Making Business Ethics Practical

Making Business Ethics Practical
Author(s): Gerald F. Cavanagh, Dennis J. Moberg and Manuel Velasquez

Source: Business Ethics Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Jul., 1995), pp. 399-418
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3857391
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MAKING BUSINESS ETHICS PRACTICAL
Gerald F. Cavanagh, Dennis J. Moberg, and Manuel Ve
Abstract: Our critics confuse the role normative ethical theory c

business ethics. We argue that as a practical discipline, busin
must focus on norms, not the theories from which the norms d
true that our original work is defective, but not in its form, b
neglect of contemporary advances in feminist ethics.
Arecurring
enough; that itcriticism of business
is too abstract ethics is that application
to allow straightforward business ethics
to the is not practical
real moral conundrums that managers face in their daily lives (Pamental, 1991;
Stark, 1993). This criticism often cites the abstract nature of the theories that
moral philosophers have proposed, and points out how difficult it is to relate
these abstract theories to the messy details of everyday business life. This is an
important issue for business ethics. It calls into question the relevance of the
foundational models of our discipline. It raises the basic question?what is the
proper role of ethical theory in business ethics?
This brings us to the core difference between our own approach to business
ethics and that advanced by Brady and Dunn in the preceding article. We view
business ethics as an applied, practical discipline. Indeed, it is precisely this
practical emphasis that imposes significant limitations on the role that normative
theories can play in business ethics. Our critics give normative theory a role in
practical decision-making that normative theory is ill-suited to play. In contrast,
our approach provides a way of approaching business ethics that is at once a
practical and heuristically powerful aid to the business decision maker while
remaining properly grounded on normative theory.
We will try to explain and justify these summary remarks in the paper that
follows. We begin by summarizing the model of business ethics we developed
fifteen years ago indicating how we believe that model should be amended to
incorporate interim developments. Next, we argue that our model of business
ethics has advantages over approaches that try to make ethical theories practical
by applying them directly to business decisions. Finally, we discuss the appro?
priate role of normative theories in business ethics.
The discipline and practice of business ethics has experienced significant
growth during the past two decades. One factor that may have contributed to this
growth in a small way was our attempt in 1981 to develop a simple and under?
standable model for ethical decision-making in business contexts (Cavanagh,
Moberg, & Velasquez, 1981; Velasquez, Moberg, & Cavanagh, 1983; Cavanagh,
1990; Velasquez, 1992). That model synthesized three categories of ethical ob?
ligation that dominated thinking at the time: the obligation to promote utility, the
obligation to respect rights, and the obligation to act justly.
?1995. Business Ethics Quarterly, Volume 5, Issue 3. ISSN 1052-150X. 0399-0418.
400 BUSINESS ETHICS QUARTERLY
This model (the so-called URJ model) proposed three c

the ethics of an act: (1) Does the act optimize the utility
constituencies? (2) Does the act respect the rights of th
(3) Is the act consistent with norms of justice? We fles
providing more specific norms within each of these genera
ethical theory to justify these more concrete norms. T
norms we suggested were: avoid acts that represent ineffic
avoid acts that favor narrow interests at the expense ofthe
rights that should be respected in organizations, we sug
the right of free consent, the right of privacy, the right
right to due process. And the specific norms of justice
organizational contexts included: individuals who are sim
terms of relevant, job-related qualities should be treated si
als who differ in relevant ways should be treated differen
differences between them. The model also proposed th
conflicts with the others, or when certain "overwhelming
cult or impossible to satisfy a criterion, the agent may
criterion aside. We summarized these principles in a sim
managerial use of the model.
In developing the URJ model we tried to construct a
practically useful and well-grounded in theory. From a
wanted to provide a formulation that managers found not
vant to their experience. Accordingly, we tried to devel
help managers conceptualize their ethical problems and d
colleagues in a familiar language. At the same time, we wan
a solid basis on ethical theory so it would lead managers
moral decisions. In this sense, the model had to be cap
illuminating ethical issues rather than confusing and obscu
this in a way that was intellectually sound.
We settled on the three categories of utility, rights, and
reasons. First, we decided that these categories were mo
ers than the relatively obscure conceptualizations in the
on ethics, including "deontology," "consequentialism," "
salism," "contractarianism," "axiology," etc. Our own us
categories in teaching graduate and undergraduate busin
demonstrated that our three concepts were readily unde
quickly mastered and correctly used by practicing and a
ond, our search of the literature on ethics convinced us th
the dominant ethical traditions were neatly captured by
And third, numerous discussions with practitioners convin
the implicit categories that they already used intuitively t
stand their moral issues. They experienced the moral issues
work as problems of fairness, as problems involving the ri
as problems of trying to achieve the greatest good for the
On the basis of the widespread acceptance of the URJ
we succeeded in achieving our purposes. Even the critics
ledge its influence by calling it a major competitor of
model that they say, dates back "nearly two hundred years
MAKING BUSINESS ETHICS PRACTICAL 401
model with having had "considerable influence" on the

