and in every criminal prosecution, the judiciary always stands as a silent accused. More than
convicting the guilty and acquitting the innocent, the business of the judiciary is to assure fulfillment of the promise that justice
shall be done and is done — and that is the only way for the judiciary to get an acquittal from the bar of public opinion."
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. No costs.
26. Bracy vs. Gramley

Facts:
Petitioner William Bracy was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death before then-Judge Thomas J. Maloney for his role in an
execution-style triple murder. Maloney was later convicted of taking bribes from defendants in criminal cases. Although he was
not bribed in this case, he “fixed” other murder cases during and around the time of petitioner’s trial. Petitioner contends that
Maloney therefore had an interest in a conviction here to deflect suspicion that he was taking bribes in other cases, and that this
interest violated the fair trial guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
Maloney was one of many dishonest judges exposed and convicted through “Operation Greylord,” a labyrinthine federal
investigation of judicial corruption in Chicago. Maloney served as a judge from 1977 until he retired in 1990, and it appears he has
the dubious distinction of being the only Illinois judge ever convicted of fixing a murder case. Before he was appointed to the
bench, Maloney was a criminal defense attorney with close ties to organized crime who often paid off judges in criminal cases.
Once a judge, Maloney exploited many of the relationships and connections he had developed while bribing judges to solicit bribes
for himself.
Maloney was convicted in Federal District Court of conspiracy, racketeering, extortion, and obstructing justice in April 1993. Four
months later, petitioner filed this habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, claiming,
among other things, that he was denied a fair trial because “in order to cover up the fact that [Maloney] accepted bribes from
defendants in some cases, [he] was prosecution oriented in other cases.”
Petitioner sought discovery in support of this claim. Specifically, he requested (1) the sealed transcript of Maloney’s trial; (2)
reasonable access to the prosecution’s materials in Maloney’s case; (3) the opportunity to depose persons associated with
Maloney; and (4) a chance to search Maloney’s rulings for a pattern of pro-prosecution bias.
The District Court rejected petitioner’s fair-trial claim and denied his supplemental motion for discovery, concluding that
“[petitioner’s] allegations contain insufficient specificity or good cause to justify further discovery.” The Court of Appeals affirmed
by a divided vote. The court conceded the “appearance of impropriety” in petitioner’s case but reasoned that this appearance did
not require a new trial because it “provide[d] only a weak basis for supposing the original trial an unreliable test of the issues
presented for decision in it.”
Issue: Whether, on the basis of the showing made in this particular case, petitioner should have been granted discovery under
Habeas Corpus Rule 6(a) to support his judicial bias claim.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that petitioner has made a sufficient factual showing to establish “good cause,” as required by Habeas
Corpus Rule 6(a), for discovery on his claim of actual judicial bias in his case and they reversed the previous decisions.
The Supreme Court drew heavily on Bracy's contentions that his trial attorney, a former associate of Maloney's, had allegedly
been involved in corruption and that he might have agreed to take Bracy's case to trial quickly so that the conviction would deflect
any suspicion surrounding the rigged murder cases.
Before addressing whether petitioner is entitled to discovery, his claim's essential elements must be identified. Due process
requires a fair trial before a judge without actual bias against the defendant or an interest in the outcome of his particular case.
Petitioner claims that Maloney's acceptance of bribes from criminal defendants not only rendered him biased against the State in
those cases, but also induced a compensatory bias against defendants who did not bribe him, since he did not want to appear
"soft" on criminal defendants. There is no question that, if proved, such compensatory, camouflaging bias in petitioner's own case
would violate due process.
Petitioner has shown good cause for appropriate discovery to prove his claim. The usual presumption that public officials have
properly discharged their official duties has been soundly rebutted here. Maloney's public trial and conviction show that he was
thoroughly corrupt. A Government proffer in that case details his corruption as both a trial attorney and a judge. Additional evidence
supports the claim that Maloney was biased in petitioner's own case. His trial attorney was a former associate of Maloney's in a
law practice that was familiar and comfortable with corruption, who announced that he was ready for trial just a few weeks after
his appointment and requested no additional time before trial to prepare for the penalty phase of the case. Petitioner alleges that
Maloney appointed the attorney with the understanding that he would not object to, or interfere with, a prompt trial, so that
petitioner's case could camouflage bribe negotiations being conducted in another murder case. The Government's proffer confirms
that petitioner's murder trial was sandwiched tightly between other murder trials that Maloney fixed. Although petitioner may be
unable to obtain evidence sufficient to support a finding of actual judicial bias in his trial, he has made a sufficient showing to
establish "good cause" for discovery. Although, given the facts of this particular case, it would be an abuse of discretion not to
permit any discovery, Habeas Corpus Rule 6(a) provides that the scope and extent of discovery is a matter confided to the District
Court's discretion.
Right of Accused – Public Trial
27. RE: PETITION FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION COVERAGE OF THE MULTIPLE MURDER CASES AGAINST
MAGUINDANAO GOVERNOR ZALDY AMPATUAN, ET AL
In this day and age, it is about time to craft a win-win situation that shall not compromise rights in the criminal administration of
justice, sacrifice press freedom and allied rights, and interfere with the integrity, dignity and solemnity of judicial proceedings.
