XVIII.

Right to Self-Incrimination

A. General Considerations

1. Villaflor vs. Summers

The object of having criminal laws is to purge the community of persons who violate the laws to the great prejudice of their fellow men.
Criminal procedure, the rules of evidence, and constitutional provisions are then provided, not to protect the guilty but to protect the
innocent. No rule is intended to be so rigid as to embarrass the administration of justice in its endeavor to ascertain the truth.
The constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a
prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. And on a proper showing and under an order of the trial court, an ocular
inspection of the body of the accused is permissible.

Facts:
Petitioner Villaflor and Florentino Souingco was charged with the crime of adultery. The trial court, upon motion of the assistant
fiscal, ordered her to submit to physical examination to determine if she was pregnant or not. Villaflor refused to obey the order on the
ground that such examination of her person was a violation of the constitutional provision relating to self-incrimination. Thereupon she
was found in contempt of court and was ordered to be committed to Bilibid Prison until she should permit the medical examination required
by the court. Counsel for petitioner argues that such bodily exhibition is an infringement of the constitutional provision; the representative
of the city fiscal contends that it is not an infringement of the constitutional provision. The trial judge in the instant case has held with the
fiscal; while it is brought to our notice that a judge of the same court has held on an identical question as contended for by the attorney
for the accused and petitioner.

Issue:
Whether the compelling of a woman to permit her body to be examined by physicians to determine if she is pregnant, violates
that portion of the Philippine Bill of Rights and that portion of our Code of Criminal Procedure providing that no person shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled No.
The authorities are abundant but conflicting. What may be termed the conservative courts emphasize greatly the
humanitarianism of the constitutional provision and are pleased to extend the privilege in order that its mantle may cover any fact by
which the accused is compelled to make evidence against himself. A case concordant with this view and almost directly in point is People
vs. McCoy. A woman was charged with the crime of infanticide. The coroner directed two physicians to go to the jail and examine her
private parts to determine whether she had recently been delivered of a child. She objected to the examination, but being th reatened
with force, yielded, and the examination was had. The evidence of these physicians was offered at the trial and ruled out. The court said
that the proceeding was in violation of the spirit and meaning of the Constitution, which declares that "no person shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself." Continuing, the court said:
"They might as well have sworn the prisoner, and compelled her, by threats, to testify that she had been pregnant, and had been
delivered of a child, as to have compelled her, by threats, to allow them to look into her person, with the aid of a speculum, to ascertain
whether she had been pregnant and been delivered of a child. Has this court the right to compel the prisoner now to submit to an
examination of her private parts and breasts, by physicians, and then have them testify that from such examination they are of the opinion
she is not a virgin, and has had a child? It is not possible that this court has that right; and it is too clear to admit of argument that evidence
thus obtained would be inadmissible against the prisoner."
It may be revealing a judicial secret but nevertheless we cannot refrain from saying that, greatly impressed with the weight of
these decisions, especially the one written by Mr. Justice McClain, in State vs. Height, , the instant case was reported by the writer with
the tentative recommendation that the court should lay down the general rule that a defendant can be compelled to disclose only those
parts of the body which are not usually covered. But having disabused our minds of a too sensitive appreciation of the rights of accused
persons, and having been able, as we think, to penetrate through the maze of law reports to the policy which lies behind the constitutional
guaranty and the common law principle, we have come finally to take our stand with what we believe to be the reason of the case.
In contradistinction to the cases above-mentioned are others which seem to us more progressive in nature. Among these can
be prominently mentioned decisions of the "United States Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court of these Islands. Thus, the always
forward looking jurist, Mr. Justice Holmes, in the late case of Holt vs. United States, in resolving an objection based upon what he termed
"an extravagant extension of the Fifth Amendment," said: "The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against
himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as
evidence when it may be material." The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, in two decisions, has seemed to limit the protection to
a prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The constitutional limitation was said to be "simply a prohibition
against legal process to extract from the defendant's own lips, against his will, an admission of his guilt."
Although we have stated a proposition previously announced by this court and by the highest tribunal in the United States, we
cannot unconcernedly leave the subject without further consideration. Even in the opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes, to which we have
alluded, there was inserted the careful proviso that "we need not consider how far a court would go in compelling a man to exhibit himself."
Other courts have likewise avoided any attempt to determine the exact location of the dividing line between what is proper and what is
improper in this very broad constitutional field. But here before us is presented what would seem to be the most extreme case which
could be imagined. While the United States Supreme Court could nonchalantly decree that testimony that an accused person put on a
blouse and it fitted him is not a violation of the constitutional provision, while the Supreme Court of Nevada could go so far as to require
the defendant to roll up his sleeve in order to disclose tattoo marks, and while the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands could permit
substances taken from the person of an accused to be offered in evidence, none of these even approach in apparent harshness an order
to make a woman, possibly innocent, to disclose her body in all of its sanctity to the gaze of strangers. We can only consistently consent
to the retention of a principle which would permit of such a result by adhering steadfastly to the proposition that the purpose of the
constitutional provision was and is merely to prohibit testimonial compulsion.
The maxim of the common law, Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare, was recognized in England in early days, but not in the other
legal systems of the world, in a revolt against the thumbscrew and the rack. A legal shield was raised against odious inquisitorial methods
of interrogating an accused person by which to extort unwilling confessions with the ever present temptation to commit the crime of
perjury. The kernel of the privilege as disclosed by the text writers was testimonial compulsion. As forcing a man to be a witness against
himself was deemed contrary to the fundamentals of republican government, the principle was taken into the American Constitutions,
and from the United States was brought to the Philippine Islands, in exactly as wide-but no wider-a scope as it existed in old English
days. The provision should here be approached in no blindly worshipful spirit, but with a judicious and a judicial appreciation of both its
benefits and its abuses.
Perhaps the best way to test the correctness of our position is to go back once more to elementals and ponder on what is the
prime purpose of a criminal trial. As we view it, the object of having criminal laws is to purge the community of persons who violate the
laws to the great prejudice of their fellow men. Criminal procedure, the rules of evidence, and constitutional provisions, are then provided
not to protect the guilty but to protect the innocent. No rule is intended to be so rigid as to embarrass the administration of justice in its
endeavor to ascertain the truth. No accused person should be afraid of the use of any method which will tend to establish the
truth. For instance, under the facts before us, to use torture to make the defendant admit her guilt might only result in inducing her to tell
a falsehood. But no evidence of physical facts can for any substantial reason be held to be detrimental to the accused except in so far
as the truth is to be avoided in order to acquit a guilty person.
Obviously a stirring plea can be made showing that under the due process of law clause of the Constitution every person has
a natural and inherent right to the possession and control of his own body. It is extremely abhorrent to one's sense of dece ncy and
propriety to have to decide that such inviolability of the person, particularly of a woman, can be invaded by exposure to another's gaze.
As Mr. Justice Gray in Union Pacific Railway Co. vs. Botsford said, "To compel any one, and especially a woman, to lay bare the body,
or to submit to the touch of a stranger, without lawful authority, is an indignity, an assault, and a trespass." Conceded, and yet, as well
suggested by the same court, even superior to the complete immunity of a person to be let alone is the interest which the public has in
the orderly administration of justice. Unfortunately, all too frequently the modesty of witnesses is shocked by forcing them to answer,
without any mental evasion, questions which are put to them; and such a tendency to degrade the witness in public estimation does not
exempt him from the duty of disclosure. Between a sacrifice of the ascertainment of truth to personal considerations, between a disregard
of the public welfare for refined notions of delicacy, law and justice cannot hesitate.
The protection of accused persons has been carried to such an unwarranted extent that criminal trials have sometimes seemed
to be like a game of shuttlecocks, with the judge as referee, the lawyers as players, the criminal as guest of honor, and the public as
fascinated spectators. Against such a loose extension of constitutional guaranties we are here prepared to voice our protest.
Fully conscious that we are resolving a most extreme case in a sense, which on first impression is a shock to one's sensibilities,
we must nevertheless enforce the constitutional provision in this jurisdiction in accord with the policy and reason thereof, undeterred by
merely sentimental influences. Once again we lay down the rule that the constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination.
The corollary to the proposition is that, on a proper showing and under an order of the trial court, an ocular inspection of the body of
the accused is permissible. The proviso is that torture or force shall be avoided. Whether facts fall within or without the rule with its
corollary and proviso must, of course, be decided as cases arise.
Although the order of the trial judge, acceding to the request of the assistant fiscal for an examination of the person of the
defendant by physicians was phrased in absolute terms, it should, nevertheless, be understood as subject to the limitations herein
mentioned, and therefore legal. The writ of habeas corpus prayed for is hereby denied.

