G.R. No.

L-17512           December 29, 1960

CLARO IBASCO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. MELQUIADES G. ILAO, ET AL., respondents.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Facts:

Jose Pascual filed with the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte a protest contesting the election of
Claro Ibasco as Mayor of Mercedes, Camarines Norte. When summons was serve upon Ibasco, instead of filing an
answer, he filed a motion for bill of particulars which was granted. the court ordered Pascual "to amend his motion
of protest by naming the precincts where the alleged minors voted, the date and the precincts where they were
registered, the persons who voted twice and the precincts where they voted, and the precincts where the inspectors
allegedly committed irregularities", within five days from receipt of the order.

As protestant failed to file an amended protest, protestee filed a motion to dismiss, , which was denied by
the court. In the meantime, protestee failed to file his answer as required by law; he was not however declared in
default, but was deemed to have entered a general denial as provided for in Section 176 (e) of the Revised Election
Code.

During the hearing, protestee questioned the validity of the ballots cast in favor of protestant which had
been marked by protestee as exhibits during the revision of the ballots before the Committee on Revision in
precincts covered by the protest, but the trial court ruled that protestee cannot impugn said ballots because he failed
to file an answer with affirmative defenses. Protestee filed a motion for reconsideration contending that, as he has
not been declared in default, he has a right to contest the votes cast in favor of protestant provided that they are
covered by the protest, but the motion was denied.

Hence, protestee came to this Court by way of certiorari praying that respondent court be ordered to allow
him to present such evidence as may be necessary to nullify the questioned ballots cast in favor of protestant in those
precincts involved in the protest. Upon his petition, this Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction.

Issue:

The interpretation to be placed on the terms "general denial" used in Section 176 (e) of the Revised Election Code.

Held:

It is the theory of the trial court that the failure of protestee to file an answer is tantamount to an admission
on his part of the material allegations of the protest and, therefore, he is no longer in a position to dispute them.
There seems to be a misapprehension in the application of Rule 132 1 which provides for the extension of the Rules
of Court to election cases on matters not specifically covered by the Election Law. While said rule provides that our
rules shall apply to election cases "by analogy or in a suppletory character", the application is qualified. It says that
the gap shall be filled "whenever practicable and convenient." Apparently, this rationale has been overlooked by the
trial court when in one brush it adopted the meaning of the term "general denial" as understood in the realm of our
procedural law. The Court believes such to be an error.

It is meet to recall here what we once said of general denial. This is what we said: "No rule is better settled
in pleading and practice than that neither party can prove facts which he has not alleged, if objection is properly
made. Under a general denial the defendant is permitted to present any evidence which disproves, or tends to
disprove, any of the allegations in the complaint. The reason why "prescription" cannot be interposed under a
demurrer or a general denial is the fact that the defendant thereby admits the allegations in the complaint, but seeks
to avoid their effect by other proof. Evidence which amounts to a confession or an avoidance is not generally
admissible under a general denial." In other words, a general denial puts in issue the material allegations of the
complaint, and, consequently, under such denial the protestee may present evidence which may disprove said
allegations. But he cannot present evidence to prove any affirmative defense. It is in this sense that the terms
"general denial" should be understood in election cases, for to give it a different meaning would render the
provisions of Section 176 (e) nugatory and meaningless; that phrase would be purposeless if we were to hold that by
"general denial" protestee would be deemed to have admitted all the material allegations of the protest.

There are weighty reasons that support the application of such theory in election cases. One is the cardinal
principle that an election case involves public interest and, hence, it imposed upon the court the imperative duty to
ascertain by all means within its command who is the real candidate elected by the electorate. That is why the law
gives to the court the power, in interest of justice, to order motu proprio that the ballot boxes and other election
documents be produced before it so that they may be examined and recounted regardless of whether the party raises
any issue in its pleading concerning the validity of the ballots. On the other hand, it has been postulated as a
fundamental principle underlying the trial of election cases that technicalities or procedural barriers should not be
allowed to stand if the same would tend to defeat rather than promote the interest of justice. Rather, it is enjoined
that the Election Law should be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people may not be defeated.