Compliance with regulations, not curtailment of a right, provides a workable solution to the concerns raised in these administrative
matters, while, at the same time, maintaining the same underlying principles upheld in the two previous cases (to be mentioned
in the discussion below mejo mahaba kasi guidelines hehe)
Facts:
On November 23, 2009, 57 people including 32 journalists and media practitioners were killed while on their way to
Shariff Aguak in Maguindanao. Touted as the worst election-related violence and the most brutal killing of journalists in recent
history, the tragic incident which came to be known as the Maguindanao Massacre spawned charges for 57 counts of murder and
an additional charge of rebellion against 197 accused.
Almost a year later or on November 19, 2010, the National Union of Journalists of the Philippines (NUJP), ABS-CBN
Broadcasting Corporation, GMA Network, Inc., relatives of the victims, [1] individual journalists[2] from various media entities, and
members of the academe[3] filed a petition before this Court praying that live television and radio coverage of the trial in these
criminal cases be allowed, recording devices (e.g., still cameras, tape recorders) be permitted inside the courtroom to assist the
working journalists, and reasonable guidelines be formulated to govern the broadcast coverage and the use of devices. President
Benigno S. Aquino III, by letter of November 22, 2010 [8] addressed to Chief Justice Renato Corona, came out in support of those
who have petitioned [this Court] to permit television and radio broadcast of the trial." The President expressed earnest hope that
[this Court] will, within the many considerations that enter into such a historic deliberation
Petitioners seek the lifting of the absolute ban on live television and radio coverage of court proceedings. They principally
urge the Court to revisit the 1991 ruling in Re: Live TV and Radio Coverage of the Hearing of President Corazon C. Aquinos Libel
Case[12] and the 2001 ruling in Re: Request Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Cases Against
the Former President Joseph E. Estrada[13] which rulings, they contend, violate the doctrine that proposed restrictions on
constitutional rights are to be narrowly construed and outright prohibition cannot stand when regulation is a viable alternative.
Hence, the present petitions which assert the exercise of the freedom of the press, right to information, right to a fair and public
trial, right to assembly and to petition the government for redress of grievances, right of free access to courts, and freedom of
association, subject to regulations to be issued by the Court.
Issue:
WON Broadcasting the trial of the Maguindanao Massacre Case is valid
Ruling:
SC partially ruled YES.
The Court partially GRANTS pro hac vice petitioners prayer for a live broadcast of the trial court proceedings,
subject to the guidelines
The rationale for an outright total prohibition was shrouded, as it is now, inside the comfortable cocoon of a
feared speculation which no scientific study in the Philippine setting confirms, and which fear, if any, may be dealt with
by safeguards and safety nets under existing rules and exacting regulations.
In this day and age, it is about time to craft a win-win situation that shall not compromise rights in the criminal
administration of justice, sacrifice press freedom and allied rights, and interfere with the integrity, dignity and solemnity of judicial
proceedings. Compliance with regulations, not curtailment of a right, provides a workable solution to the concerns raised in these
administrative matters, while, at the same time, maintaining the same underlying principles upheld in the two previous cases.
The basic principle upheld in Aquino is firm ─ [a] trial of any kind or in any court is a matter of serious importance to all
concerned and should not be treated as a means of entertainment, and [b] to so treat it deprives the court of the dignity which
pertains to it and departs from the orderly and serious quest for truth for which our judicial proceedings are formulated. The
observation that [m]assive intrusion of representatives of the news media into the trial itself can so alter and destroy the
constitutionally necessary atmosphere and decorum stands.
The Court had another unique opportunity in Estrada to revisit the question of live radio and television coverage of court
proceedings in a criminal case. It held that [t]he propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve[s] the weighing out of
the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public information, on the one hand, and the fundamental
rights of the accused, on the other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair
and impartial trial.
Respecting the possible influence of media coverage on the impartiality of trial court judges, petitioners correctly explain
that prejudicial publicity insofar as it undermines the right to a fair trial must pass the totality of circumstances test, applied in
People v. Teehankee, Jr. and Estrada v. Desierto, that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press, that
pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to a fair trial, and that there must be allegation and proof of
the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Mere fear of possible undue influence is not tantamount to actual
prejudice resulting in the deprivation of the right to a fair trial. Moreover, an aggrieved party has ample legal remedies. He may
challenge the validity of an adverse judgment arising from a proceeding that transgressed a constitutional right. As pointed out by
petitioners, an aggrieved party may early on move for a change of venue, for continuance until the prejudice from publicity is
abated, for disqualification of the judge, and for closure of portions of the trial when necessary. The trial court may likewise exercise
its power of contempt and issue gag orders. One apparent circumstance that sets the Maguindanao Massacre cases apart from
the earlier cases is the impossibility of accommodating even the parties to the cases the private complainants/families of the
victims and other witnesses inside the courtroom.
In so allowing pro hac vice the live broadcasting by radio and television of the Maguindanao Massacre cases,
the Court lays down the following guidelines toward addressing the concerns mentioned in Aquino and Estrada:
