JUDITH YU vs. HON.

ROSA SAMSON-TATAD, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 105, and
the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.
G.R. No. 170979               February 9, 2011

Facts: In a May 26, 2005 decision, the RTC convicted the petitioner of estafa. On November 16, 2005, the petitioner filed a
notice of appeal with the RTC, alleging that pursuant to our ruling in Neypes v. CA, she had a “fresh period” of 15 days from
November 3, 2005, the receipt of the denial of her motion for new trial, or up to November 18, 2005, within
which to file a notice of appeal. On December 8, 2005, the prosecution filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for being filed
10 days late, arguing that Neypes is inapplicable to appeals in criminal cases. On January 26, 2006, the petitioner filed
the present petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ
of preliminary injunction to enjoin the RTC from acting on the prosecution’s motions to dismiss the appeal and for the
execution of the decision

Issue: W h e t h e r t h e “ f r e s h p e r i o d r u l e ” e n u n c i a t e d i n Neypes applies to appeals in criminal cases.

Held:  YES. While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Court’s pronouncement of a“fresh period” to appeal
should equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, for the following reasons:
First, BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on which the Rules of Court is based, makes no distinction
between the periods to appeal in a civil case and in a criminal case. Section39 of BP 129 categorically states that “[t]he
period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be
fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from.”  
Second , the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, though differently worded, mean exactly the same. There is no substantial
difference between the two provisions insofar as legal results are concerned.
Third, while the Court did not consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal period in criminal cases under Section 6, Rule 122
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure since it involved a purely civil case, it did include Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure on petitions for review from the RTCs to the Court of Appeals (CA), and Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure governing appeals by certiorari  t o t h i s C o u r t , b o t h o f w h i c h a l s o a p p l y t o a p p e a l s i n
c r i m i n a l cases, as provided by Section 3 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. In light of these legal
realities, we hold that the petitioner seasonably filed her notice of appeal on November 16, 2005, within the fresh
period of 15 days, counted from November 3, 2005, the date of receipt of notice denying her motion for new trial. 

People vs. Lacson,

G.R. 149453, October 7, 2003

Facts:
Petitioner asserts that pursuant to a long line of jurisprudence and a long-standing judicial practice in applying penal law,
Section 8, Rule 117 of the RRCP should be applied prospectively and retroactively without reservations, only and solely on the
basis of its being favorable to the accused. He asserts that case law on the retroactive application of penal laws should likewise
apply to criminal procedure, it being a branch of criminal law. The respondent insists that Section 8 was purposely crafted and
included as a new provision to reinforce the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy disposition of his case. Accordingly,
prospective application thereof would in effect give the petitioners more than two years from March 29, 1999 within which to
revive the criminal cases, thus violating the respondent’s right to due process and equal protection of the law.

ISSUE:
What is the time-bar rule? Being favorable to the accused , can the time-bar rule be applied retroactively?

HELD: 
The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that plagued the administration of the criminal
justice system for the benefit of the State and the accused; not for the accused only. The Court emphasized in its assailed
resolution that: In the new rule in question, it has fixed a time-bar of one year or two years for the revival of criminal cases
provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused and with a priori notice to the offended party. In fixing the
time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests and those of the accused for the orderly and speedy disposition of criminal
cases with minimum prejudice to the State and the accused. It took into account the substantial rights of both the State and of
the accused to due process. The Court believed that the time limit is a reasonable period for the State to revive provisionally
dismissed cases with the consent of the accused and notice to the offended parties. 

The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the time-bar retroactively so that the two-year period commenced to run on
March 31, 1999 when the public prosecutor received his copy of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the criminal cases
is inconsistent with the intendment of the new rule. Instead of giving the State two years to revive provisionally dismissed
cases, the State had considerably less than two years to do so. 

Ombudsman; Supreme Court’s review of Ombudsman’s grant of immunity.  An immunity statute does not, and cannot, rule out
a review by the Supreme Court of the Ombudsman’s exercise of discretion. Like all other officials under our constitutional
scheme of government, all their acts must adhere to the Constitution. The parameters of the Supreme Court, however, are
narrow.  In the first place, what the Supreme Court reviews are executive acts of a constitutionally independent Ombudsman. 
Also, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Since the determination of the requirements under Section 17, Rule 119 of the
Rules of Court is highly factual in nature, the Court must thus generally defer to the judgment of the Ombudsman who is in a
better position (than the Sandiganbayan or the defense) to know the relative strength and/or weakness of the evidence
presently in his possession and the kind, tenor and source of testimony he needs to enable him to prove his case.   It should
not be forgotten, too, that the grant of immunity effectively but conditionally results in the extinction of the criminal liability the
accused-witnesses might have incurred, as defined in the terms of the grant.  This point is no less important as the grant
directly affects the individual and enforces his right against self-incrimination. These dynamics should be a constant reminder to
the Supreme Court to tread softly, but not any less critically, in its review of the Ombudsman’s grant of immunity. The Supreme
Court’s room for intervention only occurs when a clear and grave abuse of the exercise of discretion is shown.   Erdito Quarto
v. The Hon. Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo, et al