2. Francisco Beltran v. Hon. Judge Felix Samson

September 23, 1929
FACTS:
The petitioner complains that Judge Samson ordered him to appear before the provincial fiscal to take dictation in his own
handwriting from the latter. The order was given upon petition of said fiscal for the purpose of comparing the petitioner's handwriting and
determining whether or not it is he who wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified. The respondents contend that the petitioner is
not entitled to the remedy applied for. The fiscal under section 1687 of the Administrative Code, and the proper judge, upon motion of the
fiscal, may compel witnesses to be present at the investigation of any crime of misdemeanor. But this power must be exercised without
prejudice to the constitutional rights of persons cited to appear. The petitioner, in refusing to perform what the fiscal demanded, seeks
refuge in the constitutional provision contained in the Jones Law and incorporated in General Orders, No. 58 which reads: "Nor shall he
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." This text is not limited to declaracion but says "to be a witness."
Moreover, as we are concerned with a principle contained both in the Federal constitution and in the constitutions of several states of the
United States, but expressed differently, we should take it that these various phrasings have a common conception.
In the interpretation of the principle, nothing turns upon the variations of wording in the constitutional clauses; this much is
conceded (ante, par. 2252). It is therefore immaterial that the witness is protected by one constitution from 'testifying', or by
another from 'furnishing evidence', or by another from 'giving evidence,' or by still another from 'being a witness.' These various
phrasings have a common conception, in respect to the form of the protected disclosure. What is that conception? (4 Wigmore
on Evidence, p. 863, 1923 ed.)
As to its scope, this privilege is not limited precisely to testimony, but extends to all giving or furnishing of evidence. The rights
intended to be protected by the constitutional provision that no man accused of crime shall be compelled to be a witness against himself
is so sacred, and the pressure toward their relaxation so great when the suspicion of guilt is strong and the evidence obscure, that is the
duty of courts liberally to construe the prohibition in favor of personal rights, and to refuse to permit any steps tending toward their invasion.
Hence, there is the well-established doctrine that the constitutional inhibition is directed not merely to giving of oral testimony, but
embraces as well the furnishing of evidence by other means than by word of mouth, the divulging, in short, of any fact which the accused
has a right to hold secret.

ISSUE:
Whether the writing from the fiscal's dictation by the petitioner for the purpose of comparing the latter's handwriting and
determining whether he wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified, constitutes evidence against himself within the scope and
meaning of the constitutional provision under examination.

RULING:
YES, the writing from the fiscal's dictation by the petitioner for the purpose of comparing the latter's handwriting and determining
whether he wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified, constitutes a violation of petitioner’s right against self-incrimination.
Whenever the defendant, at the trial of his case, testifying in his own behalf, denies that a certain writing or signature is in his own hand,
he may on cross-examination be compelled to write in open court in order that the jury may be able to compare his handwriting with the
one in question.
It was so held in the case of Bradford vs. People (43 Pacific Reporter, 1013) inasmuch as the defendant, in offering himself as witness in
his own behalf, waived his personal privileges.
Of like character is the case of Sprouse vs. Com. (81 Va., 374,378), where the judge asked the defendant to write his name during the
hearing, and the latter did so voluntarily.
In this case, the witness is compelled to write and create, by means of the act of writing, evidence which does not exist, and which may
identify him as the falsifier. It cannot be contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a specimen of the petitioner’s handwriting
is not granted, the crime would go unpunished. Considering the circumstance that the petitioner is a municipal treasurer, it should not be
a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtain genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain a specimen
or specimens without resorting to the means complained, that is not reason for trampling upon
a personal right guaranteed by the constitution.
This constitutional privilege exists for the protection of innocent persons. In the case of People vs. Badilla (48 Phil., 718), it does not
appear that the defendants and other witnesses were questioned by the fiscal against their will, and if they did not refuse to answer, they
must be understood to have waived their constitutional privilege. “The privilege not to give self-incriminating
evidence, while absolute when claimed, may be waived by any one entitled to invoke it."
The writ of prohibition was GRANTED and it is ordered that the respondents and those under their orders desist and abstain absolutely
and forever from compelling the petitioner to take down dictation in his handwriting for the purpose of submitting the latter for comparison.

3. Agustin v. Court of Appeals

Facts:
Fe Angela (diagnosed with leukemia and has been undergoing chemotherapy) and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martin's
alleged biological father, Arnel L. Agustin, for support and support pendente lite before the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
The baby's birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses
but later refused Fe's repeated requests for Martin's support despite his adequate financial capacity and even suggested to have the child
committed for adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the child.
Arnel claimed that the signature and the community tax certificate (CTC) attributed to him in the acknowledgment of Martin's
birth certificate were falsified. The CTC erroneously reflected his marital status, as single when he was actually married.
Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing pursuant
to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court.
 Arnel opposed said motion by invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination.

Issue:
Whether DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a proceeding for support without violating petitioner's constitutional right to
privacy and right against self-incrimination. (Yes)

Held:
The court opened the possibility of admitting DNA as evidence of parentage, as enunciated in Tijing v. Court of Appeals:
A final note. Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and
scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and
parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis
Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is
based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from
the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course,
being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the
appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that
courts should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid ofsituations presented, since to reject
said result into deny progress.
The first real breakthrough of DNA as admissible and authoritative evidence in Philippine jurisprudence came in 2002 with the
Court’s en banc decision in People v. Vallejo where the rape and murder victim's DNA samples from the bloodstained clothes of the
accused were admitted in evidence. The court reasoned that "the purpose of DNA testing (was) to ascertain whether an association
exist(ed) between the evidence sample and the reference sample. The samples collected (were) subjected to various chemical processes
to establish their profile."
Moreover in the en banc decision in People v. Yatar, the court affirmed the conviction of the accused for rape with homicide, the
principal evidence for which included DNA test results.
Significantly, the Court upheld the constitutionality of compulsory DNA testing and the admissibility of the results thereof as
evidence. In that case, DNA samples from semen recovered from a rape victim's 'vagina were used to positively identify the accused Joel
"Kawit" Yatar as the rapist. Yatar claimed that the compulsory extraction of his blood sample for DNA testing, as well as the testing itself,
violated his right against self-incrimination, as embodied in both Sections 12 and 17 of Article III of the Constitution. We addressed this
as follows:
The contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion.
The right against self-incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an
admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as
part of object evidence.
Over the years, the Court have expressly excluded several kinds of object evidence taken from the person of the accused from
the realm of self-incrimination. These include photographs, hair, and other bodily substances. We have also declared as constitutional
several procedures performed on the accused such as pregnancy tests for women accused of adultery, expulsion of morphine from one's
mouth and the tracing of one's foot to determine its identity with bloody footprints. DNA testing and its results, per the Court’s ruling
in Yatar, are now similarly acceptable.
Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and seizures, and the
infringement of privacy of communication where the constitutional right to privacy has been critically at issue. Petitioner's case involves
neither and, as already stated, his argument that his right against self-incrimination is in jeopardy holds no water. His hollow
invocation of his constitutional rights elicits no sympathy here for the simple reason that they are not in any way being violated. If, in a
criminal case, an accused whose very life is at stake can be compelled to submit to DNA testing, we see no reason why, in this civil case,
petitioner herein who does not face such dire consequences cannot be ordered to do the same. CLAUSE