(a) An audio-visual recording of the Maguindanao massacre cases may be made both for documentary purposes and for
transmittal to live radio and television broadcasting.
(b) Media entities must file with the trial court a letter of application, manifesting that they intend to broadcast the audio-
visual recording of the proceedings and that they have the necessary technological equipment and technical plan to carry out the
same, with an undertaking that they will faithfully comply with the guidelines and regulations and cover the entire remaining
proceedings until promulgation of judgment.
No selective or partial coverage shall be allowed. No media entity shall be allowed to broadcast the proceedings without
an application duly approved by the trial court.
(c) A single fixed compact camera shall be installed inconspicuously inside the courtroom to provide a single wide-angle
full-view of the sala of the trial court. No panning and zooming shall be allowed to avoid unduly highlighting or downplaying
incidents in the proceedings. The camera and the necessary equipment shall be operated and controlled only by a duly designated
official or employee of the Supreme Court. The camera equipment should not produce or beam any distracting sound or light rays.
Signal lights or signs showing the equipment is operating should not be visible. A limited number of microphones and the least
installation of wiring, if not wireless technology, must be unobtrusively located in places indicated by the trial court. The Public
Information Office and the Office of the Court Administrator shall coordinate and assist the trial court on the physical set-up of the
camera and equipment.
(d) The transmittal of the audio-visual recording from inside the courtroom to the media entities shall be conducted in
such a way that the least physical disturbance shall be ensured in keeping with the dignity and solemnity of the proceedings and
the exclusivity of the access to the media entities. The hardware for establishing an interconnection or link with the camera
equipment monitoring the proceedings shall be for the account of the media entities, which should employ technology that can (i)
avoid the cumbersome snaking cables inside the courtroom, (ii) minimize the unnecessary ingress or egress of technicians, and
(iii) preclude undue commotion in case of technical glitches. f the premises outside the courtroom lack space for the set-up of the
media entities facilities, the media entities shall access the audio-visual recording either via wireless technology accessible even
from outside the court premises or from one common web broadcasting platform from which streaming can be accessed or derived
to feed the images and sounds. At all times, exclusive access by the media entities to the real-time audio-visual recording should
be protected or encrypted.
(e) The broadcasting of the proceedings for a particular day must be continuous and in its entirety, excepting such
portions thereof where Sec. 21 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court[27] applies, and where the trial court excludes, upon motion,
prospective witnesses from the courtroom, in instances where, inter alia, there are unresolved identification issues or there are
issues which involve the security of the witnesses and the integrity of their testimony (e.g., the dovetailing of corroborative
testimonies is material, minority of the witness). The trial court may, with the consent of the parties, order only the pixelization of
the image of the witness or mute the audio output, or both.
(f) To provide a faithful and complete broadcast of the proceedings, no commercial break or any other gap shall be
allowed until the days proceedings are adjourned, except during the period of recess called by the trial court and during portions
of the proceedings wherein the public is ordered excluded.
(g) To avoid overriding or superimposing the audio output from the on-going proceedings, the proceedings shall be
broadcast without any voice-overs, except brief annotations of scenes depicted therein as may be necessary to explain them at
the start or at the end of the scene. Any commentary shall observe the sub judice rule and be subject to the contempt power of
the court;
(h) No repeat airing of the audio-visual recording shall be allowed until after the finality of judgment, except brief footages
and still images derived from or cartographic sketches of scenes based on the recording, only for news purposes, which shall
likewise observe the sub judice rule and be subject to the contempt power of the court;
(i) The original audio-recording shall be deposited in the National Museum and the Records Management and Archives
Office for preservation and exhibition in accordance with law.
(j) The audio-visual recording of the proceedings shall be made under the supervision and control of the trial court which
may issue supplementary directives, as the exigency requires, including the suspension or revocation of the grant of application
by the media entities.
(k) The Court shall create a special committee which shall forthwith study, design and recommend appropriate
arrangements, implementing regulations, and administrative matters referred to it by the Court concerning the live broadcast of
the proceedings pro hac vice, in accordance with the above-outlined guidelines. The Special Committee shall also report and
recommend on the feasibility, availability and affordability of the latest technology that would meet the herein requirements. It may
conduct consultations with resource persons and experts in the field of information and communication technology.
(l) All other present directives in the conduct of the proceedings of the trial court (i.e., prohibition on recording devices
such as still cameras, tape recorders; and allowable number of media practitioners inside the courtroom) shall be observed in
addition to these guidelines. Indeed, the Court cannot gloss over what advances technology has to offer in distilling the abstract
discussion of key constitutional precepts into the workable context. Technology per se has always been neutral. It is the use and
regulation thereof that need fine-tuning. Law and technology can work to the advantage and furtherance of the various rights
herein involved, within the contours of defined guidelines.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisition, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS PRO HAC VICE the request for live
