Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)

Post-pandemic Infrastructure and Digital Connectivity in the Indo-Pacific

Author(s): Daniel F. Runde, Conor M. Savoy and Owen Murphy
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) (2020)
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep26994
Accessed: 14-12-2020 16:58 UTC

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) is collaborating with JSTOR to
digitize, preserve and extend access to this content.

This content downloaded from 202.125.103.103 on Mon, 14 Dec 2020 16:58:02 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 CSIS BRIEFS
Post-pandemic Infrastructure
and Digital Connectivity
in the Indo-Pacif ic
By Daniel F. Runde, Conor M. Savoy, and Owen Murphy NOVEMBER 2020

THE ISSUE
■  The Indo-Pacific region is critical to the interests of the United States. The pandemic presents challenges to
infrastructure and economic development but also reveals openings for U.S. leadership to collaborate with allies,
development banks and institutions, and the private sector to compete with China as the region seeks to accelerate
recovery efforts and diversify its investment and development opportunities post-pandemic.
■  Even prior to the global Covid-19 pandemic, economic trends already forecast changes to global supply chains. More
specifically, trends indicated an increase in global value chains, a heightened focus on closing the infrastructure gap,
as well as greater digital expansion, diversification, and connectivity in the Indo-Pacific. China has dominated the
infrastructure development space in the region in recent years with extensive funding and project allocation through
its Digital Silk Road and broader Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
■  The pandemic triggered a slowdown in funding for core infrastructure projects, an upsurge in concerns about debt
sustainability issues in emerging countries, and a continued emphasis on enhancing digital and energy infrastructure
in the Indo-Pacific.

Physical and digital connectivity have become both key

INTRODUCTION
Over the last few decades, the Indo-Pacific region has
experienced enormous change and unprecedented
development. With the three largest global economies—the
United States, China, and Japan—the region contributes
60 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP).1 This
figure will rise because the region also includes some of the
fastest growing developing economies in the world: India,
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Nepal, and the Philippines.
Its prosperous economic transition is largely due to the
expansion of market-based economies, many of which
still have room for liberal economic advancement. More
hospitable investment environments—particularly in
the private sector—have removed barriers, increased
transparency, and fostered greater economic prosperity.
pillars of and continuing goals for Indo-Pacific economies.
The region holds nine of the ten most active seaports in
the world and accounts for about 60 percent of global
maritime trade, a third of which crosses the South China
Sea alone.2 Open and free trade in the region remains a top
priority for the United States, as it is the destination for
a quarter of U.S. exports, with exports to India and China
more than doubling in the past decade.3
Economic growth pushed many Indo-Pacific countries
to either Upper Middle-Income Country (UMIC) or
Advanced Middle-Income Country (AMIC) status while
lifting billions of people out of poverty in the process.
Economic reforms have prompted the region to triple its
regional GDP over the last quarter century and categorize

CSIS BRIEFS | WWW.CSIS.ORG | 1

This content downloaded from 202.125.103.103 on Mon, 14 Dec 2020 16:58:02 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
70 percent of the population as either economically secure Healing the economic damage requires first addressing and
or middle class.4 The AMICs in the region include China, containing the pandemic itself. Currently, the countries
Malaysia, Thailand, Fiji, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives—with within the region that are on the fastest road to recovery are
Indonesia, Mongolia, the Philippines, and Vietnam set to the ones that implemented rapid and effective containment
join the group over the next decade (though this could take measures (e.g., Singapore, Mongolia, Taiwan, and Korea).
longer due to Covid-19).5 However, those that have struggled to contain Covid-19 face
Demand for infrastructure development in the Indo- even more severe economic contractions going forward (e.g.,
Pacific has grown steadily. With increasing urbanization India and the Philippines). These countries in particular
and government focus on new economic sectors, general have had to put infrastructure development projects on hold
construction in 2019 was expected to reach an 8.9 in order to prioritize addressing the immediate impacts of
percent compound annual growth rate by 2023. The Asian the Covid-19 crisis (e.g., health, poverty, unemployment,
Development Bank (ADB) in 2019 estimated that to keep breakdown of supply chains and services, and struggling
up with economic growth and climate change, the region’s SMEs).11 Given that many of the countries struggling were
infrastructure development would require an investment of already trying to break out of low and lower-middle income
$1.7 trillion annually until 2030.6 Vast global and regional status (e.g., Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste, Cambodia, and
advances in technology and communication mechanisms Myanmar), Covid-19 poses another challenging setback to
have transformed supply chains; as they have become their economic growth in the long term.12
shorter and more efficient, governments have looked to
expand their digital infrastructure capacity and diversify
partnerships and investors to diverge from previous Chinese
A rapid digital transformation within
dominance in the region.7 the Indo-Pacif ic region is greatly
Over the last few decades, supply chains have increasingly needed in areas such as e-commerce
become global value chains, where goods and services
production cycles span multiple countries. Global platforms, cybersecurity measures,
value chains made up a total of 70 percent of global distance learning protocols, legal
trade in 2019.8 A rapid digital transformation within
the Indo-Pacific region is greatly needed in areas such frameworks reforms, e-government
as e-commerce platforms, cybersecurity measures, services, and increasing local
distance learning protocols, legal frameworks reforms,
e-government services, and increasing local technical technical cooperation.
cooperation. Nevertheless, prior to the pandemic, the
Indo-Pacific was on an unsustainable development track.
Percent of Real GDP Growth in Developing Asia
Many countries were developing an overdependence
on fossil fuels and were experiencing an increase in
income inequality as they sought rapid development.
Covid-19 has severely exacerbated the obstacles
to economic development in the region. Since the
World Health Organization (WHO) recognized the
coronavirus as a global pandemic in March 2020,
Covid-19 has infected over 8.2 million people in the
Indo-Pacific.9 In addition to its impact on health,
the economic consequences of the pandemic—twin
supply shocks (stalled production and supply of
goods and services) and demand shocks (reduced
incomes, greatly restricted mobility, and social
distancing measures)—make recovery timelines for
many countries unpredictable. The IMF predicts the
slowest growth for the region in 60 years.10

