SPRINGER BRIEFS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

Benjamin Zyla

The End of European
Security Institutions?
The EU’s Common
Foreign and Security
Policy and NATO
After Brexit

123
SpringerBriefs in Political Science
More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/8871
Benjamin Zyla

The End of European

Security Institutions?
The EU’s Common Foreign and Security
Policy and NATO After Brexit

123
Benjamin Zyla
Department of Government
Harvard University
Cambridge, MA, USA
School of International Development
and Global Studies
University of Ottawa
Ottawa, Canada

ISSN 2191-5466 ISSN 2191-5474 (electronic)

SpringerBriefs in Political Science
ISBN 978-3-030-42159-5 ISBN 978-3-030-42160-1 (eBook)
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Preface

Writing a book on a contemporary security issue such as the Brexit is undoubtedly

exciting and rewarding in many regards. One gets to discuss and possibly contribute
to solving contemporary policy issues, and thus help shape future discussions and
debates. On the other hand, one always runs the risk that current events related to
that particular issue one focusses upon might change rather quickly, which, in turn,
most likely would require a re-write of certain passages or even a chapter. The latter
was and most certainly continues to be the case with writing on the Brexit as at least
two British governments initially did not manage to clearly articulate how they
would want the U.K. to separate from the mainland in Europe. In the meantime, and
with winning the general election in December 2019 the new government of Prime
Minister Johnson has used its comfortable majority in Parliament to secure its
approval for the Brexit. Yet, the political hurdle to strike a deal with the EU and
negotiating the details and conditions of Britain’s departure remain nebulous. If the
UK does not manage to reach a deal with the EU at the end of the grace period in
December 2020, a hard-Brexit would follow. Unclear also remain questions about
the role of Scotland, as well as Northern Ireland, in the Union (see detailed
discussion below).
While students of European security affairs perhaps watch this process with a
certain degree of amusement as the British “undecidedness”, “bickering”, “infight-
ing”, “revolting”, “contestation”, and political despair have often been attributes that
seemed to have been reserved for describing the outcomes of exhaustive meetings
of the European Heads of States and Governments in Brussels or those of the Council
of Ministers that often ends way past midnight. Oxymoronically, at the time of writing
they adequately describe and capture the state of British politics and its government.
Having observed the Brexit process unfolding since 2016, the debates sur-
rounding it appear to be narrowed down discussing its various implications for the
economy, as well as Britain’s immigration and social policy, to only name a few

v
vi Preface

policy issues. However, not many policy analysts1 have devoted their time to
extensively discussing the implications of the Brexit for the two most important
security institutions in Europe, namely the E.U.’s Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This book
addresses this lacuna.
We are confident that its shelf life will be longer than some would suggest,
because even if the U.K. at the end of this Brexit process decides to remain in the
E.U. (which at the time of writing still is a possibility), it will remain a grumpy
spouse in this marriage. At the same time, the E.U. will not only know that the U.K.
will most likely be grumpy and thus most likely torpedo the EU’s initiatives for
further integration in the area of security and defence; it will also consider the U.K.
as an unreliable and untrustworthy (security) partner moving forward. In short, both
scenarios are not really positive, ideal, or beneficial for any partner. However, in
putting aside the politics of the Brexit discussions, this book offers possible and for
both sides practicable policy scenarios where each side benefits and would maintain
their “face”.
This book would not have been possible without the generous support of the
Institute for Advanced Study at the University of Konstanz where I had the great
fortune to spend two academic years (2017–19) as Fellow, as well as the Department of
Government at Harvard University where he currently is a Visiting Scholar (while
being on leave from the University of Ottawa) and where the book manuscript was
completed. I am also grateful for the generous financial support from the Social
Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) for this project
through their Insight Grant programme. The University of Ottawa and in particular my
colleagues in the department, as well as the Faculty of Social Sciences also need to be
thanked for allowing me to spend so much time away for doing research. It is one
of the very rare occasions in somebody’s career that one could spend three years abroad
at two of the world’s best research institutions! And for that I cam deeply grateful.
Arnold Kammel, who is the co-author of chapters four and five, and I also thank
the Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy (AIES) for their support of
this project and the institutional affiliation that we have enjoyed with them for the
past several years.
Lorraine Klimowich was a superb editor and supported this project from the
beginnings. Together with her editorial team at Springer she made the publishing
process a very enjoyable and smooth ride.

1
A notable and excellent exception are Benjamin Kienzle and Ellen Hallams. “FORUM: European
security and defence in the shadow of Brexit”, Global Affairs vol. 2, no. 5, 2016, pp. 465–469.
https://doi.org/10.1080/23340460.2017.1280376. Whitman even charged that “security and
defence is an area in which the impact of a vote to leave the EU would be relatively marginal”. See
Whitman, Richard G. (2016b). “The UK and EU foreign and security policy: An optional extra.”
The Political Quarterly, 87(2), p. 254. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-923X.12249; Bakker, A.,
Drent, M., & Zandee, D. (2016, July). European Defence: How to Engage the UK After Brexit.
Clingendael Report.
Preface vii

I also gratefully acknowledge the research assistance of Forest Poff-Smith,

Tomke Blotevogel, Paul Heinrich, Francesco Iorianni, Juliane Kuhn, and especially
Alexander Pöschl for helping me to collect some of the data and trace some of the
literature on the Brexit. Moreover, I thank Thomas Roberts at ELF Translations
LTD for his assistance, as well as my family for their support, love, comfort, and
understanding. Without them, this book would not have seen the light of the day!
All errors, of course, remain ours.

Boston, USA Benjamin Zyla

December 2019
Contents

1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Aims, Objectives, and Research Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Why This Book? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Why Is This Guidance Important, in What Context, and for Who? . . . . 9
Roadmap for the Book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Part I Historical Evolutions of the U.K.—NATO

and U.K.—E.U. Relationship
2 A Brief History of the U.K.—NATO Relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
The End of World War II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
The Treaty of Dunkirk, the Treaty of Brussels, and NATO . . . . . . . . . . 20
Korean War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
The Suez Crisis and Fallout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
French Withdrawal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Détente . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
The Fall of the U.S.S.R . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Gulf War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Partnership for Peace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
NATO Enlargement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Bosnia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Kosovo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
9/11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Libya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Brexit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

ix
x Contents

3 A Brief History of the U.K.—E.U. Relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

End of World War II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Schuman Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Western European Union (WE.U.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Petitions to Join the EEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Joining the EEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Schengen Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Single European Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
The Treaty of Maastricht and the End of the Cold War . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
The Treaty of Amsterdam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Nice Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Treaty of Lisbon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Eurozone Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Migrant Crisis and the Brexit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

Part II Contemporary Contexts and Impacts of the Brexit

4 The Geopolitical Contexts of the Brexit (With Arnold Kammel) . . . 73
5 The Impact of Brexit on E.U. Security (With Arnold Kammel) .... 85
Losing a Capable E.U. Member . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 86
Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the Future
of Defence Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 90
European Intervention Initiative (E2I) and the U.K. . . . . . . . . . . . .... 94
U.K. Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 96
6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
List of Tables

Table 1.1 Market Exchange Rates (MER), 2017 at current prices

and exchange rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 4
Table 1.2 Purchasing Power Parity Rates (PPP). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 5
Table 1.3 Military operations undertaken by U.K. under CDSP
(Jan. 2013–Jan. 2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 10
Table 1.4 Civilian Operations and associated costs for U.K. under CSDP
(2012–2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 12
Table 1.5 World U.K. regular force deployments, 2015. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 13
Table 2.1 Force deployments of NATO members to UNPROFOR . . . . .. 36
Table 2.2 Force deployments of NATO members to IFOR
1996–1997 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 37
Table 2.3 Force contributions to SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
and Croatia, 1997–2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 38
Table 2.4 Force deployments of NATO members to KFOR,
2002–2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 41
Table 2.5 Force deployments of NATO members to ISAF
in Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 45
Table 4.1 NATO Countries’ defence expenditure, 2011–2017 . . . . . . . . .. 76
Table 4.2 NATO Countries’ Defence Expenditure as a % of
GDP, 2011–2017 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 81

xi
Chapter 1
Introduction

The outcome of the so-called Brexit, which is an abbreviation of “British exit” from
the European Union (E.U.) that Britons had voted for in a nation-wide referendum
on 23 June, 2016 surprised many, not only in the United Kingdom (U.K.).1 Other
members of the E.U. were also astonished to learn that the U.K. decided to be the
first country in the history of the E.U. to leave the mostly intergovernmental Union.2
This would mean that the U.K. would no longer be a member of the E.U. and its
institutions, including the European Council, Council of the E.U., Commission, and
European Parliament, and several E.U. agencies.3 Indeed, the U.K. would be without
a formal voice or even veto for that matter in these institutions, including Europe’s

1 When we use the term U.K. we refer to the entire British nation—that is Northern Ireland, England,

Scotland, and Wales. Geographically speaking, Britain normally excludes Northern Ireland. For an
excellent discussion of the Brexit and its deeper roots in British society see Geoffrey Evans and
Anand Menon. 2017. Brexit and British Politics. Polity Press and Anand Menon and Brigid Fowler.
2016. “Hard or Soft? The Politics of Brexit”. National Institute Economic Review 238, pp. R4–R12.
2 The obvious exceptional cases where the E.U.’s size was diminished are with the cases of Greenland

and Algeria. See Kiran Klaus Patel, Kiran Klaus. “Something new under the sun? The lessons of
Algeria and Greenland”, in Martill, Benjamin and Uta Staiger (eds.) Brexit and Beyond: Rethinking
the Futures of Europe. London: University College London Press; Tim Oliver, “Goodbye Britan-
nia? The International Implications of Britain’s Vote to leave the E.U.”, Geopolitics, History, and
International Relations 8(2) 2016, p. 218.
3 Niklas Helwig and Isabelle Tannous. “Gemeinsame Außen-und Sicherheitspolitik”, in Werner

Weidefeld and Wolfgang Wessels, Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration. Baden-Baden: Nomos
Verlag, 2016, p. 343. To be sure, the E.U. currently has The E.U. has 42 agencies, or which 6 can
be considered executive and 36 regulative agencies. Each is designed to carry out specific legal,
technical or scientific tasks that are central to the overall functioning of the E.U. For a discussion
see European Union, “The E.U. agencies working for you”. 2006. https://doi.org/10.2814/522644;
Keleman, D.R., “The Politics of ‘Eurocratic’ Structure and the New European Agencies”, in West
European Politics 25, no. 4. 2011. https://doi.org/10.1080/713601644.
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 1
B. Zyla, The End of European Security Institutions?,
SpringerBriefs in Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42160-1_1
2 1 Introduction

Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as well as its Common Security and
Defence Policy (CSDP).4
However, the mechanics of how to actually leave the E.U. even after the British
government invoked Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty of the European Union with their
letter to the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, on 29 March 20175
are still unknown until this day. With more than two years past the referendum,
in the spring of 2019 former Prime Minister Theresa May’s initial proposal for an
orderly Brexit did not find the support in the British House of Commons that would
allow the U.K. to officially ‘divorce’ from the E.U. This is somewhat surprising,
given that she had made unbendingly clear immediately after the referendum that
Britain has all intentions to leave the E.U. after 43 years of marriage. Indeed, May’s
inability to introduce a Brexit plan to the House of Commons that would find the
support of the majority of parliamentarians (from all parties) ultimately cost her the
job. She resigned as Prime Minister at the end of July 2019, and was replaced by
Boris Johnson, the U.K.’s former Foreign Minister in May’s cabinet. After months
of intense political contestations inside the House of Commons (as well as among
the Tories themselves), Johnson called for an election in December 2019, which he
won with a landslide majority of 43.6% of the votes, which translates to 365 of the
650 seats in the House of Commons.

Aims, Objectives, and Research Questions

While the Brexit process is still unfolding at the time of writing,6 this book discusses
what the Brexit would mean for the future of Europe’s security institutions, espe-
cially CFSP and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). More precisely,
we examine what the Brexit would mean for the U.K.’s relationship with these two
major security institutions that the U.K. has been an integral member of for decades.7

4 We hasten to add that in case the Brexit materializes the U.K. would also be placed outside the
E.U. single market; the E.U.’s 32 specialized agencies (e.g. the European Medicines Agency, the
European Banking Authority, the European Aviation Safety Agency) as well as the more than 40
trade agreements that the E.U. currently has signed with over 65 countries; other key E.U. pro-
grams and initiatives (e.g. in the area of research the successor to Horizon 2020 programme), the
Galileo programme and its commercial and security aspects (e.g. satellite navigation), the Erasmus
programme facilitating student and research mobility for circa 678000 individuals and with a bud-
get of more than Euro 2.1 billion (European Commission, 2017) http://ec.europa.eu/programmes/
erasmus-plus/about_en#tab-1-5; and Eurojust, and the European Arrest Warrant (EAW). Moreover,
the U.K. will no longer be a formal participant in the E.U.’s sanctions process (e.g. against Russia).
5 See HM Government. 2017. ‘Prime Minister’s Letter to Donald Tusk Triggering Article 50.’

29 March (available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prime-ministers-letter-to-

donald-tusk-triggering-article-50).
6 We follow Tim Oliver here with this term to consider Brexit as a process rather than an event.

It thus signals multidimensionality, complexity, and actorness. See Oliver, Tim. 2016. “The world
after Brexit: From British referendum to global agenda.” International Politics 53 (6): 689–707.
7 To be sure, the Brexit referendum simply decided that the U.K. would leave the E.U., not NATO.
Aims, Objectives, and Research Questions 3

Moreover and in pure policy terms, we ask how the Brexit will most likely affect the
inner mechanics of the transatlantic alliance (NATO) and CFSP/CSDP in particular
moving forward?
These are important questions to consider for at least two reasons. First, as noted
the U.K. has been an integral part of the transatlantic as well as the European security
architecture since their foundations. In 1973 it joined the E.U., and on 4 April 1949
NATO. Second, the E.U. is currently exposed to a variety of external security and
foreign policy challenges, and thus a situation of ‘internal insecurity’ with one of its
core members leaving the CFSP institution is not only undesirable; it arrives at the
wrong time and is most likely going to destabilize the E.U. even further in light of the
contemporary security environment. In turn, we charge, it also harms British security
interests. The most serious threat facing both NATO and CFSP over the short term
clearly is Russia, along with the instability permeating the Middle East and North
Africa (MENA) region.8 The E.U.’s ability to adequately react to these threats and
pockets of insecurity could seriously be undermined by the Brexit unless a way could
be found to incorporate or at least affiliate the U.K. with the CSDP architecture and its
bureaucratic apparatus that would allow, above all, access to critical information. In
addition, the U.K. leaving CFSP and its security architecture are exacerbated by the
uncertainty surrounding the future of NATO that primarily stems from the U.S. and
Turkey having called into question the reliability of the alliance and their country’s
commitments to it.9 Moreover, it is unclear to what extent the E.U. is still able to
rely on NATO in support of its operations, especially when it comes to planning
and commanding these operations based on the “Berlin-Plus” agreement. Even if the
U.S. under President Trump would clearly and unequivocally commit to Article 5
of the Washington Treaty, the reliability of Turkey having the second largest NATO
military cannot necessarily be taken for granted due to its severe problems with civil-
military relations, as well as its political proximity with Russia. Turkey has recently
bought Russia’s S-400 missile defense system at a cost of circa $2 billion. That
system was precisely designed to down NATO warplanes. A further rapprochement
with Russia could also complicate decision-making processes within NATO and risk
the procurement of the F-35 fighter jets.
At the same time, there appears to be a serious gap between rhetoric and reality
with regards to the E.U.’s efforts of achieving strategic autonomy, which is something
that especially the Americans have long called for. For example, Table 1.1 shows
the top ten worldwide military spenders in 2017, as produced by the Stockholm

8 See e.g. MacGillivray, Iain (2016). Four effects of Brexit on the Middle East. Global Risk Insights,

14. July 2016. Available at http://globalriskinsights.com/2016/07/four-effects-brexit-middle-east;

see also E.U. Global Strategy. (2016, June). Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe.
A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy; Rob Johnson and Janne
Haaland Matlary (eds.) The United Kingdom’s Defence After Brexit: Britain’s Alliances, Coalitions,
and Partnerships (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), pp. 2–3.
9 See e.g. Trump, Donald J. (2016) Foreign policy speech to the Centre for the National Interest

in Washington, DC. Available at: https://www.donaldjtrump.com/press-releases/donald-j.-trump-

foreign-policy-speech.
4 1 Introduction

Table 1.1 Market Exchange Rates (MER), 2017 at current prices and exchange rates
Rank Country Spending U.S.$ Spending per World share (%)
billions (MER) capita U.S.$
1 U.S.A. 609.8 1,879.3 35.1
2 China 228.2 161.9 13.1
3 Saudi Arabia 69.4 2,107.4 4.0
4 Russia 66.3 460.7 3.8
5 India 63.9 47.7 3.7
Sub-total top 5 1,037.7 59.7
6 France 57.8 889.1 3.3
7 U.K. 47.2 713.1 2.7
8 Japan 45.4 356.0 2.6
9 Germany 44.3 539.8 2.5
10 South Korea 39.2 768.0 2.3
Sub-total top 10 1,271.5 – 73.1
World total 1,738.6 – 100.0
Source SIPRI milex database 2018

International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).10 While the U.S. clearly is the world’s
foremost military paymaster with more than $600 billion spent on defence, China is
catching up ranked second with a world share of more than 13% (compared to U.S.
at 35.1%).11
Moreover, Europe’s largest military forces, especially the French forces, are
widely deployed at the moment, both at home and abroad (more than 10,000 French
forces are currently deployed to Mali, Iraq, Lebanon, Central African Republic,
Sahel). The German forces, currently holding the second largest E.U. military, are
seriously underfunded. Moreover, their overall operational readiness continues to be
considered very low due to a lack of investments into the forces for more than a
decade. The point here is that Brexit will undoubtedly exacerbate these internal E.U.
problems following the U.K.’s withdrawal from CFSP (Table 1.2 ).
Meanwhile, as we are trying to show in this monograph, there are signs that
the U.K. is willing to participate in the CFSP architecture post-Brexit, although the
details are still very vague and under negotiation. We argue that three very specific
forms of cooperation are most likely to induce a structural change for the E.U. after
Brexit, namely for its Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO); the European

10 Figures are expressed in Constant (2017) Prices and Exchange Rates (US$ Billion). Countries are

ranked using Market Exchange Rates (MER) and figures are also shown calculated using Purchasing
Power Parity (PPP) rates. If a different base year were used, the rankings could change due to
fluctuations in exchange rates.
11 However, it is also true given these numbers that Europeans spend more than twice as much on

defence as Russia (namely just short of $150 billion).

Aims, Objectives, and Research Questions 5

Table 1.2 Purchasing Power Parity Rates (PPP)3

Rank Country Spending U.S.$ billions
1 U.S.A 609.8
2 China 440.4
3 India 234.6
4 Saudi Arabia 180.0
5 Russia 168.4
Sub-total top 5 1,633.2
6 France 63.8
7 Iran 53.5
8 U.K. 52.6
9 South Korea 51.9
10 Japan 50.5
Sub-total top 10 1,905.5
World total –
Source SIPRI milex database 2018

Intervention Initiative (E2I); and the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) approach.12
However, as a quick preview to the more detailed discussions below, all three forms
of cooperation are plagued with problems and difficulties. To start with, at the moment
the PESCO arrangement appears to place relatively little focus on cooperation, and
it is not clear to what extent it could improve the operational capabilities of the E.U.
after Brexit. Moreover, it will cast into sharper relief the strategic differences between
the different E.U. Member States.
Secondly, France has proposed E2I, which seeks to achieve the level of strategic
and cultural concentration that is required for fast multinational deployments within
dangerous theatres of operation. While this initiative operates outside of the E.U.’s
Military Committee and its staff, it is open for the U.K. to actively participate in it
(a first commitment by the U.K. has already been made in this regard). Having said
that, E2I appears to be focused on interventions in Northern Africa and especially
French-speaking Africa. Thus, it remains unclear whether E2I might actually be a
viable solution for the U.K. seeking cooperation with the E.U. down the road in case
the Brexit materializes.
Thirdly, the U.K.—headed JEF falls under the NATO Framework Nations Con-
cept, although is detached from NATO decision making processes. It brings together

12 For a quick discussion see Dijkstra, H. (2016). “U.K. and E.U. foreign policy cooperation after

Brexit.” RUSI Newsbrief, 36(5), 1–3. Retrieved from https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/dijkstra_

newsbrief_sept_vol.36_no.5.pdf as well as Rob Johnson and Janne Haaland Matlary (eds.) The
United Kingdom’s Defence After Brexit: Britain’s Alliances, Coalitions, and Partnerships (Pal-
grave Macmillan, 2019). On the JEF specifically see Tormod Heier, “Britain’s Joint Expeditionary
Force: A Force of Friends?”, in Rob Johnson and Janne Haaland Matlary (eds.) The United King-
dom’s Defence After Brexit: Britain’s Alliances, Coalitions, and Partnerships (Palgrave Macmillan,
2019, pp. 189–214.
6 1 Introduction

eight European countries (including non-E.U. and non-NATO states) and focuses
primarily on countering Russian threats. It solely is a NATO concept/approach, and
thus cannot easily be transferred to the E.U. without affecting E.U.—NATO relations.

Why This Book?

This monograph is very timely and highly relevant politically, given that both sides
(the U.K. as well as E.U. members) are unsure how to maintain their security coop-
eration. As noted, while research on the Brexit has been under way for years, espe-
cially in terms of analyzing its economic dimensions13 as well as social implications
(e.g. labour market, immigration etc.), the NATO—CFSP dimension of the Brexit
has largely been overlooked in that debate. This is mainly due to the silence of
the British government on explaining clearly how it intends to organize the U.K.—
NATO/U.K.—CFSP relationship in the future should the Brexit indeed fully materi-
alize at the end of 2020. This is in spite of the fact that a post of Secretary of State for
Exiting the European Union has been created in the British Cabinet whose respon-
sibility in part at least, one would assume, is to implement the Brexit. The result is
leaving both the E.U. and NATO in suspense. Moreover, the U.K. government let pass
a major opportunity at NATO’s most recent Summit in Brussels in 2018 to explain
to its allies how it intends to manage, in an orderly and coordinated fashion, its exit
from the E.U. and what that would mean for both the British commitment to NATO
and the future of CFSP. Quite to the contrary, some observers had the impression at
the Summit that the U.K. really does not want to play a critical role in transatlantica
anymore. Indeed, a cold shivering of a looming isolationist British foreign policy
made the rounds on NATO floors, again one must say, leaving many to speculate
about the U.K.’s future in the entire transatlantic security architecture—that is both
NATO and CFSP. The aim of this monograph is to help fill these obvious gaps and
to provide answers as to how the U.K.—CFSP/NATO security relationship could be
organized and structured now that the British Parliament has voted for the Brexit.
This book thus helps us to answer one of the most pertinent security questions in
the transatlantic relationship today, which are undoubtedly changing European secu-
rity affairs. In other words, readjusting U.K.—CFSP/NATO relations is more than
simply an internal management exercise where British commitments (financial and

13 The OECD, for example, has estimated in 2016 that the U.K.’s GDP would be more than 3%

smaller by 2020 (in comparison to continued E.U. membership), and 5% lower by 2030 – the
equivalent of £3200 per household (estimates are calculated on 2016 prices). It is also commonly
expected that Brexit would have long term structural impacts on the U.K. economy in terms of
reduced capital inflows, lower immigration, lower technical progress, stagnant labour productivity
due to less foreign direct investments. For a scholarly discussion (with the exception of security)
see da Costa Cabral, Nazaré, José Renato Gonçalves, Nuno Cunha Rodrigues (Eds.). After Brexit:
Consequences for the European Union. London: Palgrave Macmillan. In 2016, for example, roughly
1.2 million British citizens lived in the E.U., while 3 million E.U. citizens lived in the U.K.; see
McBridge, “What Brexit Means”; special issue of National Institute Economic Review vol. 238, no.
1, November 2016.
Why This Book? 7

human resources etc.14 ) to the E.U. would be simply going to be sort of ‘switched
around’ from one organization to the other (from the E.U. to NATO)—or where
human resources (civilian and military) are being rotated out of the respective E.U.
institutions in Brussels and posted elsewhere under the NATO umbrella.15 It is very
evident that the Brexit is much more fundamental than that, touching upon the very
basic foundations of European security affairs and the transatlantic relationship in
particular. It is, we contend, fair to state that the Brexit indeed poses a very criti-
cal moment for the alliance to re-adjust its inter-institutional relationship with the
E.U., as well as what has been appreciated in the literature as the ‘transatlantic link’
that has bound Europe with its two north American partners (the U.S. and Canada)
together since the end of World War II.16 Against this backdrop, it is evident that
the Brexit will undoubtedly have significant policy implications for all transatlantic
security actors and institutions involved in the management of European security, in
Britain, in NATO, and in the E.U.17 In a word, the overall objective of this book is
to unpack these issues and to provide much needed clarity and guidance on them for
policy makers in the U.K., as well as the E.U. and NATO member states, on what
the Brexit would mean for both CFSP and NATO.

Argument

We put forward three arguments in this monograph. First, we charge that pragmatism
should win out against ideology in the Brexit process in order to ensure the continuing
participation of the U.K. in the wider European security architecture. Should the
European Commission continue to insist on excluding the U.K. from precisely that
architecture, this could result in the emergence of bilateral and multilateral ad hoc
alliances, such as the E2I and the U.K.—JEF, which could also represent a possible
means of incorporating the U.K. into the European security architecture post Brexit.

14 Undoubtedly, the U.K. must increase their foreign and security (human) resources significantly.

See Chalmers, Malcolm. “U.K. Foreign and Security Policy after Brexit”, Briefing Paper, January
2017; Alicia von Voss and Torben Schütz. “The U.K.’s potential role in enabling E.U.–NATO coop-
eration after Brexit“, The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and German Council
on Foreign Relations, June 2018.
15 Some commentators suggest that the Brexit might actually require more resources that staying

within the E.U. See Richard Whitman: Brexit or Bremain: what future for the U.K.’s European
diplomatic strategy?, in: International Affairs 3/2016, S. 509–529.
16 Some analysts have suggested that the Brexit would make it incredibly difficult for the U.K. to

continue to cooperate with the E.U. in the areas of foreign-, security-, and defence policy. See
Bond, i. (2015). Cameron’s security gamble: is Brexit a strategic risk? Centre for European reform.
London, 21 December. http://www.cer.eu/insights/camerons-security-gamble-brexit-strategic-risk;
and Kerr, John (2016). Brexit would shake the four pillars of British foreign policy. Centre for
European Reform. London, 31 May; https://www.cer.eu/insights/brexit-would-shake-four-pillars-
british-foreign-policy.
17 See also Stephanie Hofmann, “Brexit will weigh heavily on European security. Here’s Why.” The

Washington Post Monkey Cage Analysis, October 18, 2018.

8 1 Introduction

Whilst NATO as a whole might no longer be as reliable as it once was, the alliance can
and must continue to offer a useful framework for such arrangements. Specifically,
arrangements such as the E2I and U.K.—JEF would undermine the E.U.’s control
over the European security architecture and enhance the role of national defence
actors. They also underscore the ineffectiveness of the E.U.’s Permanent Structured
Cooperation (PESCO).
Second, in case the U.K. indeed leaves the E.U. in terms of European security
policy we are likely to see that the U.K. will push for taking Europe’s most important
military and security decisions inside NATO rather than the E.U. Its foremost strategic
interest thereby is to discourage the E.U.’s efforts to advance its ‘strategic autonomy’
vis-à-vis NATO. Meanwhile, France as Europe’s second largest military power and
a significant source of (E.U.) force projection as well as permanent member of the
UN Security Council (and thus a veto power) will be enhanced and upgraded.18
Third, we are likely to expect that the U.K. will consider, indeed use, NATO as
an essential source of international legitimacy and influence over European security
affairs and policy, and step up its commitment in the alliance for precisely that
reason, especially in terms of increasing their postings of additional military and
political officials that would support NATO’s military and civilian missions. This
is a logical consequence of a report published by the British House of Commons
warning that the Brexit will lead to a significantly reduced British influence in CFSP.19
Given that the U.K. currently is one of seven NATO countries20 that meets the 2%
defence spending as a share of national GDP target, we are likely to see the U.K.
joining American voices calling upon the Europeans to significantly increase their
defence spending. It would also be difficult to remove the U.K. from occupying the
position of NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR), which
traditionally is reserved for a member of the U.K. military.21 Meanwhile, the benefit
for the alliance undoubtedly is that the U.K. shifting its priorities to NATO will
strengthen the Euro-Atlantic security pillar.

18 Tim Oliver, “Goodbye Britannia? The International Implications of Britain’s Vote to leave the

E.U.”, Geopolitics, History, and International Relations 8(2) 2016, p. 225.

19 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee: Implications of the referendum on E.U. mem-

bership for the U.K.’s role in the world, 26.4.2016, available at https://publications.parliament.uk/
pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmfaff/545/545.pdf (last access 01.7.2017).
20 Out of the 29 NATO members in total, these 6 include Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,

the U.K., and the USA.

21 Chalmers, Malcolm. “U.K. Foreign and Security Policy after Brexit”, Briefing Paper, January

2017, p. 2.
Why Is This Guidance Important, in What Context, and for Who? 9

Why Is This Guidance Important, in What Context,

and for Who?

