REM

REV CASES the property which should bethe basis for determining jurisdiction and the amount of
docket fees to be paid
IV. ACTIONS

b. Personal actions and Real Actions • Heirs of Reterta v. Sps. Lopez G.R. No. 159941, 17 August 2011

• Sps. Trayvilla v. Sejas G.R. No. 204970, 1 February 2016 DOCTRINE: Certiorari can be the proper remedy despite the availability of
appeal or other remedy if warranted by exceptional reasons such as: (a) when it is
FACTS: necessary to prevent irreparable damages and injury to a party; (b) where the trial
This case started when the SPS. TRAYVILLA instituted a civil case for specific performance judge capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment; (c) where there may
anddamages against SEJAS. Later on, the spouses filed an amended complaint this time be danger of a failure of justice; (d) where an appeal would be slow, inadequate,
for specific performance, reconveyance, and damages. However, the additional docket and insufficient; (e) where the issue raised is one purely of law; (f) where public
fees for the moraldamages prayed for in the Amended Complaint were not paid. Likewise, interest is involved; and (g) in case of urgency.
for the additionalcauses of action, no docket fees were charged and paid. Respondents
moved for the dismissal of the case claiming lack of jurisdiction over the subjectmatter FACTS:
arguing that petitioners' case was not for specific performance but was in reality a
Teofilo Reterta was granted a friar land in Tanza, Cavite, by virtue of his open,
realaction or one involving title to and possession of real property, in which case the value
exclusive and continued occupation for more than 30 years. He died in 1983
of the property should be alleged in the complaint in order that the proper filing fee may
leaving behind the land to his heirs, the petitioners. The petitioners discovered in
be computedand paid. RTC denied the motion, stating among others that petitioners' case
1999 that there was an affidavit purportedly executed by their father waiving his
is not a real action but indeed one for specific performance and thus one which is
rights and interest over the land, and by virtue of such affidavit, a Sale Certificate
incapable of pecuniary estimation.CA reversed the decision of the RTC favoring the
and TCT was issued in favor of the respondents.
respondent that the RTC did not acquired jurisdiction over the case. The consistent rule
The petitioners filed an action for quieting of title and reconveyance alleging that
is that 'a case is deemed filed only upon paymentof the docket fee regardless of the actual
such affidavit was a forgery and the sale certificate and TCT were procured
date of filing in court,' and that jurisdiction over anycase is acquired only upon the
payment of the prescribed docket fee which is both mandatory and jurisdictional. fraudulently.
The respondents filed a motion to dismiss, insisting that the RTC had no jurisdiction
ISSUE: on the ground that the Director of Lands had the exclusive power to the propriety
of grant of Friar lands, and to determine whether or not there is fraud in procuring
Whether or not the Caption of the Complaint should be the basis of determining the sales certificate.
Jurisdiction(specific performance-incapable of pecuniary estimation) thus, the RTC has Agreeing with the ground, the RTC granted the Motion to Dismiss. Receiving the
jurisdiction over thecase despite of non-payment of required fees. Order of Dismissal on Nov.16, 2001, the petitioners filed an MR on Nov.26.
However, the RTC denied the MR in its order, which was received by the
RULING: NO, the RTC erred in taking cognizance of the case despite private respondents' petitioners on March 20, 2002, thus, prompting them to file a petition for certiorari
non-payment of the correct docket fees which must be computed in accordance with with the CA on May 15, 2002.
Section 7(1), Rule 141 of theRules of Court, as amended.While petitioners' Amended The CA dismissed the petition, holding that certiorari cannot be used as a
Complaint was denominated as one mainly for specific performance,they additionally substitute for the lost remedy of appeal, considering that the order granting the
prayed for reconveyance of the property, as well as the cancellation of TCT. Inother Motion to Dismiss was a final order against which the proper remedy was an
words, petitioners' aim in filing Civil Case was to secure their claimed ownership and appeal in due course.
titleto the subject property, which qualifies their case as a real action. Since it is a real Hence, the appeal to the SC.
action made so by the Amended Complaint later filed, petitioners should have observed
the requirement under A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC relative to declaring the fair market value of ISSUE: WON the Petition for Certiorari was proper.

HELD: YES, Certiorari was proper.

At first, the SC held that the contention of the petitioners that their proper remedy
was certiorari by virtue of Rule 41 was misplaced. According to Sec.1, Rule 41 (not
yet amended by AM 7-7-12 during the decision of the CA) an Order denying a
Motion for New Trial or Reconsideration is one of the cases where no appeal may
be taken from and the proper remedy is to avail of Certiorari under Rule 65.
However, in this case, what the petitioners really wanted to obtain relief from was
the Order of Dismissal which finally disposed of the case, and not the denial of
their MR. The general rule is that certiorari is precluded as a remedy against the
final order when appeal is available.
Nonetheless, the SC considered Certiorari as the proper remedy despite the
availability of appeal or other remedy if warranted by exceptional reasons such as:
(a) when it is necessary to prevent irreparable damages and injury to a party; (b)
where the trial judge capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment; (c)
where there may be danger of a failure of justice; (d) where an appeal would be
slow, inadequate, and insufficient; (e) where the issue raised is one purely of law;
(f) where public interest is involved; and (g) in case of urgency.
Thus, the CA should have given due course to and granted the petition for certiorari
on two reasons: (a) the broader interest of justice demanded it in order to avoid
the undeserved grossly unjust result that would befall the petitioners; and (b) the
RTC’s grant of the MTD on the ground of lack of jurisdiction evidently constituted
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
For the first reason, the petitioners’ complaint made out a good case considering
its allegations, if duly established, might warrant reconveyance of the land to them
from the petitioners, as the title of a friar land obtained by a grantee may be
assailed and nullified if found not in conformity with the requirements set by law.
For the second, according to BP.129 as amended, the RTC has exclusive original
jurisdiction over actions involving title or possession of real property, which
includes an action for quieting of title (considering the jurisdictional amount) and
the authority of the Director of Lands (now the LMB) is limited to the administration
and disposition of friar lands, and does not include actions for reconveyance.
c. Actions in rem, in personam, and quasi in rem titles to the subject properties were indefeasible because they were
V. Rule 2 - Cause of Action claim on the subject properties casts a cloud on their title when they failed
b. Meaning of cause of action to demonstrate a legal or an equitable title to the same.
• Heirs of Tomas Dolleton v. Fil- Estate Management, Inc., G.R. No. 170750, 7 April 2009
DOCTRINE
The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the complaint
alleges facts which if true would justify the relief demanded. The inquiry is into the
sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations.
FACTS
- The Heirs of Tomas Dolleton, Heraclio Orcullo, Remedios San Pedro, et
al., Heirs of Bernardo Millama, Heirs of Agapito Villanueva, et al., Heirs
of Hilarion Garcia, et al., Serafina SP Argana, et al., and Heirs of Mariano
Villanueva, et al. filed before the RTC separate Complaints for Quieting
of Title and/or Recovery of Ownership and Possession with Preliminary
Injunction/Restraining Order and Damages against Fil-Estate
Management Inc., Spouses Arturo E. Dy and Susan Dy, Megatop Realty
Development, Inc., and the Register of Deeds of Las Piñas.
o The Complaints were later consolidated.
- The eight Complaints were similarly worded and contained substantially
identical allegations.
o That they had been in continuous, open, and exclusive
possession of the subject properties for more than 90 years until
they were forcibly ousted by armed men.
o They had cultivated the subject properties and religiously paid
the real estate taxes for the same.
o Spouses Dy cannot rely on Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs)
issued by the Registry of Deeds of Las Piñas in their names,
because the subject properties were not covered by said
certificates.
- Respondents filed before the RTC a Motion to Dismiss and Opposition to
Application for a Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary
Injunction. They moved for the dismissal of the eight Complaints on the
grounds of (1) prescription; (2) laches; (3) lack of cause of action; and (4)
res judicata.
- RTC: Granted respondents Motion to Dismiss for all the complaints. The
trial court determined that the subject properties were already registered
in the names of respondents, and that petitioners were unable to prove
by clear and convincing evidence their title to the said properties.
- CA: Denied the appeal and affirmed the RTC Resolutions stating that the
registered under the Torrens system. Thus, it could not be said that any
 o In addition, actions had already prescribed. PD 1529 requires
that an action assailing a certificate of title should be filed within
one year after its issuance and actions assailing fraudulent titles
should be filed within 10 years after the said titles were issued
but in this case, it took 30 years before petitioners filed their
case.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE/S
1. W/N the RTC properly granted respondents motion to dismiss
PROVISIONS
Rule 2
Section 1. Ordinary civil actions, basis of. — Every ordinary civil action must be
based on a cause of action. (n)
Section 2. Cause of action, defined. — A cause of action is the act or omission by
which a party violates a right of another. (n)
RULING & RATIO
1. NO
- Respondents seek the dismissal of petitioners Complaints for failure to
state a cause of action.
o This contention is untenable.
- Respondents mistakenly construe the allegations in petitioners
Complaints. What petitioners alleged in their Complaints was that while
the subject properties were not covered by respondents’ certificates of
title, nevertheless, respondents forcibly evicted petitioners therefrom.
o It is not simply a question of whether petitioners’ possession can
defeat respondents’ title to registered land. Instead, an initial
determination has to be made on whether the subject properties
were in fact covered by respondents’ certificates of title.
- Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure defines a cause of action
as the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another.
o Its essential elements are as follows: (1) a right in favor of the
plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or
is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant
to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission
on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the
plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant
to the plaintiff, for which the latter may maintain an action for
recovery of damages or other appropriate relief.
- The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the
complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the relief demanded.
The inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material
allegations.
- This Court is convinced that each of the Complaints filed by petitioners
sufficiently stated a cause of action. The Complaints alleged that
petitioners are the owners of the subject properties by acquisitive
prescription. As owners thereof, they have the right to remain in peaceful
possession of the said properties and, if deprived thereof, they may
recover the same.
Right of Action
• Multi-Realty Development Corp.,vs Makati Tuscany G.R. No. 146726, 16 June 2006
Facts:
• Petitioner is a real estate developer and constructed the Makati Tuscany
Condominium
• Respondent is a corporation established to manage the condominium units
• 270 parking slots were made, 164 allotted
• 98 units were left retained by petitioner to be put on sale to unit owners who
would want more parking
• The Master Deed and Declaration of Restrictions did not reflect or specify the
ownership of the 98 parking slots. Nevertheless, petitioner sold 26 of them to
unit buyers in 1977-1986
• SEC. 5. Accessories to Units. To be considered as part of each unit and reserved
for the exclusive use of its owner are the balconies adjacent thereto and the
parking lot or lots which are to be assigned to each unit.
SEC. 7. The Common Areas. The common elements or areas of the Makati
Tuscany shall comprise of all the parts of the project other than the units,
including without limitation the following:
(d) All driveways, playgrounds, garden areas and PARKING AREAS OTHER THAN
THOSE ASSIGNED TO EACH UNIT UNDER SEC. 5 ABOVE
• Respondent did not object, and Certificates of Title were issued
• In September 1989, Multi-Realty, through its President, Henry Sy, who was also
a member of the Board of Directors of MATUSCO, requested that two Multi-
Realty executives be allowed to park their cars in two of Makati Tuscanys
remaining 72 unallocated parking slots
• In a letter, through its counsel, MATUSCO denied the request, asserting, for the
first time, that the remaining unallocated parking slots were common areas
owned by it
 • On April 26, 1990, Multi-Realty filed a complaint against MATUSCO for Damages To determine when all the facts which constitute a cause of action for reformation of an
and/or Reformation of Instrument with prayer for temporary restraining order instrument may be brought and when the right of the petitioner to file such action
and/or preliminary injunction accrues,... the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63, must be considered... under said
• Petitioner alleged they had retained ownership of the 98 parking lots, however Rule
was not specified in Sec 7 (d)
• In its Answer, respondent alleged that petitioner had no COA against it for An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove
reformation of their contract. By its own admission, petitioner had sold various clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may
parking slots to third parties despite its knowledge that the parking areas, other be brought under this Rule
than those mentioned in Sec. 5 of the Master Deed belonged to respondent
• Trial Court dismissed, on the ground that petitioner failed to prove any ground The concept and meaning of the term cause of action in proceedings for declaratory relief,
for the reformation of its agreement with respondent relative to the vis-à-vis an ordinary civil action, is broadened. It is not, as in ordinary civil action, the
ownership of the common areas. There is no evidence on record to prove that wrong or delict by which the plaintiff's rights are violated, but it... is extended to a mere
the respondent had acted fraudulently. denial, refusal or challenge raising at least an uncertainty or insecurity which is injurious
• CA Dismissed on ground of prescription to plaintiff's rights.