CSIS BRIEFS | WWW.CSIS.ORG | 2

This content downloaded from 202.125.103.103 on Mon, 14 Dec 2020 16:58:02 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
U.S. APPROACH TO ECONOMIC AND
INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
IN THE INDO-PACIFIC
The Trump administration outlined its vision for a free
and open Indo-Pacific in November of 2017, aimed at
ensuring all of the countries in the region remain strong,
independent, and prosperous.13 The Indo-Pacific Strategy
(IPS) recognizes the importance of safeguarding a peaceful
and open Indo-Pacific, not only for the billions of people
who live there, but also for U.S. economic and strategic
interests. Protecting the freedom of sea lanes, airways, and
cyberspace in the region is essential to ensuring that this
economic exchange, and the livelihoods that depend on
it, can continue to grow. The Indo-Pacific Strategy seeks to
accomplish this by focusing on three pillars: governance,
security, and economics. The governance pillar seeks to
ensure that Indo-Pacific countries are free from coercion
by strengthening and supporting state sovereignty,
regional bodies, civil society, and democratic institutions.
The security pillar focuses on promoting partnerships in
the region to protect regional stability, maritime security,
freedom of navigation, and deter transnational crime,
environmental degradation, and terrorism. The economics
pillar aims to promote regional integration and economic
growth by encouraging open, transparent, and fair
investment environments and enhanced trade networks.
The Indo-Pacific Strategy calls for a whole-of-
government approach to enacting these pillars.
Alongside the many other agencies involved in the
implementation of the Trump administration’s vision
since its launch, USAID plays a leading role in meeting
some of the vision’s flagship initiatives, especially
those aimed specifically at economic and infrastructure
development in the Indo-Pacific.
These include the Infrastructure Transaction and
Assistance Network (ITAN), an interagency initiative
aimed at promoting sustainable, transparent, and high-
quality infrastructure across the Indo-Pacific. Within
ITAN, USAID encourages private investment in the region
and helps its regional partners manage projects that
meet these sustainability and transparency standards.14
Another initiative is the Digital Connectivity and
Cybersecurity Partnership (DCCP), whose goal is to
promote a free, open, and secure internet in the Indo-
Pacific, starting primarily with the implementation of
regulatory standards and reforms as well as private sector
network investments.15 A third initiative, known as Asia
EDGE (Enhancing Development and Growth through
This content downloaded from 202.125.103.103 on Mon, 14 Dec 2020 16:58:02 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Energy), seeks to develop sustainable and secure energy
projects in the region, with USAID leading the effort to
work with Indo-Pacific partners to support and promote
energy access, diversification, and security across the
region going forward.16
Though USAID has played an outsized role in its
implementation, the strategy’s whole-of-government
approach has also relied on support from other
government agencies. In 2018 alone—the first fiscal
year since the IPS was announced—the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) invested over
$640 million into projects in the Asia region.17 This is
a vast increase from the $503 million OPIC invested in
2017, and investments continue to increase now under
the recently formed U.S. International Development
Finance Corporation (DFC).18 Roughly around when
the IPS entered into force, the Millennium Challenge
Corporation (MCC) signed compacts in the region worth
$830 million, and is currently developing compacts with
Indonesia and Timor Leste that would grow the agency’s
commitment even further.19 And from 2018–2019, the
U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USDTA) spent
over $24 million to support infrastructure development
projects in the Indo-Pacific, second only to its similar
investments in sub-Saharan Africa.20
ECONOMIC AND INFRASTRUCTURE CHAL-
LENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE
INDO-PACIFIC DURING COVID-19
CHALLENGES AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS
Some of the most significant consequences of the
Covid-19 pandemic for the Indo-Pacific region are its
unsustainable debt levels, digital transformation needs,
and collapsing supply and value chains.21 The majority of
Indo-Pacific countries are in great need of infrastructure
development but do not currently possess the policy or
fiscal space to revive economies and facilitate large scale
infrastructure investments.22 More specifically, countries
in the Indo-Pacific have large fiscal deficits (e.g., Vietnam
and Cambodia), elevated levels of debt (e.g., Malaysia,
Vietnam, Lao PDR, and Papua New Guinea), and an
over-reliance on volatile capital (e.g., Cambodia and
Indonesia).23 Moreover, key sectors such as tourism and
manufacturing continue to struggle— leading the private
sector to experience cuts to revenue and reduced access
to capital.24 As a hub of international travel, the Indo-
Pacific’s falling tourism numbers have led to an estimated
loss of $1.04 trillion in annual GDP for the region. Many
CSIS BRIEFS | WWW.CSIS.ORG | 3
businesses, small and large, are no longer able to sustain
pre-pandemic levels of operations.25
The Covid-19 pandemic has exposed vulnerabilities and
structural flaws (e.g., factory lockdowns, transportation
disruptions, and shortages caused by panic buying)
in global supply and value chains that have led to
trade restrictions and nationalist policies meant to
impede globalization and dependent supply chains.26
The aftereffects of the pandemic will likely require a
redefinition of globalization since, even prior to the
pandemic, a number of initiatives intended to address
concerns and perceived vulnerabilities in global supply
chains were put forward. Examples of these measures
include altering cost structures to counteract East Asia’s
shrinking cost advantage, facilitating the “re-localization
of supply chains,” supporting investment in manufacturing
technology (e.g., Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing
building U.S. plants in Arizona), and lastly, augmenting
certain sectors that have proven to be particularly
vulnerable (e.g., biopharmaceuticals, medical tools,
