Supreme Court: The Executive Director of The ANTI-MONEY

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
ANAK MINDANAO (AMIN) PARTY-LIST

R E P R E S E N TAT I V E A M I H I L D A
SANGCOPAN; DEPUTY SPEAKER MUJIV
S . H ATA M A N ; AT T Y ’ S . S AT R I N A
M O H A M M A D , J A M A R M . K U L AYA N ,
ALMAN-NAJAR L. NAMLA and BENSAUD
O. DEGUSMAN; RAMEER TAWASIL; and,
SHEIKH JAMSIRI T. JAINAL, G.R. NO._______
Petitioners, For: Certiorari
and Prohibition
-versus- under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, Hon. and Article VIII,
Salvador Medialdea; NATIONAL SECURITY Section 16 of the
ADVISER, Ret. Gen. Hermogenes Esperon 1987 Constitution
Jr.; SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF with application
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Hon. Teodoro L. Locsin f o r Te m p o r a r y
Jr.; SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF Restraining Order
NATIONAL DEFENSE, Gen. Delfin N. [TRO] and/or Writ
L o r e n z a n a ; S E C R E TA R Y O F T H E of Injunction
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, Ret. Gen. Eduardo Año;
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
FINANCE, Hon. Carlos Dominguez III;
JUSTICE, Hon. Menardo I. Guevarra;
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION
TECHNOLOGY, Hon. Gregorio Honasan; the
Executive Director of the ANTI-MONEY
LAUNDERING COUNCIL (AMLC); the
N AT I O N A L INTELLIGENCE
COORDINATING AGENCY (NICA); SENATE
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by Senate President Vicente C.
Sotto III; THE HOUSE OF
R E P R E S E N TAT I V E S , r e p r e s e n t e d b y
Speaker Alan Peter S. Cayetano, their agents
and all persons acting in their behalf,
Respondents.
X——————————-—————— — — X
Page 1 of 83
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION
With Urgent Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) and/or Writs of Injunction
“Ours is not a police state where order is exalted

over liberty or, worse personal malice on the part of the
arresting officer maybe justified under the name of
security.”1
PETITIONERS, by the undersigned counsels, respectfully state

and allege that:
Prologue
The experiences of our elders under martial law were extremely

horrendous, too excruciating to ever forget. More than elsewhere in
the country, the military might of the state was focused on areas of
the country where Muslims live. None of our elders suffered extended
unlawful detention, as was the case in other parts of the Philippines
under Martial Law. Many of our elders died under more painful
circumstances: Muslim Mindanao was a war zone where no mercy
was shown. Our ancestral homes were razed to the ground as well.
The traumas these things have caused prompted all of us to support
the peoples’ revolution at EDSA in 1986 to restore democracy, in the
hopes that, perchance the rule of law would also be reinstated and
we could finally have peace and progress in our communities. Even
the Moro rebel groups joined in this hope when they signed a peace
agreements with the government.
The Constitution that followed EDSA ensured that nothing of

the past government’s excesses would be repeated. Among others, it
removed the phrase “other authorized officers” from the provision
against unreasonable searches and seizures and it imposed a three
(3) day maximum limit on detention without lawful charge, even under
the extreme circumstance when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended.
Notwithstanding the guarantee on the right to seek peaceful

redress for grievances, a few of our misguided fellows still resorted to
violence and extremism. In response, our law enforcement agencies
1 People v. Mengote, G.R. No. 87059, June 22, 1992
Page 2 of 83
often overreached into the secure spaces of peaceful citizens,
arresting them first and, sometimes, not even asking questions later.
In Mindanao, especially in Muslim communities, it is a frequent

occurrence that mosque-goers, Quran reciters, prayer-callers, even
simple market vendors and truck drivers are dragged away by law
enforcers—simply on suspicion that they are supporters, relatives,
co-conspirators or active participants in acts of rebellion, kidnapping,
and what now constitutes terrorism.
In an investigative report2 of ABS-CBN reporter in March 2015,

fifty-one (51) Muslims who had been unlawfully arrested and detained
for years were released by judicial order. In another report3, a Muslim
truck driver was released by the court three (3) years after he was
mistakenly arrested and jailed. In a case 4 that reached the Supreme
Court, a returning pilgrim from Mecca languished in jail for over five
(5) years, just for sharing the same first name with one of the
suspects in Maguindanao Massacre.
This is more than several simple cases of mistaken identity.

This is prejudice and injustice based in unfounded fear of Muslims. It
is religious discrimination, plain and simple.
The herein assailed law threatens to legalize these clearly

abhorrent state actions. It threatens to “sacrifice liberty in exchange
for security”. Peace at any price is not peace, and the human cost is
beyond exorbitant.
I
NATURE OF THE PETITION
1. This is an original special civil action for certiorari and

prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, with
an urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
(“TRO”) and/or writ of preliminary injunction (WPI). This petition prays
that this Honorable Court issue:
2 https://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/03/25/15/51-wrongful-arrests
3 https://news.abs-cbn.com/focus/07/09/15/mistaken-identity-judge-frees-abu-sayyaf-
after-3-years
4 In the matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Datukan Malang Salibo, G.R. No.
197597, April 08, 2015
Page 3 of 83
a) A judgment declaring that Republic Act No.
11479, otherwise known as the “Anti-Terrorism Act of
2020”, is unconstitutional.
b) A judgment commanding the respondents, their

subordinates and all persons acting on the basis of
Republic Act No. 11479 from implementing the same.
c) A Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of

Preliminary Injunction enjoining the respondents and
their subordinates from implementing Republic Act No.
11479.
Attachments
1.1. Due to the difficulty of securing a certified true

copy of RA 11479, a true copy thereof downloaded from
the Official Website of the Official Gazette5 is hereto
attached as Annex “A” and its sub-annexes; and, is
made an integral part of this petition, while photocopies
of the same are attached to the other copies of this
Petition.
1.2. This petition also banks on the Supreme Court’s

expanded power of judicial review to determine whether or not
Congress committed grave abuse of discretion or acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction of its jurisdiction.
II
TIMELINESS
2.1. The herein assailed Republic Act 11479 was signed into
law by His Excellency, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte on 3 July 2020
and published on-line in the Official Website of the Official Gazette on
the same date. According to the Department of Justice it took effect
on 18 July 2020.
5 https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/downloads/2020/06jun/20200703-RA-11479-
RRD.pdf
Page 4 of 83
2.2. Hence, it is respectfully submitted that this petition is filed
within the sixty (60) day period prescribed under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.
III
JURISDICTION AND BASES FOR THE PETITION
3.1. This Petition is filed because there is no remedy of appeal

and neither is there any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
available in the ordinary course of law.
3.2. This Petition assails the constitutionality of Republic Act

11479, otherwise known as the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020, on the
grounds that: it encroaches on the free exercise of petitioners’ religion
and infringes on their rights of free expression; it delegates judicial
authority to issue order of arrest to the Anti-Terrorism Council; it
authorizes the issuance of arrest order on the basis mere of
suspicion; it empowers the Council to authorize the detention of a
suspect for more than three (3) days without lawful charge; it violates
petitioners’ right to due process and their rights against unreasonable
seizure. It constitutes an unreasonable intrusion into the private
spaces of the petitioners even as its provisions are mostly vague. It
also grants the council the unbridled discretion to determine how the
law is to be implemented.
3.3. This Petition requires urgent resolution because the

issues pertain to the prime and fundamental freedoms guaranteed by
the Constitution as well as by International Law. The issues here are
therefore of transcendental importance to the public.
3.4. The issues involved are also purely legal and this petition
can be resolved without determining the factual issues involved;
hence, the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the
hierarchy of courts do not apply.
3.5. The petitioners are also invoking the extra-ordinary

jurisdiction of this Honorable Court to determine whether or not
Congress gravely abuse its discretion when it enacted a clearly
unconstitutional law. And, particularly, whether the House of
Representatives committed grave abuse of discretion when it passed
HB 6875 despite there being only twenty-five (25) members present
in its session.
Page 5 of 83
3.6. This is not a petition for declaratory relief.
3.7. Consequently, the Petitioners pray of this Honorable

Court to take cognizance of this petition and to issue of the writ of
certiorari and prohibition prayed for, on the basis of the following:
IV
PARTIES
Petitioners are:
4.1. ANAK MINDANAO (AMIN) is a party-list organization duly

registered under Philippine Laws. It has one seat in the House of
Representatives occupied by Representative AMIHILDA
SANGCOPAN, who is also representing the said Party-List group in
this suit. Its constituency includes the indigenous peoples (Lumads),
peasants and urban poor in Mindanao, mostly Muslim Filipinos of
various tribes. It is known for its strong advocacy for human rights,
minority rights, peace and national unity.
4.2. Representative AMIHILDA SANGCOPAN is single and

resident of Sulu. She is also suing in her personal capacity as a
member of the House of Representatives. She can be served with
notices and other processes of this Court at Room 416, Southwing
Building, House of Representatives, Batasan Hills, Quezon City.
4.3. Representative MUJIV S. HATAMAN is married, resident

and representative of the Lone District of Basilan and one of the
House of Representative’s Deputy Speakers. He can be served with
notices and other processes of this Court at Room 310-SWA, House
of Representatives, Batasan Hills, Quezon City.
4.4. LAWYERS SATRINA MOHAMMAD, JAMAR KULAYAN,

ALMAN-NAJAR NAMLA and BENSAUD DEGUSMAN are all of legal
ages and residents of Zamboanga City. They are suing in their
capacity as members of the Integrated Bar of Philippines. They can
be served with notices and other processes of this Court at their
respective address provided below their respective name and
signature.
4.5. RAMEER TAWASIL is married and resident of Barangay

Tumaga, Zamboanga City, where he can be served with notices and
other processes of this Court. He is a Muslim visual artist/designer
and a peace advocate.
Page 6 of 83
4.6. SHEIKH JAMSIRI JAINAL is a Muslim religious preacher
and Imam. He is married and resident of Barangay Tumaga,
Zamboanga City, where he can be served with notices and other
processes of this Court.
Petitioners are all Filipino citizens, taxpayers and believers in

Islam. For purposes of this petition, they can also be served through
the addresses provided under the name of the herein counsels.
Public Respondents are:
4.7. THE ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL is the office created

by Republic Act No. 11479 to implement the same and is the office
vested with all the powers herein questioned. It is composed of the
offices held by the following public respondents.
4.8. Hon. SALVADOR MEDIALDEA, Executive Secretary, alter

ego of the President and Chairman of the Anti-Terrorism Council. He
is a Filipino, of legal age and may be served with notices and other
legal processes of this Honorable Court at the Office of Executive
Secretary, Malacañang Palace, Manila;
4.9. Gen. HERMOGENES ESPERON JR. AFP (Ret.), National

Security Adviser and Vice Chairman of the Anti-Terrorism Council. He
is a Filipino, of legal age and may be served with notices and other
legal processes of this Honorable Court at the Office of National
Security Council, Malacañang Palace, Manila;
4.10. Hon. TEODORO L. LOCSIN JR., Secretary of Foreign

Affairs and member of the Anti-Terrorism Council. He is a Filipino, of
legal age and may be served with notices and other legal processes
of this Honorable Court at the Office of Secretary, 2330 Roxas
Boulevard, Pasay City;
4.11. Gen. DELFIN N. LORENZANA, AFP (Ret.), Secretary of

National Defense and member of the Anti-Terrorism Council. He is a
Filipino, of legal age and may be served with notices and other legal
processes of this Honorable Court at the Office of Secretary, DND
Building, Segundo Ave. Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo Quezon City,
Philippines 1110;
4.12. Gen. EDUARDO M. AÑO, AFP (Ret.), Secretary of the

Interior and Local Government and member of the Anti-Terrorism
Council. He is a Filipino, of legal age and may be served with notices
Page 7 of 83
and other legal processes of this Honorable Court at the Office of the
Secretary, DILG-NAPOLCOM Center, EDSA corner Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City;
4.13. CARLOS DOMINGUEZ III, Secretary of Finance and

member of the Anti-Terrorism Council. He is a Filipino, of legal age
and may be served with notices and other legal processes of this
Honorable Court at the Office of the Secretary, DOF Building, Roxas
Boulevard corner Pablo Ocampo Street, Manila;
4.14. MENARDO I. GUEVARRA, Secretary of Justice and

member of the Anti-Terrorism Council. He is a Filipino, of legal age
and may be served with notices and other legal processes of this
Honorable Court at the Office of the Secretary, Padre Faura Street,
Ermita, Manila;
4.15. GREGORIO HONASAN, Secretary of Information and

Communications Technology and member of the Anti-Terrorism
Council. He is a Filipino, of legal age and may be served with notices
and other legal processes of this Honorable Court at the Office of the
Secretary, C.P Garcia Ave., Diliman, Quezon City.
4.16. MEL GEORGIE B. RACELA, Executive Director of the

Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) and Secretariat of the Anti-
Terrorism Council. He is a Filipino, of legal age and may be served
with notices and other legal processes of this Honorable Court at 5/F
EDPC Building, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Complex, Mabini corner
Vito Cruz Streets, Malate, Manila.
4.17. ALEX PAUL MONTEAGUDO, Director-General of the

National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA). He is a Filipino, of
legal age and maybe served with notices and other legal processes
of this Honorable Court at V. Luna Road, Quezon City.
4.18. The SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its

President, Senator Vicento Sotto III and the HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, represented by Speaker Alan Peter S.
Cayetano, are sued for committing grave abuse of discretion in
enacting Republic Act No. 11479. They can be served with notices
and other processes of the Honorable Court at Senate of the
Philippines, Rm. 606, 211 & 24 (New Wing 5/F), GSIS Bldg.,
Financial Center, Diokno Blvd., Pasay City and at House of
Representatives, Constitution Hills, Quezon City, Philippines 1126,
respectively.
Page 8 of 83
4.19. HON. JOSE CALIDA is impleaded and served with copy
of the petition in his official capacity as the Solicitor General, whose
duty is to defend and act as counsel for any government agency or
instrumentality. His office can be served with summons and other
processes at 134 Amorsolo Streeet, Legaspi Village, Makati City.
Public Respondents are all sued in their official capacity as either

officer, member or secretariat of the Anti-Terrorism Council,
hereinafter referred to as the Council.
V
STATEMENT OF FACTS
5.1. Petitioners are all Filipinos, taxpayers, residents of

Mindanao and believers of Islam. They are neither supportive of
terrorism nor are they terrorists.
5.2. As Muslim, they believe in the virtues of “JIHAD” as a way

to fulfill their faith, to actualize Islam as a complete way of life and to
uplift their soul to Allah.
5.3. JIHAD is defined in Britanica as follows:
“Jihad, (Arabic: “struggle” or “effort”) also spelled

jehad, in Islam, a meritorious struggle or effort. The
exact meaning of the term jihād depends on context; it
has often been erroneously translated in the West as
“holy war.” Jihad, particularly in the religious and ethical
realm, primarily refers to the human struggle to promote
what is right and to prevent what is wrong.”6
5.4. The primacy of becoming a better person or promoting

what is right and preventing wrongs over actual participation in a
defensive battle are emphasized in many Prophetic traditions, viz:
a) Narrated Àbdullah bin Àmr:
A man said to the Prophet, "Shall I participate in

Jihad?" The Prophet (‫ )ﷺ‬said, "Are your parents
6 https://www.britannica.com/topic/jihad
Page 9 of 83
living?" The man said, "Yes." the Prophet (‫ )ﷺ‬said, "Do
Jihad for their benefit."7
b) Narrated from Mu'awiyah bin Jahimah As-Sulami,

that Jahimah came to the Prophet (‫ )ﷺ‬and said:
"O Messenger of Allah! I want to go out and fight and