To start with, the U.K. is Europe’s second largest economy.22 It currently transfers
approximately £11 billion to the E.U. each year, which roughly equals e12.85 bil-
lion.23 If one subtracts the roughly £4.4 billion of subsidies etc. that Britain receives
yearly from the E.U., the British ‘net gain’ upon leaving the E.U. would roughly be
in the neighborhood of £8.6 billion (or e9.86 billion).24 Moreover, in 2018 the E.U.
accounted for 45% of U.K. exports and 54% imports.25 However, the U.K. recorded
an overall trade deficit with the E.U. of -£64 billion. A surplus of £29 billion on trade
in services was outweighed by a deficit of -£93 billion on trade in goods.26 As the
third largest net contributor to the E.U. in financial terms,27 it thus appears to be evi-
dent that the Brexit will not only weaken the E.U.’s clout in terms of its foreign and
security policy; it will also significantly affect its role and impact as a reliable inter-
national security actor, for example, in other international (security) organizations
such as the United Nations.28 Moreover, the possibility that bilateral defence and
security cooperation may be pursued between the U.K. and individual E.U. member
states, whilst treating the U.K. as a third country for the purposes of E.U. foreign
and security policy, clearly is a policy option at the time of writing that cannot be
excluded from the planning of future policy scenarios. Indeed, in this respect, the
smaller E.U. member states could play a positive role in promoting cooperation with

22 The U.K. has a GDP of e2.569 billion, France e2.184 billion, and Germany e3,026 billion. See

Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung. Dossier: Der Brexit und die britische Sonderrolle in der
E.U.. 26.02.2019. p. 5.
23 This is based on calculations by the U.K. Office for National Statistics. See

detailed calculations here: https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/governmentpublicsectorandtaxes/

publicsectorfinance/articles/theukcontributiontotheeubudget/2017-10-31. Specifically, in 2018 the
U.K. government spent £864.9 billion on all aspects of public spending, of which initially £20.0
billion was transferred to the E.U. However, this amount is not the net-amount of transfers as it
does not include U.K. rebates and abatements, which for 2018 amounts to £4.5 billion. From the
remaining £15.5 billion, the U.K. received additional £4.5 billion from the E.U. from the so-called
‘shared management’ programmes (e.g. the agricultural guarantee fund etc.). This brings the net
transfer amount of the U.K. to the E.U. to £11 billion (or roughly e12.85 billion).
24 James McBridge, “What Brexit Means”, Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, March

29, 2017. See also Der Brexit und das E.U.—Machtgefüge—Wie wirkt sich das britische
Votum auf die E.U. und ihr Gewicht in der Welt aus? Hrsg.: Deutsche Gesellschaft für
Auswärtige Politik e.V. Abrufbar unter: https://dgap.org/de/thinktank/publi-kationen/fuenffragen/
derbrexitunddaseumachtgefuege.
25 McBridge, “What Brexit Means”.
26 Ward, M. (2019). “Statistics on U.K.—E.U. trade”, House of Commons Library, Briefing Paper

No. 7851, 3.
27 Ibid. This includes the so-called “Britain rebate” by which the U.K. is reimbursed about 66%

of its net payments to the E.U.. See Weinmann, G. “Britenrabatt”, in Martin Große Hüttmann u.
Hans-Georg Wehling (Hg.): Das Europalexikon, 2., aktual. Aufl. Bonn: Dietz 2013.
28 Uta Staiger and Benjamin Martill. 2018. “Rethinking the futures of Europe”, in Benjamin Martill

and Uta Staiger. Brexit and Beyond: Rethinking the Futures of Europe. London, U.K.: UCL Press,
pp. 260–265.
10 1 Introduction

Table 1.3 Military operations undertaken by U.K. under CDSP (Jan. 2013–Jan. 2014)
Operation Common U.K. Costs Percentages of Total U.K.
costs (Million U.K. shares personnel Personnel
(Million Euros) (%) contribution
Euros)
Althea 15.3 2.3 15.03 1081 4 in theatre +
(Bosnia and an “over the
Herzegovina horizon”
peacekeeping) reserve force
of up to 120
troops
Atalanta 7.5 1.2 16 1,421 Operations
(counterpiracy commander
off the coast and 60 HQ
of Somalia) staff, 1 frigate
for 3 months
every 2 years
E.U. Training 7.8 1.2 15.38 91 3 military, 2
mission civilians
somalia
E.U. Training 21.6 3.3 15.27 524 37 military
mission mali
Total 52.1
U.K. Share 8
Source Government of the United Kingdom. (2013). Review of the Balance of Competences between
the United Kingdom and the European Union Foreign Policy. Retrieved from https://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/227437/2901086_Foreign_Policy_acc.
pdf as well as calculations by authors

the U.K. under the auspices of the E.U., in particular during periods of them holding
the rotating presidencies of the European Council (although this is subject to the
proviso that it does not undermine European cooperation in the area of security and
defence policy) (Table 1.3).
With that in mind and as evidenced in table three, as an example, it is most likely
that the U.K. leaving the E.U. would definitely have significant implications for future
CSDP missions (as well as the E.U. more generally of course) and indeed NATO’s
civilian and military crisis management operations. Moreover, it is likely to have
significant implications in terms of human resources,29 especially the U.K.’s civilian
staff (career diplomats) that are currently serving on or are seconded to the E.U.’s
External Action Service, the further development of the E.U.’s security strategy,30
as well as the U.K.’s security expertise, intelligence resources, and equipment that

29 Richard Whitman. “Brexit or Bremain: what future for the U.K.’s European diplomatic strategy?”,

International Affairs 3/2016, S. 509–529.

30 See Niklas Helwig and Isabelle Tannous. “Gemeinsame Aussen-und Sicherheitspolitik”, in:

Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration, 2016, p. 341.

Why Is This Guidance Important, in What Context, and for Who? 11

it currently shares widely with both the E.U. and NATO.31 Could one expect, for
example, that Britain’s military and civilian resources that are currently committed
to CSDP be simply redirected to NATO? And if so, how might this work practically?
Or will this external engagement be ‘absorbed’ by a new isolationist British foreign
policy, as some British commentators have suggested32 ? These are not inconsequen-
tial questions to ask, as table four highlighting the civilian operations as well as the
associated costs for U.K. under the CSDP banner for the years 2012–2013 shows.
To be fair, it is a snapshot for the years 2012–2013; yet, it offers an indication if not
trend of what compensations the rest of the E.U. most likely will have to compensate
for should the U.K. indeed leave the E.U. (Table 1.4).
The table is also significant because it demonstrates that the U.K. currently is the
E.U.’s country with the largest military capabilities and defence budget, which in
turn carries a significant weight with regards to Europe’s international credibility as
a reliable and capable security actor,33 also because the U.K. is a significant nuclear
power. In any case, as Faleg reminds us, “[f]irst and foremost, Brexit means that the
CSDP will lose one of its majority shareholders, and a veto player. The U.K. and
France alone make up more than 40% of public defence investments in the E.U.”34
Moreover, there is a looming question as to whether the U.K. leaving the E.U.
could mean an end to what some have called a ‘special relationship’ with the U.S.35
and thus significantly reduce the U.K.’s role and status in transatlantic (security)
affairs. It is most likely to even weaken the entire transatlantic relationship, including
the inner governance of NATO.36 If one believes the recent foreign policy statements
made by U.S. officials at the Munich Security Conference in February 2019, such
a development would not necessarily appear to be inconvenient for the Americans
(Table 1.5).

31 Jolyon Howorth (2017). “E.U. defence cooperation after Brexit: what role for the U.K. in the

future E.U. defence arrangements?”, European View 16:191–200 https://doi.org/10.1007/s12290-

017-0455-5.
32 See for example Anand Menon. “Littler England: The United Kingdom’s Retreat From Global

Leadership”. Foreign Affairs, November/December 2015, pp. 93–100.

33 For example, the U.K. is a leader in reconnaissance in Europe: it owns 44% of the airborne early-

warning and control aircraft, and nearly half of the E.U.’s heavy transport aircraft. Both are only to
be replaced by the E.U. and its member states at significant costs.
34 Faleg, G. (July 26, 2016). The Implications of Brexit For the E.U.’s Common Security and Defence

Policy. CEPS. Retrieved March 5, 2017, from https://www.ceps.eu/publications/implications-

brexit-eu%E2%80%99s-common-security-and-defence-policy#_ftnref3.
35 Niklas Helwig and Isabelle Tannous. “Gemeinsame Außen-und Sicherheitspolitik”, in Werner

Weidefeld and Wolfgang Wessels, Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration. Baden-Baden: Nomos
Verlag, 2016, p. 343. To be sure, this “special relationship” has never been that of equals, and was
one “of choice” for the Americans. See James K. Wither. “Brexit and the Anglo-American Security
and Defense Partnership”, Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018, pp. 73–84.
36 As Stephanie Hofmann shows, the E.U. and NATO are deeply intertwined. See Stephanie C.

Hofmann (2019) The politics of overlapping organizations: hostage-taking, forum-shopping and

brokering, Journal of European Public Policy, 26:6, 883-905, https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.
2018.1512644.
12 1 Introduction

Table 1.4 Civilian Operations and associated costs for U.K. under CSDP (2012–2013). (Costs
for each mission are for a year from the month in which the mission first started. Costs listed for
EUAVSEC South Sudan are for 19 months)
Operation Common U.K. Total U.K. U.K.
costs Costs personnel Personnel Share
(Million (Million contribution in
Euros) Euros) (%)
E.U.BAM Lbya (border management 30.3 4.6 165 4 civilians, 15.18
assistance) incl. deputy
head of
mission
E.U.CAP Sahel (capacity building 8.7 1.3 32 1 civilian 14.94
for security forces)
E.U.AVSEC South Sudan (capacity 12.5 1.9 8 1 civilian 15.2
building for aviation security)
E.U.CAP Nestor (capacity building 22.9 3.5 29 4 civilians 15.28
for maritime security forces in the
Horn of Africa)
E.U.JU.S.T LEX (capacity building 27.2 4.2 26 5 civilians 15.44
for Iraqi judicial sector)
E.U.S.EC Democratic Republic of 11 1.7 46 0 15.45
Congo (security sector reform)
E.U.BAM Rafah (border 1 0.2 3 0 20
management assistance in the
occupied Palestinian territories)
E.U.POL COPPS (police capacity 9.3 1.4 49 4 civilians 15.05
building in the occupied Palestinian
territories)
E.U.POL Afghanistan (police 57 8.7 258 18 civilians 15.26
capacity building)
E.U.POL Democratic Republic of 6.8 1 28 0 14.7
Congo (police capacity building)
E.U.LEX Kosovo (executive and 111 17 819 37 civilians 15.32
capacity building mission in rule of
law)
E.U.MM Georgia (ceasefire 20.9 3.2 238 12 civilians 15.31
monitoring)
Total 318.4
U.K. Share 48.8
Source Government of the United Kingdom. (2013). Review of the Balance of Competences between
the United Kingdom and the European Union Foreign Policy. Retrieved from https://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/227437/2901086_Foreign_Policy_acc.pdf
as well as calculations by authors
Why Is This Guidance Important, in What Context, and for Who? 13

Table 1.5 World U.K. regular force deployments, 2015

Location Number of troops In (%)
Total 153,270 100
U.K. 134,930 88.03
Europe, excluding the U.K. 13,970 9.11
Asia, excluding the Middle East 790 0,52
North Africa/Middle East 1,170 0.76
Sub-Saharan Africa 560 0.37
North America 910 0.59
Central America/Caribbean 10 0.007
South Atlantic 1,030 0.67
Oceania 50 0.03
Unallocated 300 0.12
Source British Armed Forces. (2015) U.K. Defence in Numbers. https://www.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/467482/20151013-U.K._Defence_in_Numbers_
screen.pdf as well as calculations by authors

Moreover, with the Brexit currently under way, there remain significant questions
about Britain’s financial, personnel, and indeed political commitments to NATO.
What will happen, for example, to NATO installations on British soil, including its
naval ports in Scotland37 that are vitally important for the British Navy (especially
Faslane naval base and the warhead storeplace at Coulport)?38 In turn, would leaving
the E.U. also have consequences for the British armed forces, given the fact that
Scotland has already indicated that it would secede from the U.K.? This could mean
that the U.K. would lose Scottish members of the British Armed Forces and the
closure of its nuclear deterrent submarine force (SSBN).39
As noted, these questions and issues are not only interesting and stimulating
to discuss from an intellectual point of view; policy officials on both sides of the
Brexit debate also need answers to them in order to effectively govern the transat-
lantic (security) relationship after Brexit. This book attempts to help finding these

37 Scotland roughly represents about five percent of Britain’s population, yet more than a third of the

U.K.’s territory. It is especially the latter point that makes it vitally important as a strategic location
for NATO’s northern defence.
38 According to RUSI’s calculations, a relocation of British forces based in Scotland, including

the logistics thereof back to Britain is extremely expensive, politically sensitive, and complicated.
See Hugh Chalmers and Malcolm Chalmers, Relocation, Relocation, Relocation: Could the U.K.’s
Nuclear Force be Moved after Scottish Independence? (London: RUSI, 2014).
39 For a discussion see David Blagden. “Britain and the World After Brexit”. International

Politics 54(1), 2017, pp. 1–25. Military bases in Scotland are also used as a part of the
critical defence perimeter and the maritime defence zone, aside from a number of weapons
manufacturers there. For a more detailed discussion see HM Government. 2014. Scotland
analysis: Defence. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
285961/Scotland_infographics_26022014.pdf.
14 1 Introduction

answers, and to better contextualize the U.K.’s security relationship with NATO and
CFSP in order to have an enhanced understanding of the potential implications of the
Brexit for both the E.U. and NATO. Consider just one specific security policy issue
as an example. The U.K. is a member of the so-called 5-eyes intelligence community.
After the Brexit it remains doubtful whether the U.K. will indeed maintain its close
intelligence sharing network across the English Channel40 —that is with the E.U.—or
whether London can continue to rely on the E.U.’s intelligence data and information
and those of its member states and share it with the U.K.’s MI5 and MI6. Up until
the Brexit referendum in 2016, these intelligence exchanges were important institu-
tional, cross-border networks the U.K. could always rely and count on to support,
for example, their fight against radical extremism in the U.K. and abroad, as well as
terrorism and organized crime. In other words, whether these intelligence networks
will remain ‘live, active, and accessible’ after the Brexit remains very unclear at the
time of writing. However, the consequences of Britain restricting or even cutting
access to intelligence information would be significant for all parties involved, for
example for policing purposes (e.g. Europol).
On the NATO side, a recent call by the former President of the European Com-
mission, Jean-Claude Juncker, and the former President of the European Parliament,
Martin Schulz, to create a European army41 in response to Britain leaving the E.U.
should be frightening for the alliance (especially the Americans) as it remains very
unclear, for example, what role and objectives such an army would have in addition
to NATO. Moreover, would it not question or even violate what Madeleine Albright
once called the 3-D paradigm—that is no duplication, no decoupling, and no dis-
crimination of NATO/E.U. assets? While frightening perhaps for NATO, one could
suppose that the French might be delighted about this idea of a European army as it
would come closer to their long-term foreign policy goal of creating an active and
effective counterweight to the United States in transatlantic security affairs. It would
also mean a general rebalancing of power and influence in NATO. On the other side
of the Atlantic, this might pose yet another opportunity for the United States to fur-
ther disengage itself from the alliance, with severe consequences, for example, for
NATO’s ongoing burden sharing debates, strategy, partnerships etc.
In case the U.K. also engages in a more isolationist foreign policy42 as a result of
the Brexit, it might indeed contribute to forming what former Secretary of Defence,
Robert Gates, has called a two-tier alliance—that is an alliance of states that share
collective burdens and are engaged in the alliance and those states that do not. Thus, it
is close to being certain that what NATO needs after the Brexit is a new political com-
mitment among the allies to re-vitalize Article 4 of the Washington Treaty, namely
to “[…] consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial

40 “Joint Fact Sheet: U.S. and U.K. Defense Cooperation,” White House, March 14, 2012, https://

obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-ofce/2012/03/14/joint-fact-sheet-us-and-uk-defense-
cooperation.
41 Deutsche Welle. (2015, March 8). Juncker Calls for Collective E.U. Army. Deutsche Welle.

Retrieved from http://www.dw.com/en/juncker-calls-for-collective-eu-army/a-18302459.

42 For a discussion see for example Sven Biscop, Brexit, Strategy, and the E.U.: Britain Takes Leave.

Egomont Paper 100. Brussels: Egmont Institute.

Why Is This Guidance Important, in What Context, and for Who? 15

integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.” This

will foster the political relationships among the NATO allies, as well as underline the
multidimensionality of transatlantic security and defence cooperation. At the same
time, re-committing to Article 4 will most likely improve NATO’s resilience against
external shocks and insecurities. In brief, a new political commitment to NATO and
its allies is desperately needed to assure NATO members, especially those in central
and south-eastern Europe, that the organization is robust and healthy. Moreover, they
need to be reassured that there is no need to leave the alliance, or that in case the
Brexit materializes they are going to be forced to decide whether they side with the
U.K. to keep NATO as the foremost institution governing European security affairs,
or with France and Germany who continue to push for a more integrated E.U. defence
policy.43

Roadmap for the Book

The book starts in Part I with a quick historical overview of U.K.—E.U. as well
as U.K.—NATO relations since Britain jones these institutions in 1973 and 1949
respectively. Our aim in these two chapters (chapter two and three) is neither to
provide a historiography of these two relationships, nor do we claim comprehensive-
ness of the literature.44 Rather, our aim simply is to provide readers with a short and
quick overview of the key and most important historical events that shaped these two
relations in the past—perhaps even a primer for new scholars studying the complex
embedment of the U.K. in —ropean security institutions.
In Part II starting with chapter four we turn to the discussions of the Brexit and
especially how it is embedded in the larger geopolitical context of today. In other
words, when discussing the Brexit from a security point of view one must also
consider the contemporary security environment that undoubtedly shapes security
thoughts and practices. In chapter five we zoom in on discussing what options the
E.U., and particular its CSDP arm, has in case the Brexit materializes, and what most
likely scenario we could expect once the U.K. has made the last step in divorcing
from the E.U.

43 For an extensive debate and elaboration see Zyla, Benjamin, and Arnold Kammel, A. Peacebuild-

ing At Home: NATO in Eastern Europe (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2018).

44 A wonderful overview can be found in Kienzle, B. (2016). The Foreign, Security and Defence
Implications of Brexit: A Guide to the Academic Literature. Regional Security Research Centre.
 Part I
Historical Evolutions
of the U.K.—NATO and U.K.—E.U.
Relationship
Chapter 2
A Brief History of the U.K.—NATO
Relationship

The United Kingdom (U.K.) has been at the center of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) since the organization’s creation in 1949. And even before
that the U.K. was a member to the Treaty of Brussels, which is widely considered
the precursor to NATO. The aim of this chapter is to briefly trace the development
of the U.K.—NATO relationship. Our aim is not to provide a comprehensive his-
toriography; this would need way more space than is available here to do justice
to the vast literature available. Rather, by highlighting some of the main historical
essentials, we examine how particular events, key ideas, and issues have shaped that
relationship up to present day.
It will not have remained unnoticed to careful readers and analysts of the transat-
lantic relationship that U.K.—NATO relations and even more so U.K.—E.U. rela-
tions have at times been (very) contentious. In part, this has to do with the importance
of the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ in the discourse of British security.1
This ‘special relationship dates back to Victorian times, and has truly solidified itself
with America’s entry into World War I.2 It is thus important to note that throughout
the discussion of Britain’s relationship with NATO, certainly in its early days, has
to a large extent been driven by that special relationship between the British and the
Americans.3

1 Tim Oliver. “Special relationships in flux: Brexit and the future of the U.S.—E.U. and U.S.—U.K.

relationships”, in: International Affairs 3/2016, S. 547–567.

2 Campbell, D.A. (2007). Unlikely Allies: Britain, America and the Victorian Origins of the Special

Relationship. New York: Hambledon Continuum, p. 1.

3 For a reaffirmation of this special relationship in the context of Brexit see Missy Ryan, “U.S.

Military Ties with Britain Are Sheltered from Brexit Storm, Officials Say,” Washington Post, June
28, 2016; and Spencer Ackerman, “U.S.—U.K. Security Officials Cement Intelligence Partnership
after Leave Vote,” Guardian, June 24, 2016.
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 19
B. Zyla, The End of European Security Institutions?,
SpringerBriefs in Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42160-1_2
20 2 A Brief History of the U.K.—NATO Relationship

The End of World War II

World War II saw an alliance between the U.K., France, the U.S.A., and the U.S.S.R
to combat militant nationalism in Germany. With the end of World War II in 1945, the
threat of nationalist militarism was reduced, but not entirely eliminated. Further, the
emergence of the Soviet Union as a military and economic superpower, while being
diametrically opposed to capitalism, posed a new ideological and existential threat
to European states. The end of World War II set the stage for the development of
NATO to accomplish a trio of goals: “deterring Soviet expansionism, forbidding the
revival of nationalist militarism in Europe through a strong North American presence
on the continent, and encouraging European political integration”.4 It was therefore
no surprise that the credo of European security affairs after WWII became, to quote
Lord Ismay, “to keep the Russians out, the Germans down and the Americans in.”5

The Treaty of Dunkirk, the Treaty of Brussels, and NATO

As part of a necessity to prevent another World War, the idea of a new collective secu-
rity arrangement surfaced. Employed during the creation of the League of Nations,
the concept of collective security went beyond the pure idea of defence and included,
according to Inis Claude, arrangements for facilitating peaceful settlement of disputes.
It assumed that the mechanisms of preventing war and defending states under armed
attack would “supplement and reinforce each other.”6 The philosophy behind a new
collective security concept was to create a system for the maintenance of international
peace (like the League of Nations) where a collectivity of states functioned as a deter-
rent to potential aggressors that were trying to offset the existing balance of power.
To this end, the United Nations (UN) was founded on 24 October, 1945 as an interna-
tional institution to “maintain international peace and security, develop friendly rela-
tions among nations, achieve international co-operation and be a centre for harmoniz-
ing the actions of nations.” At that point, the British government and its foreign policy
elites saw the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R) and post-war Germany as
the two largest threats to European security.7 Especially the rearmament of Germany
was considered with deep suspicions, and was to be prevented at all costs.
Shortly after the end of combat in Europe, Winston Churchill warned the inter-
national community in a speech given in Fulton, Missouri on 12 May 1945 that an
iron curtain had come down “from Stettin to the Baltic to Trieste,” and separated

4 NATO (2012). A Short History of NATO. Retrieved from, http://eu-nato.gov.ge/sites/default/files/

20120412_ShortHistory_en.pdf, p. 1.
5 Lord Ismay was the first Secretary General of NATO from 1949–1957.
6 Inis L. Claude, Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization,

4th ed. (New York: Random House, 1971), 245.

7 Baylis, John (1982) Britain and the Dunkirk Treaty: The origins of NATO. Journal of Strategic

Studies, 5(2), 236–247, p. 237.

The Treaty of Dunkirk, the Treaty of Brussels, and NATO 21

Western and Eastern Germany.8 The Soviet Union had gained control and influence
over regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, including Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
Poland, and East Germany. It also actively supported the communist insurrection in
Greece. The gravity of the situation in Greece and Turkey, where communist ide-
ology threatened to take control of the state institutions, pushed President Truman
on 12 March 1947 in a Joint Session of Congress to announce what has become
known as the Truman Doctrine.9 Truman’s speech was attached to a request of $400
million for the assistance of Greece and Turkey to remain democratic states. On 24
June 1948, the Soviet Union retaliated and launched a full blockade of surface routes
to West Berlin, and threatened to starve the population of food supplies and other
goods.10 The Western allies reacted to this Berlin blockade with an airlift on 26 June
to feed the population of West Berlin.
This was the moment when the British government realized that in spite of being
a permanent member of the UN Security Council and thus holding a veto power over
all of its decisions, it could not rely on the collective security system of the UN to
guarantee Britain’s security during a time when the Soviet Union engaged in expan-
sionist foreign policies that could again threaten the fragile political and economic
conditions in Europe.11 When the fathers of the UN Charter developed Article 2(4),
which described the general prohibition of the use of force in that “all members shall
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territo-
rial integrity or political independence of any state or in any other manner inconsistent
with the purposes of the United Nations,” they had not anticipated the possibility of
two superpowers (the U.S.A and the U.S.S.R) rivaling for influence in world politics.
Indeed, the idealism of the UN’s collective security system was quickly overshadowed
by precisely these two rivaling as well as veto powers. In brief, when it came to ques-
tions of national security and national defence the British government did not trust
the UN’s collective security system; instead it concentrated its efforts on creating a
collective security institution in and for Europe.12
This view of tying Britain to a permanent European security institution, however,
was not uncontested among British politicians. Prime Minister Winston Churchill,

8 See for example Roy Jenkins, Churchill: A Biography, 1st ed. (New York: Farrar, Straus and
Giroux, 2001), 809–813.
9 Urwin, Derek W. (1991). The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration since

1945, Longman: London and New York.

10 There still is debate in the literature if the blockade was an overreaction of the Soviet Union trying

to gain a hegemonic position in Central Europe of it is was a reaction to the London Agreement
of June 1948 in which the allies decided to create a West German state, which was opposed by the
Soviet Union. At the end of the month the allies had also introduced a new currency into Germany,
which threatened to undermine economic policies in Eastern Germany. For the latest research on
this period see the excellent volume of Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945 (New
York: Penguin Press, 2005), 145–146.
11 The negotiations for the creation of a North Atlantic Alliance took place in light of George F.

Kennan’s long telegram sent from the American Embassy in Moscow on 22 February 1946. For an
excellent discussion about the time period see John W. Young and John Kent, International Relations
since 1945: A Global History (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 68–93.
12 Baylis, 1982, p. 237.
22 2 A Brief History of the U.K.—NATO Relationship

amongst others, reminded his colleagues that in terms of security European powers
should be considered as “liabilities rather than assets.”13 The U.K. should, so his
recommendation, wait until such a time as the other European states have recovered
from the ravages of World War II before tying U.K. security interests permanently to
them, perhaps even through a collective defence system.14 In that sense, the British
differed significantly from other WWII allies, such as Canada, who not only asked
what role Canada might play in a post-war international order but also what policies
were conducive for establishing a global community of states. Canada believed in
the collective security system in which international organizations were an integral
component to ensure peace and security.15 Further, there was the British concern that
any movement towards a defence union within Europe may contribute to a security
dilemma scenario with the Soviet Union whereby military investments on one side
would even more threaten the existence of the other side, and thus trigger calls for
even more military investments. This, so the assessment of the British government,
would even more threaten British security interests.16
Despite detractors, the foundations of a Western European Union (W.E.U.) and
subsequently NATO were laid down with the signing of the Treaty of Dunkirk in
March of 1947, with France and the United Kingdom agreeing to cooperate on
defence issues.17 It is important to note that the Treaty of Dunkirk was framed as a
pact to “prevent Germany from becoming a menace again.”18 This is important as
the treaty was framed as defence against the threat of Germany, so as to ensure that

13 Ibid.,p. 20.
14 Ibid.,p. 238.
15 John Holms clearly shows that the primary objective of Canadian foreign policy immediately

following WWII was to create a collective security system. As Holmes argues, “there was, however,
no particularly Canadian territorial or economic interest at stake. Canadians were more concerned
with general questions of collective security.” See Holmes, The Shaping of Peace: Canada and
the Search for World Order, 1943–1957, 106. Eventually, this policy became known as a middle-
powermanship that gave Canada international status and a feeling of moral superiority—they were
the ones that constrained the great powers “and acted as the world’s conscience when things got
out of hand.” See Chapnick, “Canadian Foreign Policy: The Middle Power Muddle,” 4.
16 Park, W. (1986). Defending the West: A History of NATO. Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books, p. 7.
17 (Baylis, 1982, p. 244. Examples of EU military cooperation has occurred, among others, include

the German-French brigade created on 13. November 1987; Bundeswehr support for the French
army in Mali in response to the terror attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015; deployment of the
Bundeswehr in support of France, Iraq, and the international coalition against ISIS; French-German
defence industry cooperation (e.g. (Krauss-Maffai Wegmann on the German side, and Nexter on
the French side; as well as joint French-German diplomatic missions to solve the civil wars in
Syria and the Ukraine (Minsk agreement of 12. February 2015). Notably is also the French-German
defence- and security council (DFVSR), which is also known as the Elysée Treaty and was singed on
22. January 1988; available online at https://www.france-allemagne.fr/Deutsch-Franzosischer,0582.
html.
18 Escott Reid, “The Birth of the North Atlantic Alliance,” International Journal 22, no. 3 (1967),

p. 427. See also Treaty of Dunkirk, 1947, Article 1. Treaty of Dunkirk (1947). Retrieved from
http://www.cvce.eu/en/education/unit-content/-/unit/026961fe-0d57-4314-a40a-a4ac066a1801/
5d5a64ab-9c7c-4e19-b528-9e53f9ce937b/Resources#1fb9f4b5-64e2-4337-bc78-db7e1978de09_
en&overlay.
The Treaty of Dunkirk, the Treaty of Brussels, and NATO 23

the Treaty would not be seen as a threat to the Soviets. The Treaty was also signed
signaling to the Americans that Europe was serious about its own security.
At the same time the British believed that involving the U.S.A. in European
security affairs was crucial, as this would offer Europe a credible deterrent against
Soviet encroachment and invasion.19 In that sense, the Treaty of Dunkirk was a way
of increasing the chances that the Americans would view European states as serious
allies in the protection of Europe. Indeed, it laid the groundwork for the Brussels
Pact that included the U.K., France, Belgium, The Netherlands, and Luxembourg.
The creation of NATO in 1949 was the first treaty to include the U.S.A., and was
thus integral, in the minds of many, to British security as well as that of the other
European states.
The geopolitical superpower rivalry between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in the
late 1940s clearly displayed that the U.N. could not “provide its members with the
security which would enable them to put it to full force for the peaceful settlement
of international disputes.”20 Thus, Britain had to consider alternatives to ensure its
national security, and it found one in NATO. Its closest allies, including the U.S.,
Canada, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg thought along the same
lines. In 1948, they negotiated a collective defence system, the Brussels Treaty,
which later became the Western European Union (W.E.U.).21 The W.E.U. was a
precursor to NATO and included a collective Article 5 defence clause that would
ensure mutual defence. In the meantime, Britain was also a part of a group of states
that negotiated the Washington Treaty, the treaty that created NATO.22 To some, it was
an idealist treaty that would provide the “basis for the building of a federation of North
Atlantic countries, a real North Atlantic Community”.23 Such a community would
be comprised of states sharing the norms and values of liberal western democracies
that would serve—besides mutual defence in the time of war—additional purposes
during peacetime. Canada, for example, expected economic benefits from such treaty.
Moreover, in looking back, the Treaty clearly increased the influence of middle and
small powers and that “the people of the Western world might consider creating a
regional security organization, open to any Western country, in which each member
state would pool the whole of its economic and military resources with those of other
members if any power should be found to have committed aggression against any
one of the members”.24 However, the U.K.’s intention from the beginning was to
keep the Alliance small and strong, avoiding commitments to peripheral countries.

