18997-AI-RPT-001 Rev 2 PDF

14/008 - 98 Dunkettle Interchange
Pipeline Crossing Assessment

18977-AI-RPT-001 Rev 2
Gas Networks Ireland

November 2019
Penspen
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Revision, change control and authorisation history.
Document owner: CDE for Integrity
Description Prepared Checked Authorised

No of
Rev Date and/or pages Name Name Name
change history Job title Job title Job title
AC MT MB
0 15/04/2019 Issued for client comment 41
Principal
Integrity Engineer Consultant
Consultant
SZ AC MT
1 20/06/2019 Revised for client comments 41
Senior Engineer Integrity Engineer Consultant
SZ AC NL
2 11/11/2019 Final Issued for Use 46
Senior Engineer Integrity Engineer Consultant
18977-AI-RPT-001 Rev 2 Page i

CONTENTS
Abbreviations . 3
1 Executive Summary 4
1.1 Crossing Location 1 4
2 Objectives/Scope of Work 5
3 Introduction 6
3.1 Background 6
4 Asset Details 7
4.1 Pipeline details 7
4.2 Crossing location 1 7
4.3 Crossing location 2 9
5 Current Pipeline Condition Review 11

5.1 General 11
5.4 Summary 12
6 Geological Review 13
6.1 General 13
7 Review of Risk to Pipeline Caused By Permanent Works 17

7.1 General 17
8 Assessment of Pipeline Integrity Due To Permanent Crossings 19

8.1 General 19
9 Review of Risk Caused to Pipeline By Temporary Civil works 27

9.1 General 27
10 Conclusions 32
11 Recommendations 34
Appendix A Methodology 38
Appendix B Technical Note Detailing Works Under VO - Attached As Addendum 41
18977-AI-RPT-001 Rev 2 Contents Page ii

ABBREVIATIONS .
ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable

API American Petroleum Institute
CIPS Close Interval Potential Survey
CP Cathodic Protection
CRU Commission for Regulation of Utilities in Ireland
DCVG Direct Current Voltage Gradient
GNI Gas Networks Ireland
ID Internal Diameter
ILI In Line Inspection
IMU Inertial Measuring Unit
MAOP Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure
MPa Mega Pascals
OD Outside Diameter
QRA Qualitative Risk Analysis
RAMS Risk Assessment Method Statement
RBI Risk Based Inspection
SMYS Specified Minimum Yield Stress
18977-AI-RPT-001 Rev 2 Executive Summary Page 3 of 41

1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
New road construction in the Cork area has resulted in the requirement for two new pipeline
crossings as part of the Dunkettle interchange improvement works. GNI have requested
Penspen to provide an assessment of the proposed crossing design solutions to establish if
temporary and permanent risks to the pipeline are acceptable.
Both crossing locations show DCVG indications which must be investigated and remediated
before installation of either crossing. In both cases the RAMS document supplied by the civils
contractor does not sufficiently control risk to the pipeline during excavation operations. These
procedures should be updated to reflect the recommendations given in this report.
In both locations a post-installation location classification of category ‘S’ will be appropriate.

The current classification should be determined. A QRA will be required if either location is
currently categorised as ‘R’. [IS328:2015]
1.1 Crossing Location 1
Crossing 1 is a broadly standard crossing design, however several metres of additional depth
of cover have been added to the wayleave during the period 2003 to 2013. No data has been
received by Penspen to show that this has been assessed or approved by GNI. Penspen have
calculated an estimate of pipeline strain on a best endeavours basis at the proposed crossing
location. This shows that pipeline strain is likely to be acceptable based on estimated input
data. Wayleave infringements such as uncontrolled changes to depth of cover must not be
made without prior assessment and approval by GNI.
The best method of controlling risk at the proposed Crossing 1 location is by installing the
crossing without the use of a slab, and by moving the location to the West of the proposed
location by approximately 15 metres as described in Section 8.2.2. Provided that all
recommendations are implemented, the permanent crossing at location 1 is acceptable.
Crossing 2 is a non-standard crossing due to the magnitude of change to the depth of cover
associated with crossing installation. This will require the installation of a piled slab to control
localised pipeline settlement.
The use of a piled slab has significant risk during the installation phase and will require
intensive involvement of GNI responsible persons. The installation operations must include
the use of ‘stop the job’ methodology and will require direct oversight and sign-off by GNI to
confirm each individual pile boring operation has been correctly located immediately before
each pile location is excavated.
Lift operations at crossing location 2 plan to use an excavator due to site access limitations.
Some lift operations will occur when the pipeline wayleave is partially excavated which will
reduce the protection provided by depth of cover. A lift specific RAMS to control the risk of lift
operations should be developed and implemented prior to any lifting operations.
The slabbing may result in shielding of cathodic protection and is likely to stop accurate
inspection by DCVG and CIPS. Further assessment should be undertaken to determine if
additional cathodic protection is required, and the feasibility of installing remote monitoring
sensors for salinity, DCVG and CIPS. Provided that all recommendations are implemented,
the permanent crossing at location 2 is acceptable.
18977-AI-RPT-001 Rev 2 Executive Summary Page 4 of 41

2 OBJECTIVES/SCOPE OF WORK
The objectives of the study will be to carry out a technical assessment of the two proposed
pipeline crossings, in order to assess:
 The proposed design solutions from the contractor as well as the proposed pipe
protection, and;
 Establish whether the proposed design adequately reduces both the temporary risk
and the permanent risk to the pipeline.
18977-AI-RPT-001 Rev 2 Objectives/Scope of Work Page 5 of 41

3 INTRODUCTION
3.1 Background
Under Framework Agreement 14/008 for the Provision of Technical Specialist Consultancy,
Gas Network Ireland (GNI) requested a tender [1] for a technical assessment of two pipe
crossings by new road construction in the Cork area caused by improvements to the Dunkettle
interchange. The new roads cross a 19-bar gas pipeline in two separate locations. These
locations are expected be subject to both temporary heavy load site traffic, as well as the
permanent loading from the finished road. The depth of cover of the pipe will change as a
result of these works due to fill required during construction of the road.
The technical assessment will review the proposed design solutions and establish whether it
adequately reduces both the temporary risk and the permanent risk to the pipeline.
A map of the location is shown below. The proposed solution at crossing location 2 is a slab
supported by piles. The proposed solution for crossing location 1 is a more standard type of
slab installation. Both slabs are intended to be installed over sections of pipeline with bend
sections.
Figure 3-1: Map of pipe crossing locations
18977-AI-RPT-001 Rev 2 Introduction Page 6 of 41

4 ASSET DETAILS
4.1 Pipeline details
The pipeline being assessed is a major gas feed pipeline to the Cork area. Pipeline details are
shown in Table 4-1.
Wall Thickness 9.52 mm
Material Grade X52
Design Pressure 19 Bar
MAOP 19 Bar
External Diameter 609.60 mm
Commissioning Date 1978
Table 4-1: Pipeline parameters [1]
4.2 Crossing location 1
Crossing location 1 is indicated in Figure 4-1 [2]. The proposed crossing location is an area of
ground which has been altered in height after installation of the pipeline. This may have caused
differential settlement. The crossing location is expected to remove approximately 0.8 metres
of surcharge from the current depth of cover which has been measured as 4.8 metres, to allow
a suitable profile for installation of the new access road as shown in Figure 4-2 [3].
Figure 4-1: Crossing location 1.
18977-AI-RPT-001 Rev 2 Asset Details Page 7 of 41

Figure 4-2: Change in ground profile at proposed crossing location 1.
It should be noted that a conflicting value for proposed change to depth of cover is indicated
by the first revision drawing supplied to Penspen, which indicated approximately 2 metres of
additional depth of cover would be installed rather than the removal of 0.8 metres indicated in
Figure 4-2. This will be discussed further in Section 6.2[2]. An additional conflict which has been
identified is the existing depth of cover, the depth of cover as installed was in the region of 1.3
metres, whilst the current depth of cover is indicated as approximately 4.8 metres, no
information has been received from GNI to show that this change to the depth of cover has
been planned for or assessed.
Detail B shown below in Figure 4-3 indicates that the bend near to proposed crossing location
1 is fabricated from two bend sections [4]. The slab is shown as partially covering the 22.5°
bend section [3], the proposed slab location is indicated by the blue outline in Figure 4-3.
Figure 4-3: As-laid pipeline details near to crossing location 1.