broadcast by television and radio of the trial court proceedings of the Maguindanao Massacre cases, subject to the guidelines
herein outlined.
28. Crawford v. Washington (2004)
Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause provides that a defendant has the right to confront witnesses who testify against him
with a reasonable opportunity to cross examine.
Former testimony of a witness not present at trial are admissible when the declarant is unavailable and the defendant has had a
previous opportunity to cross-examine the witness.
Outline:
 Mr. Crawford was charged with attempted murder of a man who allegedly attempted to rape his wife.
 Crawford’s wife made statements to the responding officers, regarding the incident.
 At trial, the prosecution tried to use the statements against Crawford, since his wife was unavailable to testify after asserting
Washington’s marital privilege. Crawford argued the statement was inadmissible under the Sixth Amendment’s
Confrontation Clause.
 The Court held that under the Confrontation Clause, a defendant has the right to confront witnesses who testify against him
with a reasonable opportunity to cross examine and here that opportunity did not exist.
FACTS:
Petitioner was tried for assault and attempted murder. The State sought to introduce a recorded statement that petitioner’s
wife Sylvia had made during police interrogation, as evidence that the stabbing was not in self-defense. Sylvia did not testify at
trial because of Washington’s marital privilege. Petitioner argued that admitting the evidence would violate his Sixth Amendment
right to be “confronted with the witnesses against him.”
Under Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U. S. 56, that right does not bar admission of an unavailable witness’s statement against a
criminal defendant if the statement bears “adequate ‘indicia of reliability,’ ” a test met when the evidence either falls within a “firmly
rooted hearsay exception” or bears “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” The trial court admitted the statement on the
latter ground. The State Supreme Court upheld the conviction, deeming the statement reliable because it was nearly identical
to, i.e., interlocked with, petitioner’s own statement to the police, in that both were ambiguous as to whether the victim had drawn
a weapon before petitioner assaulted him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the State’s use of Sylvia’s statement violated the Confrontation Clause.
RULING:
YES. The State’s use of Sylvia’s statement violated the Confrontation Clause because, where testimonial statements are
at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is confrontation.
(a) After examine the history behind the Confrontation Clause, the Supreme Court arrived at two conclusions about it.
First, the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and
particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused. Based on this, the Court rejected “the view that the
Confrontation Clause applies of its own force only to in-court testimony, and that its application to out-of-court statements
introduced at trial depends upon “the law of Evidence for the time being.
Second, “that the Framers would not have allowed admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear
at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.
It concluded that in this case, the State admitted Sylvia’s testimonial statement against petitioner, despite the fact that he
had no opportunity to cross-examine her. That alone is sufficient to make out a violation of the Sixth Amendment. In so doing, it
overruled Ohio v. Roberts, which “conditioned the admissibility of all hearsay evidence on whether it falls under a firmly rooted
hearsay exception’ or bears ”particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."
(b) This Court’s decisions have generally remained faithful to the Confrontation Clause’s original meaning.
(c) However, the same cannot be said of the rationales of this Court’s more recent decisions. The Roberts test departs from
historical principles because it admits statements consisting of ex parte testimony upon a mere reliability finding.
(d) The Confrontation Clause commands that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of
cross-examination. Roberts allows a jury to hear evidence, untested by the adversary process, based on a mere judicial
determination of reliability, thus replacing the constitutionally prescribed method of assessing reliability with a wholly foreign one.
(e) Roberts’ framework is unpredictable. Whether a statement is deemed reliable depends on which factors a judge
considers and how much weight he accords each of them. However, the unpardonable vice of theRoberts test is its demonstrated
capacity to admit core testimonial statements that the Confrontation Clause plainly meant to exclude.
(f) The instant case is a self-contained demonstration of Roberts’ unpredictable and inconsistent application.
It also reveals Roberts’ failure to interpret the Constitution in a way that secures its intended constraint on judicial discretion. The
Constitution prescribes the procedure for determining the reliability of testimony in criminal trials, and this Court, no less than the
state courts, lacks authority to replace it with one of its own devising
29.
RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION
30. Go v. People
677 SCRA 213 (2012)
The procedure for taking depositions in criminal cases recognizes the prosecution's right to preserve testimonial evidence
and prove its case despite the unavailability of its witness. It cannot, however, give license to prosecutorial indifference or
unseemly involvement in a prosecution witness' absence from trial. To rule otherwise would effectively deprive the
accused of his fundamental right to be confronted with the witnesses against him.
Facts:
Petitioners Harry Go, Tonny Ngo, Jerry Ngo and Jane Go were charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Manila for Other Deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The prosecution's complaining witness, Li Luen Ping, a frail old businessman from Laos, Cambodia, traveled from his
home country back to the Philippines in order to attend the hearing held on September 9, 2004. However, trial dates were
subsequently postponed due to his unavailability.
On October 13, 2005, the private prosecutor filed with the MeTC a Motion to Take Oral Deposition of Li Luen Ping,