19 Baylis, 1982, p. 244.

20 Government of Canada. Department of External Affairs, Canada and the United Nations 1948,
Report of the United Nations (Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, 1949), 23.
21 According to Reid, Canada’s Prime Minister Mackenzie-King was informed about such develop-

ments by a top-secret telegram from the British Prime Minister in mid January 1948, in which the
British PM spoke about an urgent necessity of a Western Alliance against the evolving Soviet threat.
22 For a great historical analysis of this negotiation process see Adam Chapnik, The Middle Power

Project: Canada and the Founding of the United Nations. Vancouver: University of British Columbia
Press, 2005.
23 Reid, 1967, p. 430.
24 Reid, 1967, p. 426.
24 2 A Brief History of the U.K.—NATO Relationship

The Washington Treaty that founded NATO was officially signed in Washington
D.C. on 4 April 1949.25 Ever since it has been a landmark of European defence
and the transatlantic relationship, and eventually became the personification of a
Western community of states that shared more than simple security interests, but
also common norms, values, and objectives. As one of the founding members of the
alliance, Britain has a deep historical understanding of the organization and its role
in it.

Korean War

NATO was of little importance during the year of its creation in 1949, except for being
a deterrent against a Soviet attack on Europe. This changed with the outbreak of the
Korean War in 1950, which started with Kim IL Sung gaining support from Stalin
for an armed attack on South Korea. The West assumed that Stalin had ordered the
invasion of South Korea and that he might use this proxy war to distract the West from
a larger invasion into Western Europe.26 Britain shared the assessment of its allies that
the U.S.S.R. was not afraid of using force to achieve their desired ends,27 and decided
to participate with 14,198 armed forces in the United Nations Command (UNC), a
multinational military force that was authorized by the UN Security Council to drive
the invader (North Korea) out of the Republic of Korea. As per the UN Security
Council resolution, the United States was listed as executive agent to implement the
resolution, and command UN military operations in Korea.
While the Korean War did not offer an immediate or direct threat to the territorial
integrity of the U.K. (or to any NATO member state for that matter), it did signal
to the Alliance that their de facto enemy was willing to use extra-diplomatic and
indeed coercive techniques. The reasoning logically followed that the enemy may be
willing to do so again in the future, this time perhaps at the expense of Europe. In that
sense, the Korean War altered the relationship between the East and the West and
deepened the hostilities between the two, making reconciliation nearly impossible
for the decades to come.
The war in Korea also sped up the institutionalization of the Western collective
defence system, and transformed NATO from a more political to a genuine military
organization. Before Korea, there was no significant political and military coordina-
tion and cooperation taking place among the allies. Evidence for the institutionaliza-
tion of this relationship can be found in the creation of a Supreme Allied Command
Europe (S.A.C.E.U.R.), which gave NATO its first unified and coherent military
command. The first S.A.C.E.U.R. was General Dwight Eisenhower, who was dual
hated: above all, he was the Alliance’s chief military commander and at the same

25 The following states were signatories to the Treaty: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland,

Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom, and the United States.
26 See for example John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin, 2005).
27 See Park, 1986, p. 21.
Korean War 25

time the highest military authority for the American Forces stationed in Europe.28
In 1952, the naval equivalent of the S.A.C.E.U.R., the Supreme Allied Comman-
der Atlantic (S.A.C.L.A.N.T.), was created and headquartered in Norfolk, Virginia.
S.A.C.L.A.N.T. However, it was different from S.A.C.E.U.R. in the sense that no
standing forces were associated with this command post. Nonetheless, member
states’ troops were earmarked for (naval) emergencies.
The Korean War was the true beginning of the Cold War arms race, both in terms
of conventional and nuclear weapons. Indeed, it marked the beginning of a transition
period shifting NATO’s emphasis from conventional armed forces towards nuclear
armament, also on European soil. To be sure, at that time virtually all European
members of NATO were heavily reliant on the Americans for both conventional as
well as nuclear forces.29 This was largely due to the slow economic recovery of
Western Europe from World War II as compared to the United States and Canada.
A brief statistic quickly illustrates this imbalance. In 1953, eight years after the end
of WWII, 173 million North Americans roughly tripled the economic output of 208
million citizens in NATO’s European member states.30 Bearing this in mind, U.S.
President Truman’s government made strides to ensure that the European NATO
members provided the bulk of conventional NATO forces in Europe as a deterrent
and trip-wire against a potential invasion of the U.S.S.R.31
In 1953, NATO was certain that the Alliance would lose a conventional arms race
with the U.S.S.R.,32 and therefore expedited the development of a nuclear deter-
rent. Once again, European NATO members became heavily reliant on the United
States in order to develop NATO’s nuclear capabilities. Britain, however, was one
of the two exceptions (France being the other), and had begun developing its own
nuclear weapons in 1946 due to America’s reluctance to share nuclear materials
with the U.K. As Carl Hodge33 charges, this was evidence of Britain’s importance
to European security writ large. With this in mind, Britain’s pursuit of an alliance
with the United States is clear evidence of a feeling of inferiority as compared to the
U.S.S.R. Until the end of the 1950s, the United States essentially had a monopoly
on NATO’s deployment of tactical nuclear weapons.34 However, the 1958 ‘Agree-
ment for Co-operation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence Purposes

28 See for example David J. Rothkopf, Running the World: The inside Story of the National Security

Council and the Architects of American Power, 1st ed. (New York: PublicAffairs, 2005), 63.
29 See Park, 1986, p. 28. To be clear, American nuclear forces were only stationed in several European

countries (e.g. Germany, the Netherlands); they were never “handed over” to those states’ armed
forces and thus at all times were under the control of the United States government.
30 Ismay, L. (1954). NATO: The First Five Years, 1949–1954. Bosch: Utrecht, p. 33.
31 See Park, 1986, p. 27. This small, yet important fact is often forgotten in contemporary burden

sharing debates that the Trump has put on the agenda since 2016. See Benjamin Zyla. 2015. Sharing
the Burden? NATO and its Second-Tier Powers (New York, Toronto: University of Toronto Press).
32 Park, 1986, p. 29.
33 Hodge, C.C. (2005). Atlanticism For a New Century: The Rise, Triumph and Decline of NATO.

New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall, p. 4.

34 Park, 1986, p. 31.
26 2 A Brief History of the U.K.—NATO Relationship

between the U.K. and the U.S.A. allowed for sharing nuclear materials and infor-
mation between the governments of the two countries. This solidified the U.K.’s
importance in European security affairs even more.

The Suez Crisis and Fallout

The Suez Canal crisis occurred when France and the U.K. unilaterally cooperated
with Israel to invade Egypt in order to re-open the Suez Canal to British and French
shipping after Egyptian President, Gamal Nasser, had nationalized the canal and
closed it for international shipping altogether. The Suez Canal is the shortest link
between the east and the west as compared with the Cape of Good Hope in South
Africa linking the Mediterranean and the Red sea. Following the invasion of Egypt,
America strongly condemned the action.35 While this condemnation did not damage
the Anglo-American relationship over the long-term, it did however reaffirm the
U.K.’s growing reliance on the U.S.A. in matters of war and security.36
With the 1956 Suez Crisis in mind, NATO solicited a report on the importance
of non-military coordination in NATO, which was entitled Report of the Committee
of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO. Colloquially, this is known as The
Report of the Three Wise Men, with the Wise Men being Halvard Lange (Foreign
Minister of Norway), Lester B. Pearson (Secretary of State for External Affairs,
Canada), and Gaetano Martino (Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy).37 The Report
called for greater levels of non-military cooperation amongst NATO members, as the
“two aspects of security—civil and military—[could] no longer safely be considered
in watertight compartments, either within or between nations”.38
As such, the Three Wise Men advocated the pursuit of a deeper integration of the
Alliance on many civilian issues, inter alia, science and politics.39 Specifically, in
the context of the Suez Crisis, they felt that the security role of NATO could only
be attained through cooperation between members on a multitude of levels, as “an
Alliance in which the members ignore each other’s interests or engage in political
or economic conflict, or harbour suspicions of each other, cannot be effective either
for deterrence or defence. Recent experience makes this clearer than ever before.”40
As a result of their work, the NATO Science Programme was created in 1957.
For Britain, the Suez Canal Crisis was an awakening to the inability of the country
to unilaterally exert influence abroad. However, rather than seeing this experience as

35 Peden, G.C. (2012). Suez and Britain’s Decline as a World Power. The Historical Journal, vol.

55, p. 1073.
36 Frankel J. (1975). British foreign policy, 1945–1973. London: Oxford University Press, p. 162.
37 Kaplan, L. (2006) Report of the Three Wise Men: 50 years on. NATO Review.
38 NATO. (1956). Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO.

Retrieved from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17481.htm#top, parag. 16.

39 Kaplan, L. (2006) Report of the Three Wise Men: 50 years on. NATO Review.
40 NATO, 1956, par. 9.
The Suez Crisis and Fallout 27

a reason to seek deeper security integration with its European NATO allies or even
with the evolving European Coal and Steel community, which at the time was being
developed and ultimately advanced to be one of the forerunners of the European
Union (E.U.) that we know today, Britain instead interpreted its Suez Canal crisis
experience as a way to turn towards the U.S.A. for security matters,41 and ultimately
seek a ‘special relationship’ with the Americans.

French Withdrawal

In 1966, following NATO’s turn towards nuclear weapons as well as a growing

American influence in NATO and Europe in general, President De Gaulle withdrew
French troops from NATO’s command structure. This unilateral withdrawal of some
750,000 troops from NATO’s conventional military forces placed greater importance
on the nuclear capabilities of both the U.S.A. and the U.K., which in turn upgraded
their importance and role in the alliance as the sole nuclear powers and thus providing
the foremost military deterrent of the Alliance. Nonetheless, even though French
military forces were withdrawn from NATO’s command structure, France remained
an integral part of the Alliance.42 In 2009 France decided to re-join NATO’s military
command structure yet remains outside of NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group.43

Détente

When the Americans began the process of détente in the late 1960s, this policy
change took place in the context of Britain already having re-established diplomatic
relations with the Soviet Union, and with China post-Mao.44 Similarly, with the
cooling of the bipolar tensions between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. due to détente,
as well as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and the subsequent 1972 Anti-ballistic
Missile Treaty, the context of Anglo-Soviet relations must be carefully considered,
as the United Kingdom was a major player in NATO both politically and militarily
to reach these agreements. For example, the U.K. helped to negotiate the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) between the five recognized nuclear possessors at
the time (China, France, U.K., U.S., and the U.S.S.R.). The NPT aims to prevent
the spread of nuclear weapons and eventually eliminate them altogether. With this
diplomatic success at hand, the U.K. regained great power status in the alliance,
displayed what had become a special and tight relationship with the U.S.A., and
ensured Britain’s ability to protect its nuclear status in Europe (White 1992, p. 119).

41 Hodge, 2005, p. 8.
42 Hodge, 2005, p. 10.
43 Fabius, L. (2012) France and NATO. Diplomatic Insight.
44 White, B. (1992). Britain, Détente, and Changing East-West Relations. London: Routledge. p. 39.
28 2 A Brief History of the U.K.—NATO Relationship

Further, the Harmel45 Report of 1967, called for the “maintenance of adequate
military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression,”46 as well as for a more
political Alliance “in which the underlying political issues can be solved.”47 In short,
the Harmel report advocated “defence and détente”, and made suggestions for how
to best reduce East-West tensions in the future.
At the NATO level, the alliance changed its strategy to “flexible response”48 at
the 13–14 December 1967 NATO ministerial meeting. With the French withdrawing
from NATO’s integrated command structure in 1966, the main opponent to a more
flexible NATO strategy was no longer present.49 As a result, the process of drafting
a new strategy went ahead quickly. On 7 October 1966, an informal meeting of the
NATO Military Committee revisited the threats facing NATO and re-examined allied
responses to it. Little surprising, it concluded by calling for flexible responses to meet
various contingencies. Those recommendations were then taken to NATO’s Defence
Ministers on 11 May 1967 who agreed that “the overall strategic concept for NATO
should be revised to allow NATO greater flexibility and to provide for the employment
as appropriate of one or more of direct defence, deliberate escalation and general
nuclear response, thus confronting the enemy with a credible threat of escalation in
response to an aggression below the level of a major nuclear attack.”50 In other words,
not only the element of flexibility was reiterated in NATO’s strategy, but also the idea
of escalation, a thought that was developed in greater detail in MC 14/3.51 This NATO
document then spelled out three types of military responses to aggression in case
NATO was attacked externally: first, to escalate NATO’s responses to the level the
enemy chose to fight on. Second, the concept of deliberate escalation added various
steps “to defeat aggression by raising but where possible controlling, the scope and
intensity of combat.”52 This included retaining a first strike nuclear capability or
selective nuclear strikes on interdiction targets. Finally, the ultimate military response
was the massive use of nuclear weapons against military and urban-industrial targets,
which was seen as the ultimate deterrent. However, MC 14/3 was supplemented and

45 This report was named after Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel.
46 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, North Atlantic Council Ministerial Communiqué, “The
Future Tasks of the Alliance—Report of the Council,” Brussels, 13–14 December 1967.
47 Ibid.
48 Following the Harmel Report on NATO doctrine, the North Atlantic Council formally adopted

the strategy of flexible response. The flexible response strategy allows the Alliance to engage in
some degree of conventional warfare before and escalation into nuclear exchange is being pursued.
Flexible response, before it became an official NATO strategy, was a new doctrine developed by
US Secretary of State Dean Rusk in 1961 in a report for the Kennedy administration entitled “A
Review of North Atlantic Problems for the Future.”
49 For an excellent discussion about the withdrawal of France from NATO’s integrated command

structure see Michael M. Harrison, The Reluctant Ally: France and Atlantic Security (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981).
50 Defence Planning Committee DPD/D(67)23, “Decisions of the Defence Planning Committee in

Ministerial Session 11 May 1967.

51 Military Committee 14/3, “Overall Strategic Concept for the Defence of the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization Area.”
52 Ibid.
Détente 29

specified by MC 48/3, which listed “measures to implement the strategic concept for
the defence of the NATO area.”53 It described the military requirements for defending
NATO, including improved intelligence capabilities and early warning, increased
readiness and flexibility, improved air defence, reinforcement forces, mobilization
and better logistics. Britain played an active role in drafting this new strategy and
developing these two NATO documents.
Flexible Response was tested shortly after it was adopted as NATO’s new strategy.
On 20 August 1968 Warsaw Pact forces overthrew a moderate Czech government,
and Soviet tanks moved through the streets of Prague. NATO closely monitored
the events in Czechoslovakia, but did not put its forces on high alert, in spite of the
fact that NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (S.A.C.E.U.R) had asked for
additional conventional forces in Europe for protection.54

The Fall of the U.S.S.R

When Mikhail Gorbachev took power in the Soviet Union, he introduced policies of
glasnost (transparency) and perestroika (economic opening), which put the Soviet
Union on a less confrontational course with the West. However, while this significant
policy change was noticed among Western allies, they were reluctant to show tri-
umphalism over their former enemy. In the late 1980s, it was visible that Soviet impe-
rialism had slowly come to an end: the U.S.S.R. had withdrawn from Afghanistan
by 1989, and the cohesion of the U.S.S.R. and its satellite states in Eastern Europe
was crumbling. International disarmament agreements were an important milestone
in achieving these ends. In 1987, Gorbachev had responded favorably to an arms
reduction treaty proposed by the United States55 and offered to reduce Soviet short
range SS-12 and SS-23 missiles. In June that same year, NATO and Warsaw Pact
countries approved the Intermediate–range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which elim-
inated all intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe and thus contributed to the
reduction of (military) tensions in Europe.56 In total, the Soviet Union destroyed
1,750 nuclear missiles; the U.S. eliminated 850.57

53 Ibid.
54 See for example Tony Judt, Post War: A History of Europe Since 1945 (New York: Penguin Books,

2005), 441–447.
55 It needs to be noted that the INF issue has been around since the NATO 1979 ‘dual-track’ decision

to deploy Cruise Missiles and Pershing II missiles in Europe. After they arrived in Europe in 1983,
the Soviets left the INF talks. They were finally revived in March 1985 almost simultaneously with
Gorbachev taking power in the Kremlin.
56 The INF treaty was officially signed on 8 December 1987 in Washington by Mikhail Gorbachev

and Ronald Reagan. The treaty eliminated all INF systems of missiles with a range of 500–5,500 km.
The agreement also provided verification mechanisms. It is precisely this treaty that the Trump
administration declared to withdraw from on 20 October 2018.
57 Young and Kent, International Relations since 1945: A Global History, 585.
30 2 A Brief History of the U.K.—NATO Relationship

With the fall of the Berlin Wall, East and West Germany were united into the
Federal Republic of Germany. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, and more
particularly with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991, European states had
received promising assurances against full-scale armed conflict in Europe in over a
century.58 The two main threats to European security, namely a divided Germany
and the existential and security threat posed by the U.S.S.R., had both dissipated59
and thus questioned the raison d’être of NATO.
NATO was believed to have three options, namely to dissolve, to shift emphasis
on becoming an increasing global political actor, or to continue as a robust military
alliance. Robert Kaplan, a strong supporter of the realist foreign policy tradition
in international affairs, had a clear preference by recommending that “[w]ithout
the Soviet menace to serve as a unifying glue, there seemed to be ample reason to
recommend its dissolution.”60 NATO’s Secretary General Manfred Wörner, however,
had a different view:
I am experiencing the fortieth anniversary of NATO rather like the manager of a successful
football team which has just won the league title. His initial instinct is to celebrate the
season’s glories. But instead his mind is inevitably on the team’s promotion to the higher
division. How will the team cope with the new, more demanding environment where not only
the rewards, but also the challenges, are so much greater? Such is life. The more successful
we are, the more new tasks we find ourselves taking on.61

In the end, NATO opted for a mix of two of the three options: on the one hand and
in light of fiscal deficits in many European member states (including Britain) that
equaled calls for increasing defence spending with suicide, allies decided to cash in
the so-called peace-dividend. In other words, they decided to reduce their defence
spending and thus the amount of NATO forces.62 On the other hand they agreed
to maintain their nuclear deterrent and upkeep their conventional forces. They were
also supposed to be modernized for being deployed in crisis management operations,
particularly those designed to assist fragile and conflict-affected states.
In spite of the fact that the Berlin Wall had crumbled, the Soviet Union still main-
tained sufficient residual military power to pose a conventional threat to Europe.63
Moreover, following the collapse of the U.S.S.R. in 1989, the security situation in

58 Hodge, 2005, p. 27.

59 McCalla, R.B. (1996). NATO’s Persistence After the Cold War. International Organization, 50(3),

p. 448.
60 Kaplan, NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance. Similar arguments were

offered by Maersheimer.
61 “The future Tasks of the Alliance,” Speech by NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner to the

Quadrangular Forum, Brussels, 1 April 1989.

62 What is often forgotten in this discussion is that according to a NATO Parliamentary Report, by

1999 the United States had also reduced its forwardly deployed forces in Europe from 325,000 to
about 100,000 troops while European members of the Alliance reduced them by more than 500,000
in total (NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Report NATO Enlargement, International Secretariat,
October 2001, Article 4). This accounted for 30–40% reductions of troops of all three services in
the NATO Alliance.
63 McCalla, 1996, p. 451.
The Fall of the U.S.S.R 31

much of Eastern Europe was still in flux and uncertain. Ultimately, NATO extended
a ‘hand of friendship’ to those states and aspired to eventually bring them into the
alliance as new members.64 At the same time, this ‘new’ Europe also held some
economic prospects for British businesses in central and eastern Europe. Thus, the
greatest danger to Britain was a re-nationalization of European societies, which then
had the potential of renewing tensions and conflicts all over Europe.
A further shift in NATO’s policy following the collapse of the Soviet Union was
the creation of Rapid Response Forces (RRF) at the London Summit in 1990. These
were relatively small contingents of forces designed to be deployed to help manage
intra- rather than inter state conflicts.65 Of the initial four of such units, two of
them were comprised solely of British forces, with two additional units supplied
by Italy, Turkey and Greece, along an assortment of European countries, including
Britain. The United States would provide the tactical airlift capabilities for the troops,
which is something that the Europeans had not acquired for historical reasons as the
Cold War played out in Europe and thus largely negated the necessity for tactical
airlift capabilities. As part of the RRF, NATO envisioned to have 5,000 troops more
or less on standby to be able to respond to a crisis situation within 72 h notice.
A Rapid Reaction Corp for Allied Command Europe was established under the
leadership of the United Kingdom and supported by a multinational headquarter66 to
coordinate the efficient deployment of the forces.67 This was an obvious signaling
of the importance of the British to NATO (and vice versa), as they were contributing
significant resources to the development of the NRF and the alliance in general.68
The London Summit also gave NATO a new conventional force posture, mov-
ing away from forward defence towards a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons.
About 80% of NATO’s stockpile of sub-strategic nuclear weapons were slated to be
destroyed. Also, NATO planned to reduce the overall size of its forces as well as
their level of readiness and instead increase the flexibility, adaptability and mobility
of its forces.

64 Ibid.
65 London Declaration on A Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, issued by the Heads of State and

Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, London 5–6 July 1990,
Article 14.
66 Kaplan, L. (2004). NATO Divided. NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance. Connecticut:

Praeger, p. 112.
67 This concept of NATO’s new force structure was institutionalized in the Combined Joint Task

Force Concept (CJTF).

68 For a detailed discussion of NATO burden sharing at the time see Benjamin Zyla, Sharing the

Burden? NATO and its Second-Tier powers. Toronto, New York: University of Toronto Press, 2015.
32 2 A Brief History of the U.K.—NATO Relationship

Gulf War

On 2 August 1990 Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait. That same day, the UN Secu-
rity Council discussed the matter and passed Resolution 660 demanding the uncon-
ditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops.69 Four days later, the Council passed another,
more forceful resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and imposed eco-
nomic sanctions against Iraq.70 The ground invasion to liberate Kuwait started on
16 January 1991 after Iraq had failed to comply with UN demands to withdraw its
troops from the country. The coalition of the willing, comprised inter alia of 12 of
the then 16 members of NATO (including Britain),71 successfully halted Saddam
Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait.
Even though the liberation of Kuwait was a UN mission, the Gulf War also had a
significant impact on the NATO Alliance and Britain’s foreign and defence policy in
particular. It reminded the U.K. that despite the absence of a threat from the Soviet
Union, the world was still an unstable place where violent conflicts were likely to
occur. Indeed, it underlined a demand for military capabilities.
The U.K. answered the call for coalition forces mandated by UN Security Council
Resolution 661 with Operation Granby. A total of 53,462 members of the British
Armed Forces were deployed during the conflict at a total cost of £2.434 billion. At
least £2.049 billion of that amount was paid for by Iraq’s neighbouring countries,
including Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.72
The Gulf War demonstrated what comparative advantages NATO possessed in
international security affairs. Even though NATO as an international defence Alliance
was not formally involved in liberating Kuwait from Iraqi forces, NATO military
assets and planning capabilities were used by the coalition of the willing to plan and
execute the operation in the Gulf. During the liberation of Kuwait, and particularly
during the sea and air operations around Kuwait and Iraq, the allies depended heavily
on NATO and its common operational procedures, habits, techniques, and practices of
cooperation—all of which facilitated interoperability amongst the various coalition
partners, and indeed made a rapid build-up in and deployment to the Gulf possible.
This would not have been achieved without making use of NATO’s infrastructure in
Europe.
While NATO territory was not directly invaded, it was nonetheless threatened,
because Turkey, as a NATO ally, shares a border with Iraq. The Turkish government
officially requested military assistance from its NATO allies for the defence of its
territory, which NATO members delivered.73

69 S/RES/660, 2 August 1990.

70 S/RES/660, 6 August 1990.
71 To be sure, this was not a NATO mission.
72 £200 million of British equipment was lost or written off.
73 Turkey shared a border with Iraq and its government was anxious that the conflict would spread

into Turkey.
Partnership for Peace 33

Partnership for Peace

In order to quell Russian fears that the NATO enlargement process would intervene
or even threaten Russia’s territorial sovereignty, the alliance developed the so-called
‘Partnership for Peace’ programme (PfP). PfP became available to former members of
the Warsaw pact in 1994, and aimed to ensure that all countries were equal partners in
pursuit of European peace, and to affirm the Alliance’s desire to work cooperatively.74
Britain played a very active role in PfP, in part because it had significant benefits for
the U.K.: it provided (1) transparency of and democratic control for the armed forces
of central and eastern European states; (2) a network of military and defence related
issues; (3) cooperation between central and eastern European states and NATO; and
(4) it specific confidence-building measures to reduce (military) tensions in Europe.
Specifically, the PfP program was announced by U.S. Secretary of Defence Les
Aspin in Travemünde, Germany, in October 1993 and formally accepted on 10 Jan-
uary 1994 during the NATO Brussels Summit. It was a comprehensive cooperative
security program in which NATO provided detailed advise of how to run an effec-
tive civil administration and how to organize and structure the armed forces.75 To
this end, a Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC)76 was established at SHAPE in
Mons, Belgium. Representatives of PfP countries met with NATO allies on a regular
basis and fully participated in discussions and deliberations of the NAC and NATO’s
military bodies. The PfP program stressed transparency as the highest objective, as
a confidence building measure, and dialogue and cooperation for joint actions. It
was designed as a reach out program seeking cooperation, mutual understanding,
and transparency in defence planning among all of its member states. It intended to
create a real, personalized partnership between NATO allies and aspiring member
states.77

NATO Enlargement

In the fall of 1990 Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic voiced their intentions
to establish closer ties with NATO. To achieve this goal, they formed an informal
Alliance at their meeting in Visegrad, Hungary in September 1990 to seek greater of

74 Asmus, R.D. (2002) Opening NATO’s Door. New York: Columbia University Press, p. 54.
75 The White House, National Security Directive 23, September 22 1989. The Bush Library, F
89–191.
76 For a greater discussion about the role of the PCC see G. Lange, “The PCC—a New Player in the

Development of Relations between NATO and Partner Nations,” NATO Review 3 (May 1995).
77 Member of the PfP program as of 2007 are the following countries: Albania, Armenia, Austria,

Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland,
Georgia, Hungary, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Kyrghyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Montene-
gro, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.
34 2 A Brief History of the U.K.—NATO Relationship

cooperation amongst themselves and vis-a-vis NATO.78 Allies, including the U.K.
quickly realized that the process of NATO enlargement is a useful political tool
for helping central and eastern European states to establish liberal principles of
democratic governance (e.g. democracy, rule of law, freedom etc.). But Britain was
not blind and clearly driven by functionalist calculations. It quickly understood that
helping new and emerging democracies in central and eastern Europe was not only
good for promoting peace and security in these countries; it was also lucrative for
the British economy. Moreover, it induced and rewarded economic change, fostered
private sector relationships and had a number of multiplier effects (e.g. stimulation
of direct trade with the U.K.).
On the other side of the table, states from central and eastern Europe essentially had
two options: they could either form a new buffer zone between the West and Russia,
or they could become an integral part of the NATO alliance. NATO enlargement
was initially met with disdain by the Americans because they felt that NATO was
already well placed and equipped to protect Europe. Due to the poor state of their
armed forces, adding Eastern European countries to the alliance would most likely
add an unnecessary burden.79 On top, it was expected to be expensive. The fear of
weakening NATO was complimented by the fear that adding any additional members
may signal an open-ended expansionism to Russia, and thereby reignite Cold War
tensions.80 By 1993 the British position became to maintain a ‘grey area’ East of
Europe rather than incorporating Eastern European countries into the Alliance, which
would essentially mean extending NATO’s Article 5 provisions to them.81
However, throughout negotiating the enlargement process NATO allies, includ-
ing Britain, quickly realized that only the U.S. was able to push its allies towards
extending the invitation to selected countries from Central and Eastern Europe. In
Washington, the issue of enlargement did not gain momentum until Richard Hol-
brooke, then U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs
in the State Department, took office in 1994.82 When the United States made the
political decision later in 1995/1996 to expand the Alliance,83 Britain effectively had
no other chance than endorsing that decision. At the same time, the enlargement
decision helped to keep the Americans engaged in the alliance, which was also in
Britain’s (security) interest.
In addition to NATO, a number of other security organizations were part of this
process of promoting peace and security in Europe. In addition to the E.U. (see

78 See Asmus, 2002. As a result, these three countries are often referred to as the Visegrad countries.
79 Bilinsky, Y. (1999). Endgame in NATO’s Enlargement: The Baltic States and Ukraine. Connecti-

cut: Praeger, p. 1.
80 Ibid., p. 3.
81 Solomon, G.B. (1998). The NATO Enlargement Debate, 1990–1997: Blessings of Liberty.

Connecticut: Praeger, p. 31.

82 He held this position until 1996.
83 Brent Scowcroft, “Whither the Atlantic Community” Issue Brief, (01–02), (Washington, DC: The

Forum for International Policy, March 21, 2001).

NATO Enlargement 35

further below),84 it was hoped that the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE) would provide a wide, inclusive framework for looser forms of
cooperation. The advantage of ‘using’ the OSCE over NATO or the E.U. was that
Russia is a member of it, and thus political consultations and exchanges were easily
possible and could be dealt with ‘in-house’ so to speak.
In 1999 the first set of states, including Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic,
acceded to the Washington Treaty and thus became official members of NATO.
Since then, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia
have joined (all in 2004), as well as Albania and Croatia (in 2009) (NATO 2016).