4.3 Crossing location 2
Crossing location two is indicated in Figure 4-4 [2]. The proposed crossing location is an area
of ground which is expected to have a significant increase in surcharge to achieve a final
altered profile at a higher elevation to suit the required contours of the new motorway access
road. The crossing location is expected to require approximately 3.9 metres of additional
surcharge to allow a suitable profile for installation of the new access road as shown in Figure
4-5 [2].
Figure 4-4: Crossing location 2.
Figure 4-5: Change in ground profile at proposed crossing location 2.
Detail A shown below in Figure 4-6 indicates that a bend and pup pieces are located in the
section of pipeline to be crossed [4]. The nearest indicated depths of cover show that the
pipeline was installed with 1.35-1.42 metres’ depth of cover locally to the proposed crossing
location.

Figure 4-6: As-laid pipeline details near to crossing location 2.

5 CURRENT PIPELINE CONDITION REVIEW
5.1 General
Pipelines transporting dry sales quality natural gas do not typically suffer from internal
corrosion provided that upset conditions are prevented. External corrosion can be a concern,
as can crack growth. This can be exacerbated by pressure cycling and welds of unknown or
poor quality which are sometimes found in older pipelines.
GNI have confirmed that Gas Networks Ireland do not inspect 19 Bar gas pipelines using ILI
and therefore no ILI data is available for this pipeline [5], no alternative data or justification such
as RBI or MOP affirmation documentation has been received by Penspen. A cathodic
protection survey was conducted on the 9th July 2018. An additional DCVG survey was
conducted in February 2019 of crossing location 2 [5]. The integrity review is therefore limited
by data availability as indicated in Sections 5.2 and 5.3.
It is noted that the Irish Standard IS328:2015 [6] section 12.5.5 requires pipewall condition
monitoring to take into account the implications of loss of gas supply, population density and
proximity infringements amongst other factors. IS328:2015 also states that ILI frequency of a
piggable pipeline shall not exceed 10 years unless shown otherwise by a risk-based approach.
The combined DCVG/CIPS survey conducted on the 9th July 2018 shows one category 1
indication near to the proposed crossing 1 location [7]. Category 1 relates to 0% - 15% of the
potential lost from the defect epicentre to remote earth as a percentage of the total potential
shift on the pipeline at the defect epicentre. This indication may be related to the termination
of the Gunite coating indicated by the as-laid drawings [4]. Recorded CIPS potentials were
more negative than -0.850V with reference to a copper/copper sulphate (Cu/CuSO4) reference
electrode with the exception of the anomalous spike.
No further data has been made available to Penspen.
The combined DCVG/CIPS survey conducted on the 9th July 2018 shows one category 1
indication near to the proposed crossing 2 location [7]. Recorded CIPS potentials were more
negative than -0.850V with the exception of the anomalous spikes.
An additional DCVG survey was conducted on the 15th February 2019 [8], the previously
identified anomalies are re-identified and return similar results. A third, more serious anomaly
within category 2 has been identified following the clearing of weed growth to allow better
access. The newly identified defect shows a 32.6% IR (Severity) value which indicates more
extensive coating deficiency. This value is approaching that of a category 3 anomaly and
should be investigated with a view to repair, irrespective of future actions at the crossing
location.
No further data has been made available to Penspen.
18977-AI-RPT-001 Rev 2 Current Pipeline Condition Review Page 11 of 41

5.4 Summary
The indications found by DCVG must be investigated to confirm protection against degradation
to the future integrity of the pipeline. The coating defects should be repaired, and if found,
metal loss defects or other defects such as cracking should be assessed further. The extent
of, and condition of Gunite coating has been verified by GNI as being located to West of the
crossing location 1 only.[9, 10]
As no further data such as weld records, ILI or local investigations have been made available
to Penspen it is not possible to fully determine the integrity of the pipeline at the proposed
crossing locations other than to say that indications of coating damage are apparent at both
crossing locations. Investigation of indications at Crossing Location 1 should additionally
include consideration of the condition and extent of the Gunite coating.
Given the proposed depths of cover, careful consideration should be given to the current
coating condition and the prospect of coating degradation sufficient to allow development of
corrosion features within the required design life of the pipeline.
The pipeline wayleave must be controlled appropriately, uncontrolled changes in depth of

cover can cause differential settlement and elevated strain magnitudes which can cause the
pipeline to be at a higher risk of failure. This is discussed further in Section 8.2.2.
As stated previously, Irish Standard IS328:2015 [6] section 12.5.5 requires pipewall condition
monitoring to take into account the implications of loss of gas supply, population density and
proximity infringements amongst other factors. There will be an obligation therefore that GNI
develop an inspection plan capable of monitoring pipewall condition following crossing
installation in both locations, this may be made more difficult by the piled supports at crossing
location 2 if ILI is not possible on this pipeline. The design should therefore maintain CP
protection and monitoring and coating survey (DCVG) capability, so that the GNI inspection
plans can be implemented.
18977-AI-RPT-001 Rev 2 Current Pipeline Condition Review Page 12 of 41

6 GEOLOGICAL REVIEW
6.1 General
The two pipeline crossing locations proposed as part of the Dunkettle interchange
improvement works are located to the East of the river Lee estuary. Semi-tidal basins are
apparent close to the crossing locations. A change in surcharge level over and near to the
pipeline is proposed as part of the earth works to be undertaken for the road improvement
works.
In general, silts and clays can be prone to settlement over an extended period following a
change in surcharge levels. This is normally controlled by the rate at which water can permeate
the soils and will continue until a new equilibrium level is found. One potential implication is
that placement of earthworks inside of tidal basins but outside of the wayleave, may cause
saline solutions to migrate towards the pipeline location particularly at the crossing 2 location
which may lead to increased local corrosion rates.
Multiple borehole locations are indicated in publicly available data [11,12,13]. Further details have
been received of additional site investigation works for crossing location 2 [14].
In general, all boreholes indicate that the surface layers are comprised predominantly of silts
and/or clays of various origin. Of particular note is cable percussion borehole R1264/B66373
(Company name: BH11) located just to the South of crossing location 1, which indicates a
minor peat component in the near surface layers [12].
Data received shows a conflict in depth of cover in between the as-built documentation and
the currently recorded depth of cover. Figure 6-1 shows the approximate location of proposed
crossing 1 outlined in blue, and additionally shows the approximate pipeline route in yellow.
The date of change of depth of cover is not confirmed however satellite imagery would indicate
changes are likely to have been made in between 2003 and 2007. The state of consolidation
and reference ground level of borehole records are therefore not certain. It is noted that in
some cases that the equilibrium level may not be achieved for an extended period of time,
perhaps in the order of several years, this is discussed further in Section 8.2.2.
Figure 6-1: Potential change in depth of cover
18977-AI-RPT-001 Rev 2 Geological Review Page 13 of 41

Soil consolidation and ultimately pipeline settlement are generally not a cause for concern if
changes to pipeline placement are equal over a long pipeline length or tapered over an
extended distance. Displacement driven strain can be expected to develop in the pipeline
where differential pipeline settlement occurs over comparatively short distances. Due to the
variations in changes to the depth of cover within the wayleave higher levels of strain than
expected may exist near to the crossing 1 location.
No project specific geotechnical records have been received for crossing location 1, therefore
consideration is given to publicly available borehole records [11,12,13]. Key points are collated in
Table 6-1. In all cases the surface layers to a depth of approximately 3.5-4 metres are
comprised of softer materials including silts and clays. The publically available borehole
records are not dated and therefore it is not possible to determine reference ground level
against which the boreholes are referenced. The borehole records are expected to correlate
with current ground levels and the additional made ground which has been deposited at some
point since pipeline installation based on the composition of strata in the records.
Results below the expected level of the pipeline indicate probable gravels and stones with a
minorlith of silt in the majority of boreholes such as R1264/BB97465, R1260/B66281 and
R1260/B66286. This type of ground in general thought to be less susceptible to secondary
consolidation however borehole R5505/B134300 indicates some sections of softer ground.
Borehole R5505/B134300 indicates a silt layer with minorlith (minor component of the strata)
of peat in between 1.4 and 3.4 metres below ground level, whilst this is expected to be above
the pipeline, the ability of any soils to provide support to the protection slab should be ensured.
The Risk Assessment Method Statement (RAMS) provided to Penspen discusses suitability
of soil bearing capacity and methods to assure minimum requirements have been achieved
[15].
A softer clay layer is noted from 5.5 to 6.75 metres below ground level at borehole location
R5505/B66286. This layer is likely to be susceptible to secondary settlement in the event of
changes to surcharge levels. The current state of consolidation given the additional surcharge
already put in place since pipeline installation is not confirmed but is presumed to be in
equilibrium given that the majority of significant changes are evident in satellite imagery before
2007.
Multiple borehole records are available; the key points are collated in Table 6-1. All records
indicate a layer with a majorlith (major component of the strata) consisting of clays and silts
near to the surface. The proposed alteration to depths of cover will be likely to cause additional
consolidation of these layers. The pipeline is located in the surface layers, and whilst
settlement of a whole pipeline would not cause any concern for pipeline integrity, differential
settlement caused by differing depths of additional surcharge may allow stress levels sufficient
to cause concern for pipeline integrity.
Sub-strata with reduced propensity for secondary settlement are likely to be encountered from
somewhere in the region of 3-4 metres below the ground surface. These layers are not
expected to give immediate cause for concern due to change in surface surcharge levels.
At crossing location 2 the reaction force to the piles will consist of two main elements, skin
friction of the pile tube, and tip reaction. The softer surface layers are expected to compress
and experience a reduction in residual positive skin friction over time, settlement of the

