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A NOTE ON SOCRATE8 AND ARIBTO'ILE.
PEBaaPithe weightiest single rerrson for holding bo the usual
opinion about the relation of ElocreLes to the Platonic philosophy,
is whet is taken to be the testimony of Aristotle to the effect that
&ratas was qnoerned only with definibions and induative in-
quiries, and did not believe in the exidenoa of eeparate Ideas,
which last heresy wee due to Plato. There are various ways of
meeting this which might be adopted by thoae who think that a
caae has been established, by Professors Burnet and Taylor in par-
ticular, for soceptingPlato's own. rait of h r a b e e as containing
a subtantiel measure of truth. g..l
s a last mrt it is always pos-
sible to fsll baak on the supposition that A r i d e is mistaken, and
was not suffiaiently aaquainted with the faate. This is not an
altogether &isfactory solution. But it is not an impossible one
provided a strong enough positive cam aan be made out for the
thing that Arietotle denies; and at least it a n n o t be dismissed
off-hand by critics who urge that Aristotle has blundered egregiously
in dmribing the ideal theory of his own teacher Plato.
9 line of attack somewhat more setisfa& would be through s
re-in~rpretetionof dristotle's evidenos. A ~ as Ia matter of fact,
there are diiliculties connected with this a rt from any particular
thesis that one may desire to see emerge. gbubtless to the modem
r d e r it will seem natural to Cake the statement aa if it meant h t
80cmks regerded the u n i v e d simp1 in a oonoeptnalistic sense ;
g
but the historicel presum tion is on b e whole against this. The
original approach of the &reek mind to the problem of the univeml
was realistic rather than psychological ; for the Pythagoreans the
number theory was underetood in a thoroughly realietia way, and
everywhere in P l a b it ii evident that the realistic point of view ie
regarded as so obvious as hardlv to need aruument. It would
a&%rdingly be W b l e bo supPo& that the sktement about the
semratenese of the Idea h e reference. in the aase of &rates iust
main Aristotle's similar statement sbbut the Pythegoreans, n i t to
a denial of realism, but simply to a failure to
==riseg
any residuum of sense over and above the ideal e ments
constitub the reality of the phenomenal world-perha s bectmma
explioitl
whic
~ocnb ~e not thought hi. way far enough into the iBal theory
to realise the problems involved. It is certainly worth noting that,
in Met. A, Plato's innovation is said to consist In the fact, not that
 he made Ideas exist spar6 from sensible things by hypostashing
cronuepbe, but that he mede sensible t h i n p exiet apart from ' real '
univerda, and thus only indireably ' psrboipete ' in reality.'
The creee would be still &ro r if we muld follow Profsssor
B-et d m in ths s u p p c e i t i o n x t what Aristotle in M&. M hss
b say a b u t ' those who f h & maintained the erietenoa of Ideae ' is
meant to a ply, not b P l a b at all, but to the contemporery k o m t i o
p u p in t\e Phah.' I t is e drong argument in h m u r of this
b h , ae he points out, Arisbde expressly distinguishes the theory
he is here exemining as en eerly theory nob wnneabed with the

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neture of nnmtmrs ; end this carbir~lya n n o t apply to the doatrim
which he commonly attributes to Pleto. S i d e r l y he speake of
oertein aonsequenoes whioh follow for the& early Ideelista, but
which the Plebniete denied.
NeverLheleaa it is not easy b avoid the impression thet the
diotum about Swratea' uts a reel, thongh not necassarily a htel,
difficulty in the way of t&a thesis. For wbsl is stated here about
those who firet mid bhat there were Ideas has previously in Met. A
been aaid ex lioitl of Plato; and one woultl not naturally have
expected (o L d the same statement made of different -ns
without some ex@enetion. Furthermore, it ie not quite easy to be
sure of the meanmg of the paasage in this new referenoe. There
is mme trouble in supposing the4 prior to Plato, the metaphysia
of the ideel theory had been worked out sufficiently to develop a
sharp diffemnoe of opinion betwean Socrebse and hie Pythagomn
~ ~ s o c i a t(oertainly
ss we should n& gether this from the Pkmk);
while if we do thlnk that SmraCes' psition is being crontnded
with e clearly consoions early theory of q a r a k i o n of a very ax-
treme type,4 we have b meet the objeotion that the separation is
not only attributed in the two con- b different persons, bub
that it mill have to h r a di&rent meaning here from the one
ven to sepamtion in Mat. A. I t appears to me that a more
k s t i o remedy is needed 0 mmove thia difioulty.
A s an eppmsch to thia it is neoesserv to examine first the earlier
peseege.' -After d e a l i v briefl with thekythagoreans, Aristotle here
oroceeds to d v e a relat~velvc L r and stramhtforward aoaount of the
bnnexion &ween them a h P h t o - a cl& cronnexion on the whole,
thongh there are several points of diffe~nce. From Heracleitns
Plato had got the ition that sensible thin are in a state of
7
flus, so that no know1 ge of them is p i b l e . F rom &-crab he
derived the insight that knowledge is m n c e r n d with definitions or
u n i v e m l a EbcreLes himself, however, had been intereabd only
in e t h i d universals; it was P l a b who turned the method into
e generel theory of knowledge, end by combining the two docbrines

' Aid. A. 6,867 b, 8.