4. Chavez v. CA

24 SCRA 663 (1968)

Petitioner, as accused, occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness. Whereas an ordinary witness may be
compelled to take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each question requiring an incriminating answer is shot at him, and
accused may altogether refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to answer any and all questions. For, in reality, the purpose of
calling an accused as a witness for the People would be to incriminate him. The rule positively intends to avoid and prohibit the
certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person "to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction." This rule may
apply even to a co-defendant in a joint trial. And the guide in the interpretation of the constitutional precept that the accused shall not
be compelled to furnish evidence against himself "is not the probability of the evidence but it is the capability of abuse."
Facts:
An information against Chavez and eight others states that Chavez conspired, with intent of gain, abuse of confidence and without the
consent of the owner thereof, Dy Sun Hiok y Lim, in asporting the motor vehicle above-described. Chavez pleaded not guilty upon
arraignment.
Trial commenced, relevant dialogue is herein provided:
COURT: The parties may proceed.
FISCAL GRECIA: Our first witness is Roger Chavez [one of the accused].
ATTY. CARBON [Counsel for petitioner Chavez]: I am quite taken by surprise, as counsel for the accused Roger Chavez, with this move of the
Fiscal in presenting him as his witness. I object.
COURT: On what ground, counsel?
ATTY. CARBON: On the ground that I have to confer with my client. It is really surprising that at this stage, without my being notified by the
Fiscal, my client is being presented as witness for the prosecution. I want to say in passing that it is only at this very moment that I come
to know about this strategy of the prosecution.
COURT (To the Fiscal): You are not withdrawing the information against the accused Roger Chavez by making [him a] state witness?
FISCAL GRECIA: I am not making him as state witness, Your Honor. I am only presenting him as an ordinary witness.
ATTY. CARBON: As a matter of right, because it will incriminate my client, I object.
COURT: The Court will give counsel for Roger Chavez fifteen minutes within which to confer and explain to his client about the giving of his
testimony.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT: [after the recess] Are the parties ready?
FISCAL: We are ready to call on our first witness, Roger Chavez.
ATTY. CARBON: As per understanding, the proceeding was suspended in order to enable me to confer with my client.
I conferred with my client and he assured me that he will not testify for the prosecution this morning after I have explained to him the
consequences of what will transpire.
COURT: What he will testify to does not necessarily incriminate him, counsel. And there is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as
witness on the witness-stand including the accused.
 If there should be any question that is incriminating then that is the time for counsel
to interpose his objection and the court will sustain him if and when the court feels that the answer of this witness to the question would incriminate
him.
Counsel has all the assurance that the court will not require the witness to answer questions which would incriminate him. But surely, counsel
could not object to have the accused called on the witness stand.
ATTY. CARBON: I submit.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. CRUZ [Counsel for defendants Pascual and Meneses]:
MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT: This incident of the accused Roger Chavez being called to testify for the prosecution is something so sudden
that has come to the knowledge of this counsel.
This representation has been apprised of the witnesses embraced in the information.
For which reason I pray this court that I be given at least some days to meet whatever testimony this witness will bring about. I therefore move
for postponement of today's hearing.
COURT: The court will give counsel time within which to prepare his cross-examination of this witness.
ATTY. CRUZ: I labored under the impression that the witnesses for the prosecution in this criminal case are those only listed in the information.
I did not know until this morning that one of the accused will testify as witness for the prosecution.
COURT: That's the reason why the court will go along with counsels for the accused and will give them time within which to prepare for their
cross-examination of this witness.
The court will not defer the taking of the direct examination of the witness. Call the witness to the witness stand.
EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION: ROGER CHAVEZ, 31 years old, single, buy and sell merchant, presently detained at the Manila Police
Department headquarters, after being duly sworn according to law, declared as follows:
ATTY. IBASCO [Counsel for defendant Luis Asistio]:
WITH THE LEAVE OF THE COURT: This witness, Roger Chavez is one of the accused in this case No. Q-5311.
The information alleges
conspiracy. Under Rule 123, Section 12, it states: 'The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence,
may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.'
COURT: That is premature, counsel. Neither the court nor counsels for the accused know what the prosecution events to establish by calling
this witness to the witness stand.
ATTY. IBASCO: I submit.
COURT: The Fiscal may proceed.

The trial court gave evidence to Sumilang's averment, strengthened by Baltazar's and Cailles' corroborations, that he paid good money
for the car. Sumilang was thus cleared. So was Asistio whom the trial court believed to be a mere buyer of the car. And so, the
prosecution's theory of conspiracy was discounted.
As to the other accused, the court found no case against Pedro Rebullo alias "Pita" and Lorenzo Meneses alias "Lory". The accused
"Ging" Pascual was also acquitted for in the first place he was not identified by Johnson Lee in court.
As to Roger Chavez, however, the court had this to say: "Roger Chavez does not offer any defense. As a matter of fact, his testimony as
witness for the prosecution establishes his guilt beyond reasonable doubt." The trial court branded him "a self-confessed culprit". The
court further continued:
It is not improbable that true to the saying that misery loves company Roger Chavez tried to drag his co-accused down with him by
coloring his story with fabrications which he expected would easily stick together what with the newspaper notoriety of one and the
sensationalism caused by the other. But Roger Chavez' accusations of Asistio's participation is utterly uncorroborated. And coming, as it
does, from a man who has had at least two convictions for acts not very different from those charged in this information, the Court would
be too gullible if it were to give full credence to his words even if they concerned a man no less notorious than himself.
Court of First Instance of Rizal in Quezon City found Chavez guilty of qualified theft of a motor vehicle, one (1) Thunderbird car, Motor
No. H9YH-143003, with Plate No. H-16648 Pasay City '62 together with its accessories worth P22,200.00. All the other accused were
freed.
CA dismissed the appeal. Hence this case. Petitioner Chavez invokes that he is entitled, on habeas corpus, to be freed from imprisonment
upon the ground that in the trial which resulted in his conviction, he was denied his constitutional right not to be compelled to testify
against himself. He was presented as a witness for the prosecution. His counsel objected but subsequently submitted upon assurance of
the CFI that Chavez will not be compelled to answer incriminating questions.