I have come to ask your advice." He said: "Do you have
a mother?" He said: "Yes." He said: "Then stay with her,
for Paradise is beneath her feet."8
c) Narrated from Tariq bin Shihab
A man asked the Prophet, when he had put his leg in

the stirrup: "Which kind of Jihad is best?'" He said: " a
word of truth spoken before an unjust rulers."9
5.5. Another important tenet of Islam is the “obligation to

convey” the religion, be it on the pulpits in the confines of the
mosque, or on dining tables inside the safety of our homes, or in the
open spaces of parks and the wide reach of the internet. Our Qur’an
enjoined us:
“[Allah praises] those who convey the messages of

Allah and fear Him and do not fear anyone but Allah.
And sufficient is Allah as an Accountant.” [Surah 33:39]
and, in another:
“Invite to the way of your Lord with wisdom and good

instruction, and argue with them in a way that is best.
Indeed, your Lord is most knowing of who has strayed
from His way, and He is most knowing of who is [rightly]
guided.” [Surah 16:125]
5.6. This Quranic injunction was also emphasized by the

Prophet as narrated by “Abdullah bin Amr”10 :
7 Sahih al-Bukhari 5972, Book 78, Hadith 3

8 Sahih (Darussalam), Sunan an-Nasa'i 3104, Book 25, Hadith 20
9 Hasan (Darussalam), Sunan an-Nasa'i 4209, Book 39, Hadith 61
10 Sahih al-Bukhari 3461 Book 60, Hadith 128
Page 10 of 83
“The Prophet (‫ )ﷺ‬said, "Convey (my teachings) to
the people even if it were a single sentence, and tell
others the stories of Bani Israel (which have been
taught to you), for it is not sinful to do so. And whoever
tells a lie on me intentionally, will surely take his place in
the (Hell) Fire.”
5.7. The “obligation to convey” makes it incumbent upon each

Muslim to impart every tenet of Islam, including JIHAD, to his family,
friends, colleagues and acquaintances. The Imams have to discuss it
on the pulpit and the Madaris teachers have to make it
understandable to their students. These beliefs are secured by the
“free exercise clause”11 in our Constitution.
5.8. But the growing Islamophobia, threats of terrorism and

the counter-terrorism measures employed by the state have hindered
the complete discussion of our beliefs. Law enforcement measures
employed by the state after the Sipadan Hostage Crisis, Lamitan
Hospital Crisis, ICRC Hostage Crisis, Zamboanga Siege and Marawi
Siege were discriminatory to believers in Islam who are easily
suspected of either participating, supporting or cuddling suspected
rebels or terrorist merely for sharing the same beliefs, practices,
traits, tendencies or demeanors. These resulted in the many wrongful
arrest and incarceration of many Muslim Filipinos, some of whom are
still in our jail awaiting the completion of their trial. This is not to
mention those who were killed in what were often declared as
legitimate armed encounters.
5.9. Then, on 2 October 2019, Senator Panfilo Lacson

delivered his sponsorship speech for Senate Bill No. 1083, which
would ultimately become RA 11479, by making reference to the siege
in Marawi, bombings in Sulu and in Basilan, and the “Armed Forces
of the Philippines repeated commitment to end martial law in
Mindanao if the law is passed”12 as justifications for his proposed bill.
5.10. On 21 February 2020, Rappler 13 reported of a leaked

PNP Memorandum requiring the submission of an “updated list of
Muslim Students in High School, Colleges, and Universities” studying
in Metro Manila thereby indicating that muslim students have been
11 Section 4, Article III, 1987 Constitution

12 https://pinglacson.net/2019/10/02/sponsorship-speech-for-the-anti-terrorism-act-
of-2019-18th-congress/
13 https://www.rappler.com/nation/252313-metro-manila-police-profile-muslim-
students-anti-extremism-campaign
Page 11 of 83
unknowingly under discreet surveillance or subjected to profiling by
the Philippine National Police. This was allegedly part of its counter-
terrorism measures.
5.11. On 26 February 2020, Senate passed Senate Bill No.

1083.
5.12. On 30 May 2020, the House’s Committees on Public

Order and Safety and on National Defense and Security submitted
their Committee Report proposing to adapt the Senate’s version as a
substitute for all the pending bills on the same subject and
recommending for its approval without any amendment. This became
House Bill 6875.
5.13. On 1 June 2020, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte certified

House Bill 6875 as urgent.
5.14. On 3 June 2020, the House of Representatives, with only

twenty-five (25) members physically present, passed House Bill 6875
without amendment. The voting was remotely done, either through
“zoom” or via viber group chat. Petitioners Representatives
Sangcopan and Hataman were among the few who remotely voted
against the passage of the bill.
5.15. On 8 June 2020, the Senate President and the Speaker

of the House of Representatives transmitted the enrolled bill to the
Office of the President.
5.16. On 3 July 2020, the President signed into law Republic

Act No. 11479. It among others: (1) expanded the definition of
“terrorism” 14; (2) criminalized ordinary acts of free expression, to
association, and religious beliefs 15; (3) empowered the Anti-Terrorism
Council to issue written authority to take custody and to detain
prisoners without charges16; (4) authorized the Council to designate
and/or proscribe individual or association as terrorist or terror group
on the basis of mere suspicion17; (5) penalized preparatory acts or
those referred to as inchoate crimes; and (6) repealed RA 9372
otherwise known as the Human Security Act of 200718.
14 Section 4
15 Section 9
16 Section 25
17 Section 29
18 Section 57
Page 12 of 83
5.17. That same day, Republic Act No. 11479 was electronically
published on the official website of the Official Gazette19 .
Consequently, the Department of Justice opined that it took effect on
18 July 2020.
5.18. Drawing from the experiences of the excesses committed

during the martial law in the 1970’s and in the aftermaths of the
Sipadan Hostage Crisis in 2000, the Siege of Lamitan in 2001, ICRC
kidnapping in 2009, the Zamboanga Siege in 2013, and the Marawi
Siege in 2017 when many peace loving and law-abiding Muslim
Filipinos like the petitioners were mistakenly arrested and unlawfully
detained for prolonged period and for the reasons hereinafter
discussed, petitioners are constrained to file the instant petition.
VI
GROUNDS
The law is UNCONSTITUTIONAL on various grounds, viz:
1. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION or
EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION WHEN IT
ENACTED REPUBLIC ACT 11479 DESPITE LACK
OF QOURUM IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE VI,
SECTION 16 (2) OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
2. CONGRESS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS

DISCRETION WHEN THE MEANS IT EMPLOYED
TO PREVENT TERRORISM ARE BOTH
UNREASONABLE AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL
3. THE LAW, BY PUNISHING INCITING AND

PROPOSAL TO COMMIT TERRORISM,
CURTAILS PETITIONERS’ RIGHT TO FREE
EXERCISE AND FREE EXPRESSION
GUARANTEED UNDER SECTIONS 4 AND 5,
ARTICLE III OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

DISCRETION IN GRANTING THE ANTI-
TERRORISM COUNCIL THE POWER TO
19https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/downloads/2020/06jun/20200703-RA-11479-
RRD.pdf
Page 13 of 83
D E S I G N AT E A N D P R O S C R I B E T E R R O R
SUSPECT ON MERE SUSPICION IN VIOLATION
OF SECTION 1, ARTICLE III AND SECTION 1,
ARTICLE VI, OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

TERRORISM COUNCIL THE POWER TO ISSUE
WRITTEN AUTHORITY TO TAKE CUSTODY OF
PERSONS SUSPECTED OF COMMITTING
TERRORISM OR CONSPIRACY THEREOF, IN
VIOLATION OF SECTIONS 2 AND 14, ARTICLE III
OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

TERRORISM COUNCIL THE POWER TO
D E TA I N , W I T H O U T C H A R G E , T E R R O R
SUSPECTS BEYOND THREE (3) DAYS IN
VIOLATION OF SECTION 1 AND 14, ARTICLE III
AND SECTION 28, ARTICLE VII OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION
7. REPUBLIC ACT 11479 IS REPLETE WITH

UNCLEAR AND VAGUE PROVISIONS AND
DEFINITIONS VIOLATING THE PEOPLE’S RIGHT
TO BE INFORMED OF WHAT CONSTITUTE THE
PUNISHABLE ACT/ACTS IN VIOLATION OF
SECTION 1, ARTICLE III OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION
VII
ISSUES
1. WHETHER OR NOT RA 11479 WAS

LAWFULLY ENACTED BY THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES DESPITE ITS LACK OF
QUORUM
2. CAN CONGRESS PROVIDE FOR

UNREASONABLE AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL
MEANS TO PREVENT TERRORISM?
Page 14 of 83
3. DOES RA 11479 THAT PUNISHES
“INCITING TO TERRORISM” AND “PROPOSAL
TO COMMIT TERRORISM” CONSTITUTE
CURTAILMENT OF PETITIONERS’ RELIGIOUS
F R E E D O M TO D I S C U S S , C O N V E Y A N D
PUBLISH “JIHAD”, WHICH IS AN INTEGRAL
PART OF THEIR FAITH?
4. DOES RA 11479 PUNISHING SEVERAL

ACTS OF “PUBLISHING” CONSTITUTES
INFRINGEMENT OF PRESS FREEDOM AND
EXPRESSION?
5. ARE SECTIONS 25 AND 26 OF

REPUBLIC ACT 11479 GIVING THE COUNCIL
THE POWER TO DESIGNATE AND PROSCRIBE
TERROR SUSPECT OR ASSOCIATION ON
MERE SUSPICION CONSTITUTE VIOLATION OF
THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE and DOES IT
CONSTITUTE AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF
LEGISLATIVE POWERS TO THE ANTI-TERROR
COUNCIL?
6. CAN CONGRESS GRANTS THE ANTI-

TERRORISM COUNCIL THE POWER TO ISSUE
A WRITTEN AUTHORITY TO ARREST AND TO
D E TA I N S U S P E C T S A LT H O U G H T H E S E
POWERS ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY RESERVED
TO THE JUDICIAL BRANCH OF THE
GOVERNMENT?
7. IS SECTION 29 OF REPUBLIC ACT

11479 EMPOWERING THE COUNCIL TO DETAIN
TERROR SUSPECTS, WITHOUT CHARGE, FOR
A PERIOD EXCEEDING THREE (3) DAYS
VIOLATES SECTION 3, ARTICLE III AND
SECTION 28, ARTICLE VII OF THE
CONSTITUTION?
8. ARE THE PROVISIONS OF THE ANTI-

TERRORISM ACT UNCLEAR AND VAGUE AND
VIOLATE THE PEOPLE’S RIGHT TO BE
INFORMED?
Page 15 of 83
VIII
DISCUSSIONS
I. Procedural Issues
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND

PROHIBITION ARE BOTH PROPER
REMEDY TO CHALLENGE THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
REPUBLIC ACT 11479
PETITIONERS MAY DIRECTLY

SEEK RECOURSE FROM THIS
HONORABLE COURT WITHOUT
EXHAUSTING ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES NOR OBSERVING THE
HIERARCHY OF COURTS
8.1. The expanded power of the Supreme Court under the

1987 Constitution "to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government”20 has
empowered this Court to take cognizance of petitions for certiorari
and prohibition involving acts of its co-equal branch. This provision
has accordingly broaden the scope and reach of these remedies as
held in IFURUNG v. CARPIO-MORALES21 :
“Under the 1987 Constitution, judicial power

includes the duty of the courts of justice not only "to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable," but also "to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government." Its expanded power of review provides:
Sec. 1. The judicial power shall be

vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
20 Section 1, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution

21 G.R. No. 232131, APRIL 24, 2018
Page 16 of 83
Judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
Fundamental is the rule that grave abuse of

discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal patently
violates the Constitution, the law, or existing
jurisprudence. We have already ruled that petitions for
certiorari and prohibition filed before the Court "are the
remedies by which the grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government may
be determined under the Constitution," and explained
that "[w]ith respect to the Court, x x x the remedies of
certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in
scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or
prohibition may be issued to correct errors of
jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal,
corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions, but also to set right,
undo, and restrain any act of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the
Government, even if the latter does not exercise
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions."
8.2. Earlier in Umali vs. Judicial and Bar Council22, this

Honorable Court also stated that:
“But, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition

are necessarily broader in scope and reach before
this Court as the writs may be issued to correct errors
of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal,
corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right,
undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any
branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the
22 Umali v. The Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. 228628, July 25, 2017
Page 17 of 83
latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions. Thus, they are appropriate
remedies to raise constitutional issues and to
review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of
legislative and executive officials.” [emphasis
supplied]
8.3. The constitutional grant to the courts of its expanded

power of review clearly authorized this Honorable Court “to determine
whether or not the branches have kept themselves within the limits of
the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the
discretion given to them”.23
8.4. Petitioners in this case are invoking primary constitutional

rights and alleging serious constitutional violations committed by
Congress in passing RA 11479. This make the instant petition falls
under either two or more of the exceptional cases mentioned in
Umali vs. Judicial and Bar Council 24, where direct recourse to the
Court is allowed, viz:
“xxx In The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on

Elections, and again in Maza v. Turla, this Court took
pains in enumerating the circumstances that would
warrant a direct resort to this Court, to wit: (1) when
there are genuine issues of constitutionality that
must be addressed at the most immediate time; (2)
when the issues involved are of transcendental
importance; (3) cases of first impression as no
jurisprudence yet exists that will guide the lower courts
on this matter; (4) the constitutional issues raised are
better decided by this court; (5) the time element
presented in this case cannot be ignored; (6) the filed
petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ; (7)
petitioners rightly claim that they had no other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law; and (8) the petition includes questions that are
dictated by public welfare and the advancement of
public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of
justice, or the orders complained of were found to
be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as
23 Kilosbayan vs. Guingona

24 Ibid.
Page 18 of 83
clearly an inappropriate remedy. [Citations omitted]
[Emphasis supplied]
8.5. Considering the foregoing, “it becomes not only the

right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.”25
8.6. To justify the exercise of this expanded power of judicial

review, it is only required that petitioners comply with the following
requisites: “(1) there must be an actual case or justiciable controversy
before this Court; (2) the question before this Court must be ripe for
adjudication; (3) the person challenging the act must be a proper
party; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest opportunity and must be the very lis mota of the case.”26
8.7. Petitioners respectfully submit that these requirements

are present in this case.
A. THERE IS AN ACTUAL CASE

SUSCEPTIBLE OF JUDICIAL
DETERMINATION
8.8. “There is an actual case or controversy if there is a

"conflict of legal right, an opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial
resolution." A petitioner bringing a case before this Court must
establish that there is a legally demandable and enforceable right
under the Constitution. There must be a real and substantial
controversy, with definite and concrete issues involving the legal
relations of the parties, and admitting of specific relief that courts can
grant.”27
8.9. As earlier stated and will be further discuss below,

petitioners anchor their challenge against Republic Act 11479 on
constitutional grounds, particularly on violations of their rights to
religious freedom, their right to freely express these belief; their right
against unreasonable seizure; their right not to be deprive of life and
liberty without due process; their right not to be unlawfully detained;
their right to be presumed innocent; and, their right to organize or
form associations.
25 Supra.
26Araullo v. Aquino III, 731 Phil. 457 (2014); KMU vs. Aquino, G.R. No. 210500 April 2,
2019
27 id.
Page 19 of 83
8.10. The sheer number of constitutional violations and the
primacy of the rights herein involved warrant this Honorable Court to
exercise “not [to] its supremacy, but the fulfillment of its 'solemn and
sacred obligation' under the Constitution”28 bringing the Court’s ruling
in IFURUNG 29 to the fore, viz:
“From these considerations, it cannot be gainsaid

that there is indeed a justiciable controversy
involving an alleged serious infringement of the
fundamental law, and which the Court is duty
bound to resolve.”
8.11. As held in Imbong vs. Ochoa30, a petition challenging a

legislative action on religious objections is a justiciable controversy.
Invoking Tañada, the Supreme Court held:
“In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine

Senate on the ground that it contravenes the
Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a
justiciable controversy. Where an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed
the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact
the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The
question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The
duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the
supremacy of the Constitution is upheld." Once a
"controversy as to the application or interpretation
of constitutional provision is raised before this
Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal
issue which the Court is bound by constitutional
mandate to decide. [Emphasis supplied]”
8.12. Similarly, in Peralta v. PHILPOST31 , it was held that the

invocation of religious freedom alone is already sufficient to cause an
actual controversy:
“Based on these precedents, the Court has the duty

to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional
28 Lozano v. Nograles, 607 Phil. 334

29 Supra.
30 GR. No. 204819 , April 8, 2014
31 G.R. No. 223395, December 04, 2018
Page 20 of 83
precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function
of educating the bench and the bar, and in the present
petition, the parties involved, on the application of the
constitutional provisions allegedly violated vis-a-vis the
printing and issuance of the INC commemorative
stamps. There is no question that the issues being
raised affect the public interest, involving as they
do, the alleged misuse of public funds and the non-
establishment clause which is one of the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of religion.
This petition calls for a clarification of constitutional
principles. Perforce, there is a need to adjudicate the
instant case.”
B . P E T I T I O N E R S H AV E T H E
REQUISITE STANDING TO INSTITUTE THE
PRESENT ACTION
8.13. The petitioners twin rights of “religious freedom” and “free

expression” are both accorded preferred status by the framers of our
constitution.32 Curtailment of these rights already constitutes direct
injury.
8.14. In addition, petitioner AMIN also invokes its constitutional

rights to organize and it other rights as a duly registered party-list
group. The assailed law will hinder its lawful activities to conduct
livelihood trainings, advocate human rights and minority rights,
organize assemblies or join in rallies.
8.15. Petitioners Amihilda Sangcopan and Mujiv Hataman are

suing in their capacity as members of the House of Representatives
because they believe the House of Representatives did not have the
required quorum when it enacted HB 6875 and they were prevented
from introducing any amendment. The remote voting conducted also
does not have any foundation in the Constitution.
8.16. Lawyers Satrina Mohammad, Jamar Kulayan, Alman-

Najar Namla and Bensaud Degusman are members of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines who sworn to support the constitution and are
also enforcing the same rights to “free exercise” and of “free
expression”.
32Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No.
153888, July 9, 2003
Page 21 of 83
8.17. Petitioner Rameer Tawasil is a visual artist promoting
Tausug culture and history. Some of his artworks depict the horrors of
war and violence that Moros endured over the centuries. The
assailed law threatens the continued free exercise of his profession
as his artworks may be construed as promoting terrorism and
violence.
8.18. Petitioner Sheikh Jamsir Jainal is an imam and regularly

give Friday sermons in mosque. Republic Act 11479 threatens to
punish him for inciting terrorism once he discussed JIHAD during
Friday sermons or whenever he give lectures on the subject.
8.19. Collectively, petitioners are restrained by the assailed law

from freely and openly discussing their religious beliefs and
conveying the same.
8.20. The fact that Republic Act 11479 violates petitioners’

constitutional protected rights as well as impaired the legislative
privilege of the petitioner-members of the House of Representatives
is enough to cloth them with “personal and substantial interest” in the
instant case such that “they sustained or will sustain a direct injury as
a result of the governmental act that is being challenged”33.
8.21. Finally, petitioners are all Filipino citizens and taxpayers.

The assailed law (RA 11479) will justify, if not, demand for the
utilization or expenditures primarily of the Confidential/Intelligence
Fund (CIF).
8.22. Their locus standi to initiate petition of this importance is

recognized since the case of Chavez vs. PEA-Amari34. The Court in
that case held:
“The petitioner has standing to bring this

taxpayer's suit because the petition seeks to
compel PEA to comply with its constitutional
duties. There are two constitutional issues involved
here. First is the right of citizens to information on
matters of public concern. x x x Moreover, the petition
raises matters of transcendental importance to the
33 Integrated Bar of the Phils. v. Hon. Zamora, 392 Phil. 618, 632-633
34 G.R. No. 133250, May 6, 2003
Page 22 of 83
public. In Chavez v. PCGG, the Court upheld the right
of a citizen to bring a taxpayer's suit on matters of
transcendental importance to the public, thus
—"Besides, petitioner emphasizes, the matter of
recovering the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses is an
issue of 'transcendental importance to the public.' He
asserts that ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate
and prosecute actions questioning the validity of acts or
orders of government agencies or instrumentalities, if
the issues raised are of 'paramount public interest,' and
if they 'immediately affect the social, economic and
moral well being of the people.’
Moreover, the mere fact that he is a citizen

satisfies the requirement of personal interest, when
the proceeding involves the assertion of a public
right, such as in this case. He invokes several
decisions of this Court which have set aside the
procedural matter of locus standi, when the subject of
the case involved public interest. xxx xxx
xxx” [emphasis supplied]
8.23. The recent ruling in Umali v. Judicial and Bar Council 35,
reiterating the capacity of a legislator, citizen and taxpayer to sue,
also applies to the petitioners:
“When suing as a citizen, the interest of the

petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute must
be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not
only that the law or any government act is invalid, but
also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in
some indefinite way. It must appear that the person
complaining has been or is about to be denied some
right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that
he is about to be subjected to some burdens or
penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.
In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a
public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies
the requirement of personal interest.
35 Supra.
Page 23 of 83
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue
where there is a claim that public funds are illegally
disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to
any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of
public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law. Before he can invoke the power of
judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that
he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal
expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he
would sustain a direct injury as a result of the
enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is
not sufficient that he has merely a general interest
common to all members of the public.
xxxx
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question
the validity of any official action which he claims
infringes his prerogatives as a legislator. Indeed, a
member of the House of Representatives has standing
to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and
privileges vested by the Constitution in his office.26
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
xxxx
It is clear therefrom that each member of Congress
has a legal standing to sue even without an enabling
resolution for that purpose so long as the questioned
acts invade the powers, prerogatives and privileges of
Congress. Otherwise stated, whenever the acts affect
the powers, prerogatives and privileges of Congress,
anyone of its members may validly bring an action to
challenge the same to safeguard and maintain the
sanctity thereof.[citations omitted and emphasis
supplied]
C. THE ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY

IS RAISED IN THE EARLIEST
OPPORTUNITY AND IS THE VERY LIS
MOTA OF THE INSTANT CASE
8.24. The assailed law took effect only very recently. Its certified
true copy is not even available yet. Its constitutionality is therefore
raised at the earliest opportunity.
8.25. The unconstitutionality of the law are the very issues in

this case and there is no other way for this Court to dispose of the
Page 24 of 83
instant case on some other ground. Petitioners also show that there
is clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. Hence, the
requirement of Lis Mota is also satisfied.
TRANSCENDENTAL IMPORTANCE
8.26. Another basis that justifies petitioners’ locus standi in this

case is the liberal approach of determining standing under the
doctrine of transcendental importance which the Court had
increasingly apply on issues of public interest and those raising
serious constitutional issues, such as the instant case.
8.27. This Honorable Court has applied the guidelines in

determining whether a matter is of transcendental importance, as
follows: “(1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the
case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional
or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or
instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party
with a more direct and specific interest in the questions being
raised.”36
8.28. Petitioners in this case sufficiently passed the required

test for the application of the doctrine of transcendental importance.
The enforcement of RA No. 11479 necessarily requires or allows the
utilization of Confidential/Intelligence Fund (CIF) of the Office of the
President, the Armed Forces of the Philippines and that of the other
members of the Council; the law also authorizes wanton disregard of
petitioners constitutionally protected rights; and, there is no other
party with more direct and specific interest in the questions being
raised.
8.29. As held in Chavez vs. PEA-Amari37:
“The instant case, however, raises constitutional

issues of transcendental importance to the public.
The Court can resolve this case without
determining any factual issue related to the case.
Also, the instant case is a petition for mandamus which
falls under the original jurisdiction of the Court under
Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution. We resolve to
36 Senate v. Ermita, Supra; CREBA v. MERALCO, G.R. No. 174697, July 8, 2010
37 Ibid.
Page 25 of 83
exercise primary jurisdiction over the instant
case.” [Emphasis supplied]
8.30. This Court in the earlier Emergency Power Cases38 has

applied the rule of liberality due to the seriousness of the
constitutional issues raised. It held:
“Nevertheless, where a most compelling reason

exists, such as when the matter is of transcendental
importance and paramount interest to the nation, the
Court must take the liberal approach that
recognizes the legal standing of non traditional
plaintiffs, such as citizens and taxpayers, to raise
constitutional issues that affect them. This Court thus
did so in a case that involves the conservation of our
forests for ecological needs. Until an exact balance is
struck, the Court must accept an eclectic notion that
can free itself from the bondage of legal nicety and hold
trenchant technicalities subordinate to what may be
considered to be of overriding concern.” [Emphasis
supplied]
8.31. Another justification for directly bringing the instant case

to this Court is the fact that petitioners could not possibly obtain the
desired redress elsewhere. In Santiago vs. Vasquez39, this
Honorable Court ruled that petitions for certiorari, prohibition, or
mandamus, though cognizable by other courts, may directly be filed
with the Supreme Court “if the redress desired cannot be obtained in
the appropriate courts or where exceptional compelling
circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the
exercise of our primary jurisdiction.”
FACIAL CHALLENGE
8.32. Generally, a facial challenge against a penal law is not

allowed otherwise prosecution of crimes will be hampered. The
instant petition, however, falls under the exception because RA 11479
is not an ordinary penal statute. Aside from penalizing certain acts, it
curtails the vital freedoms of “free exercise of religion”, “free
38 Araneta vs. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368 (1949)

39 G.R. No. 99289-90, January 27, 1993
Page 26 of 83
expression” and “freedom from unreasonable seizure and arbitrary
detention”. Other than defining crimes, it unlawfully vests an
executive office with the power constitutionally reserved to the
judiciary, e.g. to issue written authority to take custody, to detain and
to designate individuals and organizations as criminal suspects.
8.33. As held in Romualdez vs. COMELEC40:
“The rule established in our jurisdiction is, only

statutes on free speech, religious freedom, and
other fundamental rights may be facially
challenged. Under no case may ordinary penal
statutes be subjected to a facial challenge.”
8.34. Petitioners also satisfy the required minimum standing

mentioned in SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT
NETWORK v. ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL41, e.g., that petitioners
should not be made to wait until actually detained for expressing their
religious tenets before their plea will be heard. It was held:
“Prevailing American jurisprudence allows an

adjudication on the merits when an anticipatory
petition clearly shows that the challenged
prohibition forbids the conduct or activity that a
petitioner seeks to do, as there would then be a
justiciable controversy.”
8.35. Although Republic Act 11479 (Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020)

and Republic Act 9372 (Human Security Act 2007) both punish
terrorism, their similarity ends there. The current law punishes
innocent acts like advocacy and training to mean “inciting to
terrorism”, “membership to an organization”, “publishing
advertisement”, “providing material support”, “facilitating travel” and
“traveling to a foreign state”. These were not the case under the
Human Security Act.
8.36. The questioned Act empowered the Council to issue

written authority to arrest, to cause the arrest individuals on mere
suspicion, to detain arrested individuals for more than three (3) days,
to designate ex parte terror suspect or organization, to curtail right to
40 G.R. No. 167011, December 11, 2008

41 GR No. 178552, Oct 05, 2010
Page 27 of 83
travel and of locomotion and to intercept private conversations. These
were not so in the Human Security Act.
8.37. While the Human Security Act is purely a penal law, the
Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020 is not. The latter, aside from defining
certain acts as crime, actually grants the Council and enforcement
agencies the imprimatur to violate constitutionally guaranteed rights.
Hence, this petition must not share the same fate of Southern
Hemisphere.
8.38. Justice Leanardo-De Castro once said in her concurring

opinion42 that “religious freedom can be invoked not only against a
facially-neutral law that unduly impairs such freedom but any
regulation or practice that has the same effect unless it passes the
accepted test or standard laid down by jurisprudence to protect the
freedom of religion that occupies a preferred status in the hierarchy of
human rights.”
8.39. Thus in Imbong, it was made clear that although the

Reproductive Health Law is not a penal statue, it can still be facially
challenge on religious ground, viz:
“The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial

challenge lodged by the subject petitions, contending
that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it
is not a speech regulating measure.
The Court is not persuaded.
In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial
challenge, also known as a First Amendment
Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity
of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but
also all other rights in the First Amendment.106 These
include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the
right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances.107
After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom,
freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but
component rights of the right to one's freedom of
expression, as they are modes which one's thoughts
are externalized.
42 A.M. No. 10-4-19-sc, March 7, 2017
Page 28 of 83
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines
originating from the U.S. has been generally
maintained, albeit with some modifications. While this
Court has withheld the application of facial challenges
to strictly penal statues, it has expanded its scope to
cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also
those involving religious freedom, and other
fundamental rights. The underlying reason for this
modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the
U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is
mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, but also to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. Verily, the framers of Our Constitution
envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its
duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing
petitions have seriously alleged that the
constitutional human rights to life, speech and
religion and other fundamental rights mentioned
above have been violated by the assailed legislation,
the Court has authority to take cognizance of these
kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can
indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these
petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no
actual case or controversy, would diminish this
Court as a reactive branch of government, acting
only when the Fundamental Law has been
transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.”
CONGRESS COMMITTED GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
DISREGARDING THE CLEAR
M A N D AT E S O F T H E 1 9 8 7
CONSTITUTION FOUND IN
ARTICLES III, VI and VIII thereof
8.40. Jurisprudence has defined grave abuse of discretion to

mean the capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
Page 29 of 83
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.43
8.41. There is grave abuse of discretion when “tribunal

committed not merely a reversible error but also a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Showing mere
abuse of discretion is not enough, for the abuse must be shown to be
grave. Grave abuse of discretion means either that the judicial or
quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner
by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent
judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to
perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as
when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction”.44
8.42. Undoubtedly, Congress exceeded its jurisdiction and

abused its discretion when it passed the herein assailed law despite
the numerous constitutional provisions it run countered into, e.g.: the
Bill of Rights, the doctrine of separation of powers and the
requirement on quorum.
8.43. In Neri v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee45, the

Honorable Court assumed jurisdiction and exercised its power of
judicial review because the contempt order against Secretary Neri
was issued by only the minority members of the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee even if it was later on signed by the majority of its
membership. In that case, this Honorable Court ruled that the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee committed grave abuse of discretion.
8.44. Similarly, Congress committed grave abuse of discretion

when it passed Republic Act 11479 despite its obvious conflict with
the Constitution. The House of Representatives, in particular, further
exceeded its jurisdiction when it enacted the said law despite the fact
that only 25 of its members were present.
II. Substantive Issues
RA 11479 WAS NOT LAWFULLY

PASSED BY THE HOUSE OF
43 Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129368, 25 August 2003
44 Umali v. The Judicial and Bar Council, Supra.
45 G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008
Page 30 of 83
REPRESENTATIVES DUE TO LACK
OF QUORUM
8.45. House Bill 6875 was approved on final reading by the