It would therefore appear that by legislative fiat the trial of an election case shall be conducted in a
summary litigations in order that its result may be determined in the shortest time possible. The reason is obvious:
an election case, unlike an ordinary action, involves public interest, time element being of the essence in its
disposition so that the uncertainty as to who is the real choice of the people may at once be dispelled. Moreover, it is
neither fair no just that we keep in office for an uncertain period once whose right to it is under suspicion. It is
imperative that his claim be mmediately cleared not only for the benefit of the winner but for the sake of public
interest, which can only be achieved by brushing aside technicalities of procedure which protract and delay the trial
of an ordinary action."The purpose of the legislature in declaring that contest should not be conducted upon
pleadings or by action was to free the courts as far as possible from the technicalities incident to ordinary proceeding
by action and to enable the court's to administer justice speedily and without complications".

Petition is granted. The orders of the trial court herein involved are set aside.

G.R. No. 155618            March 26, 2003

EDGAR Y. SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (FIRST DIVISION) and PEDRO Q. PANULAYA, respondents.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Facts:

Petitioner Edgar Y. Santos and respondent Pedro Q. Panulaya were both candidates for Mayor of the
Municipality of Balingoan, Misamis Oriental in the May 14, 2001 elections. On May 16, 2001, after the votes were
counted and canvassed, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed respondent Panulaya as the duly elected
Mayor.

Petitioner filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental. After trial and
revision of the ballots, the trial court found that petitioner garnered 2,181 votes while respondent received only
2,105. The RTC declared the protestant as the duly elected mayor setting aside the proclamation of herein protestee.

Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for execution pending appeal. Meanwhile, before the trial court could
act on petitioner’s motion, respondent filed on April 22, 2002 with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a
petition for certiorari, assailing the decision of the trial court. Likewise on April 22, 2002, respondent appealed the
trial court’s decision to the COMELEC. The COMELEC, issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, which effectively
enjoined the trial court from acting on petitioner’s motion for execution pending appeal. Subsequently, on August
19, 2002, the COMELEC dismissed the petition for certiorari after finding that the trial court did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in rendering the assailed judgment. Moreover, the COMELEC held that the remedy from the
decision of the court a quo was to file a notice of appeal, which respondent precisely did in EAC No. A-12-2002.
Hence, it directed the trial court to dispose of all pending incidents in SPL Election Protest.
 The Trial Court upheld and approved the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal. After petitioner posted the
required bond, the trial court issued the Writ of Execution, thereby installing petitioner as Municipal Mayor of
Balingoan, Misamis Oriental. Accordingly, petitioner took his oath of office and thereafter assumed the duties and
functions of his office.

Respondent filed with the COMELEC a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of his petition for
certiorari.

The COMELEC issued the assailed Order directing the parties to maintain the status quo ante and enjoining
petitioner from assuming the functions of Mayor. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the above Order.
However, the COMELEC First Division did not refer the said motion to the COMELEC En Banc. Hence, petitioner,
citing our ruling in Kho v. COMELEC,12 brought the instant special civil action for certiorari with this Court.
Meanwhile, on September 9, 2002, petitioner filed an "Omnibus Motion (1) To Dissolve The Status Quo Order As It
Was Based On An Unverified And Dismissed Petition With Pending Motion For Reconsideration; And (2) To Refer
This Motion To The Commission En Banc Under Section 2, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure." 13 On
October 14, 2002, the COMELEC issued a Resolution in SPR No. 37-2002, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the August 20, 2002 Resolution of the
respondent judge granting the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal as well as his Order also dated August 20, 2002 directing the
issuance of the Writ of Execution and his Writ of Execution dated August 21, 2002 are hereby set aside. Private Respondent Edgar Y.
Santos is enjoined from assuming the function of mayor of Balingoan, Misamis Oriental until the final determination of the election
appeal case.
This resolution shall be immediately executory.
The Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) is hereby requested to assist in the peaceful and orderly implementation of
this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.

Issue:

WON the COMELEC is correct in setting aside decision of the RTC granting the Motion for Execution Pending
Appeal.

Held:

No. Respondent was guilty of forum-shopping when he instituted SPR No. 37-2002 with the COMELEC.
In the case at bar, respondent obtained an adverse decision when his petition in SPR No. 20-2002 was dismissed by
the COMELEC. He thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration and a supplemental petition, praying for the
nullification of the trial court’s order for the execution of its decision pending appeal. Two days after filing the
supplemental petition, and while the same was very much pending before the COMELEC, he filed a wholly separate
petition for certiorari, docketed as SPR No. 37-2002, wherein he pleaded the same reliefs prayed for in the
supplemental petition. This is plainly evident from the respective prayers in the supplemental petition and the
petition for certiorari as reproduced hereinabove. In doing so, respondent, before allowing the COMELEC to fully
resolve the incidents in SPR No. 20-2002, both of which were at his own instance, sought to increase his chances of
securing a favorable decision in another petition. He filed the second petition on the supposition that the COMELEC
might look with favor upon his reliefs.