Issues: In sum, one has a right of action to file a complaint/petition for reformation of an
instrument when his legal right is denied, challenged or refused by another; or when there
Whether or not cause of action for reformation of an instrument may be brought is an antagonistic assertion of his legal right and the denial thereof by another concerning
a real... question or issue; when there is a real, definitive and substantive controversy
Ruling: between the parties touching on their legal relations having adverse legal interests.

Prescription is... rightly regarded as a statute of repose whose object is to suppress • Consular Area Residents Association v. Casanova G.R. No. 202618, 12 April 2016
fraudulent and stale claims from springing up at great distances of time and surprising the
parties or their representatives when the facts have become obscure from the lapse of c. Test of sufficiency of cause of action
time or the... defective memory or death or removal of witnesses.
• Misamis Occidental II Cooperative, Inc. v. David, G.R.
Article 1144 of the New Civil Code provides that an action upon a written contract must No. 129928, 25 August 2005
be brought within ten (10) years from the time the right of action accrues
d. Splitting of a single cause of action and its effects
The term "right of action" is the right to commence and maintain an action. In the law of • Marilag v. Martinez G.R. No. 201892, 22 July 2015
pleadings, right of action is distinguished from a cause of action in that the former is a
remedial right belonging to some persons while the latter is a formal statement of the... FACTS:
operational facts that give rise to such remedial right. The former is a matter of right and
On July 30, 1992, Rafael Martinez (Rafael), respondent's father, obtained from
depends on the substantive law while the latter is a matter of statute and is governed by
petitioner a loan in the amount of P160,000.00, with a stipulated monthly interest of
the law of procedure. The right of action springs from the cause of action, but does... not
accrue until all the facts which constitute the cause of action have occurred. five percent (5%), payable within a period of six (6) months. The loan was secured by
a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land. However, Rafael failed to settle his
A cause of action must always consist of... the plaintiff's primary right and the defendant's obligation upon maturity and despite repeated demands, prompting petitioner to file
corresponding primary duty, whatever may be the subject to which they relate - person, a Complaint for Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage.
character, property or contract... and... the delict or wrongful act or omission of... the
defendant, by which the primary right and duty have been violated. RTC issued a Decision dated January 30, 1998, in the foreclosure case, declaring the
stipulated 5% monthly interest to be usurious and reducing the same to 12% per
annum. Accordingly, it ordered Rafael to pay petitioner the amount of P229,200.00,
consisting of the principal of P160,000.00 and accrued interest of P59,200.00 from
July 30, 1992 to September 30, 1995. Records do not show that this Decision had
already attained finality. Meanwhile, respondent agreed to pay Rafael's obligation to
petitioner which was pegged at P689,000.00. After making a total payment of
P400,000.00, he executed a promissory note dated February 20, 1998 binding
himself to pay on or before March 31, 1998 the amount of P289,000.00, "representing
the balance of the agreed financial obligation of his father to petitioner. After learning
of the January 30, 1998 Decision, respondent refused to pay the amount covered by
the promissory note despite demands, prompting petitioner to file a complaint for
sum of money and damages.
TC ruled in favor of the respondents, upon motion of the petitioner the appellate court
reversed its decision, prompting the respondent to elevate the matter to CA.
It held that the doctrine of res judicata finds application in the instant case,
considering that both the judicial foreclosure and collection cases were filed as a
consequence of the non-payment of Rafael's loan, which was the principal obligation
secured by the real estate mortgage and the primary consideration for the execution
of the subject PN.
ISSUE: whether or not the CA committed reversible error in upholding the dismissal
of the collection case.
HELD: A case is barred by prior judgment or res judicata when the following elements
concur: (a) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (b) the decision
must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the parties; (c) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (d)
there must be as between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject
matter, and causes of action
the Court finds the principle of res judicata to be inapplicable to the present case. This
is because the records are bereft of any indication that the August 28, 2003 Decision
in the judicial foreclosure case had already attained finality, evidenced, for instance,
by a copy of the entry of judgment in the said case. Accordingly, with the very first
element of res judicata missing, said principle cannot be made to obtain.
• Yap v. First E-Bank Corporation, G.R. No. 169889, 29 September 2009
Facts:
Sammy Yap obtained a P2 million loan from PDCP Development Bank, Inc. (PDCP). As
security, Sammy’s parents, petitioners Simon Yap and Milagros Guevarra, executed a
third-party mortgage on their land and warehouse standing on it. The mortgage
agreement provided that PDCP may extrajudicially foreclose the property in case Sammy
failed to pay the loan. Sammy issued a promissory note and six postdated checks in favor
of PDCP as additional securities for the loan.
When Sammy defaulted on the payment of his loan, PDCP presented the six checks to the
drawee bank but the said checks were dishonored. This prompted PDCP to file a
complaint against Sammy for six counts of violation of BP 22
PDCP filed an application for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage on the property of
petitioners which served as principal security for Sammy’s loan.
On motion of Sammy and without objection from the public prosecutor and PDCP, the BP
22 cases were provisionally dismissed.
Pursuant to the petition of PDCP for extrajudicial foreclosure, the extrajudicial sale was
set.
Petitioners filed in the RTC a complaint for injunction, damages and accounting of
payments against PDCP. The complaint sought to stop the foreclosure sale on the ground
that PDCP waived its right to foreclose the mortgage on their property when it filed the
BP 22 cases against Sammy. RTC rules in favour of petitioners.
CA reversed RTC’s ruling. It opined that PDCP was not barred from exercising its right to
foreclose on the property of petitioners despite suing Sammy for violation of BP 22. The
purpose of BP 22 was to punish the act of issuing a worthless check, not to force a debtor
to pay his debt.
Petitioners argue that, when Sammy was sued for six counts of violation of BP 22, PDCP
should have been deemed to have simultaneously filed for collection of the amount
represented by the checks. The civil aspect of the case was naturally an action for
collection of Sammy’s obligation to PDCP. PDCP clearly elected a remedy. PDCP should
not be allowed to pursue another, like foreclosure of mortgage.
Issue:
W/N PDCP waived its right to foreclose the mortgage when it filed the BP22 case against
Sammy
Held: Held:
Supreme Court Circular 57-97 provides the criminal action for violation of [BP] 22 shall be We rule that Civil Case Nos. 8084 and 9210 involve different causes of action.
deemed to necessarily include the corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file Generally, a suit may only be instituted for a single cause of action. If two or more suits
such civil action separately shall be allowed or recognized. are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment on
the merits in any one is ground for the dismissal of the others. Several tests exist to ascertain
Circular 57-97 was not yet in force when PDCP sued Sammy for violation of BP 22 and whether two suits relate to a single or common cause of action, such as whether the same
evidence would support and sustain both the first and second causes of action (also known
when it filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure on the mortgaged property of
as the “same evidence” test),or whether the defenses in one case may be used to substantiate
petitioners on February 8, 1993 and May 3, 1993, respectively.
the complaint in the other. Also fundamental is the test of determining whether the cause
of action in the second case existed at the time of the filing of the first complaint.
Prior to the effectivity of Circular 57-97, the alternative remedies of foreclosure of
mortgage and collection suit were not barred even if a suit for BP 22 had been filed earlier, Of the three tests cited, the third one is especially applicable to the present case,
unless a judgment of conviction had already been rendered in the BP 22 case finding the i.e., whether the cause of action in the second case existed at the time of the filing of the
accused debtor criminally liable and ordering him to pay the amount of the check(s). In first complaint – and to which we answer in the negative. The facts clearly show that the
this case, no judgment of conviction (which could have declared the criminal and civil filing of the first ejectment case was grounded on the petitioner’s violation of stipulations
liability of Sammy) was rendered because Sammy moved for the provisional dismissal of in the lease contract, while the filing of the second case was based on the expiration of the
the case. Hence, PDCP could have still foreclosed on the mortgage or filed a collection lease contract. At the time the respondent filed the first ejectment complaint on October
suit. 10, 2000, the lease contract between the parties was still in effect. The lease was fixed for
a period of two (2) years, from January 16, 2000, and in the absence of a renewal agreed
upon by the parties, the lease remained effective until January 15, 2002. It was only at the
• Umale v. Canoga Park Development Corp., G.R. No. 167246, 20 July 2011 expiration of the lease contract that the cause of action in the second ejectment complaint
accrued and made available to the respondent as a ground for ejecting the petitioner. Thus,
Facts the cause of action in the second case was not yet in existence at the time of filing of the
On January 4, 2000, the parties entered into a Contract of Lease on an eight hundred sixty first ejectment case. Thus, the respondent cannot be said to have committed a willful and
(860)-square-meter prime lot located in Ortigas Center, Pasig City owned by the deliberate forum shopping. Hence, petition is DENIED.
respondent. The respondent acquired the subject lot from Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership
through a Deed of Absolute Sale, subject to the some conditions
On October 10, 2000, before the lease contract expired, the respondent filed an
unlawful detainer case against the petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC)- • Chu et al v. Cunanan G.R. No. 156185, 12 September 2011
Branch 68, Pasig City. The respondent used as a ground for ejectment the petitioner’s
violation of stipulations in the lease contract regarding the use of the property. MTC decide Facts:
in favor of the respondent. RTC-Branch 155 affirmed. The case, however, was re-raffled
to the RTC-Branch 267, granted the petitioner’s motion, thereby reversing and setting aside The petitioners spouses Manuel Chu, Sr. and Catalina Chu were the registered owners of
the MTC-Branch 68 decision. Accordingly, Civil Case No. 8084 was dismissed for being five (5) parcels of land situated in Barrio Saguin, San Fernando, Pampanga. They
prematurely filed. Thus, the respondent filed a petition for review with the CA. During the executed a deed of sale on Sept. 30, 1986 with assumption of mortgage in favor of
pendency of the petition for review, the respondent filed on May 3, 2002 another case for Trinidad N. Cunanan. It was made to appear in the deed of sale that the total
unlawful detainer against the petitioner before the MTC. Respondent used as a ground for consideration had been fully paid to enable Cunanan to have the parcels of land
ejectment the expiration of the parties’ lease contract. MTC rendered a decision in favor registered in her name so that she could mortgage the same to secure a loan and
of the respondent. On appeal, the RTC-Branch 68 reversed and set aside the decision of the
thereupon pay from the proceeds of the loan.
MTC-Branch 71, and dismissed Civil Case No. 9210 on the ground of litis pendentia.

Issue: Their agreement, however, was that the ownership of the properties shall remain with
Whether Civil Case Nos. 8084 and 9210 involve the same cause of action. the petitioners until full payment of the balance of the total purchase price.