House of Representatives on 5 June 2020 with only twenty-five (25)
members physically present in the Batasan. The rest of the members
merely voted remotely using the “zoom” and their “viber chat group”.
This is unprecedented and without Constitutional basis.
8.46. Sections 15 and 16 (2), Article VII of the 1987 Constitution

clearly requires the PHYSICAL PRESENCE or ATTENDANCE of the
members of Congress in its sessions and the presence of the
majority thereof is required before it can do any business. Otherwise,
it must adjourn. Thus:
“SECTION 15. The Congress shall convene once

every year on the fourth Monday of July for its regular
session, unless a different date is fixed by law, and
shall continue to be in session for such number of
days as it may determine until thirty days before the
opening of its next regular session, exclusive of
Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. The President
may call a special session at any time.” [emphasis
supplied]
SECTION 16. (1) xxx
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a

quorum to do business, but a smaller number may
adjourn from day to day and may compel the
attendance of absent Members in such manner, and
under such penalties, as such House may provide.
(3) xxx
(4) Each House shall keep a Journal of its

proceedings, and from time to time publish the same,
excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect
national security; and the yeas and nays on any
question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the
Members present, be entered in the Journal.
Each House shall also keep a Record of its

proceedings.
(5) Neither House during the sessions of the

Congress shall, without the consent of the other,
adjourn for more than three (3) days, nor to any other
place than that which the two Houses shall be
sitting. [emphasis supplied]
Page 31 of 83
8.47. That Section 15 mandates for “physical presence or
attendance” by members of Congress in its session is manifest from
the used of the word “to convene” and to continue “in session”
except on Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays. Convene,
according to Cambridge Dictionary means “to bring together a group
of people for a meeting, or to meet for a meeting".46 This is supported
by Section 16 (5) barring either House from adjourning to any other
place than that which they are sitting.
8.48. The need for PHYSICAL PRESENCE can also be inferred

from “parliamentary immunity” and “speech and debate clause” in
Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution granting members of
Congress immunity from arrest while the Congress is in session; and,
their speeches are privilege only when delivered in the Congress.
The said provision reads:
“Section 11. A Senator or Member of the House of

Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not
more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from
arrest while the Congress is in session. No Member
shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place
for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any
committee thereof.”
8.49. Although the current pandemic affecting the country has

been repeatedly described as “war”, this alone would not merit the
dispensation of the physical attendance or presence of the members
of Congress during its session because even during the existence of
an actual war when it becomes necessary to declare its existence,
Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution still requires Congress to
convene in joint session assembled, viz:
“SECTION 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-

thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled,
voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare
the existence of a state of war.
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the

Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a
limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may
prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to
carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner
46 https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/convene
Page 32 of 83
withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers
shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.”
8.50. Similarly, for the purpose of revoking or extending the

declaration of martial law by the President, Congress is required to
physically meet jointly. If Congress is not in session, it is required to
immediately convene within twenty-four (24) hours without need of a
call. Section18, Article VIII provides:
“Section 18. The President shall be the

Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he
may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of
invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it,
he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within
forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or
in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting
jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its
Members in regular or special session, may revoke
such proclamation or suspension, which revocation
shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the
initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the
same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension
for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the
invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety
requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within

twenty-four hours following such proclamation or
suspension, convene in accordance with its rules
without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate

proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension
thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon
within thirty clays from its filing. [emphasis supplied]
Page 33 of 83
8.51. In turn, the following provisions of the Rules of
Procedure 47 of the House of Representatives clearly mean
PHYSICAL PRESENCE or ATTENDANCE of its members in all of its
sessions. They read:
“Section 71. Attendance in Sessions. - Every

Member shall be present in all sessions of the
House unless prevented from doing so by sickness or
other unavoidable circumstances duly reported to the
House through the Secretary General.
While the House is in session, the following shall be

deemed present:
a. Members who are attending committee meetings

as authorized by the Committee on Rules, in
accordance with Section 35 hereof, upon written
notification to the Secretary General by the
concerned committee secretary;
b. Members who are attending meetings of:

b.1. The Commission on Appointments;
b.2. The House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal; and
b.3. Bicameral Conference Committees
c. Members who are on official mission as approved

by the Speaker.
“Section 75. Quorum. - A majority of all the

Members of the House shall constitute a quorum.
The House shall not transact business without a
quorum. A Member who questions the existence of a
quorum shall not leave the session hall until the
question is resolved or acted upon, otherwise, the
question shall be deemed abandoned.”
Section 76. Absence of Quorum. - In the absence

of a quorum after the roll call, the Members present
may compel the attendance of absent Members.
47 h t t p : / / w w w. c o n g r e s s . g o v. p h / d o w n l o a d / d o c s / h r e p . h o u s e . r u l e s . p d f ?
fbclid=IwAR1snPTZQgkeRrQZrRXkLkGd0AaEVDuNnb3HMKLQfL5NREgltAqsmz3BA7s
Page 34 of 83
In all calls of the House, the doors shall be
closed. Except those who are excused from
attendance in accordance with Section 71 hereof, the
absent Members, by order of a majority of those
present, shall be sent for and arrested wherever
they may be found and conducted to the session
hall in custody in order to secure their attendance
at the session. The order shall be executed by the
Sergeant-at-Arms and by such officers as the Speaker
may designate. After the presence of the Members
arrested is secured at the session hall, the Speaker
shall determine the conditions for their discharge.
Members who voluntarily appear shall be admitted
immediately to the session hall and shall report to
the Secretary General to have their presence
recorded.
8.52. The clear import of the foregoing is nothing less than the
PHYSICAL PRESENCE of the members of Congress in its session.
Otherwise, it would be superfluous to authorize the present member
to compel the attendance of an absent member wherever they may
be found. Neither would their be a need for those who voluntarily
appear to be “admitted immediately to the session hall” and “report to
the Secretary General to have their presence recorded”.
8.53. The Supreme Court in Neri v. Senate Committee48

interpreted the same Constitutional provision to mean physical
presence or attendance. Consequently, after declaring the
deliberations that led to the issuance of the contempt order as flawed
for lack of quorum, the Court declared void the contempt order. The
Court held:
“Respondent Committees committed grave abuse of

discretion in issuing the contempt order in view of the
five (5) reasons:
First, xxx.
Second, xxx.
Third, a reading of the transcript of respondent

Committees’ January 30, 2008 proceeding reveals that
only a minority of the members of the Senate Blue
48 G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008
Page 35 of 83
Ribbon Committee were present during the
deliberation. xxxx
Clearly, the needed vote is a majority of all the

members of the Committee. Apparently, members who
did not actually participate in the deliberation were
made to sign the contempt order. Thus, there is a cloud
of doubt as to the validity of the contempt order dated
January 30, 2008. xxx” [emphasis supplied]
8.54. In affirming this Decision, the Court held49:
“In the assailed Decision, we said that there is a

cloud of doubt as to the validity of the contempt
order because during the deliberation of the three
(3) respondent Committees, only seven (7) Senators
were present. This number could hardly fulfill the
majority requirement needed for respondent Committee
on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations
which has a membership of seventeen (17) Senators
and respondent Committee on National Defense and
Security which has a membership on eighteen (18)
Senators. With respect to respondent Committee on
Trade and Commerce which has a membership of nine
(9) Senators, only three (3) members were present.
xxx.
xxx
Obviously the deliberation of the respondent

Committees that led to the issuance of the
contempt order is flawed. Instead of being submitted
to a full debate by all the members of the respondent
Committees, the contempt order was prepared and
thereafter presented to the other members for signing.
As a result, the contempt order which was issued on
January 30, 2008 was not a faithful representation of
the proceedings that took place on said date. records
clearly show that not all of those who signed the
contempt order were present during the January 30,
2008 deliberation when the matter was taken
up.” [emphasis supplied]
49 G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008
Page 36 of 83
8.55. A "Quorum" is defined as that number of members of a
body which, when legally assembled in their proper places, will
enable the body to transact its proper business or that number which
makes a lawful body and gives it power to pass upon a law or
ordinance or do any valid act. "Majority," when required to constitute
a quorum, means the number greater than half or more than half of
any total.50
8.56. A similar opinion was earlier pronounced in Avelino vs.

Cuenco51:
“When the Constitution declares that a majority of

"each House" shall constitute a quorum, "the House:
does not mean "all" the members. Even a majority of all
the members constitute "the House". There is a
difference between a majority of "the House", the latter
requiring less number than the first. Therefore an
absolute majority (12) of all the members of the
Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional
majority of the Senate for the purpose of a
quorum.” [Citations omitted]
8.57. The existence of “quorum” and its mandatory character is

obvious from the used of the word “shall” in the Constitution. Without
the required presence of the majority, the House cannot do any
business, it has to adjourn and compel the attendance of the absent
members. As aptly said by J. Carpio in his dissent in Neri: “To act as
a legislative body, the Senate must have a quorum, which is a
majority of its membership.”
8.58. Consequently, a law passed by only twenty-five (25)

members of the House of Representatives being present or when it
did not have the required quorum to do business is flawed52 and
therefore NULL and VOID.
8.59. As J. Moran said in his concurring opinion said:
“If this group is found sufficient to constitute a

quorum under the Constitution, then its proceeding
should be free from interference. But if it is not
50Zamora vs. Caballero, G.R. No. 147767, January 14, 2004 citing Perez v. Dela Cruz,
27 SCRA 587
51 Avelino v. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-2821, March 4, 1949
52 Supra.
Page 37 of 83
possessed of a valid quorum, then its proceedings
should be voided.”
THE VARIOUS MEANS EMPLOYED

BY CONGRESS ARE
“UNREASONABLE” AND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
8.60. While petitioners support the government efforts to curtail,

prevent, counter, deter and penalized terrorist acts; and, further
recognize the state’s duty to protect citizens from any possible
harmful attacks, they also believe that Congress is restricted from
employing means or methods that are unreasonable and
unconstitutional. As held in People vs. Pomar53:
“But the state, when providing by legislation for the

protection of the public health, the public morals, or the
public safety, is subject to and is controlled by the
paramount authority of the constitution of the state, and
will not be permitted to violate rights secured or
guaranteed by that instrument or interfere with the
execution of the powers and rights guaranteed to
the people under their law — the constitution.”
8.61. Under our legal system, no virtuous end can justify the
use of unlawful means. Or to put it more precisely, “in the attainment
of public good, no infringement of the constitutional rights is
permissible”54 . This was the teaching in Association of Small
Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform55:
“One of the basic principles of the democratic

system is that where the rights of the individual are
concerned, the end does not justify the means. It is
not enough that there be a valid objective; it is also
necessary that the means employed to pursue it be in
keeping with the Constitution. Mere expediency will not
excuse constitutional shortcuts. There is no question
53People vs. Pomar, G.R. No. L-22008, November 3, 1924 citing Mugler vs. Kansas,
123 U. S., 623
54 Morfe v Mutoc, G.R. L-20387, January 31, 1968
55 175 SCRA 343, 375-376 [1989]
Page 38 of 83
that not even the strongest moral conviction or the most
urgent public need, subject only to a few notable
exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an individual's
rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a person
invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of the
Constitution is a majority of one even as against the
rest of the nation who would deny him that right.”
8.62. As will be hereinafter discussed, RA 11479 seeks to

prevent or deter terrorism by curtailing religious freedom, infringing
freedom of expression, disregarding due process requirements,
violating the rights to be presumed innocent, encroaching on the
exclusive judicial authority to issue seizure orders and most
dangerously, punishing inchoate crimes. These means are not only
unreasonable but are also unconstitutional.
R A 11 4 7 9 I N F R I N G E S O N
PETITIONERS’ RIGHT TO THE
FREE EXERCISE OF THEIR
RELIGION and of FREE
EXPRESSION
8.63. Since the guarantee on religious freedom is intertwined

with free speech56, they are hereby discussed jointly.
8.64. Republic Act 11479 penalized, among others, the

following acts:
SEC. 8. Proposal to Commit Terrorism. – Any

person who proposes to commit terrorism as defined in
Section 4 hereof shall suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of twelve (12) years.
SEC. 9. Inciting to Commit Terrorism. – Any person

who, without taking any direct part in the commission of
terrorism, shall incite others to the execution of any of
the acts specified in Section 4 hereof by means of
speeches, proclamations, writings, emblems, banners
or other representations tending to the same end, shall
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years.
56 Imbong, Supra.
Page 39 of 83
SEC. 10. Recruitment to and Membership in a
Terrorist Organization. –
xxx
xxx
(b) Publishing an advertisement or propaganda for

the purpose of recruiting persons to serve in any
capacity in or with such an armed force;
(c) Publishing an advertisement or propaganda

containing any information relating to the place at which
or the manner in which persons may make applications
to serve or obtain information relating to service in any
capacity in or with such armed force or relating to the
manner in which persons may travel to a foreign state
for the purpose of serving in any capacity in or with
such armed force; or
xxx
xxx
8.65. These are otherwise innocent and neutral acts now made
punishable by RA 11479 and it is to this extent that this law infringes
on petitioner’s constitutionally protected rights of “free exercise” and
“free expression”.
A. FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
8.66. Freedom of religion, in the words of Jefferson, is "the

most inalienable and sacred of all human rights”. 57 It is not surprising
that Section 5, Article III of our Constitution secured this right for us,
thus:
“SECTION 5. No law shall be made respecting an

establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, without discrimination
or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test
shall be required for the exercise of civil or political
rights.”
57 Citeed in Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, June 22, 2006
Page 40 of 83
8.67. “Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by
the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently
affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to
protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man
to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs , and to live
as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others
and with the common good.”58
8.68. This provision covers both guarantees that the state will
not establish a religion, known as the “non establishment clause”;
and, that the state will not prohibit the free exercise of religion, known
as the “free exercise clause”. In this petition, the challenge is limited
to the fact that RA 11479 interferes if not actually prohibits the “free
exercise of religion”.
8.69. The basis of free exercise according to the Court in

Imbong 59 is:
“xxx the respect for the inviolability of the human

conscience. Under this part of religious freedom
guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly
interfering with the outside manifestations of one's
belief and faith.”
8.70. Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to

believe. It also means the freedom to act or not to act according to
what one believes. And this freedom is violated when one is
compelled to act against one's belief or is prevented from acting
according to one's belief.60
8.71. Petitioners’ religions, Islam, is a complete way of life and

governs a myriad of human conduct. It legislates the relationship
between human and his Creator as well as the relationships among
humans, his family, his community and his environment. Its followers
believe in the Qur’an as God’s revelations and consider its exultation
as requiring mandatory compliance. Aside from believing in strict
monotheism and praying five (5) times a day, there are some beliefs,
like “JIHAD”, that are controversial. Nevertheless, a Muslim is still
oblige to talk and discuss its merits and to impart the concept;
because, to convey all its messages regardless of the controversy it
may stir is still another obligation of a Muslim.
58 Imbong v. Garcia, supra.