electrical and mechanical machinery, semiconductors, and
aerospace).27,28 The implications of these actions for the
future of infrastructure development in the Indo-Pacific
remain unclear.
The majority of Indo-Pacif ic countries
are in great need of infrastructure
development but do not currently
possess the policy or f iscal space to
revive economies and facilitate large
scale infrastructure investments.
In part, these globalization changes led Indo-Pacific
countries to seek diversification of partners and
opportunities to increase country capacity, thereby shifting
demand.29 As China looks to leverage the pandemic for
its own gains, other countries in the Indo-Pacific need
to be given greater opportunities to partner with the
United States, Australia, Japan, and other allies for their
infrastructure development needs, especially during the
upstream phase (i.e., project identification). Similarly,
developed governments and multilateral institutions
should seek to diversify sourcing and back critical
production capacities in the region (e.g., pharmaceuticals
This content downloaded from 202.125.103.103 on Mon, 14 Dec 2020 16:58:02 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
and food supply) as well as engage the private sector in
public private partnerships (PPPs). The public sector can
amplify investment and economic growth, create more
transparency, and facilitate energy efficient, high-quality
projects for the Indo-Pacific.
China’s Support for Indo-Pacific
Infrastructure Developments
Since 2013, China has become a significant source of
infrastructure development financing in the Indo-Pacific
under its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).30 While promoted
as a direct investment and diplomatic tool in emerging
markets, the BRI has also promoted unsustainable, non-
transparent, and debt-generating projects, often leaving
countries worse off than they started. Covid-19 has
created a situation in which Indo-Pacific countries likely
face greater reliance on China’s threatening infrastructure
financing unless effective alternatives are put forth.
However, China has halted or suspended numerous
infrastructure and development projects in BRI countries
due to the vast disruptions to global supply chains,
workers repatriating from other countries, travel
restrictions, and economic and social lockdowns.31
Furthermore, domestically, China’s current account
struggled, seeing only 3.2 percent second quarter growth
after an economic contraction of 6.8 percent of GDP in
the first quarter of 2020.32
Chinese firms are struggling with debt and sustainability
issues regarding BRI initiatives, so Beijing has undergone
an inward policy change (Dual Circulation policy) that
stems from mounting public pressure to prioritize
domestic investment over foreign investment. According
to a survey conducted by China’s Ministry of Foreign
Affairs in June, Covid-19 has impacted about 50 to 60
percent of the projects under China’s Belt and Road
Initiative.33 Despite the global slowdown of economic
activity, China’s economy is set to fully recover, and many
predict BRI activity to increase in the long run, starting
with initiatives under the Digital Silk Road.34
Under the Digital Silk Road, Beijing has announced
its efforts to directly infiltrate the region with the
development and expansion of new 5G networks and data
centers—along with software and surveillance programs
that governments may abuse—thus possibly further
inflating the gap for hidden strategic corruption and debt.35
In addition to the ongoing “tech cold war” between China
and the United States, Covid-19 has only increased efforts
and drive from Chinese technology firms to win projects
CSIS BRIEFS | WWW.CSIS.ORG | 4
in the region. With the developing trends of Covid-19,
China’s Digital Silk Road faces many new opportunities
for acceleration and expansion in the Indo-Pacific. China’s
“whole of society” strategy and interoperability of Chinese
tech platforms allows it to move faster to begin projects
and gain influence in comparison to other countries such
as the United States.36 Digital infrastructure projects tend
to have lower costs, and as Covid-19 has underscored the
significance of a digital economy in addressing both the
pandemic and efforts to keep economies and societies
operating, Indo-Pacific countries with fewer affordable
alternatives are eyeing Chinese firms and financing.37
IT infrastructure and data projects provide Beijing
with ample opportunity to disrupt or manipulate
information flows, access private data or information,
track and monitor individuals, and much more.38 As
China’s development strategies threaten the economic,
environmental, and social sustainability in the region,
Covid-19 has expedited the efforts of the United States
and its allies to promote a free and open Indo-Pacific.39
Digital infrastructure projects tend
to have lower costs, and as Covid-19
has underscored the signif icance of
a digital economy in addressing both
the pandemic and efforts to keep
economies and societies operating,
Indo-Pacif ic countries with fewer
affordable alternatives are eyeing
Chinese f irms and f inancing.
Infrastructure Demands and Opportunities
Infrastructure has been greatly impacted by the Covid-19
pandemic, leading to a slowdown in investment and
a decline in asset utilization and solvency challenges
throughout the Indo-Pacific.40 Nevertheless, core
infrastructure projects are still needed to address digital
integration, economic growth, disaster risk reduction,
gender disparities, and other issues. Specific sectors
that will require increased attention include sustainable
transport and efficient energy projects— primarily through
the acquisition of distributed renewable energy resources
This content downloaded from 202.125.103.103 on Mon, 14 Dec 2020 16:58:02 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
and the integration of these resources into power grids.
Moreover, countries can encourage their manufacturing
industries to integrate renewable energy and storage
technologies to become more resilient. These projects
will become increasingly important as the global climate
crisis worsens, and Indo-Pacific countries’ attention
focuses on shifting toward an increasingly virtual world.
These changes will require the region to integrate
renewable energies, promote energy efficiency, and plan
infrastructure for disaster risk management.41
The Indo-Pacific presents a “digital frontier” where rapid