Noting some two dozen pieces of research that cite our m
"seldom do contributions in the field of business ethics have such influence."
Most business management texts now use this model, or some variant of it
their discussions of ethics, and it has been used extensively in training cours
most notably in the Arthur Andersen & Company programs in business ethics.
We are unsure precisely why our model has proved so popular, but we thin
its wide use may be due to three factors. First, the model draws upon the insigh
of thousands of years of intellectual inquiry and ethical analysis. It manages
bring together the leading ethical traditions going back to Aristotle, Aquina
Mill, Kant, and many others. It was an early, if not the first, attempt to synthesi
the insights of these various traditions for the business professional. Second, the
model is easy to understand and use. It deliberately employs straightforwar
language and examples, and eschews technical philosophical jargon. For one t
understand and use the model, it is not necessary that one have a sophisticat
background in philosophy or ethics theory. Finally, we think the flow char
appealed to the practical penchant of business people for naming familiar ph
nomena and spelling out decision-making processes.
Nevertheless, the model has been criticized on three bases: (1) that the URJ
model is "not parsimonious" in comparison to the older deontology-utilitarianism
(DU) model, (2) that a DU model has "practical superiority" when compared
URJ model, and (3) that the DU model more adequately captures the distincti
between "universals and particulars" (Brady & Dunn, this volume). We believ
that these criticisms are important, and they challenge us to re-examine th
model we proposed almost fifteen years ago. In addition to the questions rais
in these criticisms, we believe it is important to ask whether our model sho
be amended in light of the developments in business ethics during the pa
decade and a half.
In this article we first outline how we believe our model should be amended
in light of current developments in the field of ethics. We will then proceed to
systematic examination of the three criticisms lodged against it.
An Amended Model of Business Ethics

In order to meet the full spectrum of ethical issues that confront organization
as the Twentieth Century draws to a close, the practicing manager will need mo
than the three ethical criteria that we proposed in our original model. We believ
that two expansions are needed, one relatively minor, and the other much more
substantive.
The relatively minor expansion is one that is suggested by our critics who
point out that our model does not explicitly incorporate the important category
of moral duties. They are correct. Our original model incorporated the category
of moral rights, but left implicit the correlative category of moral duties. Some
ethicists have claimed that the category of moral duties is more fundamental tha
the category of moral rights (O'Neil, 1988a; 1988b), while others have argue
that moral rights are more basic than moral duties (Gewirth, 1982). Our view
that both are equally important, and we agree that the category of moral duties
should have been made explicit in our original model. We do not believe tha
moral duties should be considered a fourth ethical category

stood as integral to the category of moral rights. Two c
this conclusion. First, we believe that most of the dil
experience as involving questions of the moral rights of in
neously experienced as raising questions concerning the
viduals, and vice versa. Second, scholarly work in the d
ethics has traditionally related rights and duties (Donaldson
suggest that our model of ethics should be expanded to
"Rights and Duties" in place of our original, narrower ca
A more significant revision of our model derives from ou
moral importance of interpersonal relationships in contem
the contributions of contemporary feminist ethics add
understanding of the moral significance of caring in r
there are significant dangers in generalizing about feminis
claim underlying much of this sub-field is the view that t
has been dominated by a male perspective that has give
cerns no voice (Cole & Coultrap-McQuin, 1992). In partic
ethics has centered on impartial moral principles, feminist
sized the importance of partiality based on caring. Mor
ethical theory has tended to conceive the moral agent as rat
plative, and autonomous, feminist theory has tended to vie
tional, attached, active, and interdependent (Held, 1987). Ot
between traditional ethics and feminist ethics are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1
A Comparison of Traditional and Feminist Ethics
Traditional Ethics Feminist Ethics
Extension of that work Extension of that work

conventionally associated conventionally associated
with men (i.e., the marketplace) with women (i.e., family life)
Relations between equals Relations between unequals
Public encounters Private encounters
Emphasis on abstract Emphasis on context and

principles connection
Moral agent is detached Moral agent is attached
and rational and emotional
Value on rights and Value on maintaining ties

justice where possible without
sacrificing integrity of self
Unilateral giving as All giving as bilateral

virtuous altruism
Partiality suspect Impartiality suspect
On the basis of a number of empirical studies, for

has argued that when faced with moral decisions, w
focus on the relationships of the people involved and
of taking care of the people in relationships and of
ships. In contrast, when men are faced with moral
focus on the separate individuals involved and see m
following abstract moral rules that apply impartially
tained that an ethic based on care is different from but
to the traditional emphasis on justice and rights, oth
Noddings have taken a stronger position:
One might say that ethics has been discussed largely in
father: in principles and propositions, in terms such as ju
justice. The mother's voice has been silent. Human carin
caring and being cared for, which I shall argue form the
response, have not received attention except as outcom
(Noddings, 1984, 1).
While we do not agree that caring is somehow more
tional ethical categories, it is clear to us that caring
significant ethical category of obligation. It is clear
their moral dilemmas as dilemmas of care (Gilligan
behavior is often at the core of solutions to contem
Good personal relationships, better communications,
commonly viewed as essential for a business firm t
elements can be better evaluated through an ethical
clude, therefore, that caring must be incorporated into
independent category of moral obligation in order to
complete ethical model. As a practical aid, therefor
chart in figure 1.
Figure 1
The URJC Model?Flow Diagram for Making Ethical Decisions
Gather the facts surrounding the decision
Is the decision acceptable according to:

Utility: Does it optimize the satisfaction
of all relevant constituencies?
Rights & Duties: Does it respect the rights

and duties of the individuals involved?
Justice: Is it consistent with the canons of justice?

