CHAPTER SIX

Safety of Offshore Topside

Processing Facilities:
The Era of FPSOs and FLNGs
Nima Khakzad1, Genserik Reniers
Faculty of Technology, Policy, and Management, Delft University of Technology, Delft, The Netherlands
1
Corresponding author: e-mail address: n.khakzadrostami@tudelft.nl

Contents
1. Introduction 269
2. Offshore Topside Facilities 270
3. Floating Production, Storage, and Offloading Vessels 272
3.1 FPSO 272
3.2 FLNG 278
4. Conclusions 285
References 285

1. INTRODUCTION
The need for more fossil energy resources has resulted in an ever-
increasing offshore operations including drilling, extraction, producing,
and processing of oil and natural gas. Forced by the extraction and depletion
of the most of shallow water recourses, the pursuit of oil and gas resources
has shifted toward deep water and ultradeep water operations.
The depth of water, which in most cases makes it impossible to employ
fixed platforms, from one hand and the remote locations of deep-water off-
shore operations, which are hundreds of kilometers away from shore, from
the other hand have resulted in an outgrowth of floating production, stor-
age, and offloading vessels. Such vessels, depending on the type of substances
they process, i.e., crude oil or natural gas, are usually referred to FPSO and
FLNG vessels, respectively.
FPSOs have been in operation for almost two decades now (Leonhardsen,
Ersdal, & Kvitrud, 2001), but the first FLNG, Shell’s Prelude FLNG, just came

Methods in Chemical Process Safety, Volume 2 # 2018 Elsevier Inc. 269

ISSN 2468-6514 All rights reserved.
https://doi.org/10.1016/bs.mcps.2018.04.004
270 Nima Khakzad and Genserik Reniers

into operation in 2017, 475 km north–northeast of Broome, Western

Australia. Longer than four soccer fields, Prelude FLNG is the largest
offshore floating facility ever built, hosting more than 600 staff, and able
to produce 117% of Hong Kong’s annual natural gas demand.
With the exclusion of long subsea pipelines and large onshore facilities,
FPSO and FLNG vessels not only avoid the installation cost of floating and
semisubmersible platforms but also lower the transportation cost since the
produced oil and gas can directly be transported via sea to destination facil-
ities onshore. However, such floating facilities also present numerous risks,
including multiphase jet and spray fires, cryogenic releases, possibility of
large deflagrations through to escape paths, anoxia hazards, mooring, and
collision impacts (Jones, 2014).
Compared to standard offshore facilities (discussed in Section 2), the haz-
ard identification and safety assessment of FPSOs and FLNGs will be more
challenging due to their two key differences, that is, their size and the larger
range of release scenarios. A thorough comparison of techniques for hazard
identification and risk assessment of FPSO/FLNG vessels, such as fire risk
assessment, cryogenic risk assessment, explosion risk assessment, and quan-
titative risk assessment, can be found in Jones (2014).
In this chapter, we aim to point out safety challenges faced with the
application of FPSO and FLNG vessels. In Section 2, offshore topside facil-
ities are described, including fixed platforms, compliant towers, tension leg
platforms, SPAR platform, and FPSOs/FLNGs. Section 3 is devoted to the
description of FPSOs/FLNGs in more detail along with safety issues and
previous attempts to safety assessment and risk analysis of such vessels. Con-
clusions are in Section 4.