alleging that he was being treated for lung infection at the Cambodia Charity Hospital in Laos, Cambodia and that, upon doctor's
advice, he could not make the long travel to the Philippines by reason of ill health. Notwithstanding petitioners' Opposition, the
MeTC granted the motion after the prosecution complied with the directive to submit a Medical Certificate of Li Luen Ping.
Petitioners sought its reconsideration which the MeTC denied, prompting petitioners to file a Petition for Certiorari before the RTC.
On September 12, 2006, the RTC granted the petition and declared the MeTC Orders null and void. The RTC held that
Section 17, Rule 23 on the taking of depositions of witnesses in civil cases cannot apply suppletorily to the case since there is a
specific provision in the Rules of Court with respect to the taking of depositions of prosecution witnesses in criminal cases, which
is primarily intended to safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused to meet the witness against him face to face.
On February 19, 2008, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision which held that no grave abuse of discretion can be
imputed upon the MeTC for allowing the deposition-taking of the complaining witness Li Luen Ping because no rule of procedure
expressly disallows the taking of depositions in criminal cases and that, in any case, petitioners would still have every opportunity
to cross-examine the complaining witness and make timely objections during the taking of the oral deposition either through
counsel or through the consular officer who would be taking the deposition of the witness. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration to CA but was denied hence this review on certiorari.
Issue:
1. Whether or not CA erred in not finding that the MeTC infringed the constitutional right of the petitioners to a public trial in allowing
the taking of the deposition of the complaining witness in Laos, Cambodia.
2. Whether or not CA erred in not finding that the deposition taking of the complaining witness in Laos, Cambodia is an infringement
of the constitutional right of the petitioners to confront the said witness face to face.
Ruling:
1. The Supreme Court held that YES, the examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge in open court.
This is true especially in criminal cases where the Constitution secures to the accused his right to a public trial and to meet the
witnesses against him face to face. The requirement is the "safest and most satisfactory method of investigating facts" as it enables
the judge to test the witness' credibility through his manner and deportment while testifying. It is not without exceptions, however,
as the Rules of Court recognizes the conditional examination of witnesses and the use of their depositions as testimonial evidence
in lieu of direct court testimony. Even in criminal proceedings, there is no doubt as to the availability of conditional examination of
witnesses – both for the benefit of the defense, as well as the prosecution. The Court's ruling in the case of Vda. de Manguerra v.
Risos explicitly states that –
"x x x As exceptions, Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court provide for the different modes of discovery that may be resorted
to by a party to an action. These rules are adopted either to perpetuate the testimonies of witnesses or as modes of
discovery. In criminal proceedings, Sections 12, 13 and 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
took effect on December 1, 2000, allow the conditional examination of both the defense and prosecution witnesses."
The procedure under Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court allows the taking of depositions in civil cases, either upon oral
examination or written interrogatories, before any judge, notary public or person authorized to administer oaths at any time or
place within the Philippines; or before any Philippine consular official, commissioned officer or person authorized to administer
oaths in a foreign state or country, with no additional requirement except reasonable notice in writing to the other party.
But for purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution witness who would
foreseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial examination should be made before the court, or at least before the judge,
where the case is pending as required by the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure:
SEC. 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. – When it satisfactorily appears that a witness for the prosecution
is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of
returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending. Such examination, in
the presence of the accused, or in his absence after reasonable notice to attend the examination has been served on
him shall be conducted in the same manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the
examination after notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the
accused.
Since the conditional examination of a prosecution witness must take place at no other place than the court where the
case is pending, the RTC properly nullified the MeTC's orders granting the motion to take the deposition of Li Luen Ping before
the Philippine consular official in Laos, Cambodia. The condition of the private complainant being sick and of advanced age falls
within the provision of Section 15 Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. However, said rule substantially provides that he should be
conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending. Thus, this Court concludes that the language of Section 15
Rule 119 must be interpreted to require the parties to present testimony at the hearing through live witnesses, whose demeanor
and credibility can be evaluated by the judge presiding at the hearing, rather than by means of deposition. Nowhere in the said
rule permits the taking of deposition outside the Philippines whether the deponent is sick or not.
Certainly, to take the deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and not before the very same court where the case
is pending would not only deprive a detained accused of his right to attend the proceedings but also deprive the trial judge of the
opportunity to observe the prosecution witness' deportment and properly assess his credibility, which is especially intolerable when