Caring: Does it arise from an impulse to care?
No Yes
Are there any overwhelming

factors? Double effects?
Incapacitating factors?
No
Yes
The act is unethical The act is ethical
There are several accounts of caring as a moral category (Herman, 1984;

Manning, 1992; Noddings, 1984). All of them assert a moral obligation to be
receptive to the needs of others, as responsive to these others in need as possible,
and based on a conscientious calibration of the acts of care to the specific
relationship and situation at hand. While contributors to feminist ethics have
avoided formulaic versions ofa caring obligation, several factors are considered
important. First, there is proportionality. The obligation to care does not require
superogation, especially where it is very costly; otherwise, care-givers would be
subject to instant burn-out. Second, the moral form of care must be mediated by
roles and responsibilities (Moberg, 1990). For example, caring for one's students
is different from caring for one's children. Third, one cannot be obligated to
provide care one is incapable of providing. And, finally, one's obligation to care
requires no one-for-one reciprocation. We help those in need without expecting
that once cared for, they will come forward to help us.
We do not believe that an ethics based only on ca

encompass all our moral concerns. Caring necessaril
tionship, and most people have relatively few such
modern technology allows us to affect countless nu
not know. For example, the environmental polluti
harms on anonymous people so distant from us in
have no personal relationship with them. According
must be augmented with, and balanced by, the trad
tion that are designed to deal with the more imperson
terize much of our lives.1
Evaluating the URJC and DU Mode

Parsimony, Practical Superiority, and Univ
Let us focus now on the critique of our model and
our critics propose. In place of our URJ model (now
offer a dualistic model based on Kantian deontology
model). They agree with us that utilitarianism mu
model of business ethics. Their disagreement center
addition to utilitarianism. They argue that our m
because Kantian deontology by itself can adequately
rules of justice.
Parsimony
It is not clear to us that "parsimony" in its simple
more) is a very important criterion for judging th
ethics model. It seems to us that other criteria are mu
clarity, specificity, simplicity, and usefulness. We b
it can be demonstrated that our URJ(C) model is be
that the alleged parsimony of the DU model is spur
Our critics do not explain specifically what they mea
and that points to a fundamental difficulty with t
exactly what Kantian deontology is and what it req
very broad category that has been characterized as
other than utilitarianism (Rawls, 1971). Apparently, ou
subset of deontology they know as "Kantian," but
particularly enlightening when it comes to the par
businesspersons.
Kant, of course, proposed three fundamental prin
characterized as the categorical imperative:
1. Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the
should become a universal law.
2. So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any

other, in every case as an end, never as a means only.
3. Everything [should] be done from maxims of one's will regarded as a will
which could at the same time will that it should itself give universal laws.
We have quoted these Kantian principles to demonstrat

tian principles are obscure to the extreme. They are articul
is unfamiliar and counter-intuitive to any practicing bu
selves they neither clarify nor simplify moral decision-
ness contexts. Our experience is that attempts to apply
specific situations must first cope with an almost insur
close textual exegesis, time-consuming debates over the
cial terms, and maneuvering through a dense thicket of con
versial interpretations of the Kantian principles.2 Our criti
that the meaning of Kant is perspicuous, unambiguous,
versy. However, even a cursory examination ofthe volumin
accumulated on Kant demonstrates that there is no single,
widely accepted view of what Kantian deontology is nor wh
in general or in particular situations.
Our critics base their assertion of parsimony on the claim
tology provides an adequate account of rights and justic
few authors to support this claim, it is far from obvious. O
Kantian principles are supposed to imply welfare righ
other interpretations of Kant assert that they imply no we
(Sullivan, 1989). Some interpretations of Kant imply t
distributions according to need (Rawls, 1971), but other int
justice can ever require distributions according to need (
Kantian principles are indeterminate. It is this indeterm
critics to claim that Kantian deontology can justify righ
deontology can be manipulated to justify virtually any p
The "parsimony" that our critics claim for their approach
But even if one were to accept the parsimony argument,
that the three categories of obligation in our original mode
justice) are really reducible to our critics' two categorie
Kantian deontology. It is well-known that the standard
theory is that it cannot account for norms of distributive
rights (e.g., Velasquez, 1992). Moreover, while it is clear
phy, both historically and logically, provides the basis f
standing of human rights,3 it is not obvious that Kantian d
basis of our norms of justice. Undoubtedly, because Kan
indeterminate, it is possible to find some interpretation
under which one can provide some logical support for norm
support would be of merely academic interest. The cruc
Kantian principles are historically the actual source and
justice?i.e., are our norms of justice in actuality derived fr
is that they are not. First, the concept of justice itself, and
of justice ("treat equals equally and unequals unequally i
inequality") predates Kant and his principles by some
early Greeks in general, and Aristotle in particular, wer
concept of justice and argued at great length for the fu
justice.3 Clearly, Kant is not the source of basic norms
our principles of justice are not based on Kantian n