Issue:
Whether or not Chavez’s constitutional right against self-incrimination was violated when he was presented as a witness for the
prosecution

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that YES, his constitutional right against self-incrimination was not merely a formal technical rule the
enforcement of which is left to the discretion of the court; it is mandatory, it secures to every defendant a valuable and substantive right.
Therefore, the court may not extract from a defendant's own lips and against his will an admission of his guilt. Nor may a court as much
as resort to compulsory disclosure, directly or indirectly, of facts usable against him as a confession of the crime or the tendency of which
is to prove the commission of a crime. Because, it is his right to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness
stand — with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free, genuine will.
Compulsion as it is understood here does not necessarily connote the use of violence; it may be the product of unintentional
statements. Pressure which operates to overbear his will, disable him from making a free and rational choice, or impair his capacity for
rational judgment would in our opinion be sufficient. So is moral coercion "tending to force testimony from the unwilling lips of the
defendant."
With the foregoing, let us consider the facts. Petitioner is a defendant in a criminal case. He was called by the prosecution as
the first witness in that case to testify for the People during the first day of trial thereof. Petitioner objected and invoked the privilege of
self-incrimination. This he broadened by the clear cut statement that he will not testify. But petitioner's protestations were met with the
judge's emphatic statement that it "is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on the witness stand including the
accused," and that defense counsel "could not object to have the accused called on the witness stand." The cumulative impact of all
these is that accused-petitioner had to take the stand. He was thus peremptorily asked to create evidence against himself. The foregoing
situation molds a solid case for petitioner, backed by the Constitution, the law, and jurisprudence.
Petitioner, as accused, occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness. Whereas an ordinary witness may be
compelled to take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each question requiring an incriminating answer is shot at him, and accused
may altogether refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to answer any and all questions. For, in reality, the purpose of calling an
accused as a witness for the People would be to incriminate him. The rule positively intends to avoid and prohibit the certainly inhuman
procedure of compelling a person "to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction." This rule may apply even to a co-
defendant in a joint trial. And the guide in the interpretation of the constitutional precept that the accused shall not be compelled to furnish
evidence against himself "is not the probability of the evidence but it is the capability of abuse."
The judge's words heretofore quoted — "But surely counsel could not object to have the accused called on the witness stand"
— wielded authority. By those words, petitioner was enveloped by a coercive force; they deprived him of his will to resist; they foreclosed
choice; the realities of human nature tell us that as he took his oath to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, no genuine
consent underlay submission to take the witness stand. Constitutionally sound consent was absent.
The decision convicting Roger Chavez was clearly of the view that the case for the People was built primarily around the
admissions of Chavez himself. The trial court described Chavez as the "star witness for the prosecution". Indeed, the damaging facts
forged in the decision were drawn directly from the lips of Chavez as a prosecution witness and of course Ricardo Sumilang for the
defense. There are the unequivocal statements in the decision that "even accused Chavez" identified "the very same Thunderbird that
Johnson Lee had offered for sale"; that Chavez "testimony as witness for the prosecution establishes his guilt beyond reasonable doubt
and that Chavez is "a self-confessed culprit".
It is then clearly apparent that petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate himself, in full breach of his constitutional right to
remain silent. It cannot be said now that he has waived his right. He did not volunteer to take the stand and in his own defense; he did
not offer himself as a witness; on the contrary, he claimed the right upon being called to testify. If petitioner nevertheless answered the
questions inspite of his fear of being accused of perjury or being put under contempt, this circumstance cannot be counted against him.
His testimony is not of his own choice. To him it was a case of compelled submission. He was a cowed participant in proceedings before
a judge who possessed the power to put him under contempt had he chosen to remain silent. Nor could he escape testifying. The court
made it abundantly clear that his testimony at least on direct examination would be taken right then and thereon the first day of the trial.
Finally, Court directed to discharge Chavez from custody, unless he is held, kept in custody or detained for any cause or reason.

6. Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners Case Digest

Facts:
Salvador Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton filed an administrative case against Arsenio Pascual Jr.
for alleged immorality. At the initial hearing thereof, Gatbonton’s counsel announced that he would present Pascual as his first witness.
Pascual objected, relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself. The Board of Examiners took note
of such a plea but scheduled Pascual to testify in the next hearing unless in the meantime he could secure a restraining order from a
competent authority. Pascual filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila an action for prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction
against the Board of Medical Examiners. The lower court ordered that a writ of preliminary injunction issue against the Board commanding
it to refrain from hearing or further proceeding with such an administrative case and to await the judicial disposition of the matter.
Subsequently, a decision was rendered by the lower court finding the claim of Pascual to be well-founded and prohibiting the Board "from
compelling the petitioner to act and testify as a witness for the complainant in said investigation without his consent and against himself."
Hence, the Board appealed.

Issue:
Whether a medical practitioner charged with malpractice in administrative case can avail of the constitutional guarantee not to
be a witness against himself.

Held:
Yes. The case for malpractice and cancellation of the license to practice medicine while administrative in character possesses
a criminal or penal aspect. An unfavorable decision would result in the revocation of the license of the respondent to practice medicine.
Consequently, he can refuse to take the witness stand.
The right against self-incrimination extends not only to right to refuse to answer questions put to the accused while on witness stand, but
also to forgo testimony, to remain silent and refuse to take the witness stand when called by as a witness by the prosecution. The reason
is that the right against self incrimination, along with the other rights granted to the accused, stands for a belief that while a crime should
not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objective should not be accomplished according to means and
methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded to the human personality.

B. Immunity Statutes
7. Galman vs. Pamaran
In the face of such grave constitutional infirmities, the individual testimonies of private respondents cannot be admitted against them in
any criminal proceeding. This is true regardless of absence of claim of constitutional privilege or of the presence of a grant of immunity
by law.
Facts:
On August 21, 1983, after a long sojourn abroad, former Senator Benigno Aquino Jr. was gunned down to death.
To determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing and to allow a free, unlimited and exhaustive investigation of
all aspects of the tragedy, P.D. 1886 was promulgated creating an Fact Finding Board which later became more popularly known as the
Agrava Board. Pursuant to the powers vested in it by P.D. 1886, the Board conducted public hearings wherein various witnesses appeared
and testified and/or produced documentary and other evidences either in obedience to a subpoena or in response to an invitation issued
by the Board. Among the witnesses who appeared, testified and produced evidence before the Board were the herein private respondents
General Fabian C. Ver, Major General Prospero Olivas, Sgt. Pablo Martinez, Sgt. Tomas Fernandez, Sgt. Leonardo Mojica, Sgt. Pepito
Torio, Sgt. Prospero Bona and AIC Aniceto Acupido.
Upon termination of the investigation, two (2) reports were submitted to His Excellency, President Ferdinand E. Marcos. One,
by its Chairman, the Hon. Justice Corazon Juliano Agrava; and another one, jointly authored by the other members of the Board namely:
Hon. Luciano Salazar, Hon. Amado Dizon, Hon. Dante Santos and Hon. Ernesto Herrera. The reports were thereafter referred and turned
over to the TANODBAYAN for appropriate action. After conducting the necessary preliminary investigation, the TANODBAYAN filed with
the SANDIGAN BAYAN two (2) Informations for MURDER one for the killing of Sen. Benigno C. Aquino which was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 10010 and another, Criminal Case No. 10011, for the killing of Rolando Galman, who was found dead on the airport tarmac not
far from the prostrate body of Sen. Aquino on that same fateful day. In both criminal cases, private respondents were charged as
accessories, along with several principals, and one accomplice.
Upon arraignment, all the accused, including the herein private respondents pleaded NOT GUILTY.
In the course of the joint trial of the two (2) aforementioned cases, the prosecution represented by the Office of the petitioner
TANODBAYAN, marked and thereafter offered as part of its evidence, the individual testimonies of private respondents before the Agrava
Board Private respondents, through their respective counsel objected to the admission of said exhibits. Private respondent Gen. Ver filed
a formal "Motion to Exclude Testimonies of Gen. Fabian C. Ver before the Fact-Finding Board as Evidence against him in the above-
entitled cases"[7] contending that its admission will be in derogation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination and violative of the
immunity granted by P.D. 1886. He prayed that his aforesaid testimony be rejected as evidence for the prosecution. Major Gen. Olivas
and the rest of the other private respondents likewise filed separate motions to exclude their respective individual testimonies invoking
the same ground. Petitioner TANODBAYAN opposed said motions contending that the immunity relied upon by the private respondents
in support of their motions to exclude their respective testimonies, was not available to them because of their failure to invoke their right
against self-incrimination before the Fact-Finding Board. Respondent SANDIGANBAYAN ordered the TANODBAYAN and the private
respondents to submit their respective memoranda on the issue, after which said motions will be considered submitted for resolution.