Cunanan failed to pay the balance of the total purchase price to the petitioners. Without
the knowledge of the petitioners, Cunanan sold the three (3) parcels of land to Cool rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued and the law will in no way oblige
Town Realty and Development Corporation, and the two (2) other parcels of land to the him to go behind the certificate to determine the condition of the property.
spouses Amado and Gloria Carlos. The spouses Carlos, in turn, sold these two (2)
properties to the respondent Benelda Estate Development Corporation. A person is considered in law as an innocent purchaser for value who is defined as one
who buys the property of another, without notice that some other person has a right or
Petitioners commenced civil case before the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga against interest in such property and pays a full price for the same, at the time of such purchase
Trinidad N. Cunanan, Cool Town Realty and Development Corporation and the Register or before he has notice of the claims or interest of some other person in the property. In
of Deeds of Pampanga. The petitioners amended their complaint to include respondent this connection, Section 53 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the
Benelda Estate Development Corporation as a defendant. Property Registration Decree, provides that:

The respondent filed its answer with a motion to dismiss on the ground that the The production of the owners duplicate certificate, whenever any voluntary instrument
amended complaint states no cause of action against respondent. It alleged that is presented for registration, shall be conclusive authority from the registered owner to
respondent corporation, through its officers, acted in good faith in buying the properties the Register of Deeds to enter a new certificate or to make a memorandum of
inasmuch as it exerted all efforts to verify the authenticity of the titles and that no registration in accordance with such instrument, and the new certificate or
defect was found. memorandum shall be binding upon the registered owner and upon all persons claiming
under him, in favor of every purchaser for value and in good faith.
After the petitioner filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss, the trial court rendered
a decision denying the motion to dismiss. Thus, a title procured through fraud and misrepresentation can still be the source of a
completely legal and valid title if the same is in the hands of an innocent purchaser for
The respondent filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before value.
the Court of Appeals alleging that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying its motion to dismiss the amended complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed In a case for annulment of title, therefore, the complaint must allege that the purchaser
the order of the trial court and dismissed the case as against the respondent on the was aware of the defect in the title so that the cause of action against him will be
ground of lack of cause of action and for failure of the petitioners to include the spouses sufficient. Failure to do so, as in the case at bar, is fatal for the reason that the court
Carlos as indispensable parties in the complaint. cannot render a valid judgment against the purchaser who is presumed to be in good
faith in acquiring the said property. Failure to prove, much less impute, bad faith on said
Issues: purchaser who has acquired a title in his favor would make it impossible for the court to
render a valid judgment thereon due to the indefeasibility and conclusiveness of his
a) Whether the spouses Amado E. Carlos and Gloria A. Carlos (sellers of the subject title.
titled parcels of land to respondent) are real and indispensable parties in the case at
bar. What is important is that when respondent bought the subject properties, it was not
aware of any defect in the covering certificates of title thereto at the time of such
b) Whether or not the respondent corporation is an innocent purchaser for value. purchase. There is no allegation to the contrary in the amended complaint. Therefore,
the title of respondent, being that of an innocent purchaser for value, remains valid.
Held:
By allowing the cancellation of their certificates of title and the issuance of new ones in
A cause of action is defined as an act or omission by which a party violates a right of lieu thereof in the name of Trinidad N. Cunanan despite alleged non-payment of the full
another. The test of the sufficiency of the facts found in a petition as constituting a purchase price for their subject two (2) parcels of land, the petitioners took the risk of
cause of action is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a losing their titles on the said properties inasmuch as the subject deed of sale with
valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer thereof. assumption of mortgage constitutes their consent and announcement to the whole
world that Cunanan was indeed the legal owner of the properties by virtue of the said
In land title cases, the court held that a person dealing with registered land may safely deed which is a public document.
 CCA Holdings protested the termination of the agreement and demanded that Riviera
The appellate court therefore was correct in entertaining the petition for the reason Golf settle its unpaid management and royalty fees. Riviera Golf however refused on the
that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion when it refused to dismiss the ground that CCA Holdings violated the terms of the agreement.
case against the respondent, despite the obvious insufficiency of the amended
complaint against the corporation respondent. In April 2001, CCA Holdings filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 146, Makati
City, a complaint for sum of money with damages docketed as Civil Case No. 01-611 (first
To implead the respondent in the case at bar, absent an allegation of bad faith on its complaint) against Riviera Golf. During the pendency of the case, the parties tried to
part, is to undermine a well-settled rule protecting innocent purchasers for value and extrajudicially settle their differences and executed a Compromise Agreement.
the indefeasibility and conclusiveness of certificates of title issued under the Torrens
System.
Subsequently, or on November 22, 2002, CCA Holdings again sent a letter to Riviera Golf,

this time, demanding the sum of US$390,768.00 representing the projected net income
The petition is DENIED for lack of cause of action.
or expected business profits it was supposed to derive for the unexpired two-year term

of the Management Agreement.
• Riviera Golf Club Inc v. CCA Holdings B.V. G.R. No. 173783, 17 June 2015

FACTS: Noting that the first and second complaints involve the same parties, the same subject
Riviera Golf, a domestic corporation, is the owner of Riviera Golf Club (Club), a 36-hole matter, and the same causes of action, Riviera Golf filed on August 6, 2003, a Motion to
Dismiss on the grounds of res judicata and violation of the rule against splitting of causes
golf course and recreational facility in Silang, Cavite. On October 11, 1996, Riviera Golf
of action. CCA Holdings opposed the motion contending that there is no splitting of causes
entered into a Management Agreement with CCA Holdings, B.V. (CCA Holdings), a foreign of action since the two cases are entirely independent of each other. CCA Holdings also
corporation, for the management and operation of the Club. justified its belated filing of the second complaint, arguing that the needed financial
records were in Riviera Golf’s possession.
The Management Agreement was for a period of five (5) years. Under this agreement,
Riviera Golf would pay CCA Holdings a monthly Base Management Fee of 5.5% of the ISSUE:
Adjusted Gross Revenue equivalent to US$16,500.00 per month, adjusted to4.5% per
month from the opening date, plus an incentive Management Fee of 10% of the Gross Whether CCA Holdings villolated the prohibitions against res judicara and splitting a single
Operating Profit. cause of action?

The parties also entered into a co-terminous Royalty Agreement that would allow Riviera HELD: Yes. Res judicata requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) the
Golf and the Club’s developer, Armed Forces of the Philippines’ Retirement and former judgment must be final; (2) it must have been rendered by a court having
Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS), to use CCA Holdings’ name and facilities to jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits;
market the Club’s shares. In consideration of the license to use CCA Holdings’ name, and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions (a) identity of parties, (b)
Riviera Golf and AFP-RSBS will pay CCA Holdings a gross licensing fee of 1% on all identity of subject matter, and (c) identity of causes of action.
membership fees paid in the sale of shares, an additional gross licensing fee of 4% on all
club shares, and 7% on non-golf memberships sold.
All the Elements of Res Judicata are Present. A cause of action may give rise to several
reliefs, but only one action can be filed.8 A single cause of action or entire claim or
On October 29, 1999, Riviera Golf sent CCA Holdings a letter informing the latter that it demand cannot be split up or divided into two or more different actions. The rule on
was pre-terminating the Management Agreement purportedly to alleviate the financial prohibiting the splitting of a single cause of action is clear. Section 4, Rule 2 of the Rules
crisis that the AFP-RSBS was experiencing. The Royalty Agreement was also deemed pre- of Court expressly states:
terminated.
Section 4. Splitting a single cause of action; effect of. – If two or more suits are instituted DOCTRINE copy SCRA syllabus related to the topic if possible
on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits It is well to remember that the joinder of causes of action may involve the same parties
in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others. or different parties. If the joinder involves different parties, as in this case, there must be
a question of fact or of law common to both parties joined, arising out of the same
In both Civil Case No. 01-611 and Civil Case No. 03-399, CCA Holdings imputed the same transaction or series of transactions.
wrongful act – the alleged violations of the terms and conditions of the Management and
Royalty Agreements. In Civil Case No. 01-611, CCA Holdings’ cause of action rests on
Riviera Golf’s failure to pay the licensing fees, reimbursement claims, and monthly FACTS bullet points
management and incentive fees. In Civil Case No. 03-399 on the other hand, CCA Holdings’ • April 27, 1998 - Petitioners filed a civil case for enforcement of contract and damages
cause of action hinges on the damages it allegedly incurred as a result of Riviera Golf’s with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or preliminary injunction against
premature termination of the Management and Royalty Agreements (i.e., the expected respondent before QC RTC.
business profits it was supposed to derive for the unexpired two-year term of the • Jan 17, 2000 – Respondent filed a “motion with leave to dismiss the complaint or
Management Agreement). Although differing in form, these two cases are ultimately ordered severed for separate trial” arguing there was a misjoinder of causes of action
anchored on Riviera Golf’s breach of the Management and Royalty Agreements. Thus, we under Sec 6 Rule 2 which was granted in an order dated Feb 28, 2000
conclude that they have identical causes of action • March 21, 2000 – petitioners received the order
• March 23, 2000 – petitioners moved for motion for reconsideration, which was
denied by the trial court on May 25, 2000, and received by petitioners on June 18,
e. Joinder and misjoinder of causes of 2000.
action • August 17, 2000 – petitioners filed original action for certiorari before the CA
imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in dismissing the complaint
• Perez v. Hernano, G.R. No. against respondent
147417, 8 July 2005 • CA dismissed the petition for having been filed beyond the reglementary period
pursuant to Sec 4 Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure amended by A.M. No.
CASE SUMMARY 00-2-03-50
Petitioners filed a case for the enforcement of contract and damages against respondent. ISSUE state all issues first. Bold the one related to the subject
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint arguing there was a misjoinder of 1. WON PETS FILED WITHIN REGLEMENTARY PERIOD à YES
causes of action, which the RTC granted. The RTC dismissed the MR which was denied, 2. WON RTC JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN DROPPING THE CASE
and on appeal through a Rule 65 petition for certiorari, the CA dismissed for having been DUE TO MISJOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION? à YES
filed beyond the reglementary period. The Supreme Court ruled first that the case was not
filed beyond the reglementary period, as Section 4 on Rule 65 was amended by AM No. RATIO Bold important words or phrases
00-23-SC, which clarified the 60 day rule that such 60-day period starts to run from receipt 1. WON à YES. Sec 4 was amended by A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC, and amendment
of notice of the denial of the MR, if one is filed.. They also said that there was no should be applied retroactively because it is considered curative in nature, as it
misjoinder of causes of action, as there were various questions of fact and law common to remedied the confusion caused by the original Circular No. 39-98
both Zescon Land, Inc., and respondent Hermano arising from a series of transactions over a. At the time petitioners filed their petition for certiorari (August 17,
the same properties. The RTC found that there was no joinder on the parties, hence the 2000) the rule then prevailing was Sec 4 Rule 65 as amended by
misjoinder, but the Supreme Court found that if the joinder involves different parties, as in Circular No. 39-98. However, on September 1, 2000, Sec 4 was
this case, there must be a question of fact or of law common to both parties joined, arising amended by A.M. No. 00-2-03- SC to read:
out of the same transaction or series of transactions. Such questions were sufficiently
alleged in the complaint by Petitioners in their complaint. “Sec 4 – The petition shall be filed not later than 60 days from notice
of the judgment or order resolution. In case of a motion for
reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is

 required or not, the 60-day period shall be counted from notice of the ii. Question of which of the four contracts were validly
denial of said motion.” entered into by the parties.
i. Under the amendment, the 60-day period starts to run iii. Question of whether or not Zescon Land, Inc., as
from receipt of notice of the denial of the MR, if one is filed. represented by Sales-Contreras, and respondent Hermano
b. The amendment should be applied retroactively because it is committed fraud against petitioners as to make them liable
considered curative in nature, as it remedied the confusion caused by for damages.
Circular No. 39-98 (because prior to the amendment, a party had a d. Thus, respondent Hermano will definitely be affected if it is
fresh period from receipt of the order denying the MR to file a petition subsequently declared that what was entered into by petitioners and
for certiorari) Zescon Land, Inc., was a Contract of Sale.
c. Curative statutes, enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to validate e. Prescinding from the foregoing, and bearing in mind that the joinder
legal proceedings, by their very essence, are retroactive. And being a of causes of action should be liberally construed as to effect in one
procedural rule, such are construed to be applicable to actions action a complete determination of all matters in controversy
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, and are involving one subject matter, we hold that the trial court committed
deemed retroactive. grave abuse of discretion in severing from the complaint petitioners
d. Petitioners had a fresh period of 60 days from June 18. When they cause of action against respondent Hermano.
filed on Aug. 17, exactly 60 days had lapsed.
2. YES. There was no Misjoinder on Causes of action in the current case.
a. The rule on misjoinder of causes of action is found in Sec 6 Rule 2.
There is misjoinder of causes of action when the conditions for joinder
under Sec 5 Rule 2 are not met. It is the first condition - on joinder of • Danilo v. Pedro, G.R. No. 155736,
parties - that the trial court deemed to be lacking. It is well to 31 March 2005
remember that the joinder of causes of action may involve the same
parties or different parties. If the joinder involves different parties, as Facts:
in this case, there must be a question of fact or of law common to
both parties joined, arising out of the same transaction or series of The petitioners, Spouses Danilo and Cristina Decena were the owners of a parcel of land,
transactions. with a house constructed thereon, located in Parañaque City... issued on February 24,
b. In herein case, petitioners have adequately alleged in their complaint 1998.
that after they had already agreed to enter into a contract to sell with
Zescon Land, Inc., through Sales-Contreras, the latter also gave them On September 7, 1997, the petitioners and the respondents, the Spouses Pedro and
other documents to sign, to wit: A Deed of Absolute Sale over the Valeria Piquero, executed a Memorandum of Agreement... in which the former sold the
same properties but for a lower consideration, two mortgage deeds property to the latter for the price of P940,250.00 payable in six (6) installments... via
over the same properties in favor of respondent Hermano with postdated checks. The vendees forthwith took possession of the property.
accompanying notes and acknowledgment receipts for Ten Million
pesos (P10,000,000) each. Petitioners claim that Zescon Land, Inc., It appears in the MOA that the petitioners obliged themselves to transfer the property to
through Sales-Contreras, misled them to mortgage their properties the respondents upon the execution of the MOA with the condition that if two of the
which they had already agreed to sell to the latter postdated checks would be dishonored by the drawee bank, the latter would be obliged
c. Reasonably apparent that there are questions of fact and law to reconvey the... property to the petitioners.
common to both Zescon Land, Inc., and respondent Hermano arising
from a series of transactions over the same properties. the petitioners, then residents of Malolos, Bulacan, filed a Complaint... against the
i. Question of fact, of whether or not Zescon Land, Inc., respondents with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, for the annulment
indeed misled petitioners to sign the mortgage deeds in of the sale/MOA, recovery of possession and damages. The... petitioners alleged therein
favor of respondent Hermano. that, they did not transfer the property to and in the names of the respondents as vendees
because the first two checks drawn and issued by them in payment for the purchase price respondents are merely incidental to the main cause... of action, and are not independent
of the property were dishonored by the drawee bank, and were not... replaced with cash or separate causes of action.
despite demands therefor.
the action should have been filed in the proper court where the property is located,
The respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground, inter alia, of namely, in Parañaque City, conformably with Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court which
improper venue and lack of jurisdiction over the property subject matter of the action. reads:

On the first ground, the respondents averred that the principal action of the petitioners SECTION 1. Venue of real actions. Actions affecting title to or possession of real property,
for the rescission of the MOA, and the recovery of the possession of the property is a real or interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has
action and not a personal one; hence, it should have been brought in the RTC of jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is...
Parañaque City,... where the property subject matter of the action was located, and not situated.
in the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, where the petitioners resided. The respondents posited
that the said court had no jurisdiction over the property subject matter of the action Since the petitioners, who were residents of Malolos, Bulacan, filed their complaint in the
because it was located in Parañaque City. said RTC, venue was improperly laid; hence, the trial court acted conformably with Section
1(c), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court when it ordered the dismissal of the complaint.
Issues:
Principles:
whether or not venue was properly laid by the petitioners in the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan.
Where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to different venues
Ruling: or jurisdiction, the joinder may be allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one of the
causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies therein
The resolution of this issue is, in turn, anchored on whether Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules
of Court invoked by the petitioners is applicable in this case. Under the third condition, if one cause of action falls within the jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court and the other falls within the jurisdiction of a Municipal Trial Court, the action
Under the said Rule, a party may, in one pleading, assert, in the alternative or otherwise, should be filed in the Regional Trial Court. If the causes of action... have different venues,
as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party subject to the they may be joined in any of the courts of proper venue. Hence, a real action and a
conditions therein enumerated personal action may be joined either in the Regional Trial Court of the place where the
real property is located or where the parties reside.
A cause of action is to be found... in the facts alleged in the complaint and not in the
prayer for relief. It is the substance and not the form that is controlling. • Totality Rule (BP 129, Sec. 33)

A party may have two or more causes of action against another party. • Flores v. Mallare-Phillipps, G.R.

After due consideration of the foregoing, we find and so rule that Section 5(c), Rule 2 of FACTS
the Rules of Court does not apply. This is so because the petitioners, as plaintiffs in the Flores sued the resps for the collection of sum of money with the RTC
court a quo, had only one cause of action against the respondents, namely, the breach The first cause of action alleged in the complaint was against Ignacio Binongcal for
of... the MOA upon the latter's refusal to pay the first two installments in payment of the refusing to pay the amount of P11,643 representing cost of truck tires which he purchased
property as agreed upon, and turn over to the petitioners the possession of the real on credit from Flores on various occasions from August to October, 1981;
property, as well as the house constructed thereon occupied by the respondents. The The second cause of action was against resp Fernando Calion for allegedly refusing to pay
claim for damages for... reasonable compensation for the respondents' use and the amount of P10,212 representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit from
occupation of the property, in the interim, as well as moral and exemplary damages pet on several occasions from March, 1981 to January, 1982.
suffered by the petitioners on account of the aforestated breach of contract of the
Binongcal filed a MTD on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the amount of the If the total demand If the total demand
demand against said resp was only P11,643.00, and under Section 19(8) of BP129 the RTC exceeds P20K – RTC has exceeds P20K – RTC has
shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction if the amount of the demand is more than jurisdiction jurisdiction
P20K.
Although another person, Fernando Calion, was allegedly indebted to pet in the amount If the causes of action are If the causes of action are
of P10,212.00, his obligation was separate and distinct from that of the other resp. Calion separate and separate and
joined in moving for the dismissal of the complaint. independent, their joinder independent, their joinder
RTC dismissed the complaint. in one complaint is in one complaint is
permissive and not permissive and not
ISSUE mandatory, and any cause mandatory, and any cause
WON the trial court correctly ruled on the application of the permissive joinder of parties of action where the of action where the
amount of the demand is amount of the demand is
ruling 20K or less may be the 20K or less may be the
The lower court has jurisdiction over the case following the "novel" totality rule subject of a separate subject of a separate
introduced in Section 33(l) of BP129 and Section 11 of the Interim Rules. complaint filed with a complaint filed with a
Section 33(l) of BP129 metropolitan or MTC. metropolitan or MTC.
That where there are several claims or causes of action between the same or different Two or more plaintiffs Where the claims or The causes of action in
parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality having a separate causes causes of action joined in favor of the two or more
of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose of action against a a single complaint are plaintiffs or against the
out of the same or different transactions. ... defendant join in a single separately owned by or two or more defendants
Section 11 of the Interim Rules complaint due to different parties, should arise out of the
Application of the totality rule. In actions where the jurisdiction of the court is dependent each separate claim shall same transaction or series
on the amount involved, the test of jurisdiction shall be the aggregate sum of all the furnish the jurisdictional of transactions and there
money demands, exclusive only of interest and costs, irrespective of WON the separate test should be a common
claims are owned by or due to different parties. If any demand is for damages in a civil The former rule applied question of law or fact, as
action, the amount thereof must be specifically alleged. only to cases of permissive provided in Section 6 of
former rule under Section 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 joinder of parties plaintiff. Rule 3.
Where there are several claims or causes of action between the same parties embodied However, it was also
in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the demand in applicable to cases of
all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same permissive joinder of
or different transactions; but where the claims or causes of action joined in a single parties defendant.
complaint are separately owned by or due to different parties, each separate claim shall
furnish the jurisdictional test. ... Brillo vs. Buklatan (former rule):
Separate claims against several defendants of different amounts each of which is not
comparison of former and present rules more than P2,000 and falls under the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace court. The
several claims do not arise from the same transaction or series of transactions and there
Present rule Former rule seem to be no questions of law or of fact common to all the defendants as may warrant
Where a plaintiff sues a Totality of the claims in all Totality of the claims in all their joinder under Rule 3, section 6.
defendant on two or the causes of action the causes of action
more separate causes of irrespective of whether irrespective of whether The difference between the former and present rules in cases of permissive joinder of
action the COA arose out of the the COA arose out of the parties may be illustrated by the two cases which were cited in the case of Vda. de Rosario
same or diff transactions. same or diff transactions. vs. Justice of the Peace as exceptions to the totality rule.
· Soriano y Cia vs. Jose 29 dismissed employees joined in a complaint against the Archbishop of Manila and the brotherhood was formally organized under the name of La
defendant to collect their respective claims, each of which was within the jurisdiction of Archicofradia del Santisimo Sacramento. Under the law as it then existed royal approval
the municipal court although the total exceeded the jurisdictional amount, this Court held was essential to the legality of an association of this character; and it was not until July 23,
that under the law then the municipal court had jurisdiction. Although the plaintiffs' 1819, that a royal cedula was issued by the king of Spain, placing the brotherhood upon a
demands were separate, distinct and independent of one another, their joint suit was lawful basis and defining the manner in which it should be organized and conducted.
authorized under Section 6 of Rule 3 and each separate claim furnished the jurisdictional Meanwhile, however, under the approval of the Archbishop, the association had begun
test. exercising its functions and had maintained a de facto existence from the time of its first
· International Colleges, Inc. vs. Argonza, 25 dismissed teachers jointly sued for unpaid
organization.
salaries, the MC had jurisdiction because the amount of each claim was within, although
the total exceeded, its jurisdiction and it was a case of permissive joinder of parties
plaintiff under Section 6 of Rule 3. Issues:

Under the present law, the two cases would be under the jurisdiction of the RTC. Similarly, WON the defendants should be accountable to the Court for the fund held by them as
Brillo vs. Buklatan and Gacula vs. Martinez, if the separate claims against the several trustees pertaining to the Brotherhood.
defendants arose out of the same transaction or series of transactions and there is a
common question of law or fact, they would now be under the jurisdiction of the RTC. Ruling:
In cases of permissive joinder of parties, whether as plaintiffs or as defendants, under
Section 6 of Rule 3, the total of all the claims shall now furnish the jurisdictional test. Yes, the court have undoubted jurisdiction to compel a trustee to account for the trust funds
Needless to state also, if instead of joining or being joined in one complaint separate in his hands and property to perform his trust. In this connection we note that, under the
actions are filed by or against the parties, the amount demanded in each complaint shall terms of the foundation, the board of directors of the brotherhood was required to account
furnish the jurisdictional test. to the gobernadorcillo, for the time being, of the town of Pagsanjan. But in view of the fact
The lower court correctly held that the jurisdictional test is subject to the rules on joinder that officials of the civil government have, since the change of sovereignty in these Islands,
of parties pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2 and Section 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and ceased to concern themselves with the performance of this trust, it was observed that in this
that, after a careful scrutiny of the complaint, it appears that there is a misjoinder of action the defendants should be required to account to the court.
parties for the reason that the claims against resps Binongcal and Calion are separate and
distinct and neither of which falls within its jurisdiction.
b.Real parties in interest


Rule 3 - Parties to Civil Actions
• Evangelista v. Santiago, G.R. No.157447, 29 April 2005
a.Natural and Juridical Persons, Entities Authorized by law


c. representatives as parties
• Verzosa v. Fernandez, 49. Phil. 627 (1926)
• V-Gent, Inc. v. Morning Star Travel & Tours, Inc., G.R. No. 186305, 22 July 2015


• Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, 30 July 1993
Facts:

• Resident Marine Mammals of Tanon Strait v. Reyes G.R. No. 180771, 21 April 2015
On February 20, 1807, a number of individuals constituting or representing the guild of