Bosnia

The conflict that began in the former Republic of Yugoslavia in 1994 would prove
to be the impetus to the first significant explicitly NATO mission beyond the borders
of NATO country. While the conflict particularly in Bosnia had started to evolve
since 1992, NATO’s intervention was largely halted by American trepidation, which
was based on Washington’s view of the conflict being a purely European issue.85
Moreover, there was a significant danger that the evolving crisis in the Balkans had
the potential to seriously undermine European security and revive Cold War-like
East-West tensions.86 The transatlantic relationship was also put under strain.87 For
these reasons, the only resource available to the Europeans was to join the UN-led
peacekeeping mission UNPROFOR (Table 2.1).
The U.K. sent a total of 3424 forces, which represented slightly more than 8%
of the total UN force contingent that initially deployed in a traditional peacekeeping
role.88 The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) came into existence
in March 1992 in three UN protected areas in Croatia, particularly in eastern and
western Slavonia, and the Krajina. It was authorized by the UN Security Council to
demilitarize the UNPAs and to provide protection for the population living in these
zones. It had three main objectives: first, to facilitate and provide security for the
delivery of humanitarian aid; second, contain the conflict through safe-zones and

84 Although the E.U. at the time was primarily a political and economic entity, it also makes an

important contribution to European security. See Richard Holbrooke, “America: European Power,”
Foreign Affairs 74 (March/April 1995): 46.
85 See Kaplan, 2004, p. 117; see also Lenard J. Cohen, Alexander Moens, and Allen G. Sens, NATO

and European Security: Alliance Politics from the End of the Cold War to the Age of Terrorism,
Humanistic Perspectives on International Relations (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2003).
86 See for example Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” or Mearsheimer,

“Back to the Future: Instability after the Cold War.”

87 A good discussion can be found in Sophie Vanhoonacker, The Bush Administration (1989–1993)

and the Development of a European Security Identity (Aldershot, Hampshire, England; Burlington,
VT: Ashgate, 2001), 147–204.
88 Source: Department of Public Information, United Nations, September 1996.
36 2 A Brief History of the U.K.—NATO Relationship

Table 2.1 Force deployments of NATO members to UNPROFOR

NATO states contributions to UNPROFOR
Country Police Troops Observers Total % Rank
France 41 4493 11 4545 24.23 1
U.K. 0 3405 19 3424 18.25 2
Canada 45 2091 15 2151 11.47 3
Netherlands 10 1803 48 1861 9.92 4
Turkey 0 0 1,464 1464 7.80 5
Spain 0 1267 19 1286 6.86 6
Belgium 0 1038 6 1044 5.57 7
Norway 31 826 39 896 4.78 8
U.S. 0 0 748 748 3.99 9
Denmark 45 1230 14 1289 6.87 10
Portugal 39 0 12 51 0.27 11
Total 211 16153 2395 18759 100 11
Source Military Balance 1991–1995

a no-fly zone; and third, to negotiate cease-fires with the belligerents.89 It failed
miserably on all accounts.90
With UNPROFOR failing to stop the mass atrocities and even genocide (e.g. in
the city of Srebrenica in 1995), NATO had to step in. NATO’s robust diplomatic
and peace enforcement operations in Yugoslavia heralded a more interventionist
doctrine of international affairs that was fully supported by Britain. Indeed, it set a
precedent of a justification of intervening into the domestic affairs of a sovereign
state based on humanitarian grounds.91 In reaction to Bosnian Serb’s shelling of the
city of Sarajevo the alliance finally intervened militarily in 1994, and launched a 21-
day air and artillery strike campaign known as Operation Deliberate Force.92 NATO
once again intervened in 1995 in reaction to the massacre off Muslim Bosniaks at
the UN safe-zone in Srebrenica,93 once again reacting with a 22 day campaign of
shelling and mortar attacks against the Bosnian Serb force, effectively ending the
war in Bosnia.94 For the alliance, this was a crucial moment for two reasons. First,
it underlined its raison d’être; and second, it underlined the effectiveness of its new

89 See for example “Fighting escalates, UN role in question,” United Nations Chronicle vol. 32, no.

3 (September 1995).
90 Kaplan, 2004, p. 118.
91 Later, this became known as the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine (R2P).
92 Behnke, A. (2013). NATO’s Security Discourse After the Cold War: Representing the West. New

York: Routledge, p. 137.

93 Bono, G. (2003). NATO’s ‘Peace-Enforcement’ Tasks and ‘Policy Communities’: 1990–1999.

Aldershot: Ashgate, p. 114.

94 Kaplan, 2004, p. 120.
Bosnia 37

Table 2.2 Force

NATO troop contributions to IFOR
deployments of NATO
members to IFOR 1996–1997 Country # of troops % of total Rank
Belgium 420 0.8 14
Canada 1024 2.0 9
Denmark 807 1.5 12
France 7500 14.4 3
Germany 4000 7.7 4
Greece 1000 1.9 10
Iceland 0 0.0 16
Italy 2200 4.2 5
Luxembourg 0 0.0 15
Netherlands 2000 3.8 6
Norway 750 1.4 13
Portugal 900 1.7 11
Spain 1400 2.7 7
Turkey 1300 2.5 8
U.K. 10500 20.1 2
U.S.A. 18,400 35.2 1
Total 52201 100 15
Source Military Balance 1996/1997

crisis management doctrine and thus justified the restructuring of its armed forces to
make them more agile and effective to operate in these missions.95
The Dayton Peace Accords reached on Nov. 21, 1995 finally brought about a
peace agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. It also replaced UNPROFOR
with NATO’s more robust Implementation Force (IFOR) (Tables 2.2 and 2.3).
The IFOR mission was authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 1031 of
15 December 1995. It authorized to use force under chapter VII of the UN charter.
All NATO as well as some non-NATO countries contributed to the mission and by
early 1996 some 50,000 troops from 15 NATO nations, as well as 10,000 troops from
sixteen non-NATO, had deployed their forces to Bosnia to take part in Operation Joint
Endeavor.96 Specifically, IFOR was tasked to monitor the border between Croatia
and Bosnia and their four-kilometer wide zones of separation. IFOR troops literally
interpositioned themselves in between the belligerents and thus physically separated

95 Behnke, 2013, p. 138.

96 IFOR AFSOUTH Fact Sheet, 1 March 1996. The list of non-NATO countries participating in
the IFOR mission include countries from the NATO PfP countries such as Albania, Austria, Czech
Republic, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Sweden, and the
Ukraine. It was the first time that Russian forces served in a NATO operation and were under the
tactical control of the United States led multinational division. NATO’s Combined Joint Task Force
concept allowed for a smooth integration of the forces.
Table 2.3 Force contributions to SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia, 1997–2004
38

Country/Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total 1997–2004 % of total force
U.S.A. 9,128 8,050 8,510 4,600 7,100 2,000 1,800 839 42,027 20.4
U.K. 5,403 4,900 4,500 6,200 2,950 1,700 1,400 1,100 28,153 13.7
France 3,646 3,300 3,000 8,280 2,200 2,200 1,500 1,500 25,626 12.4
Germany 2,603 2,600 2,738 7,669 1,900 1,700 1,000 1,000 21,210 10.3
Italy 1,825 2,500 2,313 8,040 1,500 1,600 1,500 979 20,257 9.8
Spain 1,555 1,600 1,600 2,500 1,200 1,200 1,200 935 11,790 5.7
Canada 990 961 2,382 2,110 1,201 1,600 1,600 400 11,244 5.5
Turkey 1,522 1,300 1,300 2,250 1,201 1,200 1,200 1,200 11,173 5.4
Netherlands 1,059 1,220 1,220 2,717 1,180 1,000 1,070 1,000 10,466 5.1
Denmark 662 600 630 1,325 346 365 365 4 4,297 2.1
Norway 593 743 700 1,425 126 125 125 125 3,962 1.9
Belgium 135 550 550 1,450 660 450 4 4 3,803 1.8
Portugal 320 351 355 675 331 330 330 330 3,022 1.5
Poland** N/A N/A 450 1,053 302 287 287 287 2,666 1.3
Greece 218 250 250 680 250 250 250 250 2,398 1.2
Czech Republic** N/A N/A 561 720 491 7 8 7 1,794 0.9
Hungary** N/A N/A 314 639 314 159 159 154 1,739 0.8
Luxembourg 22 25 23 23 23 23 23 23 185 0.1
Slovenia* 158 158 0.1
Romania* 106 106 0.1
Lithuania* 97 97 0.0
(continued)
2 A Brief History of the U.K.—NATO Relationship
Table 2.3 (continued)
Country/Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total 1997–2004 % of total force
Bosnia

Slovakia* 29 29 0.0
Estonia* 2 2 0.0
Bulgaria* 1 1 0.0
Latvia* 1 1 0.0
Iceland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0
Total 29,681 28,950 31,396 52,356 23,275 16,196 13,821 10,531 206,206 100.0
Source Military Balance 1997–2004; N/A1 = these specific numbers could not be provided as not all NATO states broke them down according to individual
missions, i.e. Bosnia + Croatia etc
*This state joined NATO on 29 March 2004
**This state joined the alliance on 12 March 1999
39
40 2 A Brief History of the U.K.—NATO Relationship

them.97 In short, NATO forces were tasked, as Douglas MacGregor noted, “to prevent
a resumption of ethnic cleansing and fighting, and to formalize the creation of a
Muslim-dominated multiethnic Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.”98
Authorized by Security Council Resolution 1088 (12 Dec. 1996) IFOR was
replaced with a Stabilization Force (SFOR). The U.K. initially contributed 5,403
forces to this stabilization mission, and after the U.S. was the second largest force
contributor. It also shared a rotational divisional headquarter with the Canadians
and the Dutch. As table 2.3 shows, the U.K. was the second largest force provider,
which indicates how important it considered this mission. SFOR troops were tasked
to implement the Dayton Peace agreement, as well as ensuring the civilian elements
therein, such as supporting the international police task force, providing humani-
tarian assistance, ensuring the safe returns of refugees and displaced people, and
catching war criminals.

Kosovo

Slobodan Milošević came to power in 1987 while campaigning on the promise to

reintegrate the Albanian dominated province of Kosovo back into Serbia. He Presi-
dent of Serbia from 1989 to 1997 and subsequently President of the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia from 1997 to 2000. Kosovo’s Serb minorities had raised concerns that
they were discriminated against by the ethnically Albanian government and thus
sought the help of the Serbian leadership. Milošević responded and introduced mar-
tial law in Kosovo while replacing ethnic-Albanian officials with Serbs. It was in this
environment that the conflict in Kosovo was evolving. Following the end of hostilities
in Bosnia, the militant Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) fought for Kosovo to gain
independence from Serbia. In reaction, President Milošević began to systematically
cleanse ethnic Kosovars, which with more than 90% of the population were predom-
inantly Muslims.99 In total, the conflict between the KLA and Serb forces resulted in
more than 400,000 refugees and killed more than 2,500 people.100 NATO’s interven-
tion in Kosovo in the 78-day air campaign was carried out without the approval of
the UN Security Council,101 and therefore marked a watershed in the history of the
alliance, because it was the first time that NATO had used force without international
legal approval (Table 2.4).

97 Important to note here is that a 2,200-strong Russian contingent was deployed as part of IFOR.
98 Douglas A. Macgregor, “The Balkan Limits to Power and Principle,” Orbis 45, no. 1 (Winter
2001): 95.
99 Kaplan, 2004, p. 125.
100 Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress, Kosovo and US Policy, 4 December 2001,

RL31053, 2.
101 Indeed, NATO intervened without an approval of the UN Security Council. It was thus considered

illegal. However, the Council later retroactively endorsed the intervention.

Table 2.4 Force deployments of NATO members to KFOR, 2002–2013
Country/Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total % of
Kosovo

2002–2013 total
force
Germany 4,600 3,100 3,900 3,900 3,150 3,000 2,279 2,249 1,507 1,451 1,249 685 31,070 19.92
Italy 4,200 3,780 2,530 2,471 2,280 2,280 2,280 2,192 1,409 583 574 580 25,159 16.13
France 5,200 3,800 2,900 2,400 2,455 2,455 1,830 1,830 807 303 337 320 24,637 15.79
U.S.A. 5,100 2,250 1,800 1,800 1,801 1,745 1,640 1,492 1,480 783 760 669 21,320 13.67
Greece 1,700 1,700 1,700 1,700 1,262 1,429 742 744 366 207 118 119 11,787 7.56
Turkey 940 940 940 940 940 467 940 544 465 357 393 394 8,260 5.29
U.K. 2,200 1,400 1,400 1,400 400 200 150 164 5 1 2 1 7,323 4.69
Spain 1,300 1,300 800 800 749 749 627 620 3 3 0 0 6,951 4.46
Poland 574 574 574 574 312 312 312 271 227 295 117 235 4,377 2.81
Czech 400 409 408 410 500 501 500 400 321 107 7 8 3,971 2.55
Republic
Belgium 800 500 500 500 420 420 420 195 99 0 0 0 3,854 2.47
Hungary 325 325 294 294 484 268 484 317 241 245 195 219 3,691 2.37
Denmark 540 540 370 371 364 320 363 311 188 35 35 35 3,472 2.23
Portugal 313 313 313 313 308 308 296 253 279 160 150 182 3,188 2.04
Canada 800 800 800 3 3 9 8 8 5 5 9 5 2,455 1.57
Norway 980 980 60 60 6 6 86 25 6 3 3 3 2,218 1.42
Slovenia 6 2 2 2 92 158 92 360 387 318 308 314 2,041 1.31
Romania 221 226 226 226 150 146 153 150 145 58 59 67 1,827 1.17
(continued)
41
Table 2.4 (continued)
42

Country/Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total % of
2002–2013 total
force
Netherlands 1,450 0 0 0 0 4 1 9 10 7 7 7 1,495 0.96
Slovakia 40 100 100 100 111 132 134 196 146 141 0 0 1,200 0.77
Luxembourg 26 26 26 26 23 26 23 23 29 22 22 23 295 0.19
Lithuania 29 30 26 30 30 32 30 34 36 0 0 0 277 0.18
Bulgaria 0 0 0 0 46 46 46 51 10 10 10 11 230 0.15
Estonia 0 0 98 2 25 26 28 30 1 1 1 2 214 0.14
Latvia 15 11 30 12 10 9 18 19 0 0 0 0 124 0.08
Croatia 0 20 20 26 23 89 0.06
Albania 0 2 4 9 14 29 0.02
Iceland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00
Total 33,761 25,109 21,801 20,339 17,927 17,055 15,490 14,496 8,194 5,119 4,391 3,916 187,598 100
Sources 2010–2013: NATO’s placemats. 2002–2009: IISS The Military Balance
2 A Brief History of the U.K.—NATO Relationship
Kosovo 43

Subsequently, a UN approved Kosovo Force (KFOR) peace enforcement mission

was set up to monitor and control the compliance of the Serbian regime with the
international peace agreement, as well as help demining the country and ensuring
the safe return of refugees and internally displaced people of all ethnicities—that
is—Serbs, Bosniacs, Roma, Turks, and Albanians (the latter accounted for nearly
90% of the total population of Kosovo).102 The British Prime Minister at the time,
Tony Blair, had openly campaigned amongst his NATO colleagues for the use of
ground troops, in spite of an absence of a clear UN endorsement.”103

9/11

The attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001 changed the nature of
transatlantic affairs forever. It marked the first time in its history that NATO invoked
the collective defence clause in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.104 Britain was
particularly fervent in their support of the U.S.A. in the aftermath of 9/11. It also
strongly endorsed invoking Article 5 of the Washington Treaty (the collective defence
clause), and took part in what became a full-blown counterinsurgency campaign
against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan (see next paragraph) that was known to
have harboured, trained, and aided some of the al-Qaeda members that helped carry-
ing out the attacks.105 Moving into Afghanistan and eventually acquiring responsibil-
ity for NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) underscored NATO’s
increasingly global role and presence beyond traditional NATO territory.106 This
fitted nicely with the U.K.’s as well as America’s own role perception as a global
actor.107

Afghanistan

Invoking Article 5 of the Washington Treaty led to the military invasion of Iraq in the
fall of 2001. In this invasion, over 50 countries made contributions to the American-
lead counterinsurgengy Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) that ousted the Taliban
regime. This was a US-led coalition of the willing that mostly consisted of special

102 Congressional Research Service, Issue Brief for Congress, “Kosovo and Macedonia: US and
Allied Military Operations,” July 8, 2003, 1.
103 Nossal and Roussel, “Canada and the Kosovo War: The Happy Follower,” 183.
104 Kaplan, 2004, p. 134.
105 Kaplan, 2004, p. 136.
106 Behnke, 2013, p. 146.
107 See Claudia Major and Nicolai von Ondarza. “Kein «Global Britain» nach dem Brexit: Der Brexit

schwächt die britische Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik—eine bilaterale Einbindung ist dennoch im
deutschen Interesse,” SWP Aktuell No. 29, May 2019, p. 1.
44 2 A Brief History of the U.K.—NATO Relationship

forces. It saw widespread support from NATO allies, as it was in line with Article
51 of the UN Charter.108 However, NATO was not officially involved in the conflict
until 2003 with transferring the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) from
the UN to NATO.109
As shown in Table 2.5, from the beginning of the American led coalition in
Afghanistan, the British were at the forefront, second only to America in terms of
their troop contributions, having at the peak close to 10,000 troops in Afghanistan.110
British Prime Minister at the time, Tony Blair, has since justified Britain’s involve-
ment noting that “we [the British] had to be there at the outset with a clear and
unequivocal demonstration of support. I believed in the alliance with America. I
thought its maintenance and enhancement a core objective of British policy”.111
This demonstrates the perceived importance of British involvement for the special
relationship with America.112 It also undoubtedly strengthened the perceptions of
NATO as a key to collective defence in the Euro-Atlantic area and strengthened the
Anglo-American special relationship.
With NATO taking over the responsibilities for ISAF, the mission transformed
from purely focusing on reconstruction after the ousting of the Taliban regime towards
one concentrating on stabilizing and state-building113 —that is to help the Afghan
government to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of its institutions and thus to
increase their legitimacy.114

Iraq

NATO did not have, nor did it approve, any role in the American-led (and British
supported) invasion of Iraq in 2003. Instead, the Alliance evoked Article 4 of the
Washington Treaty, and offered some preventative and protective measures to Turkey
(also a NATO member) in the event that the conflict in Iraq would spill over into
Turkey.115 This lack of NATO support for the American led intervention in Iraq
that was widely considered illegal demonstrates that dissenting voices inside the

108 Ballard, J.R., Lamm, D.W., & Wood, J.K. (2012). From Kabul to Baghdad and Back: The U.S.

at War in Afghanistan and Iraq. Maryland: Naval Institute Press, p. 2.

109 Behnke, 2013, p. 166.
110 Joshi, S. (2015). Assessing Britain’s Role in Afghanistan. Asian Survey, vol. 55, p. 420.
111 Blair, T. (2011). A Journey. London: Arrow, p. 352.
112 Cyr, Arthur I. “Special Relationships: Brexit and Transatlantic Security,” Parameters 48(1) Spring

2018, pp. 85–93.

113 Behnke, 2013, p. 167.
114 OECD DAC. (2007, April). Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and

Situations. Paris: OECD; OECD DAC. (2008). Concepts and Dilemmas of State Building in Fragile
States (Discussion Paper). Paris: OECD. Retrieved from http://www.oecd.org/development/incaf/
41100930.pdf.
115 NATO (2015). NATO and the 2003 campaign against Iraq (Archived). Retrieved from http://

www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_51977.htm.
Table 2.5 Force deployments of NATO members to ISAF in Afghanistan
Iraq

Country/Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total % of % of Rank
2003–2012 total change
2007–10
U.S.A. 67 67 67 89 15150 19.406 27.830 77490 90000 90000 320.166 58.5 494.1 1
U.K. 300 315 315 4300 6539 8.326 8.587 9500 9500 9500 57.182 10.4 45.3 2
Germany 2300 1909 1909 2800 3031 3.400 3.664 4401 4930 4187 32.530 5.9 38.1 3
Italy 650 491 990 1860 2239 2.427 2.477 3370 3871 3959 22.335 4.1 76.8 4
Canada 1900 1576 1576 2300 2363 2536 2.826 2867 2115 811 20.869 3.8 −65.7 5
France 500 565 565 742 1020 2.225 2.891 3770 3962 2653 18.894 3.5 160.0 6
Poland 0 22 22 3 808 1.111 1.769 2441 2544 2226 10.947 2.0 175.5 7
Turkey 1400 161 315 825 1093 776 733 1773 1814 1340 10.230 1.9 22.6 8
Netherlands 610 153 153 1200 1754 1.747 1.826 917 190 407 8.957 1.6 −76.8 9
Spain 350 125 125 572 655 776 811 1432 1513 1520 7.879 1.4 132.2 10
Romania N/A** 32 32 550 624 653 903 1431 1848 1773 7.846 1.4 184.2 11
Denmark 50 50 185 106 457 723 700 746 750 654 4.420 0.8 43.1 12
Belgium 165 250 250 301 320 388 456 541 519 439 3.630 0.7 37.2 13
Norway 30 147 147 433 472 486 504 435 416 376 3.446 0.6 −20.5 14
Bulgaria N/A** 0 34 37 270 440 524 524 604 580 3.013 0.6 114.8 15
Czech 133 19 56 17 196 361 443 483 532 491 2.732 0.5 149.9 16
Republic
Hungary 0 130 130 187 211 229 326 404 434 430 2.481 0.5 103.7 17
Lithuania N/A** 9 6 120 158 217 207 230 216 237 1.401 0.3 49.5 18
(continued)
45
Table 2.5 (continued)
46

Country/Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total % of % of Rank
2003–2012 total change
2007–10
Slovak N/A** 17 17 17 65 100 184 274 304 318 1.297 0.2 393.0 19
Republic
Croatia N/A** N/A** N/A** N/A** N/A** N/A** 319 289 309 281 1.198 0.2 N/A 20
Greece 30 127 127 157 155 136 139 65 149 70 1.155 0.2 −54.7 21
Slovenia N/A** 18 18 572 53 70 73 73 79 81 1.037 0.2 51.1 22
Portugal 20 8 8 166 158 106 61 149 126 138 940 0.2 −13.1 23
Albania N/A** N/A** N/A** N/A** N/A** N/A** 156 262 266 255 939 0.2 N/A 24
Estonia N/A** 7 7 7 114 124 136 148 160 153 857 0.2 33.9 25
Latvia N/A** 2 10 28 60 79 149 171 149 129 777 0.1 116.0 26
Luxembourg 0 9 9 9 9.6 9 8.9 9 10 10 84 0.0 6.2 27
Iceland 0 0 0 20 8.3 8.9 8 4 4 4 57 0.0 −51.7 28
Total 8505 6209 7073 17418 37985 46860 58711 114199 127317 123019 547.296 100.0 2144.4 28
**Those countries joined the alliance at a later stage and thus cannot be included in alliance calculations at this time
2 A Brief History of the U.K.—NATO Relationship
Iraq 47

alliance did exist (e.g. Germany, Luxembourg, Belgium). Such disagreement, at

times hotly exchanged between the allies, in some way provided a corrective to
American unilateralism in international security affairs. Meanwhile the Americans
themselves have acknowledged that their unilateral invasion in Iraq clearly damaged
their international reputation.
Equally important to NATO’s inaction was the U.K.’s active involvement in Iraq,
as they, much like in Afghanistan, unilaterally came to the aid of the U.S. despite
significant detractors in NATO.116 This is especially compelling evidence for the
eagerness of Britain to appease the Americans and to reaffirm their ‘special rela-
tionship’ in that there was significant doubt about the legality of the invasion of Iraq
and using the believed existence of weapons of mass destruction as justification for
the invasion.117 However, the inability of Britain to effectively sustain war in both
Afghanistan and Iraq put strain on the relations between Britain and the U.S.A. It
also clearly showed the inferiority of Britain to the U.S. in terms of military capabil-
ities and strength, and the need to work closely with allies in the conduct of military
operations.118

Libya

NATO evoked the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine in 2011 shortly before the
Alliance commenced a campaign against the Libyan’s dictator Muammar Qaddafi
in order to stop his regime from targeting innocent civilians in Benghazi.119 It thus
answered a call by the UN and Security Council Resolution 1973 to protect the Libyan
people against the systematic violation of their human rights (including arbitrary
detentions, disappearances, torture, and summary executions). NATO’s operation
Unified Protector had the mandate to enforce an arms embargo, maintaining a no-fly
zone, and protect civilians from attacks of their government.120 It has since been
hailed as a ‘model intervention’,121 and as such, can be regarded as a bright spot
on the record of successful NATO’s interventions. The intervention, however, was
not without critics. BRIC states (which include Brazil, Russia, India, and China) in
particular have seen the actions as akin to imperialism feeling that NATO exceeded

116 Barry, B. (2016). Britain’s Difficult War in Iraq. London: The Stationary Office, p. 168; NATO,
2015.
117 Murphy, S.D. (2004). Assessing the Legality of Invading Iraq. Georgetown Law Journal. 92(2),

p. 174.
118 Barry, 2016, p. 172.
119 Kuperman, A. (2013). A Model Humanitarian Intervention? Reassessing NATO’s Libya

Campaign. International Security, 38(1), p. 108.

120 Only six European countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Norway, and the U.K.) as well

as Canada contributed to strike missions in Libya. See Tim Haesenbrouck. 2016. “NATO Burden
Sharing in Libya: A Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis.” Journal of Conflict Resolution
61 (10): 2235–2261.
121 Ibid., p. 105.
48 2 A Brief History of the U.K.—NATO Relationship

the UN Resolution 1973 mandate of protection of civilians, and instead pursued

regime change in Libya, which was not mandated by that resolution.122

Brexit

The scholarly literature on the Brexit as well as how it might affect U.K.—NATO
relations, as noted in the introduction, is sparse at best, and most definitely uncertain.
Having said that, some analysts suggest that the Brexit will not directly effect Britain’s
role in NATO but decrease its reputation as a reliable major power in world politics.123
Others have speculated that the special relationship between the U.S. and the U.K.
is strong enough that the U.K.’s role in NATO will likely be largely unaffected
by the Brexit.124 Indeed, to some, the U.K. should seek a renewal of its “special
relationship” with the U.S.125 Others have speculated whether the U.K. might lose
its post as Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACE.U.R), a post that
was traditionally held by a British general since the creation of the post in 1951. Since
the post was traditionally held by the Europeans, they might reclaim it back. Indeed,
the French have lobbied for the post on the grounds that it to the French would allow
NATO to retain a stronger connection with the E.U. in light of Brexit.126 We will
elaborate on and discuss these arguments in greater detail in the next chapters.

122 Ralph, J. & Gallagher, A. (2015). “Legitimacy Faultlines in International Society: The
Responsibility to Protect and Prosecute after Libya.” Review of International Studies, 41(3). p. 555.
123 Oliver, T. & Williams, M. (2016). Special relationships in flux: Brexit and the future of the

U.S.—E.U. and U.S.—U.K. relationships. International Affairs, 92(3), 557.

124 O’Sullivan, J. (2017). A Very Special Relationship. National Review, 69(3), 38–40.
125 Chalmers, Malcolm. “U.K. Foreign and Security Policy after Brexit,” Briefing Paper, January

2017.
126 Dearden, L. (January 10, 2017). Brexit: U.K. could lose its most senior mili-

tary position in Nato to France after departure from E.U. The Guardian. Retrieved
from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/brexit-latest-news-uk-lose-most-senior-
nato-military-position-eu-european-union-deputy-supreme-a7519196.html. For a more positive
perspective that Brexit indeed would not impact the U.K.’s ability and effectiveness to continue to
work with the EU in the area of foreign and security policy see Menon, a. (2016). Britain’s mili-
tary standing would not suffer after Brexit. Financial Times, 24 April. https://www.ft.com/content/
a6f95c18-087d-11e6-a623-b84d06a39ec2; Godement, F. (2016). China and Brexit: What’s in it
for us? European Council on Foreign relations. China analysis. http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/
summary/china_and_brexit_whats_in_it_for_us7112.
Conclusion 49

Conclusion

To sum up this brief historical synoposis of the U.K.-NATO relationship it is evident

that the U.K. has been an integral member of NATO since 1949. Indeed, in light of its
rather ambiguous relationship with the E.U. in terms of polling its security resources
with Brussels (see next chapter), NATO has always been the ‘more important’ and
preferred primary security institution for the U.K. to work with. But in spite of the
fact that Brexit supporters will point out that leaving the E.U. is not a ‘real problem’
for British security interests as there will always be the ‘real’ safety net provided by
NATO where the U.K. feels more comfortable in any case, we will show in chapters
four and five that NATO will have its own challenges to deal with should Britain
indeed leave the E.U. at the end of 2020 as it was decided in the British House of
Commons on 20 December 2019.
Chapter 3
A Brief History of the U.K.—E.U.
Relationship

The History of British and European relations is long and storied, filled with conflicts,
bickering, rejections, but also cooperation.1 It is thus inaccurate to characterize the
relationship as solely rejecting; indeed, it has always oscillated between one of inte-
gration and distancing.2 Moreover, the historical baggage of hundreds of years prior
to the 20th century cannot be discounted when considering the current relationships
between Britain and continental Europe. Even though we don’t have the time to dis-
cuss this is greater detail here, it is fair to note that the relationship between Britain
and Europe has been a constant point of contention throughout British history.
The British Empire was on a decline, even leading into the Second World War,
and the UK started to shift from a global superpower to a regional power in Europe.
It has often been suggested that a level of dissonance may have been an ideological
roadblock to European integration (until this day),3 as the British were unwilling to
accept their diminished place in international politics.

End of World War II

The Second World War II destroyed much of the economies, financial markets,
and physical infrastructure of European countries. Europe had been saved from the
brink of disaster by the U.S. who entered the war in 1941 after the Japanese attack
on Pearl Harbour. After the war countries were driven by a desire to rebuild the
continent, especially their shattered economies to help recover socially and politically

1 For a superb historical analysis, especially since the 1990s, see Nicholas Wright. The EU’s Common

Foreign and Security Policy in Germany and the UK: Co-Operation, Co-Optation and Competition
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2019).
2 For an excellent and short discussion of this see Anand Menon and John-Paul Salter. “Brexit:

initial reflections”. International Affairs 92: 6 (2016) pp. 1297–1318.