Issue:
Whether or not the testimonies given by the private respondents who did not invoke their rights against self-incrimination are
admissible as evidence.

Ruling:
No, they are not admissible as evidence.
The subject matter dealt with and the line of questioning as shown by the transcript of their testimonies before the Agrava Board,
indubitably evinced purposes other than merely eliciting and determining the so-called surrounding facts and circumstances of the
assassination. In the light of the examination reflected by the record, it is not far-fetched to conclude that they were called to the stand to
determine their probable involvement in the crime being investigated. Yet they have not been informed or at the very least even warned
while so testifying, even at that particular stage of their testimonies, of their right to remain silent and that any statement given by them
may be used against them. If the investigation was conducted, say by the PC, NBI or by other police agency, all the herein private
respondents could not have been compelled to give any statement whether incriminatory or exculpatory. Not only that. They are also
entitled to be admonished of their constitutional right to remain silent, to counsel, and be informed that any and all statements given by
them may be used against them. Did they lose their aforesaid constitutional rights simply because the investigation was by the Agrava
Board and not by any police investigator, officer or agency? True, they continued testifying. May that be construed as a waiver of their
rights to remain silent and not to be compelled to be a witness against themselves? The answer is yes, if they have the option to do
so. But in the light of the first portion of Section 5 of P.D. 1886 and the awesome contempt power of the Board to punish any refusal to
testify or produce evidence, the Court is not persuaded that when they testified, they voluntarily waived their constitutional rights not to
be compelled to be a witness against themselves much less their right to remain silent.
To buttress their precarious stand and breathe life into a seemingly hopeless cause, petitioners and amicus curiae (Ex-Senator
Ambrosio Padilla) assert that the "right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself" applies only in favor of an accused in a
criminal case. Hence, it may not be invoked by any of the herein private respondents before the Agrava Board. The Cabal vs. Kapunan
doctrine militates very heavily against this theory. Said case is not a criminal case as its title very clearIy indicates. It is not People vs.
Cabal nor a prosecution for a criminal offense. And yet, when Cabal refused to take the stand, to be sworn and to testify upon being
called as a witness for complainant Col. Maristela in a forfeiture of illegally acquired assets, this Court sustained Cabal's plea that for him
to be compelled to testify will be in violation of his right against self-incrimination. The Court did not therein state that since he is not an
accused and the case is not a criminal case, Cabal cannot refuse to take the witness stand and testify, and that he can invoke his right
against self-incrimination only when a question which tends to elicit an answer that will incriminate him is profounded to him.
Clearly then, it is not the character of the suit involved but the nature of the proceedings that controls. The privilege has
consistently been held to extend to all proceedings sanctioned by law and to all cases in which punishment is sought to be vi sited upon
a witness, whether a party or not. If in a mere forfeiture case where only property rights were involved, "the right not to be compelled to
be a witness against himself" is secured in favor of the defendant, then with more reason it cannot be denied to a person facing,
investigation before a Fact-Finding Board where his life and liberty, by reason of the statements to be given by him, hang on the
balance. Further enlightenment on the subject can be found in the historical background of this constitutional provision against self-
incrimination.

8. Mapa Jr. vs Sandiganbayan

Facts:
On January 20, 1987, petitioners Placido L. Mapa and Lorenzo Vergara, together with Gregorio Ma. Araneta III, Fernando Balatbat,
Ramon Aviado, Jr., Dominador Lopez, Jr., Fernando Maramag, Jr., and Jose Crisanto, Jr., were charged with violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act.
In the interim, the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos were charged in New York with violations of the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) by transporting to the United States and concealing the investment of money
through cronies and offshore organizations. To insure the conviction of the Marcoses, the prosecution solicited the testimonies of
witnesses. Among these witnesses were petitioners Vergara and Mapa. Petitioner Vergara was interviewed in 1987 by PCGG lawyers
Kendall and Severina Rivera and by United States Prosecutor Charles La Bella. Petitioner Mapa was interviewed on November 14, 1988
and August 11, 1989 also by Prosecutor La Bella at the behest of former Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordonez and former PCGG
Chairman Mateo Caparas. After their interviews, petitioners were requested to testify in the said RICO cases against the former First
Couple. They were promised immunity from further criminal prosecution. They agreed.
All the expenses of Mapa were shouldered by the PCCG when they flew to New York to testify against the Marcoses. During the trial,
Ferdinand Marcos died and La Bella, the American prosecutor dispensed the testimony of Mapa and thereby acquitted Imelda Marcos.
Since Mapa, was not able to testify, it was contended that the immunity from suit of Mapa took without force and effect. However, the
record shows that the petitioners provided information to the PCGG relating to the prosecution of the RICO cases against the Marcoses
in New York. Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the immunity given by the PCGG to Mapa is still in effect and force.

Ruling: Yes. Under Sec. 5, EO 14, the PCGG has the separate power to grant immunity to any person from being prosecuted provided
they will meet the conditions provided by the PCGG.
Contrary to the ruling of the respondent court, the failure of petitioners to testify in the RICO cases against the Marcoses in New York
cannot nullify their immunity. They have satisfied the requirements both of the law and the parties' implementing agreements. Under
section 5 of E.O. No. 14, as amended, their duty was to give information to the prosecution, and they did. Under their Memorandum of
Agreement, they promised to make themselves available as witnesses in the said RICO cases, and they did. Petitioners were ready to
testify but they were not called to testify by the US prosecutors of the RICO case. Their failure to testify was not of their own making. It
was brought about by the decision of the US prosecutors who may have thought that their evidence was enough to convict the Marcoses.
Since petitioners' failure to testify was not of their own choosing nor was it due to any fault of their own, justice and equity forbid that they
be penalized by the withdrawal of their immunity. Indeed, initially, the PCGG itself adopted the posture that the immunity of petitioners
stayed and should not be disturbed. It joined the motion to dismiss filed by petitioners in the respondent court. W hen the respondent court
denied the motion, PCGG stuck to its previous position as it again joined the petitioners in their motion for reconsideration. It is only in
this petition for review on certiorari that PCGG, after a change of Chairman, flip-flopped in its position.
SC also rule that there was nothing irregular when PCGG granted a section 5 immunity to petitioners while they were already undergoing
trial in Criminal Case No. 11960. Section 5 of E.O. 14, as amended, does not prohibit the PCGG from granting immunity to persons
already charged in court and undergoing trial. As long as the privilege of immunity so given will in the judgment of the PCGG assist it in
attaining its greater objectives, the PCGG is well within legal grounds to exercise this power at any stage of the proceedings. This section
5 immunity frees and releases one from liability, and as it inures to the benefit of an accused, it can be invoked at any tim e after its
acquisition and before his final conviction. Our regard for the rights of an accused dictates this result. Thus, SC have consistently held
that laws that decriminalize an act or a grant of amnesty may be given retroactive effect. They constitute a bar against the further
prosecution of their beneficiaries' regardless of the appearance of their guilt. To be sure, the guilt of the petitioners in Criminal Case No.
11960 has yet to be established beyond doubt. The PCGG itself does not appear certain and confident of the strength of its evidence
against the petitioners in said criminal case. The records show that petitioners Mapa was granted immunity not only because of the
information he gave to the prosecution but also ". . . in light of Republic's review of the cases both civil and criminal which it has filed or
intends to file against . . ." him. Similarly, petitioner Vergara was granted immunity ". . . in light of Republic's review of Vergara's
participation in Criminal Case No. 11960 . . . ." After reviewing its evidence against the petitioners, PCGG appears to have sensed the
sterility of its efforts of continuing their prosecution. Its former chairman, M.A.T. Caparas, learned that petitioners would file a Motion to
Dismiss Criminal Case No. 11960 after PCGG rest its evidence, "for failure of the prosecution to prove its case." In his May 16, 1990
letters to the petitioners, he assured them that "we shall . . . offer no objection to its favorable consideration." This is a patent admission
that petitioners' Motion to Dismiss has merit and that the PCGG cannot prove its case against the petitioners in Criminal Case No. 11960.
Finally, SC reject respondent court's ruling that the grant of section 5 immunity must be strictly construed against the petitioners. It
simplistically characterized the grant as special privilege, as if it was gifted by the government, ex gratia. In taking this posture, it misread
the raison d'etre and the long pedigree of the right against self-incrimination vis-a-vis immunity statutes.