compressible fill may allow a situation whereby negative skin friction occurs. Pile design will
require consideration of the following elements (as well as other factors):
- Pile loading will be likely to transfer from skin friction to tip loading over an extended
period following installation.
- Piles should be designed and installed with consideration given to negative skin
friction. To maintain long term pile stability this may result in additional tip reaction
force being required than in the as-installed condition.
- Pile design should include consideration of lateral forces and should consider time-
dependant mechanisms.
Penspen note that the nominated pile design at crossing location 2 is for bored piles. Driven
piles would require consideration of additional factors such as pipeline upheaval.

Location Identification Near-surface majorlith Underlying majorlith
Mainly clays mixed with sand, gravel Gravels and sands with high cobble
BH390 [14]
and cobbles to 3 metres. content. (End 8 m)
Mainly clays and silts mixed with

sand, gravel and cobbles to 3.1 Gravels and sands with medium
TP348 [14]
metres. A layer of concrete rubble is cobble content. (End 4.5 m)
noted at 1.1 metres.

Gravels and sands with variable
BH216 [14] sand, gravel and cobbles to 3.5
cobble content. (End 8.3 m)
metres.

sand and gravels to 3.5 metres. Gravels with high sand and silt
TP204 [14]
Made ground at the surface is content. (End 4.5 m)
predominantly gravels.
R1260/B66275 (B2) [11] Silts and clays to (End 5 m). N/a
Predominantly gravels, cobbles and

[12] boulders, however a layer of silt and
R1264/B97465 (BH10) Silt and stones to 4 metres.
stones is noted at 5.5 m to 7.25 m.
(End 15 m).
Silts, clays and gravels to (End 2.2

R5505/B134313 (TP7) [13] N/a
m).
R1260/B66281 (B8) [11] Silts and clays to 2.7 metres. Gravel with silt. (End 4.6 m)
R1260/B66286 (B13) [11] Silts and clays to 2.4 metres. Gravel with silt. (End 4.6 m)
Predominantly gravels and boulders,

Silts with some gravels and peats to
R5505/B134300 (BH2) [13] however a layer of clay is noted from
3.5 metres.
5.5 m to 6.75 m. (End 6.8 m)
Table 6-1: Summary of geotechnical investigations local to Crossing Locations

7 REVIEW OF RISK TO PIPELINE CAUSED BY PERMANENT WORKS
7.1 General
Post installation of the interchange upgrade scheme, the pipeline is expected to require an
area classification of ‘S’. The criteria for ‘T’ classification are not met, and hence this
classification is not expected to be applicable.
The pipeline is currently assumed to be classed as area classification S due to the proximity
of the Pfizer buildings. If this is not the case, and the pipeline is changed from an ‘R’ to an ‘S’
classification then a QRA to IGEM TD/1 or similar is stipulated by IS328:2015 [6] therefore the
current area classification should be confirmed to determine if QRA is required.
Given the pipeline parameters shown in Table 4-1 the theoretical utilisation is 0.17, this is
compliant with the maximum requirement of 0.3 design factor indicated for area classification
‘S’ by IS328:2015 1.
At a pressure of less than or equal to 19 Bar, section 6.11.4 of IS328:2015 shows that the
pipeline must not exceed a design factor of 0.3, and that the nominal wall thickness must be
not less than 9.52 mm otherwise protection shall be provided for impact protection 2. At the
current pressure the pipeline does not require additional protective slabbing to manage risk to
the pipeline, however the omission of protective slabbing may prevent future uprating of the
pipeline operating pressure.
In addition to the general requirements and assessment, further analysis of the risks to the
pipeline caused by a change of crossing is detailed below.
Whilst no slab is required for pipeline protection purposes, the proposed slab would be likely
to comply with the general requirements of a type ‘f’ concrete protection slab provided that
marker tape or mesh identifying the gas pipeline protection slab is installed at appropriate
locations.
If the pipeline is to be considered for uprating in the future, the slab requirements would be
extended to a distance equivalent to the minimum building proximity distance from the road
edge including hard shoulder. The minimum building proximity distance for this pipeline whilst
operating within a design factor of 0.3 is 6.52 metres, therefore if future uprating is a possibility
the slabbing should be provided to a minimum distance of 6.52 metres measured
perpendicularly from the road edge including hard shoulder. Additional measures will be
required if a pressure increase will result in the design factor being greater than 0.3.
Irrespective of future uprating plans a minimum depth of cover of 1.2 metres should be verified
and maintained to a minimum distance of 10 metres perpendicular from the nearest hard road
surface [16].
The clay layer below the pipeline is considered as potentially compressible by secondary
settlement in the event of change of surcharge level. Provided that the crossing is not installed
1
No documentation has been received by Penspen to indicate the design factor of the pipeline; the utilisation factor
is therefore used in lieu for the remainder of this document. This implies that if the pipeline is considered for uprating
in the future, re-assessment will be required, and may find that crossings found to be currently acceptable would fail
the revised assessment.
2
Section 6.11.2 of IS328:2015 shows that the minimum nominal wall thickness of 11.91 mm is required for pipelines
operating in excess of 19 Bar at high density road crossings, therefore a QRA would be required.
18977-AI-RPT-001 Rev 2 Review of Risk to Pipeline Caused By Permanent Works Page 17 of 41

over the in-filled creek/drainage ditch 3, the existing change in surcharge level is assumed to
have been installed for a sufficient time such that the clay layer is currently in equilibrium.
Penspen have not received any analysis from GNI to indicate the probable strain state in this
region of pipeline.
Given the uncertainties in the strain state near to the pipeline, and the risk of additional
secondary settlement, the crossing must not add any additional depth of cover without first
conducting a detailed analysis of the changes caused by the prior change to surcharge level,
this analysis would extend for at least the full length of pipeline with additional depth of cover.
The estimated strain state at the crossing location is discussed further in Section 8.2.2.
In addition to the general requirements and assessment, further analysis of the risks to the
pipeline caused by a change of usage is detailed below.
Whilst no protection slab is required, a slab is required to control pipeline differential

displacement. The proposed slab would be likely to comply with the requirements of a type f
concrete protection slab, provided that marker tape or mesh identifying the gas pipeline
protection slab is installed at appropriate locations.
If the pipeline is to be considered for uprating in the future the slab requirements would be
likely to extend to a distance equivalent to the minimum building proximity distance from the
road edge including hard shoulder. The minimum building proximity distance for this pipeline
is 6.52 metres, therefore if future uprating is a possibility the slabbing should be provided to a
minimum distance of 6.52 metres measured perpendicularly from the road edge including hard
shoulder. This could be achieved by one of two methods:
- Extending the existing slab design; or,
- Designing and installing additional protection slabs to provide the required

additional length.
Irrespective of future uprating plans, a minimum depth of cover of 1.2 metres should be verified
and maintained to a minimum distance of 10 metres perpendicular from the nearest hard road
surface [16].
The current pipeline is expected to achieve this based on as-laid drawings; however, this
should be verified once detailed designs are available, and again when construction work has
been completed.
Detailed design should consider degradation/shielding of the pipeline cathodic protection

system, interaction of the piles with the pipeline cathodic protection system as well as any
effect the cathodic protection system may have on the pile structure. In general, the pile design
must ensure structural integrity of the piles is maintained for at least the best reasonable
estimate of remnant pipeline design life.
3
Discussed in more detail in Section 8.2.2.
18977-AI-RPT-001 Rev 2 Review of Risk to Pipeline Caused By Permanent Works Page 18 of 41