of the empirical research on norms of justice. That r
of justice?in fact the exact norms of justice artic
thousand years ago?may be found in many cultur
tively untouched by Kantian ideology such as Asia
norms of justice suggests that they have their tru
fundamental features of human beings and their inte
of justice are necessary concomitants of human co
stitution. In any event, it is a mistake and a distortio
justice are somehow based on, derived from, or red
Norms of justice constitute a category of obligation t
only of utilitarianism, but also of Kantian deonto
three categories of utility, rights/duties, and justi
categories is without foundation.
Practical Superiority
Our critics also claim that their DU model has "p
compared to our URJ(C) model. We disagree. Kanti
awkward, and not easily accessible to the contemp
plexity makes them exceedingly difficult to incor
model. These were the reasons that we chose not to in
directly into our original formulation.
In contrast, URJ(C) is easy to understand. Utilit
fined moral system that is quickly understood by
familiar with economic models and cost/benefit analy
same roots as does North American individualism
easily understood. Due to the prevalence ofthe langua
moral conflicts are instinctively experienced in term
Notions of fairness and justice are likewise fami
culture also leads us to experience and understand
of fairness and justice. For these reasons, we conclud
from a practical point of view, much superior to the
DU model our critics advance.
In the final analysis, the practical superiority of any model of applied
can only be demonstrated by seeing how the model deals with actual ca
critics describe three cases and suggest that their model deals more ade
with them than ours does. Their claim is incorrect. In actuality, the DU
leads them to ignore significant moral features of these three cases, featur
our model highlights.
Case 1. The first case is one that we described in our original article. Cons
an organization in which two project leaders have proposed two differe
jects for funding to a committee that must choose between them. The two
equal merit and both have equally good chances of successful completio
one person lobbies the committee to ensure that committee members
prove his project. His project is the one that ultimately gets funded. Was it
for him to use such political tactics?
Using their two-part model, our critics argue first that

spective, political tactics have bad long-term consequen
and so are wrong.6 And, secondly, from the perspectiv
the members of the committee have a duty to assess th
of merit alone. Their willingness to allow individual
their decision is not universalizable, so they did wrong. O
there is no need to examine "separate theories of justic
Does our model add anything to this analysis? We th
would say that in addition to the utilitarian conseque
committee members, we must also examine seriously
issue?were any norms of fairness violated? When we
sions with managers, one widely shared reaction is that t
one of "unfairness." Yet, managers focus their indictment
the committee members (although they did have a dut
as our critics point out), but with the person using t
behaved unjustly toward the other project leader becau
his personal relationships to gain an advantage over his
injuring him. Our critic's DU model led them to ignore th
unfairness because it does not take fairness seriously. Inst
with rights and duties. Justice has to be considered se
aspects of this situation are to be identified. Our critic
onstrates that a failure to consider justice explicitly a
kind of moral myopia?an inability to visualize all of
situation.
But there is another potential moral issue embedded in this case that the DU
model also misses. The project manager who won the funding in the case did so
by appealing to a basic human vulnerability, i.e., the need to maintain good
relationships with our fellow human beings. Lobbying in organizations works
primarily because organization members are generally anxious to preserve good
relationships with their immediate colleagues (Moberg & Meyer, 1990). And our
attention will be drawn to this aspect of the case (an aspect that is present in
virtually all cases involving organizational politics) by our model's new incor?
poration of the ethics of care. What is the ethics of appealing to this basic human
need to maintain good relationships when such appeals are used as means to
capture organizational resources? The ethic of care shines some light on this
issue in its insistence that genuine care is not based on the prospect of recipro-
cation. Relationships nurtured by a moral impulse to care are not used as lever-
age to extract favors, and it is unethical to exploit human vulnerabilities by so
using them. The URJC model with its incorporation of the perspective of care
helps us to see additional moral aspects of this case that the DU model cannot.
Case 2. Our critics' second case involves a manager who has just been asked
to write a letter of recommendation by an employee who is seeking work with
another employer. The employee is a problem employee, and the current man?
ager would like to see the employee get the other job to "facilitate the em?
ployee's voluntary exit." What kind of a recommendation should she write to the
prospective employer?
Our critics declare that their two-part model sugges

is moral duty?in this case, the duty to be honest."
write an honest recommendation" must be "juxtap
values of getting rid of a problem employee and p
a new job in which he or she is happier. Our critics
not seem to be at issue in this case. (p. x)"
We believe that again, our critic's model misleads
issue in this case, but the DU model obscures it. What does fairness demand?
The immediate question that fairness raises is, fairness to whom? And that
question will lead us to a moral issue our critics miss?fairness to the prospec?
tive employer. Once one focuses there, several asymmetries present themselves
that create the potential for injustice:
1. the current employer has more information than the prospective employer,
2. the prospective employer depends on the current employer for this

information,
3. the prospective employer can be manipulated by the current employer.