digital transformation is needed.42 This includes robust
internet infrastructure and cybersecurity; modernized
data centers, e-commerce, and e-governance services;
and enhanced digital literacy programs and legal
frameworks to foster and protect economic growth
and stability. The pandemic has revealed that a lack
of digital development and connectivity has created
larger vulnerabilities for entrepreneurship and SMEs,
which comprise the clear majority of Asia’s employment
opportunities. Implementing digital infrastructure and
increasing connectivity is a complicated process that
involves cybersecurity concerns, misinformation and
disinformation campaigns, and other impediments to
digital inclusion.
•  Development of cybersecurity capacity and sufficient
legal frameworks is critical to fostering sustainable digital
growth, infrastructure, and connectivity while also
protecting governance initiatives, democratic institutions,
and digital markets.43 The Indo-Pacific region in particular
has increased focus on building cyber capabilities for
member states and deterring bad actors. Nonetheless,
as Covid-19 catalyzes digital demand, cybersecurity will
become an ever-increasing concern.44
•  In a progressively digital environment, misinformation
and disinformation campaigns present a challenge
to accurate communications, governance, and
development. Covid-19 produced an enormous
“infodemic,” an overload of information channels
that wound up preventing reliable and trustworthy
communications from providing guidance for citizens.45
In the Indo-Pacific, governments, multilateral
institutions, journalists, and individuals on social
media platforms have made efforts to counteract
misinformation and disinformation campaigns in
response. A creative example is BBC’s initiative to
contest the “infodemic” in Myanmar, Indonesia,
India, Cambodia, and Nepal through traditional folk
CSIS BRIEFS | WWW.CSIS.ORG | 5
 music.46 However, countries such as the Philippines
and Cambodia are also leveraging the existence
of misinformation campaigns and government
health policies during Covid-19 to justify increased
authoritarian measures that target and charge political
opponents and activists.47
•  Digital infrastructure programs should specifically target
gaps in digital inclusion, technology literacy, and internet
connectivity, as these will be essential to strengthening
local economies during and after the pandemic.48 The
Indo-Pacific region has already undergone much digital
development—with 2.3 billion people in the region having
access to the internet in 2019.49 Nevertheless, there
remains a significant digital divide, as approximately
2 billion people in the region do not have internet
access and 207 million women do not have access
to mobile phones. This challenge disproportionately
affects low-income and/or rural populations as well
as women who are less “fluent” in digital resources,
have less access to online and mobile networks, are
the targets of various forms of digital harassment, and
have fewer economic and social opportunities when
targeted infrastructure development is lacking. Digital
inclusion, connectivity, and literacy programming will
need to be a central concern for Covid-19 recovery and
economic development efforts by governments, investors,
multilateral organizations, and aid agencies.50
COVID-19 ACCELERATES DEMAND FOR
DIGITAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF TECHNOLOGY
IN VIETNAM
Vietnam’s Covid-19 response was rapid and relatively
effective, allowing only minimal cases and deaths
nationwide.51,52 Moreover, despite economic
consequences caused by the pandemic (including
negative impacts to trade, manufacturing exports,
foreign direct investment (FDI), and tourism),
Vietnam was able to quickly re-open its economy
following strict Covid-19 response measures that
included movement restrictions, school closures,
and travel bans. It also leveraged its large domestic
spending (approximately 68 percent of GDP) through
a $1.6 billion stimulus package for households and
SMEs to help keep the economy alive.53 Consequently,
the Asian Development Bank (ADB) estimates that
despite the pandemic, Vietnam is on track to have the
fastest growing economy in Southeast Asia.54
This content downloaded from 202.125.103.103 on Mon, 14 Dec 2020 16:58:02 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
A large part of the success of the Vietnamese
response efforts can be attributed to its effective
use of information technology and online tools to
spread health messaging and information. Prior
to the pandemic, Vietnam had instituted various
digital agendas to increase digital infrastructure.
In December of 2019, Vietnam established the
National Public Services Portal, a public service
and e-government platform serving as a conduit
between government, citizens, and businesses.55
This platform later became a central part of the
Covid-19 response to disseminate public health
announcements and information. Following the worst
of Covid-19, the government instituted the National
Digital Transformation Roadmap 2025 in June 2020,
which laid out a multidimensional transition plan
that prioritizes e-government, e-economy, and
e-society initiatives.56
1. E-government: this initiative aims to digitize
documents, public services, and administrative
capacities like the National Public Services
Portal. Moreover, it seeks to expand national
databases monitoring demographics,
population, property, insurance, and business
inventory.
2. E-economy: this initiative aims to have 30
percent of GDP based on digital activities
by 2030 and to implement e-commerce in
business and online markets. Vietnam hopes to
increase domestic technological innovation by
reaching a goal of 100,000 local tech firms.
3. E-society: this initiative aims to bridge digital
gaps and increase digital inclusion. Strategies
include increasing access to the internet and
fiber optic broadbands, deploying 5G networks,
promoting online spending, and diversifying
e-payment methods. Additionally, it encourages
investment into newer digital technologies
of interest such as cloud computing, artificial
intelligence, blockchains, and “the internet
of things.”
Other related initiatives include supporting local
tech firms and e-commerce platforms (e.g., Tiki and
Sendo) and promoting local social media platforms
as they compete with international corporations.
Vietnam seeks support from the private sector to
CSIS BRIEFS | WWW.CSIS.ORG | 6