8 ASSESSMENT OF PIPELINE INTEGRITY DUE TO PERMANENT CROSSINGS
8.1 General
Provided that the pipeline is currently in good condition and suitably protected, future pipeline
integrity is mainly affected by changes in loading due to alterations in operating parameters,
levels of surcharge, any changes to the pipeline protection system, and any other alterations
to the current pipeline operating environment which are a result of the proposed design.
This following items are considered further at each crossing location:
- Changes in loading on the pipeline due to the crossing: loadings are assessed by:
o API 1102;
o Penspen internal methods incorporating elements of Boussinesq theory [17];

and,
o Specific items which may impact on the future integrity of the pipeline.
Crossing location 1 was installed in 1977 with circa 1.2 to 1.3 metres depth of cover. Earth
works undertaken circa 2007/2008 have added somewhere in the region of 3.5 to 4 metres of
cover to the pipeline in the region of crossing location 1. GNI have recorded the current depth
of cover at crossing location 1 as 4.8 metres. The most recent design received by Penspen
shows that the crossing would be installed by reducing the depth of cover to approximately 4
metres to allow a suitable road surface profile.
Several factors are considered when assessing the future integrity of the pipeline at this
location, and the influence that the proposed crossing may have on the integrity. These are
considered below.
8.2.1 Future inspection and degradation
Future inspection of the pipeline coatings may be made more difficult by the installation of a
protection slab. Any indications of coating defects identified before crossing installation should
be excavated and repaired before the installation of protective slabbing or other civil works.
Penspen have not received any ILI data or data related to external inspection of the pipeline
such as dig verification of the DCVG indication. The pipeline and coatings are therefore
assumed to be in good condition with effective CP protection other than the potential coating
damage at the location of DCVG indication.
To maintain future pipeline integrity, the CP and coatings must remain in good condition.
Therefore, coating condition should be inspected as part of any excavation works, if coatings
are found to be in a degraded condition remediation should be carried out. Note that it may be
necessary to consider recoating of the whole pipeline section before crossing installation if
coatings are found to be in generally poor condition.
Coating inspection should include standard linepipe coatings and field joint coatings. DCVG
indications are noted at two locations, assessment of the condition of the coating at these
18977-AI-RPT-001 Rev 2 Assessment of Pipeline Integrity Due To Permanent Crossings Page 19 of 41

locations should be conducted as part of the Inspection, Maintenance and Repair (IMR)
activities of the pipeline.
8.2.2 Strain caused by differential settlement
Satellite imagery indicates that additional depth of cover was installed within the pipeline
wayleave in several phases in between 2003 and 2009. A drainage ditch appears to have
been formed at the proposed location of crossing 1 by landscaping performed prior to
September 2007. This has then been filled in within the time period between September 2007
and March 2009. There is a concern that additional softer sediments could have accumulated
in the location before levelling, and that a large diameter drainage pipeline may continue to
exist at this proposed location.
The large diameter drainage pipe is potentially of concern for two reasons: distribution of
stresses to the pipeline, and as a conduit for gas in the event of a leak.
Figure 8-1 shows the ground profile in November 2003, in the absence of additional data this
is presumed to represent the ground profile at the time of pipeline installation.
Figure 8-1: Satellite imagery dated 7th November 2003

Figure 8-2 shows that significant changes have been made to the depth of cover within the
pipeline wayleave from the car parking area, extending westwards. Note the formation of a
creek/drainage ditch parallel to the car parking area at the proposed crossing 1 location.
Figure 8-2: Satellite imagery dated 8th June 2006
Figure 8-3 shows additional landscaping within the pipeline wayleave.
Figure 8-3: Satellite imagery dated 9th September 2007

Figure 8-4 indicates that the creek/drainage ditch parallel to the car parking area has been
filled in, and also shows a drainage culvert which exits to the remaining creek/drainage ditch
to the south of the pipeline wayleave.
Figure 8-4: Satellite imagery dated 3rd April 2013
Figure 8-5 shows the same location in 2018. No further changes to the depth of cover are
apparent, however an unsurfaced road crossing has become established near to the crossing
1 location. The status of this crossing is not confirmed and has not been assessed by Penspen.
Figure 8-5: Satellite imagery dated 23rd June 2018
From publicly available borehole record data, a clay layer of circa 1.25 metres thickness is
likely to be located below the pipeline in the area where the depth of cover has been altered.

This clay layer is considered compressible and at risk of secondary settlement in the event of
a change in surcharge level from the existing ground level.
Settlement in itself is not a concern, but differential settlement related to localised changes to
the magnitude of settlement are a potential concern. Penspen have performed a strain-based
assessment utilising assumed changes to the surcharge on the original ground surface caused
by changes in the depth of cover. This assessment is based on estimates of changes evident
in the satellite imagery, and the measured current depth of cover at proposed crossing location
1.
The original ground profile is not known and has been estimated. Similarly, the distribution of
the clay layer is not known and has been estimated as a continuous layer of 1.25 metres
thickness and having average properties of a standard clay. The strain assessment is viewed
as best endeavours on the basis that the main input variables are estimates. It is
recommended that project specific boreholes are performed for crossing location 1 to confirm
the assumption made on compressible layers below the pipeline at and near to the proposed
crossing location.
The strain at crossing location 1, caused by change in depth of cover and the resultant
secondary settlement in the clay layer is estimated to be below the level at which more detailed
analysis would be recommended.
The proposed crossing location indicated in Figure 8-6 is co-located with the creek/drainage
ditch shown in Figure 8-3 and Figure 8-4, subsequent images show that the drainage has been
diverted into a concrete culvert. This area has been in-filled at a later date and should be
avoided, the crossing location should therefore be moved Westwards to a location which has
been previously in-filled prior to June 2006 as shown in Figure 8-6. The proposed crossing
slab location and expected culvert location are shown in red, the location should be moved
Westwards as shown in blue.
Relocation of the crossing will avoid unnecessary risks associated with a later in-fill date,
inconsistency of fill and complications caused by crossing of a concrete conduit within the
pipeline crossing location. It is estimated that the required location will be in the region of 15
metres to the West of the proposed location, however this should be verified on site.
Figure 8-6: Proposed location of crossing 1

8.2.3 Crossing assessment
The pipeline crossing has been assessed using API 1102 and additionally by a methodology
developed by Penspen which is based on Boussinesq theory and other appropriate standards
and research as detailed in Appendix A.
Assessment has been performed at various depths as indicated in Table 8-1. The effective
stress levels as a percentage of SMYS are broadly acceptable from 1.2 metres depth of cover
to 4.8 metres depth of cover. In general, as depth increases the relative loading from live
loading is reduced and soil loadings increase. At 3.8 metres and 4.8 metres depth of cover the
load contribution from the crossing is minimal and soil loadings are still at an acceptable
magnitude.
Scenario 1 indicates the approximate installed depth for comparison, scenario 2 indicates the
expected depth of cover. Scenarios 3 and 4 are included as sensitivity checks.
Effective API1102
Depth of
Method Stress % of SMYS Fatigue Ovality (%)
Cover (m)
(MPa) Check
Allowable
- - 107.4 30 - -
Stress
Scenario 1 API 1102 1.2 98.2 27 Pass -
Scenario 1 Penspen 1.2 - 23 - 0.36
Scenario 2 API 1102 3.8 116.6 33 Pass
Table 8-1: Crosssing location 1 assessment at different depth scenarios
The stress levels reported in Table 8-1 are considered to be conservative due to the following
assumptions:
 Due to lack of available soils data, assumed values used have been to predict the
stress in the pipeline. More information of the soil installation technique and soil type
is likely to cause a reduction in calculated stress.
 The MAOP of the pipeline was used to calculate the hoop stress due to pressure.
The proposed crossing location 2 is assumed to currently have a minimum of 1.2 metres’ depth
of cover. The depth of cover is expected to be increased to somewhere in the region of 4.72
metres including a piled slab of 300 mm thickness.