Moreover, a focus on fairness to the prospective employer will also lead us to
ask about the prospective employer's expectations. Suppose, as seems natural,
that there is a publicly acknowledged expectation that in such cases one will be
told the truth if one asks specific questions.8 By virtue of this expectation, the
prospective employer has a right to be provided with honest answers to specific
questions. In addition to ignoring the many fairness issues embedded in this
case, the DU model misses the important rights aspect of this situation.
Attention to an ethics of care allows an even more incisive analysis. This
would lead us to examine the moral weight accorded to personal relationships.
In this situation, it is entirely possible that the manager has built a personal
relationship with the employee. They could even be friends. If one broadens the
ethical model to an ethic of care, an entirely different set of moral issues arises
regarding the moral demands of caring relationships.
Case 3. The third case involves a manager facing the dilemma of either hiring
a person known to be an excellent internal candidate or following policy and
posting the job. Our critics allege that the DU model more accurately diagnoses
what is going on here than the URJ model; namely, a conflict between the
manager's deontological duty to adhere to company policy, and her utilitarian
obligations to maximize utility for the company.
However, we believe that the DU model misleads them. First, although our
critics correctly identify the manager's fiduciary duty to the company as an
essential issue in this case, this duty does not spring out of thin air. Managers'
fiduciary duties are based on rights, in this case the property rights of stock-
holder/owners to be served adequately by the agents they have retained to ad?
minister their property. Deontological duties are at issue here, then, but they are
duties that are directly based on rights. Moreover, once we see that managerial
duties are based on the rights of stockholders/owners, it becomes obvious that
the "real moral conflict" in this case is not the conflict between fiduciary duty
and utility. The obligation to pursue utility for the company is as much an
obligation the manager owes to the stockholder as th

company policy. So where is the real conflict? To uncover
to the third moral value that DU model ignores?justice
require casting a broad net for every position are not onl
best people are hired (a utilitarian perspective). They a
sure that every qualified candidate is given fair cons
justice perspective) and that jobs are not distributed on ir
whom one happens to know (e.g., the "old boy network" t
women and minorities). The real dilemma in this case, the
the fairness toward all job seekers that company policy de
of conserving company resources for stockholders by
identified as adequate for the job.9 Contrary to our critic
is not between duty (to stockholders) and maximizing util
They misdiagnose the real underlying moral dilemma
DU model leads them to ignore justice and to downplay
An ethics of care perspective adds further to the analys
reason why the hiring manager in this case wants to o
employee is because the two have a personal relationsh
conflict between the moral bonds of friendship, on the o
duties on the other. We are not sure how dilemmas of this sort should be resolved.
However, we believe that it is vital to at least recognize such dilemmas when
they are present, something that is not facilitated by models that do not incorpo?
rate an ethic of care.
We conclude, that the URJ(C) is much better at helping managers and other
accurately diagnose moral issues in business than the DU model. In fact, the D
model may mislead even expert ethicists like our critics into ignoring significant
moral features imbedded in real cases, features that use of our model easily
identifies.
Universals and Particulars
Finally, our critics argue that their DU model more adequately captures th
distinction between "universals and particulars." They suggest that while Kan
tian principles are universal and impartial, utilitarianism recognizes the mor
significance of particulars and of partiality. Consequently, deontology and utili?
tarianism are complementary theories, each attending to one of these two main
aspects of human living (universals and particulars). Moreover, they contend
that the two together form a complete theory since, having covered the two ma
aspects of human living, nothing more is needed. No such claim can be made for
our model, our critics conclude, because it appears to be a mish-mash of thre
different ethical categories which have no claim to complementarity nor com
pleteness.
We believe that these claims are based on confusions. First, while it is true that
the basic Kantian moral principles (so-called categorical imperatives) are uni?
versal and impartial, it is also true that the utilitarian moral principle is also
universal and impartial. And second, while it is true that utilitarianism attends
to particulars, it is also the case that deontology