6 h c k Ph-hy, pp. 167, 313. Cf. pp. 165 ff.
Met. M. 4, 1078 b, 30.
Cf. Taylor, Van'n 6 c m d i c u , p. 81 ff.
5 Mat. A. 6.
 A NOTE ON 8 0 ~ AND
~ A~B I ~m E6. 473
WBS led not merelv to poetdata a world of Id- as the true objeat
of knowledge, but to separmte )he eeneible world from thie Re
having an esietenoe for knowledge only through ' participation ' in
the Forma Aa regard^ thb relationship of partiaiption P l a b did
not differ from the PyLhsgoreens, exmpt in using a different term
to express it. He elm egress in ~ayingthat the Numbere are the
C a U S M of the r d i t y ~f other thine. Hh d i b c l e e b y in intro-
duoing the objeobe of mathematias as inbermeiliete between sensible
t h i n p and the Forms; in hie theory of the Dyed; and in hie view
that the Numbere exist apart from sensible things, whersas the

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Py&agorsans say that the things themaelves are Numbers.
I t would Fbpp-r, then, thet in thie earlier passege Ariabtle baa
intention of oontrasting Plato m t h Socr&m when he
spealre of t e seperstion of the Ideas. The firet etahment which
he make3 to this effect m' M aonoeiwbly have E o Q r a h in mind,
but hardly on the m a t p%able interpretation. Sooreta ap-
to be inttduued merely to axplain Plabo's acloepbenue of the method
of definition ; the thought then bo4k to the problem of know-
l e d g raised by Herealeitua. E t h i a ia not Bmrated problem ia
i n b t e d by the fmt that Saoratea has just been said to have wn-
tined hie interest to ethh, and to h v e ignored general questions
about the physical or 'seneible' world. And a little further on
Aristotle expreaaly names the Pythagoreans as t h e from whom
Plate differed on the neetion of the mparetensse of the Ideas.
We need to have %us &tisely dear -unt in mind, then, in
turning b the seoond in Mat. M? In a general wey this
seems to be modelled on the basis of the ps- in A; but the
sequence ia muoh more mnfnsed. It sets out as a oritioiem of the
ideal theory rather than ~ E I an historicre1 amount of ik I n h t h
uasea, however; a referencle to the Herauleibn doatrine ie followed
b remarks about h r a t e e ;,and while bhese remerka are d e r -
d l y more ertonded in M,they lesd in the same w e y k an h$i+
andemnation of ' those who f h t maintained the existenoe of I em
for aiviw to Ideas a serarate eristenue. It ia hew that the swcial
di&m a b u t EoQrata appsare. The passege then goes on &th a
critiaal a t t d such ae the opening sentenue would l e d ne to emect.
I t doea not take a very i&eful-reading b beoome awere thsi the
referen- to &mraCeein thb d o n hee a far less netnrel setting
than in the earlier one. The trensibion oomee indeed 8s a distinct
jolt ;and thie jolt is not lsssened on a more m f d anelyak Why,
r
when we are alread launched on an aamun&aacmrding to the
ordinary view-of P ab's theory, ehonld we hum baak mddenly to
his pred-r? An interest primirily historid, BB in A, might
furniah rseson for this ; but here it is the o r i t i d intereat that is
nppermcmt, and the referenw adds nothing to the argument. In
the first lace it is a m i o n from aritioim to hietorid apprecia-
1
tion, an to an appreuiation, furthermore, in terms of aaientific
methodology rather than of a metephyaics of the ideel theory, with
Met. K 4.
which bhe rest of the paasege is oonoerned. I t is true that t h e
h t i o episode turns to metaphyeia a t its oloae. Bub even then
bhe relevanue Lo the argument is not a p nt. Those who first
mainteined Idem, the passege runs,gmve em -te
therefore it followed for them, d m & by the seme ab-,
%" existence ;
that
there must be Ideas of all things that are spoken of u n i v e q -
But why should suah a aonolueion follow from the fact thmt the
Idem are ueparake? What it might be tho ht to follow from is
the aentenoe whioh immediately p d e s the%ratio digmion-
that if knowledge is to have an obj- there mnet be other and