Considering that respondent was indubitably guilty of forum-shopping when he filed SPR No. 37-2002, his
petition should have been dismissed outright by the COMELEC. 18 Willful and deliberate forum-shopping is a
ground for summary dismissal of the case, and constitutes direct contempt of court.

The Court finds that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the trial court. Also, the Court disagrees with the COMELEC in
their reason for setting aside the aforesaid order, saying that shortness of term alone is not a good reason for execution of a judgment
pending appeal. A valid exercise of the discretion to allow execution pending appeal requires that it should be based "upon good
reasons to be stated in a special order." The following constitute "good reasons" and a combination of two or more of them will suffice
to grant execution pending appeal: (1.) public interest involved or will of the electorate; (2.) the shortness of the remaining portion of
the term of the contested office; and (3.) the length of time that the election contest has been pending.
 The decision of the trial court in Election Protest No. 1-M(2001) was rendered on April 2, 2002, or after
almost one year of trial and revision of the questioned ballots. It found petitioner as the candidate with the plurality
of votes. Respondent appealed the said decision to the COMELEC. In the meantime, the three-year term of the
Office of the Mayor continued to run. The will of the electorate, as determined by the trial court in the election
protest, had to be respected and given meaning. The Municipality of Balingoan, Misamis Oriental, needed the
services of a mayor even while the election protest was pending, and it had to be the candidate judicially determined
to have been chosen by the people.

Thus, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in giving due course, instead of dismissing
outright, the petition in SPR No. 37-2002 despite the clear showing that respondent was guilty of forum-shopping;
and in setting aside the trial court’s order granting execution pending appeal.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED.

[G.R. No. 160130.  April 14, 2004]

ISIDRO IDULZA and GODOFREDO CABANA, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
TERESITA A. BOLLOZOS, REY L. MORTIZ, MIGUEL P. PADERANGA, JOJAC Q. ASUNCION and
CIFERINO L. GARCIA, JR. respondents.

RESOLUTION

TINGA, J.:

Facts:
On 17 May 2001, petitioners Isidro Idulza (“Idulza”) and Godofredo Cabana (“Cabana”) were proclaimed as the
seventh (7th) and eighth (8th) winning candidates for the office of members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of
Gingoog City.  Private respondents Miguel Paderanga (“Paderanga”), Jojac Asuncion (“Asuncion”), and Ciferino L.
Garcia, Jr. (“Garcia”), all losing candidates for the same office, filed an election protest with the COMELEC on 25
May 2001, against the two petitioners therein and Besben Maquiso (“Maquiso”), who had placed ninth (9th) in the
canvass results. The election protest was docketed as COMELEC Case No. EPC 2001-3.  After conducting the
revision of ballots, the COMELEC Second Division (“Second Division”) on 16 January 2003 promulgated a
Resolution that settled the election protest at that point. It determined that the protestants garnered more than the
three protestees. At the same time, the Second Division determined that one Rey Y. Mortiz (“Mortiz”), who was not
a party to the election protest, had garnered more votes than the three protestants. Apparently, per the Certificate of
Canvass, Mortiz had placed tenth (10th) in the city council election, though he had not been impleaded in the protest
as he was a party-mate of the protestants. Hence, the COMELEC granted their petition.

As a consequence of the final numerical results of the votes obtained by the winning candidates vis-à-vis
the number of those authorized to be elected, Rey Y. Mortiz, who garnered more votes than the three Protestants
herein, wins the seventh (7th) rank in the City Council. While the three protestants were named the 8 th, 9th and 10th in
rank. Also, the COMELEC ordered the protestees to vacate their positions.

The protestees, filed a Motion for Reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc on 21 January 2003.
Aside from contesting the Second Division’s appreciation of the contested ballots, the petitioners also specifically
questioned the proclamation of Mortiz, who was not a party to the election protest. Petitioners also noted therein that
Asuncion and Garcia had filed certificates of candidacy for Punong Barangay and Barangay Kagawad respectively
in the 15 July 2002 barangay elections, and Asuncion was elected. As a result, it was argued, Asuncion and Garcia
should be deemed to have abandoned their election protest.