2. OFFSHORE TOPSIDE FACILITIES

Offshore topside facilities can be divided to two main categories: dril-
ling rigs and production facilities. Offshore topside facilities based on their
application to shallow, deep, and ultradeep waters are categorized in three
general types as fixed platforms (jackup rigs) for use in shallow waters up to
300 ft, semisubmersible platforms for use in waters more than 300 ft deep,
and FPSOs and FLNGs for use in waters over 10,000 ft deep. Different types
of offshore topside facilities have been depicted in Fig. 1 (Americas Offshore
Energy, n.d.):
• Fixed Platforms (FP), which are supported by piles on the seabed,
with a deck on top for crew, the drilling rig, and production facilities.
Safety of Offshore Topside Processing Facilities 271

Fixed Platform Compliant Tower Tension Leg Platform Mini-Tension Leg

(FP) (CT) (TLP) Platform
(Mini-TLP)

B
SPAR Platform Floating Production Shuttle Floating Production, Storage,
(SPAR) System Tanker and Offloading System
(FPS) (FPSO)

Subsea System
(SS)

Fig. 1 Different types of offshore facilities (http://www.americasoffshoreenergy.com/

#/?section¼producing-offshore).

The fixed platform is economically feasible for installation in water

depths up to 1500 ft.
• Compliant Tower (CT) consists of a narrow, flexible tower and a piled
foundation that can support a conventional deck for drilling and produc-
tion operations. Compared with FP, CT withstands large lateral forces
and is usually used in water depths between 1000 and 2000 ft.
272 Nima Khakzad and Genserik Reniers

• Tension Leg Platform (TLP) consists of a floating structure held in place

by vertical, tensioned tendons connected to the sea floor. TLPs can be
used in waters up to 4000 ft deep.
• SPAR Platform (SPAR) consists of a large diameter single vertical cylinder
supporting a deck. SPARs are usually used in water depths up to 3000 ft.
• Floating Production System (FPS) consists of a semisubmersible unit
anchored in place with wire rope and chain, or can be dynamically posi-
tioned using rotating thrusters. Production from subsea wells is trans-
ported to the surface deck through production risers. FPS can be used
in ultradeep water.
• Floating Production, Storage, and Offloading System (FPSO) is a large
tanker type vessel. It is used to process and stow production from subsea
wells and to offload the stored oil to a smaller shuttle tanker. The shuttle
tanker then transports the oil to an onshore facility for further processing.
FPSOs are suitable for deep water areas where a pipeline infrastructure
does not exist.

3. FLOATING PRODUCTION, STORAGE, AND

OFFLOADING VESSELS
3.1 FPSO
An FPSO is a floating production storage and offloading, aimed at the devel-
opment of small and/or remote oil and gas fields in deeper water; it does not
need expensive subsea oil pipelines to onshore (Fig. 2).
The module layout of a typical FPSO has been depicted in Fig. 3.
A FPSO receives production fluids from subsea oil reservoirs via risers,

Fig. 2 FPSOA OSX-1 at Rio de Janeiro Coast. Image courtesy of Edersguerri.

Safety of Offshore Topside Processing Facilities 273

1 5 4 4 3 7 7
2 1 9
3 4 7 6 8
6 8

1 Utilities, chemicals, 3 Laydown area 6 Oil treatment 9 Turret

and methanol Utilities, chemicals,
2 Acommodation/office 4 and methanol 7 Gas treatment
HP/LP scrubber
Grated floor 5 Power 8 and flare
generation
Fig. 3 Schematic of a typical FPSO’s module layout (Suardin, McPhate Jr, Sipkema,
Childs, & Mannan, 2009).