The foundation piles are assumed to provide sufficient reaction such that the slab can be
considered immovable with respect to other surrounding soils. It is noted that the additional
surcharge is expected to consolidate and to cause additional consolidation in existing soils.
8.3.1 Future inspection and degradation
Future inspection of the pipeline coatings may be made more difficult by the installation of a
protection slab. Any indications of coating defects identified before crossing installation should
be excavated and repaired before the installation of protective slabbing or other civil works.
Penspen have not received any ILI data or data related to external inspection of the pipeline
such as dig verification of the DCVG indications. The pipeline and coatings have been
assumed to be in good condition with effective CP protection other than the coating at the
location of DCVG indications.
The additional changes to site topography outside of the pipeline wayleave include the filling
of a semi-tidal basin approximately 100 metres to the West of the proposed crossing location.
There is potential for saline water to be driven Eastwards towards the crossing location as
secondary settlement progresses to an equilibrium level in reaction to the change in surcharge
levels in the semi-tidal basin. To maintain future pipeline integrity, the CP and coatings must
remain in good condition.
Therefore, coating condition should be inspected as part of any excavation works at each
excavation location. If coatings are found to be in a degraded condition remediation should be
carried out. Note that it may be necessary to consider recoating of the whole pipeline section
before crossing installation if coatings are found to be in generally poor condition. This is
particularly important in the event of saline drive which could affect local corrosion growth
rates.
Coating inspection should include standard linepipe coatings, field joint coatings at both
crossing locations and Gunite coating at Location 1.
The piled slab arrangement, additional depth of cover and proposed usage as part of the
motorway infrastructure are expected to result in future inspection of the pipeline coatings and
any features on the pipeline being impractical by normal external techniques.
The pile arrangement is noted as 450 mm piles at a nominal 2-metre centre to centre spacing;
this corresponds to a nominal coverage ratio of 23% which may cause CP shielding. Sufficient
CP coverage to the pipeline must be ensured to maintain future pipeline integrity. This may
require the installation of additional anode provision below the slab arrangement. The potential
changes to CP requirements should be assessed and addressed before the crossing is
installed.
To comply with the inspection requirements of IS328:2015 alternative measures to allow

inspection must be considered. This may include use of ILI technology, and will include
revision of current RBI planning documents relating to this section of pipeline.
An alternative to ILI would be the installation of remote monitoring CP and salinity sensors
beneath the proposed slab; these would be connected to test posts in an appropriate location
away from the surfaced road area.

8.3.2 Crossing assessment
The pipeline crossing has been assessed using API 1102 and additionally by a methodology
developed by Penspen which is based on Boussinesq theory and other appropriate standards
and research as detailed in Appendix A.
The piled slab is considered an essentially immovable object in relation to the pipeline,
assessment of live loadings assumes that all traffic loadings are transferred to the pipeline by
the slab arrangement, assessment of soil loadings assumes that all loadings are transferred
to the pipeline, this is considered as conservative.
Assessment has been performed with original (planned slab depth) and final depths of cover
as indicated in Table 8-2, the effective stress levels as a percentage of SMYS are broadly
acceptable. Scenario 1 indicates a depth comparable to the as-built depth of cover, scenario
2 indicates a depth comparable to the planned depth of cover.
Effective
Depth of Fatigue
Method Stress % of SMYS Ovality (%)
Cover (m) Check
(MPa)
Allowable
- - 107.4 30 - -
Stress
Scenario 1 API 1102 1.2 98.2 27 Pass -
Table 8-2: Crosssing location 2 assessment at different depth scenarios
The stress levels reported in Table 8-2 are considered to be conservative due to the following
assumptions:
 Due to lack of available soils data, conservative assumed values used have been to
predict the stress in the pipeline. More information of the soil installation technique
and soil type is likely to cause a reduction in calculated stress.
 The MAOP of the pipeline was used to calculate the hoop stress due to pressure.
 The calculations assume that all loadings above the piled slab are transferred to the
pipeline.

9 REVIEW OF RISK CAUSED TO PIPELINE BY TEMPORARY CIVIL WORKS
9.1 General
GNI have confirmed that no temporary crossing locations are planned for vehicular crossing
of the pipeline by the civils contractor, therefore crossing of the pipeline using temporary
crossing locations has not been assessed [18].
Extensive civil works are expected close to the pipeline location, the risk of a 3rd party
interaction event with the pipeline is assumed to be heightened. This is examined in more
detail in sections 9.2 and 9.3.
9.2.1 Current usage
Satellite imagery indicates that a non-surfaced crossing point is well established over the
pipeline already as shown in Figure 6-1, this appears to be an unauthorised crossing point and
has not been assessed by Penspen. In the interim, and if the crossing in not authorised,
measures to restrict unauthorised crossing of the pipeline are advised where practicable.
9.2.2 Proposed works
A Risk Assessment Method Statement produced by the civils contractor has been provided to
Penspen. Penspen make the following observations with respect to the risk posed to the
pipeline by the civil works. No comment is made on general safety management not directly
related to risk to the pipeline.
The RAMS produced by the civils contractor SISK stipulates that hand digging will be required
within 500 mm of the pipeline, and that no work is to commence without GNI supervisor
Brendan Cree being on site.
Irish Standard IS328:2015 shows that mechanical plant must be excluded from within 3 metres
of the pipeline circumference.
IS328:2015 shows that ‘under certain circumstances consideration may be given to relaxation
of the conditions provided that the excavation methods and safeguards to be employed have
been specified and the work is supervised by the operator on site’
Comparable standards relating to similar types of work show that mechanical excavation is
excluded from closer than 500 mmm to pipelines operating below 2 Bar. Similarly, the
exclusion distance for mechanical plant is 3 metres for pipelines at similar pressure to the
pipeline being assessed.
Comparable standards indicate that mechanical excavation may be allowed to within 600 mm
of the pipeline if under the direct supervision of the pipeline operator, and include the following
additional provisos which are considered relevant:
- The pipeline location must be directly confirmed by hand dug trial pits;
- Toothless buckets shall be used;
18977-AI-RPT-001 Rev 2 Review of Risk Caused to Pipeline By Temporary Civil works Page 27 of 41
- Mechanical excavators must only excavate the area in between the pipeline and
the machinery (not reach over the pipeline).
Mechanical excavation to within 500 mm of a live gas pipeline is an operation which would
carry an excessively high risk to the pipeline, given the high consequence nature. The limiting
distance must be reviewed upwards from 500 mm. The section of pipeline being crossed
includes a bend section, the chance of misidentifying the location is higher than for a straight
pipeline section.
Additional risk is caused by lifting operations. The pre-cast concrete slab will require a lift
height of 3 metres or more above the bottom of the excavation; significant kinetic energy
transfer can be expected in the case of a failure of lift equipment or other uncontrolled rate of
lowering. Proper lift plans and procedures should be in place for all lift operations in the vicinity
of the pipeline, this will include the use of trained operatives, and appropriate equipment with
in-date load test inspection certification.
In summary the risk to the pipeline during the slab installation phase is considered as
unacceptable when controlled using the supplied RAMS document [15]. For any excavation
within the pipeline wayleave it is recommended that the additional mitigations discussed above
are implemented at a minimum, and that a larger proximity distance from the pipeline for
mechanically assisted excavation should be considered.
9.3.1 Current usage
Data received by Penspen shows that the pipeline position is marked, and that temporary
fencing to allow passage of vehicles encroaches within the pipeline corridor, additionally a
crossing over the pipeline is visible. Penspen have not received data or previous assessment
relating to these temporary crossings [19]. Uncontrolled crossing points at any location on the
pipeline may increase risk of failure and must be prevented.
Figure 9-1: Crossing location 2 corridor
9.3.2 Proposed works
The proposed crossing design for this location indicates that multiple 450 mm diameter bored
piles are to be installed at a designed proximity to the pipeline of 995 mm [20]. This design
distance does not account for over-boring of the hole, misplacement of the borehole location
or any other factors.
Irish Standard IS328:2015 [6] section 12.4.2.6, f, h, i, and l, show that:
- Mechanical plant must be excluded from within 3 metres of the pipeline

circumference;
- That the use of piling next to the pipeline shall be limited;
- A minimum separation distance of 300 mm to any buried service or structure