the witness' testimony is crucial to the prosecution's case against the accused.
Thus, the giving of testimony during trial is the general rule. The conditional examination of a witness outside of the trial
is only an exception, and as such, calls for a strict construction of the rules. This is designed mainly for the protection of the
accused’s constitutional rights.
2. The Supreme Court held that YES, CA took a simplistic view on the use of depositions in criminal cases and overlooked
fundamental considerations no less than the Constitution secures to the accused, i.e., the right to a public trial and the right to
confrontation of witnesses. Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution provides as follows:
Section 14. (1) x x x
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the
right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have
a speedy, impartial and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable.
There is a great deal of difference between the face-to-face confrontation in a public criminal trial in the presence of the
presiding judge and the cross-examination of a witness in a foreign place outside the courtroom in the absence of a trial judge.
The main and essential purpose of requiring a witness to appear and testify orally at a trial is to secure for the adverse
party the opportunity of cross-examination. "The opponent", according to an eminent authority, "demands confrontation, not for
the idle purpose of gazing upon the witness, or of being gazed upon by him, but for the purpose of cross examination which cannot
be had except by the direct and personal putting of questions and obtaining immediate answers." There is also the advantage of
the witness before the judge, and it is this – it enables the judge as trier of facts "to obtain the elusive and incommunicable evidence
of a witness' deportment while testifying, and a certain subjective moral effect is produced upon the witness. It is only when the
witness testifies orally that the judge may have a true idea of his countenance, manner and expression, which may confirm or
detract from the weight of his testimony. Certainly, the physical condition of the witness will reveal his capacity for accurate
observation and memory, and his deportment and physiognomy will reveal clues to his character. These can only be observed by
the judge if the witness testifies orally in court. x x x"
The right of confrontation, on the other hand, is held to apply specifically to criminal proceedings and to have a twofold
purpose: (1) to afford the accused an opportunity to test the testimony of witnesses by cross-examination, and (2) to allow the
judge to observe the deportment of witnesses. The Court explained in People v. Seneris that the constitutional requirement
"insures that the witness will give his testimony under oath, thus deterring lying by the threat of perjury charge; it forces the witness
to submit to cross-examination, a valuable instrument in exposing falsehood and bringing out the truth; and it enables the court to
observe the demeanor of the witness and assess his credibility."
As the right of confrontation is intended "to secure the accused in the right to be tried as far as facts provable by witnesses
as meet him face to face at the trial who give their testimony in his presence, and give to the accused an opportunity of cross-
examination," it is properly viewed as a guarantee against the use of unreliable testimony in criminal trials.
Admitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is fundamentally at odds with the right of confrontation. To be sure, the
Clause's ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It commands,
not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.
The Clause thus reflects a judgment, not only about the desirability of reliable evidence (a point on which there could be little
dissent), but about how reliability can best be determined."
In this case, where it is the prosecution that seeks to depose the complaining witness against the accused, the stringent
procedure under Section 15, Rule 119 cannot be ignored without violating the constitutional rights of the accused to due process.
Finally, the Court takes note that prosecution witness Li Luen Ping had managed to attend the initial trial proceedings
before the MeTC of Manila on September 9, 2004. At that time, Li Luen Ping's old age and fragile constitution should have been
unmistakably apparent and yet the prosecution failed to act with zeal and foresight in having his deposition or testimony taken
before the MeTC pursuant to Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court. In fact, it should have been imperative for the
prosecution to have moved for the preservation of Li Luen Ping's testimony at that first instance given the fact that the witness is
a non-resident alien who can leave the Philippines anytime without any definite date of return. Obviously, the prosecution allowed
its main witness to leave the court's jurisdiction without availing of the court procedure intended to preserve the testimony of such
witness. The loss of its cause is attributable to no other party.
Still, even after failing to secure Li Luen Ping's conditional examination before the MeTC prior to said witness becoming
sick and unavailable, the prosecution would capitalize upon its own failure by pleading for a liberal application of the rules on
depositions. It must be emphasized that while the prosecution must provide the accused every opportunity to take the deposition
of witnesses that are material to his defense in order to avoid charges of violating the right of the accused to compulsory process,
the State itself must resort to deposition-taking sparingly if it is to guard against accusations of violating the right of the accused
to meet the witnesses against him face to face. Great care must be observed in the taking and use of depositions of prosecution
witnesses to the end that no conviction of an accused will rely on ex parte affidavits and deposition.
Thus, the CA ignored the procedure under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure for taking the deposition of an
unavailable prosecution witness when it upheld the trial court's order allowing the deposition of prosecution witness Li Luen Ping
to take place in a venue other than the court where the case is pending. This was certainly grave abuse of discretion.
31. UNITED STATES v. SCHEFFER