which is separated on the deck into oil, gas, and water. The oil is then
offloaded to an oil tanker. The produced gas is exported, reinjected, or
combusted (Suardin et al., 2009). Compared to other offshore platforms
depicted in Fig. 1, an FPSO is faster to build, can operate at different water
depths, and can easily be relocated (Shimamura, 2002).
Fires and explosions have been identified as major potential hazards for
FPSO (Table 1), and thus similar safety measures and fire protection systems
used at offshore oil and gas facilities (HSE, 2009) can presumably be used to
prevent and mitigate fires and explosions. However, limitations in the space
and weight of the FPSO may pose more constraints on the type and siting of
safety measures (e.g., the design and sizing of fire water pumps as pointed out
by Suardin et al., 2009). Besides, fire safety systems need to be able to cope
with the forces caused by the FPSO’s movements, need to have a certain
level of flexibility, and must meet stringent anticorrosion requirements.
Passive fire protection (PFP), also known as fireproof coating, is the most
common way used to protect main structural elements that support walk-
ways, open escape routes, and process vessels containing hydrocarbon
(Friebe, Beom-Seon, & Yanlin, 2014; HSE, 2009). As identified by HSE
(2009), PFP is aimed at providing up to 2 h fire resistance for fire and blast
walls, including covered escape routes such as tunnels on FPSO’s, especially
in case of jet fires and pool fires.
PFP technically takes priority over active fire protection systems such as
sprinkler systems and water deluge systems due to their passive performance
(no need for detection and actuation systems, and thus lower failure rates),
and lower maintenance and inspection costs. However, fireproof coating
materials are susceptible to physical damage and water ingress which may
decrease their efficiency (lower fire resistance) or lead to complete
unavailability (HSE, 2009; Landucci, Argenti, Tugnoli, & Cozzani, 2015).
274 Nima Khakzad and Genserik Reniers

Table 1 FPSO Modules in Fig. 3 and Relevant Accident Scenarios (Suardin et al., 2009)
Module Equipment Included Hazards
Oil treatment Separators and pumps Jet fire, pool fire,
explosion
Glycol regeneration/fuel Separators, contractor, and Jet fire
gas system/metering compressors
Power generation Natural gas power generation Jet fire, pool fire,
and diesel powered explosion
Flare system High pressure and low pressure Jet fire, pool fire,
scrubber for oil and gas explosion
Gas compression systems Compressors Jet fire, pool fire,
explosion
Flash gas compression Scrubbers and compressors Jet fire, pool fire,
explosion
Risers Oil and gas risers Jet fire, pool fire,
explosion

High-performance fireproofing materials, such as intumescent, vermic-

ulite sprays, high performance cementitious materials, and silica blankets, are
normally rated to offer a 2-h fire protection with a high efficiency
(s ¼ 0.999), even in case of extreme heat radiations, e.g., 200 kW/m2
(Gomez-Mares, Tugnoli, Landucci, & Cozzani, 2012). PFP is already in
place and does not require external activation; thus, ignoring the external
loads and environmental deteriorating processes (e.g., corrosion or water
ingress) an optimistic unitary availability can be considered for such barriers
(i.e., probability of failure on demand, PFD ¼ 0.0).
In case of an effective performance, the fireproof coating adds an extra time
to failure (ttfp) to the time to failure of the unprotected process vessel (ttfo), thus
delaying the failure of the process vessel as ttf ¼ ttfo + ttfp. As such, the failure
probability of the protected vessel (or structural elements) would decrease.
Considering, for example, the failure probability of atmospheric and pressur-
ized process vessels exposed to external heat radiation as (Cozzani et al., 2013):

Pressurized vessels : ln ð ttf Þ ¼ 0:95 ln ðQÞ + 8:85 V 0:032

Atmospheric vessels : ln ð ttf Þ ¼ 1:13 ln ðQÞ  2:67  10ð5Þ V + 9:9
 
ttf
Y ¼ 12:54  1:85 ln
60
Pr ¼ ΦðY  5Þ
Safety of Offshore Topside Processing Facilities 275