9. JESUS T. TANCHANCO and ROMEO R. LACSON vs.

THE HONORABLE SANDI-GANBAYAN (Second Division)
FACTS:
Tanchanco served as NFA Administrator from 1972 to 1986, during the presidency of Ferdinand Marcos. His co-petitioner Romeo Lacson
(Lacson) was the Deputy Administrator of the NFA when he was the Administrator.
On 6 May 1988, Tanchanco and the PCGG entered into a Cooperation Agreement, occasioned by the desire of Tanchanco to cooperate
with the Philippine government in connection with the latter’s efforts in the location and pursuit of government properties "purloined" by
Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos, their agents and others who hold property on their behalf. In the Cooperation Agreement, the parties
stipulated as follows:
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants contained herein and intending to be legally bound hereby, the parties
agree as follows:
1. Tanchanco shall cooperate with any and all Philippine Government investigations or prosecutions pursuant to Executive Order No. 1.
2. "Cooperation" means that Tanchanco shall provide complete, candid and absolutely truthful disclosures, in response to any and all
questions and inquiries that may be put to him/her in connection with the Philippines’ investigations, civil actions, criminal prosecutions,
or any other proceedings whether in the Philippines, the United States or elsewhere. Further, upon the request of the Philippines,
Tanchanco will offer such cooperation in investigations and proceedings brought by other governments, including but not limited to the
United States and Switzerland.
Cooperation also means a disgorgement of assets, if any, acquired in violation of Philippine laws, rules and regulations. Cooperation
further means a full disclosure of assets and liabilities, beneficially owned by Tanchanco. Any assets not therein listed as Tanchanco’s
personal property, and thereafter discovered to be in Tanchanco’s name or under his/her legal or beneficial control, directly or indirectly,
as of the date of this Agreement, shall become the property of the PCGG.
3. Should any of Tanchanco’s statements or testimonies be false, misleading or materially incomplete, or should Tanchanco knowingly
fail to act with total honesty and candor in any such matters, the Philippines shall no longer be bound by any of its representations
contained herein. Immunities and other considerations granted in reliance thereof, shall be null and void.
In return for the above, the Philippines hereby represents and agrees as follows:
(1) At a time to be mutually agreed upon between Tanchanco and the Philippines, the Philippines shall move to dismiss all
actions that are presently pending against Tanchanco before the Sandiganbayan and any such other courts;
(2) The Philippines shall lift any sequestration orders against Tanchanco’s properties, if any, and rescind hold orders it may
have issued against his/her actions;
(3) The Philippines shall not bring any additional civil or criminal charges against Tanchanco, arising from:
(A) Service in or for the Marcos government;
(B) Any other actions revealed by Tanchanco pursuant to his/her cooperation as defined in this Agreement.
Significantly, Tanchanco was called upon as one of the witnesses for the prosecution in the case filed against Imelda Marcos in New
York for violation of the so-called RICO Act. It appears that his testimony was elicited concerning the transfer of ₱10,000,000.00 rebate
obtained by the NFA from the Philippine National Lines to the Security Bank, as well as the matter of the use of discretionary and/or
intelligence funds by the Marcos administration involving the funds of the NFA during Tanchanco’s administration.
Nonetheless, a criminal case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 16950, was filed in 1991 against Tanchanco with the Sandiganbayan for
malversation of public funds in the amount of ₱10,000,000.00 from the Philippine National Bank. Tanchanco filed a Motion for
Reinvestigation, wherein he argued that the case should be dismissed as he had been granted immunity from the said suit by the PCGG.
Eventually, the Sandiganbayan First Division agreed with Tanchanco and in a Resolution dated 27 October 2000, the case was ordered
dismissed.
However, Criminal Case No. 16950 proved to be only just one of several attempts of the government to prosecute Tanchanco. In 1997,
a total of 22 Informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan against Tanchanco. He was charged with 21 counts of Malversation of Public
Funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, and one count of Failure of Accountable Officer to Render Accounts under Article
218 of the same Code. Lacson was charged as a co-defendant in four of the informations for Malversation of Public Funds. These cases
were consolidated and raffled to the Sandiganbayan Second Division. On 2 September 1997, Tanchanco and Lacson pleaded not guilty
to all of the charges.
On 26 November 1997, Tanchanco and Lacson filed a Motion to Quash and/or Dismiss all 22 cases, citing as basis the Cooperation
Agreement which was said to have granted immunity to Tanchanco from criminal prosecution. They likewise presented an affidavit
executed by former Vice-President Emmanuel Pelaez, who was serving as Philippine Ambassador to the United States at the time of the
New York trial of Imelda Marcos. In his affidavit, Ambassador Pelaez relevantly stated:
2. During my incumbency as Ambassador, I had the privilege to assist the Philippine Government thru the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) in obtaining the full cooperation of Mr. Jesus Tanchanco relative to its investigation on the transfer of TEN
MILLION PESOS (₱10,000,000.00) rebate obtained by the National Food Authority (NFA) from the Philippine National Lines (PNL) to the
Security Bank. The scope of investigation also encompassed the controversial use of discretionary and/or intelligence funds by the Marcos
Administration particularly involving the funds of NFA during the administratorship of Mr. Tanchanco.
3. In this regard, sometime May 1990, I invited Mr. Jesus Tanchanco, on behalf of PCGG, to my office in Washington, D.C. to have an
investigative meeting with Atty. Severina Rivera and Atty. Labella, both of whom presented PCGG in cases against the Marcoses in the
U.S. On this occasion, it was explained to Mr. Tanchanco that his disclosure/testimony on the adverted P10M fund transfer and the matter
of discretionary and intelligence funds of the NFA were indispensable to the Philippine Government’s case against the Marcoses. I urged
him to cooperate with the Government and he signified his willingness to do so.
4. After a time of reflection, Mr. Tanchanco obliged, and he thereafter had lengthy question and answer sessions with Attys. Rivera and
Labella on the aforesaid major and other collateral issues. 8
Still, the motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan Second Division in a Resolution dated 5 March 1999.9 The Sandiganbayan examined
Section 5 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 14, which empowered the PCGG to grant immunity from criminal prosecution, and ruled that the
grant of immunity by the PCGG pertained only to offenses which may arise from the act of a person testifying or giving information in
connection with the recovery of supposed ill-gotten wealth.
Respondent court declared that the charges of malversation and failure to render an accounting could not be considered as falling within
the immunity granted to Tanchanco as the offenses were not related or connected to the testimony or information furnished by Tanchanco
in a proceeding concerning the recovery of the purported ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses. The Sandiganbayan opined that the PCGG
could not have intended the grant of immunity to extend to any other crime which Tanchanco may have committed while serving the
Marcos Administration, "such as bribery and rape," since such was beyond the scope of the PCGG to bestow. To construe the grant of
immunity so broadly, held the Sandiganbayan, would violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution, as well as the due process
clause.10
The Sandiganbayan likewise concluded that even assuming the immunity granted by the Cooperation Agreementcovered the offenses
charged against Tanchanco, the same could not benefit Lacson, as he was not a party to the immunity agreement. 11
A Motion for Reconsideration filed by Tanchanco and Lacson was denied in a Resolution dated 28 December 1998, the Sandiganbayan
declaring therein that the crimes to which petitioners were charged "are beyond the authority and mandate of the PCGG."12
Petitioners now argue before this Court that the grant of immunity under the Cooperation Agreement encompassed the subject charges.
They note that Tanchanco had given testimony in the United States regarding the intelligence fund of the NFA, which was used by
President Marcos for his own personal benefit. Petitioners advert to the affidavit attesting to such testimony by Ambassador Pelaez. It is
argued that Tanchanco had complied with all his commitments made in the Cooperation Agreement, and it would be the height of "gross
distortion of justice and both moral and legal outrage for the government now to welch on the said Agreement" after Tanchanco had
already testified against the Marcoses. Petitioners likewise cite the relevant jurisprudence concerning the grant of immunity from criminal
prosecution by the PCGG.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor, on behalf of the People of the Philippines, cites the comment filed by the PCGG to the Motion to
Quash and/or Dismiss before the Sandiganbayan, wherein it alleged that contrary to the terms of the Cooperation Agreement, Tanchanco
had not yet provided the PCGG "a full disclosure of assets and liabilities beneficially owned by Tanchanco."13 This claim is countered by
petitioners, who assert before this Court that he had already submitted such disclosure to the PCGG even prior to the execution and
signing of the Cooperation Agreement.14
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing respondent Sandiganbayan, provides a different argument against petitioners.
The OSG reiterates the position of the Sandiganbayan that the 22 charges against Tanchanco were not covered by the immunity granted
by the PCGG, which pertained only to offenses which may arise from his act in testifying or giving information in connection with the
recovery of ill-gotten wealth.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the grant of immunity under the Cooperation Agreement encompassed the subject charges