sangley mestizos of the pueblo of Pagsanjan, in the Province of Laguna, united themselves Facts:
into a religious association or brotherhood for the purpose of raising and supplying, from
year to year, the means necessary to meet the expenses of the annual fiestas in honor of the This is a consolidated petition filed by two different petitioners. This is an original petition for certiorari,
most Holy Sacrament and of their patroness the Virgen Lady of Guadalupe, as well as for prohibition and mandamus assailing the validity of Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46), which allowed the exploration,
the further purpose of procuring the celebration of an annual requiem mass for the repose development, and exploitation of petroleum resources within Tañon Strait, a narrow passage of water situated between the
islands of Negros and Cebu. SC-46 originated from a Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102) entered
of the souls of the deceased members. The step met the approval of their superior, the
by DOE with JAPEX. This contract involved geological and geophysical studies of the Tañon Strait. The studies included
surface geology, sample analysis, and reprocessing of seismic and magnetic data. JAPEX, assisted by DOE, also conducted
geophysical and satellite surveys, as well as oil and gas sampling in Tañon Strait.
JAPEX committed to drill one exploration well during the second sub-phase of the project. Since the well was
to be drilled in the marine waters of Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan, where the Tañon Strait was declared a protected
seascape in 1988,10 JAPEX agreed to comply with the Environmental Impact Assessment requirements pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 1586. This was approved by the Protected Area Management Board12 of the Tañon Strait (PAMB-
Tañon Strait), and an ECC was subsequently released to JAPEX for the offshore oil and gas exploration project in Tañon
Strait. From 16 November 2007 to 8 February 2008, JAPEX drilled an exploratory well with a depth of 3,150 meters near
Pinamungajan town. Being adversely affected by the activities, this petition was filed.
ISSUES
1. WON Petitioners have a legal standing
2. WON President Arroyo may be impleaded as unwilling co-petitioner.
3. WON SC-46 is unconstitutional
RULING:
1. YES. In our jurisdiction, locus standi in environmental cases has been given a more liberalized approach. The
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allow for a “citizen suit,” and permit any Filipino citizen to file an
action before our courts for violation of our environmental laws on the principle that humans are stewards of
nature:
“Section 5. Citizen suit. – Any Filipino citizen in representation of others,
including minors or generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce
rights or obligations under environmental laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit,
the court shall issue an order which shall contain a brief description of the cause
of action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested parties to manifest their
interest to intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The
plaintiff may publish the order once in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines or furnish all affected barangays copies of said order.
Citizen suits filed under R.A. No. 8749 and R.A. No. 9003 shall be governed by
their respective provisions. (Emphasis supplied)”
Although the petition was filed in 2007, years before the effectivity of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases, it has been consistently held that rules of procedure may be retroactively applied to
actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and will not violate any right of a person who
may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there is no vested rights in rules of procedure.
Moreover, even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases became effective, the
SC had already taken a permissive position on the issue of locus standi in environmental cases. In Oposa, the
SC allowed the suit to be brought in the name of generations yet unborn “based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.”
In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our Rules,
which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws. It is worth noting
here that the Stewards are joined as real parties in the Petition and not just in representation of the named cetacean species.
The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition that there may be possible violations of laws
concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine Mammals, are therefore declared to possess the legal standing to file this
petition.c (in a way, wala gyud ni rule ang Court if tagaan ba legal standing ang animals).
2. NO. Under the Rules, if the consent of a plaintiff cannot be obtained, he or she shall be impleaded as a
defendant. In this case, we cannot implead the president as defendant because her functions as President
need her full devotion. This will put the unwilling party under the jurisdiction of the Court, which can properly
implead him or her through its processes. The unwilling party's name cannot be simply included in a petition,
without his or her knowledge and consent, as such would be a denial of due process. Moreover, the reason
cited by the petitioners Stewards for including former President Macapagal-Arroyo in their petition, is not
sufficient to implead her as an unwilling co-petitioner. Impleading the former President as an unwilling co-
petitioner, for an act she made in the performance of the functions of her office, is contrary to the public policy
against embroiling the President in suits, "to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from
any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside
from requiring all of the office holder's time, also demands undivided attention.
3. YES. Petitioners maintain that SC-46 transgresses the Jura Regalia Provision or paragraph 1, Section 2, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution because JAPEX is 100% Japanese-owned.60 Furthermore, the FIDEC asserts that
SC-46 cannot be considered as a technical and financial assistance agreement validly executed under
paragraph 4 of the same provision. It is petitioner’s position that service contracts involving foreign corporations
or entities have been banned by the 1987 Constitution. The Court went back to discuss the case of La Bugal,
and explained that par.4 of Sec.2 Article XII of the Constitution is the exception to the general rule in par.1 of
the same provision (in short, pwede ra mo enter into service contracts subject to certain conditions).
The following are the safeguards this Court enumerated in La Bugal:chanroblesvirt
Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils. The grant
thereof is subject to several safeguards, among which are these requirements:
(1) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law that will set standard or
uniform terms, conditions and requirements, presumably to attain a certain uniformity in provisions
and avoid the possible insertion of terms disadvantageous to the country.
- The Court finds that there was a law. PD 87 (The Oil Exploration and Development Act of
1972). This law has not been repealed, and so is an existing valid law governing oil explorations.
But note must be made at this point that while Presidential Decree No. 87 may serve as the general
law upon which a service contract for petroleum exploration and extraction may be authorized, as
will be discussed below, the exploitation and utilization of this energy resource in the present case
may be allowed only through a law passed by Congress, since the Tañon Strait is a NIPAS area
 (2) The President shall be the signatory for the government because, supposedly before an agreement is
presented to the President for signature, it will have been vetted several times over at different levels
to ensure that it conforms to law and can withstand public scrutiny.
- Not met. Paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution requires that the
President himself enter into any service contract for the exploration of petroleum. SC-46
appeared to have been entered into and signed only by the DOE through its then Secretary,
Vicente S. Perez, Jr., contrary to the said constitutional requirement. Moreover, public
respondents have neither shown nor alleged that Congress was subsequently notified of the
execution of such contract.
o Cannot fall under the alter-ego doctrine, because in cases where the Chief
Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the
exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the alter ego doctrine
cannot apply. In this case, the public respondents have failed to show that the
President had any participation in SC-46. Their argument that their acts are actually
the acts of then President Macapagal-Arroyo, absent proof of her disapproval, must
fail as the requirement that the President herself enter into these kinds of contracts
is embodied not just in any ordinary statute, but in the Constitution itself. These
service contracts involving the exploitation, development, and utilization of our
natural resources are of paramount interest to the present and future generations.
Hence, safeguards were put in place to insure that the guidelines set by law are
meticulously observed and likewise to eradicate the corruption that may easily
penetrate departments and agencies by ensuring that the President has authorized
or approved of these service contracts herself.
(3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to Congress to give that branch of
government an opportunity to look over the agreement and interpose timely objections, if any.69cralawlawlibrary
- Not complied as well.
Adhering to the aforementioned guidelines, this Court finds that SC-46 is indeed null and void for noncompliance
with the requirements of the 1987 Constitution.
d. indispensable parties
• In the Matter of the Heirship of the
Late Hermogenes Rodriguez, G.R. No. 182645, 15 December 2010 (Resolution)
This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to declare null and
void ab initio the 16 April 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57417
and the 21 February 2007 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iriga City, Branch 34
in SP No. IR-1110. The Court of Appeals' decision nullified the entire special proceedings
in SP No. IR-1110, while the 21 February 2007 Order of the RTC expunged from the records
the proceedings in SP No. IR-1110.
On 14 September 1989 a petition for Declaration of Heirship And Appointment of
Administrator and Settlement Of The Estates of the Late Hermogenes Rodriguez
(Hermogenes) and Antonio Rodriguez (Antonio) was filed before the RTC.1 The petition,
docketed as Special Proceeding No. IR-1110, was filed by Henry F. Rodriguez (Henry),
Certeza F. Rodriguez (Certeza), and Rosalina R. Pellosis (Rosalina). Henry, Certeza and
Rosalina sought that they be declared the sole and surviving heirs of the late Antonio
Rodriguez and Hermogenes Rodriguez. They alleged they are the great grandchildren of
Antonio based on the following genealogy: that Henry and Certeza are the surviving
children of Delfin M. Rodriguez (Delfin) who died on 8 February 1981, while Rosalina is
the surviving heir of Consuelo M. Rodriguez (Consuelo); that Delfin and Consuelo were
the heirs of Macario J. Rodriguez (Macario) who died in 1976; that Macario and Flora
Rodriguez were the heirs of Antonio; that Flora died without an issue in 1960 leaving
Macario as her sole heir.
Henry, Certeza and Rosalina's claim to the intestate estate of the late Hermogenes
Rodriguez, a former gobernadorcillo, is based on the following lineage: that Antonio and
Hermogenes were brothers and the latter died in 1910 without issue, leaving Antonio as
his sole heir.
At the initial hearing of the petition on 14 November 1989, nobody opposed the petition.2
Having no oppositors to the petition, the RTC entered a general default against the whole
world except the Republic of the Philippines. After presentation of proof of compliance
with jurisdictional requirements, the RTC allowed Henry, Certeza and Rosalina to submit
evidence before a commissioner in support of the petition. After evaluating the evidence
presented, the commissioner found that Henry, Certeza and Rosalina are the
grandchildren in the direct line of Antonio and required them to present additional
evidence to establish the alleged fraternal relationship between Antonio and
Hermogenes.
Taking its cue from the report of the commissioner, the RTC rendered a Partial Judgment
dated 31 May 1990 declaring Henry, Certeza and Rosalina as heirs in the direct descending
line of the late Antonio, Macario and Delfin and appointing Henry as regular administrator
of the estate of the decedents Delfin, Macario and Antonio, and as special administrator
to the estate of Hermogenes.
Henry filed the bond and took his oath of office as administrator of the subject estates.
Subsequently, six group of oppositors entered their appearances either as a group or
individually, namely:
 Several of the aggrieved parties questioned the Amended Decision. Florencia Rodriguez
(1) The group of Judith Rodriguez; appealed to the Court of Appeals to no avail and eventually via Petition for Review before
this Court in G.R. No. 142477, which this Court denied with finality on 5 September 2000.4
(2) The group of Carola Favila-Santos The group of Carola Favila-Santos challenged the Amended Decision in this Court which
was docketed as G.R. No. 140271, which was denied with finality on 22 February 2000.5
(3) Jaime Robles;
For his part, Jaime Robles assailed the Amended Decision by merely filing a mere notice
(4) Florencia Rodriguez; of appeal on 12 October 1999. The RTC, in an order dated 22 November 1999, denied this
for his failure to file a record on appeal as required by the Rules of Court.6
(5)Victoria Rodriguez; and
Since Jaime Robles' appeal was not perfected, the Amended Decision became final and
(6) Bienvenido Rodriguez. executory and a Certificate of Finality was issued on 17 January 2000.7 Apparently,
petitioner Rene B. Pascual came into the picture since he is a buyer of a real property
Only the group of Judith Rodriguez had an opposing claim to the estate of Antonio, while belonging to the Rodriguez estate located at San Jose, San Fernardo, Pampanga covered
the rest filed opposing claims to the estate of Hermogenes.3 by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12022. The Absolute Sale of Real Property executed on
19 January 2005, approved by the RTC, was entered into between petitioner Rene B.
In his opposition, Jaime Robles likewise prayed that he be appointed regular administrator Pascual and the administrator of the estates, Henry. It is by virtue of this sale that
to the estates of Antonio and Hermogenes and be allowed to sell a certain portion of land petitioner Rene B. Pascual intervened in this case
included in the estate of Hermogenes covered by OCT No. 12022 located at Barrio
Mangahan, Pasig, Rizal. • Cerezo v. Tuazon, G.R. No. 141538, 23 March 2004

After hearing on Jaime Roble's application for appointment as regular administrator, the FACTS:
RTC issued an Order dated 15 December 1994 declaring him to be an heir and next of kin Country Bus Lines passenger bus collided with a tricycle. Tricycle driver Tuazon
of decedent Hermogenes and thus qualified to be the administrator. Accordingly the said filed a complaint for damages against Mrs. Cerezo, as owner of the bus line, her
order appointed Jaime Robles as regular administrator of the entire estate of Hermogenes husband Attorney Juan Cerezo, and bus driver Danilo A. Foronda.
and allowed him to sell the property covered by OCT No. 12022 located at Barrio After considering Tuazon‘s testimonial and documentary evidence, the trial court
ruled in Tuazon‘s favor. The trial court made no pronouncement on Foronda‘s
Manggahan, Pasig, Rizal.
liability because there was no service of summons on him. The trial court did not

hold Atty. Cerezo liable as Tuazon failed to show that Mrs. Cerezo‘s business
On 27 April 1999, the RTC rendered a decision declaring Carola Favila-Santos and her co-
benefited the family, pursuant to Article 121(3) of the Family Code. The trial court
heirs as heirs in the direct descending line of Hermogenes and reiterated its ruling in the held Mrs. Cerezo solely liable for the damages sustained by Tuazon arising from
partial judgment declaring Henry, Certeza and Rosalina as heirs of Antonio. The decision the negligence of Mrs. Cerezo‘s employee, pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil
dismissed the oppositions of Jaime Robles, Victoria Rodriguez, Bienvenido Rodriguez, and Code.
Florencia Rodriguez for their failure to substantiate their respective claims of heirship to
the late Hermogenes. ISSUE:
Whether petitioner is solidarily liable.
On 13 August 1999, the RTC issued an Amended Decision reversing its earlier finding as
to Carola Favila-Santos. This time, the RTC found Carola Favila-Santos and company not RULING:
related to the decedent Hermogenes. The RTC further decreed that Henry, Certeza and Contrary to Mrs. Cerezo‘s assertion, Foronda is not an indispensable party to the
Rosalina are the heirs of Hermogenes. The RTC also re-affirmed its earlier verdict case. An indispensable party is one whose interest is affected by the court‘s action
dismissing the oppositions of Jaime Robles, Victoria Rodriguez, Bienvenido Rodriguez, and in the litigation, and without whom no final resolution of the case is possible.
Florencia Rodriguez. However, Mrs. Cerezo‘s liability as an employer in an action for a quasi-delict is