where ttf is the time to failure (s); Q is the received heat radiation (kW/m2);
V is the process vessel’s volume (m3); Y is the probit value; Pr is the failure
probability of the vessel; Φ(.) is the cumulative standard normal distribution.
Ideally, ttfp ¼ 120 min (rating time), but the fireproof coating deteriorates
over time due to fire exposure, environmental and chemical activities (expo-
sure to sea water and humidity), and thus not maintaining its initial protec-
tion integrity.
In case of low performance fireproof coating or deteriorated coating, a
percentage α of ttfp is usually considered as fire resistance (e.g., α ¼ 0.25 in
Khakzad, Landucci, Cozzani, Reniers, & Pasman, 2018). The impact of fire-
proof coating on exposed structures and process vessels can be modeled
using an event tree in Fig. 4 (Khakzad et al., 2018).
Water deluge is an active fire protection system aimed at providing
a spray curtain (usually salt water, which causes nozzle blockage and
internal corrosion) in order to shield the target vessel from a primary fire
(HSE, 2009). Similar to other active fire protection systems, a water
deluge consists of a gas, heat and flame detection, logic solver, and an
actuation system, each with their own reliability, availability, and effi-
ciency. In addition to the previous components of a water deluge system,
large pumps and pipework add more complexity to the system compared
with PFP.
As pointed out in HSE (2009), on installations with minimum facilities
and limited space (FPSOs implied), a general area protection system such as
water deluge will provide a higher level of personnel protection than other

Fig. 4 Performance evaluation of fireproof coating used to protect a target equipment

from external heat radiation (Khakzad et al., 2018).
276 Nima Khakzad and Genserik Reniers

more specialized systems. However, water deluge is ineffective against jet

fires but is highly effective against pool fires. Water deluge systems are
applied on target vessels, typically pressurized vessels, and are activated in
case of fire. Such as sprinkler systems, due to process or internal failures, this
type of safety barriers might not respond on demand, which can be taken
into account via a PFD.
If effectively designed and maintained, and successfully activated, the sys-
tem would completely shield the target vessel, reducing radiation on the wall
to a negligible incoming heat flux. However, as demonstrated in previous
studies (Finucane & Pinkney, 1988; Roberts, 2004), even if the safety barrier
is successfully activated, a fraction of heat radiation can be received by the
target vessel in case of inappropriate design or lack of maintenance. In the
present study a 50% fraction (i.e., Qr ¼ 0.5Qo) was assumed. This can also
be considered as an implicit ineffectiveness of the safety barrier. The impact
of water deluge system on exposed structures and process vessels can be
modeled using an event tree in Fig. 5 (Khakzad et al., 2018), where
PFD ¼ 4.43  10–2 (Landucci et al., 2015).
Fig. 6 depicts the amount of water needed by water deluge system for
different modules of a FPSO (Suardin et al., 2009).
Since explosion is also a credible accident scenario for FPSOs, fire and
blast walls are used to separate the process area from the other areas as
depicted in Fig. 7 (Kang et al., 2017).

Fig. 5 Performance evaluation of water deluge system used to protect a target equip-
ment from external heat radiation (Khakzad et al., 2018).
Safety of Offshore Topside Processing Facilities 277

Maximum water required for deluge system for each module in FPSO
10,000 Back to Water
Calculation

9000
Risers
Water application rate (m3/hr)

8000
Flash gas compression
7000 package
Gas compression system
6000
Flare system
5000
Power generation
4000

3000 Glycol regeneration/fuel gas

system/metering
2000 Oil treatment 2

1000
Oil treatment

0
FPSO
Fig. 6 Water required by water deluge systems on FPSO (Suardin et al., 2009).

een
all betw
Blast W d Utility
a n
Process
een
all betw
Blast W c ess
nd Pro
Turret a

Fig. 7 Separation of process area from the other areas using blast walls (Kang, Choi,
Choi, Ryu, & Lee, 2017).

Aside from the fire and explosion hazards, collisions, green water inci-
dents, mooring line failures, pitting corrosion in cargo tanks, cracking of rails
in turret area, and loss of heading control have been reported as other incidents
for FPSOs. Fig. 8 depicts the collision frequency of FPSOs compared to other
278 Nima Khakzad and Genserik Reniers

Collisions/operational years 0.2

0.15

0.1

0.05

0
ket
s
uni
ts S' ys Us
Jac le GB buo /FS
obi ng PS
O
M Loadi F

Fig. 8 Collision frequencies in the Norwegian Continental Shelf from 1982 to 2000
(Leonhardsen et al., 2001).

offshore facilities on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (Leonhardsen et al.,

2001). The collisions have occurred both during cargo offloading operations
and mooring of FPSOs mostly between loading platforms and tankers.
For mooring line failures, incorrect heat treatment and fatigue crack
were to blame as the causes. However, loss of heading control should also
be regarded as a concern due to the possibility of excessive twisting and ten-
sion of mooring lines. Cracking of welds between cargo- and ballast tanks
has also been reported on the FPSOs. 60% of the cracks were through thick-
ness and have caused oil seepage from the cargo tanks into ballast tanks.
Pitting corrosion in cargo tanks with a maximum depth of 60% of the plate
thickness has also been observed, though only a limited number of cracks
and corrosion are believed to have contributed to the possibility of a signif-
icant accident (Leonhardsen et al., 2001).

3.2 FLNG
Many natural gas resources are located in remote offshore fields, where sub-
sea pipelines structures do not exist or are not economically viable. Floating
liquefied natural gas (FLNG) vessels have been designed to facilitate the pro-
duction, liquefaction, and storage of natural gas at sea (Fig. 9).
The first FLNG begins operations this year off the coast of Northern
Australia over Shell’s Prelude natural gas field. FLNG pumps up natural
gas, storing it within massive storage tanks at the temperature of 162°C.
On a regular basis, storage tanks are off-loaded to gas tankers. When fully
Safety of Offshore Topside Processing Facilities 279

Fig. 9 Shell Prelude FLNG. Image courtesy of Royal Dutch Shell.

Refrigerant LNG
compression –161°C
Pipeline
feeds gas To ships

Gas treatment Heat LNG

condensates impurities exchangers storage
• Carbon dioxide
• Mercury
• Hydrogen sulfide
• Water
Fig. 10 LNG liquefaction process (http://goldborolng.com/about-lng/what-is-lng/).

loaded, the FLNG may contain 600,000 t of liquefied natural gas (LNG).
It also produces around 3.6 million tonnes per year of LNG.
FLNG vessels makes it possible to transfer LNG directly from the floating
facility to a variety of consumers around the world via waterways. The LNG
liquefaction process in onshore LNG plants and FLNG vessel are all but the
same (Fig. 10). The process includes:
• to separate condensates from gas. The gases such as methane, ethane, pro-
pane, and butane are then compressed and sent to the liquefaction unit.
• impurities such as carbon dioxide and hydrogen sulfide are removed
through acid-gas removal column.
• water and mercury are removed from the remaining natural gas through
absorber and regeneration column.
280 Nima Khakzad and Genserik Reniers

A. Field specific part B. Liquefaction part

A1. Slug A2. Gas/liquid B1. Acid gas B4. Liquefaction B6. Cooling B7. Heating
catcher separation C1~C4 removal system system system
C5~C6 C1~C4
A3. B8. Inert B9. N2
B2. Dehydration B5. Fractionation gas supply supply
Stabilization
C5~C6
B3. Mercury B10. HPU
A4. Condensate removal

Condensate LPG tank LNG tank LNG tank

tank
Well

Fig. 11 Schematic of a typical FLNG’s module layout (Dan, Lee, Park, Shin, & Yoon, 2014).