59 Supra.
60 Supra.
Page 41 of 83
8.72. Britannica defined Jihad as follows:
“Jihad, (Arabic: “struggle” or “effort”) also spelled

jehad, in Islam, a meritorious struggle or effort. The
exact meaning of the term jihād depends on context; it
has often been erroneously translated in the West as
“holy war.” Jihad, particularly in the religious and ethical
realm, primarily refers to the human struggle to promote
what is right and to prevent what is wrong.”61
8.73. The importance of jihad is rooted in the Quran’s

command to struggle (the literal meaning of the word jihad) in the
path of God and in the example of the Prophet Muhammad and his
early Companions. In its most general meaning, jihad refers to the
obligation incumbent on all Muslims, individuals and the
community, to follow and realize God’s will: to lead a virtuous life
and to extend the Islamic community through preaching,
education, example, writing, etc. Jihad also includes the right,
indeed the obligation, to defend Islam and the community from
aggression. Throughout history, the call to jihad has rallied Muslims to
the defense of Islam.62
8.74. Another relevant belief of Islam is the obligation is convey

which is found in many chapters of the Quran, to wit:
“[Allah praises] those who convey the messages of

Allah and fear Him and do not fear anyone but Allah.
And sufficient is Allah as an Accountant.” [Surah 33:39]
and, in another:
“Invite to the way of your Lord with wisdom and good

instruction, and argue with them in a way that is best.
Indeed, your Lord is most knowing of who has strayed
from His way, and He is most knowing of who is [rightly]
guided.” [Surah 16:125]
8.75. Unfortunately, the attack of September 11 in New York,

the rise in Islamophobia and the surged of ISIL had jeopardized, if not
actually deterred the discussion of JIHAD even for purely academic
purposes. It too led to the misconception that JIHAD is nothing but
61 https://www.britannica.com/topic/jihad
62 https://www.unaoc.org/repository/Esposito_Jihad_Holy_Unholy.pdf
Page 42 of 83
“HOLY WAR”, a word that finds no reference in the Quran. Over the
years, it has come to be known instead as a “terrorist attack”.
8.76. This labelling and the way it has been connected to Islam
has prevented Muslims from openly expressing their belief in JIHAD
to avoid suspicion of inciting or proposal to commit terrorism, which
under this assailed law are already punishable. It thus deters
petitioner Imam from delivering sermon on JIHAD. It prevents the
other petitioners from openly teaching the concept to their children
and family.
8.77. When before we can immediately exclaim “Allahu Akbar”

on hearing good news or when praising Allah, we now have to be first
conscious of the place and of our surroundings. When before we
could point our index finger to testify to the oneness of Allah, it is now
seen as an allegiance to ISIL. When before we can have pocket
Quran in our backpacks, the same Quran can now be used as
evidence of our indoctrination. All these can now used as bases for
“designating” herein petitioners as terrorists.
8.78. Also, the state’s response to terrorism, particularly its law

enforcement, has lead to the arrest of innocent individuals on the
basis of mere suspicions and unverified informations. Most of these
individuals, if not all, were Muslims, an identity shared by petitioners.
Hence, petitioners are being threatened by the implementation of this
assailed law.
8.79. While the fear was mostly apprehension unless one is

actually taken into custody, Republic Act 11479 now makes these
threats real by simply making ordinary and innocent acts of making
speeches, proclamations, writings, emblems, banners or other
representations and publishing advertisement punishable. Thus, the
law now effectively prevents petitioners from freely and openly
discussing their religious beliefs and freedom of expression.
B. FREE EXPRESSION
8.80. The limitations and scope of the freedom of expression

was discussed in the case of Chavez vs. Gonzales63 to include
discussion of religious ideas not shared by the majority. It was held:
“The scope of freedom of expression is so broad

that it extends protection to nearly all forms of
63 GR No. 168338, 15 February 2008
Page 43 of 83
communication. It protects speech, print and assembly
regarding secular as well as political causes, and is not
confined to any particular field of human interest. The
protection covers myriad matters of public interest or
concern embracing all issues, about which information
is needed or appropriate, so as to enable members of
society to cope with the exigencies of their period. The
constitutional protection assures the broadest
possible exercise of free speech and free press for
religious, political, economic, scientific, news, or
informational ends, in as much as the
Constitution's basic guarantee of freedom to
advocate ideas is not confined to the expression of
ideas that are conventional or shared by a majority.”
8.81. The herein assailed law therefore constitutes both as a

“prior restraint” and as “subsequent punishment” that are proscribed
under Section 4, Articles III of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
“No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of

speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances.
8.82. Prior restraint is defined as an “official government

restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance of
actual publication or dissemination”64. The restriction against prior
restraint was comprehensively discussed in Chavez as follows:
“Prior restraint refers to official governmental

restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in
advance of actual publication or dissemination. Freedom
from prior restraint is largely freedom from government
censorship of publications, whatever the form of
censorship, and regardless of whether it is wielded by the
executive, legislative or judicial branch of the government.
Thus, it precludes governmental acts that required
approval of a proposal to publish; licensing or permits as
prerequisites to publication including the payment of
license taxes for the privilege to publish; and even
injunctions against publication. Even the closure of the
business and printing offices of certain newspapers,
64 J.G. Bernas, S.J., The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary 205
(1996), as cited in the case of Soriano vs. Laguardia, GR No. 164785, 29 April 2009
Page 44 of 83
resulting in the discontinuation of their printing and
publication, are deemed as previous restraint or
censorship. Any law or official that requires some form of
permission to be had before publication can be made,
commits an infringement of the constitutional right, and
remedy can be had at the courts.
8.83. Republic Act 11479 clearly constitutes a prior restraint on

free expression because it compels Muslim preachers and fathers
from freely and publicly discussing their religious beliefs. The
discussion or mere mentioned of JIHAD can be now considered by
law enforcers as acts of conspiracy to commit terrorism or proposal to
commit terrorism.
8.84. Although freedom of expression is unlimited, the same is

subject to a strict scrutiny and only after satisfying the clear and
present danger test, which is not present in this case. As held in
Chaves:
“Prior restraint on speech based on its content

cannot be justified by hypothetical fears, "but only by
showing a substantive and imminent evil that has taken
the life of a reality already on ground." As formulated, "the
question in every case is whether the words used are
used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as
to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree."
8.85. While terrorism indeed endangers the lives of innocent

people and must be prevented; such danger is neither clear nor
present to justify the curtailment or subsequent punishment of free
speech and free exercise of religious beliefs.
THE POWER TO DESIGNATE and/

or PROSCRIBE TERROR
SUSPECTS OR ORGANIZATION
VIOLATE THE DOCTRINE OF
DELEGATION OF POWERS; IT
CONSTITUTES VIOLATIONS OF
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AND THE
RIGHT TO ORGANIZE
Page 45 of 83
8.86. Section 25 of the Republic Act 11479 granted the Anti-
Terrorism Council the draconian power to designate terrorist
suspects. It reads:
SEC. 25. Designation of Terrorist Individual, Groups of

Persons, Organizations or Associations. – Pursuant to
our obligations under United Nations Security Council
Resolution No. 1373, the ATC shall automatically adopt
the United Nations Security Council Consolidated List of
designated individuals, group of persons, organizations,
or associations designated and/or identified as a
terrorist, one who finances terrorism, or a terrorist
organization or group.
xxx
The ATC may designate an individual, groups of
persons, organization, or association, whether domestic
or foreign, upon a finding of probable cause that the
individual, groups of persons, organization, or
association commit, or attempt to commit, or
conspire in the commission of the acts defined and
penalized under Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12
of this Act.
The assets of the designated individual, groups of
persons, organization or association above-mentioned
shall be subject to the authority of the Anti-Money
Laundering Council (AMLC) to freeze pursuant to
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 10168.
The designation shall be without prejudice to the
proscription of terrorist organizations, associations, or
groups of persons under Section 26 of this Act.
8.87. Section 26 thereof invests the Council with the corollary

and forceful authority to proscribed individuals and organizations:
SEC. 26. Proscription of Terrorist Organizations,

Association, or Group of Persons. – Any group of
persons, organization, or association, which commits
any of the acts defined and penalized under Sections
4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of this Act, or organized
for the purpose of engaging in terrorism shall, upon
application of the DOJ before the authorizing division of
the Court of Appeals with due notice and opportunity to
Page 46 of 83
be heard given to the group of persons, organization or
association, be declared as a terrorist and outlawed
group of persons, organization or association, by the
said Court.
The application shall be filed with an urgent prayer for
the issuance of a preliminary order of proscription. No
application for proscription shall be filed without the
authority of the ATC upon the recommendation of the
National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA).
8.88. These provisions grant the Council the unbridled power

to unilaterally designate and proscribe a terrorist or a terror
organization solely on the basis that he or the group is committing,
attempting to commit or is conspiring in the commission of any of the
defined terrorist acts.
8.89. RA 11479 neither provides sufficient standard nor the

procedure to be followed in the designation proceeding, if there is
even such a proceeding. It does not even require prior notice and
hearing. Once made, it is automatically effective and have some ill
effects: 1) authorize the Anti-Money Laundering Council to freeze the
account65; 2) it could be the basis for an application to secretly wire-
tap private conversations66; 3) it can be use as basis for the
application to place a person under house arrest and/or hold
departure order67; 4) it can become the basis for the issuance of an
authority to take custody and to detain suspect a maximum period of
twenty-four (24) days68. Finally, there is no appeal nor any remedy of
review.
8.90. In the case of proscription under Section 26, it is enough

that the person or association has committed terrorist acts defined in
this assailed law. While membership therein is also made punishable
under Section 20 thereof. Both provisions clearly violates petitioners’
right to form or join organizations.
8.91. The herein assailed provision thus make the Anti-

Terrorism Council the prosecutor, jury and judge.
65 SEC. 36. Authority to Freeze

66 SEC. 16. Surveillance of Suspects and Interception and Recording of Communications
67 SEC. 34. Restriction on the Right to Travel
68 SEC. 29. Detention Without Judicial Warrant of Arrest
Page 47 of 83
A . U N I L AT E R A L o r E X - PA R T E
DESIGNATION BY THE ATC VIOLATES THE
CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS OF DUE
PROCESS
8.92. Notwithstanding the express provision in the law that the

Council is not empowered to exercise any judicial or quasi-
judicial power or authority69, the enumerated powers of the Council
give it both administrative and quasi-judicial powers. These are:
1. To issue written authority to take custody of and

detain terror suspect (Section 29)
2. To designate individuals or groups of persons or
associations as terror suspects. (Section 25)
3. To issue written authority for application for
proscription (26)
4. To determine the propriety of foreign request for
proscription (28)
8.93. Section 29 is particularly a judicial power because it

grants the Council the power exclusively reserved by the Constitution
to our courts. Although the other three are not exclusively judicial,
they nevertheless requires the exercise of discretion and sound
judgment affecting rights of private parties. As held in The Honorable
Monetary Board v. Philippine Veterans Bank70:
“A quasi-judicial agency or body is an organ of

government other than a court and other than a
legislature, which affects the rights of private parties
through either adjudication or rule-making.”
8.94. The Council’s power to designate is supposedly

investigative and its findings merely initiatory or preparatory, yet its
decision to designate a person or group as a terrorist or terror
organization already produces some legal effects prejudicial to the
person or association thus designated. Among these, as earlier
mentioned, are: (1) the freezing of the bank account or property of the
69Section 45, last paragraph: “Nothing herein shall be interpreted to empower the ATC to
exercise any judicial or quasi-judicial power or authority.”
70 G.R. No. 189571 January 21, 2015
Page 48 of 83
designated person; (2) restrictions on the right to travel; (3) wire-
tapping of his private conversations; (4) arrest and detention without
judicial warrant. These characterized the designation proceeding as
essentially criminal in nature or is at least a tool for criminal law
enforcement, akin to the preliminary stage in extradition proceeding
and preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor.
Consequently, the designation proceedings has to comply with due
process requirements.
8.95. In Secretary of Justice v. Lantion 71, it was held that

criminal investigation proceedings (deportation proceeding) must
comply with due process requirement:
“Because of these possible consequences, we

conclude that the evaluation process is akin to an
administrative agency conducting an investigative
proceeding, the consequences of which are essentially
criminal since such technical assessment sets off or
commences the procedure for, and ultimately, the
deprivation of liberty of a prospective extraditee. As
described by petitioner himself, this is a "tool" for
criminal law enforcement. In essence, therefore, the
evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal
investigation. In a number of cases, we had occasion
to make available to a respondent in an
administrative case or investigation certain
constitutional rights that are ordinarily available
only in criminal prosecutions.” [citations omitted]
8.96. The designation by Anti-Terrorism Council is akin to but

with worse consequence than extradition proceedings because it
could result in arrest, detention and forfeiture of property making the
ruling in SOJ more apropos, viz:
“By comparison, a favorable action in an extradition

request exposes a person to eventual extradition to a
foreign country, thus saliently exhibiting the criminal or
penal aspect of the process. In this sense, the
evaluation procedure is akin to a preliminary
investigation since both procedures may have the
same result — the arrest and imprisonment of the
71 G.R. No. 139465, January 18, 2000
Page 49 of 83
respondent or the person charged. Similar to the
evaluation stage of extradition proceedings, a
preliminary investigation, which may result in the filing
of an information against the respondent, can
possibly lead to his arrest, and to the deprivation of
his liberty.”
8.97. Considering the ill effects of designation, compliance with

the due process requirements should be indispensable as held SOJ,
viz:
“Here lies the peculiarity and deviant

characteristic of the evaluation procedure. On one
hand there is yet no extraditee, but ironically on the
other, it results in an administrative if adverse to
the person involved, may cause his immediate
incarceration. The grant of the request shall lead to the
filing of the extradition petition in court. The
"accused" (as Section 2[c] of Presidential Decree No.
1069 calls him), faces the threat of arrest, not only after
the extradition petition is filed in court, but even during
the evaluation proceeding itself by virtue of the
provisional arrest allowed under the treaty and the
implementing law. The prejudice to the "accused" is
thus blatant and manifest.
Plainly, the notice and hearing requirements of

administrative due process cannot be dispensed
with and shelved aside.”
8.98. The following due process requirements eruditely

enumerated in Ang Tibay v. The Court of Industrial Relations72,
must at least be complied, thus:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing,

which includes the right of the party interested or
affected to present his own case and submit
evidence in support thereof.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to

present his case and to adduce evidence tending to
72 69 Phil. 635 (1940)
Page 50 of 83
establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal
must consider the evidence presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the

obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity
which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having
something to support its decision. A decision with
absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when
directly attached."
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to

support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must
be “substantial."
(5) The decision must be rendered on the

evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties
affected.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its

judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of
the controversy, and not simply accept the views of
a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all

controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know
the various issues involved, and the reasons for the
decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is
inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.25
[Citations omitted and emphases supplied]
8.99. None of these is required by RA 11479. Quite the

opposite, the Council is given the imprimatur to disregard this basic
concept. The law only provides that the designation must be “upon
probable cause” that the “suspect is committing, attempting to
commit or conspiring to commit” acts of terrorism, without providing
the procedure on how will the Council arrive at its conclusion or on
what evidence will it base its order of designation. It just being
sufficient that the person or association thus designated is a
SUSPECT.
Page 51 of 83
8.100. As stated earlier, mere suspicion is not even sufficient to
justify arrest or to deprive a person of his liberty. Consequently,
considering the evil consequences of a designation, it is with more
reason that designation should not be based on mere “suspicion”.
8.101. Additionally, the designation is ex-parte; it deprives the

suspect the opportunity to be heard and to present evidence in
violation of Section 14 (1), Article III of the Constitution, viz:
“No person shall be made to answer for a criminal

offense without due process of law”
8.102. Even worse, it does not afford the designated person or

group of persons any remedy of appeal. Worst even is the seemingly
immediate executory nature of the designation.
B. THE UNBRIDLED POWER OF THE

COUNCIL TO DESIGNATE CONSTITUTES
UNDUE DELEGATION OF POWERS
8.103. While it is true that increasing complexities of

modern life warrants the recognition of the principle of delegation of
powers and one of these is delegation to administrative agencies, still
it is required that for the valid exercise of the power of subordinate
legislation that the regulation be germane to the objects and
purposes of the law and that the regulation be not in contradiction to,
but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by the law. These
requirements are denominated as the completeness test and the
sufficient standard test.32
8.104. In ABAKADA v. Executive Secretary73, it was held:
“In every case of permissible delegation, there

must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is
valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth
therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or
implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard-
the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and
determinable - to which the delegate must conform in
the performance of his functions. A sufficient standard is
73 G.R. No. 168056, September 1, 2005
Page 52 of 83
one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits,
maps out boundaries and specifies the public agency to
apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the
legislative command is to be effected. Both tests are
intended to prevent a total transference of legislative
authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into
the shoes of the legislature and exercise of a power
essentially legislative.”
8.105. Citing People v. Vera74, the Court further ruled:
“In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue

delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to
inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms
and provisions when it left the hands of the legislature
so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other
appointee or delegate of the legislature.”
xxxx
xxxx
Clearly, the legislature may delegate to executive

officers or bodies the power to determine certain facts
or conditions, or the happening of contingencies, on
which the operation of a statute is, by its terms, made to
depend, but the legislature must prescribe sufficient
standards, policies or limitations on their authority.
8.106. Republic Act 11479 is incomplete because it leaves the