3 Greenwood, S. (1992). Britain and European Cooperation since 1945. Oxford: Blackwell, p. 2.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 51

B. Zyla, The End of European Security Institutions?,
SpringerBriefs in Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42160-1_3
52 3 A Brief History of the U.K.—E.U. Relationship

and, above all, ensure that such a tragedy would never happen again. This process
of rebuilding European societies was stimulated externally by the Marshall Plan
that presented European countries with the financial means to successfully start this
process.
The primary goal, however, was to prevent a renewed antagonism between Ger-
many and France, and to create institutions that would help ensure peaceful relations
between the two enemies. Many politicians in both France and Germany supported
the idea of a politically unified Europe and proposed a European federation or some
form of European government. For example, on 19 September, 1946, British Prime
Minister Winston Churchill gave a speech at the University of Zurich in which he
outlined his vision of a “United States of Europe”, similar to the United States of
America. Churchill called for the formation of a union of European countries, which
would work towards strengthening the security of the world. He suggested that any
union amongst European countries must be centered on an alliance between France
and Germany.4 As a result of this, it was assumed that they would abstain from
mutual antagonism or even renewed conflict with one another.5 It is important to
note, however, that, while Churchill called for such union, he did not explicitly men-
tion that Britain would join this union. Indeed, he mentioned the Commonwealth in
such a way that Britain would not be a part of any European organization, which he
coined ‘The European Council’.6 The idea behind this was to ensure that the fates
of all European states would be tied to one another.
The need for a European security organization was largely mitigated by the for-
mation of NATO in 1949, which established a framework for cooperation in the area
of defence, putting Britain in a position of relative power within the organization,
and tying American security interests permanently to those of Britain and continental
Europeans alike. As such, much of the discourse surrounding the importance of an
alliance between European countries was abandoned.7 In turn, for Britain the cre-
ation of NATO allowed them to turn away from Europe, and instead nurture their
‘special relations’ with the Americans, also at the economic level.8

4 See Council on Foreign Relations. (2017). Churchill’s “United States of Europe” Speech, in Zurich.

Retrieved from http://www.cfr.org/europe/churchills-united-states-europe-speech-zurich/p32536.

5 Diebold,William. (1959). The Schuman Plan: a study in economic cooperation 1950–1959, New
York: Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Praeger; European Union (2017). The
Schuman Declaration—9 May 1950. Retrieved from https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/
symbols/europe-day/schuman-declaration_en.
6 See Council on Foreign Relations (2017).
7 Greenwood (1992), p. 18.
8 Greenwood (1992), p. 26.
Schuman Plan 53

Schuman Plan

The E.U. that we know today grew out of three separate communities, which contin-
uously shared the same membership. Those were the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity (ECSC); the European Economic Community (EEC); and a European Atomic
Energy Community (EAEC). Each of these communities had its own Commission
(in the case of the ECSC a High Authority), as well as its own council.
In May of 1950, France began negotiating with Germany the formation of what
would become known as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), a supra-
national administrative and regulatory organization that would oversee the produc-
tion of coal and steel across the continent. On May 9, 1950 French Foreign Minister
Robert Schuman publicly presented his plan of pooling the coal and steel resources
of the member states to create a unified market for their coal and steel products. This
became known as the “Schuman Declaration”, which was drafted by the French Civil
Servant Jean Monnet. Initially, the United Kingdom was invited to join the Com-
munity as well but refused citing sovereignty reasons. Thus the ECSC was formed
by France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands with the
signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1951 for a period of 50 years.9 By 1954 the ECSC
managed to lift restrictions on imports and exports, creating a unified labour market
as well as a common set of rules. Between 1952 and 1960 the steel production rose
by about 75%. A supranational High Authority would administrate the new Commu-
nity. At that time, coal and steel were the primary resources for the industrialization
of Western Europe. The Treaty of Paris from 1952 formally established the ECSC.
Specifically, the United Kingdom rejected the Schuman plan by and large due
its supranational nature. They believed that it would erode some of their territorial
sovereignty,10 and therefore it ran contrary to what can be considered the first rule of
European integration, namely that integration should only take place when benefitting
all of the members of the agreement.11 Further, it has been posited that the French
sought to outline terms which they knew would prevent the British from joining the
ECSC so that in turn it would strengthen their own position of power. Additionally,
by essentially keeping Britain out of the ECSC, France could use the burgeoning
European community to mitigate some of the growing influence of the United States
on the continent.12
A few years later, ECSCs attempted to further integrate its members politically and
militarily. The goal was to create a European Political Community and a European
Defence Community (EDC) having in mind a European military service under joint
control, as well as a federation of European States that would allow them to better

9 European Parliament (2017). The First Treaties. Retrieved from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/

ftu/pdf/en/FTU_1.1.1.pdf, p. 1.
10 Julie Smith, “Europa und das Vereinigte Königreich-Kleine Geschichte der Beziehungen seit

1945”, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 49–50/2016, p. 11–16; Greenwood (1992), p. 35.
11 Greenwood (1992), p. 38.
12 Lindley-French, J. (2007). A Chronology of European Security & Defence: 1945–2007. New

York: Oxford University Press, p. 26.

54 3 A Brief History of the U.K.—E.U. Relationship

coordinate their policies. In 1950, Winston Churchill first circulated such idea of
a community, perhaps even creating a supranational European military, which he
viewed as an opportunity to counteract the rearmament of West Germany13 and thus
providing security to Europe against the threat of a rearmed Germany. Similar to
his ‘United States of Europe’ speech, Churchill did not explicitly state that Britain
would be a part of any such alliance.14 This idea was transformed into the Pleven plan,
proposed by the French, who saw this as a step towards eventually establishing the
European Defence Community (EDC). However, this was a short-lived aspiration, as
the French feared German rearmament through the EDC.15 Moreover, the question
of pooling sovereignty in the area of security and defence policy did not seem to be
adequate tools for them to achieve an EDC. It is important to note that the United
Kingdom was on the outside looking in on the EDC, much as they were on the
ECSC.16 In the end the French National Assembly failed to ratify the EDC treaty
and thus the idea quickly dissolved. In 1955 the Western European Union (W.E.U.)
took up this space.
Soon after this ratification failure ECSC members, however, reiterated their desire
for further integration and founded the European Economic Community (EEC) as
well as the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom or EAEC). The for-
mer was established by the Treaty of Rome in 1957 and formed a customs union
among the six founding countries in 1958. The political strategy behind such decision
was that a deeper economic integration would ultimately lead to a political union.
Specifically, the EEC started to liberalize the flow of goods, services, capital, and
people; to abolish economic cartels; and to develop joint and reciprocal policies on
labour, social welfare, agriculture, transport, and foreign trade. Indeed, the EEC was
the most important of the three communities. The United Kingdom decided not to
become a signatory,17 although it was invited to join. This was important, because
the treaty sought to “lay the foundation of an even closer union among the peoples
of Europe”,18 and thus signaled Britain’s unwillingness to seek a deeper integration
with the European community.
Euratom arose as the third treaty organization and was also created by the Treaty
of Rome in 1958. Euratom’s aim was to foster collaboration with other member
states in terms of peaceful nuclear research, as well as to ensure the free movement
of nuclear raw materials, equipment, investment capital, and specialists among its
members. Ultimately, its goal was to promote European nuclear research and to
help avoid national competitions in this area. Euratom’s authority was exclusively
restricted to the civilian use of atomic energy.

13 Ibid., p. 27.
14 Lindley-French (2007), p. 33.
15 Dinan, D. (2014). Europe Recast: A History of the European Union. Boulder: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, p. 6.
16 Greenwood (1992), p. 50.
17 Dinan (2014), p. 76.
18 Lindley-French (2007), p. 56.
Schuman Plan 55

Since the United Kingdom did not participate in any of the three Communities
noted above, it proposed instead that the Common Market to be expanded to North
America, which would thus include the United States and Canada. To this end,
London initiated European Free Trade Association (EFTA) negotiations, which were
finalized in 1960. Other European countries that were not member of any of the
three Communities noted above joined in as well. The idea of negotiating free trade
agreements started to become popular. A bit later, in the 1970s EFTA and EEC
negotiated various free trade agreements that ultimately reduced trade barriers (e.g.
tariffs on goods and services etc.). It also introduced the European Monetary System
(EMS) in 1979 which helped to stabilize the currencies after two major oil crisis in
1973 and 1979.

Western European Union (WE.U.)

A British led solution to the problems of rearming Germany (as it was being pres-
sured by the U.S.A. and to a lesser extent, Britain through NATO) was found in 1955
through the founding of the Western European Union (W.E.U.). This was essentially
the expansion of the Brussels Treaty (a precursor to NATO), and included the for-
mer Axis powers of Italy and Germany. It thus offered the opportunity for the two
nations to join NATO. In turn, it gave the alliance a tool to incorporate their military
capabilities and thus to exert control over them.19 This was a moment in what could
be seen as a power dialectic between NATO and emerging other European (security)
institutions, with NATO gaining the upper hand.

Petitions to Join the EEC

French President Charles De Gaulle, who came to power in 1958, saw the EEC
as a potential avenue for ensuring the freedom of Europe and to reduce its overall
reliance on the United States.20 As such, and in light of the ‘special’ Anglo-American
relationship noted above that he obviously knew of, De Gaulle used France’s veto
in the EEC twice to block Britain’s ascension into the European community (in
1963 and 1967).21 Part of his calculation was to prevent further American influence
in Europe (beyond of what it had already exerted through NATO), as well as to
ensure that France retained its position as the most important member of the EEC.
In justifying France’s veto on British Membership in the EEC of 14 January 1963
De Gaulle stated that

19 SeeGreenwood (1992), p. 54; Lindley-French (2007), p. 55; Dinan (2014), p. 70.

20 Dinan (2014), p. 88.
21 Dinan (2014), p. 88; Lindley-French (2007), p. 19.
56 3 A Brief History of the U.K.—E.U. Relationship

England in effect is insular, she is maritime, she is linked through her interactions, her
markets and her supply lines to the most diverse and often the most distant countries; she
pursues essentially industrial and commercial activities, and only slight agricultural ones.
She has, in all her doings, very marked and very original habits and traditions. In short, the
nature, the structure, the very situation (conjuncture) that are England’s differ profoundly
from those of the continentals.22

Joining the EEC

With the Treaty of Brussels in 1965 Euratom, EEC, and ECSC merged into the
European Community. The Treaty also amalgamated the three Commissions and
Councils to a single European Commission of the European Communities, as well
as single Council of Ministers of the European Communities. Due to the failed
attempts by the British to establish an organization that would rival or even replace
the EEC, while reducing the level to which British sovereignty would be effected,
and due to the slow development of the country economically (compared to other
members of the EEC23 ) Britain once again petitioned for ascension to the EEC in
1969.24 French President Charles de Gaulle once again vetoed Britain’s request,
which it previously had applied for the first time in 1963. It was only after de Gaulle
left office that Britain could join the EC in 1973, at the same time that Ireland and
Denmark joined.25 This was especially due to the good personal relationship between
British Prime Minister Edward Heath and French President George Pompidou who
stated after a joint meeting:
Many people believed that Great Britain was not and did not wish to become European,
and that Britain wanted to enter the Community only so as to destroy it or divert it from its
objectives. Many people also thought that France was ready to use every pretext to place,
in the end, a fresh veto on Britain’s entry. Well, ladies and gentlemen, you see before you
tonight two men who are convinced of the contrary.26

The Single European Act of 1987 created a single internal European market.
Together with the Schengen Convention it abolished all trade barriers that might
hinder the free flow of goods, services, and people. The Community also integrated
further in political and social affairs.27
Yet, even after Britain had formally acceded to the EEC, there remained sufficient
opposition (if not resentment) amongst the British population against the E.U. to

22 https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/125401/1168_DeGaulleVeto.pdf.
23 See e.g. O’Neill (2000), p. 355.
24 Dinan (2014), p. 135.
25 Lindley-French (2007), p. 112.
26 Hannay, D. (2000). Britain’s Entry into the European Community. Portland: Whitehall History

Publishing.
27 Almost ten years later, Greece joined the EC in 1981; Spain and Portugal joined in 1986. When

Germany reunited in 1990 former East Germany was automatically absorbed into the Community
when it annexed with Western Germany.
Joining the EEC 57

the extent that the government decided to hold a referendum on that question. Con-
trary 2016, the 1975 referendum saw an overwhelming support amongst the British
population to remain in the EEC.28

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

In 1973 the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was held in
Helsinki. It produced an agreement, called the Helsinki Final Act, that was signed
in 1975.29 The CSCE took place in the context of détente, and provided European
countries with an opportunity of reprise to work together and seek cooperation on
the area of security (amongst other policy areas).
While the Helsinki Final Act was a step towards a greater level of European coop-
eration by providing institutional avenues for cooperation, and normative codes of
action,30 seeing the CSCE as a step towards total Europeanization of European secu-
rity would be a mistake, as significant factions at this time within Britain believed that
it was crucial to keep any European organization from managing European security
affairs, which London clearly considered to be the purview of NATO.31 Moreover,
the U.S. government under President Richard Nixon as well as his national security
advisor, Henry Kissinger, did not consider the CSCE as being of particular impor-
tance32 in international politics. Quite contrary, they reminded allies that a deepening
European cooperation in the domain of security affairs would automatically impede,
if not duplicate, the security functions of NATO, and thus should be avoided.

Schengen Agreement

The Schengen Agreement is a treaty that established a free-travel area amongst Euro-
pean countries and essentially eliminated Europe’s internal borders. Belgium, France,
Germany, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands were its first signatories in 1985.33 Mean-
while, the United Kingdom decided intentionally not sign the Schengen agreement,
citing concerns regarding security and migration.34 Such reluctance to sign onto the

28 Gliddon, P.M. (2017). The Labour government and the battle for public opinion in.
29 Lindley-French (2007), pp. 113−120.
30 Lindley-French (2007), p. 120; Bickerton, C. (2011). Towards a Social Theory of E.U. Foreign

and Security Policy. Journal of Common Market Studies, 49(1), p. 176.

31 Peters, D. (2010). Constrained Balancing: The E.U.’s Security Policy. Hampshire: Palgrave

Macmillan, p. 101.
32 Bickerton, 2011, p. 177.
33 Lindley-French (2007), p. 155; Dinan (2014), p. 208.
34 Dinan (2014), p. 209; Dinan et al. (2017).
58 3 A Brief History of the U.K.—E.U. Relationship

Schengen agreement clearly signaled the U.K.’s reluctance to fully buy into the Euro-
pean project, foreshadowing the potential issues for Britain in an integrated Europe,
which came to fruition in the Brexit vote of 23 June, 2016. In short, Britain’s reluc-
tance to sign the Schengen agreement in many ways can be considered a milestone
to better understand its hesitations with the European Union (E.U.) of today.

Single European Act

The Single European Act (SEA), which was passed in 1987, was an act signed and
ratified by members of the EEC,35 which set the goal of creating a truly single market
in Europe by 1992, as well as deepening political cooperation among its members
in areas of security (not in the area of defence). The United Kingdom under Prime
Minister Margaret Thatcher championed this program as it was broadly seen as an
opportunity for neo-liberal reform.36 It also signaled, if not a desire for European
integration, at least a desire for the removal of barriers between the United Kingdom
and continental Europe. Jacques Delores, who served as the 8th President of the
European Commission from 1985 to 1995 and is widely considered one of the con-
tinent’s most cautious leaders, praised this advancement in the European integration
process by noting that “[Europe] is almost at the threshold of the irreversible”.37
The British support for the SEA, however, was also partially based on the accep-
tance of extra-treaty provisions covering foreign and security policy issues,38 as well
as a grudging acceptance of some integrationist policies (changes in voting sys-
tems within the EEC).39 Once again this underlined the U.K.’s trepidation towards
European integration and its security institutions.

The Treaty of Maastricht and the End of the Cold War

NATO’s move in 1990 to find a new role for itself in international security affairs40
in addition to being concentrated on providing collective defence guarantees for
its members was consistent with the broader developments within the European

35 The United Kingdom, France, German, Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Denmark,

Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain (Lindley-French, 2007).

36 Dinan (2014), p. 209.
37 Cited in Dinan (2014), p. 208.
38 Parsons (2010), p. 717.
39 Parsons (2010), p. 718.
40 See Benjamin Zyla (2015). Sharing the Burden? NATO and its Second-Tier Powers (New York,

Toronto: University of Toronto Press).

The Treaty of Maastricht and the End of the Cold War 59

Union.41 More specifically, until the end of the Cold War there was a division of
labour between the E.U. and NATO whereby the European Community (EC) would
foster member’s economic and cultural integration while NATO would solely be
responsible for providing security for the continent. In that sense, NATO reduced the
(financial) burdens for especially its E.U. members by allowing them to invest less
in their territorial defence capabilities. This division of labour, however, ended with
the end of the Cold War and called for proposals to rethink this division of labor
and how to better integrate the E.U. members’ efforts in the areas of security and
defence.
The Treaty of the European Union (T.E.U.), signed in Maastricht in the Nether-
lands in 1992 and ratified by the member states in 1993, created the European Union
(E.U.). It thus replaced the Treaty of Rome of 1957. The creation of the E.U. with
now 15 member states was subject to many and significant objections from the U.K.42
Nonetheless, among the most important achievements was that the T.E.U. laid the
foundations for a single European currency (the Euro), a central banking system,
and gave the E.U. a legal personality which allowed it to be represented internation-
ally (e.g. in the OSCE, the UN).43 Specifically, with the T.E.U. the newly created
E.U. absorbed the functions of the W.E.U. in 1999, and thus automatically provided
the E.U. with military capabilities that traditionally had been outside of the E.U.’s
purview. These decisions were taken in light of the slow response of the E.U. during
the Balkan crisis in the early 1990s and the ensuing civil wars there. Specifically, in
June 1992, the W.E.U. was tasked by the E.U. to develop a new concept for future
European forces, stressing that the sole responsibility for defence would remain with
NATO. In turn, the W.E.U. developed the so-called Petersberg Tasks that marked the

41 When speaking of the European Union reference is made to the political-institutional setting as

opposed to a geographical union.

42 Christiansen, T., Duke, S. & Kirchner, E. (2013). Understanding and Assessing the Maastricht

Treaty. In T. Christiansen & S. Duke, The Maastricht Treaty: Second Thoughts after 20 Years (1–
14). New York: Routledge, p. 3; Cini, Michelle and Amy Verdun. “The implications of Brexit for
the future of Europe”, in Martill, Benjamin and Uta Staiger (eds.) Brexit and Beyond: Rethinking
the Futures of Europe. London: University College London Press, p. 63.
43 It is being recognized that the EU does not formally possess a seat at the United Nations as an

international organization. Common diplomatic practice, however, is that most EU member states
try to find a common position on a specific policy issue before it is being brought before the
committees. See for example Heliskorski, J., The “Duty of Cooperation’ Between the European
Community and Its Member States Within the World Trade Organization,” Finnish Yearbook if
International Law 7 (1996), 59; Kuijper, P.J., “The European Communities and Arbitration,” in:
A.H.A. Soons (ed.), International Arbitration: Past and Prospects, 1989, 181; Marchiso, S., “EU‘s
Membership in International Organizations,” in: E. Cannizzaro (ed.), The European Union as an
Actor in International Relations, 2002, 231; Rosas, A., “The European Union and International
Dispute Settlement,” in: Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Cesare P.R. Romano, Ruth Mackenzie
(eds.), International Organizations and International Dispute Settlement: Trends and Prospects,
2002, 49; Sack, J., “The European Community‘s Membership of International Organizations,”
Common Market Law Review 32 (1995), 1227; Schermers, H.G., “International Organizations
as Members of Other International Organizations,” in: R. Bernhardt et al. (eds.), Völkerrecht als
Rechtsordnung, internationale Gerichtsbarkeit, Menschenrechte: Festschrift für Hermann Mosler,
1983, p. 823.
60 3 A Brief History of the U.K.—E.U. Relationship

first recognition of a new strategic environment in Europe after the end of the Cold
War and became the core of European Security and Defence Policy (E.S.D.P.).44 The
Petersberg Tasks include conflict prevention mechanisms, humanitarian and rescue
tasks, crisis management missions, peacekeeping tasks as well as active combat tasks
such as peacemaking.45 To be sure, the provision of collective defence for Europe
solely remained the responsibility of NATO. In short, the Petersberg Tasks were an
attempt to define what, when, and how Europe’s forces should be used for, and how
they are different from NATO.
In some countries, this step towards more autonomous European forces was not
very well received, particularly in the U.K. and the U.S.46 Especially Washington
very much objected to more autonomous European capabilities and laid down some
general principles under which the U.S. was willing to allow greater E.U. auton-
omy. In 1998 then Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, defined the conditions for
European autonomy inside NATO more closely by demanding three things: (1) no
duplication of already existing NATO forces; (2) no discrimination against non-E.U.
but NATO members; (3) no decoupling from NATO.47 With this proposal, the U.S.
offered a solution that was centered on a compromise creating separable but not sep-
arate forces. Moreover, this arrangement allowed the W.E.U. to act independently
from NATO while using the latter’s military assets and planning capabilities. This
solution was later formalized in the Berlin-Plus agreement between NATO and the
E.U.
Meanwhile and contrary to Albright’s proposal, former NATO Secretary General
Lloyd Robertson pushed for greater autonomy inside NATO. Specifically, Robertson,
a British citizen, responded to Albright’s “3Ds” by outlining his own principles
under which NATO should co-operate with the E.U. He called them the three “I’s”—
indivisibility, inclusiveness, and improvement.48 Transatlantic security, he charged,
is paramount for both continents (indivisibility) while all those NATO states that
concurrently were not members of the E.U. should be invited to the E.U.’s military
operations (inclusiveness). Also, additional capabilities were to be provided by the

44 Currently, the European Union receives its authority to deploy forces abroad from the Treaty of

the European Union, Article 17.2, which says: “Questions referred to in this Article shall include
humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis manage-
ment, including peacemaking.” The terms peacemaking and humanitarian are taken from the WEU
Petersberg Declaration of June 1992. See Petersberg Declaration, Western European Union, Western
European Union Council of Ministers, Bonn, 19 June 1992.
45 However, the Europeans misleadingly use the term peacemaking instead of peace-enforcement,

a term that the UN, NATO, and other countries commonly use. See for example Martin Ortega,
Petersberg Tasks, and missions for the EU military forces (Paris: European Institute for Security
Studies, 2005), available at http://www.iss.europa.eu/esdp/04-mo.pdf.
46 Madeleine Korbel Albright, “The Right Balance Will Secure Nato’s Future,” Financial Times

07.12.1998. For a greater discussion of the ‘3D’s’ see for example Sloan, NATO, the European
Union, and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Challenged, p. 191.
47 Albright, “The Right Balance Will Secure Nato’s Future”.
48 George Robertson, “Die NATO Und Die EU: Partner Oder Rivalen?” in Europäische Sicherheits-

Und Verteidigungspolitik. Der Weg Zu Integrierten Europäischen Streitkräften, ed. Werner Hoyer
and Gerd F. L. Kaldrack (Badan-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2002).
The Treaty of Maastricht and the End of the Cold War 61

E.U. member states for such operations (improvement). Robertson argued that if these
three principles were lived up to, NATO would have no reason to fear ESDP; indeed,
it should encourage it.49 In the Joint Declaration of the French-British Summit of St.
Malo in December 1998, both President Jacques Chirac as well as Prime Minister
Tony Blair made clear that “the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action,
backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness
to do so, in order to respond to international crises.”50 This paved the way for the
implementation of a common security and defence policy as part of CFSP of the
E.U.
Moreover, title V of the 1991 Maastricht Treaty also established a common for-
eign and security policy (C.F.S.P.) for the E.U., which became the second pillar of
the European Union.51 This was made possible through C.F.S.P. The objective of the
C.F.S.P. was that member states were to “inform and consult with one another within
the Council on any matter of foreign and security policy of general interest in order
to ensure that their combined influence is exerted as effectively (…)”.52 In a sense,
C.F.S.P. was meant to provide the answer to Henry Kissinger’s famous question of
“Whom should I call when I want to talk to Europe?” Now the E.U. believed to have
an answer. Most importantly, C.F.S.P. was based on principles of intergovernmental-
ism, meaning that decisions regarding Europe’s foreign and security policy needed
to be taken unanimously by the Council of Ministers, and were exposed to little influ-
ence by the other institutions (e.g. the Commission).53 Meanwhile, the Maastricht
Treaty reiterated the importance of NATO for ensuring the security of Europe.54 This
was significant for Britain as its role in NATO automatically elevated its importance
in the E.U. due to being a major (nuclear) security guarantor for the continent.55
Moreover, in recognizing NATO as the foremost organization responsible for man-
aging European security affairs establishes a clear division of labour between the two
institutions, if not a hierarchy. Britain saw the W.E.U. as an intermediary between
NATO and the E.U., and as an opportunity for the U.K. to exert its influence in
both institutions, while battling to keep the W.E.U. relatively autonomous.56 The
U.K. vocally objected the idea of conducting military operations outside of NATO.57
However, in spite of these advancements and the political commitments to C.F.S.P.,

49 Ibid., p. 189.
50 https://www.cvce.eu/obj/franco_british_st_malo_declaration_4_december_1998-en-f3cd16fb-

fc37-4d52-936f-c8e9bc80f24f.html.
51 The first pillar creates an internal EU market, a joint agricultural policy, environmental policy,

economic and monetary union, and a customs union. The third pillar includes cooperation in the
field of home and justice affairs (e.g. Europol, Eurojust).
52 Title V, Article J.2 of the Treaty on the European Union, Maastricht 7 February 1992.
53 Peters (2010), p. 116.
54 Ibid.
55 Karl-Heinz Kamp (2017). “Eine nukleare Neuausrichtung der NATO”. SIRIUS, 1(4): 359–366,

https://doi.org/10.1515/sirius-2017-0086.
56 Peters (2010), pp. 154–155.
57 Rees, G.W. (1996). Constructing a European Defence Identity: The Perspective of Britain, France

and Germany. European Foreign Affairs Review, 1(2). 238.

62 3 A Brief History of the U.K.—E.U. Relationship

the E.U. lacked real military capabilities to carry out any significant autonomous
military or civilian operation for that matter.58

The Treaty of Amsterdam

While the Maastricht Treaty outlined the need for the E.U. to work together collec-
tively in terms of its foreign and security policy, the Treaty of Amsterdam signed
on 2 October 1997 went a step further and emphasized the necessity for the E.U. to
project its influence internationally, as well as to work more autonomously of NATO.
By creating the position of an EU High Representative with Javier Solana being the
first incumbent, C.F.S.P. also became a leading personality responsible for further
developing Europe’s international responsibilities and role abroad. Again, the British
acceptance of the Treaty’s provisions need to be considered in light of the role of
the E.U.’s powerlessness during the civil wars ramping through the Balkans at the
time, the United States’ mounting reluctance to ensure the security of Europe, as
well as the deepening military cooperation between the British and the French.59 At
the same time, France accepted that NATO should remain the primary institution in
Europe that is solely responsible for ensuring collective defence.60 Nonetheless, the
U.K. was unwilling to turn over its military control to the E.U. and insisted on the
maintenance of the status quo with the W.E.U. acting as the arms-length military
body of the E.U.61 Further, it was decided that the E.U.’s defence capabilities would

58 Howorth, J. (2013). European Security Institutions 1945–2010: The Weaknesses and Strengths of

‘Brusselisization’. In S. Biscop and R.G. Whitman, The Routledge Handbook of European Security
(5–17). New York: Routledge.
59 Peters (2010), p. 164. For example, in the “Lancaster House” agreement of 2010 between the U.K.

and France of 2010, both states pledged to cooperate closely on nuclear as well as defence industry
issues. Both praise the importance of this co-operation, their leadership role on managing global
security and defense issues, point to their role as permanent UN Security Council members and
nuclear powers, their high national defense expenditures, and experienced armies. In January 2018,
both France and the U.K. have further deepened their cooperation, especially in maritime affairs and
the fight against terrorism and political and social instability, especially in the Sahel region. Great
Britain also committed to participating in France’s new prestige project, the European Intervention
Initiative (EII), and to create a flexible intervention force outside of existing EU structures (to which
politically willing and militarily capable EU member states such as Denmark, Estonia and Italy have
agreed to). Germany, on the other hand, considers the EII project critically, primarily because it
bypasses the EU structures. From a French point of view, however, it is a pragmatic approach to
ensure Europe’s operational capability and to permanently anchor the U.K. in Europe’s security
cooperation.
60 Ware, R. & Wright, J. (2004). Second Pillar Challenges: Foreign Security and Defence Policies.

In P. Giddings & G. Drewry, Britain in the European Union: Law, Policy and Parliament (175–198).
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 177.
61 Griller, S., Droutas, D.P., Falkner, G., Forgo, K. & Nentwich, M. (2000). The Treaty of Amsterdam:

Facts, Analysis, Prospect. New York: Springer, 2000, p. 422.

The Treaty of Amsterdam 63

remain optional for the member states, leaving the option for ‘constructive absten-
tion’ of military operations,62 which would not halt the operation, but maintained
the inter, rather than supra governmental nature of the E.U.’s military power. This is
key to understanding the U.K.’s position in the E.U., as the U.K. has almost always
favoured organizations that ensure their military sovereignty over those that seek
deeper integration.