Nevertheless, we will argue, our critics call attenti
that an adequate model of ethics must recognize.
First, Kantian moral principles ("Act only on thos
as universal laws" and "Always treat humanity as a
means") are universal in the sense that they make
teristics of particular individuals and so apply to all p
are impartial in the sense that they give no greater w
over the interests of others.11 But the utilitarian pri
extent that they promote happiness, wrong to the ex
opposite") is universal in exactly the same sense sin
of the particular characteristics of particular indiv
greater weight to one's own interests over those of o
Secondly, our critics allege that utilitarianism a
persons applying the utilitarian principle must consid
their situation. How otherwise can they determin
happiness except by taking account of the particu
exactly the same way and for exactly the same reason
also attend to particulars. People who want to appl
consider the particular features of their situation
must determine which act in a situation would be based on a maxim that can be
willed as a universal law applying to this situation and which course of action
would treat people as ends and not merely as means. Making such determina-
tions of necessity requires attending to the particulars of the situation.
However, our critics claim that the particulars to which utilitarians must attend
are somehow more particular or less "impartial" than the particulars to whic
Kantians must attend. They claim that utilitarianism attends to "our idiosyncra-
sies, our cares, our personal attachments," which lead us to be partial to particu?
lar individuals (our lovers, our family, our friends). In contrast, they claim that
Kantian deontology does not and so ignores this important realm of human life.
But this is a confusion. To begin with, utilitarianism attends to personal relation?
ships only to the extent that these share the same general (universal, abstract
feature?they augment aggregate utility. Utilitarianism is indifferent to personal
relationships when these have no utilitarian consequences, and it is hostile to
such attachments when such attachments reduce aggregate utility. On the other
hand, Kantian deontology is quite capable of taking personal relationships into
account and of allowing for their tendency to lead us to be partial to particula
individuals. For example, Kantian ethics explicitly holds that we have an obli
gation to be partial toward family members precisely because such partiality
based on a maxim that can be willed to be universal and because families can
form a community whose members treat each other as free ends.13 Thus,
critics are mistaken in their suggestion that utilitarianism is somehow alig
with particulars while Kantian deontology is somehow aligned with univers
And they are also mistaken in their suggestion that the DU model is prefer
to the URJ(C) model because it incorporates complementarity and completen
At the same time, we do not want to lay aside this discuss

particulars and universals in an adequate moral theory. Indeed
to the notion that an adequate ethical model must attend to
impartial moral principles and the significance of personal r
believe that the major amendment to our model?the addition of
caring?incorporates precisely the elements that our critics sugge
namely, a perspective that takes seriously the moral significance
tionships and of partiality. In traditional ethical theory, persona
partiality matter only if some general moral principle says they
anism personal attachments are morally legitimate only if they ar
the fundamental utilitarian principle that utility must be maxim
morality personal attachments are morally significant only if th
with the Categorical Imperative. But this feature of traditional
recently been subjected to intense criticism. Modern critics of t
theory hold that even in the absence of a general moral principl
as affection, family ties, ethnicity, tribal membership, are somet
sive (Williams, 1981; Wolf, 1982; 1986). The fact that you ar
sufficient moral justification of my being partial toward y
whether an ethical principle says that loving someone morally ju
ism. These criticisms suggest that relationships of caring have a
significance that is independent of abstract moral principles. Th
husband and wife, parent and child, friend and friend, is mo
When such morally significant caring motivates partiality towar
dividuals, such partiality is morally legitimate in and of itself.
In short, our critics are correct in calling our attention to t
particular relationships and the partiality that arises from t
wrong to attempt to incorporate these into their model by mak
utilitarianism. Utilitarianism is no more receptive to particularit
than is Kantian deontology. Instead, we hold that personal
partiality have a moral significance quite separate from utilitari
deontology. Accordingly, they must be recognized as a separate a
source of moral values and obligations. This can only be do
caring as a fourth category together with utility, rights, and ju
3. Practical Ethical Models: The Role of Theo

It is important to note before we end that the DU model m
assumption about the role of ethical theory that our own m
believe this assumption accounts for several of the importan
tween our models and for URJ(C)'s superior practicality.
Our critics assume that managers should use ethical theorie
ian theory and Kantian deontology?to determine what action
quired in specific situations. This assumes that the moral princip
core of theories of ethics are decision-rules intended to guid
they are trying to decide which course of action in any given si
appropriate. Unfortunately, as we have argued, ethical princi
those of Kantian deontology, are too obscure, complex, and
serve managers as decision-rules.
Our URJC model, however, implicitly rejects the assumption that the princi?
ples propounded by Kant, Mill, and Bentham should be treated as decision rules
for deciding which courses of action are morally appropriate. Instead, our model
takes the view that ethical theories merely provide philosophical justifications
and rationales for more familiar and more specific action-guiding norms. In
particular, the ethical theory proposed by Kant may be invoked to explain why
certain specific rights are morally justified. The ethical theory proposed by
Rawls may be invoked to explain why certain specific rules of justice are mor?
ally justified. And the ethical theory proposed by Bentham and Mill may be
invoked to explain why certain specific efficiency norms are morally justified.
Thus, the purpose of abstract ethical theories in our model is to provide a
justification?the philosophical underpinnings, as it were?of more specific
norms that are much more concrete and familiar to people than the ethical
theories of philosophers.
While our critics propose that applications should flow from a theoretically
pristine and justifiable position, we propose acceptable short-cuts. Rather than
requiring that practicing managers master the nuances of formalism and arcane
philosophical logic, our model provides general principles that apply in certain
contexts. In our critics' view, applied ethics consists of principles embedded in
ethical theories. Their application consists of an unspecified but cognitively
dense or intuitive process by which these principles emerge to address concrete
situations. In our view, applying ethics is a three-step process consisting first of
the ethical theories with their embedded principles, a second intermediary level
made up of specific and more familiar norms of utility, rights, justice, and caring
that are justified by the ethical theories on the first level, and the third level
comprised of the application of these intermediary and familiar norms to con?
crete situations.
Figure 2
The Role of Theory in Applied Ethics
According to Brady & Dunn According to Cavanagh, Moberg & Velasquez
General Ethical Theories General Ethical Theories
Familiar Moral Norms of