Anti-Terrorism Council with the unbridled discretion to determine how
and on what basis can a terror suspect be designated and/or who
could he be ordered arrested and detained and on what basis. The
law also failed to prescribe the procedure the Council must follow in
making designation or in giving the written authority to arrest.
Congress also left it to the Council to determine the degree of proof
required to reach its judgments. The Council’s authority on this matter
is absolute. It makes the council a “roving commission that is not
canalized within banks to keep it from overflowing”75.
74 G.R. No. 45685, November 16, 1937

75 Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 669
Page 53 of 83
THE POWER TO ISSUE WRITTEN
AUTHORITY TO TAKE CUSTODY
OF TERRORIST SUSPECT
VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS ON THE GUARANTY
AGAINST UNREASONABLE
S E I Z U R E , D E P R I VAT I O N O F
LIBERTY WITHOUT DUE
PROCESS AND ARBITRARY
DETENTION
8.107. The other assailed provision of RA 11479 is Section 29. It

reads:
SEC. 29. Detention Without Judicial Warrant of

Arrest. – The provisions of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code to the contrary notwithstanding, any law
enforcement agent or military personnel, who, having
been duly authorized in writing by the ATC has taken
custody of a person suspected of committing any of the
acts defined and penalized under Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,
9, 10, 11 and 12 of this Act, shall, without incurring any
criminal liability for delay in the delivery of detained
persons to the proper judicial authorities, deliver said
suspected person to the proper judicial authority within
a period of fourteen (14) calendar days counted from
the moment the said suspected person has been
apprehended or arrested, detained, and taken into
custody by the law enforcement agent or military
personnel. The period of detention may be extended to a
maximum period of ten (10) calendar days if it is
established that (1) further detention of the person/s is
necessary to preserve evidence related to the terrorism
or complete the investigation; (2) further detention of
the person/s is necessary to prevent the commission of
another terrorism; and (3) the investigation is being
conducted properly and without delay.
Immediately after taking custody of a person

suspected of committing terrorism or any member of a
group of persons, organization or association
proscribed under Section 26 hereof, the law
enforcement agent or military personnel shall notify in
Page 54 of 83
writing the judge of the court nearest the place of
apprehension or arrest of the following facts: (a) the time,
date, and manner of arrest; (b) the location or locations of
the detained suspect/s and (c) the physical and mental
condition of the detained suspect/s. The law
enforcement agent or military personnel shall likewise
furnish the ATC and the Commission on Human Rights
(CHR) of the written notice given to the judge.
The head of the detaining facility shall ensure that

the detained suspect is informed of his/her rights as a
detainee and shall ensure access to the detainee by
his/her counsel or agencies and entities authorized by
law to exercise visitorial powers over detention facilities.
The penalty of imprisonment of ten (10) years shall

be imposed upon the police or law enforcement agent or
military personnel who fails to notify any judge as
provided in the preceding paragraph.
8.108. This provision can be divided into three parts, all of them
being UNCONSTITUTIONAL: (1) it grants the Council the power to
issue “written authority to take custody”; (2) it authorizes the unlawful
detention of a person in violation of due process and of his rights to
be presumed innocent; and, (3) it allows detention without charges for
more than three (3) days.
1. THE POWER TO ISSUE AN ORDER

OF ARREST OR WARRANT IS EXCLUSIVELY
JUDICIAL. THE ANTI-TERROR COUNCIL IS NOT
A JUDGE.
8.109. Section 29 of RA 11479 gives the Council the authority to

“issue written authority” to take custody of a person, which is actually
a definition of “arrest” under Section 1, Rule 113 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, viz:
“SECTION 1. Definition of arrest. - Arrest is the

taking of a person into custody in order that he may be
bound to answer for the commission of an offense.”
Page 55 of 83
8.110. In short, the Council is empowered to issue arrest order.
This is certainly UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
8.111. First, under the 1987 Constitution, only a judge can issue
search and seizure order. It having already omitted the phrase “such
other responsible officer as may be authorized by law” found in the
1973 Constitution. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution reads:
SECTION 2. The right of the people to be secure in

their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
8.112. This provision unmistakably provides the exclusive

judicial nature of that authority as held in Ponsica vs. Ignalaga76,
“The constitutional proscription has thereby

been manifested that thenceforth, the function of
determining probable cause and issuing, on the basis
thereof, warrants of arrest or search warrants, may
be validly exercised only by judges, this being
evidenced by the elimination in the present Constitution
of the phrase, "such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law" found in the counterpart provision of
said 1973 Constitution, — who, aside from judges,
might conduct preliminary investigations and issue
warrants of arrest or search warrants.”
8.113. Thus, it has been the consistent ruling of this Court that
“[T]he function of the judge to issue a warrant of arrest upon the
determination of probable cause is exclusive77 .
76 G.R. No. 72301, July 31, 1987

77 Viudez vs. Court of Appeals, 152889, June 5, 2009
Page 56 of 83
8.114. In Viudez v. Court of Appeals78 this Court nullified the
provision in the old Local Government Code authorizing local mayors
to conduct preliminary investigation and to issue warrants of arrest. In
Salazar v. Acachaco79, it declared unconstitutional the power given
to the Secretary of Labor to issue search and arrest order against
illegal recruiters. In the Philippine Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force80,
the Court also declared as unconstitutional the power to issue search
and seizure orders given to the Task Force.
8.115. Just six (6) years ago, the Supreme Court in Disini v.
The Secretary of Justice81 also declared unconstitutional the
provision in the Cyber Crime Law giving the Secretary of the
Department of Justice the power to issue an order to restrict or block
access to computer data because the Department of Justice order
cannot substitute for judicial search warrant. The contrary will makes
him the judge, the jury and the executioner in one. The Court held:
“Petitioners contest Section 19 in that it stifles

freedom of expression and violates the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. The Solicitor
General concedes that this provision may be
unconstitutional. But since laws enjoy a presumption of
constitutionality, the Court must satisfy itself that
Section 19 indeed violates the freedom and right
mentioned.
Computer data may refer to entire programs or

lines of code, including malware, as well as files that
contain texts, images, audio, or video recordings.
Without having to go into a lengthy discussion of
property rights in the digital space, it is indisputable that
computer data, produced or created by their writers or
a u t h o r s m a y c o n s t i t u t e p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y.
Consequently, they are protected from unreasonable
searches and seizures, whether while stored in their
personal computers or in the service provider’s
systems.
78 Id.
79 Salazar vs. Achacoso, G.R. No. 81510. March 14, 1990
80 Phil. Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force v. CA, G.R. No. 83578 March 16, 1989
81 G.R. No. 203335, February 11, 2014
Page 57 of 83
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
provides that the right to be secure in one’s papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable. Further, it states that no search warrant shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge. Here, the Government, in
effect, seizes and places the computer data under its
control and disposition without a warrant. The
Department of Justice order cannot substitute for
judicial search warrant.
The content of the computer data can also

constitute speech. In such a case, Section 19 operates
as a restriction on the freedom of expression over
cyberspace. Certainly not all forms of speech are
protected. Legislature may, within constitutional bounds,
declare certain kinds of expression as illegal. But for
an executive officer to seize content alleged to be
unprotected without any judicial warrant, it is not
enough for him to be of the opinion that such
content violates some law, for to do so would make
him judge, jury, and executioner all rolled into one.”
8.116. The rationale for dispossessing executive officers this

awesome power was in consideration of the “due process clause”
and the imminent danger of allowing an officer of becoming the
prosecutor and a judge at the same time. It also militates against the
principle of separation of powers. The Court in Philippine Anti-Dollar
Salting Task Force vs Court of Appeals82, said:
“According to the Court of Appeals, the implied

e x c l us io n o f p r os e c ut o r s u n d e r t he 1 9 7 3
Constitution was founded on the requirements of
due process, notably, the assurance to the respondent
of an unbiased inquiry of the charges against him prior
to the arrest of his person or seizure of his property. We
add that the exclusion is also demanded by the
principle of separation of powers on which our
republican structure rests. Prosecutors exercise
essentially an executive function (the petitioner itself is
chaired by the Minister, now Secretary, of Trade and
Industry), since under the Constitution, the President
82 G.R. No. 83578, March 16, 1989
Page 58 of 83
has pledged to execute the laws. As such, they cannot
be made to issue judicial processes without unlawfully
impinging the prerogative of the courts.”
8.117. This consistent ruling of the Supreme Court qualifies it to

become part of the doctrine on stare decisis that this Court must now
now adhere to, viz:
“The doctrine of stare decisis enjoins adherence to

judicial precedents. It requires courts in a country to
follow the rule established in a decision of the
Supreme Court thereof. That decision becomes a
judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases
by all courts in the land. The doctrine of stare decisis is
based on the principle that once a question of law has
been examined and decided, it should be deemed
settled and closed to further argument.”
2 . T H E L AW W O U L D L E G A L I Z E
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES ON THE BASIS
OF MERE SUSPICION
8.118. Second, the herein challenged law is worst than those

struct down in the afore-mentioned cases. Aside from empowering
non-judge to issue an authority to arrest, it also allows ARREST ON
THE BASIS OF MERE SUSPICION. This is clear from the phrase
“suspected of committing any of the acts defined and penalized
under Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 found in Section 29 of RA
11479. This clearly runs aground to our constitutional rights against
unreasonable searches and seizure under Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution considering all arrest as unreasonable unless based on
“probable cause”.
8.119. Section 2, Article III mandates that a search and seizure

must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant
predicated upon the existence of probable cause; in the absence of
such warrant, such search and seizure becomes, as a general rule,
“unreasonable” within the meaning of the said constitutional
provision.83
83 Gonzales v. People, G.R. No. 205926, July 22, 2015
Page 59 of 83
8.120. Probable cause for arrest means an “actual belief or
reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are
reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting
officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty
of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable
cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion,
therefore, must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith
on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.”84
8.121. The Constitution does not allow arrest based either on

suspicion85 or on reliable informations86. Our jurisprudence is replete
with decisions declaring arrest made on this basis as void. The
following cases are illustrative:
a. In People v. Aminuddin87, the arrest of a

person disembarking from a passenger vessel after
having being pointed out by an informer was held illegal
because he became a suspect only after he was
pointed out by the informer.
b. In People v. Bolasa 88, the police officers were

tipped off by an informant that people were packing
drugs in a certain house, which information was
confirmed after the officers peeked into the window. The
officers entered the house and arrested the persons
involved. The Court held that the arrests and the
subsequent search were invalid.
c. In People v. Racho89, the police officers

received an information that a man, wearing red and
white striped t-shirt, is in possession of illegal drugs and
was on board a Genesis bus bound for Baler, Aurora.
After he disembarked from the bus and while waiting for
a tricycle, he was approached by the police but as he
84 Abelita Ill v. Doria et al., G.R. No. 170672, August 14, 2009, 596 SCRA 220
85 Gonzales v. People, G.R. No. 205926, July 22, 2015
86 Veridiano v. People, G.R. No. 200370, June 7, 2017
87 G.R.No. 74869, July 6, 1988
88 378 Phil. 1073 (1999)
89 640 Phil. 669
Page 60 of 83
pulled out his hands from his pocket, a white envelope
fell yielding a sachet of shabu. The Court invalidated
the arrest because it was solely based on a tip.
d. In Gonzales v. People 90, the police officer

on a motorcycle saw two (2) persons standing and
showing “improper and unpleasant movements,” with
one of them handing plastic sachet to the other. On this
basis, he effected an arrest. The Court said the arrest
was solely based on suspicion and the accused were
not committing any criminal act.
8.122. This provision place the Council above the courts and the
prosecutor in that while the latter officers are required to based their
decision on the existence on probable cause based on the evidence
submitted, the Council can issue the authority to take custody on
mere suspicion and without any evidence. RA 11479 would now
sanction them. Unless declared void, this law would open the
floodgates to widespread warrantless arrest of persons on the basis of
mere suspicion.
8.123. To sustain the constitutionality of RA 11479 will make real

what was feared by Justice Cruz in People vs. Mengote91. He said:
“It would be a sad day, indeed, if any person

could be summarily arrested and searched just
because he is holding his abdomen, even if it be
possibly because of a stomach-ache, or if a peace
officer could clamp handcuffs on any person with a
shifty look on suspicion that he may have committed
a criminal act or is actually committing or
attempting it. This simply cannot be done in a free
society. This is not a police state where order is
exalted over liberty or, worse, personal malice on
the part of the arresting officer may be justified in
the name of security.” [emphasis supplied]
8.124. Additionally, Section 29 does not prescribe the procedure

to be followed before the Council may issues the authority to arrest.
90 Supra.
91G.R. No. 87059 June 22, 1992
Page 61 of 83
Unlike in the laws92 involved in the three cases above-mentioned, RA
11479 leaves it to the Council to determine and formulate its own
procedure. Thus, aside from being in violation of the Bill of Rights
provision in the Constitution, the ATL also constitute an undue
delegation of legislative power as will be later on discussed.
8.125. The written authority to arrest issued by the Council is but

just another name for the order of arrest issued by law enforcers that
has already been struck down in Alih vs. Castro93 as constitutionally
proscribed. The Court, in that case, ruled:
“The precarious state of lawlessness in

Zamboanga City at the time in question certainly did not
excuse the non-observance of the constitutional
guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures.
There was no state of hostilities in the area to justify,
assuming it could, the repressions committed therein
against the petitioners.
It is so easy to say that the petitioners were

outlaws and deserved the arbitrary treatment they
received to take them into custody; but that is a criminal
argument. It is also fallacious. Its obvious flaw lies in
the conclusion that the petitioners were unquestionably
guilty on the strength alone of unsubstantiated reports
that they were stockpiling weapons.
The record does not disclose that the petitioners

were wanted criminals or fugitives from justice. At the
time of the "zona," they were merely suspected of the
mayor's slaying and had not in fact even been
investigated for it. As mere suspects, they were
presumed innocent and not guilty as summarily
pronounced by the military.
Indeed, even if were assumed for the sake of

argument that they were guilty, they would not have
been any less entitled to the protection of the
Constitution, which covers both the innocent and the
guilty. This is not to say, of course, that the Constitution
coddles criminals. What it does simply signify is that,
92 Labor Code; Cyber Crime Law; Local Code and PD 1936

93 G.R. No. L-69401, June 23, 1987
Page 62 of 83
lacking the shield of innocence, the guilty need the
armor of the Constitution, to protect them, not from a
deserved sentence, but from arbitrary punishment.
Every person is entitled to due process. It is no
exaggeration that the basest criminal, ranged against
the rest of the people who would condemn him outright,
is still, under the Bill of Rights, a majority of one.
If the respondents did not actually disdain the