help boost the economy following the pandemic
and enhance its digital goals. Nonetheless, Vietnam
faces various challenges to fostering innovation
and digital development—such as censorship and
weak legal systems. Heightened state censorship
(e.g., its 2018 cybersecurity law), mandated
government access to stored digital data from both
foreign and domestic companies, and surveillance
of homegrown social media platforms may impede
digital capacity and economic growth. In addition,
Vietnam’s current underdeveloped and adverse legal
frameworks stifle innovation and technological
advancements, which ultimately challenge its
overarching digital agenda.
2020 presents opportunities for accelerated digital
integration and investment, partner diversification,
and refinement of digital infrastructure initiatives
particularly in the context of national crises.57
Overall, the pandemic may assist in expediting
digital development and investment in Vietnam
and the wider regional and global context.58
OPPORTUNITIES POST-PANDEMIC:
RECOMMENDATIONS
To compete with China in the digital and hard
infrastructure sector, USAID should adapt its approach
to the economics pillar of the Indo-Pacific Strategy in the
following ways:
PRIORITIZE THE EXPANSION OF ACCESS TO WATER,
SANITATION, AND HOUSING
In 2019, the Indo-Pacific region became majority urban
with at least 2.3 billion people living in urban areas across
the region.59 By 2050, this number is expected to grow to
3.5 billion.60 While urbanization can be hugely beneficial for
economic growth, it also brings its own set of infrastructure
challenges. One of the most basic issues is a lack of adequate
housing. Urban density in the Indo-Pacific is the highest of
any region in the world, and one third of urban-dwellers live
in slums or slum-like conditions. Unsurprisingly, many of
these residential areas lack basic services like piped water
and sanitation (sewage). According to the ADB, in 2016,
1.7 billion people across the Indo-Pacific lacked access to
basic sanitation, and in 48 member countries, less than
50 percent of the populations had access to piped water.61
These issues are not exclusive to urban areas—in fact, rural
areas tend to have even less access to water and sanitation.
This content downloaded from 202.125.103.103 on Mon, 14 Dec 2020 16:58:02 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
USAID should seek to actively address these basic
infrastructure gaps. Covid-19 has exacerbated the
negative health consequences of overcrowding and
lack of access to clean water. Even after the virus is
contained, failure to address these growing basic needs
will create a fertile breeding ground for future pandemics,
as well as limit sorely needed economic growth.
Moreover, basic infrastructure provision provides an
enormous strategic opportunity for the United States. By
concentrating heavily on large-scale projects and digital
infrastructure provision, China has somewhat neglected
these sectors of infrastructure development.62 The U.S.
development community is well positioned to fill this
dearth by providing long-term gains toward livelihoods,
government service provisions, and employment
prospects in the process.
INVEST IN BROADBAND INTERNET—THE
“NEW ELECTRICITY”
Not only are basic infrastructure needs not being met in
the region, but so is broadband internet access—which
Covid-19 has revealed is a necessity in today’s digital,
globalized world. Less than 15 percent of the population in
the Indo-Pacific has access to broadband internet.63 China
has prioritized broadband internet provision throughout
the region, but the need for broadband access is nowhere
near satiated. As with water and sanitation, rural areas
have even less access than urban ones. While some
countries have rapidly improved in recent years, others
are persistently behind—in Cambodia, Laos PDR, and
Myanmar, broadband access was below 1 subscription per
100 households as late as 2017.64
Post-Covid, broadband will be the “new electricity”. The
pandemic has brought enormous economic challenges,
but it has also transformed the way people live, work,
and study—in many cases for the better.65 There has been
more progress toward e-government, e-commerce, and
distance learning in the last 30 weeks than in the last 30
years.66 These developments hold enormous potential for
economic growth in the region going forward. However,
for these gains to be realized, and for growth to be
inclusive of all subregions and income-levels, the digital
broadband they depend on will need to be expanded
significantly. The UN Economic and Social Commission for
Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) member states in the Indo-
Pacific region have recognized this gap and are actively
seeking to address it through the Asia-Pacific Information
Superhighway initiative (AP-IS), whose goal is to promote
regional cooperation around building broadband activity.67
CSIS BRIEFS | WWW.CSIS.ORG | 7
To ensure that broadband infrastructure is built where it
is most needed, and to strengthen regional coordination
going forward, USAID should actively seek to expand
broadband infrastructure development within the
framework of the AP-IS Master Plan.68
High-quality infrastructure and proper connectivity have a
direct impact on the delivery of public goods and services
and overall economic efficiency, growth, and productivity.
Digital infrastructure provides an enabling environment
for mobilizing domestic and international private capital to
support the broader agenda of economic development and
human prosperity.69
CREATE A PIPELINE OF INVESTABLE AND
BANKABLE PROJECTS
U.S. government agencies should collaborate by unifying
program standards and actively working with countries
in the Indo-Pacific to identify sector needs and promote
digital and hard infrastructure while they recover from
the effects of the pandemic. More specifically, USAID
should work with the DFC and the United States Trade and
Development Agency (USTDA) to create a reliable pipeline
of investable (bankable) projects to take advantage of the
large infrastructure gaps in the Indo-Pacific. Interagency
collaboration will be essential for project implementation
during the development, construction, operation, and
evaluation stages of all projects.
USAID’s efforts and on-the-ground presence in the
region is paramount for building the foundation of a
functional project pipeline, but its ability to reposition
businesses and provide tools to governments is limited
without a dedicated interagency pipeline. USTDA can
provide valuable connections to U.S. companies and assist
throughout the entirety of a project process, especially
during the upstream and project design phases, as well as
during project renegotiations and when economic activity
begins to resume. Likewise, the DFC will be crucial in
attracting investment from the private sector to promote
infrastructure development and resilient economic growth.
This could include collaboration on the Blue Dot Network
to further enable infrastructure projects and strengthen
U.S. relationships from a single government front. In order
to heighten project impact and opportunities, USAID,
the DFC, and USTDA should also continue to coordinate
their project objectives more closely—such as through the
Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network (ITAN),
while also enabling Indo-Pacific countries to establish their
own national project development funds.
This content downloaded from 202.125.103.103 on Mon, 14 Dec 2020 16:58:02 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
USAID and other U.S. agencies must recognize the
importance of collaboration over competition as there is
bound to be overlap in terms of relationships and expertise
among the agencies.
CREATE A STRATEGIC INVESTMENT FUND FOR THE
INDO-PACIFIC
The U.S. government should create a Strategic Investment
Fund for the Indo-Pacific with the mission of providing the
region with grants for digital infrastructure. The new fund
should leverage USAID’s technical assistance expertise
and the DFC’s expanded credit guarantee capabilities and
increased investment tools to provide digital infrastructure
in the Indo-Pacific that fosters long-term access to capital
and a business enabling environment. In addition, where
appropriate, Export-Import Bank financing could support
projects launched under this fund. Such a fund could also
pursue co-financing MOUs with the Asian Development
Bank and other regional allies, such as Japan and Australia
to further expand the pool of funding.
Countries who receive grants from the Strategic
Investment Fund could become part of a Digital
Connectivity Compact, which would ensure that the
country’s digital infrastructure meets quality infrastructure
standards. USAID and other U.S. development agencies
would provide technical assistance to help these
countries meet the required benchmarks. On larger-scale
projects, the fund should seek to work with multilateral
development banks, bilateral development finance
institutions, and other development agencies to co-finance
digital connectivity initiatives.
USAID’s ability to improve the digital infrastructure space
and digital connectivity in the region will be central
to meeting the objectives of the Indo-Pacific Strategy
and countering China’s Digital Silk Road and Belt and
Road Initiative. A Strategic Investment Fund provides a
platform for incorporating digital thinking within Indo-
Pacific development for the long-term. USAID and partner
agencies should focus on building a business-enabling
environment to facilitate U.S. private sector engagement in
the Indo-Pacific digital conversation, lest Chinese telecom
firms take their place.
CSIS BRIEFS | WWW.CSIS.ORG | 8
Daniel F. Runde is senior vice president and director of the
Project on Prosperity and Development at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.
Conor Savoy is a non-resident senior associate with the Project
on Prosperity and Development at CSIS. Owen Murphy is a
program coordinator and research assistant for the Project on
Prosperity and Development at CSIS.
The authors would like to thank Rakan Aboneaaj, Elena
Méndez Leal, Virgil Parker, and Blair Sullivan for their excellent
research assistance.
Support for this brief was provided by the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID). The views expressed here
do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID.