not only solidary, it is also primary and direct. Foronda is not an indispensable party arise. The burden of evidence then shifts to the defendant to show that no liability under
to the final resolution of Tuazon‘s action for damages against Mrs. Cerezo. Art. 2180 has ensued. This case harmonizes the requirement of Art. 2180, in relation to
The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is Art. 2176, and the so-called “registered-owner rule”
solidary. Where there is a solidary obligation on the part of debtors, as in this case, - It is imperative to apply the registered-owner rule in a manner that harmonizes it with
each debtor is liable for the entire obligation. Hence, each debtor is liable to pay Arts. 2176 and 2180, CC. Rules must be construed in a manner that will harmonize them
for the entire obligation in full. There is no merger or renunciation of rights, but only with other rules so as to form a uniform and consistent system of jurisprudence—Art.
mutual representation. Where the obligation of the parties is solidary, either of the
2180 should defer to the registered-owner rule, but it was never stated that Art. 2180
parties is indispensable, and the other is not even a necessary party because
should be completely abandoned.
complete relief is available from either. Therefore, jurisdiction over Foronda is not
even necessary as Tuazon may collect damages from Mrs. Cerezo alone.
Moreover, an employer‘s liability based on a quasi-delict is primary and direct, Facts:
while the employer‘s liability based on a delict is merely subsidiary. The words - 13 July 2000: R was walking along the west- bound lane of Sampaguita St., United
―primary and direct,ǁ as contrasted with ―subsidiary,ǁ refer to the remedy Paranaque Subd. IV, Paranaque City. An L-300 van was traveling along the east-bound
provided by law for enforcing the obligation rather than to the character and limits lane opposite R. To avoid an incoming vehicle, the van swerved to its left and hit R. E went
of the obligation. Although liability under Article 2180 originates from the negligent to her aid and loaded her in the back of the van and told the driver, B, to bring R to the
act of the employee, the aggrieved party may sue the employer directly. hospital. Instead, B left the van parked inside a nearby subdivision (with R still in the van).
When an employee causes damage, the law presumes that the employer has Fortunately, an unidentified civilian helped and drove R to the hospital.
himself committed an act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage. - C, a corporation engaged in organizing travels and tours, was the registered owner of
This is the fault that the law condemns. While the employer is civilly liable in a the van. B was C's EE and was assigned to drive the van as its service driver.
subsidiary capacity for the employee‘s criminal negligence, the employer is also - C shouldered the hospital expenses of R, but R died two days after the accident.
civilly liable directly and separately for his own civil negligence in failing to exercise - A, R’s paternal aunt and the person who raised her since R was 9 y.o., filed a Complaint
due diligence in selecting and supervising his employee. The idea that the for damages against B and C in RTC Paranaque. A alleged that B was an EE of C and that C
employer‘s liability is solely subsidiary is wrong. is the registered owner of the van.
To hold the employer liable in a subsidiary capacity under a delict, the aggrieved
- Summons could not be served on B, so A moved to drop B as a defendant—RTC granted.
party must initiate a criminal action where the employee‘s delict and corresponding
- RTC found that B was grossly negligent in driving
primary liability are established. If the present action proceeds from a delict, then
the trial court‘s jurisdiction over Foronda is necessary. the vehicle. RTC awarded damages in favor of A1. C’s MR was denied
However, the present action is clearly for the quasi-delict of Mrs. Cerezo and not CA affirmed with modification RTC’s decision2. C’s MR was denied. Hence this petition for
for the delict of Foronda. review on certiorari (on CA decision).
Thus, the petition was denied ordering the defendant Hermana Cerezo to pay the - C’sArguments:
plaintiff. • A has no personality to bring this suit because
-
A’s Arguments:
• Foster-Gallego v. Spouses Galang, G.R. No. 130228, July 27, 2004 •C failed to provide proof that it exercised the
requisite diligence in the selection and
e.necessary parties; supervision of B.
• CA ruling on damages should be upheld
• Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc. v. Abejar, G.R. • Since C is the registered owner of the van, it is
No. 170631, February 10, 2016 directly, primarily, and solidarity liable for the tortious acts of B.
she isn’t a real party-in-interest
Doctrine: • A doesn’t exercise legal or substitute parental
- The plaintiff may first prove the ER’s ownership of the vehicle involved in a mishap by authority, nor is she the judicially appointed guardian of or only living relative of R, nor
presenting the vehicle’s registration in evidence. Thereafter, a disputable presumption the executor or administrator of the estate of R.
that the requirements for an ER’s liability under Art. 2180, CC have been satisfied will
•Only the victim or the heirs can enforce an action on culpa aquiliana (such as A’s action (thus she had already reached the age of majority and was emancipated), and parental
for damages). authority is terminated upon emancipation, A continued to support and care for R—the
• A didn’t offer documentary or testimonial evidence to prove that B acted within the relationship remained the same. “The anguish and damage caused to [A] was by [R’s]
scope of his assigned tasks when the accident occurred. death was no different because of [R’s] emancipation”
- According to C, B’s tasks only pertained to the transport of company personnel or - In any case, termination of A’s parental authority is not an insurmountable legal bar that
products precludes the filing of her Complaint.
•C argues it exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and - The Court has held that Art. 1902, Old CC/Art. 2176, New CC is broad enough to
supervision of its EEs. accommodate even plaintiffs who are not relatives of the deceased.