• nearly pure natural gas is condensed to LNG through a liquefaction sys-

tem, consisting of heat exchangers, expansion valves, and compressors.
A schematic of a typical FLNG’s module layout has been depicted in Fig. 11
(Dan et al., 2014).
Like any other onshore and offshore installations which handle large
inventory of flammable and explosive chemical substances, fires and explo-
sions are the most feared accident scenarios at FPSO and FLNG vessels. As a
result, any equipment which handle, process, store such chemicals, includ-
ing risers, pipelines, separators, heat exchangers, turbines, compressors, and
pumps, can be a point of undesired release and subsequent fires and explo-
sions (Khan & Amyotte, 2002).
LNG is a flammable gas (liquid) which under favorable conditions can
cause fires and explosions. Loss of containment events in form of high pres-
sure gas, LNG, refrigerant, and LPG can give rise to gas dispersion, fire,
explosion, and due to the low temperature of LNG (s162°C) to cryogenic.
The Cleveland East Ohio Gas Explosion which occurred in 1944 after a
leakage from a LNG tank in the East Ohio Gas Company’s tank farm caused
130 deaths (Encyclopedia of Cleveland History, n.d.). The liquefaction pro-
cess, in particular, takes place mostly under high temperature, high pressure
conditions which increase the likelihood and severity of potential accident
scenarios.
In case of LNG spillage, depending on factors such as the medium (on
water or on the ground), possibility of immediate or delayed ignition,
and whether the release takes place in a confined area, a number of accident
scenarios can be envisaged as depicted in the event tree in Fig. 12. Among
Safety of Offshore Topside Processing Facilities 281

confined area
Dispersion in
Immediate

Delayed
medium
Spillage

ignition

ignition
Water Rapid phase
transition

Pool fire/jet

Yes
LNG spillage fire

Yes
Ground

Flash fire

Yes Vapour cloud

No
explosion
No

Dispersion into
No

air

Fig. 12 Event tree analysis for LNG release.

the accident scenarios, rapid phase transition (RPT), also known as cold
explosion, is a phenomenon specific to cryogenic chemicals such as LNG,
where LNG vaporizes violently upon contact with water causing a physical
explosion. During a cold explosion there is no combustion but a huge
amount of energy is released in the form of heat.
Dan et al. (2014) assessed the risk of fire and explosion in a FLNG with a
focus on the LNG liquefaction process units. They considered a number of
release scenarios with the LNG and refrigerant leakages from valves as the
most probable scenarios causing fire and explosion. Risk contours of fire
and explosion for the considered release scenarios have been depicted in
Fig. 13.
Despite the similarities between onshore and offshore LNG plants in
terms of both operations and accident scenarios, the safety of the latter seems
more challenging as, due to usually compact structures and limited space,
application of onshore safety measures such as inherently safer design tech-
niques and safety distances (Khan & Amyotte, 2002), is not easily possible.
Aside from accident scenarios such as fires and explosions which are
common between LNG plants onshore and FLNGs (Dan et al., 2014), there
are several scenarios which can be envisaged mainly due to the floatation of
FLNGs. Among others, the grounding of FLNGs, their collision with
282 Nima Khakzad and Genserik Reniers

´ 10–4
5

4.5

3.5

2.5

1.5

0.5

0
Fig. 13 Risk contours for fire and explosion at FLNG (Dan et al., 2014).
Safety of Offshore Topside Processing Facilities 283

shuttle tankers during offloading operation, and failure of loading arms are
worth noting (Yeo et al., 2016). However, it should be noted that since the
application of FLNGs is quite new, compared to some 158 accidents
recorded for LNG tankers since 1959 (Vanem, Antao, Østvik, & de
Comas, 2008), there has been no accident reported for FLNGs as the first
FLNG was put into operation just in 2017. According to Vanem et al.
(2008), collision and grounding have accounted for around 90% of total
accidents reported for LNG tankers. Likewise, as reported in Yeo et al.
(2016), Lloyds shipping accident database (Blake, 1960), collision, leakage
of LNG, and foundering have been among the most feared accident scenar-
ios during offloading operations.
A collision can occur between an FLNG and a shuttle tanker or between
the FLNG and the port. A poorly designed mooring system or the failure of
the mooring system can result in instability of FLNG (and also shuttle tanker)
due to either the environmental forces such as wind, waves, and tides or
waves generated by other passing ships. A mooring system consists of
breasting, mooring dolphins, and a loading platform (Yeo et al., 2016). Large
tankers use steel wires or steel wires with nylon tails as mooring lines. Several
safety barriers are employed to dampen the impact of collisions among
which fenders are very common. Fig. 14 depicts a rubber fender for this pur-
pose, being placed between the LNG carrier and the port berth.
Leakage of LNG due to the failure of loading arms is another envisaged
accident scenario. Loading arms are to connect the manifolds of the LNG
carriers so as to transport LNG from one to another. A loading arm comprises

Fig. 14 Rubber fenders (http://www.yokohama-fenders.gr/yokohama-fenders).