CSIS BRIEFS are produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution
focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific
policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to
be solely those of the author(s). © 2020 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
Cover Photo: NHAC NGUYEN/AFP via Getty Images

CSIS BRIEFS | WWW.CSIS.ORG | 9

This content downloaded from 202.125.103.103 on Mon, 14 Dec 2020 16:58:02 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

ENDNOTES
1. U.S. Department of Defense, Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness,
Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region (Washington, DC:
U.S. Department of Defense, June 1, 2019), https://media.defense.
gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DE-
FENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. “Advanced Middle-Income Countries of the Indo-Pacific: The Road
Ahead,” Asia Foundation, March 5, 2019, https://asiafoundation.
org/2019/02/21/advanced-middle-income-countries-of-the-indo-
pacific-the-road-ahead/.
5. “AMICs: Advancing Middle Income Countries,” Asia Foundation,
https://asiafoundation.org/emerging-issues/amic/.
6. “Asia Infrastructure Needs Exceed $1.7 Trillion Per Year, Double
Previous Estimates,” Asian Development Bank, February 28, 2017,
https://www.abd.org/news/asia-infrastructure-needs-exceed-17-tril-
lion-year-double-previous-estimares#:~:text=Developing%20
Asia%20will%20need%20to,(climate%Dadjusted%20estimate).
7. Vijar Vaitheeswaren, “Supply Chains are Undergoing a Dramatic
Transformation,” The Economist, July 11, 2020, https://www.
economist.com/special-report/2019/07/11/supply-chains-are-
undergoing-a-dramatic-transformation.
8. “The Trade Policy Implications of Global Value Chains,” Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), https://www.
oecd.org/trade/topics/global-value-chains-and-trade/.
9. “Asia Pacific COVID-19: Humanitarian Data Portal,” U.N. Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), https://interac-
tive.unocha.org/data/ap-covid19-portal/index.html.
10. Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Outlook 2020 Update:
Wellness in Worrying Times (ADB: Mandaluyong, Philippines,
September 2020), https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publica-
tion/635666/ado2020-update.pdf.
11. Jiten Arora and Surya Bagchi, “ASEAN needs to re-think approach to
US$2.8 trillion infrastructure gap,” Standard Chartered, April 3, 2019,
https://www.sc.com/en/feature/asean-needs-to-re-think-approach-
to-us2-8-trillion-infrastructure-gap/; Swiss Reinsurance Company
Ltd, “Infrastructure investment to be a key driver of growth in
emerging markets post COVID-19 crisis, sigma says,” Media release,
June 17, 2020, https://www.swissre.com/media/news-releases/
nr-20200617-sigma-3-2020.html; and “Can governments across
Asia-Pacific accelerate infrastructure investment to offset Covid-19
disruption?” Design Build, June 8, 2020, https://www.design-
build-network.com/comment/covid-19-asia-pacific-infrastructure/.
12. The World Bank, World Bank East Asia and Pacific Economic Update, April
2020: East Asia and Pacific in the Time of COVID-19 (Washington DC:
The World Bank, April 2020), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/
handle/10986/33477.
13. U.S. Department of State, A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a
Shared Vision (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, Nov. 4,
2019), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Free-
and-Open-Indo-Pacific-4Nov2019.pdf.
14. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Fact Sheet:
Advancing Sustainable Infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific Region (Wash-
ington DC: USAID, August 7, 2019), https://www.usaid.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/1861/USAID_ITAN_Fact_Sheet_080719.pdf.
15. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Fact Sheet:
Advancing Digital Connectivity in the Indo-Pacific Region (Washington
DC: USAID, August 7, 2019), https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/1861/USAID_DCCP_Fact_Sheet_080719f.pdf.
16. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Asia EDGE Fact
Sheet: The U.S. Government’s Indo-Pacific Energy Initiative (Wash-
ington DC: USAID, June 28, 2019), https://www.usaid.gov/sites/de-
This content downloaded from 202.125.103.103 on Mon, 14 Dec 2020 16:58:02 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
fault/files/documents/1861/July_8_Asia_EDGE_Factsheet.pdf.
17. “Transparency and Accountability: Data on DFC Projects,” Develop-
ment Finance Corporation, September 30, 2018, https://www.dfc.
gov/who-we-are/transparency-and-accountability.
18. Ibid.
19. U.S. Department of State, A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing A
Shared Vision (Washington DC: U.S. Department of State, November
4, 2019), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Free-
and-Open-Indo-Pacific-4Nov2019.pdf.
20. U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA), 2018 Annual Report
(Washington, DC: USTDA, 2019), https://ustda.gov/wp-content/up-
loads/FY-2018-Annual-Report.pdf; and U.S. Trade and Development
Agency (USTDA), 2019 Annual Report (Washington, DC: USTDA,
2020), https://ustda.gov/wp-content/uploads/FINAL-2019-Annu-
al-Report.pdf.
21. International Finance Corporation (IFC), COVID-19 Economic Impact:
East Asia and the Pacific, (Washington DC: IFC, May 2020), https://
www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/b612cced-108c-42fb-9e8e-
eb977bd7d19f/20200528-COVID-19-Response-Brief-EAP.pdf?-
MOD=AJPERES&CVID=n9swElA.