Before the COMELEC En Banc had resolved the Motion for Reconsideration, private respondent Teresita
A. Bollozos, who was not a party to the election protest, filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene. She alleged therein
that she too was a losing candidate for the Gingoog City Sanggunian, yet her vote total according to the records had
surpassed the number of votes ascribed to Asuncion and Garcia. She therefore asserted that she should have been
proclaimed as the ninth (9th) winning candidate in lieu of Asuncion, who should have placed tenth (10th) instead.
On 18 September 2003, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution partially affirming the Second Division’s
Resolution. It held that the Second Division committed no reversible error as to the appreciation of the contested
ballots, and in declaring Mortiz as the seventh (7th) place councilor.

However, the COMELEC also considered Bollozos’ claim as meritorious, as according to it, “[r]ecords
reveal that Bollozos garnered a total of seventeen thousand twenty-three (17,023) votes…, clearly outnumbering
[Asuncion’s] 16,567 votes and [Garcia’s] 16,502 votes.” Bollozos’ Motion for Intervention was thus granted, and
Bollozos was proclaimed as the ninth (9th) place candidate. At the same time, the COMELEC En Banc also ruled
that Asuncion should not be proclaimed, as he has been deemed to have abandoned his protest due to his successful
candidacy for Punong Barangay in the 15 July 2002 elections. Accordingly, the tenth (10th) place was declared
vacant.

Petitioners now come before this Court on a Petition for Certiorari, assailing the Resolutions of the
COMELEC. They assert that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in proclaiming Mortiz and
Bollozos, the former having no participation in the election protest, while the latter having filed her motion for
intervention beyond the period provided by law. They also question the manner of appreciation by the COMELEC
of the contested ballots. Finally, they applied for a Temporary Restraining Order, which the Court has not granted.

Issue:

WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed RESOLUTIONS proclaiming
Mortiz and Bollozos.

Held:

No. Petitioners are unable to point out why the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
the appreciation of the contested ballots. Notwithstanding the dissenting opinion, the Second Division’s
factual findings, as affirmed by the COMELEC En Banc, are supported by substantial evidence and thus
beyond the ken of review by the Court.

Thus, the Court is bound by the findings of the COMELEC as to how many votes the parties had obtained
in the city council election. The COMELEC had also noted that Mortiz, who had originally placed tenth (10th), has
become the seventh (7th) placer, considering that his original vote total still surpassed that of the protestants.   We
are unable to see how such declaration by the COMELEC could constitute grave abuse of discretion, even if Mortiz
had not been a party to the election protest. He was not a losing candidate elevated into victory, as he apparently was
already proclaimed a duly elected city councilor in May of 2001. The petitioners were dislodged from their
respective seats because the private respondents garnered more votes than them. Mortiz’s vote total remained
unchanged despite the protest. His elevation to seventh (7th) place is but a necessary consequence of the finding of
the COMELEC that the petitioners had actually obtained less number of votes than as reflected in the first canvass
results. It would be patently ridiculous for the Court or the COMELEC to hold that he should still be deemed as the
tenth (10th) placer when the amended vote totals reveal that he had garnered more votes than the new eighth (8th)
placer. Presumptively, the vote totals as amended after the revision more accurately reflect the true will of the voters
of Gingoog City, and the elevation of councilor Mortiz from tenth (10th) to seventh (7th) place is in consonance
with the electoral mandate.

Election protests are guided by an extra-ordinary rule of interpretation that statutes providing for election
contests are to be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not be
defeated by mere technical objections. For that reason, the Court sustains the allowance by the COMELEC of
Bollozos Intervention. Besides, in allowing the Bollozos Intervention, the COMELEC did not stretch itself by
applying an overarching equitable principle that would have disturbed the judicially sedate. Statutory prescription on
the right to intervene in an election protest is provided only by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, particularly Rule
8, Section 1. The aforementioned rule does state that the motion for intervention be filed before or during the trial of
an action or proceeding. At the same time, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are to be construed liberally “in order
to promote the effective and efficient implementation of the objectives of ensuring the holding of free, orderly,
honest, peaceful and credible elections and to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and
disposition of every action and proceeding” before the COMELEC.
 Finally, none of the parties question the COMELEC En Banc’s declaration of vacancy of the tenth (10th)
seat in the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Gingoog City on the premise that the tenth (10th) placer Asuncion’s
subsequent active candidacy and election as Punong Barangay should be deemed an abandonment of his protest. In
so holding, the COMELEC En Banc cited the Court’s majority opinion in the case of Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos.
The parties adduced no compelling reason for the Court to disturb this conclusion of the COMELEC. At the same
time, the eleventh (11th) placer Garcia cannot be elevated to the tenth (10th) spot, for the simple reason that the
electorate of Gingoog City did not elect him as one of the ten (10) city councilors.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 180917
ATTY. VICENTE E. SALUMBIDES, JR., and GLENDA ARAÑA,
petitioners
   