crossing it must be ensured, and that this should increase if practicable to 3 metres
if parallel to the pipeline; and,
- That the integrity of the cathodic protection system and pipeline coating should be
ensured.
Irish Standard IS328:2015 shows that plant must not be allowed to operate within 3 metres of
the pipeline, and that piling operations should be limited near to the pipeline with particular
emphasis on driven piles. These are reasonable recommendations to mitigate risk to the
pipeline. However, this would preclude the installation of the current design without further
consideration.
Driven piles can cause concern with respect to maximum peak particle acceleration
transferred to the pipeline in close proximity. Additionally, the risk of pile installation causing
upheaval of the surrounding ground is higher with driven piles than with piles installed by
borehole. The risk caused to the pipeline by driven piles is judged to be unacceptable.
Bored piles can mitigate to a large extent the risk of ground upheaval, and somewhat reduce
the risk of negative skin friction. The risk of operating plant and installing piles less than 1
metre from a live high-pressure gas pipeline is significant. The preliminary design drawing
indicates somewhere in the region of 60 piles, some of which are required to follow the pipe
contour at field bend locations.
The consequences of failure will have serious implications to safety of operators in the works
area, environmental consequences and is presumed to have potential for severe
consequences with respect to interruption of gas supply to the greater Cork area. If
undertaken, all works would have to be completed with particular regard given to compliance
with Irish Standards relating to safe working practices such as those contained in IS328:2015,
ISEN12007:2012 and any other applicable standards [6,21]. In general, all work must be
undertaken on an ALARP basis, examples of additional suggested risk mitigations are noted
in Section 9.3.3.
The piled structure and covering slab are planned to be installed in excess of 300 mm from
the pipeline. Although the piling arrangement is parallel to the pipeline, the structure is not
continuous, and therefore the 3-metre recommended minimum separation distance for parallel
structures can be otherwise accounted for [6].
The proposed crossing solution is detailed as being at preliminary stage, some pile design
detail has been included with revised documentation, however no consideration has been
detailed on the potential for interaction or degradation of the pipeline cathodic protection
system [22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29]. No drawings or other information has been received to indicate the
location of current cathodic protection infrastructure for either DC or AC protection. The risk of
damaging existing cathodic protection infrastructure should be considered.
9.3.3 Risk mitigations
A Risk Assessment Method Statement produced by the civils contractor has been provided to
Penspen. Penspen make the following observations with respect to the risk posed to the
pipeline by the civil works. No comment is made on general safety management not directly
related to risk to the pipeline.
The RAMS produced by the civils contractor SISK stipulates that hand digging will be required
within 500 mm of the pipeline [30], and that no work is to commence without GNI supervisor
Brendan Cree being on site. This is viewed as unacceptable in a similar way to Section 8.2.2,
recommendations for this point are the same as given in Section 8.2.2.
The sequence of work shown as point 8 in the RAMS shows that the pipeline is to be excavated
at 2-metre centres to allow for positive identification of the pipeline crown and installation of
450 mm diameter poly pipe markers. This activity is viewed as absolutely critical to effective
risk management of the subsequent piling works. In addition to the requirement for a GNI
representative to directly observe excavation activities, it is recommended that there is a
requirement for a GNI responsible person who is suitably qualified and experienced to directly
observe and assist to confirm that;
- The crown of the pipeline has been accurately located;
- The marker is accurately located on the pipeline centreline in a true vertical position;
- The marker remains accurately in position during the backfilling operation;
- The pipeline location remains known to a high degree of confidence following

backfilling;
- The borehole location is accurately placed, and agreed upon in writing between all
parties for each borehole location immediately before commencement of each
borehole drilling operation; and that,
- The borehole excavation continues to be made in the correct location and maintains
true to vertical during the boring operation.
Each person on site must understand, and freely be able to use ‘stop the job’ to pause all
operations in the event of a concern that the risk has not been minimised to the lowest level
possible, or that the operation is deviating from planned parameters. This requirement will
extend to all parts of the slabbing operation.
The GNI representative should additionally make opportunistic inspection of pipeline, coating
type and coating condition at each point where the pipeline is excavated.
The pile cap beams are nominally 930 mm in height, a trench will be excavated either side of
the pipeline to sufficient depth such that a hydraulic cropper can be used on the installed piles
at the correct height. No detailed of the hydraulic cropping tool or lifting arrangements have
been received by Penspen. Given that the ground is soft, a trench either side of the pipeline
may allow the ground to slump and/or offer a lesser level of impact protection to the pipeline
in the event of a dropped object. This operation is viewed as being high risk and must be
overseen by a GNI representative in addition to the excavation of the trenches parallel to the
pipeline.
The requirement for lift operations to be observed by a GNI representative will also apply to
lift operations to place pre-cast slabs. The slabs are nominated to be installed using a 20t
excavator rather than by crane, this is understood to be caused by site access limitations. A
dropped object study should be considered for both the slabbing and hydraulic cropping tool
once further details are known.
In summary the installation of the proposed pile design would be outside of the requirements
detailed in IS328:2015 [6]. High probability of pipeline interaction combined with the high
consequence of loss of life and loss of gas supply continuity result in a risk profile for this
operation that is viewed as significant.
The risk may be managed to an acceptable level provided that extremely stringent procedures
and checks are in place. This will require intensive GNI involvement to verify, authorise and
record each individual operation, such as locating each individual borehole, immediately prior
to the specified operation.
Lift operations are understood to be planned using an excavator due to site access limitations,
a dropped object study should be conducted once further details are finalised.
10 CONCLUSIONS
1. The location has shown a category 1 DCVG indication.
2. The RAMS does not adequately control risk to the pipeline during installation of a
crossing slab, particularly mechanical excavation.
3. A slab or QRA will be required if the pipeline is ever considered for uprating.
4. An ‘S’ area classification will be appropriate following installation of the crossing. A

QRA will be required to change from an ‘R’ classification to a ‘S’ classification.
5. A minimum depth of cover of 1.2 metres is required to a distance of 10 metres from

the nearest hard road surface.
6. Slab lifting operations will increase risk to the pipeline given the depth of the
excavation required.
7. Pipeline parameters are sufficient such that protective slabbing is not currently
required to comply with IS328:2015, however this may preclude pipeline pressure
uprating.
8. Temporary risk can be controlled by not installing a slab.
10.1.1 Additional Factors
9. Satellite imagery indicates that a temporary crossing point has become established at
the location, temporary crossings have not been assessed following confirmation from
Conor Long that temporary crossing points are not required.
10. The depth of cover at crossing location 1 has been increased by approximately 3.5 to
4 metres, this may have caused differential settlement in the clay layer below the
pipeline.
11. An estimate of pipeline strain caused by additional depth of cover within the wayleave
at the crossing location has found on a best endeavours basis, that strain is likely to
be below a level at which further assessment is currently required.
12. The revised crossing design as shown in Figure 4-2 will remove some of the existing
additional depth of cover, this is likely to reduce the depth of cover from the measured
4.8 metres to 4 metres. At 4 metres depth of cover the stresses acting on the pipeline
are dominated by soil loadings.
13. A creek/drainage ditch is apparent in satellite imagery at the location, subsequent

images show a concrete culvert exiting to the South of the location. The concrete
culvert is assumed to be in place above the pipeline in the approximate location of the
creek/drainage ditch. The design or integrity of the concrete culvert is not known.
14. Crossing load scenarios are acceptable using the supplied crossing design data.
18977-AI-RPT-001 Rev 2 Conclusions Page 32 of 41

1. The location has shown category 1 and 2 DCVG indications.
2. The RAMS does not adequately control risk to the pipeline during installation of a
crossing slab, particularly mechanical excavation, lifting and pile boring operations.
3. The slabbing must extend to the minimum building proximity distance from the pipeline
or else a QRA will be required if the pipeline is ever considered for uprating.
4. An ‘S’ area classification will be appropriate following installation of the crossing. A

QRA will be required to change from an ‘R’ classification to a ‘S’ classification.
5. A minimum depth of cover of 1.2 metres is required to a distance of 10 metres from

the nearest hard road surface.
6. Lifting operations are planned to utilise an excavator, this is expected to increase risk
to the pipeline.
7. Pipeline parameters are sufficient such that protective slabbing is not currently
required to comply with IS328:2015, however slabbing is required in order to control
pipeline movement to <10 mm [14].
10.2.1 Additional Factors
8. Photographs supplied by GNI indicate that a temporary crossing point may exist at the
location, temporary crossings have not been assessed following confirmation from
Conor Long that temporary crossing points are not required.
9. Excavating a trench either side of the pipeline to allow hydraulic cropping operations
will reduce the protection the depth of cover will provide in the event of a dropped
object.
10. Driven piles are likely to result in an unacceptable risk of ground upheaval and must
not be used.
11. Adjacent earthworks may result in a more saline solution migrating towards the
crossing location.
12. The piled structure may shield cathodic protection and is likely to prevent future DCVG
and CIPS inspection of pipeline coating integrity.
13. Crossing load scenarios are acceptable using the supplied crossing design data.
18977-AI-RPT-001 Rev 2 Conclusions Page 33 of 41