RULING:
YES. Our first point of reference understandably is the Cooperation Agreement. Therein, we note that the grant of immunity to Tanchanco
is deliberately broad. It is stipulated that the government "shall not bring any additional civil or criminal charges against Tanchanco arising
from: (a) service in or for the Marcos government; and (b) any other actions revealed by Tanchanco pursuant to his/her (sic) cooperation
as defined in this Agreement."
The undertakings expressed by the Philippine government through the PCGG in the Cooperation Agreement are quite clear-cut, even if
broad in scope. Facially, it seemingly encompasses three classes of actions committed by Tanchanco: those committed while he was in
the service of the Marcos government; those committed in behalf of the Marcos government; and any other act revealed by him in the
course of his cooperation with the PCGG.
Especially telling are the segregations made in the classification of the acts covered by the grant of criminal immunity. First, the distinction
is laid, as signified by the conjunctive "or", between those acts committed by Tanchanco arising from service in the Marcos government
and those committed for or in behalf of the Marcos government. The difference between those two classes of acts is crucial, for if the
agreement is construed plainly, the immunity covers not only those acts committed by Tanchanco for the benefit or under the instruction
of the Marcoses, but even those acts of Tanchanco which may not have been tinged with the involvement of Marcos or his government
yet which nevertheless occurred during Tanchanco’s term as NFA Administrator.
On the face of the document, we cannot simply say that the clause should be read as covering only those acts of Tanchanco which he
committed for the Marcos government while he was in service as NFA Administrator. The use of the word "or" signifies the joinder of two
distinct concepts: "service in" and "service for", and it is our conclusion that the PCGG and Tanchanco, in forging the Cooperation
Agreement purposively intended to segregate acts arising from "service in" and acts arising from "service for" the Marcos government.
The Cooperation Agreement also utilizes a distinction between these acts arising from "service in or for the Marcos government", and
"any other actions revealed by Tanchanco pursuant to [his] cooperation as defined in the Agreement." This qualification is again crucial,
as it is the contention of the OSG that the scope of immunity is limited only to those offenses which may arise from his act in testifying or
giving information in connection with the recovery of ill-gotten wealth. Immunity from criminal prosecution arising from those acts elicited
from Tanchanco in the course of his cooperation falls squarely within the second ground for immunity, "any other actions revealed by
Tanchanco pursuant to [his] cooperation." If indeed, as the OSG suggests, the scope of immunity is limited to those offenses that arise
from Tanchanco’s act in testifying or giving information, then why the provision of the first ground of immunity under the Cooperation
Agreement, for acts arising from "service in or service for the Marcos government"? The provision is there to effectuate what it declares.
Other provisions of the Cooperation Agreement likewise indicate that the intent of the PCGG, as representative of the Philippine
government, was to offer Tanchanco broad protection from criminal prosecution. The Second Whereas Clause expresses that both
Tanchanco and the PCGG "are desirous of resolving their differences and settling all litigation between them".22 Moreover, it is stipulated
that "none of the obligations or undertakings described [herein] are in any way dependent upon a jury’s or court’s verdict at any trial, or
the success of any criminal or civil prosecution." 23
We thus cannot accept the conclusion that the intent of the parties to the Cooperation Agreement was to limit the scope of immunity to
cover only offenses arising from the testimony or information given by Tanchanco pursuant to his cooperation; or that said agreement
pertains only to those offenses committed by Tanchanco in behalf of the Marcos government. Such limited construction is belied by the
clear terms of the Cooperation Agreement.
The reasons or motives of the PCGG in agreeing to so broad an immunity agreement are not evidently determinable, yet ultimately
excluded from the scope of judicial inquiry. In Mapa v. Sandiganbayan,24 the Court was asked to rule on the range and power of the
courts to review the exercise of discretion of the PCGG in granting immunity pursuant to Section 5 of E.O. No. 14. The Court, speaking
through now Senior Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, ruled that such review "can go no further than to pass upon [the immunity grant’s]
procedural regularity", and is especially limited to the questions of "(a) whether the person claiming immunity has provided information or
testimony in any investigation conducted by the PCGG in the discharge of its functions; (b) whether in the bona fide judgment of the
PCGG, the information or testimony given would establish the unlawful manner in which the respondent, defendant or accused has
acquired or accumulated the property or properties in question; and (c) whether in the bona fide judgment of the PCGG, such information
or testimony is necessary to ascertain or prove the guilt or civil liability of the respondent, defendant or accused." 25
The ruling in Mapa, which was ignored by the Sandiganbayan, establishes several principles that govern this case as seen in our
subsequent discussion. But the first integral point which we now invoke is that the reasons or motives of the PCGG in granting broad
criminal immunity to Tanchanco are beyond the scope of judicial review.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED IN PART. The Court hereby orders the DISMISSAL of the SUBJECT CRIMINAL CASES
INSOFAR AS PETITIONER JESUS TANCHANCO IS CONCERNED. No pronouncement as to costs.