                     - versus -      
 
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, RICARDO AGON, RAMON VILLASANTA, ELMER DIZON,
SALVADOR ADUL, and AGNES FABIAN,
                                           Respondents,
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Facts:
          Petitioners Vicente Salumbides, Jr. (Salumbides) and Glenda Araña (Glenda) challenge the October 11, 2007
Decision and the December 13, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 96889 affirming the
Office of the Ombudsman’s decision finding them guilty of Simple Neglect of Duty.
Salumbides and Glenda were appointed in July 2001 as Municipal Legal Officer/Administrator and
Municipal Budget Officer, respectively, of Tagkawayan, Quezon.
 
Towards the end of 2001, Mayor Vicente Salumbides III (the mayor) saw the urgent need to construct a
two-classroom building with fence (the projects) for the Tagkawayan Municipal High School (TMHS) since the
public school in the poblacion area would no longer admit high school freshmen starting school year 2002-
2003. Glenda advised Salumbides in December 2001, that there were no more available funds that could be taken
from the MOOE/RMF, but the savings of the municipal government were adequate to fund the projects.  She added,
however, that the approval by the Sangguniang Bayan of a proposed supplemental budget must be secured. The
members of the Sangguniang Bayan having already gone on recess for the Christmas holidays, Glenda and
Salumbides advised the mayor to source the funds from the P1,000,000 MOOE/RMF allocation in the approved
Municipal Annual Budget for 2002.

The mayor thus ordered on January 8, 2002 Municipal Engineer Jose Aquino (Aquino) to proceed with the
construction of the projects based on the program of work and bill of materials. Upon advice of Municipal Planning
and Development Officer Hernan Jason (Jason), the mayor included the projects in the list of local government
projects scheduled for bidding on January 25, 2002 which, together with the January 31, 2002 public bidding,
failed. 
The mayor was to admit later his expectation or assumption of risk on reimbursement . The construction of
the projects commenced without any approved appropriation and ahead of the public bidding.  Salumbides was of
the opinion that the projects were regular and legal, based on an earlier project that was “implemented in the same
manner, using the same source of fund and for the same reason of urgency” which was allowed “because the
building was considered merely temporary as the TMHS is set to be transferred to an 8-hectare lot which the
municipal government is presently negotiating to buy.”

Meanwhile, Aquino suggested to the Sangguniang Bayan the adoption of “model guidelines” in the
implementation of infrastructure projects to be executed “by administration,” while Councilor Coleta Sandro
(Coleta) sponsored a Resolution to ratify the projects and to authorize the mayor to enter into a negotiated
procurement.  Both actions did not merit the approval of the Sangguniang Bayan.
 Consequently, herein respondents filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a complaint against Salumbides
and Glenda (hereafter petitioners), the mayor, Coleta, Jason and Aquino.

The administrative aspect of the case, charged petitioners et al. with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Gross
Neglect of Duty, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and violation of the Commission on Audit
(COA) Rules and the Local Government Code.               

By Order of June 14, 2002, the Office of the Ombudsman, denied the prayer to place petitioners et al. under
preventive suspension pending investigation.  By Order dated February 1, 2005, approved on April 11, 2005, it
denied the motion for reconsideration but dropped the mayor and Coleta, both elective officials, as respondents in
the administrative case, the 2004 elections having mooted the case.     

      Meanwhile, in response to the subpoena duces tecum issued by the Office of the Ombudsman on February 18,
2005 requiring the regional officer of the COA to submit the post-audit report on the projects, Celerino Alviar, COA
State Auditor II claimed by Affidavit of May 23, 2005 that the required documents were among those razed by fire
on April 14, 2004 that hit the Office of the Municipal Accountant where they were temporarily stored due to lack of
space at the Provincial Auditor’s Office.      

     On October 17, 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman approved the September 9, 2005 Memorandum absolving
Jason and Aquino, and finding petitioners guilty of Simple Neglect of Duty, for which they were meted the penalty
of suspension from office for a maximum period of six months with a stern warning against a similar repetition.  It
also approved on November 2, 2006 the March 27, 2006 Order denying the motion for reconsideration.
Their recourse to the appellate court having failed, petitioners come before this Court via Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.