22. UNDP, The Social and Economic Impact of Covid-19 in the Asia-Pacific
Region, (UNDP: New York, April 28, 2020), https://www.undp.org/
content/undp/en/home/librarypage/crisis-prevention-and-recovery/
the-social-and-economic-impact-of-covid-19-in-asia-pacific.html.
23. IFC, COVID-19 Economic Impact: East Asia and the Pacific.
24. Ibid.
25. Molly Moore, “Tourism industry in Asia Pacific - Statistics & Facts,”
Statista, September 10, 2020, https://www.statista.com/topics/6107/
tourism-industry-in-asia-pacific/.
26. “Covid-19 is bringing out protectionist instincts,” Financial Times,
April 19, 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/ed78b09c-80a3-11ea-
8fdb-7ec06edeef84.
27. Carlos Cordon and Eric Buatois, “A post COVID-19 outlook: the future
of the supply chain,” Institute for Management Development, May
2020, https://www.imd.org/research-knowledge/articles/A-post-
COVID-19-outlook-The-future-of-the-supply-chain/.
28. Ben Aylor, Bitan Datta, Megan DeFauw, Marc Gilbert, Claudio Knizek,
and Michael McAdoo, “Designing Resilience into Global Supply
Chains,” Boston Consulting Group, August 3, 2020, https://www.bcg.
com/publications/2020/resilience-in-global-supply-chains.
29. Daniel F. Runde and Sundar R. Ramanujam, “Recovery with Resil-
ience: Diversifying Supply Chains to Reduce Risk in the Global
Economy,” CSIS, September 4, 2020, https://csis-website-prod.s3.am-
azonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/200904_Ramanujam_Global-
Supply_v4.pdf.
30. Andrew Chatzky and James McBride, “China’s Massive Belt and Road
Initiative,” Council on Foreign Relations, January 28, 2020, https://
www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative.
31. Kirk Lancaster, Michael Rubin, and Mira Rapp-Hooper, “What the
COVID-19 Pandemic May Mean for China’s Belt and Road Initiative,”
Council on Foreign Relations, March 17, 2020, https://www.cfr.org/
blog/what-covid-19-pandemic-may-mean-chinas-belt-and-road-
initiative.
32. “China GDP Annual Growth Rate,” Trading Economics, https://trading-
economics.com/china/gdp-growth-annual.
33. “China says one-fifth of Belt and Road projects ‘seriously affected’ by
pandemic,” Reuters, June 18, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-health-coronavirus-china-silkroad/china-says-one-fifth-of-belt-
and-road-projects-seriously-affected-by-pandemic-idUSKBN23Q0I1;
Sébastian Seibt, “Covid-19 creates bumps in China’s ‘New Silk Road,’”
France 24, May 20, 2020, https://www.france24.com/en/20200520-
covid-19-creates-bumps-in-china-s-new-silk-road.
34. Saheli Roy Choudhury, “Ex-Goldman economist Jim O’Neill says Chi-
CSIS BRIEFS | WWW.CSIS.ORG | 10
 na’s economy ‘well on the way’ to recover from coronavirus,” CNBC,
September 21, 2020, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/09/21/china-econ-
omy-is-on-the-way-to-recovering-from-covid-19-jim-oneill.html.
35. Net Politics, “China’s Digital Silk Road: Strategic Technological Com-
petition and Exporting Political Illiberalism,” Council on Foreign
Relations, September 26, 2019, https://www.cfr.org/blog/chi-
nas-digital-silk-road-strategic-technological-competition-and-ex-
porting-political.
36. Xie Jun, “Whole-of-society effort drives technology development in
China,” Global Times, June 25, 2020, https://www.globaltimes.cn/
content/1155732.shtml.
37. Jude Blanchette and Jonathan E. Hillman, “China’s Digital Silk Road
after the Coronavirus,” CSIS, April 13, 2020, https://www.csis.org/
analysis/chinas-digital-silk-road-after-coronavirus.
38. Ibid.
39. Roland Rajah, Mobilizing the Indo-Pacific Infrastructure Response to China’s
Belt and Road Initiative in Southeast Asia (Washington DC: Brookings
Institution, April 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/up-
loads/2020/04/FP_20200429_mobilize_compete_rajah.pdf.
40. IFC, COVID-19 Economic Impact: East Asia and the Pacific.
41. Omar Amach, “Transformational potential of COVID-19 recovery
in Asia-Pacific,” United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction
(UNDRR), May 13, 2020, https://www.undrr.org/news/transforma-
tional-potential-covid-19-recovery-asia-pacific.
42. Chris Street, “Digital Transformation Fueling Asia Pacific Data Center
Growth,” Princeton Digital Group, August 6, 2020, https://prince-
tondg.com/perspectives/digital-transformation-fueling-apac-da-
ta-center-growth/.
43. Adam Segal et al. “The Future of Cybersecurity across the Asia-Pacific.”
Asia Policy 15, no. 2 (2020): 57–59, https://www.nbr.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/pdfs/publications/ap15-2_cyberrt_apr2020.pdf.
44. Deloitte, COVID-19’s Impact on Cybersecurity (Nigeria: Deloitte, March
2020), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/ng/Docu-
ments/risk/ng-COVID-19-Impact-on-Cybersecurity-24032020.pdf.
45. Andy Leck and Ren Jun Lim, “Asia Pacific Survey on Fake News and
Intermediary Liability,” Baker McKenzie, July 2020, https://www.
bakermckenzie.com/en/insight/publications/guides/asia-pacific-sur-
vey-on-fake-news-regulations.
46. Sara Pacia, “Coconet: Fighting the COVID-19 “infodemic” in the
Asia-Pacific region,” Association for Progressive Communica-
tions, April 1, 2020, https://www.apc.org/en/news/coconet-fight-
ing-covid-19-infodemic-asia-pacific-region/.
47. Carlos H. Conde, “Philippine Activists Charged with Sedition, ‘Fake
News,’” Human Rights Watch, April 22, 2020, https://www.hrw.org/
news/2020/04/22/philippine-activists-charged-sedition-fake-news#.
48. “Bridging Asia-Pacific ‘digital divide’ vital to realize tech bene-
fits,” UN News, August 18, 2020, https://news.un.org/en/sto-
ry/2020/08/1070502.
49. J. Clement, “Number of worldwide internet users 2009–2020, by