Constitution when they made their illegal raid, they
certainly gave every appearance of doing so. This is
truly regrettable for it was incumbent on them,
especially during those tense and tindery times, to
encourage rather than undermine respect for the law,
which it was their duty to uphold.
In acting as they did, they also defied the precept

that "civilian authority is at all times supreme over the
military" so clearly proclaimed in the 1973 Constitution.
In the instant case, the respondents simply by-passed
the civil courts, which had the authority to determine
whether or not there was probable cause to search the
petitioner's premises. Instead, they proceeded to make
the raid without a search warrant on their own
unauthorized determination of the petitioner's guilt.
The respondents cannot even plead the urgency of

the raid because it was in fact not urgent. They knew
where the petitioners were. They had every opportunity
to get a search warrant before making the raid. If they
were worried that the weapons inside the compound
would be spirited away, they could have surrounded the
premises in the meantime, as a preventive measure.
There was absolutely no reason at all why they should
disregard the orderly processes required by the
Constitution and instead insist on arbitrarily forcing their
way into the petitioner's premises with all the menace of
a military invasion.”
3. THE LAW ALSO VIOLATES DUE PROCESS

AND A DISREGARDS ACCUSED’S RIGHT TO BE
PRESUMED INNOCENT
Page 63 of 83
8.126. Third, at the hierarchy of our rights is the guaranty of
Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution that “no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty and property without due process of law”. An
accused is further afforded the elementary right not to be held liable
“without due process of law” and to be “presumed innocent”94. While
the “due process clause” guaranty individuals against arbitrary
detention, Congress in passing RA 11479 has put its stamp of
approval on this abhorrent practice.
8.127. In so far as Section 29 allows detention of a suspect

without judicial authority and clearly prescribed procedure, the same
violates the constitutional guaranty of due process under Section 1,
Article III of the Constitution, that:
“Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty,

or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.”
8.128. Section 14 (1) further provides: “No person shall be held

to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.”
8.129. The right to Liberty guaranteed by the Constitution

includes the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary
personal restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere
freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is
deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the faculties with which
he has been endowed by this Creator, subject only to such restraints
as are necessary for the common welfare. 95 This right plays a
primordial role in this case because of the actual physical restraint
being sanctioned by the herein assailed law.
8.130. Although the law accommodates lawful causes for

detention as found in Articles 124 of the RPC. These recognized legal
grounds are limited to: (1) judicially issued warrant of arrest; (2)
warrantless arrest cases under the Sec.5, Rule 113, Revised Rules
of Court; and (3) arrest of person suffering from violent insanity or any
other ailment requiring compulsory confinement in a hospital. RA
11479 does not fall under either, but rather quite the contrary.
94 Section 14, Article III, 1987 Constitution

95 Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, G.R. No. L-14078, May 7, 1919
Page 64 of 83
8.131. The importance of the guaranty against unlawful
detention is evident from the fact that even during the Japanese
occupation as well as the martial law regime, detention of persons
without lawful cause has never been sanctioned. The Supreme Court
in Astorga vs. People96, said:
“The provisions of law punishing arbitrary or illegal

detention committed by government officers form part
of our statute books even before the advent of
American sovereignty in our country. Those provisions
were already in effect during the Spanish regime; they
remained in effect under American rule; continued in
effect under the Commonwealth. Even under the
Japanese regime they were not repealed. The same
provisions continue in the statute books of the free and
s o v e r e i g n R e p u b l i c o f th e P h i l i p p i n e s . Th i s
notwithstanding, and the complaints often heard of
violations of said provisions, it is very seldom that
prosecutions under them have been instituted due to
the fact that the erring individuals happened to belong
to the same government to which the prosecuting
officers belong. It is high time that every one must do
his duty, without fear or favor, and that prosecuting
officers should not answer with cold shrugging of the
shoulders the complaints of the victims of arbitrary or
illegal detention.”
4. REPUBLIC ACT 11479 DECRIMINALIZES

THE FELONY OF DELAYING DELIVERY AND
AUTHORIZES WHAT IS CONSTITUTIONALLY
PROSCRIBED EVEN DURING THE
SUSPENSION OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS
8.132. Fourth, RA 11479 authorizes the detention of terror

suspect, without charge, for an initial period of ten (10) day,
extendable by another fourteen (14) days. This is an utter disregard
of our Constitutional and our international obligations.
96 G.R. No. 154130, October 1, 2003
Page 65 of 83
8.133. Our Constitution and International Law require that a
person can only be deprived of liberty after affording him due
process. This provision simply means that:
“……. no person may be deprived of his liberty,

except by warrant of arrest or commitment issued upon
probable cause by a judge after examination of the
complainant and his witness. And the judicial authority
to whom the person arrested by a public officers must
be surrendered can not be any other but court or judge
who alone is authorized to issue a warrant of
commitment or provisional detention of the person
arrested pending the trial of the case against the latter.
Without such warrant of commitment, the detention of
the person arrested for than six hours would be illegal
and in violation of our Constitution.”97
8.134. To complement the Constitution, the Revised Penal

Code punishes failure to timely deliver a legally arrested person to
the judicial authorities98. It established the “rule that a person subject
of a warrantless arrest must be delivered to the proper judicial
authorities8 within the periods provided in Article 125 of the RPC,
otherwise, the public official or employee could be held liable for the
failure to deliver except if grounded on reasonable and allowable
delays”99.
8.135. Accordingly:
“Article 125 of the RPC is intended to prevent any

abuse resulting from confining a person without
informing him of his offense and without allowing him to
post bail. It punishes public officials or employees who
shall detain any person for some legal ground but fail to
deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities
within the periods prescribed by law. In case the
detention is without legal ground, the person arrested
can charge the arresting officer with arbitrary detention
under Article 124 of the RPC. This is without prejudice
97 Sayo vs. Chief of Police, G.R. No. L-2128, May 12, 1948
98 Art. 126, RPC
99IBP Pangasinan Legal Aid and JAY-AR R. SENIN vs. Department of Justice, et al.,
G.R. No. 232413, July 25, 2017
Page 66 of 83
to the possible filing of an action for damages under
Article 32 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines”100.
8.136. Although “delivery” does not mean “physical delivery”, it

does require more than “notif[y]ing in writing the judge of the court
nearest the place of apprehension or arrest”101. Delivery means filing
the information with the court having jurisdiction over the case, thus:
“It is obvious that the surrender or delivery to

the judicial authority of a person arrested without
warrant by a peace officer, does not consist in a
physical delivery, but in making an accusation or
charge or filing of an information against the
person arrested with the corresponding court or
judge, whereby the latter acquires jurisdiction to issue
an order of release or of commitment of the prisoner,
because the arresting officer can not transfer to the
judge and the latter does not assume the physical
custody of the person arrested. And in the City of
Manila it does consist in delivering physically the body
of the prisoner to the city fiscal, for the latter will not
assume the responsibility of being the custodian of the
prisoner; nor in making or lodging a complaint against
him with the said fiscal, because the latter has no
power to order the commitment or release of the
prisoner by a warrant containing the ground on which it
is based (auto motivado). Such delivery is a legal one
and consists in making a charge or filing a complaint
against the prisoner with the proper justice of the peace
or judge of Court of First Instance in provinces, and in
filing by the city fiscal of an information with the
corresponding city courts after an investigation if the
evidence against said person so warrants.” 102
8.137. Besides reducing the requirement from “delivering the

prisoner to judicial authorities” to just a mere “written notice to the
judge”, the law even provides for the longest detention period without
charges, which even during suspension of the privilege of the writ of
100Ibid.
101 Section 29, RA 11479

102 Sayo v. Chief of Police, G.R. No. L-2128, May 12, 1948
Page 67 of 83
habeas corpus should not exceed three (3) days. The last paragraph
of Article VIII, Section 18, reads:
“During the suspension of the privilege of the writ

of habeas corpus, any person thus arrested or detained
shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise
he shall be released.”
8.138. Section 29 of RA 11479 will bring is back to the martial

law era when the sixty (60) days period of detention was allowed.
While the 1987 Constitutional provision was intended to forever bury
the visages of martial rule in the country, RA 11479 is doing the
contrary. Perhaps this is why Senator Lacson said in his sponsorship
speech that the military repeatedly committed they will not
recommend for the continuation of the martial law in Mindanao once
this law is approved.
REPUBLIC ACT 11479 IS VOID

FOR BEING VAGUE
8.139. The rule is: [A] statute establishing a criminal offense

must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of
ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by
the statute.103
8.140. “It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it

violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the
parties targetted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it
leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions
and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.”104
8.141. “As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague

when it lacks comprehensible standards that men "of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application."105 "The test in determining whether a criminal statute is
void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently
103Romuladez v. Sandiganbayan, G. R. No. 152259 - July 29, 2004, citing Estrada v.

Sandiganbayan, 421 Phil. 290
104 People v. Nazario, G.R. No. L-44143, August 31, 1988
105 Id.
Page 68 of 83
definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by
common understanding and practice.106
8.142. Applying this test, the following provisions in the assailed

law clearly failed:
SEC. 4. Terrorism. – Subject to Section 49 of this Act,

terrorism is committed by any person who within or
outside the Philippines, regardless of the stage of
execution:
(a) Engages in acts intended to cause death or

serious bodily injury to any person, or endangers a
person’s life;
(b) Engages in acts intended to cause extensive
damage or destruction to a government or public
facility, public place or private property;
(c) Engages in acts intended to cause extensive
interference with, damage or destruction to critical
infrastructure;
(d) Develops, manufactures, possesses,
acquires, transports, supplies or uses weapons,
explosives or of biological, nuclear, radiological or
chemical weapons; and
(e) Release of dangerous substances, or causing
fire, floods or explosions
when the purpose of such act, by its nature and

context, is to intimidate the general public or a segment
thereof, create an atmosphere or spread a message of
fear, to provoke or influence by intimidation the
government or any of its international organization, or
seriously destabilize or destroy the fundamental
political, economic, or social structures of the country,
or create a public emergency or seriously undermine
public safety, shall be guilty of committing terrorism and
shall suffer the penalty of life imprisonment without the
benefit of parole and the benefits of Republic Act No.
10592, otherwise known as “An Act Amending Articles
29, 94, 97, 98 and 99 of Act No. 3815, as amended,
otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code”:
Provided, That, terrorism as defined in this Section shall
not include advocacy, protest, dissent, stoppage of
106 Supra.
Page 69 of 83
work, industrial or mass action, and other similar
exercises of civil and political rights, which are not
intended to cause death or serious physical harm to a
person, to endanger a person’s life, or to create a
serious risk to public safety.
SEC. 5. Threat to Commit Terrorism. – Any person

who shall threaten to commit any of the acts mentioned
in Section 4 hereof shall suffer the penalty of
S EC . 6. Planning, Training, Preparing, and

Facilitating the Commission of Terrorism. – It shall
be unlawful for any person to participate in the
planning, training, preparation and facilitation in the
commission of terrorism, possessing objects connected
with the preparation for the commission of terrorism, or
collecting or making documents connected with the
preparation of terrorism. Any person found guilty of the
provisions of this Act shall suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment without the benefit of parole and the
benefits of Republic Act No. 10592.
SEC. 8. Proposal to Commit Terrorism. – Any

person who proposes to commit terrorism as defined in
Section 4 hereof shall suffer the penalty of
SEC. 9. Inciting to Commit Terrorism. – Any person

who, without taking any direct part in the commission of
terrorism, shall incite others to the execution of any of
the acts specified in Section 4 hereof by means of
speeches, proclamations, writings, emblems, banners
or other representations tending to the same end, shall
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years.
SEC. 10. Recruitment to and Membership in a

Terrorist Organization. –Any person who shall recruit
another to participate in, join, commit or support any
terrorism or a terrorist individual or any terrorist
organization, association or group of persons
proscribed under Section 26 of this Act, or designated
by the United Nations Security Council as a terrorist
organization, or organized for the purpose of engaging
in terrorism, shall suffer the penalty of life imprisonment
Page 70 of 83
without the benefit of parole and the benefits of
Republic Act No. 10592.
The same penalty shall be imposed on any person
who organizes or facilitates the travel of individuals to a
state other than their state of residence or nationality for
the purpose of recruitment which may be committed
through any of the following means:
(a)Recruiting another person to serve in any capacity
in or with an armed force in a foreign state, whether
the armed force forms part of the armed forces of the
government of that foreign state or otherwise;
(b) Publishing an advertisement or propaganda for
the purpose of recruiting persons to serve in any
capacity in or with such an armed force;
(c) Publishing an advertisement or propaganda
containing any information relating to the place at
which or the manner in which persons may make
applications to serve or obtain information relating to
service in any capacity in or with such armed force
or relating to the manner in which persons may
travel to a foreign state for the purpose of serving in
any capacity in or with such armed force; or
(d) Performing any other act with the intention of
facilitating or promoting the recruitment of persons to
serve in any capacity in or with such armed force.
Any person who shall voluntarily and knowingly
join any organization, association or group of persons
knowing that such organization, association or group of
persons is proscribed under Section 26 of this Act, or
designated by the United Nations Security Council as a
terrorist organization, or organized for the purpose of
engaging in terrorism, shall suffer the penalty of
SEC. 12. Providing Material Support to Terrorists.

– Any person who provides material support to any
terrorist individual or terrorist organization, association or
group of persons committing any of the acts punishable
under Section 4 hereof, or knowing that such individual
or organization, association, or group of persons is
committing or planning to commit such acts, shall be
liable as principal to any and all terrorist activities
committed by said individuals or organizations, in
Page 71 of 83
addition to other criminal liabilities he/she or they may
have incurred in relation thereto.
SEC. 25. Designation of Terrorist Individual,

Groups of Persons, Organizations or Associations.
– Pursuant to our obligations under United Nations
Security Council Resolution No. 1373, the ATC shall
automatically adopt the United Nations Security Council
Consolidated List of designated individuals, group of
persons, organizations, or associations designated and/
or identified as a terrorist, one who finances terrorism,
or a terrorist organization or group.
Request for designations by other jurisdictions or
supranational jurisdictions may be adopted by the ATC
after determination that the proposed designee meets
the criteria for designation of UNSCR 1373.
The ATC may designate an individual, groups of
persons, organization, or association, whether domestic
or foreign, upon a finding of probable cause that the
individual, groups of persons, organization, or
association commit, or attempt to commit, or conspire in
the commission of the acts defined and penalized under
Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of this Act.
The assets of the designated individual, groups of
persons, organization or association above-mentioned
shall be subject to the authority of the Anti-Money
Laundering Council (AMLC) to freeze pursuant to
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 10168.
The designation shall be without prejudice to the
proscription of terrorist organizations, associations, or
groups of persons under Section 26 of this Act.
SEC. 26. Proscription of Terrorist Organizations,

Association, or Group of Persons. – Any group of
persons, organization, or association, which commits
any of the acts defined and penalized under Sections
4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of this Act, or organized
for the purpose of engaging in terrorism shall, upon
application of the DOJ before the authorizing division of
the Court of Appeals with due notice and opportunity to
be heard given to the group of persons, organization or
association, be declared as a terrorist and outlawed
Page 72 of 83
group of persons, organization or association, by the
said Court.
The application shall be filed with an urgent prayer for
the issuance of a preliminary order of proscription. No
application for proscription shall be filed without the
authority of the ATC upon the recommendation of the
National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA).
8.143. Section 4 (a), makes all acts as terrorism as long as it is

“intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to any person, or
endangers a person’s life”. This will allow law enforcers to convert
simple physical injury or homicide cases to acts of terror. Section 4
(b) will allow law enforcers to upgrade simple arson to terrorism; while
Section 4 (c) can be enough justification for the law enforcers to
extend the scope of terrorism to simple acts of electronic disturbance,
hacking, releasing of bugs or cyber-crime violations; and, lastly,
Section 4 (d) will justify the prosecution of person possessing
ordinary firearms or weapons for terrorism.
8.144. The difference in application or its being susceptible to

different interpretation depending on the biases, caprices and
interests of the law enforcement officers is the precise evil sought to
be prevented by the prohibition against ambiguous law. This assume
significance due to the detrimental accessory provisions attached to
the crime of terrorism that are herein challenged.
8.145. The law also made the following vague definition of

terms:
(a)Critical Infrastructure shall refer to an asset or

system, whether physical or virtual, so essential to the
maintenance of vital societal functions or to the
delivery of essential public services that the incapacity
or destruction of such systems and assets would have
a debilitating impact on national defense and security,
national economy, public health or safety, the
administration of justice, and other functions analogous
thereto. It may include, but is not limited to, an asset or
system affecting telecommunications, water and
energy supply, emergency services, food security, fuel
supply, banking and finance, transportation, radio and
television, information systems and technology,
chemical and nuclear sectors
(b)
Page 73 of 83
(c)
(d)
(e) Material Support shall refer to any property,
tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or
monetary instruments or financial securities, financial
services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance,
safehouses, false documentation or identification,
communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal
substances, explosives, personnel (one or more
individuals who may be or include oneself), and
transportation;
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
(j)
(k) Training shall refer to the giving of instruction or
teaching designed to impart a specific skill in relation to
terrorism as defined hereunder, as opposed to general
knowledge;
8.146. The definition of “critical infrastructure” is over

comprehensive to include almost all facets of modern life. “Material
support” is so broadly defined to include even innocent acts of
“training”, which is also broadly defined.
8.147. These definitions are both broad and vague and does
not sufficiently inform the people of what acts are being made
punishable. It also leaves law enforcers with the unbridled authority to
interpret the law according to their personal appreciation or to even
expand its scope beyond the original intent of the legislature.
THE FEAR IS NOT UNFOUNDED
8.148. The petitioners fear is not unfounded as illustrated in

the following:
1. Just before the passage of this law, the Police

Director of the National Capital Region issued a
directive for all the police district offices in Manila to
conduct an updated profile on all Filipino Muslim
students studying in Metro Manila.
Page 74 of 83
2. In In re Salibo v. Warden107 , the police officers
of Datu Hofer Police Station in Maguindanao detained
DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO for sharing the same
name with one of the named suspects in the
Magundanao Massacre despite proof that he was
performing Hajj in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia when
the massacre was committed in 2009. He was ordered
released by the Supreme Court only after his petition
for habeas corpus was finally granted on April 8, 2015.
3. In a 2015 news report108 of the ABS CBN, a

farmer and truck driver from Sulu, who were mistakenly
arrested for allegedly kidnapping a member of
Jehohav’s witness, were eventually released after four
(4) years of detention.
4. In a news report109 of ABS-CBN reporter Gigi

Grande, she reported the released of a total 51
individuals who were mistakenly arrested, mostly for
sharing the same name with a named accused and
largely because of the bounty offered by the
government.
8.149. In closing, it may be helpful to remind ourselves of the

primordial role our Constitution plays in the preservation of our
restored democracy our continued enjoyment of our basic rights.
“The role of the Constitution cannot be overlooked.

It is through the Constitution that the fundamental
powers of government are established, limited and
defined, and by which these powers are distributed
among the several departments. The Constitution is the
basic and paramount law to which all other laws must
conform and to which all persons, including the highest
officials of the land, must defer. Constitutional doctrines
must remain steadfast no matter what may be the tides
of time. It cannot be simply made to sway and
accommodate the call of situations and much more
107In the matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Datukan Malang Salibo, G.R. No.
197597, April 08, 2015
108 https://news.abs-cbn.com/focus/07/09/15/mistaken-identity-judge-frees-abu-
sayyaf-after-3-years
109 https://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/03/25/15/51-wrongful-arrests
Page 75 of 83
tailor itself to the whims and caprices of government
and the people who run it110.”
“The Constitution must ever remain supreme. All

must bow to the mandate of this law. Expediency must
not be allowed to sap its strength nor greed for power
debase its rectitude.”111
8.150. Finally and most importantly, J. Cruz’s counsel in Alih v.

Castro112 still rings true today:
“The fearful days of hamleting, salvaging,

"zona" and other dreaded operations should remain
in the past, banished with the secret marshals and
their covert license to kill without trial. We must be
done with lawlessness in the name of law
enforcement. Those who are supposed to uphold
the law must not be the first to violate it. As Chief
Justice Claudio Teehankee stressed in his concurring
opinion in Lacanilao v. De Leon, "It is time that the
martial law regime's legacy of the law of force be
discarded and that there be a return to the force
and rule of law.”
IX
ALLEGATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE PRAYER FOR A
TEMPRORARY RESTRAINING ORDER (TRO) AND/OR WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
9.1. Respectfully, Petitioners seek for the issuance of a 1)

Temporary Restraining Order; and, 2) Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction directing the Public Respondents, during the pendency of
the instant petition, to refrain from implementing the herein assailed
law and from exercising the powers of the Anti-Terrorism Council.
9.2. The restraining order and injunctive relief prayed for seek
to restrain and/or enjoin the Anti-Terrorism Council, the NICA, the
AFP and any other law enforcers from implementing or executing the
Republic Act 11479.
110 Lagman vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010
111 Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 2002 ed., pp. 12-13
112 Supra.
Page 76 of 83
9.3. Pertinent provisions of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court
provide, as follow:
Section 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary

injunction. — A preliminary injunction may be granted
when it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief
demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in
restraining the commission or continuance of the act or
acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an
act or acts either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-
performance of the act or acts complained of during the
litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is
doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring
or suffering to be done some act or acts probably in
violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the
subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render
the judgment ineffectual.
xxx
9.4. In the case of Hon. Ermita vs. Hon. Aldecoa-

Delorino113, the Supreme Court held that:
“And following jurisprudence, these requisites must

be proved before a writ of preliminary injunction, be it
mandatory or prohibitory, will issue:
(1) The applicant must have a clear and
unmistakable right to be protected, that is a right in esse;
(2) There is a material and substantial invasion of
such right;
(3) There is an urgent need for the writ to prevent
irreparable injury to the applicant; and
(4) No other ordinary, speedy, and adequate
remedy exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable
injury.”
113 G.R. No. 177130; June 7, 2011
Page 77 of 83
9.5. The Petitioners have a clear and unmistakable right to
be protected. The rights they invoked are paramount in our hierarchy
of rights.
9.6. The instant Petition involves the Petitioners’ constitutional

rights: 1) to freely exercise and express their religious belief; 2) not to
be deprived of life and liberty without due process; 2) against
unreasonable searches and seizures; 3) not to be detained unless for
lawful cause; 4) not to be detained without charges for more than
three (3) days.
9.7. Clearly and unmistakably, Petitioners are entitled to these

constitutionally guaranteed rights.
9.8. However, by reason of the authority vested in the Anti-

Terrorism Council to designate suspects of terrorism, to order their
arrest, to authorize their detention for more than three (3) days
without warrant, to put them under hold-over status or under house
arrest, to cause the application for the authority to wiretapped their
private conversations, there is now a material and substantial
invasion of their constitutionally guaranteed rights.
9.9. That unless public respondents are restrained from

enforcing the assailed law, petitioners will suffer grave and
irreperable injury.
9.10. There is an urgent need to prevent grave and

irreparable injury. As discussed above, Petitioners rights to freely
exercise their religion are curtailed and their rights to “free express
ion” restrained. They are also in imminent danger of being designated
as terrorist on the basis of mere suspicion and susceptible to arrest
without valid warrant. Once arrested, they can be detained for more
twenty four (24) days without charge.
9.11. “Confinement, regardless of duration, is too high a price

to pay for reckless and impulsive prosecution.”114
9.12. There is no other ordinary, speedy, and adequate

remedy exists to prevent the infliction of the said grave and
irreparable injury against the Petitioners.
114 Allado v. Diokno, G.R. No. 113630 May 5, 1994
Page 78 of 83
9.13. The Petitioners are willing and ready to post sufficient
bond that may be required by the Honorable Court.
EPILOGUE
What has been said of “dollar salting” equally applies to

terrorism; thus, we quote this Court:
“We recognize the menace it has posed (and

continues to pose) unto the very stability of the
country, the urgency for tough measures designed
to contain if not eradicate it, and foremost, the
need for cooperation from the citizenry in an all-out
campaign. But while we support the State’s efforts,
we do so not at the expense of fundamental rights
and liberties and constitutional safeguards against
arbitrary and unreasonable acts of Government. If
in the event that as a result of this ruling, we prove
to be an "obstacle" to the vital endeavour [of
stamping out the blackmarketing of valuable
foreign exchange] we do not relish it and certainly,
do not mean it. The Constitution simply does not
leave us much choice.”115
X
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully

prayed of this Honorable Court that a judgment be rendered as
follows:
A. UPON THE FILING OF THIS PETITION, a

Temporary Restraining Order be issued
RESTRAINING the ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL
and the public respondents Executive Secretary
Salvador Medialdea; the National Security Adviser
Gen. Hermogenez Esperon; the Secretaries of
Foreign Affairs, Interior and Local Government,
Finance, Justice, Information and Technology; the
NICA and other law enforcement officers and the
115Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force v. Court of Appeals, et. al.: G.R. No.
83578, March 16, 1989
Page 79 of 83
military to CEASE and DESIST from enforcing or
implementing Republic Act 11479;
B. After hearing, Decision be promulgated in

favor of the petitioners and against respondents
GRANTING the instant petition and DECLARING
Republic Act No. 11479 otherwise known as “Anti-
Terrorism Act of 2020” as NULL AND VOID in its
entirety for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Petitioners likewise pray for such other relief and remedies as

this Honorable Court may deem just and equitable under the
premises.
City of Zamboanga, 23 July 2020.
JAMAR M. KULAYAN
Counsel/Petitioner
Fabian Drive, Barangay Santa Maria,
Zamboanga City
IBP Roll No. 42828, IBP Lifetime No. 012115
PTR No. 2075835, Zamboanga City, 2/24/2020
MCLE Compliance No. VI-0014597 until April 14, 2022
Mobile Phone No. 09064624266
email address: kulayanjamar911@gmail.com
Page 80 of 83
Page 81 of 83
Copy furnished to the following by registered mail on July 30,
2020 from Cotabato City Postal Office:
HON. SALVADOR MEDIALDEA

Executive Secretary
Office of Executive Secretary,
Malacañang Palace,
Manila
Registry Receipt No. _______________
GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON JR. AFP (Ret.)

National Security Adviser
Office of National Security Council,
Malacañang Palace, Manila
HON. TEODORO L. LOCSIN JR.

Secretary of Foreign Affairs
Office of Secretary,
2330 Roxas Boulevard,
Pasay City
Gen. DELFIN N. LORENZANA, AFP (Ret.)

Secretary of National Defense
Office of Executive Secretary, DND Building,
Segundo Ave. Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo
Quezon City, 1110
Gen. EDUARDO M. AÑO, AFP (Ret.)

Secretary of the Interior and Local Government
Office of the Secretary, DILG-NAPOLCOM Center,
EDSA corner Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City
CARLOS DOMINGUEZ III

Secretary of Finance
Office of the Secretary, DOF Building,
Roxas Boulevard corner Pablo Ocampo Street,
Manila
Page 82 of 83
MENARDO I. GUEVARRA
Secretary of Justice
Office of the Secretary,
Padre Faura Street, Ermita, Manila
GREGORIO HONASAN
Secretary of Information and Communications Technology
Office of the Secretary,
C.P Garcia Ave., Diliman, Quezon City.
MEL GEORGIE B. RACELA

Executive Director of the Anti-Money Laundering Council
5/F EDPC Building, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Complex, Mabini corner
Vito Cruz Streets, Malate, Manila.
SEN. VICENTE SOTTO III

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Rm. 606, 211 & 24 (New Wing 5/F),
GSIS Bldg., Financial Center, Diokno Blvd.,
Pasay City
SPEAKER ALLAN PETER CAYETANO

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Constitution Hills, Quezon City,
ALEX PAUL MONTEAGUDO

National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA)
V. Luna Road, Quezon City
SOLICITOR GENERAL
134 Amorsolo Streeet,
Legaspi Village,
Makati 1229
Page 83 of 83

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Republic of the Philippines

ANAK MINDANAO (AMIN) PARTY-LIST

“Ours is not a police state where order is exalted

PETITIONERS, by the undersigned counsels, respectfully state

The experiences of our elders under martial law were extremely

The Constitution that followed EDSA ensured that nothing of

Notwithstanding the guarantee on the right to seek peaceful

1 People v. Mengote, G.R. No. 87059, June 22, 1992

In Mindanao, especially in Muslim communities, it is a frequent

In an investigative report2 of ABS-CBN reporter in March 2015,

This is more than several simple cases of mistaken identity.

The herein assailed law threatens to legalize these clearly

1. This is an original special civil action for certiorari and

b) A judgment commanding the respondents, their

c) A Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of

1.1. Due to the difficulty of securing a certified true

1.2. This petition also banks on the Supreme Court’s

3.1. This Petition is filed because there is no remedy of appeal

3.2. This Petition assails the constitutionality of Republic Act

3.3. This Petition requires urgent resolution because the

3.5. The petitioners are also invoking the extra-ordinary

3.7. Consequently, the Petitioners pray of this Honorable

4.1. ANAK MINDANAO (AMIN) is a party-list organization duly

4.2. Representative AMIHILDA SANGCOPAN is single and

4.3. Representative MUJIV S. HATAMAN is married, resident

4.4. LAWYERS SATRINA MOHAMMAD, JAMAR KULAYAN,

4.5. RAMEER TAWASIL is married and resident of Barangay

Petitioners are all Filipino citizens, taxpayers and believers in

Public Respondents are:

4.7. THE ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL is the office created

4.8. Hon. SALVADOR MEDIALDEA, Executive Secretary, alter

4.9. Gen. HERMOGENES ESPERON JR. AFP (Ret.), National

4.10. Hon. TEODORO L. LOCSIN JR., Secretary of Foreign

4.11. Gen. DELFIN N. LORENZANA, AFP (Ret.), Secretary of

4.12. Gen. EDUARDO M. AÑO, AFP (Ret.), Secretary of the

4.13. CARLOS DOMINGUEZ III, Secretary of Finance and

4.14. MENARDO I. GUEVARRA, Secretary of Justice and

4.15. GREGORIO HONASAN, Secretary of Information and

4.16. MEL GEORGIE B. RACELA, Executive Director of the

4.17. ALEX PAUL MONTEAGUDO, Director-General of the

4.18. The SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its

Public Respondents are all sued in their official capacity as either

5.1. Petitioners are all Filipinos, taxpayers, residents of

5.2. As Muslim, they believe in the virtues of “JIHAD” as a way

5.3. JIHAD is defined in Britanica as follows:

“Jihad, (Arabic: “struggle” or “effort”) also spelled

5.4. The primacy of becoming a better person or promoting

a) Narrated `Abdullah bin `Amr:

A man said to the Prophet, "Shall I participate in

b) Narrated from Mu'awiyah bin Jahimah As-Sulami,

"O Messenger of Allah! I want to go out and fight and

c) Narrated from Tariq bin Shihab

A man asked the Prophet, when he had put his leg in

5.5. Another important tenet of Islam is the “obligation to

“[Allah praises] those who convey the messages of

“Invite to the way of your Lord with wisdom and good

5.6. This Quranic injunction was also emphasized by the

7 Sahih al-Bukhari 5972, Book 78, Hadith 3

5.7. The “obligation to convey” makes it incumbent upon each

5.8. But the growing Islamophobia, threats of terrorism and

5.9. Then, on 2 October 2019, Senator Panfilo Lacson

5.10. On 21 February 2020, Rappler 13 reported of a leaked