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permanent entities apart from those whioh are ~enaible;the point
would then be that the Ideas, not beuause they are eeperete, but as
the permanent elements present in &he sensible world, must exist
wherever suoh common elements are to ba discovered.
I t seems to me a probable hypothesis, therefore, that this last
repnwnts the original aonnexion, whiah would lseve the section
throughout what ah the stark it promieee to be-the criticism of a
doctrine whose historical antacedents have a l d y sufficiently been
explained. But some editor, it may lm conjeutured, finding himself
with a deteohed note aboub Soorah' contribution to scientific
method, hit upon this as a good plam to insert it, since he re-
called a former passege where a reference to &rates' metbod had
followed one to Herecleitns. To fit this note in, he supplied an
introduction and conclusion. Both are obviously reminkcant of
the former seation, though the rest of the pamage is new matter ;
and in both eases an alien hand is not difEcult to trece. The intro-
duction shows the familiar signs of a textual influence, as distinct
from independent writing, by the use of the words of the earlier
and more extended p a w in a dBerent g r a m m a t i d mnnexion,
and with a somewhat different and less appropriata meening.l And
in the conclusion the cese is still oleerer. The editor has to bring
the narrative back from methodology bo his text; and he does h i s
by repeating Aristotle's complaint that PLto gave the Ideas -re&
existence. But in doing so he falls into a misunderstending, and
interprets the failure to separate the universels as referrin to
Gmrates, whereas this was originally said by ArisbUe not a%out
8oaraCes, but about the Pythagoreans, and in a Bense whioh he
clearly explains. Its reference to &rates, on the c o n h r y , can
carry at bed a very unuertain meaning. I t is true that a litkle
later Aristotle is made to repeat incidentdy the same reference
to Socrab.? But if the origin of the first statement is as has been
suggested, there is no trouble in attributing the repetition also t o
the aame hand, espeoially as it refers back to the earlier passege a s
its o w .
%cp&uw & ucpl p i v r d jerd upcr,,ar+vcw, rrpi 8d j c OrXr/c
{em
P r a r &v, I v pi- m & a c rd coBdXw
u w r i j u a v r o s u p k v n ) v &&aav,
I ~ ~ L K &+w&
cai rrrpi +up&
k 6,987 b, 1-4. Zacpairovr 84 wrpi rds
uolJvov cai rrpi r o i r m v bpi{edor c d & u { p i m r
=+ &"1ml;l-le.
~ld
* Mef. N.9, 1088 b, E
 A NOTE ON SOCRATES AND A R I B T O T L E . 475

I t remains to note briefly the bearing which this elimination

would have u n the i d m a c a t i o n of t h m who first aaid there
were 1llea.s. may be taken as almost certain that this esrly
theory is the m e 8s t h t whioh is presnpposed in ahe Phado,
and thet it differs in imporbent rticulere from the one which,
aamrding to Arinhtle, was tanggBt conaisbenkly by Plato in the
A d e m y . There is s n albrnative, however, to s u p p i n g bhet it
therefore could not have teen Plab'e ; Aristoble's words might refer
ko a n early form in whioh Plato's own doatrine was cast. I n
favour of this would be the fact that Plato is elmwhere seid to

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have m m e to ahe theory by the errme Heraaleitean path that is
here attributed to its originators; and, in general, while some of
Aristotle's criticisms clearly refer to the Phado, the d e r hardly
geta the impression anywhere that he is confrontin in different
passaga two entirely different sets of antagonists. P aee no real
necresaity, however, for choosing between the alternatives. I n
view of the reasons Profeseor Burnet has mdduced, there seems no
g m d ground for supposing that the ideal theory represented in the
P& was not in its genere1 outlines actually held by 6ccrates,
and that Aristotle consequently did not mean to include both
Socrates and his essocietas among 'those who first maintained
the existence of Ideas'. But also I see no need for refusing to
s u p p s e that P l a b himeelf was in an earlier period a Socretic, and
thet Arisbokle therefore may not have thought of him, too,as in a
sense a member of the group which he introduces in a wey so
almost studiously indefinite. I t would appear indeed to have b e n
from the less developed form of the doctrine that Aristotle gets a
g d Bhare of his evidenoa for Plato's aeparatiou of the Ideas ; and
this may very well have predisposed him to continue to find
difficdbiea in the maturer theory which, in view of Plato's c h a n ~
of emphasis, would not otherwise have loomed es large.