COMPULSARY PROCESS: In the absence of sounder discretion methods, the Court noted that the fundamental premise of the
criminal justice system is that juries are the ultimate and most reliable evaluators of credibility and truthfulness.
FACTS:
A polygraph examination of respondent airman indicated, in the opinion of the Air Force examiner administering the test, that there
was "no deception" in respondent's denial that he had used drugs since enlisting. Urinalysis, however, revealed the presence of
methamphetamine, and respondent was tried by general court-martial for using that drug and for other offenses. In denying his
motion to introduce the polygraph evidence to support his testimony that he did not knowingly use drugs, the military
judge relied on Military Rule of Evidence 707, which makes polygraph evidence inadmissible in court-martial
proceedings. Respondent was convicted on all counts, and the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. The Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces reversed, holding that a per se exclusion of polygraph evidence offered by an accused to support
his credibility violates his Sixth Amendment right to present a defense.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Military Evidence Rule of 707, excluding the admission of polygraph results into evidence, violate a defendant’s
Sixth Amendment right to present a fair defense.
RULING:
The judgment is reversed. 44 M. J. 442, reversed.
JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II-A, and II-D, concluding that Military Rule of
Evidence 707 does not unconstitutionally abridge the right of accused members of the military to present a defense.
(a) A defendant's right to present relevant evidence is subject to reasonable restrictions to accommodate other legitimate interests
in the criminal trial process. See, e. g., Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U. S. 44, 55. State and federal rulemakers therefore have broad
latitude under the Constitution to establish rules excluding evidence. Such rules do not abridge an accused's right to present a
defense so long as they are not "arbitrary" or "disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve." E. g., id., at 56. This
Court has found the exclusion of evidence to be unconstitutionally arbitrary or disproportionate only where it has
infringed upon a weighty interest of the accused. Rule 707 serves the legitimate interest of ensuring that only reliable
evidence is introduced. There is simply no consensus that polygraph evidence is reliable: The scientific community and the state
and federal courts are extremely polarized on the matter.
The three cases principally relied upon by the Court of Appeals, Rock, supra, at 57, Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14, 23,
and Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U. S. 284, 302-303, do not support a right to introduce polygraph evidence, even in very narrow
circumstances. The exclusions of evidence there declared unconstitutional significantly undermined fundamental elements of the
accused's defense. Such is not the case here, where the court members heard all the relevant details of the charged offense
from respondent's perspective, and Rule 707 did not preclude him from introducing any factual evidence, but merely
barred him from introducing expert opinion testimony to bolster his own credibility. Moreover, in contrast to the rule at
issue in Rock, supra, at 52, Rule 707 did not prohibit respondent from testifying on his own behalf; he freely exercised
his choice to convey his version of the facts at trial.
32. JAYLO V SANDIGANBAYAN