Applications to
Concrete Situations Utility, Rights, Justice, and Caring
Applications to Concrete Situations
This conception of the role of ethical theory is not ne

utilitarianism that holds that the utilitarian principle shou
to choose among courses of actions, but that it should
particular action-guiding rules and that such rules can then
more immediate inspiration for our approach was the work
Jesuit Ted Purcell who argued that business ethics shou
are two kinds of moral norms: highly abstract and general
provide the foundations of ethics, and more specific "m
provide more concrete guides for action (Purcell, 1982).
were rooted in an older tradition of casuistry that formula
of thumb (such as the principle of double effect) to g
highly general moral principles to the more concrete co
ations. This tradition of casuistry recognized that the
idealistic principles that emerged from a philosophical a
not provide easy and obvious guidance in the complex co
action. Application of general principles to the realities
requires the use of some sort of mediating rules that narro
general moral principles and that are more closely asso
norms and moral concepts with which we are familiar in o
What should these intermediary norms and concepts be?
time we developed our original model of ethics that if one
of moral issues in our contemporary world, the norms tha
fail into three groups: (1) familiar notions of what is ju
familiar utilitarian notions of efficiency and of balancing
(3) familiar notions of personal rights. Further, it seemed
norms could be justified by the ethical theories from whic
cepts had historically derived or which had been influenced
ethical theories. We therefore gradually arrived at the
model of ethics. The insights of the dominant theories o
to justify and explain a well-defined set of familiar moral
moral norms should be grouped around the familiar catego
justice, and, now, caring. And these familiar moral norms
making in specific situations. Such a model of ethics, w
managers with a decision-making process that would be
and well-grounded in theory. We hope our efforts have suc
Conclusions
Our original model (Cavanagh, Moberg & Velasquez, 1981) was designe
aid business people in making ethical decisions. Managers and academic
have found the model to be practical, easily understandable, intellectu
sound, and true to ethical theory. Observers note that the URJ model h
widespread influence on teaching, research, and practice in business ethi
In this article, we have shown that Kantian deontology cannot adequately s
tute for rights and justice, in spite of the claims by our critics. However, w
agree that moral duties should be made more explicit, and we have done
our revision. Quite beyond our critics' challenge, w

tion area?the ethical concern for caring as origina
conclude that our new URJC model can more adeq
of ethical dilemmas the contemporary businessper
model, we judge that clarity and usefulness is more
We are now at work on a project that further ex
original piece (Cavanagh, Moberg & Velasquez, 198
tional politics. Consequently, the moral norms we
with intra-organizational influence and related p
listed a series of rights that persons have as emplo
model is to have more general use as a guide for
issues, we need to extend and clarify the moral norm
need to develop specific norms that emanate from
made in this paper; namely, the incorporation of care
undertaking, but we believe that the acceptance of
Notes
^he three of us wrestled with the idea of including yet a fifth separate ethical category,
virtue. In the end, we all came to see the issue of virtue separate from an ethics of obligation.
Our URJC model is designed to provide tools that aid business people who want to make
ethical decisions. While we believe our model provides a necessary component to ethical
behavior, virtue ethics takes that issue much further. Indeed, ethical business people encour?
age honesty, good personal relations, teamwork and trust among their colleagues and coun?
terparts. Such virtuous behaviors, if practiced regularly and consciously, become the good
habits we associate with moral character (Mclntyre, 1981). Every group or organization of
which we are a part influences our attitudes and actions, builds good and bad habits, and
ultimately forms a person's character. An organization made up of people of largely good
habits and hence good character will be more likely to be one that possesses a positive ethical
climate and a good corporate culture.
2Several of these conflicting interpretations of Kant, along with her own earlier and later
unique interpretations, are discussed by Onora O'Neill (1989), Chapters 5,6, and 7. A sample
ofthe controverted issues of interpretation: Does Kant's first formulation ofthe Categorical
Imperative (act only on those maxims you could will to be universal laws) mean that actions
are morally acceptable ...when they are actions that everyone would want to perform? Or
...when they are actions that I would want to have everyone perform? Or ...when they are
actions that everyone could perform? Or ...when they are actions that everyone could choose
to perform? Or does it mean that the rules we choose to follow are morally acceptable when
they are ...rules that everyone else could also follow? Or ...rules that I would want everyone
else to follow? Again, does Kant's second formulation of the Categorical Imperative (treat
humanity always as an end and never merely as a means) denote ...that we should not use
others coldly and impersonally, but always treat them with concern and sympathy? Or ...that
we should treat others only as they have actually consented to be treated? Or ...that we should
treat others only as they hypothetically would consent to be treated if they were fully rational?
Or ...that we should treat others only in ways that it is possible for them to consent to be
treated?
3Brady and Dunn question this claim. But authors as diverse as