284 Nima Khakzad and Genserik Reniers

Fig. 15 Loading arms. Image courtesy of Bysalt: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marine_

loading_arm.

a riser section, inboard and outboard arm sections, as well as a counterweight

to balance the inboard and outboard arms (Fig. 15). Loading arms failure can
lead to LNG leakage. To examine for leaks, the manifolds are usually pressur-
ized to around 5 bar for a duration of 5 min after the connection of loading
arms and before LNG starts to flow within the loading arms for transportation.
In case of a leakage, the emergency shutdown system (ESD) can shut down
the transfer process locally or totally.
Excessive movement of LNG careers, either the FLNG or the shuttle
tanker, beyond the operating envelope of the loading arms due to strong winds
or high waves may lead to the failure of loading arms. To prevent from such
excessive movements, the arms are secured by an arm drive that restricts move-
ment during the navigation and connection processes (Seamanship, 2008).
The grounding of FLNGs as floating vessels can be considered as another
envisaged failure mode which can give rise to the hull damage (Yeo et al.,
2016). Damage to the hull of a vessel, if severe enough, may cause a breach to
the ballast system.
Like most of other types of ships, LNG tankers have two hulls so as to
protect the cargo in the event of a collision, grounding, or a terrorist act
(GlobalSecurity.org, n.d.). Tanker grounding has reportedly been caused by
undetected sediment, coral reef, or irregular seabed topography (Cole, 2009;
Professional Mariner, 2010; Reuters, 2015; The Maritime Executive, 2015).
In the worst grounding accident of a loaded LNG tanker carrying
99,500 m3 of LNG, the El Paso Kayser ran onto rocks and grounded in
Safety of Offshore Topside Processing Facilities 285

the Straits of Gibraltar in June 1979. The tanker suffered heavy bottom dam-
age over the whole length of the cargo spaces, as well as flooding to the star-
board double bottom and wing ballast tanks. However, the membrane cargo
containment was not breached, and no liquefied natural gas was spilled
(GlobalSecurity.org, n.d.).

4. CONCLUSIONS
There is a number of key features in the process and layout for (LNG)
floating production, storage, and offloading vessels that require different or
modified approaches for hazard identification and safety assessment. This is
mainly due to the size and the variation in the release scenarios from one
hand, and floatation of such vessels from the other hand which in turn
can give rise to issues such as collision and grounding.
Although the accident scenarios such as mooring failure, grounding, and
collision and ensuing hydrocarbon release are among likely scenarios (com-
parable with other mobile units and loading buoys), fires and explosions
are the most feared accident scenarios at topside facilities, including FPSOs
and FLNGs, due to a variety of extremely flammable and explosive hydro-
carbons. In addition to fires and explosions, in the case of FLNGs, an spill of
LNG on water can also give rise to RPT—also known as cold explosion—
with a huge amount of heat release.
Taking into account the design, size, and novel and inherently different
features compared to other offshore facilities, safety risk assessment and man-
agement of FPSO and FLNG vessels demand for approaches that account for
varying environmental forces and operating conditions in addition to pre-
viously well-established design practices and risk assessment techniques.
For FLNG, especially due to the young technology and lack of historical
data, dynamic techniques, for example, based on Bayesian belief network,
would be needed so that the level of risk can be updated in a real-time fash-
ion as precursor data in form of equipment malfunction, collisions, minor
release, environmental changes, etc., becomes available.

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