11 RECOMMENDATIONS
1. CP design should be such that the protection is maintained for the new configuration.
Consideration given to CIPS / DCVG achievability in the new design.
2. DCVG indications must be investigated and remediated before installation of the

crossing. This will include assessment of the general condition of pipeline coatings
and may require recoating of the entire pipeline section at the crossing location.
3. The RAMS should be revised in line with the recommendations made in Section 9.2.
4. The current area classification should be confirmed. A QRA will be required if a change
is required from area classification ‘R’ to ‘S’.
5. The depth of cover must be verified as being a minimum of 1.2 metres to a distance
of 10 metres from the nearest hard road surface.
6. The crossing should be installed without a protection slab to minimise overall risk to
the pipeline. The only exception to this is if the pipeline is being, or likely to be
considered for uprating.
7. GNI representative to directly oversee any excavation work undertaken within the
pipeline wayleave, this includes excavation related to installation of the crossing
irrespective of the use of a slab.
8. Depth of cover should not be increased further without prior assessment, further
changes to the depth of cover may cause the strain state to become unacceptable.
9. Crossing specific boreholes should be commissioned to determine the thickness of

compressible layers below the pipeline 4, and that the results are reassessed if less
conservative than the assumptions used in this report to calculate differential
settlement driven strain.
10. The crossing must not be co-located with the filled-in creek/drainage ditch and culvert,
the proposed crossing location should be moved to the West sufficiently to avoid these
features. This is likely to be in the order of 15 metres but should be confirmed on site
and/or by using survey/boreholes.
11. It is recommended that warning measures such as warning tapes are installed below
the lowest level of road crossing foundations if no protection slab is installed.
1. CP design should be such that the protection is maintained for the new configuration.
Consideration given to CIPS / DCVG achievability in the new design.
2. DCVG indications must be investigated and remediated before installation of the

crossing. This will include assessment of the general condition of pipeline coatings
and may require recoating of the entire pipeline section at the crossing location.
4
Alternatively, date information for existing borehole locations would also facilitate this.
18977-AI-RPT-001 Rev 2 Recommendations Page 34 of 41

3. The RAMS should be revised in line with the recommendations made in Sections 9.2,
9.3 and particularly with the recommendations made in 9.3.3.
4. The current area classification should be confirmed. A QRA will be required if a change
is required from area classification ‘R’ to ‘S’.
5. The depth of cover must be verified as being a minimum of 1.2 metres to a distance
of 10 metres from the nearest hard road surface.
6. A suitably qualified and experienced GNI representative to directly oversee any

excavation work undertaken within the pipeline wayleave, and maintain a record of
GNI acceptance of borehole location before each individual boring operation is
commenced.
7. Implement a ‘stop the job’ system.
8. Ensure that Commission for Regulation of Utilities in Ireland (CRU) are appropriately
informed prior to commencement of any boring or excavation works.
9. A dropped object study should be conducted using the reduced protection parameters
caused by excavations to the side of the pipeline. A lift specific RAMS should be
produced and incorporate the results of the dropped object study.
10. A cathodic protection study should be conducted to examine the influence the piled
structure will have on CP shielding and the requirement for additional CP infrastructure
which may require installation below the slabbing. This may include the requirement
for remote saline monitoring capability to be installed below the slab.
11. A pipeline monitoring study should be conducted to examine the requirements for
additional infrastructure to be installed below the slabbing such as remote monitoring
sensors for DCVG/CIPS survey and monitoring saline concentration.

1 REFERENCES
[1] Gas Networks Ireland, Request for Quotation Reference Number: 14_008-98 Technical
Assessment of Pipe Crossings. 14_088-98 – RFQ Version 7th January 2019
[2] Drawing supplied by Gas Networks Ireland, Dunkettle Interchange Upgrade Scheme,
Gas Mains Conflict No 1, 11/05/2018.
[3] Drawing supplied by Gas Networks Ireland, Utilities Conflicts Gas 01, N8DKI-FTRC-
UG-XX-DR-C-001, Rev C04, 28/09/2018.
[4] Drawing supplied by Gas Networks Ireland, Inch-Cork 600 diameter pipeline as-laid
drawing, Strip map number BGE/AL/01/17, Sheet 1 of 1, Rev B, 29/04/2005.
[5] Email: Conor Long to Aidan Charlton, RE: 14_008-98 (18977) - GNI Cork Crossing
Assessments - Dunkettle Interchange - Data Request & Progress Update, 14:17hrs,
25/02/2019.
[6] Anon, Gas Transmission Pipelines And Pipeline Installations, Edition 4, Irish Standard
328:2015
[7] Chris Pimm, Cathodic Protection Co Ltd., DCVG Survey – Selective DCVG on PL01
between Inchera And The N25, 2018-01-INCH-N25-CP-P-OTH-002_01, Rev 1,
15/07/2018.
[8] Chris Pimm, Cathodic Protection Co Ltd., DCVG Survey – Selective DCVG on PL01
between Inchera And The N25, 2019-01-INCH-N25-CP-P-OTH-018_01, Rev 1,
15/02/2019.
[9] Email: Brendan Creedon to Aidan Charlton, RE: 14_008-98 (18977) - GNI Cork
Crossing Assessments - Dunkettle Interchange - Data Request & Progress Update,
12:20hrs, 16/05/2019
[10] Annotated Drawing supplied by Gas Networks Ireland, Inch-Cork 600 diameter pipeline
as-laid drawing, Strip map number BGE/AL/01/17, Sheet 1 of 1, Rev B, 29/04/2005.
[11] Anon, GSI Report 1260: Little Island House, https://www.gsi.ie/en-ie/data-and-

maps/Pages/Geotechnical.aspx, Accessed online 21/02/2019.
[12] Anon, GSI Report 1264: Mahon Crossing of the River Lee, https://www.gsi.ie/en-
ie/data-and-maps/Pages/Geotechnical.aspx, Accessed online 21/02/2019.
[13] Anon, GSI Report 5505: Industrial/Pharmaceutical, https://www.gsi.ie/en-ie/data-and-

maps/Pages/Geotechnical.aspx, Accessed online 21/02/2019.
[14] Simmons. J, Technical Note, N8DKI Gas Wayleave – CBR Commentary Conflict No 2,
N8DKI-FTRC-EW-J-TN-GE-6001, Rev P04, 30/10/2018.
[15] Hamzah Arshad, Installation of protection slabs over gas transmission main (GNI 01),
Document number 0001, Rev 1 (For comment), 06/03/2019.
[16] Anon, Petroleum and natural gas industries - Pipeline transportation systems (ISO
13623:2009 modified), I.S.EN14161:2011.

[17] Boussinesq, M. J. "Application des potentiels a l'etude de l'equilibre et du mouvement

des solides elastiques, principalement au calcul des deformations et des pressions que
produisent, dans ces solides, des efforts quelconques exerces sur une petite partie de
leur surface ou de leur interieur: Memoire suivi de notes etendues sur divers points de
physique mathematique et d'analyse," GauthierVillars, Paris, pp. 722. 1885.
[18] Conor Long (Verbal), 14_008-98 (18977) Kick-off meeting, 14/02/2019.
[19] Image pack received by email, Dunkettle Interchange - GNI Conflict 02, email Conor
Long to Aidan Charlton, RE: 14_008-98 (18977) - GNI Cork Crossing Assessments -
Dunkettle Interchange - Data Request & Progress Update, 14:17hrs, 25/02/2019.
[20] Fehily Timoney et al, Gas Conflict No 2 – Preliminary Pile Slab Arrangement – Sheet 1
of 1, Rev P01, 03/09/2018.
[21] Anon, Gas infrastructure - Pipelines for maximum operating pressure up to and
including 16 bar - Part 1: General functional requirements, I.S.EN12007-1:2012.
[22] Drawing supplied by Gas Networks Ireland, Pipe protection slab - General Arrangement
Sheet 1, N8DKI-FTRC-UG-XX-DR-C-0000, Rev I02, 04/03/2019
[23] Drawing supplied by Gas Networks Ireland, Pipe protection slab - General Arrangement
Sheet 2, N8DKI-FTRC-UG-XX-DR-C-0001, Rev I00, 04/03/2019
[24] Drawing supplied by Gas Networks Ireland, Pipe protection slab - Outline Sheet 1,
N8DKI-FTRC-UG-XX-DR-C-0002, Rev I02, 15/02/2019
[25] Drawing supplied by Gas Networks Ireland, Precast slab outlines, N8DKI-FTRC-UG-
XX-DR-C-0003, Rev I00, 15/02/2019
[26] Drawing supplied by Gas Networks Ireland, Precast slabs R.C. Details, N8DKI-FTRC-
UG-XX-DR-C-0010, Rev I00, No date supplied
[27] Drawing supplied by Gas Networks Ireland, Pile capping beam – R.C. Details Sheet 1,
[28] Drawing supplied by Gas Networks Ireland, Pile capping beam – R.C. Details Sheet 2,
[29] Drawing supplied by Gas Networks Ireland, Piles R.C. Details, N8DKI-FTRC-UG-XX-
DR-C-0013, Rev I00, 04/03/2019
[30] Patrick Tobin, Installation of protection slabs over gas transmission main (GNI 02),
Revision not noted, 29/03/2019.