Nice Treaty

In Britain a political shift occurred during the second half of Tony Blair’s Prime
Ministership.63 The U.K. became a signatory to the Nice Treaty that all European
leaders signed in 2001. The treaty officially incorporated the Petersberg tasks into
Europe’s Security and Defence Policy (E.S.D.P.).64 To wit, ESDP aims “to carry out
the full range of the Petersburg tasks as defined in the Treaty on European Union:
humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks on combat forces in
crisis management, including peacemaking”.65 The fact that the U.K. accepted these
provisions speaks to the shifting opinion towards the necessity for a more robust E.U.
defence capability, and indeed a shift away from the W.E.U. and towards the E.U.
Indeed, this was a large shift in practice, especially when one considers that
the E.U. does not have autonomous armed forces or military capabilities, and thus
virtually no military strategy. It is important to note, however, that the provisions of
the Nice Treaty did neither anticipate nor lead to the creation of a standing European
army. Rather, with the Treaty of Nice E.U. forces would be deployed as a ‘coalition
of the willing’.66 Further, the newly created E.S.D.P. visions still saw NATO as the
most fundamental pillar of the collective defence of Europe.67 Even with these two
caveats in mind, the shift towards a more robust E.U. security policy is indicative of
the U.K. having warmed up slowly to the idea of giving the E.U. more international
weight and role to play in the management of international crisis.68

62 Grilleret al. (2000), p. 410.

63 Ware & Wright (2004), p. 178.
64 These tasks were set out in the Petersberg Declaration adopted at the Ministerial Council of the

WEU in June 1992 were member countries declared their readiness to make available to the WEU,
as well as NATO and the EU, military units from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed
forces for the purpose of humanitarian and rescue tasks; conflict prevention and peace-keeping
tasks; combat forces for peacekeeping and peacemaking operations; and post-conflict stabilisation
tasks.
65 Rynning, S. (2006). European Security and Defence Policy: Coming of Age? In F. Laursen,

The Treaty of Nice: Actor Preferences, Bargaining and Institutional Choice (479–502). Boston:
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p. 480.
66 Rynning (2006), p. 481.
67 Rynning (2006), p. 481.
68 Ware & Wright (2004), p. 184.
64 3 A Brief History of the U.K.—E.U. Relationship

Treaty of Lisbon

The 2007 Treaty of Lisbon saw yet another change in name for Europe’s common
foreign and security policy. Specifically, E.S.D.P. was renamed to Common Security
and Defence Policy (C.S.D.P.), emphasizing the commonality of the security question
amongst all members of the E.U.69 The Treaty of Lisbon reaffirmed the intergovern-
mental nature of C.S.D.P.,70 as well as the necessity for cooperation among all E.U.
members, especially on issues such as research and development, crisis management,
and enlargement.71
The Treaty of Lisbon further created institutions that are designed to work towards
security and military cooperation for the E.U., including the high level political
European Defence Agency (E.D.A.), which works on matters such as capability
development, and armaments cooperation.72 While the U.K. for a long time has had
reservations about increasing the size and scope of the E.D.A., which is designed to
support the E.U. member states in improving their overall defence capabilities, the
Brexit might be a relief for the other E.U. members that this idea might now push
forward without facing the U.K.’s resistance that has been in place since at least
2012. At the same time, from the current Brexit negotiations it appears that the U.K.
wants to maintain influence in the decision-making of the EDA, which is rejected by
the Europeans.
The civilian side of C.S.D.P. was based on the outcomes of the Summit in Santa
Maria de Feira in 2000 and the E.U.’s first Security Strategy of 2003, and focuses
on civilian crisis management through the exportation of democracy, the rule of law,
and freedom.73
The C.S.D.P. has been called upon many times by the E.U. to engage in peace
keeping and peace making abroad, both in civilian and military capacities,74 which
illustrates the ability of the E.U. to project its normative ideological footprint outside
of its territory.75 At the same time, failings in Bosnia, Yugoslavia, and Iraq to act
as a unified front have revealed some of the complications with intergovernmental

69 Craig, P. (2010). The Lisbon Treaty: Law, Politics, and Treaty Reform. New York: Oxford

University Press.
70 Howorth (2013), p. 7.
71 Teixeira, N. S. (2012). European Defence: Challenges After the Treaty of Lisbon. Robert Schuman

Centre for Advanced Studies Policy Paper. (Report), pp. 3–4.

72 Biscop, S. & Coelmont, J. (2013). Military CSDP: The Quest for Capability. In S. Biscop and

R.G. Whitman, The Routledge Handbook of European Security (78–90). New York: Routledge,
p. 81; Craig, 2010, p. 424.
73 Gourlay, C. (2013). Civilian CSDP: A Tool for State-Building? In S. Biscop and R.G. Whitman,

The Routledge Handbook of European Security (91–104). New York: Routledge, p. 92.
74 European Union External Action (2017). Security and Defence. Retrieved from https://eeas.

europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/area/security-and-defence_en.
75 Merlingen, M. (2013) The CSDP in the Western Balkans: From Experimental Pilot to Security

Governance. In S. Biscop and R.G. Whitman, The Routledge Handbook of European Security
(145–158). New York: Routledge. p. 146.
Treaty of Lisbon 65

politics and its implementations.76 However, to date more than 30 civilian and mili-
tary missions and operations have been deployed in the context of C.S.D.P. on four
continents with the focus on the E.U.’s immediate neighborhood, i.e. the Western
Balkans, Eastern Europe as well as Africa.

Eurozone Crisis

In 1999, eleven European countries decided to abandon their national currencies and
to start using the Euro as a common currency. While being invited to also adopt
the Euro, Britain was one of the European countries that decided to opt out of the
so-called Eurozone, which some observers interpreted as the U.K.’s unwillingness
to accept full E.U. integration and to maintain a certain level of autonomy.77
In 2009, in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, Greece was unable to meet
its financial obligations and to pay back the loans it had borrowed from international
markets. As a result, the Greek government defected on their debt, leading to what
would become the Eurozone Crisis wherein the Euro as a currency became volatile
and exposed to significant threats by international speculates.78 In turn, the U.K. used
this Eurozone crisis as evidence to prevent deeper European integration.79

76 Dinan (2014), p. 299.

77 Lindley-French (2007).
78 Samarakoon, L. (2017). Contagion of the Eurozone Debt Crisis. Journal of International Financial

Markets, Institutions and Money.

79 Gamble, A. (2012). Better Off Out? Britain and Europe. The Political Quarterly, 83(3). 468–477,

p. 471. In recent discussions about the Brexit commentators often seemed to suggest that Britain
has always been the ‘difficult’ child in the EU, as someone with special needs and always asking
for exceptions (see e.g. Biscop, S. (2012), “The U.K. and European Defence: Leading or Leav-
ing?” International Affairs 88(6): 1297–1313). While this characterization undoubtedly is partially
true, we should also highlight some of influence that Britain has had throughout its EU mem-
bership. Among other things, Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate, member of the European parliament,
helped to create the Passenger Name Records (PNR) Directive (see European Parliament. 2016.
Parliament Backs EU Directive on Use of Passenger Name Records. European Parliament News,
14 April. Available from: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20160407IPR21775/
parlia-ment-backs-eu-directive-on-use-of-passenger-name-records-pnr); the EU Policy Cycle4; the
European Criminal Intelligence Model (see Gruszczak, A. 2017. The EU Criminal Intelligence
Model: Problems and Issues. In EU Criminal Law and Policy: Values, Principles and Methods, ed. J.
Banach-Gutierrez and C. Harding. London and New York: Routledge); while holding the presidency
of the EU Council, the U.K. helped to create the Data Retention Directive (Ripoll Servent, A. 2015.
Institutional and Policy Change in the European Parliament: Deciding on Freedom, Security and
Justice. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan); and the EU counter-terrorism strategy (see MacKenzie,
Alex, “The U.K., EU, and Counter-Terrorism”, in Carrapico, Helena and Antonia Niehuss, Chloé
Berthélémy, Brexit and Internal Security Political and Legal Concerns on the Future U.K.–EU
Relationship. London: Palgrave Pivot, 2019, pp. 100–102). Moreover, the U.K. currently holds the
world’s third largest forensic DNA database, after China and the USA (U.K. Government Statis-
tics. 2018. National DNA Database Statistics. Available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/
statistics/national-dna-database-statistics; BBC. 2017a. Privacy Concerns as China Expands DNA
Database, 17 May. Available from: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-39945220; BI.
66 3 A Brief History of the U.K.—E.U. Relationship

Migrant Crisis and the Brexit

In March 2011, three months after the Arab Spring began in Tunisia, Egypt and
Libya,80 fifteen Syrian schoolchildren were arrested and tortured for writing on a
wall the anti-regime slogan: “The people want the overthrow of the regime”.81 This
event sparked massive outrage across the country, notably in Homs and Damascus,
protests and uprisings against President Bashar al-Assad began,82 eventually leading
to a civil war that has been called by some as “the worst humanitarian crisis of our
time”.83 In the years leading up to the uprising, Assad’s opposition was fragmented
and struggled to form a united front. The opposition was made up of Islamist, liberal,
leftist and nationalist figures and factions that initially had difficulties maintaining
a conspicuous profile and were largely disconnected by their varying grievances.84
Meanwhile, President Assad assembled a strong, militarized front comprised mainly
of the Syrian Armed Forces (Syria’s national army), the National Defence Force (a
unit made up exclusively of Alawites), a pro-government militia led by members
of Assad’s extended family, and Lebanese Hezbollah and Iranian Revolutionary
Guards.85 In response to this military build-up, rebel forces rallied together to form
the Free Syrian Army (F.S.A.) in July 2011 to support the protesting civilians. The
government responded to regime critics with high levels of brutality in hopes of
subjugating those who protested The President’s rule.86 The F.S.A. gradually seized
control of various towns and villages and surprised the government with their military
capacity and resilience.
In June 2011, the civil war reached a military impasse while Syrians started to flee
their country to neighboring states in light of the escalation of violence and wors-
ening living conditions. It is estimated that more than 13.5 million Syrians needed

2018. CODIS-NDIS Statistics. Available from: https://www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-

analysis/codis/ndis-statistics).
80 Henry, C., & Jang, J.-H. (2012). Syria, The Arab Uprisings, and the Political Economy of Author-

itarian Resilience. In The Arab Spring: Will It Lead to Democratic Transitions (pp. 212–226). New
York: Palgrave MacMillan, p. 16.
81 Danahar, P. (2013). The New Middle East: The World After the Arab Spring. Great Britain:

Bloomsbury Publishing.
82 See CBC News. (2014, April 3). Syria’s civil war: key facts, important players. Retrieved May

22, 2016, from http://www.cbc.ca/news2/interactives/syria-dashboard/index.html; Danahar, 2013;

Henry & Jang, 2012: 214.
83 Amnesty International. (2015, April 7). Syria: The worst humanitarian crisis of our time. Retrieved

May 23, 2016, from https://www.amnesty.org.nz/syria-worst-humanitarian-crisis-our-time; Ban,

K. (2015, March). Secretary-General’s opening remarks at Humanitarian Pledging Conference
for Syria. Statement presented at the Humanitarian Pledging Conference for Syria, Kuwait City.
Retrieved from http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=8505.
84 Hokayem, E. (2013). Syria’s Uprising and the Fracturing of the Levant. London: The International

Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 74.

85 Malantowicz, A. (2013). Civil War in Syria and the ‘New Wars’ Debate. Amsterdam Law Forum,

5(3), 57.
86 Adams, 2015, p. 6.
Migrant Crisis and the Brexit 67

humanitarian assistance, 4.8 million were seeking refuge in other countries, 6.5 mil-
lion were internally displaced, and the death toll grew to more than half a million
people.87 The majority of Syrian refugees have fled to neighbouring countries like
Jordan and Lebanon whereby Lebanon’s Eastern Bekaa valley as well as Turkey’s
Domiz refugee camp in the Kurdish region of Northern Iraq became the major des-
tination for refugees. In addition, more than two million Syrians have attempted
to travel across the Mediterranean Sea to seek refuge in Europe—marking exten-
sive, transnational spillovers to countries that either lacked the capacity or will to
assume responsibility for them. With the increased fighting in Aleppo in July 2012,
about 200,000 Syrians fled to Turkey while Greece started to control its borders with
Turkey. Meanwhile, fighting in and around Damascus (at times using the nerve gas
Sarin) caused an exodus of Syrians to Lebanon, and the UNHCR opened the Za’atari
camp in northern Jordan.
In 2013, most notably Germany and Sweden agreed to re-settle Syrian refugees
(roughly 5000 each, temporarily in the case of the former, permanent in the case of
the latter). At the same time, there appeared first reports in December 2013 that ISIS
fighters seized parts of Ramadi, not far from the capital Baghdad in Iraq. A month
later (Jan. 2014) Syrian rebels and the Islamic Front launched an offensive against
ISIS. In mid 2014, ISIS intensified its military campaigns in both Syria and Iraq
announcing a Caliphate stretching from Aleppo in northwest Syria to eastern Iraq.
As a result, 500,000 people fled the city of Mosul, and the United States commenced
an air-campaign to contain ISIS. While also resourcing them, the stream of refugees
started to take a significant burden on the refugee camps. In December, the World
Food Program (WFP) announced a suspension of food vouchers in refugee camps
due to a lack of funding, which aggravated the humanitarian crisis. Six months later
(June 2015), the UN was forced to announce a funding shortage for its agencies
as well as NGOs providing immediate assistance on the ground, with only 23% of
funding requirements met at that point. Against this backdrop, and in light of suffering
refugees being televised on TV, the German government announced in August 2015
that it would temporarily accept roughly 800,000 refugees, which have come through
the so-called Balkan route passing through countries like Macedonia, Serbia, Austria,
etc. Months of what seem somewhat uncontrolled flows of refugees arrived in the
E.U., resulting in temporary border closures among several E.U. member states. For
example, Hungary closed its border with Serbia and subsequently Croatia. Sweden
also started border controls in November 2015 after roughly 10,000 migrants arrived
per week. Part of the challenge was that among this large number of refugees were

87 Barnard, A. (2016, February 11). Death Toll from War in Syria Now 470,000, Group finds.
The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/12/world/middleeast/
death-toll-from-war-in-syria-now-470000-group-finds.html?_r=0; MercyCorps. (2016, February
5). Quick facts: What you need to know about the Syria crisis. Retrieved May 21, 2016,
from https://www.mercycorps.org/articles/iraq-jordan-lebanon-syria-turkey/quick-facts-what-you-
need-know-about-syria-crisis; World Vision. (2016, May 11). Syria refugee crisis FAQ: How the
war is affecting children. Retrieved May 22, 2016, from https://www.worldvision.org/wv/news/
Syria-war-refugee-crisis-FAQ.
68 3 A Brief History of the U.K.—E.U. Relationship

not only Syrians but also refugees from Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, Morocco,
Pakistan, and Tunisia.
While the E.U. had significant difficulties with finding a solution to the refugee
challenge, it was finally able in March 2016 to reach a complex agreement with
Turkey that would host those refugees in Turkey rather than in the E.U. Furthermore,
it is obvious that as the crisis in Syria dragged on and as European countries were
restricting their family reunification programs, the percentage of women and children
among the refugees increased. In fact, 75% of those fleeing Syria were women and
children.88
The extent of the migration crisis is important and significant insofar as various
E.U. member states, including Britain, have used it as an example to indicate that
they do not have sufficient control over international migration and immigration, and
as a consequence should leave the E.U. in order to regain control over the coun-
try’s borders. As additional reasons for leaving the E.U. portions of the population
cite over-population and security concerns posed by migrants.89 In short, especially
conservative politicians have voiced a significant discontent with immigration in the
wake of the migrant crisis with approximately 300,000–400,000 new migrants per
year arriving in the U.K. 90 At the time of writing the refugee crisis appears to be con-
tained after the E.U. negotiated an agreement with Turkey to host the large majority
of the refugees in Turkey; but the crisis is not solved indefinitely and the stream of
refugees could resume at any time.

Conclusion

In sum, it will not have gone unnoticed by reading this very brief historical synopsis
of U.K.—E.U. relations that the partnership at times has been (very) contentious
and was plagued with mutual distrust and disagreements about fundamental policy
questions.91 In part, this has to do with the importance of the Anglo-American ‘special
relationship’ in the discourse of British security that always preferred NATO over
the E.U. when it came to pursue British security interests.92 Yet, as we will discuss

88 Lifeline Syria.
89 Binley, B. & Rotherham, L. (2015). Hard Bargains or Weak Compromises? Reforming Britain’s
Relationship With the E.U. London: Civitas, p. 24–25.
90 Giestel-Basten, S. (2016). Why Brexit? The Toxic Mix of Immigration and Austerity. Population

and Development Review, 42(4). 673–680.

91 See for example Simon Duke. Will Brexit Damage our Security and Defence? The Impact on

the UK and EU (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019); for a more historical analysis of the U.K. being an
“awkward partner” see George, S. (1997). An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community
(3rd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Important to note, for example is that the U.K. opted
out of the Schengen Agreement, the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights and the area of freedom, security and justice.
92 Tim Oliver. “Special relationships in flux: Brexit and the future of the US—EU and US—U.K.

relationships”, in: International Affairs 3/2016, S. 547–567.

Conclusion 69

in the next two chapters, with President Trump in office the British reliance on this
so-called ‘special relationship’ card is like overplaying ones hand in a poker game,
as the American (national) security establishment does not consider that relationship
with the British as so special any more.
 Part II
Contemporary Contexts and Impacts
of the Brexit
Chapter 4
The Geopolitical Contexts of the Brexit
With Arnold Kammel

Brexit is taking place at a time of growing security challenges and insecurities facing
Europe’s strategic and economic position. Included in these challenges and insecu-
rities are threats to its internal cohesion from the rise of nationalism and political
extremism in several E.U. member states (e.g. in France, Germany, Hungary, Italy,
Poland). These voices mainly reject the governance system of the European Union
and are calling for a return of competences back to the national level that are cur-
rently held by the European Commission. Furthermore, some Eastern and especially
Southern European states currently experience fragile state institutions (e.g. Albania,
Montenegro, Serbia); indeed, some of them even are at the brink of collapse.1 This
cocktail of fragility, as we know from the literature, can quickly result into full state
failure.2 Last but not least, especially Europe’s eastern frontiers currently witness
a relatively high number of frozen conflicts (e.g. Ukraine, Georgia). The increased
assertiveness of Russia there, coupled with the impact of fake news and hybrid war-
fare, along with multiple spill-overs from political turmoil and conflicts in the Arab

1 Valentin Naumescu, Agnes Nicolescu. 2018. “The Impact of Brexit on Central and Eastern

European Security”, Romanian Journal of European Affairs (18)1, pp. 93–112.

2 See, for example, Rotberg, Robert, ed. When States Fail: Causes and Consequences. Princeton,

NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004; Ayoob, Mohammed. “State Making, State Breaking, and
State Failure.” In Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict. Edited by
Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, 127–142. Washington, DC: US Institute
of Peace, 2001; Zartman, I. William. “Introduction: Posing the Problem of State Collapse.” In
Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority. Edited by I. William
Zartman, 1–14. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995; Levy, Jack S. “International Sources of Interstate
and Intrastate War.” In Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World.
Edited by Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela R. Aall, 17–38. Washington, DC:
US Institute of Peace, 2007; Marshall, Monty G.; Ted Robert Gurr, and Barbara Harff. Political
Instability (State Failure) Problem Set: Internal Wars and Failures of Governance, 1955–2004.
Political Instability Task Force; Milliken, Jennifer, ed. State Failure, Collapse, and Reconstruction.
Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003.

At the time of writing, Arnold Kammel serves as Chief of Staff in the Office of the Minister of
National Defence, Austria.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 73

B. Zyla, The End of European Security Institutions?,
SpringerBriefs in Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42160-1_4
74 4 The Geopolitical Contexts of the Brexit

world and Africa (ranging from Mali via Chad to Sudan and South Sudan as well
as the developments in Ethiopia) mean that the security challenges to Europe are
more significant than at any time since the end of the Cold War. The demographic
developments in these regions, coupled with conflicts over resources and political
influence and overall state fragility, trigger strong migratory movements to the E.U.
The refugee crisis since 2015 and subsequently the continuous flow of migrants from
northern Africa until this day underline this point.3
The ability of the E.U. to adequately react to these external security and foreign
policy challenges could be further undermined by Brexit, unless a way can be found,
as noted, to incorporate the United Kingdom into the European security architecture.
Moreover, the problems are exacerbated by the uncertainty surrounding the future of
NATO, as the reliability and commitment of its largest and second largest militaries
(U.S.A. and Turkey4 ) have been called into question.
Our objective in this chapter is to briefly analyze these challenges. We charge
that pragmatism should win out against ideology on both sides (the U.K. as well as
E.U.) of the deadlocked Brexit negotiations to ensure the continuing participation
of Britain in the entire European security architecture, which as we will see below,
goes beyond simply participating in the deployment on European crisis management
missions.
Specifically, the security and foreign policy challenges described above that could
call into question the continuing cohesion of the E.U. include the following: (1) the
Trump administration questioning the E.U.’s foreign and security policy altogether,
as well as the viability of the transatlantic alliance through NATO by the U.S. Pres-
ident doubting American commitment to Article V, as well as the U.S. pestering
the Europeans (especially Germany) with burden sharing arguments that are highly

3 See for example Alvaro de Vasconcelos (ed.), The Arab Democratic Wave: How the EU can Seize
the Moment Paris, EU-ISS, Report#9, March 2011; Nicole Koenig, The EU and the Libyan Crisis:
In Quest of Coherence? Rome, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Working Paper 11/19, July 2011;
Federica Bicchi, “The Impact of the ENP on EU-North African Relations: The Good, the Bad
and the Ugly”, in Richard Whitman and Stefan Wolff (eds.), The European Neighbourhood Policy
in Perspective: Context, Implementation and Impact, London, Palgrave, 2012, pp. 206–222; Nick
Witney & Anthony Dworkin, A Power Audit of EU-North Africa Relations, London, ECFR, 2012;
Anne-Marie Le Gloannec, Continent by Default: The European Union and the Demise of Regional
Order, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2017, Chap. 5 “A Crisis in the Making? The Refugee
Crisis”; Ariane Chebel d’Appollonia, “Xenophobia, Racism, and the Securitization of Migration”,
in Philippe Bourbeau (ed.), Handbook of Migration and Security London, Edward Elgar, 2017;
Angelos Athanasopoulos, “Fortress Europe? The Aegean Sea Frontier and the Strengthening of
EU’s External Borders” in Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Borders, International Report, April 2017,
pp.14–25; Elżbieta Kaca, “Schengen’s Future in Light of the Refugee Crisis”, PISM Strategic Files,
2016; Francois Heisbourg, “The Strategic Implications of the Syrian Refugee Crisis”, Survival,
57:6, 7–20 (2015); F. Trauner, “Asylum Policy: The EU “crisis” and the looming policy regime
failure”, Journal of European Integration, 2016, 38:8, 311–325.
4 Chalmers, Malcolm. “U.K. Foreign and Security Policy after Brexit”, Briefing Paper, January

2017.
4 The Geopolitical Contexts of the Brexit 75

debated in the literature5 ; (2) the Russian government trying to destabilize the E.U.6 ;
(3) serious troubles with regards to civil-military relations in Turkey; (4) the political
and economic instability of African countries, especially in Northern Africa; and (5)
China’s growing influence especially in southern and south-eastern Europe. Let’s
consider each of these challenges in turn.
1. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has been the cornerstone in European
security affairs since its creation in 1949. However, doubts are increasingly been
voiced regarding the future of trans-Atlantic cohesion,7 along with doubts about
the reliability of certain NATO members in the E.U. Above all, President Trump
has proved to be hesitant in stressing the U.S. commitment to Article V of the
Washington Treaty (the principle of collective defence), whilst also criticizing
European NATO members for supposedly not pulling their weight in the alliance.
To be sure, NATO has experienced burden-sharing debates since its creation
in 1949.8 Burden sharing is commonly defined as the “actual contribution of
each nation to collective defence and the fairness of each state’s contribution”,9
which makes its measuring politically and analytically quite difficult. At the heart
of the burden sharing debate are considering either the input or the output side
of burden sharing. The input side considers, for example, how many troops a
member state contributes to the alliance as perhaps the most important burden
sharing variable; the output side of the argument favours to consider the number
of troops that actually have been deployed in missions.10
As Table 4.1 indicates, the U.K. is among the European NATO members
with one of the highest defence budgets, and ranks slightly before France and

5 Heisbourg, F. (2016). Brexit and European security. Survival, 58(3), 13–22. For a discussion of
Trump undermining the general cohesion of the Alliance see Strobe Talbott, “Brexit’s Threat to the
Special Relationship,” New York Times, April 21, 2016. For burden sharing debates see Zyla, B.
2020. “Analytic Eclecticism and Atlantic Burden Sharing: A new Research Agenda.” International
Political Science Review; online first https://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0192512119863132.
6 See for example Frank J. Cilluffo and Sharon L. Cardash, “NATO after Brexit: Will Security

Cooperation Work?”, Foreign Affairs, 4 July 2016.

7 Sophia Besch, “EU Defence, Brexit and Trump: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly”, London, Centre

for European Reform, December 2016; Constanze Stelzenmuller, “Normal is Over: Europeans hope
that the Trump Era is an Anomaly. But the transatlantic Divide has never been so stark”, Washington
DC Brookings, February 2018; Philip Stephens, “How Europe should react to Donald Trump”,
Financial Times, 10 May 2018; Steven Erlanger, “Europe, again Humiliated by Trump, Struggles
to Defend its Interests”, New York Times, 9 May 2018.
8 Wallace Thies. (2003). Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO. New York:

M.E. Sharpe.
9 Hartley, K., & Sandler, T. (1999). “NATO Burden-Sharing: Past and Future.” Journal of Peace

Research, 36(6), 665–680.

10 For a more detailed discussion of this input versus output perspective see Benjamin Zyla, “Eclec-

ticism and The Future of the Burden Sharing Research Programme: Why Trump is wrong”. Inter-
national Political Science Review (forthcoming), and Zyla, B., 2015. Sharing the burden? NATO
and its second-tier powers. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
76 4 The Geopolitical Contexts of the Brexit

Table 4.1 NATO Countries’ defence expenditure, 2011–2017

Country In constant 2015 prices and exchange rates (U.S.$ billion)
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
NATO Europe 245.7 240.3 234.8 231.3 232.1 240.9 250.3
Albania 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
Belgium 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.6 4.4 4.5 4.5
Bulgaria 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
Croatia 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.7
Czech Republic 1.9 1.8 1.9 1.8 2.1 2.0 2.3
Denmark 3.8 3.9 3.7 3.5 3.5 3.7 3.8
Estonia 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
France 44.2 44.5 45.5 45.0 44.6 45.3 46.0
Germany 41.3 42.5 41.7 41.1 41.6 43.0 45.6
Greece 5.2 4.6 4.4 4.4 4.6 4.7 4.7
Hungary 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.5
Italy 26.0 24.3 24.1 21.7 20.5 22.9 23.9
Latvia 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.5
Lithuania 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.8
Luxembourg 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3
Montenegro N/A N/A 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Netherlands 9.4 9.2 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.4 9.8
Norway 5.6 5.6 5.8 6.0 5.9 6.3 6.5
Poland 7.4 7.6 7.8 8.7 10.8 10.0 9.9
Portugal 3.1 2.8 2.9 2.7 2.8 2.7 2.7
Romania 2.1 2.0 2.3 2.5 2.7 2.8 3.6
Slovak Republic 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.1
Slovenia 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5
Spain 11.2 12.1 10.9 10.9 11.4 10.3 11.9
Turkey 11.1 11.3 10.5 10.5 10.7 11.6 13.0
United Kingdom 63.4 58.2 54.5 53.6 52.1 55.4 55.3
NATO North America 801.8 757.4 731.1 694.4 678.3 688.2 708.4
Canada 17.7 16.1 15.1 15.8 19.0 18.5 22.5
United States 784.1 741.3 716.1 678.6 659.4 669.7 686.0
NATO total 1047.5 997.7 965.9 925.8 910.4 929.1 958.7
Source Defence Economics derived estimates from NATO data (Iceland is a member of the Alliance
but has no armed forces. Defence expenditure does not include pensions. In 2014, Latvia joined the
Euro and therefore the figures for 2011–2013; which were measured in its national currency, have
been converted by Defence Economics using the inferred Exchange Rate for Latvia in 2013. This was
done to ensure that constant exchange rates were used wherever possible. In 2015, Lithuania joined
the Euro and therefore the figures for 2011–2014; which were measured in its national currency,
have been converted by Defence Economics using the inferred Exchange Rate for Lithuania in
2014. This was done to ensure that constant exchange rates were used wherever possible.)
4 The Geopolitical Contexts of the Brexit 77

Germany.11 This not only gives the U.K. a prominent but also an important role
in E.S.D.P.
In July 201812 President Trump challenged the 24 Europeans countries that
had not yet reached the 2% GDP benchmark of defence spending that was agreed
upon at NATO’s Wales Summit in 2014.
This confrontation included letters sent by the then new U.S. administration
to the concerned states and threatening them of losing U.S. protection if their
defence expenses did not increase immediately. Trump also took to Twitter to
reinforce his position: “[M]any countries in NATO, which we are expected to
defend, are not only short of their current commitment of 2% (which is low), but
are also delinquent for many years in payments that have not been made. Will
they reimburse the U.S.?”13 At the Brussels NATO Summit, Trump specifically
singled out Germany when addressing reporters. He accused Berlin of being “a
captive of Russia”, and that “[i]t certainly doesn’t seem to make sense that they
paid billions of dollars to Russia and we have to defend them against Russia”.14
On the second day of the Summit, Trump renewed his threats and targeted the 24
free-riding countries with an ultimatum demanding a raise in defence spending by
January 2019, “or the United States would go it alone”.15 This caused a significant
political storm inside the alliance and was widely considered a disrespect for the
alliance itself and the transatlantic friendship in particular, also because American
defence companies currently are the biggest beneficiaries of European defence
investments (e.g. companies such as Lockheed Martin etc.). This is also one of
the reasons why the U.K. is interested in a strong cooperation with E.S.D.P. so
that it maintains its access to E.U. defence industry.16
As noted, this threat by the U.S. to depart from NATO did not go unnoticed by
the allies. Trump’s statements not only caused surprise and commotion because
the U.S. has always considered NATO an important pillar of its military strategy

11 See also Giegerich, B., Mölling, C., “The United Kingdom’s contribution to European security and

defence”. 2018. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, the German Council on Foreign
Relations. Yet, one should not underestimate the that the U.K.’s conventional defence budget is
likely to fall in real terms, which since 2010 for the first time has been included in the defence
budget.
12 The remainder of this paragraph is taken with permission from Benjamin Zyla. 2018. “Analytic

Eclecticism and Atlantic Burden Sharing: A new Research Agenda.” International Political Science
Review.
13 Similar accusations were made by Trump on the campaign trail (see, e.g. New York Times, 2016

or Trump, 2016). To be fair, this 2% benchmark was agreed by the Heads of State and Government
at the NATO Wales Summit in 2014.
14 CNN. (2018). “Trump opens NATO summit with blistering criticism of Germany, labels allies

‘delinquent’”. Accessed on 11 July.