C. Incrimination in Foreign Jurisdictions

10. United States vs. Balsys

Concern with foreign prosecution is beyond the scope of the Self-Incrimination Clause. The Court said that although resident aliens are
entitled to the same Fifth Amendment protections as citizen "persons" the risk of their deportation is not sufficient to sustain a self-
incrimination privilege intended to apply only to the United States government. The Court explained that since the Fifth Amendment
does not bind foreign governments, and that would not be subject to domestic enforcement of immunity-for-testimony deals, one could
not assert a self-incrimination protection against possible prosecution at their hands.
Facts:
Respondent Aloyzas Balsys is a resident alien who obtained admission to the United States under the Immigration and Nationality Act.
In his application, he claimed that he served in the Lithuanian army and that he later lived in hiding.
Balsys swore that the information was true and signed a statement of understanding that if his application contained any false information
or materially misleading statements, or concealed any material fact, he would be subject to criminal prosecution and deportation.
The Office of Special Investigations of the Department of Justice's Criminal Division (OSI), which was created to institute denaturalization
and deportation proceedings against suspected Nazi war criminals later subpoenaed Balsys to testify about his wartime activities between
1940 and 1944 and his immigration.
He appeared and gave his name and address, but he refused to answer any other questions, such as those directed to his wartime
activities in Europe between 1940– 1945 and his immigration to the United States in 1961. He claimed the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination, based on his fear of prosecution by a foreign nation.
The Federal District Court granted OSI's petition to enforce the subpoena, but the Second Circuit vacated the order, holding that a witness
with a real and substantial fear of prosecution by a foreign country may assert the privilege to avoid giving testimony in a domestic
proceeding, even if the witness has no valid fear of a criminal prosecution in this country.

Issue: Whether a criminal prosecution by a foreign government not subject to the U.S. constitutional guarantees presents a “criminal
case” for purposes of the privilege against self-incrimination.

Held:
The U.S. Supreme Court held that concern with foreign prosecution is beyond the scope of the Self-Incrimination Clause. The Court said
that although resident aliens are entitled to the same Fifth Amendment protections as citizen "persons" the risk of their deportation is not
sufficient to sustain a self-incrimination privilege intended to apply only to the United States government. The Court explained that since
the Fifth Amendment does not bind foreign governments, and that would not be subject to domestic enforcement of immunity-for-
testimony deals, one could not assert a self-incrimination protection against possible prosecution at their hands.
Self-Incrimination Clause
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[n]o person… shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself…" This privilege against self-incrimination "not only extends to answers that would in themselves support a
conviction under a . . . criminal statute but likewise embraces those which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute
the claimant for a crime." The privilege protects both witnesses and defendants in any proceeding, whether civil or criminal. The witness
may invoke the privilege, however, only if he "has reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer." A reasonable f ear is
one based on a prospect of penal liability that is "real and substantial" and not merely speculative.
The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is available to resident aliens as well as to American citizens. Balsys has no
reason to fear domestic prosecution in this case, and indeed he has not alleged any such fear. Rather, he charges that forcing him to
testify regarding his activities during World War II and his immigration to the United States could subject him to prosecution by the
governments of Lithuania, Germany and Israel. Thus, the issue before the Court is whether Balsys can avoid complying with the OSI
subpoena by asserting the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination based on a fear of foreign prosecution.
Fear of Foreign Prosecution
To date, neither the Supreme Court nor the Second Circuit has decided the question of whether the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination can be asserted on the grounds of fear of foreign prosecution. In Zicarelli v. New Jersey Investigation Commission, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider this question but then determined that it was unnecessary because Zicarelli's fear of being
prosecuted by a foreign court was remote and speculative. The court held that, assuming a fear of foreign prosecution is within the scope
of the privilege, a witness can assert the privilege only after establishing that the information sought would tend to incriminate him under
foreign law and pose a substantial risk of foreign prosecution.
In In re Grand Jury Subpoena of Flanagan, the Second Circuit identified a number of factors that bear on whether the witness's fear of
foreign prosecution is real or imaginary. In making this determination, the Court should "focus on questions such as whether there is an
existing or potential foreign prosecution of him; what foreign charges could be filed against him; whether prosecution of them would be
initiated or furthered by his testimony; whether any such charges would entitle the foreign jurisdiction to have him extradited from the
United States; and whether there is a likelihood that his testimony given here would be disclosed to the foreign government."
Here, there is no existing foreign prosecution of Balsys. Balsys claims, however, that the testimony sought by the OSI would incriminate
him under the laws of Lithuania, Germany and Israel, thereby subjecting him to potential prosecution. In order to determine whether
Balsys's answers would incriminate him, the Court must review the relevant criminal provisions from each sovereign.
The Fifth Amendment is not applicable extraterritorially. It serves to regulate the relationship between federal and state
governments and their citizens. The Supreme Court has stated that the privilege against self-incrimination reflects our unwillingness
to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather
than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and
abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates "a fair state-individual balance by requiring the government to leave the individual alone until
good cause is shown for disturbing him and by requiring the government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load."
To allow Balsys to invoke the privilege would unreasonably impinge on the government's ability to monitor and verify immigration and
visa applications. As stated by the court in Lileikis, "the United States cannot be deterred by the threat of a prosecution by a foreign
sovereign from gathering evidence for its own purposes." 899 F. Supp. at 807. The government has a strong interest in determining
whether or not an individual misrepresented information on his visa application. In seeking to compel Balsys's testimony, the government's
primary purpose is "the vindication of the domestic laws of the United States.” Although Balsys does indeed have a real and substantial
fear of prosecution by Lithuania and Israel, the laws of the United States should not be sacrificed where the government has established
an independent and legitimate need for his testimony.
In declining to extend the Fifth Amendment privilege in the present case, the Court concludes that the fundamental purpose of the privilege
is to protect individuals against governmental overreaching. Balsys seeks to assert the privilege as a means to thwart the enforcement of
domestic law. This is contrary to the values the Fifth Amendment was intended to protect. Although Balsys may suffer harm as a result
of the incriminating nature of the disclosure, the government has a valid purpose. There is no indication that the government's motive is
malicious, or that the government is engaging in "overzealous prosecution."
A contrary decision by this Court would allow individuals attempting to immigrate to the United States to misrepresent their personal *600
histories and other relevant information in order to gain access to this country, leaving the government without recourse and s eriously
eroding domestic law enforcement. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Respondent is not entitled to invoke the Fifth Amendment
privilege against compelled self-incrimination.
Although this holding is limited to the facts of the present case, the Court is of the opinion that the Fifth Amendment was intended to
preserve a witness's individual privacy only in the context of a criminal prosecution by our state or federal government and for
the sole purpose of preventing governmental overreaching. This Court therefore believes that the Fifth Amendment privilege
cannot be asserted by a witness who fears prosecution under the criminal laws of a foreign sovereign.
Waiver of Fifth Amendment Privilege
Even if Balsys were entitled to the protection of the Fifth Amendment, the Court finds that he waived any such privilege when he first
applied for immigration and answered questions posed to him by government officials. Voluntary statements on a given subject constitute
an implied waiver of any subsequent Fifth Amendment claim related to that subject.
The Court finds that the present case does not involve two separate proceedings. In 1961, Balsys initiated immigration proceedings which
remain open today. When he first applied for an immigrant visa in 1961, officials at the United States Consulate in Liverpool, England
made inquiries into his prior record of employment and his activities during World War II. At that time Balsys voluntarily responded to such
questioning, and testified under oath regarding the nature of his wartime activities in Europe and his immigration to the United States.
Balsys's answers to questions about his whereabouts and activities from 1934 to 1944, whether given in 1961 or today, are part of the
same proceeding. Therefore, this Court concludes that Balsys's representations to immigration authorities constituted a waiver of any
Fifth Amendment privilege which he now claims in response to questions posed by the OSI concerning his procurement of a United States
immigrant visa.
Production of Documents
Balsys has also invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege in refusing to produce the documents described in the subpoena. Although the
privilege generally does not apply to requests to produce documents, the very act of producing the documents may have "communicative
aspects which rise to the level of a testimonial communication, as where merely acknowledging possession of the documents would be
an incriminating admission." Balsys has made no showing, however, that the production of such documents would be testimonial in
nature.