•A should not have been awarded damages, and questions the Certificate provided by A
as proof of expenses since its signatory (Julian Peñaloza) was not present in court and that II. Yes, C is liable.
C was denied the right to cross-examine him. And that the Certificate constitutes hearsay. - A’s Complaint is anchored on an ER’s liability for quasi-delict provided in Art. 2180 in
•C contends that based on Art. 2206(3), CC A isn't entitled to moral damages because C relation to Art. 2176, CC.
acted in good faith. - It was not fatal to A’s cause that she herself did not adduce proof that B acted within the
• That C should not be held solidarity liable with B since B was already dropped as a party. scope of his authority. It was sufficient that A proved that C was the registered owner of
the van that hit R.
Issues: - According to the Court, two rules must be considered:
I. WON A is a real party-in-interest who may bring an action for damages against C on 1. Art. 2180’s specification that “[ERs] shall be liable for the damages caused by their
account of R’s death—YES. [EEs]...acting within the scope of their assigned tasks[.]”
II. WON C should be liable as an ER, pursuant to Art. 2180, CC—YES. 2. The operation of the registered-owner rule (ROR) that registered owners are liable for
death or injuries caused by the operation of their vehicles.
Ruling - These rules appear to be in conflict when it comes to cases in which the ER is also the
Yes, A is a real party-in-interest. registered owner of the vehicle.
- A exercised substitute parental authority and suffered actual loss - Art. 2180 requires proof of two things:
- A properly filed an action based on quasi-delict and she is a real party-in-interest, which 1. An ER-EE relationship between the driver
is defined in Sec. 2, Rule 3, 1997 Rules of CivPro which states that “xxx the party who and owner; and
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgement in the suit, or the party entitled to the 2. That the driver acted within the scope of
avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must his/her assigned tasks.
be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in- interest.” - On the other hand, applying the ROR only
- The Court also looked at Art. 216 and 233, FC to identify persons who exercise substitute requires the plaintiff to prove that defendant-ER
parental authority. is the registered-owner (RO) of the vehicle.
- R’s parents and paternal grandparents are deceased, and the whereabouts of her - ROR can be seen as early as in the case of Erezo, et al. v. Jepte (1957) where this Court
maternal grandparents are unknown. There is no record of R having siblings. A took explained that the registration of motor vehicles, as required by Sec. 5(a), RA 4136 (Land
custody of R when R was a child and A assumed the role of parent and exercised parental Transportation and Traffic Code), was necessary “not to make said registration the
authority over R. operative act by which ownership in vehicles is transferred,... but to permit the use and
- Consistent with Art. 220, FC, A supported R’s education and provided for her personal operation of the vehicle upon any public highway[.]” Its “main aim...is to identify the
needs— A treated R as her own daughter. owner so that if any accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the
- A’s right to proceed against against C is based on two grounds: vehicle on the public highways, responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite
• A suffered actual personal loss. individual, the registered owner
• A is capacitated to do what R’s actual parents
would have been to do. Separate Concurring Opinion: J. Brion
- Although R was already 18 y.o. when she died •Brion: A is a real party-in-interest, not because she exercised substitute parental
authority over R, but because she has an interest in claiming actual and exemplary
damages from C. Parental authority has no bearing on one’s status as a real party-in- • Petitioner: As a result of respondent Naga City Government's demolition of a portion
interest in a quasi- delict case. of petitioners' house, the Alguras allegedly lost a monthly income of PhP 7,000.00
•Brion: Courts may also impose exemplary damages, in addition to compensatory from their boarders' rentals. With the loss of the rentals, the meager income from
damages, if the defendant acted with gross negligence. In the present case, B’s act of Lorencita Algura's sari-sari store and Antonio Algura's small take home pay became
leaving R rather than bringing her to a hospital amounts to gross negligence. insufficient for the expenses of the Algura spouses and their 6 children for their basic
•Although J. Brion agrees that C is directly and primarily liable for damages as B’s ER and needs including food, bills, clothes, and schooling, among others.
as the van’s RO, he discusses the ROR in relation to Arts. 2180 and 2176 thus: • Respondents filed an Answer with Counterclaim arguing that the defenses of the
- The Court in Filcar Transport Services v. Espinas ruled that the RO of a vehicle is deemed petitioners in the complaint had no cause of action, the spouses' boarding house
blocked the road right of way.
the ER of the vehicle’s driver. Thus, the vehicle’s RO is vicariously liable for the driver’s
• Respondents filed a Motion to Disqualify the Plaintiffs for Non-Payment of Filing
negligent acts pursuant to Arts. 2176 and 2180, CC. The vicarious liability remains with
Fees. They asserted that in addition to the more than P3,000 net income of petitioner
the RO even when the vehicle had been sold to another person before the accident but
Antonio Algura, who is a member of the Philippine National Police, spouse Lorencita
the registration has not yet been transferred. The Court emphasized in R. Transport Algura also had a mini-store and a computer shop on the ground floor of their
Corporation v. Yu that the ER’s liability for the negligent acts of its subordinate is direct residence. Also, respondents claimed that petitioners' second floor was used as their
and primary. residence and as a boarding house, from which they earned more than P3,000/mon. In
addition, it was claimed that petitioners derived additional income from their
e. indigent parties; computer shop patronized by students and from several boarders who paid rentals to
them. Hence, respondents concluded that petitioners were not indigent litigants.
• Spouses Algura v. City of Naga G.R. No. 150135, 30 October 2006 • RTC Naga issued an Order disqualifying petitioners as indigent litigants on the
ground that they failed to substantiate their claim for exemption from payment of legal
39. Spouses Algura v. The LGU of the City of Naga, et.al. (2006) fees and to comply with the third paragraph of Rule 141, Section 18 of the Revised
G.R. No. 150135 October 30, 2006 Rules of Court—directing them to pay the requisite filing fees
• Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, thereafter; the trial court issued an
Doctrine: Procedure on Indigent Litigants: If the applicant for exemption meets the salary Order giving petitioners the opportunity to comply with the requisites laid down in
and property requirements under Section 19 of Rule 141, then the grant of the application Section 18, Rule 141, for them to qualify as indigent litigants. Petitioners submitted
is mandatory. On the other hand, when the application does not satisfy one or both their Compliance attaching their affidavits to support of their claim to be declared as
requirements, then the application should not be denied outright; instead, the court should indigent litigants.
apply the "indigency test" under Section 21 of Rule 3 and use its sound discretion in • RTC Naga denied the petitioners' MR on the ground that the pay slip of Antonio
determining the merits of the prayer for exemption. showed his "GROSS INCOME or TOTAL EARNINGS was P10,474 which amount
was over and above the amount mentioned in the first paragraph of Rule 141, Section
Facts: 18 for pauper litigants residing outside Metro Manila." Said rule provides that the
• In 1999, SPS Antonio and Lorencita Algura filed a Verified Complaint dated gross income of the litigant should not exceed PhP 3,000.00 a month and shall not
August 30, 19994 for damages against the Naga City Government and its officers, own real estate with an assessed value of PhP 50,000.00.
arising from the alleged illegal demolition of their residence and boarding house
and for payment of lost income derived from fees paid by their boarders amounting to Issue: WON RTC Naga was correct in disqualifying the petitioners as indigent litigants
PhP 7,000.00 monthly. using Rule 141, Sec.18 of Revised Rules of Court. (No, RTC Naga incorrectly applied
• Simultaneously, petitioners filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Litigate as Indigent Rule 141, Sec.18)
Litigants, to which petitioner Antonio Algura's Pay Slip showing a gross monthly
income of P10,474. and a net pay of P3,616. for the month of July 1999 and a Held:
Certification issued by the Office of the City Assessor of Naga City, which stated that Since complaint was filed in 1999. RTC Naga incorrectly applied Rule 141, Section 18
petitioners had no property declared in their name for taxation purposes. on Legal Fees when the applicable rules at that time were Rule 3, Section 21 on
• Finding that petitioners' motion to litigate as indigent litigants was meritorious, RTC Indigent Party which took effect on July 1, 1997 and Rule 141, Section 16 on Pauper
NAGA granted petitioners' plea for exemption from filing fees. Litigants which became effective on July 19, 1984 up to February 28, 2000.
The old Section 16, Rule 141 requires applicants to file an ex-parte motion to litigate as a
pauper litigant by submitting an affidavit that they do not have a gross income of PhP
2,000.00 a month or PhP 24,000.00 a year for those residing in Metro Manila and PhP
1,500.00 a month or PhP 18,000.00 a year for those residing outside Metro Manila or those
who do not own real property with an assessed value of not more than PhP 24,000.00 or
not more than PhP 18,000.00 as the case may be. Thus, there are two requirements: a)
income requirement—the applicants should not have a gross monthly income of more than
PhP 1,500.00, and b) property requirement––they should not own property with an assessed
value of not more than PhP 18,000.00.
Undoubtedly, petitioners do not own real property so the property requirement is met.
However with respect to the income requirement, it is clear that the gross monthly income
of PhP 10,474.00 of petitioner Antonio F. Algura and the PhP 3,000.00 income of Lorencita
Algura when combined, were above the PhP 1,500.00 monthly income threshold prescribed
by then Rule 141, Section 16 and therefore, the income requirement was not satisfied. The
trial court was therefore correct in disqualifying petitioners Alguras as indigent litigants
although the court should have applied Rule 141, Section 16 which was in effect at the time
of the filing of the application on September 1, 1999. Even if Rule 141, Section 18 (which
superseded Rule 141, Section 16 on March 1, 2000) were applied, still the application could
not have been granted as the combined PhP 13,474.00 income of petitioners was beyond
the PhP 3,000.00 monthly income threshold.
In the light of the foregoing considerations, therefore, the two (2) rules can stand together
and are compatible with each other. When an application to litigate as an indigent litigant
is filed, the court shall scrutinize the affidavits and supporting documents submitted by the
applicant to determine if the applicant complies with the income and property standards
prescribed in the present Section 19 of Rule 141—that is, the applicant's gross income and
that of the applicant's immediate family do not exceed an amount double the monthly
minimum wage of an employee; and the applicant does not own real property with a fair
market value of more than Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (PhP 300,000.00). If the trial
court finds that the applicant meets the income and property requirements, the authority to
litigate as indigent litigant is automatically granted and the grant is a matter of right.
However, if the trial court finds that one or both requirements have not been met, then it
would set a hearing to enable the applicant to prove that the applicant has "no money or
property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his
family." In that hearing, the adverse party may adduce countervailing evidence to disprove
the evidence presented by the applicant; after which the trial court will rule on the
application depending on the evidence adduced. In addition, Section 21 of Rule 3 also
provides that the adverse party may later still contest the grant of such authority at any time
before judgment is rendered by the trial court, possibly based on newly discovered evidence
not obtained at the time the application was heard. If the court determines after hearing,
that the party declared as an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or property,
the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the clerk of court.
If payment is not made within the time fixed by the court, execution shall issue or the
payment of prescribed fees shall be made, without prejudice to such other sanctions as the
court may impose.
The Court concedes that Rule 141, Section 19 provides specific standards while Rule
3, Section 21 does not clearly draw the limits of the entitlement to the exemption.
Thus, the trial court should have applied Rule 3, Section 21 to the application of the
Alguras after their affidavits and supporting documents showed that petitioners did not
satisfy the twin requirements on gross monthly income and ownership of real property
under Rule 141. Instead of disqualifying the Alguras as indigent litigants, the trial court
should have called a hearing as required by Rule 3, Section 21 to enable the petitioners
to adduce evidence to show that they didn't have property and money sufficient and
available for food, shelter, and basic necessities for them and their family. In that hearing,
the respondents would have had the right to also present evidence to refute the allegations
and evidence in support of the application of the petitioners to litigate as indigent litigants.
Since this Court is not a trier of facts, it will have to remand the case to the trial court to
determine whether petitioners can be considered as indigent litigants using the standards
set in Rule 3, Section 21. (IMPORTANT)
In other words, if applicant meets the salary and property requirement under Sec.19
of Rule 141, the grant of application is MANDATORY.
If the applicant does not satisfy one or both of the requirements, the Court shall not
denied the application outright, instead, The Court shall apply the Indigency Test
under Sec. 21 of Rule 3 and use its sound discretion in determining if the applicant
can be exempted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the April 14, 2000 Order granting the
disqualification of petitioners, the July 17, 2000 Order denying petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration, and the September 11, 2001 Order dismissing the case in Civil Case No.
RTC-99-4403 before the Naga City RTC, Branch 27 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Furthermore, the NAGA CITY RTC IS ORDERED to set the "Ex-Parte Motion to
Litigate as Indigent Litigants" for hearing and apply Rule 3, Section 21 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure to determine whether petitioners can qualify as indigent litigants.
g..alternative defendants
h.Complusory and permissive joinder of parties
i.Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties
• Divinagracia v. Parilla G.R. No. 196750, 11 March 2015
Facts: Regional Trial Court of Baloc, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija. 6 Respondent alleged that he
Conrado, Sr. owned a parcel of land. He had 2 children with his 1st wife and 7 children had obtained a loan from them in the amount of P9,000 on June 29, 1974, payable after
with his 2nd wife. He also begot 3 illegitimate children. Both Mateo, Sr. (7 children) and five (5) years; that is, on June 29, 1979. To secure the payment of the obligation, he
Cebeleo, Sr. (2) pre-deceased Conrado, Sr. Santiago, who bought the shares of majority supposedly executed a Deed of Sale in favor of petitioners. The Deed was for a parcel of
of the heirs of a property left by Conrado, Sr. He filed a complaint for partition but did not land in Pinagpanaan, Talavera, Nueva Ecija, covered by TCT No. T-111802. The parties also
implead Mateo, Sr.’s children. executed another document entitled "Kasunduan." 7
RTC found that through the subject document, Santiago became a co-owner of the subject Respondent claimed that the Kasunduan showed the Deed of Sale to be actually an
land and, as such, has the right to demand the partition of the same. However, Santiago equitable mortgage. 8 Spouses De la Cruz contended that this document was merely an
did not validly acquire Mateo, Sr.’s share over the subject land, considering that Felcon accommodation to allow the repurchase of the property until June 29, 1979, a right that
(son of Mateo Sr.) admitted the lack of authority to bind his siblings with regard to Mateo, he failed to exercise.
Sr.’s share.
CA dismissed Santiago’s complaint for partition. It held the Mateo, Sr.’s children are On April 23, 1990, the RTC issued a Decision in his favor. The trial court declared that the
indispensable parties to the judicial partition and thus, their non-inclusion as defendants parties had entered into a sale with a right of repurchase. 10 It further held that
would necessarily result in its dismissal. respondent had made a valid tender of payment on two separate occasions to exercise
his right of repurchase. 11 Accordingly, petitioners were required to reconvey the
Issue: property upon his payment.
WON the action for partition proper without impleading Mateo, Sr.’s children
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Held: Sustaining the trial court, the CA noted that petitioners had given respondent the right to
No because the co-heirs are indispensable parties. They have rights over the subject land repurchase the property within five (5) years from the date of the sale or until June 29,
and, as such, should be impleaded as indispensable parties in an action for partition. 1979. Accordingly, the parties executed the Kasunduan to express the terms and
An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court’s action in the conditions of their actual agreement. 13 The appellate court also found no reason to
litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case can be had. The party’s overturn the finding that respondent had validly exercised his right to repurchase the
interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably land. 14
intertwined with the other parties’ that his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is In the March 9, 2004 Resolution, the CA denied reconsideration and ordered a
an absolute necessity. In his absence, there cannot be a resolution of the dispute of the substitution by legal representatives, in view of respondent's death on December 24,
parties before the court which is effective, complete, or equitable. Thus, the absence of 1988. 15
an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void, for want Hence, this Petition
of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
(Domingo v. Scheer). The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the Issues
dismissal of an action. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be Petitioners assign the following errors for our consideration:
indispensable. "I. Public Respondent Twelfth Division of the Honorable Court of Appeals seriously erred
in dismissing the appeal and affirming in toto the Decision of the trial court in Civil Case
j. Class suit No. SD-838; CHDAEc
k. Suits against entities without juridical personality "II. Public Respondent Twelfth Division of the Honorable Court of Appeals likewise erred
l.Effect of death of party litigant in denying [petitioners'] Motion for Reconsideration given the facts and the law therein
presented." 17
• Spouses De la Cruz v. Joaquin, G.R. No. 162788, July 28, 2005 Succinctly, the issues are whether the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case upon the
death of Pedro Joaquin, and whether respondent was guilty of forum shopping
Facts
The case originated from a Complaint for the recovery of possession and ownership, the FIRST ISSUE: JURISDICTION
cancellation of title, and damages, filed by Pedro Joaquin against petitioners in the
Petitioners assert that the RTC's Decision was invalid for lack of jurisdiction. 19 They claim to substitute for the defendant also. The substitution effectively merged the persons of
that respondent died during the pendency of the case. There being no substitution by the the plaintiff and the defendant and thus extinguished the obligation being sued upon. 30
heirs, the trial court allegedly lacked jurisdiction over the litigation. 20 Clearly, the present case is not similar, much less identical, to the factual milieu of Chittick.
Rule on Substitution Strictly speaking, the rule on the substitution by heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction, but a
When a party to a pending action dies and the claim is not extinguished, 21 the Rules of requirement of due process. Thus, when due process is not violated, as when the right of
Court require a substitution of the deceased. The procedure is specifically governed by the representative or heir is recognized and protected, noncompliance or belated formal
Section 16 of Rule 3, which reads thus: compliance w ith the Rules cannot aff ect the validity of a promulgated decision. 31 Mere
"Section 16. Death of a party; duty of counsel. — Whenever a party to a pending action failure to substitute for a deceased plaintiff is not a sufficient ground to nullify a trial
dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform court's decision. The alleging party must prove that there was an undeniable violation of
the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name due process. TECIaH
and address of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply Substitution in the Instant Case
with this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action. The records of the present case contain a "Motion for Substitution of Party Plaintiff" dated
"The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without February 15, 2002, filed before the CA. The prayer states as follows:
requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a "WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Heirs of the deceased plaintiff-appellee as
guardian ad litem for the minor heirs. represented by his daughter Lourdes dela Cruz be substituted as party-plaintiff for the
"The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear said Pedro Joaquin.
and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice. "It is further prayed that henceforth the undersigned counsel32 for the heirs of Pedro
"If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one Joaquin be furnished with copies of notices, orders, resolutions and other pleadings at its
so named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order the address below."
opposing party, within a specified time, to procure the appointment of an executor or Evidently, the heirs of Pedro Joaquin voluntary appeared and participated in the case. We
administrator for the estate of the deceased, and the latter shall immediately appear for stress that the appellate court had ordered 33 his legal representatives to appear and
and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in procuring such appointment, if substitute for him. The substitution even on appeal had been ordered correctly. In all
defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs." proceedings, the legal representatives must appear to protect the interests of the
The rule on the substitution of parties was crafted to protect every party's right to due deceased. 34 After the rendition of judgment, further proceedings may be held, such as a
process.22 The estate of the deceased party will continue to be properly represented in motion for reconsideration or a new trial, an appeal, or an execution.
the suit through the duly appointed legal representative. 23 Moreover, no adjudication
can be made against the successor of the deceased if the fundamental right to a day in Considering the foregoing circumstances, the Motion for Substitution may be deemed to
court is denied. 24 HcTDSA have been granted; and the heirs, to have substituted for the deceased, Pedro Joaquin.
The Court has nullified not only trial proceedings conducted without the appearance of There being no violation of due process, the issue of substitution cannot be upheld as a
the legal representatives of the deceased, but also the resulting judgments. 25 In those ground to nullify the trial court's Decision.
instances, the courts acquired no jurisdiction over the persons of the legal representatives Second Issue: Forum Shopping
or the heirs upon whom no judgment was binding. 26 Petitioners also claim that respondents were guilty of forum shopping, a fact that should
This general rule notwithstanding, a formal substitution by heirs is not necessary when have compelled the trial court to dismiss the Complaint. 36 They claim that prior to the
they themselves voluntarily appear, participate in the case, and present evidence in commencement of the present suit on July 7, 1981, respondent had filed a civil case
defense of the deceased. 27 These actions negate any claim that the right to due process against petitioners on June 25, 1979. Docketed as Civil Case No. SD-742 for the recovery
was violated. of possession and for damages, it was allegedly dismissed by the Court of First Instance
The Court is not unaware of Chittick v. Court of Appeals, 28 in which the failure of the of Nueva Ecija for lack of interest to prosecute.
heirs to substitute for the original plaintiff upon her death led to the nullification of the Forum Shopping Defined
trial court's Decision. The latter had sought to recover support in arrears and her share in Forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or proceedings involving the
the conjugal partnership. The children who allegedly substituted for her refused to same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, on the
continue the case against their father and vehemently objected to their inclusion as supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. 37 Forum
parties. 29 Moreover, because he died during the pendency of the case, they were bound shopping may be resorted to by a party against whom an adverse judgment or order has
been issued in one forum, in an attempt to seek a favorable opinion in another, other • San Juan v. Cruz G.R. No.167321, 31 July 2006
than by an appeal or a special civil action for certiorari. 38
Forum shopping trifles with the courts, abuses their processes, degrades the FACTS:
administration of justice, and congests court dockets. 39 Willful and deliberate violation Loreto Samia San Juan executed a Last Will and Testament naming
of the rule against it is a ground for the summary dismissal of the case; it may also Oscar Casa as one of the devisees therein. Upon Loreto's death, Atty.
constitute direct contempt of court. 40 Teodorico A. Aquino filed a petition for the probate of the will in the
The test for determining the existence of forum shopping is whether the elements of litis Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City.
pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case amounts to res judicata
in another. 41 We note, however, petitioners' claim that the subject matter of the present While the petition was pending, Oscar Casa died intestate on May 24,
case has already been litigated and decided. Therefore, the applicable doctrine is res 1999. The firm of Aquino & Associates entered their appearance as
judicata. 42 counsel of Federico Casa, Jr., who claimed to be one of the heirs of Oscar
Applicability of Res Judicata Casa and their representative.
Under res judicata, a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent
jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all later suits and on In 2002, the probate court issued an Order denying the entry of
all points and matters determined in the previous suit. 43 The term literally means a appearance of said law firm, considering that Federico Casa, Jr. was not
"matter adjudged, judicially acted upon, or settled by judgment." 44 The principle bars a the executor or administrator of the estate of the devisee, hence, cannot
subsequent suit involving the same parties, subject matter, and cause of action. Public be substituted for the deceased as his representative as required by
policy requires that controversies must be settled with finality at a given point in time. Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. On November 22, 2002, the
IDcHCS court issued an order directing Aquino to secure the appointment of an
The elements of res judicata are as follows: (1) the former judgment or order must be administrator or executor of the estate of Oscar Casa in order that the
final; (2) it must have been rendered on the merits of the controversy; (3) the court that appointee be substituted in lieu of the said deceased.
rendered it must have had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (4)
there must have been — between the first and the second actions — an identity of On February 26, 2003, Aquino filed a pleading entitled "Appointment of
parties, subject matter and cause of action. 45 Administrator" signed by Candelaria, Jesus, Arlyn, Nestor, Edna,
Failure to Support Allegation Benhur, Federico, Rafael and Ma. Eden, all surnamed Casa, praying that
The onus of proving allegations rests upon the party raising them. 46 As to the matter of one of them, Federico Casa, Jr., be designated as administrator of the
forum shopping and res judicata, petitioners have failed to provide this Court with estate of the deceased and that he be substituted for the deceased.
relevant and clear specifications that would show the presence of an identity of parties,
subject matter, and cause of action between the present and the earlier suits. They have In compliance with the order of the court, Epifanio San Juan filed a
also failed to show whether the other case was decided on the merits. Instead, they have "Motion to Declare Appointment of Administrator As Inadequate or
made only bare assertions involving its existence without reference to its facts. In other Insufficient." He maintained that the heirs should present an
words, they have alleged conclusions of law without stating any factual or legal basis. administrator of the estate of Oscar Casa as the representative of the
Mere mention of other civil cases without showing the identity of rights asserted and estate in the case.
reliefs sought is not enough basis to claim that respondent is guilty of forum shopping, or
that res judicata exists. 47 On December 2, 2003, the RTC issued an Order denying the motion of
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are San Juan. Contrary to its first order, the court held that there was, after
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. all, no need for the appointment of an administrator or executor as
substitute for the deceased devisee. A 1st MR and a subsequent 2nd MR
• Gaffney v. Butler G.R. No. 219408, 8 November 2017 were filed which were both denied by the RTC.