Thomas Donaldson (1992) make the claim that our contemporary
rights can be traced back to Kant's discussions of universal duties
4See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, [c. 320 BC, many translati
5The studies we have in mind have demonstrated that while cultu
weights they give to different norms of justice, nevertheless the s
across different cultures and given due moral weight. In particular
cultures studied recognized Aristotle's basic principle of propor
treated equally, and unequals unequally in proportion to their in
principle of egalitarianism ("Treat everyone equally") although
Western cultures tended to give greater weight to the rule of propo
collectivist Asian cultures tended to give greater weight to the p
See Bond, Leung, & Wan, 1982, Leung & Bond, 1984, and Leun
6We know of no organizational scholar who has studied organiz
agree with our critics' conclusion that lobbying is wrong in the
organization or a broader societal constituency.
7In more ways than one. Brady and Dunn miss the main issue
issue for managers (and anyone else) writing letters of recomm
between the duty of honesty and dishonesty, but rather the duty
disclose. A positive but completely honest letter of recommendat
employee, no matter how problematic, so long as one limits one
the employee's positive characteristics. But the manager must a
being honest, ethics also demands that one disclose informat
problematic characteristics to the perspective new employer. This i
is quite different from the duty of honesty.
8Contemporary human resource practices argue against an expe
candid responses to very general questions.
9We know of no sentient attorney who would overlook pointin
mental principle leading to legal exposure of any client who kn
without following an existing policy of posting a job opening.
1(^As Kant puts it in his Foundations ofthe Metaphysics of Mo
translation): "unless we deny that the notion of morality has any
possible object, we must admit that its law must be valid, not m
rational creatures generally, not merely under certain contingen
tions but with absolute necessity."
11 Again, Kant puts the matter thus in ibid., see. 1: "I also set
really conform to duty, but to which men have no direct inclination
they are impelled thereto by self-interest. For in this case we can
the action which agrees with duty is done from duty, or from sel
12Mill is, in fact, at pains to make this point about utilitarian
what the assailants of utilitarianism seldom have the justice
happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in
own happiness but that of all concerned. As between his own hap
utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a dis
spectator" (Mill, 1861, chapter 2).
13See Kant's Discussion of this in his Science of Right, Secti
29.
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?1995. Business Ethics Quarterly, Volume 5, Issue 3. ISSN 1052-150X. 0399-0418.

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Making Business Ethics Practical

Author(s): Gerald F. Cavanagh, Dennis J. Moberg and Manuel Velasquez

Gerald F. Cavanagh, Dennis J. Moberg, and Manuel Ve

Abstract: Our critics confuse the role normative ethical theory c

?1995. Business Ethics Quarterly, Volume 5, Issue 3. ISSN 1052-150X. 0399-0418.

This model (the so-called URJ model) proposed three c

model with having had "considerable influence" on the

An Amended Model of Business Ethics

moral duties should be considered a fourth ethical category

Traditional Ethics Feminist Ethics

Extension of that work Extension of that work

Emphasis on abstract Emphasis on context and

Value on rights and Value on maintaining ties

Unilateral giving as All giving as bilateral

Partiality suspect Impartiality suspect

On the basis of a number of empirical studies, for

Gather the facts surrounding the decision

Is the decision acceptable according to:

Rights & Duties: Does it respect the rights

Justice: Is it consistent with the canons of justice?

Are there any overwhelming

The act is unethical The act is ethical

There are several accounts of caring as a moral category (Herman, 1984;

We do not believe that an ethics based only on ca

Evaluating the URJC and DU Mode

2. So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any

We have quoted these Kantian principles to demonstrat

our principles of justice are not based on Kantian n

Using their two-part model, our critics argue first that

Our critics declare that their two-part model sugges

2. the prospective employer depends on the current employer for this

3. the prospective employer can be manipulated by the current employer.

obligation the manager owes to the stockholder as th

Universals and Particulars

to particulars, it is also the case that deontology

At the same time, we do not want to lay aside this discuss

3. Practical Ethical Models: The Role of Theo

According to Brady & Dunn According to Cavanagh, Moberg & Velasquez

General Ethical Theories General Ethical Theories

Familiar Moral Norms of

Applications to Concrete Situations

This conception of the role of ethical theory is not ne

our revision. Quite beyond our critics' challenge, w

3Brady and Dunn question this claim. But authors as diverse as

Cavanagh, G. E, Moberg, D. J., & Velasquez, M. 1981. "The Ethics of Organ

Gewirth, A. 1982. Human Rights: Essays on Justification and Applications

Kant, I. 1785. Fundamental Principles ofthe Metaphysics of Morals. Tran

Leung, K., & Bond, M. H. 1984. "The Impact of Cultural Collectivism o

O'Neill, O. 1986. Faces of Hunger: An Essay on Poverty,

O'Neill, O. 1988a. "Children's Rights and Children's Lives." Ethics, vol. 98

O'Neill, O. 1988b. "Hunger, Needs, and Rights." In S. Luper-Foy (Ed.), Prob

?1995. Business Ethics Quarterly, Volume 5, Issue 3. ISSN 1052-150X. 0399-0418.

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