APPENDIX A METHODOLOGY
A.1 Loading assessment methodology
Where pipelines are coincident with road crossings, the pipeline experiences overburden
loading from the soil as well as from passing traffic, illustrated in Figure 11-1: Road Crossing
Example. These loads can cause high stresses to develop in the pipeline and ultimately may
lead to collapse.
Road crossing structure (if applicable)

Road traffic load Soil load Depth of
cover
Figure 11-1: Road Crossing Example
Pipeline design codes such as ASME B31.8-2014[31], BS PD 8010-2015[32] and IGEM

IGE/TD/1 Edition 5[33] give simple guidance on the design and assessment of pipelines being
crossed by roads and highways. The main loads are identified as soil cover as a sustained
load and road traffic as occasional loads. ASME B31.8-2014 identifies that stresses from
road traffic loads may be calculated in accordance with API RP 1102 [34] for pipelines installed
under highways.
Penspen has developed a methodology for the assessment of the pipeline integrity where
the pipeline is buried below a road crossing. The principles on which the Penspen method is
based are summarised in Section A.3.
A.2 API RP 1102: Steel Pipelines Crossing Railroads and Highways
Pipeline integrity is assessed by determining the combined effective stress and fatigue life of
the pipeline from the circumferential principal stress, longitudinal principal stress and the
radial principal stresses from operational and in-situ overburden loading, as well as the
additional loads due to the vehicle weight5.
It should be noted that the calculation of soil load in API RP 1102 only applies for pipelines
installed by an auger boring method and is considered a conservative assessment. The
methodology outlined in API RP 1102 should only be used with the correct knowledge of the
differences in load transfer to the pipe caused by different installation methods, both
trenched and trenchless.
A.3 Penspen Method for Assessment of Combined Vehicle and Overburden Loading
The API 1102 method contains several inherent, conservative safety factors, but also non-
conservative aspects. Thus, Penspen has developed an in-house assessment method to
address the limitations of the API approach. The methodology developed by Penspen is
5
For the cases discussed in this document the Critical Axle arrangement is Tandem Axles.
18977-AI-RPT-001 Rev 2 Appendix Page 38 of 41

capable of assessing non-standard load cases which are not able to be assessed using API
1102 including changes to the depth of cover caused by civil works.
Past examples assessed using the Penspen method include proposed pipeline crossings for
use by special vehicle loads exceeding 400 tonnes, and pipeline crossings for use by a
variety of construction equipment in a geologically similar region to the Dunkettle
interchange.
The Penspen method is based on Boussinesq theory, and aspects of Dutch Code NEN 3650
and German standard Abwassertechnische Vereinigung (ATV) A127[35,36]. This method
provides a more accurate estimate of loads imposed on the pipeline and addresses the
following conservative and non-conservative assumptions made in the API approach.
A.4 Trench Type
The type of installation affects the load developed on the crown of the pipe, due to the
relative stiffness of the pipe, surround and backfill, and soil compaction levels. The effect of
trench geometry on the soil pressure acting on a pipe is shown in Figure 11-2: Example of
Trench Geometry Influence.
Figure 11-2: Example of Trench Geometry Influence
The API method assumes an auger bored (trenchless) installation technique when
calculating soil load. This can be a non-conservative assumption for pipelines installed by
other methods, e.g. open trench. The Penspen method allows for assessment of different
trench types, using Boussinesq theory to calculate load distribution.
A.5 Soil Support
The horizontal bed support of the soil is not accounted for in the API method. The horizontal
bed support of the soil restrains against ovalisation of the pipeline ring and, therefore,
reduces stress in the pipe. NEN 3650 includes an allowance for this horizontal support [36].
A.6 Internal Pressure
The internal pressure in a pipeline has a significant stiffening effect on the pipe ring. This
stiffening can reduce the stress from the imposed soil loading, in turn reducing the
deformation due to overburden and live loads. The API method does not directly account for
this re-rounding effect caused by the internal pressure. The ATV A127 approach accounts
for this re-rounding effect [36].

[31] Anon, Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems, ASME B31.8-2014, The
American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2014.
[32] Anon, Pipeline systems – Part 1: Steel pipelines on land code of practice, BS 8010-1,
British Standards Institute, 2015.
[33] Anon, Steel Pipelines for High Pressure Gas Transmission, IGEM-TD1 Edition 5, 2008.
[34] Anon, Managing System Integrity for Hazardous Liquid Pipelines, API1160, American
Petroleum Institute, 2013.
[35] Anon, Requirements for pipeline systems - Part 1 general, NEN 3650, Nederlands
Normalisatie-Instituut (NEN) [Netherlands Standardization Institute], 2006.
[36] Anon, Standard for the static calculation of drainage sewers and pipeline, Standard ATV
A127, 2nd Edition, Abwassertechnische Vereinigung (ATV) [Sewage Technical
Association], 1988.

APPENDIX B TECHNICAL NOTE DETAILING WORKS UNDER VO -

ATTACHED AS ADDENDUM

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14/008 - 98 Dunkettle Interchange

Pipeline Crossing Assessment

Gas Networks Ireland

Revision, change control and authorisation history.

Document owner: CDE for Integrity

Description Prepared Checked Authorised

18977-AI-RPT-001 Rev 2 Page i

5 Current Pipeline Condition Review 11

7 Review of Risk to Pipeline Caused By Permanent Works 17

8 Assessment of Pipeline Integrity Due To Permanent Crossings 19

9 Review of Risk Caused to Pipeline By Temporary Civil works 27

Appendix B Technical Note Detailing Works Under VO - Attached As Addendum 41

18977-AI-RPT-001 Rev 2 Contents Page ii

ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable

18977-AI-RPT-001 Rev 2 Executive Summary Page 3 of 41

In both locations a post-installation location classification of category ‘S’ will be appropriate.

1.1 Crossing Location 1

1.2 Crossing Location 2

18977-AI-RPT-001 Rev 2 Executive Summary Page 4 of 41

18977-AI-RPT-001 Rev 2 Objectives/Scope of Work Page 5 of 41

Figure 3-1: Map of pipe crossing locations

18977-AI-RPT-001 Rev 2 Introduction Page 6 of 41

4.1 Pipeline details

Wall Thickness 9.52 mm

Material Grade X52

Design Pressure 19 Bar

External Diameter 609.60 mm

Commissioning Date 1978

Table 4-1: Pipeline parameters [1]

4.2 Crossing location 1

Figure 4-1: Crossing location 1.

18977-AI-RPT-001 Rev 2 Asset Details Page 7 of 41

Figure 4-2: Change in ground profile at proposed crossing location 1.

Figure 4-3: As-laid pipeline details near to crossing location 1.

18977-AI-RPT-001 Rev 2 Asset Details Page 8 of 41

4.3 Crossing location 2

Figure 4-4: Crossing location 2.

Figure 4-5: Change in ground profile at proposed crossing location 2.

18977-AI-RPT-001 Rev 2 Asset Details Page 9 of 41

Figure 4-6: As-laid pipeline details near to crossing location 2.

18977-AI-RPT-001 Rev 2 Asset Details Page 10 of 41

5 CURRENT PIPELINE CONDITION REVIEW

5.2 Crossing Location 1

No further data has been made available to Penspen.

5.3 Crossing Location 2

No further data has been made available to Penspen.

18977-AI-RPT-001 Rev 2 Current Pipeline Condition Review Page 11 of 41

The pipeline wayleave must be controlled appropriately, uncontrolled changes in depth of

18977-AI-RPT-001 Rev 2 Current Pipeline Condition Review Page 12 of 41

6.2 Crossing Location 1

Figure 6-1: Potential change in depth of cover

18977-AI-RPT-001 Rev 2 Geological Review Page 13 of 41

6.3 Crossing Location 2

18977-AI-RPT-001 Rev 2 Geological Review Page 14 of 41

18977-AI-RPT-001 Rev 2 Geological Review Page 15 of 41

Location Identification Near-surface majorlith Underlying majorlith

Mainly clays and silts mixed with

Mainly clays and silts mixed with

Mainly clays and silts mixed with

R1260/B66275 (B2) [11] Silts and clays to (End 5 m). N/a

Predominantly gravels, cobbles and

Silts, clays and gravels to (End 2.2

Predominantly gravels and boulders,