San Juan, now petitioner, filed a petition for certiorari with the CA on
November 22, 2004 for the nullification of the orders issued by the
probate court which the CA dismissed on the ground that it was filed
beyond the 60-day period counted from notice to petitioner of the trial
court's February 27, 2004 Order. Hence, this petition before the SC.
ISSUE:1
WON there is a need for the appointment of an administrator of the
estate of Oscar Casa, or whether it is enough that he be substituted by
his heirs.
HELD: NEGATIVE. Petition is without merit.
(Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Court) The second paragraph
of the rule is plain and explicit: the heirs may be allowed to be
substituted for the deceased without requiring the appointment of an
administrator or executor. However, if within the specified period a legal
representative fails to appear, the court may order the opposing
counsel, within a specified period, to process the appointment of an
administrator or executor who shall immediately appear for the estate
of the deceased.
The heirs of the estate of Oscar Casa do not need to first secure the
appointment of an administrator of his estate, because from the very
moment of his death, they stepped into his shoes and acquired his rights
as devisee/legatee of the deceased Loreto San Juan. Thus, a prior
appointment of an administrator or executor of the estate of Oscar Casa
is not necessary for his heirs to acquire legal capacity to be substituted
as representatives of the estate.42 Said heirs may designate one or some
of them as their representative before the trial court.
Hence, even on the threshold issue raised in the RTC and in the petition
for certiorari in the CA, the assailed order of the RTC is correct.
m.Death or separation of a party who is a public officer allegations, failed to confer jurisdiction on the lower court.
n.Incompetency or incapacity
o.Transfer of Interest
p.Notice to Solicitor General
VIII. Rule 4 - Venue
a.Venue vs. Jurisdiction
1 First issue: WON the petition for certiorari in CA is time-barred. AFFIRMATIVE. SC agreed with the be reckoned from the TC’s denial of his first MR and not of the 2nd MR, otherwise, indefinite delays
CA that the petition for certiorari in CA was filed beyond the 60-day period. The 60-day period shall will ensue.
• Nocum v. Lucio Tan G.R. No. 145022, 23 September 2005
FACTS:
Lucio Tan filed a complaint against reporter Armand Nocum, Capt. Florendo Umali,
ALPAP and Inquirer with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, seeking moral and
exemplary damages for the alleged malicious and defamatory imputations
contained in a news article. INQUIRER and NOCUM alleged that the venue was
improperly laid, among many others. It appeared that the complaint failed to state
the residence of the complainant at the time of the alleged commission of the
offense and the place where the libelous article was printed and first published.
RTC dismissed the complaint without prejudice on the ground of improper
venue. Aggrieved, Lucio Tan filed an Omnibus Motion seeking reconsideration of
the dismissal and admission of the amended complaint. In par. 2.01.1 of the
amended complaint, it is alleged that "This article was printed and first published
in the City of Makati", and in par. 2.04.1, that "This caricature was printed and first
published in the City of Makati"
RTC admitted the amended complaint and deemed set aside the previous
order of dismissal stating that the mistake or deficiency in the original complaint
appears now to have been cured in the Amended Complaint. Also, there is no
substantial amendment, but only formal, in the Amended Complaint which would
affect the defendants’ defenses and their Answers.
Dissatisfied, petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals. Two petitions
for certiorari were filed, one filed by petitioners and the other by defendants .The
two petitions were consolidated. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this
PETREV filed by the petitioners. Petitioners argue that since the original complaint
only contained the office address of respondent and not the latter’s actual
residence or the place where the allegedly offending news reports were printed
and first published, the original complaint, by reason of the deficiencies in its
ISSUE: WON THE LOWER COURT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE
CIVIL CASE UPON THE FILING OF THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT FOR
DAMAGES
HELD:
YES. It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in
the complaint since the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts
constituting the plaintiff's causes of action. Here, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over
the case when the case was filed before it. From the allegations thereof,
respondent’s cause of action is for damages arising from libel, the jurisdiction of
which is vested with the RTC. Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code provides that
it is the RTC that is specifically designated to try a libel case.
Petitioners are confusing jurisdiction with venue. The Hon. Florenz D.
Regalado, differentiated jurisdiction and venue as follows: (a) Jurisdiction is the
authority to hear and determine a case; venue is the place where the case is
to be heard or tried; (b) Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law; venue, of
procedural law; (c) Jurisdiction establishes a relation between the court and
the subject matter; venue, a relation between plaintiff and defendant, or
petitioner and respondent; and, (d) Jurisdiction is fixed by law and cannot
be conferred by the parties; venue may be conferred by the act or agreement
of the parties.
Here, the additional allegations in the Amended Complaint that the article
and the caricature were printed and first published in the City of Makati referred
only to the question of venue and not jurisdiction. These additional allegations
would neither confer jurisdiction on the RTC nor would respondent’s failure to
include the same in the original complaint divest the lower court of its jurisdiction
over the case. Respondent’s failure to allege these allegations gave the lower court
the power, upon motion by a party, to dismiss the complaint on the ground that
venue was not properly laid. The term "jurisdiction" in Article 360 of the Revised
Penal Code as referring to the place where actions for libel shall be filed or "venue."
The amendment was merely to establish the proper venue for the action. It is a
well-established rule that venue has nothing to do with jurisdiction, except in
criminal actions. Assuming that venue were properly laid in the court where the
action was instituted, that would be procedural, not a jurisdictional impediment.
The dismissal of the complaint by the lower court was proper considering
that the complaint, indeed, on its face, failed to allege neither the residence of the
complainant nor the place where the libelous article was printed and first published.
Nevertheless, before the finality of the dismissal, the same may still be amended.
In so doing, the court acted properly and without any grave abuse of discretion.
b.Venue in civil cases vs. Criminal cases
• Nocum v. Lucio Tan G.R. No. 145022, 23 September 2005
ISSUE: WON VENUE MAY BE WAIVED IN CIVIL CASES
HELD: YES. It is elementary that objections to venue in CIVIL ACTIONS arising
from libel may be waived since they do not involve a question of jurisdiction. The
laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive, relating as it does to
jurisdiction of the court over the person rather than the subject matter. Venue
relates to trial and not to jurisdiction. It is a procedural, not a jurisdictional, matter.
It relates to the place of trial or geographical location in which an action or
proceeding should be brought and not to the jurisdiction of the court. It is meant to
provide convenience to the parties, rather than restrict their access to the courts
as it relates to the place of trial. In contrast, in criminal actions, it is fundamental
that venue is jurisdictional it being an essential element of jurisdiction.
Petitioners’ argument that the lower court has no jurisdiction over the case
because respondent failed to allege the place where the libelous articles were
printed and first published would have been tenable if the case filed were a criminal
case. The failure of the original complaint to contain such information would be
fatal because this fact involves the issue of venue which goes into the territorial
jurisdiction of the court. This is not to be because the case before us is a civil action
where venue is not jurisdictional.
CA’s DECISION AFFIRMED.
c.Venue of real actions
d.Venue of personal actions
e.Venue of actions against non-residents
f.When the rules on venue does not apply
• Ley Construction & Development Corp v. Sedan G.R. No. 222711, 23 August 2017
• Unimasters Conglomeration Inc v. CA G.R. No. 119657, 7 February 1997
Effects of stipulation on venue Rule 8, Sec. 12