Facts:
In a Decision dated 17 April 2007, the Sandiganbayan found Jaylo, Castro, Valenzona, and Habalo guilty of homicide. During the
promulgation of the Sandiganbayan’s judgment on 17 April 2007, none of the accused appeared despite notice. The court
promulgated the Decision in absentia, and the judgment was entered in the criminal docket. The bail bonds of the accused were
cancelled, and warrants for their arrest issued.
Issues:
1. WON Section 6 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court cannot diminish, increase or modify substantive rights like the filing of
a motion for reconsideration provided under Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 1606.
2. WON The conditions under Section 6 Rule 120 of the Rules of Court do not obtain in the instant case.
Ruling:
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he shall lose the
remedies available in these rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from
promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these
remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence
was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice.
The promulgation of judgment shall proceed even in the absence of the accused despite notice. The promulgation in absentia shall
be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving a copy thereof to the accused at their last known address
or through counsel. The court shall also order the arrest of the accused if the judgment is for conviction and the failure to appear
was without justifiable cause.
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure to appear was without justifiable cause, the accused shall lose the remedies
available in the Rules of Court against the judgment. Thus, it is incumbent upon the accused to appear on the scheduled date of
promulgation, because it determines the availability of their possible remedies against the judgment of conviction. When the
accused fail to present themselves at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction, they lose the remedies of filing a motion for
a new trial or reconsideration (Rule 121) and an appeal from the judgment of conviction (Rule 122).When the accused on bail fail
to present themselves at the promulgation of a judgment of conviction, they are considered to have lost their standing in
court.47 Without any standing in court, the accused cannot invoke its jurisdiction to seek relief.Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of
Court, does not take away per se the right of the convicted accused to avail of the remedies under the Rules. It is the failure of the
accused to appear without justifiable cause on the scheduled date of promulgation of the judgment of conviction that forfeits their
right to avail themselves of the remedies against the judgment.
It is not correct to say that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court diminishes or modifies the substantive rights of petitioners.
It only works in pursuance of the power of the Supreme Court to “provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases.” This provision protects the courts from delay in the speedy disposition of criminal cases – delay arising from
the simple expediency of nonappearance of the accused on the scheduled promulgation of the judgment of conviction. For the
failure of petitioners to regain their standing in court and avail themselves of the remedies against the judgment of conviction, the
Decision of the Sandiganbayan attained finality 15 days reckoned from 17 April 2007.
In view thereof, this Court no longer has the power to conduct a review of the findings and conclusions in the Decision of the
Sandiganbayan. The Decision is no longer subject to change, revision, amendment, or reversal. 63 Thus, there is no need to pass
upon the issues raised by petitioners assailing it.

People V. Estrada

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 Digest – XV Right of Accused

2. ISIDRO T. HILDAWA vs. ENRILE

3. Francisco Guerrero, petitioner v. Military Commission No. 34, respondent

5. ANAMER SALAZAR vs . THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

06. People vs. Valdez

On the substantive issue:

Rights of Accused - Bail

9. Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region vs Olalia, Jr.

10. People v. Frago

11. PEOPLE V. GODOY

12. Re: Conviction of Judge Adoracion G. Angeles

13. UNITED STATES, PETITIONER V. ASH, RESPONDENT

14. ROCK VS ARKANSAS

15. People v. Liwanag

16. PEOPLE VS. TULIN

Rights of Accused – Right to be Informed

17. PECHO v. PEOPLE

18. Andaya v. People

21. CONDE V. RIVERA

23. Francisco Guerrero, petitioner v. Court of Appeals, respondent

24. People vs Lacson

Judge Pasamba, in an Order dated June 5, 2001, denied the petition.

25. WEBB vs. PEOPLE

26. Bracy vs. Gramley

Right of Accused – Public Trial

28. Crawford v. Washington (2004)

31. UNITED STATES v. SCHEFFER

32. JAYLO V SANDIGANBAYAN

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