Issue:
WON the CA erred in affirming the decision of the Ombudsman.

Held:
No.
For non-compliance with the rule on certification against forum shopping, the petition merits outright
dismissal. Petitioners’ disregard of the rules was not the first.   

 Its lapses aside, the petition just the same merits denial.
          Petitioners urge this Court to expand the settled doctrine of condonation to cover coterminous appointive
officials who were administratively charged along with the reelected official/appointing authority with infractions
allegedly committed during their preceding term.
 
          The Court rejects petitioners’ thesis.
The Court in Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija issued the landmark ruling that prohibits the
disciplining of an elective official for a wrongful act committed during his immediately preceding term of office. 
The Court explained that “[t]he underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms, and that the
reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the
right to remove him therefor.”  
            The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office.  To do otherwise
would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers.  When the people elect[e]d a man to office, it must be
assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or
misconduct, if he had been guilty of any.  It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct[,] to practically
overrule the will of the people.     
Ingco v. Sanchez, et al. clarified that the condonation doctrine does not apply to a criminal case. Salalima v.
Guingona, Jr. and Mayor Garcia v. Hon. Mojica reinforced the doctrine.  The condonation rule was applied even if
the administrative complaint was not filed before the reelection of the public official, and even if the alleged
misconduct occurred four days before the elections, respectively.  Salalima did not distinguish as to the date of filing
of the administrative complaint, as long as the alleged misconduct was committed during the prior term, the precise
timing or period of which Garcia did not further distinguish, as long as the wrongdoing that gave rise to the public
official’s culpability was committed prior to the date of reelection.

Lastly, We do not agree with respondent’s contention that his appointment to the position of president of
NORSU, despite the pending administrative cases against him, served as a condonation by the BOR of the alleged
acts imputed to him.  The doctrine this Court laid down in Salalima v. Guingona, Jr. and Aguinaldo v. Santos are
inapplicable to the present circumstances.  Respondents in the mentioned cases are elective officials, unlike
respondent here who is an appointed official.   Indeed, election expresses the sovereign will of the people.   Under the
principle of vox populi est suprema lex, the re-election of a public official may, indeed, supersede a pending
administrative case.  The same cannot be said of a re-appointment to a non-career position .  There is no
sovereign will of the people to speak of when the BOR re-appointed respondent Sojor to the post of university
president.
          Contrary to petitioners’ asseveration, the non-application of the condonation doctrine to appointive officials
does not violate the right to equal protection of the law.
The electorate’s condonation of the previous administrative infractions of the reelected official cannot be extended
to that of the reappointed coterminous employees, the underlying basis of the rule being to uphold the will of the
people expressed through the ballot.  In other words, there is neither subversion of the sovereign will nor
disenfranchisement of the electorate to speak of, in the case of reappointed coterminous employees. 

          It is the will of the populace, not the whim of one person who happens to be the appointing authority, that
could extinguish an administrative liability.  Since petitioners hold appointive positions, they cannot claim the
mandate of the electorate.  The people cannot be charged with the presumption of full knowledge of the life and
character of each and every probable appointee of the elective official ahead of the latter’s actual reelection.
Simple neglect of duty is defined as the failure to give proper attention to a task expected from an employee
resulting from either carelessness or indifference.  In the present case, petitioners fell short of the reasonable
diligence required of them, for failing to exercise due care and prudence in ascertaining the legal requirements and
fiscal soundness of the projects before stamping their imprimatur and giving their advice to their superior. 

          The appellate court correctly ruled that as municipal legal officer, petitioner Salumbides “failed to uphold the
law and provide a sound legal assistance and support to the mayor in carrying out the delivery of basic services and
provisions of adequate facilities when he advised [the mayor] to proceed with the construction of the subject projects
without prior competitive bidding.”  As pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, to absolve Salumbides is
tantamount to allowing with impunity the giving of erroneous or illegal advice, when by law he is precisely tasked
to advise the mayor on “matters related to upholding the rule of law.”  Indeed, a legal officer who renders a legal
opinion on a course of action without any legal basis becomes no different from a lay person who may approve the
same because it appears justified.
 
          As regards petitioner Glenda, the appellate court held that the improper use of government funds upon the
direction of the mayor and prior advice by the municipal legal officer did not relieve her of liability for willingly
cooperating rather than registering her written objection as municipal budget officer.
CA’s decision affirmed with modification. Suspension of 3 months without pay.