15 (Ibid.).
16 Claudia Major and Nicolai von Ondarza. “Kein » Global Britain « nach dem Brexit: Der Brexit

schwächt die britische Außen-und Sicherheitspolitik–eine bilaterale Einbindung ist dennoch im

deutschen Interesse”, SWP Aktuell No. 29, May 2019, p. 2.
78 4 The Geopolitical Contexts of the Brexit

since 1949; it also shook the somewhat fragile unity17 that NATO wanted to
portray after Russia started to practice a more aggressive foreign and security
policy since the crisis in Crimea, which especially frightened NATO’s youngest
members in Eastern Europe.18 All this considered, Trump was neither the first
President nor the first U.S. politician to voice dissatisfaction with the seemingly
insufficient contributions of some European NATO members.19 He is yet the
latest who continued to use the input side of the burden sharing debate as the key
index to measure Atlantic burden sharing practices,20 which is highly debated in
the literature.21
Chancellor Angela Merkel pushed back swiftly by pointing to other types of
contributions to Germany’s NATO contributions, namely those that consider the
output side. Specifically, she noted that “Germany also does a lot for NATO.
We are the second largest donor of troops, we put most of our military abilities
into the service of NATO and we are strongly committed in Afghanistan, where
we also defend the interests of the United States of America”.22 Merkel was
joined by Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau who also supported the Chancellor’s
point of view. He added that “[y]ou can try and be a beancounter and look at
exactly how-much-this and how-much-money-that. The fundamental question
is: Is what you’re doing actually making a difference?”23 For Trudeau, NATO
is about shared values and beliefs: “We are training together, learning together
and developing a level of interoperability that goes beyond military tactics and
abilities. It goes to how we understand each other, how we learn from each
other and how we grow together. That as a demonstration of our shared values
and convictions as an alliance is as strong as any other indication we can show
with the amount of tanks or the amount of firepower.”24 He further reminded
his colleagues that “[w]hen it comes to NATO, Canada has always pulled its
weight. Our engagement in NATO has only expanded over the years, and with

17 Ivo H. Daalder, “America Must Move To Save the European Project,” Financial Times, June 27,
2016.
18 See Zyla, B., and Kammel, A. (eds.). (2018). Peacebuilding at Home: NATO and its ‘New’ Member

States. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.

19 For an elaborate discussion see Zyla, 2015.
20 For a similar argument see Gates (2011).
21 See Benjamin Zyla, Sharing the Burden?: NATO and its Second-tier powers. Toronto: University

of Toronto Press, 2015; Zyla, B. 2019. “Analytic Eclecticism and Atlantic Burden Sharing: A new
Research Agenda.” International Political Science Review; online first https://dx.doi.org/10.1177/
019251211986313; Zyla, B. 2018. “Transatlantic Burden Sharing: Suggesting A New Research
Agenda.” European Security 27(4): 3–24.
22 The Guardian. (2018). “Angela Merkel hits back at Donald Trump at Nato summit”, accessed

online 13 July online at https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jul/11/nato-summit-

donald-trump-says-germany-is-captive-of-russians.
23 CBC. (2018a). “At the NATO Summit Truedeau won the argument. Did it matter?”. Accessed

18 July online at https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/nato-brussels-trudeau-trump-1.4746424.

24 CBC. (2018b). “‘No plans to double our defence budget,’ Trudeau says”’. Accessed online 18

July online at https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/trudeau-latvia-visit-nato-1.4740098.

4 The Geopolitical Contexts of the Brexit 79

good reason: it reflects Canadian values, and is essential in preserving the rules-
based international order. We will continue to step up and work together with our
Allies to build a safer, more peaceful world for our citizens and people around
the world.”25
Other leaders supported Merkel and Trudeau as well, even those who have
already met—the 2% benchmark, such as former Latvian Prime Minister Maris
Kuncinskis. For him, NATO’s capacity as an alliance is more important than the
2% benchmark.26
In short, the United States under President Donald Trump poses new chal-
lenges to the maintenance of global order as the U.S. does not appear to any
longer interested in an international order that is based on shared values, alliances
and institutions. Indeed, it appears to call into question the added value of inter-
national organizations, such as NATO and the WTO or international agreements
like the INF Treaty and the Iran Nuclear Deal.27 Moreover, as recent events have
demonstrated, the United States has become more and more active again in the
Near- and Middle East and pursues a strong policy against the regime in Tehran
leading to a potential conflict in the region. To add on to this, the relations with
Turkey have significantly deteriorated over the last couple of months, question-
ing the country’s ability to join the European Union at any foreseeable date, and
significantly undermining civil-military relations in the alliance.
More specifically, it is well known that the current U.S. administration not
only questions their degree of support for NATO; it has also repeatedly stated
its aversion of the entire E.U. integration project. Indeed, President Trump has
asserted that the E.U. is detrimental for U.S. interests, and has congratulated the
United Kingdom for the Brexit decision, whilst encouraging France to follow suit.
He has even criticized former Prime Minister Theresa May for failing to pursue
an even harder line in the Brexit negotiations with the E.U. One consequence has
been the imposition of customs duties on European steel and aluminum exports
to the U.S.A, which was coupled with the threat to escalate the dispute into a full-
blown trade war (although this is currently on the back burner as the U.S.A. has
directed its sights against China, the unpredictable nature of the U.S. President
suggests that the danger has not yet passed).
Equally problematic are President Trump calling into question the viability
of NATO because the European members of the alliance, according to him, are

25 Prime Minister’s Office. (2018). “Prime Minister announces increased support for NATO”.
Accessed July 12 online at https://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2018/07/12/prime-minister-announces-
increased-support-nato.
26 Ibid.
27 Former Prime Minister David Cameron has argued that the U.K. needs the E.U. to help deter Iran

and its desire to acquire nuclear weapons. See David Cameron’s speech at Chatham House, Lon-
don, 10.11.2015, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-ministers-speech-
on-europe (last accessed: 01.05. 2017).
80 4 The Geopolitical Contexts of the Brexit

not shouldering a fair share of the transatlantic burden.28 This argument is also
rooted in simple financial (and thus political) power calculations: if the U.K.
were to leave the E.U., as Table 4.2 shows, the total NATO budget of $958,7
billion (2017) would only be carried by a minority of European countries with
a value of $195 billion (based on 2017 numbers). In consequence and in part as
a counterbalance to the U.S., it is likely that France and Germany will increase
their push for a more integrated E.U. security and defence policy with the rest of
the E.U., also with the aim to reinforce the European pillar of NATO, and thus
to make it more autonomous from the U.S.29
2. There currently is a political elite in the Russian Government who seeks not
only to destabilize the E.U. as a whole, but also individual European countries,
especially in southern and south-eastern Europe (e.g. Serbia, Estonia). More-
over, Vladimir Putin’s Government has demonstrated its willingness to use force
against Ukraine and Georgia, also deploying a nerve agent in the United Kingdom
(the Skripal case). Furthermore, Russia interfered indirectly in the Brexit refer-
endum by using various cyber attacks to exert influence through social media,
and has attempted to do the same in French and German elections.30 It also has
a track-record of financing predominantly extreme right, anti-European parties
throughout Europe. So-called Russian “troll farms” use social media in order to
undermine political and social discourse, to disseminate “fake news” and to pro-
mote the fragmentation of western societies. The Baltic states have experienced
this first hand in 2007 when Russian hackers attacked parts of its infrastructure
(e.g. the Estonian parliament, several banks, ministries, newspapers and broad-
casters) that paralyzed affected institutions for days. Moreover, we know that
in recent years Russia has modernized its armed forces and has been using its
forces’ new capabilities in order to test the readiness of the European military,
in a manner reminiscent of the final years of the Cold War (e.g. the Zapad mil-
itary exercises in 2017 and 2018). These activities are known to be part of the
Gerasimov Doctrine of Hybrid Warfare,31 which calls for responses to European
attempts that supposedly undermine Russian influence in the “near abroad”.

28 This argument is further elaborated in Benjamin Zyla (2018) “Transatlantic burden sharing:

suggesting a new research agenda”, European Security, 27:4, 515–535, https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/

09662839.2018.1552142.
29 For a more detailed discussion see Stephanie C. Hofmann (2019) The politics of overlapping

organizations: hostage-taking, forum-shopping and brokering, Journal of European Public Policy,

26:6, 883–905, https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2018.1512644; Kempin, R., and J. Mawdsley
(2013), “The U.K., the EU and European Security: A German Perspective,” RUSI Journal 158(4):
32–36.
30 Fiodor Lukyanov, “Putin’s Foreign Policy—The Quest to restore Russia’s Rightful Place”, Foreign

Affairs 2016, Volume 95, No3, May/June 2016 pp. 30–37; M. Orenstein and D. Kelemen, “Trojan
Horses in EU Foreign Policy”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 55, No1, pp. 87–102;
Jeffrey Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics, rev. ed. (Rowman
& Littlefield, 2011); Olga Oliker et al., Russian Foreign Policy: Sources and Implications (RAND,
2009).
31 Margarete Klein. Russia’s Military Policy in the Post-Soviet Space: Aims, Instruments and

Perspectives. SWP Research Paper, no.1. Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik.
4 The Geopolitical Contexts of the Brexit 81

Table 4.2 NATO Countries’ Defence Expenditure as a % of GDP, 2011–2017 (This table shows
defence expenditure by NATO member states within the fiscal years 2011–2017 as a percentage of
GDP. The figures have been extracted from the NATO press release, and are based on the NATO
definition of defence expenditure and are stated at Constant 2017 prices, where the effects of inflation
have been removed)
Country 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
NATO Europea 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5
Albania 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.1
Belgium 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9
Bulgariab 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3
Croatia 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.3
Czech Republic 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Denmark 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2
Estonia 1.7 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.1
France 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8
Germany 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
Greece 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.4
Hungary 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.1
Italy 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.1
Latvia 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.5 1.7
Lithuania 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.5 1.7
Luxembourg 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5
Montenegro N/A N/A 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4
Netherlands 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2
Norway 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
Poland 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.9 2.2 2.0 1.9
Portugal 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2
Romania 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.4 1.7
Slovak Republic 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1
Slovenia 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.0
Spain 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.9
Turkey 1.8 1.8 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.5
United Kingdom 2.4 2.2 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.1
NATO North America 4.4 4.1 3.8 3.5 3.3 3.3 3.4
Canada 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.4
United States 4.8 4.4 4.1 3.8 3.6 3.6 3.6
NATO Total a 3.0 2.8 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.4
a Iceland is a member of the Alliance but has no armed forces
b Defence expenditure does not include pensions
82 4 The Geopolitical Contexts of the Brexit

3. Relations between the E.U. and Turkey have deteriorated significantly over the
last few years. This is partly due to the broken promise of E.U. membership, but
also President Erdogan’s reaction to the attempted coup d’état in 2016. The slow
response and tepid support from leading European politicians during the coup,
along with their criticism of subsequent events, heightened Erdogan’s mistrust
towards them and towards E.U. institutions. Whilst an agreement has been struck
to reduce migration through Turkey into the E.U., this has however resulted in
significant financial costs for Europe (6 billion Euro), along with an awareness
that this grants President Erdogan significant influence over the E.U. Turkey
needs strategic partners in the Middle/Near East, above all due to the instability
in Syria and Iraq, although President Erdogan appears to take the view that neither
the E.U. nor the U.S.A is able to perform this role. This has been a factor behind
the current rapprochement with Russia. Although it is impossible to predict how
solid or lasting this new partnership with Russia will be, it would be unwise
for Europe to assume that it will break down any time soon under the pressure
of regional strains (e.g. shooting down of a Russian fighter jet by Turkey in
2015). The current confrontation between Turkey and the U.S.A. is more likely
to strengthen links with Moscow than to facilitate the normalization of relations
with Europe.
Moreover, on the NATO side, at the time of writing, its second-largest army (the
Turkish) is embroiled in a public confrontation with the U.S.A, which has imposed
import tariffs on Turkish products, and is becoming increasingly close to Russia.
Furthermore, Turkey has purchased and received the Russian S400 missile defence
system,32 and has started to install it on Turkish soil. This will, inevitably, call into
question its reliability as a NATO partner as the system undermines the defense of
NATO’s newly procured F-35 fighter aircraft, which is still being developed. For the
Turks, it has strengthened their political relations with Moscow.
4. Instability in the Middle/Near East and North Africa is being heightened by
the evident withdrawal of the U.S.A. from the region, in parallel with Russia’s
growing influence there. The conflicts in Iraq, Syria and Yemen are increasingly
turning into proxy wars for regional hegemony between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
Moreover, the future of the Vienna Iran Deal is pending due to President Trump’s
withdrawal from the agreement whereas E.U. member states prefer a continuation
of said agreement. Whilst the migration agreement concluded with Turkey has
stemmed the flow of refugees from Iraq and Syria, the increase in migration from
North Africa, fueled by an unstable Libya, is becoming an increasing problem for
both Italy and Spain. Europe has little or no influence on events in the Middle/Near
East, though the continuing instability is increasing the risk of infiltration by
Islamist terrorists or renewed mass migration. In principle, Europe should have
more influence in Libya; yet the capacity for coherent action is undermined by the

32 Meier-Walser, Reinhard. Die NATO im Funktions-und Bedeutungswandel: Veränderungen und

Perspektiven transatlantischer Sicherheitspolitik. Springer/Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2018,
p. 25.
4 The Geopolitical Contexts of the Brexit 83

competing economic interests of individual E.U. member states (e.g. conflicting

interests of France and Italy there). Migration is an issue of existential significance
for the E.U., with populist and Eurosceptic parties exploiting the issue in order to
undermine the influence of Brussels, whilst giving rise to growing disagreement
between European countries.
5. China’s political and economic influence in southern and eastern Europe is
growing at an increasing rate. The country has levered Europe’s economic
crisis since 2008 in order to expand its presence in countries such as Greece
and Spain. Although larger European states such as France and Germany
remain skeptical, smaller eastern European states appear to be more willing
to grasp the economic benefits of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI),
without any concern as to the geopolitical implications. China’s increasingly
strong alliance with Russia (“Dragonbear”), in conjunction with the increas-
ingly isolationist U.S.A. has increased the pressure on Europe to develop a
coherent approach to Beijing—however, this has proved to be difficult to
achieve in practice. The presence of Renminbi trading in London will help
shield the city from the effects of Brexit, whilst at the same time China’s
financial influence in the region is consolidated and expanded. In short, from
an economic perspective, the rapid growth of emerging economies, such as
China, suggest that Europe faces the prospect of long-term decline in its
relative power and abilities.
In sum, the Brexit arrived on the E.U.’s agenda at a very critical moment in the
process of European (dis-)integration,33 especially considering the recent destabi-
lization in both the Eastern and Southern European neighborhoods (especially the
Balkan region), uncontrolled migratory pressures across the Mediterranean, the war
against ISIS,34 the rising threat of terrorism (partly induced through migration), and
America’s ambivalence about the viability of NATO.35

33 Uta Staiger and Benjamin Martill. 2018. “Rethinking the futures of Europe”, in Benjamin Martill

and Uta Staiger. Brexit and Beyond: Rethinking the Futures of Europe. London, U.K.: UCL Press,
p. 261.
34 See Ministry of Defence, Annual Report and Accounts 2016–2017, HC 21 (London: HM

Government, 2017), 24.

35 For a discussion see Ian Bond, “NATO, the EU and Brexit: Joining forces?”, Insight, Brussels:

Centre for European Reform, 5. July 2016; Meier-Walser, Reinhard. Die NATO im Funktions-
und Bedeutungswandel: Veränderungen und Perspektiven transatlantischer Sicherheitspolitik.
Springer/Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2018, p. 25.
Chapter 5
The Impact of Brexit on E.U. Security
With Arnold Kammel

As noted, the Brexit is taking place at a time when the E.U. is confronted with a
variety of internal and external challenges related to its very own foundation as well
as the security environment it is embedded in. Nonetheless, a set of shared values
and geographical proximity suggest that both the U.K. and the remaining 27 E.U.
members (that is the current twenty eight member states minus Britain) will have
powerful reasons to continue cooperating on security issues after Brexit, and to limit
the collateral damage to shared security interests. Thus, despite the possibility of the
U.K. leaving the European Union as a consequence of the Brexit vote, we charge
that it is not likely that the United Kingdom will leave European security per se, in
spite of the strong political framing during the negotiations. Indeed, it is in its own
(security) interest to keep and maintain a healthy relationship with the E.U.’s security
institutions.
Interestingly, as noted, security relations have not been a major subject of debates
in the Brexit negotiations. In fact and to the surprise of many informed analysts, in
2017 the British government had issued proposals for a future security partnership
with the European Union,1 in which it clearly states that the U.K. remains uncon-
ditionally committed to maintaining European security in general. Specifically, it
noted that the British goal was to work as closely as possible together with the E.U.
protecting its citizens, promoting its values and ensuring the future security of the
European continent.2 However, as the political debates in London about Brexit have
not been settled at the time of writing, there still are, according to Olivier de France,
four main scenarios on the table about the future of the E.U.—U.K. (security) rela-
tionship. The first is that the United Kingdom chooses to remain being a member of
the European Union. The second is that the U.K. exits the E.U. on the terms agreed

1 See Department for Exiting the European Union, Foreign policy, defence and development—a

future partnership paper, September 2017.

2 Ibid, 22.

At the time of writing, Arnold Kammel serves as Chief of Staff in the Office of the Minister of
National Defence, Austria.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 85

B. Zyla, The End of European Security Institutions?,
SpringerBriefs in Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42160-1_5
86 5 The Impact of Brexit on E.U. Security

between Brussels and London— or very similar ones (which is what Prime Minister
Johnson has promised to do at the time of writing). The third is that the U.K. exits the
E.U. on different terms than those already negotiated. The fourth is that it exits the
E.U. without negotiating any terms, which still remains a possibility given that the
time to reach a comprehensive deal with the E.U. until the end of the year is rather
short. All four of these scenarios have an impact on European security—either in
political, strategic, capability, operational, financial, or legal terms. Most importantly
(for the U.K.) all four scenarios have significant downsides as well.3 Let’s consider
each of these options in turn.

Losing a Capable E.U. Member

As soon as the Brexit materializes, the E.U. is losing one of its “big three” (i.e. Ger-
many, France and the U.K.), as well as one of the world’s leading financial centres in
the fifth largest economy of the world, and a bridge to the United States. This implies
that some anglophile countries in Europe (Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark)
would feel “a bit isolated” and perhaps lose a powerful ally in E.U. discussions on
some issues where they share an interest and perspective.4 For example, back in 2005
Chris Patten pointed out that there is no European policy on a big issue unless France,
Germany and the U.K. are on side. This could clearly be witnessed by the events
in Libya in 2011 where France and the U.K. were pushing for action and Germany
remained hesitant.5 Indeed, it abstained in the important UN Security Council vote.
Generally speaking, the Brexit will most likely affect the E.U.’s C.S.D.P. in sev-
eral ways. On the one hand, the E.U. would lose one permanent member of the UN
Security Council and thus a veto power, leaving France as the only member until an
eventual UN reform materializes. The U.K.’s exit is also likely to force Germany,
together with France, to play a more central role in the E.U.’s C.S.D.P., also mil-
itarily.6 Moreover, a Brexit would significantly weaken the role of the E.U. as an
autonomous global actor, as its diplomatic networks, capabilities, and soft powers
will be less influential on the world stage without the U.K.7

3 See https://atlantic-community.org/strategic-autonomy-and-european-security-after-brexit.
4 See Dumoulin, Andre (2016). Brexit and European defence An in-depth analysis. RHID E-Note
No. 20, 2.
5 See Patten, Chris (2005). Not Quite the Diplomat: Home Truths About World Affair. London:

Allen Lane, 159–160.

6 http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-36619129 [03.07.2016]. See also Niklas

Helwig (Ed.): “Europe’s New Political Engine: Germany’s role in the EU’s foreign and secu-
rity policy”, FIIA Report, available online at http://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/585/europe_s_new_
political_engine/ (accesses last on 10.5.2017).
7 Niklas Helwig and Isabelle Tannous. “Gemeinsame Außen-und Sicherheitspolitik”, in Werner

Weidefeld and Wolfgang Wessels, Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration. Baden-Baden: Nomos
Verlag, 2016, p. 343.
Losing a Capable E.U. Member 87

Furthermore, British positions often allowed the E.U. to consider a realist view
of international relations, as the U.K. was proactive in the field of making proposals
within the E.U. in some European crises (terrorism, Ukraine, Iran, Ebola, Syria).8
This perspective will most likely vanish should the U.K. leave the Union.
Above all, the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the E.U. would signifi-
cantly undermine the E.U.’s security capabilities. Specifically, the United Kingdom
is the only European country that both respects the agreed NATO target (investment
of 2% of GDP on defence), as well as meeting the UN aspiration of allocating 0.7%
of GDP to development aid. Although it will still be able to participate in C.S.D.P.
missions in the future in case the Brexit fully materializes, it would likely have to
do so through a third country ‘framework participation agreement’ which would not
allow it to participate in defining future missions’ mandates or in their initial planning
stage for that matter, but only at the margins and not right and centre where it is now.
When assessing the U.K.’s participation in C.S.D.P., and although it is essentially
the 1998 Franco-British Saint-Malo declaration that spurred the birth of what is now
the C.S.D.P., the United Kingdom has long been reluctant about further developing
various aspects of the policy, as well as about engaging or even committing its
security capabilities in C.S.D.P. missions. It always felt that while deploying its
defence, diplomatic, and development capabilities under the ‘E.U.-ticket’ it would
lose some of its autonomy and thus national sovereignty.
More specifically with regards to particular E.U. missions, to use two exam-
ples, while the operational headquarters of the E.U.’s Atalanta counter-piracy oper-
ation was located in Northwood and now shifted to Rota in Spain, and while the
U.K. has provided two ships to the E.U.’s operation Sophia in the Mediterranean,
its overall contributions to field personnel of CSDP civilian and military missions
remained rather low (around 5–7% of the current total of deployed personnel).9
Furthermore, concerning the Berlin-Plus based operation EUFOR Althea, the Oper-
ations Commander has shifted from the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe
(DSACEUR), General Everard, to the SHAPE Vice Chief of Staff (VCOS) Lieutenant
General Olivier Rittimann, which suggests a downgrading of importance.
This is juxtaposed to the fact that the British have various and significant security
assets, which if pooled with E.U. assets could indeed provide a significant contribu-
tion to the future and viability of the (autonomous) European security and defence
project. In particular, these assets include the following10 :

• Significant armed forces: The British Army currently has more than 85,000 active
military personnel, in addition to 27,000 reservists. Alongside its size, the British
Army’s extensive combat experience from recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq
is also important for both NATO as well as C.S.D.P.

8 See Dumoulin (2016), 2.

9 See EU Observer https://euobserver.com/opinion/134256 [20.06.2019].
10 See Riordan, Shaun (2019). Post-Brexit Relations between the EU and the U.K., AIES Fokus

1/2019, 2.
88 5 The Impact of Brexit on E.U. Security

• A 34,000-strong air force, with air-to-air and air-to-ground capabilities along with
transport and refueling capability, which is in high demand in C.S.D.P. as very few
E.U. member states do not possess any of these capabilities.11
• A smaller navy, which is however currently in the process of procuring two new air-
craft carriers12 (the HMS Queen Elizabeth II, at present in the final testing phrase,
and the HMS Prince of Wales) and more than six nuclear-powered submarines.13
• A nuclear deterrent based on four Vanguard class submarines armed with Trident
II nuclear warheads. Combined with the French Force Frappe, this could ensure a
sufficient nuclear deterrent for the E.U. against Russia.
• Considerable intelligence and counter-intelligence capabilities, both in the areas of
human intelligence and signal intelligence. Alongside these internal capabilities,
the United Kingdom is also a member of the Five Eyes Intelligence Network
(U.S.A, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United Kingdom). Although it is
not always able to directly pass on information it receives through this network to
other E.U. members who are not members of this network, it is allowed to disclose
analyses drawn up using such data. Thus, this analysis can be vitally important for
the E.U. and its member states in, for example, combatting terrorism.14
• In recent years the United Kingdom has massively expanded its offensive and
defensive cyber-capabilities, which have been further boosted by the close
cooperation between the British GCHQ and its American counterpart, the NSA.
• The United Kingdom is also among the few European countries15 that both respects
the NATO target (investment of 2% of GDP in defence) as well as meeting the UN
aspiration of allocating 0.7% of GDP to development aid.

The only country with comparable security capabilities and combat experience
is France. The French armed forces and their nuclear deterrent are larger than those
of the British, which makes it the largest military power in Europe (the French
Army, Navy and Air Force total 155,000 personnel).16 Thus, British defence spending
accounts for about twenty five percent of the E.U.’s defence spending, and roughly the

11 France and Germany do, but in the case of the latter those transport planes have had a long record

of breakdowns and extensive repairs.

12 This is all in spite of the fact that the U.K. experiences significant procurement problems. For

example, its Royal Air Force’s transport planes (the Airbus A400M) not only cost the UK £2.6
billion; only two of the 20-strong fleet are able to fly.
13 This contributed in part to an 8.5% decrease of the U.K. defence budget in real terms from 2010–

2015 (Malcolm Chalmers, Decision Time: The National Security Capability Review 2017–2018 and
Defence, Whitehall Report 1–18 (London: RUSI, 2018), 5), and resulted in an overall reduction of
the U.K.’s purchasing power (International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), “Europe,” Chap. 4
in The Military Balance 2018 (London: IISS, 2018), 80).
14 See also Peter Keith Levene, Defence Reform: An Independent Report into the Structure and

Management of the Ministry of Defence (London: Ministry of Defence, 2011).

15 As of July 2019, these countries are the following (in alphabetical order): Estonia, Greece,

Romania, Poland, United Kingdom, and the United States.

16 For a more detailed discussion see also Karl-Heinz Kamp, “Eine nukleare Neuausrichtung der

NATO”, SIRIUS 2017; 1(4): 359–366; https://doi.org/10.1515/sirius-2017-0086.

Losing a Capable E.U. Member 89

same percentage of all deployable E.U. forces.17 Having said that, while the French
military is larger in size, France’s capability for deployment in additional operations
is limited. The country already has 37,000 personnel deployed abroad, mainly in
French-speaking West Africa. A further 10,000 are active at home on Operation
Sentinelle, protecting sensitive targets against Islamist terrorism. The deployment
of soldiers on Operation Sentinelle has also been beset by problems resulting from
inadequate training and low morale due to poor living conditions. These operations
have been a heavy burden for the French Army, which only has limited capabilities.
The British Government has made it clear that it is interested in continuing to
cooperate closely with the E.U. post-Brexit.18 In its document Consultation and
Cooperation on External Security, the U.K. calls for the establishment of a framework
for consultation and cooperation with the E.U., which would enable both the United
Kingdom and the E.U. to pool their foreign policy efforts in order to achieve the best
possible effects internationally. In particular, the U.K. proposes that
• intelligence and analysis be exchanged through INTCEN;
• a bespoke administrative arrangement be agreed upon with the European Defence
Agency (EDA). To be sure, this is possible according to article 23 of the Council
Joint Action (2004/551/CFSP) on the establishment of the EDA.19 It sets out
the procedures under which third countries could contribute to the EDA and its
budgets. In order to enable the participation of third states in specific projects
and programs, the EDA can enter into Administrative Agreements to facilitate the
exchange of information and views. Such agreements were signed with Norway
in 2006, Switzerland in 2012, Serbia in 2013, and the Ukraine in 2015.20
• arrangements be made in order to participate in the European Commission’s
European Defence Fund;
• there be the option to participate in PESCO projects as a third country (see further
below).
The nature of the agreements proposed by the British Government would require
the European Commission to show flexibility and to prioritise pragmatism over ide-
ological clarity on the part of the E.U. The signs at present are not that promising,
at least with regards the security-related Galileo Project. Galileo is the European
contribution to the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS). It was developed in
order to end European dependence on the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS).
Although it offers wide-ranging civilian uses, it also has an important defence and
security component. The United Kingdom has until now been actively involved in
the project, with British aviation and aerospace companies providing sensitive tech-
nology, whilst at the same time U.K. dependent territories have expanded its global

17 Ian Bond, “NATO, the EU and Brexit: Joining forces?” Insight, Brussels: Centre for European
Reform, 5. July 2016.
18 Peter Ricketts, National Security Relations with France after Brexit (London: RUSI, 2018), 5–6.
19 Only Denmark is not member of the EDA.
20 von Ondarza, Nicolai, and Camille Borrett. Brexit and EU Agencies: What the agencies’ existing

third country relations can teach us about the future EU–U.K. relationship. Working Paper no. 02.
Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2018, p. 20.
90 5 The Impact of Brexit on E.U. Security

reach. The British Government continues to regard its future participation in Galileo
as a “strategic choice which will have a permanent effect on our future defence and
defence industrial collaboration.”21 In this regard, it is important to stress that the
“U.K. wants Galileo to be a core part of a future U.K.—E.U. security partnership.”
The Government has argued that any exclusion of British firms from security-related
areas of Galileo would result in delays of up to three years and additional costs of
up to e1 billion. Moreover, it would prevent Galileo from benefiting from British
encryption technologies and overseas territories and induce the United Kingdom to
develop its own GNSS (which would now be relatively cost-efficient as a lot of pre-
liminary work has been carried out under the aegis of Galileo). As a result, leaving
behind Galileo would have negative implications for security cooperation between
the E.U. and the United Kingdom (including interoperability).22
Nevertheless, the European Commission argues that British access to Galileo
after Brexit would jeopardize the security of the E.U., and it wants Britain to stay
out of Galileo if it indeed leaves the E.U. at the end of 2020. Action has therefore
started to exclude the British aerospace industry from the production of security-
relevant elements of the satellite programme, even though the United Kingdom is
developing the critical encryption software for the system. The Commission does
not appear to be moved by arguments concerning the central role of Galileo within
future U.K.—E.U. security cooperation, or by the benefits for the project that would
result from the continuing participation of the United Kingdom (along with the costs
of its exclusion). Public statements that the United Kingdom’s participation would
put E.U. security at risk do not bode well for the establishment of broader trust
or security cooperation. Consequently, the British Government has announced first
steps and budgeted for the development of an independent British GNSS.

Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)

and the Future of Defence Integration

The European Commission’s initial reaction to Brexit, especially as it relates to the

area of security and defence, was provocative and almost triumphalist in tone. It
was argued that, freed from British intransigence, Europe would now be able to
focus more on an integrated approach in the area of defence and security—that is to
deepen the integration process in this policy field. The irony is that it was the United
Kingdom and France that in 1998 proposed the Saint-Malo Declaration that aimed to
enhance the E.U.’s defence capabilities and boost its capacity to act independently,
although it was subsequently held back by the reluctance of other Member States
to increase their spending on defence. The desire to “draw benefit” from Brexit in
order to deepen the integration of European defence and security policy (far from the

21 HM Government: Technical Note: U.K. Participation in Galileo.

22 Ibid.
Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) … 91

creation of a “European army”) led to the implementation of the modest Permanent

Structured Cooperation (PESCO).23
The topic of PESCO has not been a new one. The mechanism has been inserted
in the Lisbon Treaty in Art. 42.6. The Treaty of the European Union (T.E.U.) and the
Protocol No. 10 of the Lisbon Treaty related to PESCO, however, due to diverging
interest of member states about the exclusivity of that project, it has taken almost a
decade to start a proper implementation of PESCO. In simple terms, PESCO aims
to deepen defence cooperation between the E.U. Member States that are willing and
able to do so. It envisages the development of special projects to enhance cooperation
and interoperability, also with NATO.24 Participation in the projects is voluntary,
although those that have committed to do so are bound by this commitment. All in
all, PESCO has made European defence a bit more efficient, and provides greater
output for boosting the “strategic autonomy”25 of the E.U., whilst at the same time
leaving national Member State sovereignty untouched. To date, 25 E.U. Member
States with very wide-ranging military capabilities have signed up, and 17 projects
involving various levels of cooperation have been approved.
As an immediate follow-up to the Brexit referendum and the release of the E.U.
Global Strategy, E.U. member states, led by France and Germany, triggered the
activation of the PESCO mechanism in an effort to get the best of both worlds,
namely opening a path towards a European Defence Union while maintaining close
bilateral defence ties with the U.K. In turn, it clearly is in the U.K.’s declared interest
that the E.U. does not slip into its comfort zone as a ‘civilian power’,26 but instead
that the E.U. maintains a high level of defence cooperation on the one hand, and at
the same time that it remains open to flexible arrangements with third countries on
the other hand.27 According to Art. 42(6) of the T.E.U., PESCO is established by
“those Member States whose military capabilities fulfill higher criteria and which
have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the
most demanding missions.” This enables defence cooperation in smaller committed
groups, below the threshold of 27 Member States, and within the E.U.-framework
rather than outside of it. Although originally conceived as an exclusive project, the
Council of the European Union opted for an inclusive PESCO, which opens up the

23 EU Commission: Permanent Structured Cooperation—PESCO: Deepening Defence Coopera-

tion among EU Member States; “Permanent Structured Cooperation—PESCO,” European Union

External Action Service, March 9, 2018.
24 Indeed, NATO Secretary Jens Stoltenberg considers PESCO as a means to strengthen NATO’s

European pillar. See Doorstep statement by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg prior to the
European Union Foreign Affairs Council meeting https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_
160495.htm.
25 This is something that the EU has called for in its own Global Strategy document. See European

External Action Service. (2016). Shared Vision, Common Action: A stronger Europe. 26 June 2016,
http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf.
26 For an extensive review of the debate see Antonio Missiroli (Hrsg.): Towards an EU Global

Strategy—Consulting the Experts, Paris 2015.

27 Van Ham, Peter (2016). Brexit: Strategic Consequences for Europe A Scenario Study. Clingendael

Report, 15.
92 5 The Impact of Brexit on E.U. Security

possibility of putting the bar as low as possible, instead of creating a defence avant-
garde that can pave the way forward. There is an inherent contradiction between the
idea of an inclusive PESCO and an ambitious PESCO.28
PESCO envisages the development of special projects to enhance cooperation
and interoperability. Participation in the projects is voluntary, although those who
have committed to do so are bound by this commitment. All in all, PESCO should
make European defence more efficient and provide greater output for boosting the
strategic autonomy of the E.U., whilst at the same time leaving the sovereignty of
E.U. Member States untouched. To date, 25 E.U. Member States (all except the U.K.,
Malta and Denmark) with very wide-ranging military capabilities have signed up to
PESCO, and 34 projects involving various levels of cooperation have been approved
thus far.29 Contrary to other forms of defence cooperation, PESCO provides for a
legally binding nature of member states’ commitments. The list of ambitious and
more binding common obligations undertaken by each of the participating PESCO
members contains 20 individual pledges, split into the five key areas set out by Art.2
of Protocol N°10 on PESCO that is annexed to the Lisbon Treaty.
However, the structure and set-up of PESCO entails a number of problems.30
Firstly, since membership is limited to E.U. member states, this by definition would
exclude British participation in case the Brexit materializes and thus military capabil-
ity (although the British Government has asked to participate in individual projects
of PESCO as a third country). Secondly, the ambition of the respective projects has
been very modest to date and limited to enhancing cooperation in very closely defined
areas. Instead of focusing on some prime projects, it seems that current PESCO ini-
tiatives aim at allowing all participating member states to provide for their ‘own’
PESCO project. PESCO does not offer any unequivocal incentives for integrating
E.U. armed forces and provides only a limited contribution to capability enhance-
ment. In all seriousness, this may possibly reflect a growing divide between political
rhetoric and military facts on the ground. As mentioned above, the prime objective of
PESCO is to enhance the strategic autonomy of the E.U., without undermining E.U.
Member’s sovereignty. This is already in itself paradoxical. Extolling the strategic
autonomy of the E.U. is a dangerous game to play where the Union does not dispose
of the necessary military resources to support that autonomy. Such calls will only
strengthen the hand of those in the Trump administration, along with the wider U.S.
defence community, who seek to scale back U.S. engagement within NATO and
with European defence more generally. The risk is that the U.S.A. might take the
E.U.’s strategic autonomy seriously and leave the Union without the capability to
implement it.

28 See De France, Olivier/Major, Claudia/Sartori, Paola (2017): How to make PESCO a Success.
Armament Industry European Research Group Policy Paper No. 21, 8.
29 See https://pesco.europa.eu/ [20.06.2019].
30 See Riordan (2019), 3.
Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) … 93

This argument may be substantiated with reference to the example of the German
Bundeswehr.31 With almost 180,000 soldiers, the Bundeswehr is the second-largest
army in Europe after France. In comparative terms, it is thus larger than the British
Army. However, since the end of the Cold War it has had to adapt to a dramatic fall
in financing, training and operational readiness. For political reasons, international
deployments have only involved support and logistical roles. As a result, in contrast
to the British and French armed forces, it has practically no combat experience,
the only moderate exception being Afghanistan. Increased financing was announced
in 2015 in order to improve training and enable modernisation of the Bundeswehr.
Nevertheless, German defence spending will not reach 1.3% of its GDP until 2021.
In any case, the operational readiness of the German armed forces is much more
concerning. A report on the operational readiness of the primary weapons systems
used by the Bundeswehr, which was presented to the Bundestag in February 2018,
stated that only 29% of combat aircraft, 22% of transport helicopters, 19% of combat
helicopters, 20% of transport aircraft, 47% of tanks and 30% of frigates were ready
for deployment. Germany had so few deployable tanks that it would be unable to take
up its leadership of the NATO Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) at the
start of 2019. Whilst Berlin engages in ambitious rhetoric and declares itself ready “to
take on responsibility for European security”, the Government is not ready to finance
the necessary resources for the Bundeswehr. Significant time and investment will be
required to make up for the lack of operational readiness shown up in the Bundestag
report. It thus comes as no surprise that Germany prefers to propose PESCO projects
that are not focused on cooperation in relation to combat deployments, or that the
E.U. countries most vulnerable to Russian pressure view the strategic autonomy
promised by PESCO with scepticism.
Moreover, rather than enhancing the strategic autonomy of the E.U. by leav-
ing national sovereignty untouched PESCO could reinforce existing differences in
national strategies between E.U. Member States, lobby groups, and companies, or
at least bring them to the fore. France is concentrating on the E.U.’s unpredictable
neighbours to the south. It is aiming to secure not only the strategic autonomy of
the E.U. (which has long since been a central plank of French security policy), but
also the autonomy of the European defence industry (which will entail benefits for
the French industry). Essentially, it is attempting to project its own security policy
goals onto the E.U. as a whole. Germany has traditionally aimed to rely on NATO
in questions relating to European security. Its change of heart towards a European
strategic autonomy has essentially come as a reaction to President Trump, as noted
above. Berlin continues to be reticent in its usage of military resources for crisis and
conflict management activities.
The eastern flank of the E.U.—Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and the Baltic states—
are sceptical as to the value of PESCO. These countries regard PESCO as being
too strongly focused on the challenges originating from the southern neighbours,

31 GeorgeAllison: Less than a third of German military assets are operational says report, U.K.
Defence Journal, June 21 2018.
94 5 The Impact of Brexit on E.U. Security

rather than the Russian threat from the east, which is more imminent for them.32
PESCO is beneficial primarily for the development of military capabilities for crisis
management deployments and interventions, rather than defence and deterrence. In
addition, it appears to bring benefits mainly to the defence industries of the largest
countries. Other eastern European countries share these doubts, although they are
more willing to back PESCO in order to avoid adding the issue to existing contentious
matters with Paris and Berlin (such as e.g. migration).

European Intervention Initiative (E2I) and the U.K.

In September 2017, the President of the French Republic, Emmanuel Macron,

launched the idea of a “European Intervention Initiative” (EI2).33 EI2 would intro-
duce a common doctrine alongside budgetary instruments for military interventions
outside the territory of the E.U. The overarching aim is to equip Europe by the begin-
ning of the next decade with a “common intervention force”, a “common defence
budget“, and a “common doctrine for action” to enable Europeans to act “convincing-
ly” together militarily.34 Participation is by invitation only. A letter of Intent launching
the initiative was signed by nine European countries (Belgium, Denmark, Estonia,
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the U.K.) on 25 June 2018.
France thus appears to be seeking a strategic-cultural convergence around rapid mul-
tilateral deployments in dangerous theatres. Finland has since joined the EI2, taking
the number of participating European countries up to 10 now.35 France argues that
EI2 must have the necessary deployment capabilities in the future, otherwise it will
be impossible to achieve strategic autonomy for the E.U. Meanwhile, Germany’s
participation, coupled with its lack of enthusiasm for operational readiness, could
call into question the entire efficacy of E2I.
At its heart the EI2 will be a flexible and non-binding forum of European states
that are able and willing to engage their military forces when and where necessary
in order to protect European security interests across the spectrum of a potential
crises, and without prejudice to the framework through which action is taken (i.e. the
UN, NATO, the E.U. or as an ad hoc coalition). Participation in any of its specific
initiatives or any military operations that result will be subject to sovereign national

32 For an extensive discussion of the Eastern European member’s perspectives see Benjamin Zyla,

and Arnold Kammel (eds.). Peacebuilding at Home: NATO and its ‘New’ Member States. Baden-
Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2018.
33 Alice Pannier: Macron´s “European Intervention Initiative”: More Questions than Answers,

European Leadership Network, 23 November 2017.

34 See Mauro, Frederic (2018). The European Intervention Initiative: Why we should listen

to German Chancellor Merkel, available at https://www.iris-france.org/115776-the-european-

intervention-initiative-why-we-should-listen-to-german-chancellor-merkel/ [20.06.2019].
35 See Mills, Claire (2019). The European Intervention Initiative. House of Commons Library,

Briefing Paper No. 8432.

European Intervention Initiative (E2I) and the U.K. 95

decision-making. EI2 operates independently of the E.U. Military Staff and Com-
mittee, thereby enabling the creation of a more flexible, adaptable and responsive
leadership structure. It will also be separated from NATO, although it will coordi-
nate closely with it. It is still unclear whether E2I will concentrate on a defensive
mission in northern and Eastern Europe, expeditions to French-speaking Africa, or
peacekeeping and civil/military missions.
Contrary to PESCO, E2I aims to improve operational capabilities. Having said
that, the Letter of Intent concerning EI2 states that “EI2 participating states will strive
to ensure that EI2 serves the objectives and projects of PESCO to the maximum
extent possible, while taking into consideration national legal constraints and the
issue of third parties’ access to PESCO.”36 Thus, E2I at least indirectly calls for the
augmentation of capabilities.
Two major differences between E2I and PESCO, however, stand out: first E2I
is focused on operational aspects, and secondly it is clearly not suitable for non-
European countries (including primarily the United Kingdom post-Brexit). This
should not come as a surprise. Despite the much-acclaimed Franco-German brigade
(in which the French downgraded their involvement in 2014 and the efficacy of
which has also been undermined by poor German operational readiness), the French
have increasingly focused their attention on bilateral cooperation with the British.
This started with the 1998 Saint-Malo Declaration and culminated in the Defence
and Security Agreement signed in 2010 (separate agreements have been reached
concerning the management of nuclear stocks, operational questions, industry and
armaments). The agreement was concluded outside the NATO and E.U. frameworks.
A consequence of this agreement was the 6-year development of a Franco-British
Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF), on which E2I appears to be based. In practical
terms, the CJEF involved the adoption of procedures to enable France and the United
Kingdom to maintain forces with a high level of readiness, which could be deployed
together if needed.
France’s demand to continue its defence cooperation with the United Kingdom
was spelled out in France’s 2017 request to join the Five Power Defence Agreement
(FDPA). The FDPA was created in 1971 in order to defend Malaysia and Singapore
against Indonesia. The FDPA members are Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, New
Zealand and the United Kingdom. At present it is a rather moribund organisation.
France justified its application to join primarily because of its desire to make a greater
contribution to security in the Asia and Pacific area, although in reality the aim was to
find an institutional framework for pursuing cooperation with the United Kingdom.
E2I appears to have taken on board this idea (presumably since the Asian FDPA
members appear determined to reject France’s membership).
In January 2018, the U.K. showed its intent to get involved in E2I following
a Franco-British summit on defence cooperation. It is also one of the signatories
to the Letter of Intent. After the signing of that Letter, the British Minister of the
Armed Forces stated that “The European Intervention Initiative does not affect the

36 Letter of Intent concerning the development of the European Intervention Initiative (EI2), June

2018, para. 9.
96 5 The Impact of Brexit on E.U. Security

independence of the U.K. Armed Forces in any way. It is a flexible, non-binding

forum, that provides a framework for increased co-operation between participating
European states. It is not a standing force.”37
Given that the EI2 is a defence initiative outside of the governance purview of
the European Union, U.K. participation in such initiative will not be affected in any
way by the Brexit. However, U.K. participation in an initiative that is so closely
linked to E.U. defence projects, and PESCO in particular, has raised some concerns
among pro-Brexit commentators who fear that the initiative could involve Britain in
an embryonic European Army through the back door.38

U.K. Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF)

An alternative forum for pragmatic cooperation that would enable continuing British
participation in European security post-Brexit is the British-led Joint Expeditionary
Force noted above.39 Created in 2012 under the aegis of the NATO Framework
Nations Concept, it builds on the U.K.’s experience in working with other northern
European countries in Afghanistan and Iraq. Initially focused on the Near/Middle
East, it was subsequently redirected to address the Russian threat within the context
of the annexation of Crimea and the destabilization of eastern Ukraine. It is made
up of a British-led force, to which eight other countries contribute, and which seeks
to achieve rapid deployment, in particular in northern Europe. Three of these are
long-standing NATO members (Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands), three are
relatively new NATO members (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) whilst two are neu-
tral E.U. Member States (Sweden and Finland). Although falling within the NATO
framework, deployment of the JEF is a sovereign decision of the British Govern-
ment (presumably following consultation with the other participating governments).
This results in a much more flexible and mobile instrument than for example the
Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), which can only be deployed with
the approval of all 29 full members of the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s highest
political institution that governs the alliance. Reaching such agreements takes time
and, given the increasing alienation of Turkey from the rest of the Council, this might
not be a viable option in the near future. In addition, the focus on the Russian threat
is more on easing the worries and concerns of northern and eastern members of the
E.U.

37 PQ160129, EU Defence Policy, 10 July 2018.

38 See “Nine states to launch joint military force as Paris pushes for post-Brexit crisis defence
group”, The Daily Telegraph, 25 June 2018.
39 Håkon Lunde Saxi: The U.K. Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), IFS Insights 5/2018, Norwegian

Institute for Defence Studies.

Chapter 6
Conclusion

The E.U. is currently confronted with a range of internal as well as external chal-
lenges. On the one hand, the Brexit is showing that the E.U. integration process as
such is not only being put on hold; it is actively in question. Moreover, nationalist as
well as disintegration forces in various E.U. countries seem to gain political ground
and influence. On the other hand, looking at the external challenges, the E.U. is con-
fronted with the most imminent and threatening of these over the short term, namely
a hostile Russia and protracted instability in the Middle/Near East and North Africa.
Doubts concerning the commitment of President Trump to NATO and the growing
rapprochement between Ankara and Moscow show that European states cannot rely
on NATO attending to their security requirements. Moreover, in cases of an imminent
emergency it is certain that it will be difficult to activate NATO mechanisms, which
requires the consent of all 29 members—such as e.g. the VJTF—in good time, should
Turkey have any objections. The increasing tensions between Brussels and Wash-
ington alongside growing foreign policy differences (e.g. in relation to the Iranian
nuclear agreement and the threat that country poses for the entire Middle East) have
also boosted arguments in favour of boosting European strategic autonomy. This
concept of strategic autonomy underlies the European Global Strategy. However, the
eastern European members states are not alone in fearing that there is a growing
divide between rhetoric and reality. In addition, any impulsive and ill-thought-out
promotion of strategic autonomy would risk encouraging those in America (both
within and outside the Trump Administration) who would like to refocus on the
Asia/Pacific area and to rein in transatlantic obligations.
Simply put, Europe’s current military capabilities are inadequate for to the needs
of a strategic union. The French armed forces, as Europe’s largest army, already have
wide-ranging obligations both at home and abroad, and thus have limited capacity for
new deployments. In addition, they are heavily focused on the instability affecting
their southern neighbours and French-speaking Africa. The Bundeswehr, Europe’s
second-largest army, is chronically under-financed, with an average readiness for
deployment of only 30%. It lacks combat experience and will only play a limited
role in operational interventions in the near future. Although the German Government
has recently committed to modest increases in the defence budget, it is still hesitant
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 97
B. Zyla, The End of European Security Institutions?,
SpringerBriefs in Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42160-1_6
98 6 Conclusion

to use military instruments as part of crisis management. Brexit exacerbates this

problem by excluding the British armed forces, along with its intelligence services
and cyber-capabilities. The United Kingdom has made it clear that it wishes to
continue to contribute to European defence and security post-Brexit; however, at the
present time there is no E.U. security architecture in place that could enable this.
Realistically, if the E.U. is to achieve strategic autonomy it will have to inte-
grate the military capabilities of non-E.U. countries such as the United Kingdom
and Norway. However, until now the European Commission appears to have pro-
moted ideological clarity above pragmatism to find a suitable solution that satisfies
all negotiating partners. The European Commission’s proposal to exclude the United
Kingdom from the non-military aspects of the E.U.’s security and defence architec-
ture will undermine the interoperability of the British armed forces with those of the
E.U. Moreover, in the aftermath of Brexit it will have far-reaching implications for
military and security cooperation between the E.U. and the United Kingdom. With
the positive Brexit vote in December of 2019 by the British House of Commons, it
will also place significant pressures on the U.K. Ministry of Defense to work out the
detailed proposals for the U.K.’s security relationship with the E.U. The E.U.’s for-
mal initiative to enhance security capabilities after Brexit by definition excludes the
United Kingdom (despite the British willingness to cooperate on special projects),
whilst at the same time little is being done to expand the operational capabilities
of the E.U. Most projects are focused on enhancing non-operational cooperation,
such as for example the provision of logistical support. The Member States that feel
most threatened by Russia view such efforts as being focused too much on the south,
whilst only benefiting the defence industries of the larger E.U. countries.
France has answered to these developments by proposing E2I. This focuses on the
development of a common doctrine along with budgetary instruments for military
interventions outside the E.U. As E2I is detached from the E.U., its military, the
Military Staff Committee as well as E.U. officials working therein, the initiative
allows for the membership of the United Kingdom and other non-E.U. countries. In
actual fact, the United Kingdom is one of the nine E.U. countries that have joined E2I.
To be sure, E2I is clearly operational. However, the initiative seems to be focused
on operational interventions in dangerous areas in southern countries that in direct
vicinity of the E.U. (and in French-speaking Africa), whilst once again disregarding
the fears of E.U. states that see Russia as the main threat.
An alternative pragmatic way of continuing cooperation with the United Kingdom
is the British-led JEF. Although it is part of the NATO Framework Nations Concept,
it is not subject to NATO’s cumbersome procedures and is made up of European
states (not all E.U. or NATO members), which participate in a British-led Joint
Force focused in particular on the Russian threat for northern Europe.
As long as the European Commission continues to insist on ideological clarity
after Brexit, and as long as the British military and intelligence capabilities are
regarded as important for European security, it is likely that the United Kingdom
will be involved in the E.U.’s institutional security and defence framework in one
way or another, most likely through initiatives such as E2I or the JEF. Whilst the
U.S. and above all Turks have called into question the reliability of NATO as the
6 Conclusion 99

cornerstone of European security, the organisation is still able to offer an important

framework within which pragmatic ways of integrating the United Kingdom can be
found. However, this could prove to be a dangerous development for the European
Commission and the E.U. as a whole. At present, both E2I and the JEF operate outside
the E.U. security architecture, and both are led at the national level and focused on the
needs of their sponsors. Moreover, both tend towards rendering PESCO irrelevant
in terms of enhancing the independent operational capabilities of the E.U. More
problematic perhaps is the fact that neither of the two operates under the aegis of the
CFSP, which means that the “force” that is set to shoulder the burden of Europe’s
strategic autonomy will be commanded from outside of CFSP, which is primarily
responsible for determining the E.U.’s military and security strategy, as well as its
security responses.
Against this backdrop, it is likely that the influence of the European Commission
and the European External Action Service on European security policy will wane. It
would be in the interest of the E.U. Commission to choose a more flexible approach
to the United Kingdom’s participation (alongside other non-E.U. states, such as for
example Norway) in E.U. security instruments.1 Having the former German Minister
of Defence, Ursula von der Leyen being elected President of the European Commis-
sion and former Spanish Foreign Minister Borrell as the next High Representative
for the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the Euro-
pean Commission, two staunch Europeans will have an important influence on that
particular approach that could foster Europe’s strategic autonomy. They also bring a
wealth of political experience with them to their new job, with von der Leyen being
Germany’s former Minister of Defence.
Depending upon the approach ultimately taken by the European Commission,
individual E.U. Member States will have to fall into line and increase their defence
spending as well as improve operational readiness. President Trump is not the only
person to take the view that Europe should contribute more to its defence. There is
a widely held view within U.S. defence and foreign policy circles that the U.S.A.
should scale back its obligations in Europe and instead enhance its presence in the
Asia-Pacific region. Even former President Obama made similar arguments. Every
post-Trump Administration will insist that Europe pulls its weight more, albeit not
in such sharp tones.
The United Kingdom is not expected to become an ‘old’ third country even after a
possible withdrawal from the E.U. To the contrary, it will be integrated into the E.U.’s
security policy both politically and economically. It may therefore be presumed that
close cooperation on security issues will be continued with the E.U., in particular in
relation to the fight against terrorism, defence against cyber-attacks, the protection of
European citizens, intelligence sharing, the Schengen Information System for border
control, passenger information lists for flights, the Europol law enforcement data
bases and the European Criminal Records Information System. If such cooperation

1 See also House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee: Implications of the referendum on EU
membership for the U.K.’s role in the world, 26.4.2016, available online at http://www.publications.
parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmfaff/545/545.pdf; accesses 20.08. 2017.
100 6 Conclusion

were not pursued by the U.K., it would immediately loose access to Europol and
Eurojust’s sensitive databases with the Brexit.2 This would clearly be a disadvantage
for the U.K., if not a downgrading, and harmful with regards to its internal and
external security interests.
If the Brexit materializes as planned by the British government, the U.K. would
not represent anyone else on the UN Security Council in matters of security policy
other than itself. France will de facto become the ‘E.U. representative’ on the Security
Council, whilst the United Kingdom will lose this role. On the one hand this means
that the British are going to have a considerable interest in future cooperation on
security policy, especially with regards to European crisis management initiatives,
also because they will be reliant on support from the E.U. Member States when it
comes to more extensive peace operations (e.g. such as in Afghanistan). At the same
time, it will be difficult for the E.U. to achieve strategic autonomy with the nuclear
and maritime potential of France alone. Meanwhile, as a result of Brexit the British
armaments industry is most likely to lose its position as a European supplier and
will be forced to ensure that it does not completely lose contact with the European
armaments market by concluding a variety of bilateral cooperation agreements with
other E.U. Member States. In that regard it has to be noted that traditionally the U.K.
has been pushing for a lighter approach with regard to the application of Art. 346 of
the T.F.E.U., which permits disapplication of E.U. rules when considered necessary
to protect their “essential security interests.”3
Switching the institutional perspective from the E.U. to NATO, the U.K. will
most likely make every effort to become the de facto leading European power within
NATO, and in particular to take on the role as the representative of the eastern
European and other countries that consider Russia to represent a particular danger.
Whether France and Germany will let the U.K. acquire this role will remain to be
seen. However, it is unlikely that these two important players will concede their own
roles and aspirations so easily.
From the viewpoint of the smaller E.U. states, this will involve maximizing the
usage of British capability within the E.U. framework in order, amongst other things,
to offset negative implications for the emergence of a common security and defence
policy. In actual fact, the protective function of the British Army in the event of
Russian aggression is at least as great as that of France, and greater than that provided
by Germany. Moreover, this dynamic also applies vis-à-vis operational readiness in
the Mediterranean, the Black Sea and the Middle East. For these reasons, cooperation
with the United Kingdom in the area of security policy will always be desirable.

2 Mortera-Martinez, C. (2017). “Hard Brexit, soft data: How to keep Britain plugged into EU
databases.” Centre for European reform. London, 23 June. https://www.cer.eu/insights/hard-brexit-
soft-data-how-keep-britain-plugged-eu-databases; see also Simon Duke. Will Brexit Damage our
Security and Defence? The Impact on the UK and EU (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), Chap. 4.
3 See Butler, L. (2016). Legal implications of Brexit on U.K. Defence Procurement, Bris-

tol, June 20. https://legalresearch.blogs.bris.ac.uk/2016/06/legal-implications-of-brexit-on-uk-

defence-procurement/ [18.08.2019].
6 Conclusion 101

At the time of writing, the prospects for a hard Brexit, meaning the U.K. leaving
the E.U. without an agreement, seems to be the most plausible option. After the res-
ignation of Prime Minister Theresa May, the newly elected Tories leader and Prime
Minister Boris Johnson has continued to call for a hard divorce between the E.U. and
the U.K. and thus almost leaving aside any new contractual relationship between the
two negotiating parties. As a result, both the U.K. and the E.U. are likely to remain for
some time inwardly-focused through a lengthy, phased implementation process. The
U.K. will need to renew governing capacities required of an E.U. external partner,
while maintaining political consensus and assuring unity among the U.K. domes-
tically. The E.U. will focus on balancing member states’ views and interests with
concern for E.U. reform implications, pressures for potential multi-speed integration,
and enduring challenges to internal unity over the rule of law, migration, Eurozone
governance and security and defence cooperation.
With regards to the alliance, we noted that it is reasonable to posit that the U.K.
will remain a close like-minded transatlantic partner and committed NATO ally
with important influence in Europe while acquiring its new autonomy and agility
in international relations. It will nonetheless face new and difficult choices given
its diminished relative influence and its pressing need to deploy all means available
to advance its trade and economic interests. An illiberal or protectionist U.K. is
unlikely but could well emerge in response to the dire economic consequences of an
acrimonious ‘no deal’ scenario or break with agreed terms.
In short, it is likely that the U.K. will enhance its participation in NATO in order
to demonstrate leadership on international security and defence policy and will treat
its strong commitment to NATO as a key source of international legitimacy and
influence. The U.K. will work closely with the U.S. on pressuring its NATO allies to
raise defence spending to the target of 2% of GDP. U.K.–E.U. tensions are unlikely
to substantially affect the functions of the Alliance.
As a final word and irrespective of the final Brexit outcome, the U.K. will remain
committed to European security as common challenges and shared values will pro-
vide for a solid base of future cooperation. Leaving the European Union institu-
tionally, however, poses the question what implications the Brexit might generate
regarding the future of CSDP missions. Although, the E.U. will lose its biggest
spender in defence and one of its most capable members alongside France, the pre-
vailing intergovernmental character of CFSP and CSDP will allow for cooperation
between the E.U. and the U.K. in the interest of European security. Both sides have
already indicated their interest to cooperate closely in the future; they just have to
move beyond the stalled Brexit negotiations to do so. In any case, based on the Lis-
bon Treaty, the U.K. can remain an active player in Europe’s security and defence by
participating in E.U.-led or ad hoc coalitions as discussed above. Specifically, it can
actively participate in the EI2 as well as push for better E.U.–NATO cooperation.
The United Kingdom is not expected to become any old third country even after a
possible withdrawal from the E.U. On the contrary, it is most likely to be integrated
into the E.U.’s security policy politically. It may therefore be presumed that close
cooperation on security issues will be continued, in particular in relation to the fight
against terrorism, defence against cyber-attacks, the protection of European citizens,
102 6 Conclusion

intelligence sharing, the Schengen Information System for border control, passenger
information lists for flights, the Europol law enforcement data bases and the Euro-
pean Criminal Records Information System. For the E.U. member states and E.U.
institutions it will per se mean to take up greater responsibility in terms of defence
spending and the provision of operational capacity and effectiveness. Furthermore,
the level of ambition regarding CFSP and CSDP needs to be newly assessed.
The extent to which Brexit has serious strategic consequences for European secu-
rity will therefore depend on whether the U.K. and the E.U. are able to move beyond
Brexit to create a new and substantial security partnership based on mutual respect
and trust. Both the U.K. and the remaining 27 E.U. Member States have strong
interests in negotiating new agreements, at strategic and operational levels, that can
help fill the post-Brexit institutional gap in defence and security cooperation. It also
needs to be witnessed how inner E.U. initiatives, such as PESCO, will enhance the
development of a more autonomous E.U. action in security and defence. Also, the
debate of a stronger European pillar within NATO will remain a subject of debate,
and could be even further triggered by the British leaving the E.U.
At the end of the day, however, the British government will have to recognize that
the security of the E.U. is indivisible from the security of the United Kingdom and
vice versa. Also, the challenges faced in security and defense terms will remain quite
similar across the Channel, despite of Brexit. Thus, there exists a mutual interest
for both negotiating parties, the E.U. and U.K., to have a close cooperation and a
pragmatic approach of how to best collaborate in order to deliver security to both the
E.U. and British citizens.