region,” Statista, October 17, 2019, https://www.statista.com/statis-
tics/265147/number-of-worldwide-internet-users-by-region/.
50. Scott Beaumont, “Closing Asia’s digital divide should be a post-COVID
priority,” Nikkei Asian Review, June 20, 2020, https://asia.nikkei.com/
Opinion/Closing-Asia-s-digital-divide-should-be-a-post-COVID-priority.
51. “Covid World Map: Tracking the Global Outbreak,” New York Times, ac-
cessed October 6, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/
world/coronavirus-maps.html#countries.
52. Bruce Delteil, Matthieu Francois, and Nga Nguyen, “Emerging from
the pandemic, Vietnam must position itself for recovery,” McKinsey
& Company, July 1, 2020, https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-in-
sights/asia-pacific/emerging-from-the-pandemic-vietnam-must-po-
sition-itself-for-recovery.
53. Bac Pham and Bennett Murray, “Behind Vietnam’s COVID-19
This content downloaded from 202.125.103.103 on Mon, 14 Dec 2020 16:58:02 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Response, Deep Distrust of China,” The Diplomat, May 14, 2020,
https://thediplomat.com/2020/05/behind-vietnams-covid-19-re-
sponse-deep-distrust-of-china/.
54. Do Thanh Ha, “Vietnam’s Economy to Grow Fastest in Southeast Asia
Despite COVID-19: ADB,” Asean Briefing, May 12, 2020, https://
opendevelopmentmekong.net/news/vietnams-economy-to-grow-
fastest-in-southeast-asia-despite-covid-19-adb/.
55. “National public service portal launched,” Ministry of Indus-
try and Trade of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, October 12,
2019, https://moit.gov.vn/web/web-portal-ministry-of-indus-
try-and-trade/tin-chi-tiet/-/chi-tiet/national-public-service-por-
tal-launched-17349-1307.html.
56. To Trieu Hai Ly, “Vietnam in the Post-COVID Era: Realizing a ‘Digital
Country,’” Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, July 28, 2020, https://
www.asiapacific.ca/publication/vietnam-post-covid-era-realiz-
ing-digital-country.
57. Ousmane Dione, “Can COVID-19 catalyze Vietnam’s digital transfor-
mation?” The World Bank, April 15, 2020, https://blogs.worldbank.
org/eastasiapacific/can-covid-19-catalyze-vietnams-digital-transfor-
mation.
58. “[Vietnam] COVID-19 a once-in-a-century opportunity to boost digital
transformation,” The Nation Thailand, July 8, 2020, https://www.
nationthailand.com/news/30390929?utm_source=homepage&utm_
medium=internal_referral.
59. The United Nations Environmental and Social Commission for Asia
and the Pacific (UNESCAP), The Future of Asian and Pacific Cities
(Bangkok: United Nations, 2019), https://www.unescap.org/sites/
default/files/publications/Future%20of%20AP%20Cities%20Re-
port%202019_0.pdf.
60. Ibid.
61. Asian Development Bank, Asian Water Development Outlook 2016:
Strengthening Water Security in Asia and the Pacific (Manila, Philip-
pines: Asian Development Bank, 2016), https://www.adb.org/sites/
default/files/publication/189411/awdo-2016.pdf.
62. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),
“China’s Belt and Road Initiative in the Global Trade, Investment
and Finance Landscape,” in OECD Business and Finance Outlook 2018
(Paris: OECD Publishing, 2018), https://doi.org/10.1787/bus_fin_out-
2018-6-en.
63. The United Nations Environmental and Social Commission for Asia
and the Pacific (UNESCAP), Inclusive Use of Broadband Connectiv-
ity for Quality Education, Insights from Asia and the Pacific (Bang-
kok: United Nations, 2019), https://www.unescap.org/resources/
inclusive-use-broadband-connectivity-quality-education-in-
sights-asia-and-pacific.
64. The United Nations Environmental and Social Commission for Asia
and the Pacific (UNESCAP), In-depth Study of the Asia-Pacific Infor-
mation Superhighway in CLMV Countries (Bangkok: United Nations,
2020), https://www.unescap.org/resources/depth-study-asia-pacif-
ic-information-superhighway-clmv-countries.
65. Elliott Davis, “Pandemic Spurs Countries’ Action on Digital Divide,”
U.S. News & World Report, July 15, 2020, https://www.usnews.
com/news/best-countries/articles/2020-07-15/coronavirus-pan-
demic-pushes-countries-to-bridge-the-digital-divide; Tania Begazo,
“COVID-19: We’re tracking digital responses worldwide. Here’s what
we see,” World Bank, May 5, 2020, https://blogs.worldbank.org/dig-
ital-development/covid-19-were-tracking-digital-responses-world-
wide-heres-what-we-see.
66. Dylan Matthews, “Covid-19 taught companies how to run remote
offices. That could transform developing countries,” Vox, September
21, 2020, https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/21445830/work-
from-home-covid-19-offshoring. 
67. “Asia-Pacific Information Superhighway,” United Nations Environ-
mental and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP),
CSIS BRIEFS | WWW.CSIS.ORG | 11
 accessed October 6, 2020, https://www.unescap.org/our-work/ict-di-
saster-risk-reduction/asia-pacific-information-superhighway/about.
68. ICT and Disaster Reduction Division, The United Nations Environ-
mental and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, “Asia-Pacific
Information Superhighway Master Plan,” UNESCAP, accessed Octo-
ber 6, 2020, https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/APIS_Mas-
ter_Plan_5.pdf.
69. Daniel F. Runde and Sundar R. Ramanujam, Financing and Implement-
ing the Quality Infrastructure Agenda (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2018),
https://www.csis.org/analysis/financing-and-implementing-quali-
ty-infrastructure-agenda. 

CSIS BRIEFS | WWW.CSIS.ORG | 12

This content downloaded from 202.125.103.103 on Mon, 14 Dec 2020 16:58:02 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms