G.R. No.

174689             October 22, 2007

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male and
female. (Genesis 5:1-2)

Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming
from inside the bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices said.
She pecked the reed once, then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit
open. Out came two human beings; one was a male and the other was a female. Amihan
named the man "Malakas" (Strong) and the woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend
of Malakas and Maganda)

When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law recognize the
changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a person’s sex?
May a person successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate
to reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery?

On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change
of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8.
The petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as
respondent.

Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio
Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel
Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as
"male."

He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and
acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood.1 Feeling
trapped in a man’s body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent
psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to
transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex
reassignment surgery2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino
Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical
certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.

From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought
to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex
from "male" to "female."

An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the People’s Journal Tonight, a
newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks.3 Copies of the
order were sent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.

On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to

the petition was made.

During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his
American fiancé, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.

On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision4 in favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions
read:

1
 Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction
thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records
compatible with his present sex.

The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.

The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.

Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in consonance
with the principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who
has always felt, thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the physique of a
female. Petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and
should not be in any way taken against him.

Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to anybody
or the community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would
bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her [fiancé] and the
realization of their dreams.

Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the present
petition despite due notice and publication thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has
not seen fit to interpose any [o]pposition.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the
Civil Registrar of Manila to change the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of
[p]etitioner, specifically for petitioner’s first name from "Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and
petitioner’s gender from "Male" to FEMALE. 5

On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals.6 It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in
the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.

On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a decision8 in favor of the Republic. It
ruled that the trial court’s decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of
either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery.
Thus, the Court of Appeals granted the Republic’s petition, set aside the decision of the trial court
and ordered the dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it
was denied.9 Hence, this petition.

Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed
under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA
9048.10

The petition lacks merit.

A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment

Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name and
sex. As found by the trial court:

Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction
thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth
records compatible with his present sex. (emphasis supplied)

Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became
entitled to the civil registry changes sought. We disagree.

The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification.11 A change of name is a privilege, not a right.12 Petitions for change of name are
controlled by statutes.13 In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:

2
 ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.

This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1
of RA 9048 provides:

SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First

Name or Nickname. – No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a
judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or
nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil
registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its
implementing rules and regulations.

RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It vests the power and authority to entertain
petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general
concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now
primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is
to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless
an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied.15 It likewise
lays down the corresponding venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the
proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.

RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:

SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition for change
of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:

(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor
or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;

(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the
petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the
community; or

(3) The change will avoid confusion.

Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He
intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into
through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil
status.18 RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment.
Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may
only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest.

Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause
or any compelling reason justifying such change.19 In addition, he must show that he will be
prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.20 In this case, he failed to show, or even
allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.

In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first name
was not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local
civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because
the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in
the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his
birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official
name does not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly
dismissed petitioner’s petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned.

No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of
Sex Reassignment

The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court
must look to the statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:

3
 ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial
order.

Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far
as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can
now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In
effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such
errors.22 Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil
register.23

Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:

SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:

xxx       xxx       xxx

(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the

performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in
the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or
misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other
existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve
the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis
supplied)

Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical
or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court.

The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:24

ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be
recorded in the civil register.

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions;
(9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.

The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even
those that occur after birth.25 However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify
the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.

To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to
change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something
that serves as a substitute."26 The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries
therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is
necessary.

Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as
legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as births,
marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations,
annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or
recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of name).
These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal
capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In
contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is
it recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.

4
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of
capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family
membership.27

The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or
less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being
legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive term status…
include such matters as the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have
rights in general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation,
adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even succession.28 (emphasis
supplied)

A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s
legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed
by special laws.

But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects.
This is fatal to petitioner’s cause.

Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:

SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. – The declaration of the physician or

midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of
the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such
declaration shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local
civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in
attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newborn child.

In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a)
date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and
religion of parents or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status
of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; and (f) such other data as may be
required in the regulations to be issued.

xxx       xxx       xxx (emphasis supplied)

Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at
the time of birth.29 Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth
attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that
there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at
the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error,30 is immutable.31

When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning
in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in
the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should
therefore be understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to
the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of peculiarities of structure and
function that distinguish a male from a female"32 or "the distinction between male and
female."33 Female is "the sex that produces ova or bears young"34 and male is "the sex that has
organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova."35 Thus, the words "male" and "female" in
everyday understanding do not include persons who have undergone sex reassignment.
Furthermore, "words that are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning
are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the
contrary."36 Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early 1900s
and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term "sex" as used then is something
alterable through surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-to-female transsexual to
be included in the category "female."

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance
through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the

5
civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or
change of the entries in his birth certificate.

Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the
Ground of Equity

The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of justice
and equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to
anyone. This is wrong.

The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy
consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first step
towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most sacred
social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman.37 One
of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and
a female.38 To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly
alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man
who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second,
there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor
Code on employment of women,39 certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code40 and the
presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,41 among
others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be substantially
affected if petitioner’s petition were to be granted.

It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render
judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a
license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the
law, not to make or amend it.

In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what
guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for
legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are
statute-based.

To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction
or change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked,
what proof must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends
to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name
and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines
in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.

It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be
recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to
fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law
exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government,
Congress.

Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and
[the] realization of their dreams." No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are
people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized
parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the
remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the
legislature, not by the courts.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna, Garcia, JJ., concur.

6
Footnotes

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 166676

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Present:
Petitioner,
Quisumbing, J., Chairperson,
- versus -
Carpio Morales,
JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN,
Tinga,
Respondent.
VELASCO, JR., and

BRION, JJ.

Promulgated:

September 12, 2008

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising purely questions
of law and seeking a reversal of the Decision[1] dated January 12, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, which granted the Petition
for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate filed by Jennifer B. Cagandahan and
ordered the following changes of entries in Cagandahan’s birth certificate: (1) the name
"Jennifer Cagandahan" changed to "Jeff Cagandahan" and (2) gender from "female" to
"male."

The facts are as follows.

On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction
of Entries in Birth Certificate2 before the RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna.

In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered
as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed
secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal
Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male
and female characteristics. She further alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral
hyperthropy in her early years and at age six, underwent an ultrasound where it was
discovered that she has small ovaries. At age thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian
structures had minimized, she has stopped growing and she has no breast or
menstrual development. She then alleged that for all interests and appearances as well
as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her
birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and
her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.

The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for three (3)
consecutive weeks and was posted in conspicuous places by the sheriff of the court.

7
The Solicitor General entered his appearance and authorized the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor to appear in his behalf.

To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Michael
Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine
General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued a medical certificate stating that respondent’s
condition is known as CAH. He explained that genetically respondent is female but
because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop
normally and she has two sex organs – female and male. He testified that this condition
is very rare, that respondent’s uterus is not fully developed because of lack of female
hormones, and that she has no monthly period. He further testified that respondent’s
condition is permanent and recommended the change of gender because respondent
has made up her mind, adjusted to her chosen role as male, and the gender change
would be advantageous to her.

The RTC granted respondent’s petition in a Decision dated January 12, 2005 which
reads:

The Court is convinced that petitioner has satisfactorily shown that he is entitled to the
reliefs prayed [for]. Petitioner has adequately presented to the Court very clear and
convincing proofs for the granting of his petition. It was medically proven that
petitioner’s body produces male hormones, and first his body as well as his action and
feelings are that of a male. He has chosen to be male. He is a normal person and
wants to be acknowledged and identified as a male.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Civil Register of Pakil, Laguna is hereby

ordered to make the following corrections in the birth [c]ertificate of Jennifer
Cagandahan upon payment of the prescribed fees:

a) By changing the name from Jennifer Cagandahan to JEFF CAGANDAHAN; and

b) By changing the gender from female to MALE.

It is likewise ordered that petitioner’s school records, voter’s registry, baptismal

certificate, and other pertinent records are hereby amended to conform with the
foregoing corrected data.

SO ORDERED.[3]

Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a reversal of the
abovementioned ruling.

The issues raised by petitioner are:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION CONSIDERING THAT:

I.

THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108 OF THE RULES OF COURT HAVE
NOT BEEN COMPLIED WITH; AND,

II.

CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108 DOES NOT ALLOW CHANGE OF

"SEX" OR "GENDER" IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE, WHILE RESPONDENT’S
MEDICAL CONDITION, i.e., CONGENITAL ADRENAL HYPERPLASIA DOES NOT
MAKE HER A "MALE."4

Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of
entries in the birth certificate of respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to

8
male, on the ground of her medical condition known as CAH, and her name from
"Jennifer" to "Jeff," under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.

The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because while the local civil registrar is an
indispensable party in a petition for cancellation or correction of entries under Section
3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, respondent’s petition before the court a quo did not
implead the local civil registrar.5 The OSG further contends respondent’s petition is
fatally defective since it failed to state that respondent is a bona fide resident of the
province where the petition was filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such
filing as mandated under Section 2(b), Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.6 The OSG
argues that Rule 108 does not allow change of sex or gender in the birth certificate and
respondent’s claimed medical condition known as CAH does not make her a male.7

On the other hand, respondent counters that although the Local Civil Registrar of Pakil,
Laguna was not formally named a party in the Petition for Correction of Birth Certificate,
nonetheless the Local Civil Registrar was furnished a copy of the Petition, the Order to
publish on December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or processes in the course of
the proceedings,8 respondent is actually a male person and hence his birth certificate
has to be corrected to reflect his true sex/gender,9 change of sex or gender is allowed
under Rule 108,10 and respondent substantially complied with the requirements of
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.11

Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide:

Rule 103

CHANGE OF NAME

Section 1. Venue. – A person desiring to change his name shall present the petition to
the Regional Trial Court of the province in which he resides, [or, in the City of Manila, to
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court].

Sec. 2. Contents of petition. – A petition for change of name shall be signed and
verified by the person desiring his name changed, or some other person on his behalf,
and shall set forth:

(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition
is filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing;

(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is sought;

(c) The name asked for.

Sec. 3. Order for hearing. – If the petition filed is sufficient in form and substance, the
court, by an order reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix a date and place for the
hearing thereof, and shall direct that a copy of the order be published before the
hearing at least once a week for three (3) successive weeks in some newspaper of
general circulation published in the province, as the court shall deem best. The date set
for the hearing shall not be within thirty (30) days prior to an election nor within four (4)
months after the last publication of the notice.

Sec. 4. Hearing. – Any interested person may appear at the hearing and oppose the
petition. The Solicitor General or the proper provincial or city fiscal shall appear on
behalf of the Government of the Republic.

Sec. 5. Judgment. – Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the order
that such order has been published as directed and that the allegations of the petition
are true, the court shall, if proper and reasonable cause appears for changing the name
of the petitioner, adjudge that such name be changed in accordance with the prayer of

9
the petition.

Sec. 6. Service of judgment. – Judgments or orders rendered in connection with this

rule shall be furnished the civil registrar of the municipality or city where the court
issuing the same is situated, who shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register.

Rule 108

CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES

IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY

Section 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry
relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding
civil registry is located.

Sec. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. – Upon good and valid grounds,
the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b)
marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage;
(f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h)
adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss
or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n)
voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.

Sec. 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is

sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would
be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.

Sec. 4. Notice and publication. – Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an
order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice
thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the
order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province.

Sec. 5. Opposition. – The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest
under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his
opposition thereto.

Sec. 6. Expediting proceedings. – The court in which the proceedings is brought may
make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for
the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings.

Sec. 7. Order. – After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an
order granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy
of the judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate
the same in his record.

The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because respondent’s petition did not implead
the local civil registrar. Section 3, Rule 108 provides that the civil registrar and all
persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made
parties to the proceedings. Likewise, the local civil registrar is required to be made a
party in a proceeding for the correction of name in the civil registry. He is an
indispensable party without whom no final determination of the case can be had.
[12] Unless all possible indispensable parties were duly notified of the proceedings, the
same shall be considered as falling much too short of the requirements of the
rules.13 The corresponding petition should also implead as respondents the civil
registrar and all other persons who may have or may claim to have any interest that

10
would be affected thereby.14 Respondent, however, invokes Section 6,[15] Rule 1 of the
Rules of Court which states that courts shall construe the Rules liberally to promote
their objectives of securing to the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of
the matters brought before it. We agree that there is substantial compliance with Rule
108 when respondent furnished a copy of the petition to the local civil registrar.

The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue
and the court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code
provides:

ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial
order.

Together with Article 376[16] of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by
Republic Act No. 9048[17] in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The
correction or change of such matters can now be made through administrative
proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048
removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors.
Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil
register.18

Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is
not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the
applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.19

The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108
of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:

ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall
be recorded in the civil register.

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage;
(6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8)
adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or
(12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation;
(15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.

The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code
include even those that occur after birth.20

Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or "inappropriate"
appearance of male characteristics. A person, like respondent, with this condition
produces too much androgen, a male hormone. A newborn who has XX chromosomes
coupled with CAH usually has a (1) swollen clitoris with the urethral opening at the
base, an ambiguous genitalia often appearing more male than female; (2) normal
internal structures of the female reproductive tract such as the ovaries, uterus and
fallopian tubes; as the child grows older, some features start to appear male, such as
deepening of the voice, facial hair, and failure to menstruate at puberty. About 1 in
10,000 to 18,000 children are born with CAH.

CAH is one of many conditions[21] that involve intersex anatomy. During the twentieth
century, medicine adopted the term "intersexuality" to apply to human beings who
cannot be classified as either male or female.[22] The term is now of widespread use.
According to Wikipedia, intersexuality "is the state of a living thing of a gonochoristic
species whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are
determined to be neither exclusively male nor female. An organism with intersex may
have biological characteristics of both male and female sexes."

Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different cultures. In most societies,

11
intersex individuals have been expected to conform to either a male or female gender
role.[23] Since the rise of modern medical science in Western societies, some intersex
people with ambiguous external genitalia have had their genitalia surgically modified to
resemble either male or female genitals.[24] More commonly, an intersex individual is
considered as suffering from a "disorder" which is almost always recommended to be
treated, whether by surgery and/or by taking lifetime medication in order to mold the
individual as neatly as possible into the category of either male or female.

In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the
various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial.
"It has been suggested that there is some middle ground between the sexes, a ‘no-
man’s land’ for those individuals who are neither truly ‘male’ nor truly ‘female’."[25] The
current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified either
as a male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when
nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification.

In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then there is no basis

for a change in the birth certificate entry for gender. But if we determine, based on
medical testimony and scientific development showing the respondent to be other than
female, then a change in the

subject’s birth certificate entry is in order.

Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither consistently and

categorically female nor consistently and categorically male) composition. Respondent
has female (XX) chromosomes. However, respondent’s body system naturally
produces high levels of male hormones (androgen). As a result, respondent has
ambiguous genitalia and the phenotypic features of a male.

Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex
the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like
respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex.
Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces
high levels of male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological support for
considering him as being male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons
makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of
such persons, like respondent, is fixed.

Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural
steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born with. And accordingly, he has already
ordered his life to that of a male. Respondent could have undergone treatment and
taken steps, like taking lifelong medication,[26] to force his body into the categorical
mold of a female but he did not. He chose not to do so. Nature has instead taken its
due course in respondent’s development to reveal more fully his male characteristics.

In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent
concerning a matter so innately private as one’s sexuality and lifestyle preferences,
much less on whether or not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male
tendency due to CAH. The Court will not consider respondent as having erred in not
choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will
the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit
the mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows this gender of the human
species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him
belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should
belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his
sexual development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an
"incompetent"[27] and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent
as a male will harm other members of society who are equally entitled to protection
under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the respondent’s position and his
personal judgment of being a male.

12
 In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how
an individual deals with what nature has handed out. In other words, we respect
respondent’s congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already
difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but respect how respondent deals with
his unordinary state and thus help make his life easier, considering the unique
circumstances in this case.

As for respondent’s change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change
of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of
the reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow.[28] The trial court’s grant
of respondent’s change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine
name to a masculine name. Considering the consequence that respondent’s change of
name merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondent’s change of
name. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate
from female to male.

WHEREFORE, the Republic’s petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 12,
2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, is AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Associate Justice

Chairperson
CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

13
1
 Rollo, pp. 29-32. Penned by Judge Florenio P. Bueser.

2
 Id. at 33-37.

3
 Id. at 31-32.

4
 Id. at 97.

5
 Id. at 99.

6
 Id. at 103.

7
 Id. at 104.

8
 Id. at 136.

9
 Id. at 127.

10
 Id. at 134.

11
 Id. at 136.

12
 Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103695, March 15, 1996, 255 SCRA 99, 106.

13
 Ceruila v. Delantar, G.R. No. 140305, December 9, 2005, 477 SCRA 134, 147.

14
 Republic v. Benemerito, G.R. No. 146963, March 15, 2004, 425 SCRA 488, 492.

15
 SEC. 6. Construction.- These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote
their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action
and proceeding.

16
 Art. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.

17
 An Act Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul General to
Correct a Clerical or Typographical Error in an Entry and/or Change of First Name or
Nickname in the Civil Registrar Without Need of a Judicial Order, Amending for this
Purpose Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Approved, March 22,
2001.

18
 Silverio v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 174689, October 19, 2007, 537
SCRA 373, 388.

19
 Id. at 389.

20
 Id. at 389.

21
 (1) 5-alpha reductase deficiency; (2) androgen insensitivity syndrome; (3) aphallia;
(4) clitoromegaly; (5) congenital adrenal hyperplasia; (6) gonadal dysgenesis (partial &
complete); (7) hypospadias; (8) Kallmann syndrome; (9) Klinefelter syndrome; (10)
micropenis; (11) mosaicism involving sex chromosomes; (12) MRKH (mullerian
agenesis; vaginal agenesis; congenital absence of vagina); (13) ovo-testes (formerly
called "true hermaphroditism"); (14) partial androgen insensitivity syndrome; (15)
progestin induced virilization; (16) Swyer syndrome; (17) Turner syndrome.
[Intersexuality <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intersexual> (visited August 15, 2008).]

22
 Intersexuality <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intersexual> (visited August 15, 2008).

23
 Intersexuality <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intersexual> (visited August 15, 2008),

14
citing Gagnon and Simon 1973.

24
 Intersexuality <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intersexual> (visited August 15, 2008).

25
 M.T. v. J.T. 140 N.J. Super 77 355 A. 2d 204.

26
 The goal of treatment is to return hormone levels to normal. This is done by taking a
form of cortisol (dexamethasone), fludrocortisone, or hydrocortisone) every day.
Additional doses of medicine are needed during times of stress, such as severe illness
or surgery.

xxxx

Parents of children with congenital adrenal hyperplasia should be aware of the side
effects of steroid therapy. They should report signs of infection and stress to their
health care provider because increases in medication may be required. In additional,
steroid medications cannot be stopped suddenly, or adrenal insufficiency will result.

xxxx

The outcome is usually associated with good health, but short stature may result even
with treatment. Males have normal fertility. Females may have a smaller opening of the
vagina and lower fertility. Medication to treat this disorder must be continued for life.
(Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia
<http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/encyclopedia.html>.)

27
 The word "incompetent" includes persons suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or
who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to read and
write, those who are of unsound mind, even though they have lucid intervals, and
persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and
other similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage
their property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation. (See Sec. 2
of Rule 92 of the Rules of Court)

28
 Yu v. Republic of the Philippines, 123 Phil. 1106, 1110 (1966).

G.R. No. 155733             January 27, 2006

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE DECEASED JOSEFA DELGADO

AND GUILLERMO RUSTIA CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA and other HEIRS
OF LUIS DELGADO, namely, HEIRS OF CONCHA VDA. DE AREVALO, HEIRS OF LUISA
DELGADO VDA. DE DANAO, ANGELA DELGADO ARESPACOCHAGA, TERESA DELGADO
PERLAS, CAROLINA DELGADO-ARESPACOCHAGA, RODOLFO DELGADO, BENJAMIN
DELGADO, GLICERIA DELGADO and CLEOFAS DELGADO; and HEIRS OF GORGONIO
DELGADO, namely, RAMON DELGADO CAMPO, CARLOS DELGADO CAMPO, CLARITA
DELGADO CAMPO-REIZA, YOLANDA DELGADO ENCINAS, FELISA DELGADO CAMPO-
ENCINAS and MELINDA DELGADO CAMPO-MADARANG, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN, namely, GUILLERMO R. DAMIAN and
JOSE R. DAMIAN; HEIRS OF HORTENCIA RUSTIA CRUZ, namely, TERESITA CRUZ-SISON,
HORACIO R. CRUZ, JOSEFINA CRUZ-RODIL, AMELIA CRUZ-ENRIQUEZ and FIDEL R.
CRUZ, JR.; HEIRS OF ROMAN RUSTIA, SR., namely, JOSEFINA RUSTIA ALBANO,
VIRGINIA RUSTIA PARAISO, ROMAN RUSTIA, JR., SERGIO RUSTIA, FRANCISCO RUSTIA,
LETICIA RUSTIA-MIRANDA; and GUILLERMINA RUSTIA, as Oppositors; 1 and GUILLERMA
RUSTIA, as Intervenor,2 Respondents.3

DECISION

15
CORONA, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 55,4 in SP Case No. 97668, which was reversed
and set aside by the Court of Appeals in its decision5 dated October 24, 2002.

FACTS OF THE CASE

This case concerns the settlement of the intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado.6 The main issue in this case is relatively simple: who, between petitioners and
respondents, are the lawful heirs of the decedents. However, it is attended by several collateral
issues that complicate its resolution.

The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado may be divided into two
groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half- and full-blood siblings,
nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, and (2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo
Rustia, particularly, his sisters,7 his nephews and nieces,8 his illegitimate child,9 and the de
facto adopted child10 (ampun-ampunan) of the decedents.

The alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado

The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa11 Delgado by one Lucio Campo. Aside
from Josefa, five other children were born to the couple, namely, Nazario, Edilberta, Jose,
Jacoba, and Gorgonio, all surnamed Delgado. Felisa Delgado was never married to Lucio
Campo, hence, Josefa and her full-blood siblings were all natural children of Felisa Delgado.

However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man in Felisa Delgado’s life. Before him was
Ramon Osorio12 with whom Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado. But, unlike her relationship with Lucio
Campo which was admittedly one without the benefit of marriage, the legal status of Ramon
Osorio’s and Felisa Delgado’s union is in dispute.

The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio ever got married is crucial to the
claimants because the answer will determine whether their successional rights fall within the
ambit of the rule against reciprocal intestate succession between legitimate and illegitimate
relatives.13 If Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado had been validly married, then their only child
Luis Delgado was a legitimate half-blood brother of Josefa Delgado and therefore excluded from
the latter’s intestate estate. He and his heirs would be barred by the principle of absolute
separation between the legitimate and illegitimate families. Conversely, if the couple were never
married, Luis Delgado and his heirs would be entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado’s intestate
estate, as they would all be within the illegitimate line.

Petitioners allege that Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado were never married. In support thereof,
they assert that no evidence was ever presented to establish it, not even so much as an
allegation of the date or place of the alleged marriage. What is clear, however, is that Felisa
retained the surname Delgado. So did Luis, her son with Ramon Osorio. Later on, when Luis got
married, his Partida de Casamiento14 stated that he was "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the
natural child of Felisa Delgado),15 significantly omitting any mention of the name and other
circumstances of his father.16 Nevertheless, oppositors (now respondents) insist that the absence
of a record of the alleged marriage did not necessarily mean that no marriage ever took place.

Josefa Delgado died on September 8, 1972 without a will. She was survived by Guillermo Rustia
and some collateral relatives, the petitioners herein. Several months later, on June 15, 1973,
Guillermo Rustia executed an affidavit of self-

adjudication of the remaining properties comprising her estate.

The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado

Sometime in 1917, Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado17 but whether a

marriage in fact took place is disputed. According to petitioners, the two eventually lived together
as husband and wife but were never married. To prove their assertion, petitioners point out that
no record of the contested marriage existed in the civil registry. Moreover, a baptismal certificate

16
naming Josefa Delgado as one of the sponsors referred to her as "Señorita" or unmarried
woman.

The oppositors (respondents here), on the other hand, insist that the absence of a marriage
certificate did not of necessity mean that no marriage transpired. They maintain that Guillermo
Rustia and Josefa Delgado were married on June 3, 1919 and from then on lived together as
husband and wife until the death of Josefa on September 8, 1972. During this period spanning
more than half a century, they were known among their relatives and friends to have in fact been
married. To support their proposition, oppositors presented the following pieces of evidence:

1. Certificate of Identity No. 9592 dated [December 1, 1944] issued to Mrs. Guillermo J.
Rustia by Carlos P. Romulo, then Resident Commissioner to the United States of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines;

2. Philippine Passport No. 4767 issued to Josefa D. Rustia on June 25, 1947;

3. Veterans Application for Pension or Compensation for Disability Resulting from Service
in the Active Military or Naval Forces of the United States- Claim No. C-4, 004, 503 (VA
Form 526) filed with the Veterans Administration of the United States of America by Dr.
Guillermo J. Rustia wherein Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia himself [swore] to his marriage to
Josefa Delgado in Manila on 3 June 1919;18

4. Titles to real properties in the name of Guillermo Rustia indicated that he was married
to Josefa Delgado.

The alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia

Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children. With no children of their own, they
took into their home the youngsters Guillermina Rustia Rustia and Nanie Rustia. These children,
never legally adopted by the couple, were what was known in the local dialect as ampun-
ampunan.

During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did manage to father an illegitimate
child,19 the intervenor-respondent Guillerma Rustia, with one Amparo Sagarbarria. According to
Guillerma, Guillermo Rustia treated her as his daughter, his own flesh and blood, and she
enjoyed open and continuous possession of that status from her birth in 1920 until her father’s
demise. In fact, Josefa Delgado’s obituary which was prepared by Guillermo Rustia, named the
intervenor-respondent as one of their children. Also, her report card from the University of Santo
Tomas identified Guillermo Rustia as her parent/guardian.20

Oppositors (respondents here) nonetheless posit that Guillerma Rustia has no interest in the
intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia as she was never duly acknowledged as an illegitimate child.
They contend that her right to compulsory acknowledgement prescribed when Guillermo died in
1974 and that she cannot claim voluntary acknowledgement since the documents she presented
were not the authentic writings prescribed by the new Civil Code.21

On January 7, 1974, more than a year after the death of Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia filed a
petition for the adoption22 of their ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia. He stated under oath
"[t]hat he ha[d] no legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children or natural children by
legal fiction."23 The petition was overtaken by his death on February 28, 1974.

Like Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia died without a will. He was survived by his sisters
Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz, and by the children of his
predeceased brother Roman Rustia Sr., namely, Josefina Rustia Albano, Virginia Rustia Paraiso,
Roman Rustia, Jr., Sergio Rustia, Francisco Rustia and Leticia Rustia Miranda.24

ANTECEDENT PROCEEDINGS

On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, the daughter of Luis Delgado, filed the original
petition for letters of administration of the intestate estates of the "spouses Josefa Delgado and
Guillermo Rustia" with the RTC of Manila, Branch 55.25 This petition was opposed by the
following: (1) the sisters of Guillermo Rustia, namely, Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and

17
Hortencia Rustia-Cruz;26 (2) the heirs of Guillermo Rustia’s late brother, Roman Rustia, Sr., and
(3) the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia. The opposition was grounded on the theory
that Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao and the other claimants were barred under the law from
inheriting from their illegitimate half-blood relative Josefa Delgado.

In November of 1975, Guillerma Rustia filed a motion to intervene in the proceedings, claiming
she was the only surviving descendant in the direct line of Guillermo Rustia. Despite the
objections of the oppositors (respondents herein), the motion was granted.

On April 3, 1978, the original petition for letters of administration was amended to state that
Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia were never married but had merely lived together as
husband and wife.

On January 24, 1980, oppositors (respondents herein) filed a motion to dismiss the petition in the
RTC insofar as the estate of Guillermo Rustia was concerned. The motion was denied on the
ground that the interests of the petitioners and the other claimants remained in issue and should
be properly threshed out upon submission of evidence.

On March 14, 1988, Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa substituted for her sister, Luisa
Delgado vda. de Danao, who had died on May 18, 1987.

On May 11, 1990, the RTC appointed Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa as administratrix of
both estates.27 The dispositive portion of the decision read:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, petitioner and her co-claimants to the estate of the
late Josefa Delgado listed in the Petitions, and enumerated elsewhere in this Decision, are
hereby declared as the only legal heirs of the said Josefa Delgado who died intestate in the City
of Manila on September 8, 1972, and entitled to partition the same among themselves in
accordance with the proportions referred to in this Decision.

Similarly, the intervenor Guillerma S. Rustia is hereby declared as the sole and only surviving heir
of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia, and thus, entitled to the entire estate of the said decedent, to the
exclusion of the oppositors and the other parties hereto.

The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the estate of Josefa Delgado executed by the late Guillermo
J. Rustia on June 15, 1973 is hereby SET ASIDE and declared of no force and effect.

As the estates of both dece[d]ents have not as yet been settled, and their settlement [is]
considered consolidated in this proceeding in accordance with law, a single administrator therefor
is both proper and necessary, and, as the petitioner Carlota Delgado Vda. de dela Rosa has
established her right to the appointment as administratrix of the estates, the Court hereby
APPOINTS her as the ADMINISTRATRIX of the intestate estate of the decedent JOSEFA
DELGADO in relation to the estate of DR. GUILLERMO J. RUSTIA.

Accordingly, let the corresponding LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION issue to the petitioner

CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA upon her filing of the requisite bond in the sum of
FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).

Finally, oppositor GUILLERMINA RUSTIA RUSTIA is hereby ordered to cease and desist from
her acts of administration of the subject estates, and is likewise ordered to turn over to the
appointed administratix all her collections of the rentals and income due on the assets of the
estates in question, including all documents, papers, records and titles pertaining to such estates
to the petitioner and appointed administratix CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA,
immediately upon receipt of this Decision. The same oppositor is hereby required to render an
accounting of her actual administration of the estates in controversy within a period of sixty (60)
days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.28

On May 20, 1990, oppositors filed an appeal which was denied on the ground that the record on
appeal was not filed on time.29 They then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus30 which was
dismissed by the Court of Appeals.31 However, on motion for reconsideration and after hearing

18
the parties’ oral arguments, the Court of Appeals reversed itself and gave due course to
oppositors’ appeal in the interest of substantial justice.32

In a petition for review to this Court, petitioners assailed the resolution of the Court of Appeals, on
the ground that oppositors’ failure to file the record on appeal within the reglementary period was
a jurisdictional defect which nullified the appeal. On October 10, 1997, this Court allowed the
continuance of the appeal. The pertinent portion of our decision33 read:

As a rule, periods prescribed to do certain acts must be followed. However, under exceptional
circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial
justice.

xxx xxx xxx

The respondent court likewise pointed out the trial court’s pronouncements as to certain matters
of substance, relating to the determination of the heirs of the decedents and the party entitled to
the administration of their estate, which were to be raised in the appeal, but were barred
absolutely by the denial of the record on appeal upon too technical ground of late filing.

xxx xxx xxx

In this instance, private respondents’ intention to raise valid issues in the appeal is apparent and
should not have been construed as an attempt to delay or prolong the administration
proceedings.

xxx xxx xxx

A review of the trial court’s decision is needed.

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the

Resolution dated November 27, 1991 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23415, for
the APPROVAL of the private respondents’ Record on Appeal and the CONTINUANCE of the
appeal from the Manila, Branch LV Regional Trial Court’s May 11, 1990 decision.

SO ORDERED.

Acting on the appeal, the Court of Appeals34 partially set aside the trial court’s decision. Upon
motion for reconsideration,35 the Court of Appeals amended its earlier decision.36 The dispositive
portion of the amended decision read:

With the further modification, our assailed decision is RECONSIDERED and VACATED.

Consequently, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is
hereby RENDERED declaring: 1.) Dr. Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado Rustia to have been
legally married; 2.) the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia, Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the
children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) entitled to partition among themselves the intestate estate
of Josefa D. Rustia in accordance with the proportion referred to in this decision; 3.) the
oppositors-appellants as the legal heirs of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia and thereby entitled to
partition his estate in accordance with the proportion referred to herein; and 4.) the intervenor-
appellee Guillerma S. Rustia as ineligible to inherit from the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia; thus
revoking her appointment as administratrix of his estate.

The letters of administration of the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia in relation to the
intestate estate of Josefa Delgado shall issue to the nominee of the oppositors-appellants upon
his or her qualification and filing of the requisite bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (P500,000.00).

Oppositor-appellant Guillermina Rustia Rustia is hereby ordered to cease and desist from her
acts of administration of the subject estates and to turn over to the appointed administrator all her
collections of the rentals and incomes due on the assets of the estates in question, including all

19
documents, papers, records and titles pertaining to such estates to the appointed administrator,
immediately upon notice of his qualification and posting of the requisite bond, and to render an
accounting of her (Guillermina Rustia Rustia) actual administration of the estates in controversy
within a period of sixty (60) days from notice of the administrator’s qualification and posting of the
bond.

The issue of the validity of the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Dr. Guillermo Rustia on
June 15, 1973 is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings to determine the extent of
the shares of Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) affected
by the said adjudication.

Hence, this recourse.

The issues for our resolution are:

1. whether there was a valid marriage between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado;

2. who the legal heirs of the decedents Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado are;

3. who should be issued letters of administration.

The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado

A presumption is an inference of the existence or non-existence of a fact which courts are

permitted to draw from proof of other facts. Presumptions are classified into presumptions of law
and presumptions of fact. Presumptions of law are, in turn, either conclusive or disputable.37

Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are satisfactory if

uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:

xxx xxx xxx

(aa) That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage;

xxx xxx xxx

In this case, several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage existed
between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot
be doubted. Their family and friends knew them to be married. Their reputed status as husband
and wife was such that even the original petition for letters of administration filed by Luisa
Delgado vda. de Danao in 1975 referred to them as "spouses."

Yet, petitioners maintain that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia had simply lived together as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. They make much of the absence of a record of
the contested marriage, the testimony of a witness38 attesting that they were not married, and a
baptismal certificate which referred to Josefa Delgado as "Señorita" or unmarried woman.39

We are not persuaded.

First, although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of marriage, its absence is
not always proof that no marriage in fact took place.40 Once the presumption of marriage arises,
other evidence may be presented in support thereof. The evidence need not necessarily or
directly establish the marriage but must at least be enough to strengthen the presumption of
marriage. Here, the certificate of identity issued to Josefa Delgado as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia,41 the
passport issued to her as Josefa D. Rustia,42 the declaration under oath of no less than Guillermo
Rustia that he was married to Josefa Delgado43 and the titles to the properties in the name of
"Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa Delgado," more than adequately support the presumption of
marriage. These are public documents which are prima facie evidence of the facts stated

20
therein.44 No clear and convincing evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truth of
the recitals therein was presented by petitioners.

Second, Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners’ own witness whose testimony they primarily relied upon
to support their position, confirmed that Guillermo Rustia had proposed marriage to Josefa
Delgado and that eventually, the two had "lived together as husband and wife." This again could
not but strengthen the presumption of marriage.

Third, the baptismal certificate45 was conclusive proof only of the baptism administered by the
priest who baptized the child. It was no proof of the veracity of the declarations and statements
contained therein,46 such as the alleged single or unmarried ("Señorita") civil status of Josefa
Delgado who had no hand in its preparation.

Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. In
this jurisdiction, every intendment of the law leans toward legitimizing matrimony. Persons
dwelling together apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact married. This is the usual
order of things in society and, if the parties are not what they hold themselves out to be, they
would be living in constant violation of the common rules of law and propriety. Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always presume marriage.47

The Lawful Heirs Of Josefa Delgado

To determine who the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado are, the questioned status of the
cohabitation of her mother Felisa Delgado with Ramon Osorio must first be addressed.

As mentioned earlier, presumptions of law are either conclusive or disputable. Conclusive

presumptions are inferences which the law makes so peremptory that no contrary proof, no
matter how strong, may overturn them.48 On the other hand, disputable presumptions, one of
which is the presumption of marriage, can be relied on only in the absence of sufficient evidence
to the contrary.

Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage of Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio. The
oppositors (now respondents) chose merely to rely on the disputable presumption of marriage
even in the face of such countervailing evidence as (1) the continued use by Felisa and Luis (her
son with Ramon Osorio) of the surname Delgado and (2) Luis Delgado’s and Caridad
Concepcion’s Partida de Casamiento49 identifying Luis as "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the
natural child of Felisa Delgado).50

All things considered, we rule that these factors sufficiently overcame the rebuttable presumption
of marriage. Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never married. Hence, all the children born
to Felisa Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and his
half-blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all
surnamed Delgado,51 were her natural children.52

Pertinent to this matter is the following observation:

Suppose, however, that A begets X with B, and Y with another woman, C; then X and Y would be
natural brothers and sisters, but of half-blood relationship. Can they succeed each other
reciprocally?

The law prohibits reciprocal succession between illegitimate children and legitimate children of
the same parent, even though there is unquestionably a tie of blood between them. It seems that
to allow an illegitimate child to succeed ab intestato (from) another illegitimate child begotten with
a parent different from that of the former, would be allowing the illegitimate child greater rights
than a legitimate child. Notwithstanding this, however, we submit that

succession should be allowed, even when the illegitimate brothers and sisters are only of the
half-blood. The reason impelling the prohibition on reciprocal successions between legitimate and
illegitimate families does not apply to the case under consideration. That prohibition has for its
basis the difference in category between illegitimate and legitimate relatives. There is no such
difference when all the children are illegitimate children of the same parent, even if begotten with
different persons. They all stand on the same footing before the law, just like legitimate children of

21
half-blood relation. We submit, therefore, that the rules regarding succession of legitimate
brothers and sisters should be applicable to them. Full blood illegitimate brothers and sisters
should receive double the portion of half-blood brothers and sisters; and if all are either of the full
blood or of the half-blood, they shall share equally.53

Here, the above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by full-blood, except Luis
Delgado, her half-brother. Nonetheless, since they were all illegitimate, they may inherit from
each other. Accordingly, all of them are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado.

We note, however, that the petitioners before us are already the nephews, nieces, grandnephews
and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of the new Civil Code, the right of
representation in the collateral line takes place only in favor of the children of brothers and sisters
(nephews and nieces). Consequently, it cannot be exercised by grandnephews and
grandnieces.54 Therefore, the only collateral relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to
partake of her intestate estate are her brothers and sisters, or their children who were still alive at
the time of her death on September 8, 1972. They have a vested right to participate in the
inheritance.55 The records not being clear on this matter, it is now for the trial court to determine
who were the surviving brothers and sisters (or their children) of Josefa Delgado at the time of her
death. Together with Guillermo Rustia,56 they are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado in
accordance with Article 1001 of the new Civil Code:57

Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the
latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children
to the other one-half.

Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo Rustia, Guillermo could not have validly
adjudicated Josefa’s estate all to himself. Rule 74, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is clear.
Adjudication by an heir of the decedent’s entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit is
allowed only if he is the sole heir to the estate:

SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. – If the decedent left no will
and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal
representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public
instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in
an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the
estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. x x x (emphasis
supplied)

The Lawful Heirs Of Guillermo Rustia

Intervenor (now co-respondent) Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child58 of Guillermo Rustia. As

such, she may be entitled to successional rights only upon proof of an admission or recognition of
paternity.59 She, however, claimed the status of an acknowledged illegitimate child of Guillermo
Rustia only after the death of the latter on February 28, 1974 at which time it was already the
new Civil Code that was in effect.

Under the old Civil Code (which was in force till August 29, 1950), illegitimate children absolutely
had no hereditary rights. This draconian edict was, however, later relaxed in the new Civil Code
which granted certain successional rights to illegitimate children but only on condition that they
were first recognized or acknowledged by the parent.

Under the new law, recognition may be compulsory or voluntary.60 Recognition is compulsory in

any of the following cases:

(1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense coincides
more or less with that of the conception;

(2) when the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father (or
mother)61 by the direct acts of the latter or of his family;

22
 (3) when the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the
supposed father;

(4) when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father. 62

On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court of record or in any authentic writing.63

Intervenor Guillerma sought recognition on two grounds: first, compulsory recognition through the
open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child and second, voluntary
recognition through authentic writing.

There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an illegitimate child from her
birth until the death of her putative father Guillermo Rustia. However, this did not constitute
acknowledgment but a mere ground by which she could have compelled acknowledgment
through the courts.64 Furthermore, any (judicial) action for compulsory acknowledgment has a
dual limitation: the lifetime of the child and the lifetime of the putative parent.65 On the death of
either, the action for compulsory recognition can no longer be filed.66 In this case, intervenor
Guillerma’s right to claim compulsory acknowledgment prescribed upon the death of Guillermo
Rustia on February 28, 1974.

The claim of voluntary recognition (Guillerma’s second ground) must likewise fail. An authentic
writing, for purposes of voluntary recognition, is understood as a genuine or indubitable writing of
the parent (in this case, Guillermo Rustia). This includes a public instrument or a private writing
admitted by the father to be his.67 Did intervenor’s report card from the University of Santo Tomas
and Josefa Delgado’s obituary prepared by Guillermo Rustia qualify as authentic writings under
the new Civil Code? Unfortunately not. The report card of intervenor Guillerma did not bear the
signature of Guillermo Rustia. The fact that his name appears there as intervenor’s
parent/guardian holds no weight since he had no participation in its preparation. Similarly, while
witnesses testified that it was Guillermo Rustia himself who drafted the notice of death of Josefa
Delgado which was published in the Sunday Times on September 10, 1972, that published
obituary was not the authentic writing contemplated by the law. What could have been admitted
as an authentic writing was the original manuscript of the notice, in the handwriting of Guillermo
Rustia himself and signed by him, not the newspaper clipping of the obituary. The failure to
present the original signed manuscript was fatal to intervenor’s claim.

The same misfortune befalls the ampun-ampunan, Guillermina Rustia Rustia, who was never
adopted in accordance with law. Although a petition for her adoption was filed by Guillermo
Rustia, it never came to fruition and was dismissed upon the latter’s death. We affirm the ruling of
both the trial court and the Court of Appeals holding her a legal stranger to the deceased spouses
and therefore not entitled to inherit from them ab intestato. We quote:

Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which [created] between two persons a

relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an adoption
made through the court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules
of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. It is not of natural law at all, but is wholly and entirely artificial.
To establish the relation, the statutory requirements must be strictly carried out, otherwise, the
adoption is an absolute nullity. The fact of adoption is never presumed, but must be affirmatively
[proven] by the person claiming its existence.68

Premises considered, we rule that two of the claimants to the estate of Guillermo Rustia, namely,
intervenor Guillerma Rustia and the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia, are not lawful
heirs of the decedent. Under Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are no descendants,
ascendants, illegitimate children, or surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the
entire estate of the deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia are the remaining
claimants, consisting of his sisters,69 nieces and nephews.70

Entitlement To Letters Of Administration

An administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the intestate estate of the
decedent. Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of Court prescribes an order of preference in the
appointment of an administrator:

23
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If no executor is named in the will,
or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give a bond, or a person
dies intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin,
requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person
selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow or next of kin,
neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to
request that the administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one
or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such
other person as the court may select.

In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the estate of
the one to be appointed.71 The order of preference does not rule out the appointment of co-
administrators, specially in cases where

justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of
the estates,72 a situation which obtains here.

It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint administrators, in the persons of Carlota
Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and a nominee of the nephews and nieces of Guillermo Rustia. They
are the next of kin of the deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia, respectively.

WHEREFORE, the petition (which seeks to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of the RTC
Manila, Branch 55) is hereby DENIED. The assailed October 24, 2002 decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED with the following modifications:

1. Guillermo Rustia’s June 15, 1973 affidavit of self-adjudication is hereby ANNULLED.

2. the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half of the intestate estate of Josefa
Delgado. The remaining half shall pertain to (a) the full and half-siblings of Josefa
Delgado who survived her and (b) the children of any of Josefa Delgado’s full- or half-
siblings who may have predeceased her, also surviving at the time of her death. Josefa
Delgado’s grandnephews and grandnieces are excluded from her estate. In this
connection, the trial court is hereby ordered to determine the identities of the relatives of
Josefa Delgado who are entitled to share in her estate.

3. Guillermo Rustia’s estate (including its one-half share of Josefa Delgado’s estate) shall
be inherited by Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz (whose
respective shares shall be per capita) and the children of the late Roman Rustia, Sr. (who
survived Guillermo Rustia and whose respective shares shall be per stirpes). Considering
that Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz are now deceased, their
respective shares shall pertain to their estates.

4. Letters of administration over the still unsettled intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia
and Josefa Delgado shall issue to Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and to a nominee
from among the heirs of Guillermo Rustia, as joint administrators, upon their qualification
and filing of the requisite bond in such amount as may be determined by the trial court.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justic

24
G.R. No. 127263             April 12, 2000FILIPINA Y. SY, petitioner,vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN FERNANDO,
PAMPANGA, BRANCH XLI, and FERNANDO SY, respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:

For review is the decision1 dated May 21, 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 44144,
which affirmed the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, denying the
petition3 for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of the spouses Filipina Sy and Fernando
Sy.

Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted marriage on November

15, 1973 at the Church of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. 4 Both were then 22 years old.
Their union was blessed with two children, Frederick and Farrah Sheryll who were born on July 8,
1975 and February 14, 1978, respectively.5

The spouses first established their residence in Singalong, Manila, then in Apalit, Pampanga, and
later at San Matias, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. They operated a lumber and hardware business in
Sto. Tomas, Pampanga.6

On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, the spouses lived
separately, and their two children were in the custody of their mother. However, their son
Frederick transferred to his father's residence at Masangkay, Tondo, Manila on May 15, 1988,
and from then on, lived with his father.7

On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation, docketed as Civil Case No.
7900 before the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga. Later, upon motion of
petitioner, the action was later amended to a petition for separation of property on the grounds
that her husband abandoned her without just cause; that they have been living separately for
more than one year; and that they voluntarily entered into a Memorandum of Agreement dated
September 29, 1983, containing the rules that would govern the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership.8 Judgment was rendered dissolving their conjugal partnership of gains and approving
a regime of separation of properties based on the Memorandum of Agreement executed by the
spouses.9 The trial court also granted custody of the children to Filipina. 10

In May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide against her husband, docketed
as Criminal Case No. 88-68006, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Filipina testified that in
the afternoon of May 15, 1988, she went to the dental clinic at Masangkay, Tondo, Manila, owned
by her husband but operated by his mistress, to fetch her son and bring him to San Fernando,
Pampanga. While she was talking to her son, the boy ignored her and continued playing with the
family computer. Filipina got mad, took the computer away from her son, and started spanking
him. At that instance, Fernando pulled Filipina away from their son, and punched her in the
different parts of her body. Filipina also claimed that her husband started choking her when she
fell on the floor, and released her only when he thought she was dead. Filipina suffered from
hematoma and contusions on different parts of her body as a result of the blows inflicted by her
husband, evidenced by a Medical Certificate issued by a certain Dr. James Ferraren. She said it
was not the first time Fernando maltreated her. 11

The Regional Trial Court of Manila, however, in its decision 12 dated April 26, 1990, convicted
Fernando only of the lesser crime of slight physical injuries, and sentenced him to 20 days
imprisonment.

Petitioner later filed a new action for legal separation against private respondent, docketed as
Civil Case No. 8273, on the following grounds: (1) repeated physical violence; (2) sexual infidelity;
(3) attempt by respondent against her life; and (4) abandonment of her by her husband without
justifiable cause for more than one year. The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga,
in its decision 13 dated December 4, 1991, granted the petition on the grounds of repeated
physical violence and sexual infidelity, and issued a decree of legal separation. It awarded
custody of their daughter Farrah Sheryll to petitioner, and their son Frederick to respondent.

On August 4, 1992, Filipina filed a petition 14 for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage
to Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity. She points out that the final judgment

25
rendered by the Regional Trial Court in her favor, in her petitions for separation of property and
legal separation, and Fernando's infliction of physical violence on her which led to the conviction
of her husband for slight physical injuries are symptoms of psychological incapacity. She also
cites as manifestations of her husband's psychological incapacity the following: (1) habitual
alcoholism; (2) refusal to live with her without fault on her part, choosing to live with his mistress
instead; and (3) refusal to have sex with her, performing the marital act only to satisfy himself.
Moreover, Filipina alleges that such psychological incapacity of her husband existed from the
time of the celebration of their marriage and became manifest thereafter. 15

The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, in its decision 16 dated December 9, 1993,
denied the petition of Filipina Sy for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to
Fernando. It stated that the alleged acts of the respondent, as cited by petitioner, do not
constitute psychological incapacity which may warrant the declaration of absolute nullity of their
marriage.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the trial court. In the
decision 17 of the Court of Appeals dated May 21, 1996, it ruled that the testimony of petitioner
concerning respondent's purported psychological incapacity falls short of the quantum of
evidence required to nullify a marriage celebrated with all the formal and essential requisites of
law. Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner failed to show that the alleged
psychological incapacity of respondent had existed at the time of the celebration of their marriage
in 1973. It reiterated the finding of the trial court that the couple's marital problems surfaced only
in 1983, or almost ten years from the date of the celebration of their marriage. And prior to their
separation in 1983, they were living together harmoniously. Thus, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the judgment of the lower court which it found to be in accordance with law and the evidence on
record. 18

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, 19 which the Court of Appeals denied in its resolution
dated November 21, 1996. 20

Hence, this appeal by certiorari 21 wherein petitioner now raises the following issues:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY

OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ON THE DATE OF THE CELEBRATION OF THE
PARTIES' MARRIAGE ON NOVEMBER 15, 1973, NOT DISPUTED BY RESPONDENT
FERNANDO, THERE WAS NO MARRIAGE LICENSE THERETO;

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED

MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY STATING THAT THE GROUNDS RELIED UPON
BY APPELLANT [herein petitioner] DO NOT CONSTITUTE PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY AS WOULD JUSTIFY NULLIFICATION OF HER MARRIAGE TO
APPELLEE [herein respondent];

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED

MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY STATING THAT APPELLANT FAILED TO SHOW
THAT THE ALLEGED UNDESIRABLE ACTUATIONS OF APPELLEE HAD EXISTED OR
WERE PRESENT AT THE TIME THEIR MARRIAGE WAS CELEBRATED IN 1973;

4. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN AFFIRMING THE ERRONEOUS RULING OF THE LOWER
COURT THAT THERE IS A REDEEMING ATTITUDE SHOWN TO THE COURT BY
RESPONDENT FERNANDO WITH RESPECT TO HIS CHILDREN AND ALSO
BELIEVES THAT RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS NOT A REMOTE
POSSIBILITY WHICH IS ERRONEOUS; AND

5. WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE OF SANTOS V. COURT OF APPEALS (240 SCRA

20) IS APPLICABLE HERETO. 22

In sum, two issues are to be resolved:

1. Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the
beginning for lack of a marriage license at the time of the ceremony; and

26
2. Whether or not private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the time of said marriage
celebration to warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity.

Petitioner, for the first time, raises the issue of the marriage being void for lack of a valid marriage
license at the time of its celebration. It appears that, according to her, the date of the actual
celebration of their marriage and the date of issuance of their marriage certificate and marriage
license are different and incongruous.

Although we have repeatedly ruled that litigants cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal,
as this would contravene the basic rules of fair play and justice, 23 in a number of instances, we
have relaxed observance of procedural rules, noting that technicalities are not ends in
themselves but exist to protect and promote substantive rights of litigants. We said that certain
rules ought not to be applied with severity and rigidity if by so doing, the very reason for their
existence would be defeated. 24 Hence, when substantial justice plainly requires, exempting a
particular case from the operation of technicalities should not be subject to cavil. 25 In our view,
the case at bar requires that we address the issue of the validity of the marriage between Filipina
and Fernando which petitioner claims is void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license, in
order to arrive at a just resolution of a deeply seated and violent conflict between the parties.
Note, however, that here the pertinent facts are not disputed; and what is required now is a
declaration of their effects according to existing law.

Petitioner states that though she did not categorically state in her petition for annulment of
marriage before the trial court that the incongruity in the dates of the marriage license and the
celebration of the marriage itself would lead to the conclusion that her marriage to Fernando was
void from the beginning, she points out that these critical dates were contained in the documents
she submitted before the court. The date of issue of the marriage license and marriage certificate,
September 17, 1974, is contained in their marriage contract which was attached as Annex "A" in
her petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and thereafter
marked as Exhibit "A" in the course of the trial. 26 The date of celebration of their marriage at Our
Lady of Lourdes, Sta. Teresita Parish, on November 15, 1973, is admitted both by petitioner and
private respondent, as stated in paragraph three of petitioner's petition for the declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and private respondent's answer admitting
it. 27 This fact was also affirmed by petitioner, in open court, on January 22, 1993, during her
direct examination, 28 as follows:

ATTY. RAZON: In the last hearing, you said that you were married on November 15,
1973?

FILIPINA SY: Yes, Sir.

November 15, 1973, also appears as the date of marriage of the parents in both their son's and
daughter's birth certificates, which are also attached as Annexes "B" and "C" in the petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and thereafter marked as Exhibits
"B" and "C" in the course of the trial. 29 These pieces of evidence on record plainly and indubitably
show that on the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license. A marriage
license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab initio. In addition, the
marriage contract shows that the marriage license, numbered 6237519, was issued in Carmona,
Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor private respondent ever resided in Carmona. 30

Carefully reviewing the documents and the pleadings on record, we find that indeed petitioner did
not expressly state in her petition before the trial court that there was incongruity between the
date of the actual celebration of their marriage and the date of the issuance of their marriage
license. From the documents she presented, the marriage license was issued on September 17,
1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place on November 15, 1973. The ineluctable
conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license. Nowhere do
we find private respondent denying these dates on record. Article 80 of the Civil Code 31 is clearly
applicable in this case. There being no claim of an exceptional character, the purported marriage
between petitioner and private respondent could not be classified among those enumerated in
Articles 72-79 32 of the Civil Code. We thus conclude that under Article 80 of the Civil Code, the
marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning.

We note that their marriage certificate and marriage license are only photocopies. So are the birth
certificates of their son Frederick and daughter Farrah Sheryll. Nevertheless, these documents

27
were marked as Exhibits during the course of the trial below, which shows that these have been
examined and admitted by the trial court, with no objections having been made as to their
authenticity and due execution. Likewise, no objection was interposed to petitioner's testimony in
open court when she affirmed that the date of the actual celebration of their marriage was on
November 15, 1973. We are of the view, therefore, that having been admitted in evidence, with
the adverse party failing to timely object thereto, these documents are deemed sufficient proof of
the facts contained therein. 33

The remaining issue on the psychological incapacity of private respondent need no longer detain
us. It is mooted by our conclusion that the marriage of petitioner to respondent is void ab initio for
lack of a marriage license at the time their marriage was solemnized.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of San
Fernando, Pampanga, dated December 9, 1993 as well as the Decision promulgated on May 21,
1996 by the Court of Appeals and its Resolution dated November 21, 1996 in CA-G.R. No. 44144
are set aside. The marriage celebrated on November 15, 1973 between petitioner Filipina Yap
and private respondent Fernando Sy is hereby declared void ab initio for lack of a marriage
license at the time of celebration. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 
CA Records, at 51-59.

2 
Records, at 136-143.

3 
Id. at 1-5.

4 
Exh. A; Id. at 6.

5 
Exhs. B & C; Id. at 7-8.

6 
Id. at 136.

7 
Ibid.

8 
Id. at 10-11.

9 
Exh. E, Id. at 10-18.

10 
Id. at 18.

11 
Id. at 23-24.

12 
Exh. G; Id. at 23-26.

13 
Exh, H; Id. at 27-46.

14 
Id. at 1-5.

15 
Id. at 3.

16 
Id. at 136-143.

17 
Supra, note 1.

18 
Id. at 59.

28
 19 
Id. at 60-64.

20 
Id. at 76.

21 
Rollo, pp. 10-55.

22 
Id. at 31.

23 
Sumbad v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106060, June 21, 1999, p. 23; Modina vs. CA,
G.R. No. 109355, October 29, 1999, p. 13; citing Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v.
Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 145 (1997).

24 
Government Service Insurance System vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 187, 198
(1997); Mauna vs. Civil Service Commission, 232 SCRA 388, 398 (1994).

25 
GSIS vs. CA, at 198, citing Aguilar vs. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA 371 (1995).

26 
Exhibit A, Records, p. 6; Rollo, p. 72.

27 
Records, at 1 and 53.

28 
TSN, 22 January 1993, p. 4.

29 
Records pp. 7 & 8; Exh. A, Rollo, p. 72.

30 
Rollo, at 20.

31 
Art. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

x x x           x x x          x x x

(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional

character:

x x x           x x x          x x x

32 
Art. 72. When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the conjugal union or
commits acts which tend to bring danger, dishonor or injury to the other or to the family,
the aggrieved party; may apply to the court for relief.

Art. 73. Either spouse may exercise any legitimate profession, occupation,
business or activity without the consent of the other. The latter may object only on
valid, serious, and moral grounds.

In case of disagreement, the court shall decide whether or not.

(1) The objection is proper, and

(2) Benefit has accrued to the family prior to the objection or thereafter. If
the benefit accrued prior to the objection, the resulting obligation shall be
enforced against the separate property of the spouse who has not
obtained consent.

The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the rights of creditors who acted in
good faith.

Art. 74. The property relations between husband and wife shall be governed in the
following order:

(1) By marriage settlements executed before the marriage;

29
 (2) By the provisions of this Code; and

(3) By the local customs.

Art. 75. The future spouses may, in the marriage settlements, agree upon the
regime of absolute community, conjugal partnership of gains, complete separation
of property, or any other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or when
the regime agreed upon is void, the system of absolute community of property as
established in this Code shall govern.

Art. 76. In order that any modification in the marriage settlements may be valid, it
must be made before the celebration of the marriage, subject to the provisions of
Articles 66, 67, 128, 135 and 136.

Art. 77. The marriage settlements and any modification thereof shall be in writing,
signed by the parties and executed before the celebration of the marriage. They
shall not prejudice third persons unless they are registered in the local civil
registry where the marriage contract is recorded as well as in the proper registries
of property.

Art. 78. A minor who according to law may contract marriage may also enter into
marriage settlements, but they shall be valid only if the persons designated in
Article 14 to give consent to the marriage are made parties to the agreement,
subject to the provisions of Title IX of this Code.1âwphi1.nêt

Art. 79. For the validity of any marriage settlements executed by a person upon
whom a sentence of civil interdiction has been pronounced or who is subject to
any other disability, it shall be indispensable for the guardian appointed by a
competent court to be made a party thereto.

33 
See also Son vs. Son, 251 SCRA 556 (1995); Tison vs. CA, 276 SCRA 582 (1997);
Quebral vs. CA, 252 SCRA 353 (1996).

G.R. No. 103047 September 2, 1994

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA M. CASTRO, respondents.

Parungao, Abesamis, Eleazar & Pulgar Law Offices for private respondent.

PUNO, J.:

The case at bench originated from a petition filed by private respondent Angelina M. Castro in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage to
Edwin F. Cardenas.1 As ground therefor, Castro claims that no marriage license was ever issued
to them prior to the solemnization of their marriage.

Despite notice, defendant Edwin F. Cardenas failed to file his answer. Consequently, he was
declared in default. Trial proceeded in his absence.

The controlling facts are undisputed:

On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony
performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City. The marriage was
celebrated without the knowledge of Castro's parents. Defendant Cardenas personally attended
to the processing of the documents required for the celebration of the marriage, including the
procurement of the marriage, license. In fact, the marriage contract itself states that marriage

30
license no. 3196182 was issued in the name of the contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig,
Metro Manila.

The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the marriage was
unknown to Castro's parents. Thus, it was only in March 1971, when Castro discovered she was
pregnant, that the couple decided to live together. However, their cohabitation lasted only for four
(4) months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways. On October 19, 1971, Castro gave birth. The
baby was adopted by Castro's brother, with the consent of Cardenas.

The baby is now in the United States. Desiring to follow her daughter, Castro wanted to put in
order her marital status before leaving for the States. She thus consulted a lawyer, Atty.
Frumencio E. Pulgar, regarding the possible annulment of her marriage. Through her lawyer's
efforts, they discovered that there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the
celebration of their marriage.

As proof, Angelina Castro offered in evidence a certification from the Civil Register of Pasig,
Metro Manila. It reads:

February 20, 1987

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that the names EDWIN F. CARDENAS and ANGELINA M.

CASTRO who were allegedly married in the Pasay City Court on June 21, 1970
under an alleged (s)upportive marriage license
no. 3196182 allegedly issued in the municipality on June 20, 1970 cannot be
located as said license no. 3196182 does not appear from our records.

Issued upon request of Mr. Ed Atanacio.

(Sgd)
CENONA
D.
QUINTOS
Senior
Civil
Registry
Officer

Castro testified that she did not go to the civil registrar of Pasig on or before June 24, 1970 in
order to apply for a license. Neither did she sign any application therefor. She affixed her
signature only on the marriage contract on June 24, 1970 in Pasay City.

The trial court denied the petition. 2 It held that the above certification was inadequate to establish
the alleged non-issuance of a marriage license prior to the celebration of the marriage between
the parties. It ruled that the "inability of the certifying official to locate the marriage license is not
conclusive to show that there was no marriage license issued."

Unsatisfied with the decision, Castro appealed to respondent appellate court. She insisted that
the certification from the local civil registrar sufficiently established the absence of a marriage
license.

As stated earlier, respondent appellate court reversed the Decision of the trial court. 3 It declared
the marriage between the contracting parties null and void and directed the Civil Registrar of
Pasig to cancel the subject marriage contract.

Hence this petition for review on certiorari.

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines urges that respondent appellate court erred when it ruled
that the certification issued by the civil registrar that marriage license no. 3196182 was not in their
record adequately proved that no such license was ever issued. Petitioner also faults the
respondent court for relying on the self-serving and uncorroborated testimony of private

31
respondent Castro that she had no part in the procurement of the subject marriage license.
Petitioner thus insists that the certification and the uncorroborated testimony of private
respondent are insufficient to overthrow the legal presumption regarding the validity of a
marriage.

Petitioner also points that in declaring the marriage between the parties as null and void,
respondent appellate court disregarded the presumption that the solemnizing officer, Judge Pablo
M. Malvar, regularly performed his duties when he attested in the marriage contract that marriage
license no. 3196182 was duly presented to him before the solemnization of the subject marriage.

The issues, being interrelated, shall be discussed jointly.

The core issue presented by the case at bench is whether or not the documentary and
testimonial evidence presented by private respondent are sufficient to establish that no marriage
license was issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the celebration of the marriage of
private respondent to Edwin F. Cardenas.

We affirm the impugned Decision.

At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing marital
relations was the New Civil Code. The law 4 provides that no marriage shall be solemnized
without a marriage license first issued by a local civil registrar. Being one of the essential
requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license would render the marriage void ab initio. 5

Petitioner posits that the certification of the local civil registrar of due search and inability to find a
record or entry to the effect that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued to the parties is not
adequate to prove its non-issuance.

We hold otherwise. The presentation of such certification in court is sanctioned by Section 29,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, viz.:

Sec. 29. Proof of lack of record. — A written statement signed by an officer having

custody of an official record or by his deputy, that after diligent search, no record
or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office,
accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that
the records of his office contain no such record or entry.

The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a
particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was
not to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers
charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter
all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the
marriage license was issued and such other relevant data. 6

The certification of "due search and inability to find" issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys
probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to
the issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and
pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of "due search and inability to
find" sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage license no. 3196182 to the
contracting parties.

The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her testimony in support of her petition is, in
itself, not a ground to deny her petition. The failure to offer any other witness to corroborate her
testimony is mainly due to the peculiar circumstances of the case. It will be remembered that the
subject marriage was a civil ceremony performed by a judge of a city court. The subject marriage
is one of those commonly known as a "secret marriage" — a legally non-existent phrase but
ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives and/or
friends of either or both of the contracting parties. The records show that the marriage between
Castro and Cardenas was initially unknown to the parents of the former.

Surely, the fact that only private respondent Castro testified during the trial cannot be held
against her. Her husband, Edwin F. Cardenas, was duly served with notice of the proceedings

32
and a copy of the petition. Despite receipt thereof, he chose to ignore the same. For failure to
answer, he was properly declared in default. Private respondent cannot be faulted for her
husband's lack of interest to participate in the proceedings. There was absolutely no evidence on
record to show that there was collusion between private respondent and her husband Cardenas.

It is noteworthy to mention that the finding of the appellate court that the marriage between the
contracting parties is null and void for lack of a marriage license does not discount the fact that
indeed, a spurious marriage license, purporting to be issued by the civil registrar of Pasig, may
have been presented by Cardenas to the solemnizing officer.

In fine, we hold that, under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial
evidence presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the
subject marriage license.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED there being no showing of any reversible error
committed by respondent appellate court.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

#Footnotes

1 Filed on February 19, 1987 and docketed as Civil Case No. Q-50117.

2 Decision dated June 30, 1987, issued by Presiding Judge Antonio P. Solano,
Quezon City RTC, Branch LXXXVI; Rollo, pp. 46-48.

3 Sixteenth Division, penned by Mr. Justice Justo P. Torres, with Mr. Justices
Ricardo J. Francisco and Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, concurring; Decision dated
November 27, 1991, Rollo, pp. 38-42.

4 Articles 53 (4) and 58, New Civil Code.

5 Article 80 (3), New Civil Code.

6 Article 70, New Civil Code.

G.R. No. 167684             July 31, 2006

JAIME O.SEVILLA, petitioner,
vs.
CARMELITA N. CARDENAS, respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 74416 dated 20 December 2004 which set aside the Decision2 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, in Civil Case No. 94-1285 dated 25 January 2002.

In a Complaint3 dated 28 March 1994 filed by Jaime O. Sevilla before the RTC, he claimed that
on 19 May 1969, through machinations, duress and intimidation employed upon him by Carmelita
N. Cardenas and the latter's father, retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed forces of the

33
Philippines, he and Carmelita went to the City Hall of Manila and they were introduced to a
certain Reverend Cirilo D. Gonzales, a supposed Minister of the Gospel. On the said date, the
father of Carmelita caused him and Carmelita to sign a marriage contract before the said Minister
of the Gospel. According to Jaime, he never applied for a marriage license for his supposed
marriage to Carmelita and never did they obtain any marriage license from any Civil Registry,
consequently, no marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer.

For her part, Carmelita refuted these allegations of Jaime, and claims that she and Jaime were
married civilly on 19 May 1969,4 and in a church ceremony thereafter on 31 May 19695 at the
Most Holy Redeemer Parish in Quezon City. Both marriages were registered with the local civil
registry of Manila and the National Statistics Office. He is estopped from invoking the lack of
marriage license after having been married to her for 25 years.

The trial court made the following findings:

In support of his complaint, plaintiff [Jaime] testified that on May 19, 1969, he and
defendant [Carmelita] appeared before a certain Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales, a Minister of the
Gospel, at the city hall in Manila where they executed a Marriage Contract (Exh. "A") in
civil rites. A certain Godofredo Occena who, plaintiff alleged, was an aide of defendant's
father accompanied them, and who, together with another person, stood as witness to the
civil wedding. That although marriage license no. 2770792 allegedly issued in San Juan,
Rizal on May 19, 1969 was indicated in the marriage contract, the same was fictitious for
he never applied for any marriage license, (Ibid., p. 11). Upon verifications made by him
through his lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Abola, with the Civil Registry of San Juan, a Certification
dated March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E") was issued by Rafael D. Aliscad, Jr., Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, that "no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued by said
office." On May 31, 1969, he and defendant were again wed, this time in church rites,
before Monsignor Juan Velasco at the Most Holy Redeemer Parish Church in Brixton
Hills, Quezon City, where they executed another marriage contract (Exh. "F") with the
same marriage license no. 2770792 used and indicated. Preparations and expenses for
the church wedding and reception were jointly shared by his and defendant's parents.
After the church wedding, he and defendant resided in his house at Brixton Hills until their
first son, Jose Gabriel, was born in March 1970. As his parents continued to support him
financially, he and defendant lived in Spain for some time, for his medical studies.
Eventually, their marital relationship turned bad because it became difficult for him to be
married he being a medical student at that time. They started living apart in 1976, but they
underwent family counseling before they eventually separated in 1978. It was during this
time when defendant's second son was born whose paternity plaintiff questioned. Plaintiff
obtained a divorce decree against defendant in the United States in 1981 and later
secured a judicial separation of their conjugal partnership in 1983.

Atty. Jose M. Abola, then counsel for the plaintiff, himself manifested that when his
service was engaged by plaintiff, and after the latter narrated to him the circumstances of
his marriage, he made inquiries with the Office of Civil Registry of San Juan where the
supposed marriage license was obtained and with the Church of the Most Holy Redeemer
Parish where the religious wedding ceremony was celebrated. His request letters dated
March 3, 1994 (Exh. "J"), March 7, 1994 (Exh. "L"), March 9, 1994 (Exh. "M") and March
11, 1994 (Exh. "K") were all sent to and received by the Civil Registrar of San Juan, who
in reply thereto, issued Certifications dated March 4, 1994 (Exh. "I"), and March 11, 1994
(Exh. "E") and September 20, 1994 (Exh. "C"), that "no marriage license no. 2770792 was
ever issued by that office." Upon his inquiry, the Holy Redeemer Parish Church issued
him a certified copy of the marriage contract of plaintiff and defendant (Exh. "F") and a
Certificate of Marriage dated April 11, 1994 (Exh. "G"), wherein it noted that it was a
"purely religious ceremony, having been civilly married on May 19, 1969 at the City Hall,
Manila, under Marriage License No. 2770792 issued at San Juan, Rizal on May 19,
1969."

Perlita Mercader, Registration Officer III of the Local Registry of San Juan, identified the
Certificates dated March 4, 1994, March 11, 1994 and September 20, 1994 issued by
Rafael Aliscad, Jr., the Local Civil Registrar, and testified that their office failed to locate
the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 may have been registered (TSN, 8-6-96,
p. 5).

34
 Defendant Carmelita Cardenas testified that she and plaintiff had a steady romantic
relationship after they met and were introduced to each other in October 1968. A model,
she was compelled by her family to join the Mutya ng Pilipinas beauty pageant when
plaintiff who was afraid to lose her, asked her to run away with him to Baguio. Because
she loved plaintiff, she turned back on her family and decided to follow plaintiff in Baguio.
When they came back to Manila, she and plaintiff proceeded to the latter's home in
Brixton Hills where plaintiff's mother, Mrs. Sevilla, told her not to worry. Her parents were
hostile when they learned of the elopement, but Mrs. Sevilla convinced them that she will
take care of everything, and promised to support plaintiff and defendant. As plaintiff was
still fearful he may lose her, he asked her to marry him in civil rites, without the knowledge
of her family, more so her father (TSN, 5-28-98, p. 4) on May 19, 1969, before a minister
and where she was made to sign documents. After the civil wedding, they had lunch and
later each went home separately. On May 31, 1969, they had the church wedding, which
the Sevilla family alone prepared and arranged, since defendant's mother just came from
hospital. Her family did not participate in the wedding preparations. Defendant further
stated that there was no sexual consummation during their honeymoon and that it was
after two months when they finally had sex. She learned from Dr. Escudero, plaintiff's
physician and one of their wedding sponsors that plaintiff was undergoing psychiatric
therapy since age 12 (TSN, 11-2-98, p. 15) for some traumatic problem compounded by
his drug habit. She found out plaintiff has unusual sexual behavior by his obsession over
her knees of which he would take endless pictures of. Moreover, plaintiff preferred to
have sex with her in between the knees which she called "intrafemural sex," while real
sex between them was far and between like 8 months, hence, abnormal. During their
marriage, plaintiff exhibited weird sexual behavior which defendant attributed to plaintiff's
drug addiction (TSN, 11-5-98, pp. 5-8). A compulsive liar, plaintiff has a bad temper who
breaks things when he had tantrums. Plaintiff took drugs like amphetamines, benzedrine
and the like, "speed" drugs that kept him from sleep and then would take barbiturates or
downers, like "mogadon." Defendant tried very hard to keep plaintiff away from drugs but
failed as it has become a habit to him. They had no fixed home since they often moved
and partly lived in Spain for about four and a half years, and during all those times, her
mother-in-law would send some financial support on and off, while defendant worked as
an English teacher. Plaintiff, who was supposed to be studying, did nothing. Their
marriage became unbearable, as plaintiff physically and verbally abused her, and this led
to a break up in their marriage. Later, she learned that plaintiff married one Angela Garcia
in 1991 in the United States.

Jose Cardenas, father of defendant, testified that he was not aware of the civil wedding of
his daughter with the plaintiff; that his daughter and grandson came to stay with him after
they returned home from Spain and have lived with him and his wife ever since. His
grandsons practically grew up under his care and guidance, and he has supported his
daughter's expenses for medicines and hospital confinements (Exhs. "9" and "10").

Victoria Cardenas Navarro, defendant's sister, testified and corroborated that it was
plaintiff's family that attended to all the preparations and arrangements for the church
wedding of her sister with plaintiff, and that she didn't know that the couple wed in civil
rites some time prior to the church wedding. She also stated that she and her parents
were still civil with the plaintiff inspite of the marital differences between plaintiff and
defendant.

As adverse witness for the defendant, plaintiff testified that because of irreconcilable
differences with defendant and in order for them to live their own lives, they agreed to
divorce each other; that when he applied for and obtained a divorce decree in the United
States on June 14, 1983 (Exh. "13"), it was with the knowledge and consent of defendant
who in fact authorized a certain Atty. Quisumbing to represent her (TSN, 12-7-2000, p.
21). During his adverse testimony, plaintiff identified a recent certification dated July 25,
2000 (Exh. "EE") issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, that the marriage
license no. 2770792, the same marriage license appearing in the marriage contract (Exh.
"A"), is inexistent, thus appears to be fictitious.6

In its Decision dated 25 January 2002, declaring the nullity of the marriage of the parties, the trial
court made the following justifications:

35
 Thus, being one of the essential requisites for the validity of the marriage, the lack or
absence of a license renders the marriage void ab initio. It was shown under the various
certifications (Exhs. "I", "E", and "C") earlier issued by the office of the Local Civil
Registrar of the Municipality of San Juan, and the more recent one issued on July 25,
2000 (Exh. "EE") that no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued by that office,
hence, the marriage license no. 2770792 appearing on the marriage contracts executed
on May 19, 1969 (Exh. "A") and on May 31, 1969 (Exh. "F") was fictitious. Such a
certification enjoys probative value under the rules on evidence, particularly Section 28,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, x x x.

xxxx

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the civil marriage between Jaime O. Sevilla
and Carmelita N. Cardenas solemnized by Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales at the Manila City Hall
on May 19, 1969 as well as their contract of marriage solemnized under religious rites by
Rev. Juan B. Velasco at the Holy Redeemer Parish on May 31, 1969, NULL and VOID for
lack of the requisite marriage license. Let the marriage contract of the parties under
Registry No. 601 (e-69) of the registry book of the Local Civil Registry of Manila be
cancelled.

Let copies of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and property registries in
accordance with Article 52 of the Family Code. Likewise, let a copy hereof be forwarded
the Office of the Solicitor General for its record and information.7

Carmelita filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 20 December 2004, the
Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court and held:

In People v. De Guzman (G.R. No. 106025, February 9, 1994), the Supreme Court

explained that: "The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted
by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The presumption,
however, prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to
the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive."

In this case, We note that a certain Perlita Mercader of the local civil registry of San Juan
testified that they "failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is
registered," for the reason that "the employee handling is already retired." With said
testimony We cannot therefore just presume that the marriage license specified in the
parties' marriage contract was not issued for in the end the failure of the office of the local
civil registrar of San Juan to produce a copy of the marriage license was attributable not
to the fact that no such marriage license was issued but rather, because it "failed to locate
the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is registered." Simply put, if the pertinent
book were available for scrutiny, there is a strong possibility that it would have contained
an entry on marriage license no. 2720792.

xxxx

Indeed, this Court is not prepared to annul the parties' marriage on the basis of a mere
perception of plaintiff that his union with defendant is defective with respect to an
essential requisite of a marriage contract, a perception that ultimately was not
substantiated with facts on record.8

Jaime filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 6 January 2005 which the Court of Appeals
denied in a Resolution dated 6 April 2005.

This denial gave rise to the present Petition filed by Jaime.

He raises the following issues for Resolution.

1. Whether or not a valid marriage license was issued in accordance with law to the
parties herein prior to the celebration of the marriages in question;

36
 2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly applied and relied on the presumption of
regularity of officials acts, particularly the issuance of a marriage license, arising solely
from the contents of the marriage contracts in question which show on their face that a
marriage license was purportedly issued by the Local Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro
Manila, and

3. Whether or not respondent could validly invoke/rely upon the presumption of validity of
a marriage arising from the admitted "fact of marriage."9

At the core of this controversy is the determination of whether or not the certifications from the
Local Civil Registrar of San Juan stating that no Marriage License No. 2770792 as appearing in
the marriage contract of the parties was issued, are sufficient to declare their marriage as null and
void ab initio.

We agree with the Court of Appeals and rule in the negative.

Pertinent provisions of the Civil Code which was the law in force at the time of the marriage of the
parties are Articles 53,10 5811 and 80.12

Based on the foregoing provisions, a marriage license is an essential requisite for the validity of
marriage. The marriage between Carmelita and Jaime is of no exception.

At first glance, this case can very well be easily dismissed as one involving a marriage that is null
and void on the ground of absence of a marriage license based on the certifications issued by the
Local Civil Registar of San Juan. As ruled by this Court in the case of Cariño v. Cariño13:

[A]s certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no
record of such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that such
a certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any
circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued by the local civil
registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a
record of all date relative to the issuance of a marriage license.

Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the
deceased has been sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to
prove that their marriage is valid and that they secured the required marriage license.
Although she was declared in default before the trial court, petitioner could have squarely
met the issue and explained the absence of a marriage license in her pleadings before
the Court of Appeals and this Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and
chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her case in jeopardy. Hence, the
presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand.

It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not
being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly
void ab initio.

The foregoing Decision giving probative value to the certifications issued by the Local Civil
Registrar should be read in line with the decision in the earlier case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals,14 where it was held that:

The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent
search, a particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry
of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public
documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of
maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all applications for marriage
licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued
and such other relevant data. (Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, the certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar must categorically state that the
document does not exist in his office or the particular entry could not be found in the register

37
despite diligent search. Such certification shall be sufficient proof of lack or absence of record as
stated in Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – a written statement signed by an officer having the
custody of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry
of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a
certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office
contain no such record or entry.

We shall now proceed to scrutinize whether the certifications by the Local Civil Registrar of San
Juan in connection with Marriage License No. 2770792 complied with the foregoing requirements
and deserved to be accorded probative value.

The first Certification15 issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, was dated
11 March 1994. It reads:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

No Marriage License Number 2770792 were (sic) ever issued by this Office. With regards
(sic) to Marriage License Number 2880792,16 we exert all effort but we cannot find the
said number.

Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the above
problem.

San Juan, Metro Manila

March 11, 1994

(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.

            Local Civil Registrar

The second certification17 was dated 20 September 1994 and provides:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that no marriage license Number 2770792 were ever issued by this
Office with regards to Marriage License Number 2880792, we exert all effort but we
cannot find the said number.

Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the above
problem.

San Juan, Metro Manila

September 20, 1994

(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.

            Local Civil Registrar

The third Certification,18 issued on 25 July 2000, states:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that according to the records of this office, no Marriage License
Application was filed and no Marriage License No. 2770792 allegedly dated May 19, 1969
was issued by this Office to MR. JAIME O. SEVILLA and MS. CARMELITA CARDENAS-
SEVILLA.

38
 This is to further certify that the said application and license do not exist in our Local Civil
Registry Index and, therefore, appear to be fictitious.

This certification is being issued upon the request of the interested party for whatever
legal intent it may serve.

San Juan, Metro Manila

July 25, 2000

(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.

            Local Civil Registrar

Note that the first two certifications bear the statement that "hope and understand our loaded
work cannot give you our full force locating the above problem." It could be easily implied from
the said statement that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar could not exert its best efforts to
locate and determine the existence of Marriage License No. 2770792 due to its "loaded work."
Likewise, both certifications failed to state with absolute certainty whether or not such license was
issued.

This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the representative from the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar of San Juan, Ms. Perlita Mercader, who stated that they cannot locate the logbook
due to the fact that the person in charge of the said logbook had already retired. Further, the
testimony of the said person was not presented in evidence. It does not appear on record that the
former custodian of the logbook was deceased or missing, or that his testimony could not be
secured. This belies the claim that all efforts to locate the logbook or prove the material contents
therein, had been exerted.

As testified to by Perlita Mercader:

Q Under the subpoena duces tecum, you were required to bring to this Court among
other things the register of application of/or (sic) for marriage licenses received by the
Office of the :Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Province of Rizal, from January 19, 1969
to May 1969. Did you bring with you those records?

A I brought may 19, 1969, sir.

Q Is that the book requested of you under no. 3 of the request for subpoena?

A Meron pang January. I forgot, January . . .

Q Did you bring that with you?

A No, sir.

Q Why not?

A I cannot locate the book. This is the only book.

Q Will you please state if this is the register of marriage of marriage applications that your
office maintains as required by the manual of the office of the Local Civil Registrar?

COURT

May I see that book and the portion marked by the witness.

xxxx

COURT

39
 Why don't you ask her direct question whether marriage license 2880792 is the
number issued by their office while with respect to license no. 2770792 the office
of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan is very definite about it it was never
issued. Then ask him how about no. 2880792 if the same was ever issued by
their office. Did you ask this 2887092, but you could not find the record? But for
the moment you cannot locate the books? Which is which now, was this issued or
not?

A The employee handling it is already retired, sir.19

Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that utmost efforts were not exerted
to locate the logbook where Marriage License No. 2770792 may have been entered, the
presumption of regularity of performance of official function by the Local Civil Registrar in issuing
the certifications, is effectively rebutted.

According to Section 3(m),20 Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the presumption that official duty has
been regularly performed is among the disputable presumptions.

In one case, it was held:

A disputable presumption has been defined as a species of evidence that may be

accepted and acted on where there is no other evidence to uphold the contention for
which it stands, or one which may be overcome by other evidence. One such
disputable/rebuttable presumption is that an official act or duty has been regularly
performed. x x x.21

The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of

irregularity or failure to perform a duty.22

The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty is disputable and can be overcome
by other evidence as in the case at bar where the presumption has been effectively defeated by
the tenor of the first and second certifications.

Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage
License No. 2770792. It can also mean, as we believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook
just cannot be found. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook,
we cannot easily accept that absence of the same also means non-existence or falsity of entries
therein.

Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the
marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds.23 The courts look upon this presumption with
great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.24

The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as
the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.25

The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and lived together for several years
producing two offsprings,26 now adults themselves. It took Jaime several years before he filed the
petition for declaration of nullity. Admittedly, he married another individual sometime in
1991.27 We are not ready to reward petitioner by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him
his freedom and in the process allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy.28

Our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution.
Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution
in which the State is vitally interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid
and happy families. The break-up of families weakens our social and moral fabric; hence, their
preservation is not the concern of the family members alone.29

"The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is x x x marriage. Marriage in this
jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of
which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward

40
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The
reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus
hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of
law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is `that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage.' Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio – Always presume marriage."30

This jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based on the prima facie presumption that a man
and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage.31

By our failure to come to the succor of Jaime, we are not trifling with his emotion or deepest
sentiments. As we have said in Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco,32 regrettably, there are situations
like this one, where neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to every individual
problem.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 20 December 2004 and the Resolution dated 6 April 2005 are AFFIRMED. Costs
against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., J.J., concur.

Footnotes

1
 Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 74416, penned by Associate Justice Vicente S. E. Veloso
with Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios and Amelita G. Tolentino, concurring; Rollo,
pp. 20-31.

2
 Rollo, p. 46. Penned by Judge Zeus C. Abrogar.

3
 Records, Vol. I, pp. 1-4.

4
 Id. at 5.

5
 Id. at 232.

6
 Rollo, pp. 47-50.

7
 Id. at 50-52.

8
 Id. at 29-31.

9
 Id. at 80-81.

10
 ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied
with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) a marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

41
 11
 ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of this
Title, but not those under Article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized without a license
first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting
party habitually resides.

12
 ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxxx

(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional

charater.

13
 G.R. No. 132529, 2 February 2001, 351 SCRA 127, 133-134.

14
 G.R. No. 103047, 2 September 1994, 236 SCRA 257, 262.

15
 Records, Vol. I, p. 103.

16
 Atty. Josa Ma. Abola, counsel for Jaime Sevilla testified before the trial court that in his
letter requesting for the issuance of a certification, addressed to the Local Civil Registrar
of San Juan, he mistakenly read the Marriage License No. as 2880792 instead of
2770792. (Records, Vol. II, pp. 725-726.)

17
 Id. at 228.

18
 Records, Vol. II, p. 888.

19
 Id. at 735-737.

20
 Rule 131. BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS

xxxx

SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions. – The following presumptions are satisfactory if

uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence;

xxxx

(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;

21
 People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 106025, 9 February 1994, 229 SCRA 795, 798-799.

22
 Mabsucang v. Judge Balgos, 446 Phil. 217, 224 (2003).

23
 Article 220 Civil Code, Bobis v. Bobis, 391 Phil. 648, 655 (2000).

24
 Ricardo J. Francisco, BASIC EVIDENCE (2nd ed., 1999), p. 77.

25
 Republic v. Quintero-Hamano, G.R. No. 149498, 20 May 2004, 428 SCRA 735, 740.

26
 Records, Vol. II, p. 413, TSN, 11 April 1996.

27
 Id. at p. 414.

28
 Ty v. Court of Appeals, 399 Phil. 647, 663 (2000).

29
 Tuason v. Court of Appeals, 326 Phil. 169, 180-181 (1996) cited in Ancheta v.
Ancheta, G.R. No. 145370, 4 March 2004, 424 SCRA 725, 740.

30
 Vda. de Jacob v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 693, 709 (1999).

42
 31
 Id.

32
 G.R. No. 158896, 27 October 2004, 441 SCRA 422, 439.

THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 191936, June 01, 2016 ]

VIRGINIA D. CALIMAG, PETITIONER, VS. HEIRS OF SILVESTRA N. MACAPAZ,

REPRESENTED BY ANASTACIO P. MACAPAZ, JR., RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

REYES, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA)
promulgated on October 20, 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 90907 which affirmed with modification
the Decision[3] dated September 28, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City,
Branch 147, in Civil Case No. 06-173, an action for annulment of deed of sale and cancellation of
title with damages. The CA Resolution[4] dated April 5, 2010 denied the motion for
reconsideration thereof.

The Facts

Virginia D. Calimag (petitioner) co-owned the property, the subject matter of this case, with
Silvestra N. Macapaz (Silvestra).

On the other hand, Anastacio P. Macapaz, Jr. (Anastacio, Jr.) and Alicia Macapaz-Ritua (Alicia)
(respondents) are the children of Silvestra's brother, Anastacio Macapaz, Sr. (Anastacio, Sr.) and
Fidela O. Poblete Vda. de Macapaz (Fidela).

The subject property, with a total area of 299 square meters, is located at No. 1273 Bo. Visaya
Street, Barangay Guadalupe Nuevo, Makati City, and was duly registered in the names of the
petitioner (married to Demetrio Calimag) and Silvestra under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 183088.[5] In said certificate of title, appearing as Entry No. 02671 is an annotation of an
Adverse Claim of Fidela asserting rights and interests over a portion of the said property
measuring 49.5 sq m.[6]

On November 11, 2002, Silvestra died without issue. On July 7, 2005, TCT No. 183088 was
cancelled and a new certificate of title, TCT No. 221466, [7] was issued in the name of the petitioner
by virtue of a Deed of Sale[8] dated January 18, 2005 whereby Silvestra allegedly sold her 99-sq-m
portion to the petitioner for P300,000.00. Included among the documents submitted for the
purpose of cancelling TCT No. 183088 was an Affidavit[9] dated July 12, 2005 purportedly
executed by both the petitioner and Silvestra. It was stated therein that the affidavit of adverse
claim filed by Fidela was not signed by the Deputy Register of Deeds of Makati City, making the
same legally ineffective. On September 16, 2005, Fidela passed away.[10]

On December 15, 2005, Anastacio, Jr. filed a criminal complaint for two counts of falsification of
public documents under Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code against the petitioner.
[11]
 However, said criminal charges were eventually dismissed.

On March 2, 2006, the respondents, asserting that they are the heirs of Silvestra, instituted the
action for Annulment of Deed of Sale and Cancellation of TCT No. 221466 with Damages against
the petitioner and the Register of Deeds of Makati City.[12]

In her Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,[13] the petitioner averred that the respondents

have no legal capacity to institute said civil action on the ground that they are illegitimate children
of Anastacio, Sr. As such, they have no right over Silvestra's estate pursuant to Article 992 of the
Civil Code which prohibits illegitimate children from inheriting intestate from the legitimate
children and relatives of their father and mother.

After trial, the RTC found for the respondents and rendered its Decision on September 28, 2007.

43
[14]
 The fallo of the RTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered as follows:

1. Declaring the Deed of Sale purportedly executed by [Silvestra] in favor of [the petitioner]
on January 18, 2005 over a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 183088 of the Registry of
Deeds of Makati City, as Null and Void;

2. Ordering the Registrar of Deeds of Makati City to cancel TCT No. 221466 issued in the
name of [the petitioner], the same having been issued on the basis of a
fraudulent/falsified Deed of Sale, and thereafter to reinstate TCT No. 183088 issued in
the name of [the petitioner] and [Silvestra] with all the liens and encumbrances annotated
thereon, including the adverse claim of [Fidela]; [and]

3. Ordering [the petitioner] to pay the [respondents] the sum of PI00,000.00 as moral
damages and another P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, P50,000.00 as and by way of
attorney's fees, plus costs of suit.

[The petitioner's] counter-claim is dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[15]

The RTC found that the Deed of Sale dated January 18, 2005 presented for the cancellation of
TCT No. 183088 was a forgery considering that Silvestra, who purportedly executed said deed of
sale died on November 11, 2002, about three years before the execution of the said Deed of Sale.
[16]
 Respecting the respondents' legal capacity to sue, the RTC favorably ruled in this wise:

Demetrio Calimag, Jr. sought, but failed, to impugn the personality of the [respondents] to
initiate this action as the alleged heirs of [Silvestra]. The marriage between [Anastacio Sr.J
and [FidclaJ is evidenced by the Certificate of (canonical) Marriage (Exh. "M"). The
name 'Fidela Obera Poblete' is indicated in [the respondents'] respective birth
certificates as the mother's maiden name but Fidela signed the same as the
informant as "Fidela P. Macapaz". In both birth certificates, "Anastacio Nator
Macapaz" is indicated as the name of the father.[17] (Emphasis ours)

Ruling of the CA

Aggrieved, the petitioner elevated her case to the CA resting on the argument that the
respondents are without legal personality to institute the civil action for cancellation of deed of
sale and title on the basis of their claimed status as legitimate children of Anastacio, Sr., the
brother and sole heir of the deceased, Silvestra.[18]

On October 20, 2009, the CA rendered its Decision affirming the RTC decision with modification
as to the amount of damages. The fallo of the assailed decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit.
The Decision dated September 28, 2007 of the [RTC] of Makati City, Branch 147 in Civil Case No.
06-173 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the award of moral and exemplary
damages is hereby reduced from PI00,000.00 to P50,000.00, respectively.

With costs against the [petitioner].

SO ORDERED.[19]

The CA sustained the RTC ruling that the cancellation of TCT No. 183088 and the issuance of TCT
No. 221466 in the name of the petitioner were obtained through forgery. As to the question of
whether the respondents are legal heirs of Silvestra and thus have the legal capacity to institute
the action, the CA ruled in this wise:

44
Reviewing the evidence on record, we concur with the trial court in sustaining the appellees'
legitimate filiation to Silvestra's brother [Anastacio, Sr.] The trial court found unsuccessful the
attempt of Atty. Demetrio Calimag, Jr. to assail the validity of marriage between [Anastacio, Sr.]
and [Fidela] with a certification from the NSO that their office has no record of the certificate of
marriage of [Anastacio, Sr.] and [Fidela], and further claiming the absence of a marriage license.

The best proof of marriage between man and wife is a marriage contract. A certificate of marriage
issued by the Most Holy Trinity Parish, Alang[-]alang, Leyte (Exh. "M") as well as a copy of the
marriage contract were duly submitted in evidence by the [respondents].

xxxx

The Marriage Contract (Exh. "U") in this case clearly reflects a marriage license number and in
the absence of a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was
issued, the marriage between [Anastacio, Sr.] and [Fidela] may not be invalidated on that ground.

x x x.

xxxx

Every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in
apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special
to the case, to be in fact married. This jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based on
the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. The Courts look upon this presumption with great
favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.

Here, the fact of marriage between [Anastacio, Sr.] and [Fidela] was established by competent
and substantial proof. [The respondents] who were conceived and born during the subsistence of
said marriage are therefore presumed to be legitimate children of [Anastacio, Sr.], in the absence
of any contradicting evidence.[20] (Citations omitted)

The petitioner sought reconsideration,[21] but her motion was denied in the Resolution[22] dated
April 5, 2010.

Hence, this petition.

Notably, even before the CA, the petitioner never assailed the factual finding that forgery was
indeed committed to effect the cancellation of TCT No. 183088 and the consequent transfer of
title of the property in her name. Verily, in this petition, the petitioner continues to assail the legal
capacity of the respondents to institute the present action. Invoking the provisions of Article 992
of the Civil Code,[23] the petitioner insists that the respondents have no legal right over the estate
left by Silvestra for being illegitimate children of Anastacio, Sr.

While the petitioner does not question that Anastacio, Sr. is the legal heir of Silvestra, she,
however, claims that the respondents failed to establish their legitimate filiation to Anastacio, Sr.
considering that the marriage between Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela was not sufficiently proven.
According to the petitioner, the marriage contract[24] presented by the respondents is not
admissible under the Best Evidence Rule for being a mere fax copy or photocopy of an alleged
marriage contract, and which is not even authenticated by the concerned Local Civil Registrar. In
addition, there is no mark or stamp showing that said document was ever received by said office.
Further, while the respondents also presented a Certificate of (Canonical) Marriage, [25] the
petitioner asserts that the same is not the marriage license required under Articles 3 and 4 of the
Family Code;[26] that said Certificate of (Canonical) Marriage only proves that a marriage
ceremony actually transpired between Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela.[27]

Moreover, the petitioner contends that the certificates of live birth of the respondents do not
conclusively prove that they are legitimate children of Anastacio, Sr.

In their Comment,[28] the respondents reiterate the finding and ruling of the CA that the
petitioner's argument has no leg to stand on considering that one's legitimacy can only be
questioned in a direct action seasonably filed by a party who is related to the former either by

45
consanguinity or affinity.[29]

Thereupon, the resolution of this case rests upon this fundamental issue: whether or not the
respondents are legal heirs of Silvestra.

Ruling of the Court

The petition is bereft of merit.

While it is true that a person's legitimacy can only be questioned in a direct action seasonably
filed by the proper party, as held in Spouses Fidel v. Hon. CA, et al.,[30] this Court however deems
it necessary to pass upon the respondents' relationship to Silvestra so as to determine their legal
rights to the subject property. Besides, the question of whether the respondents have the legal
capacity to sue as alleged heirs of Silvestra was among the issues agreed upon by the parties in the
pre-trial.

At first blush, the documents presented as proof of marriage between Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela,
viz: (1) fax or photo copy of the marriage contract, and (2) the canonical certificate of marriage,
cannot be used as legal basis to establish the fact of marriage without running afoul with the
Rules on Evidence of the Revised Rules of Court. Rule 130, Section 3 of the Rules on Evidence
provides that: "When the subject of the inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself, x x x." Nevertheless, a reproduction of the
original document can still be admitted as secondary evidence subject to certain requirements
specified by law. In Dantis v. Maghinang, Jr.,[31] it was held that:

A secondary evidence is admissible only upon compliance with Rule 130, Section 5, which states
that: when the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror,
upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his
part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document,
or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated. Accordingly, the offeror of the secondary
evidence is burdened to satisfactorily prove the predicates thereof, namely: (1) the execution or
existence of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original or its non-production in
court; and (3) the unavailability of the original is not due to bad faith on the part of the
proponent/offeror. Proof of the due execution of the document and its subsequent loss would
constitute the basis for the introduction of secondary evidence, x x x. [32] (Citation omitted)

On the other hand, a canonical certificate of marriage is not a public document. As early as in the
case of United States v. Evangelista,33 it has been settled that church registries of births,
marriages, and deaths made subsequent to the promulgation of General Orders No. 68 and the
passage of Act No. 190 are no longer public writings, nor are they kept by duly authorized public
officials.[34] They are private writings and their authenticity must therefore be proved as are all
other private writings in accordance with the rules of evidence.[35] Accordingly, since there is no
showing that the authenticity and due execution of the canonical certificate of marriage of
Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela was duly proven, it cannot be admitted in evidence.

Notwithstanding, it is well settled that other proofs can be offered to establish the fact of a
solemnized marriage.[36] Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by
relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person's birth certificate may
be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents. [37]

Thus, in order to prove their legitimate filiation, the respondents presented their respective
Certificates of Live Birth issued by the National Statistics Office[38] where Fidela signed as the
Informant in item no. 17 of both documents.

A perusal of said documents shows that the respondents were apparently born to the same
parents — their father's name is Anastacio Nator Macapaz, while their mother's maiden name
is Fidela Overa Poblete. In item no. 24 thereof where it asks: "24. DATE AND PLACE OF
MARRIAGE OF PARENTS (For legitimate birth)" it was stated therein that respondents' parents
were married on "May 25, 1955 in Alang-alang, Leyte."[39]

The petitioner asserts that said documents do not conclusively prove the respondents' legitimate
filiation, albeit, without offering any evidence to the contrary. The certificates of live birth contain

46
no entry stating whether the respondents are of legitimate or illegitimate filiation, making said
documents unreliable and unworthy of weight and value in the determination of the issue at
hand.

Moreover, the petitioner states that in the respondents' certificates of live birth, only the signature
of Fidela appears, and that they were not signed by Anastacio, Sr. She argues that the birth
certificate must be signed by the father in order to be competent evidence to establish filiation,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, invoking Roces v. Local Civil Registrar of Manila[40] where it
was held that a birth certificate not signed by the alleged father is not competent evidence of
paternity.[41]

The petitioner's contentions are untenable.

"A certificate of live birth is a public document that consists of entries (regarding the facts of
birth) in public records (Civil Registry) made in the performance of a duty by a public officer
(Civil Registrar)."[42] Thus, being public documents, the respondents' certificates of live birth are
presumed valid, and are prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated in them.[43]

"Prima facie evidence is defined as evidence good and sufficient on its face. Such evidence as, in
the judgment of the law, is sufficient to establish a given fact, or the group or chain of facts
constituting the party's claim or defense and which if not rebutted or contradicted, will remain
sufficient."[44]

The petitioner's assertion that the birth certificate must be signed by the father in order to be a
competent evidence of legitimate filiation does not find support in law and jurisprudence. In fact,
the petitioner's reliance on Roces[45] is misplaced considering that what was sought to be proved is
the fact of paternity of an illegitimate child, and not legitimate filiation.

Verily, under Section 5 of Act No. 3753,[46] the declaration of either parent of the new-born
legitimate child shall be sufficient for the registration of his birth in the civil register, and only in
the registration of birth of an illegitimate child does the law require that the birth certificate be
signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant, or only by the mother if the father refuses
to acknowledge the child.

The pertinent portion of Section 5 of Act No. 3753 reads:

Sec. 5. Registration and Certification of Birth. - The declaration of the physician or midwife in
attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of cither parent of the
newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil
register. Such declaration shall be exempt from the documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to
the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician, or midwife in
attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newly born child.

In such declaration, the persons above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a) date and
hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship, and religion of parents or,
in case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the
infant was born; if) and such other data as may be required in the regulations to be issued.

xxxx

In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to
jointly by the parents of the infant or only the mother if the father refuses. In the
latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or reveal in the document the name of the father
who refuses to acknowledge the child, or to give therein any information by which such father
could be identified, x x x (Emphasis Ours)

Forsooth, the Court finds that the respondents' certificates of live birth were duly executed
consistent with the provision of the law respecting the registration of birth of legitimate children.
The fact that only the signatures of Fidela appear on said documents is of no moment because
Fidela only signed as the declarant or informant of the respondents' fact of birth as legitimate
children.

Nonetheless, the respondents' certificates of live birth also intimate that Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela

47
had openly cohabited as husband and wife for a number of years, as a result of which they had
two children—the second child, Anastacio, Jr. being born more than three years after their first
child, Alicia. Verily, such fact is admissible proof to establish the validity of marriage. Court
Resolution dated February 13, 2013 in GR. No. 183262 entitled Social Security System (SSS) v.
Lourdes S. Enobiso[47] had the occasion to state:

Sarmiento v. CA is instructive anent the question of what other proofs can be offered to establish
the fact of a solemnized marriage, viz:

In Trinidad vs. Court of Appeals, et al., this Court ruled that as proof of marriage may be
presented: a) testimony of a witness to the matrimony; b) the couple's public and open
cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged wedlock; c) the birth and baptismal
certificate of children born during such union; and d) the mention of such nuptial in subsequent
documents.[48] (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
Moreover, in a catena of cases,[49] it has been held that, "[p]ersons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter presumption or evidence special to the
case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the
parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant
violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is 'that
a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage.' Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage."[50]

Furthermore, as the established period of cohabitation of Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela transpired way
before the effectivity of the Family Code, the strong presumption accorded by then Article 220 of
the Civil Code in favor of the validity of marriage cannot be disregarded. Thus:

Art. 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every
intendment of law or facts leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the
marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of property during marriage, the
authority of parents over their children, and the validity of defense for any member of the family
in case of unlawful aggression.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated

October 20, 2009 and Resolution dated April 5, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
90907 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, and Perez, JJ., concur.

Jardeleza, J., on official leave.

June 23, 2016

N O T I C E OF J U D G M E N T

Sirs/Mesdames:

48
Please take notice that on ___June 1, 2016___ a Decision, copy attached hereto, was rendered
by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office
on June 23, 2016 at 2:05 p.m.

Very truly yours,

(SGD)
WILFREDO V. LAPITAN
Division Clerk of Court

[1]
 Rollo, pp. 7-24.

 Penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. (now retired Supreme Court Associate
[2]

Justice), with Associate Justices Magdangal M. De Leon and Ricardo R. Rosario concurring; id. at
26-39.
[3]
 Id. at 62-67.
[4]
 Id. at 41-42.
[5]
 Records, p. 10.
[6]
 Id. at 11.
[7]
 Id. at 12-13.
[8]
 Id. at 14.
[9]
 Id. at 15.
[10]
 Rollo, pp. 27-28. Records, pp. 151-152.
[12]
 Id. at 1-8.
[13]
 Rollo, pp. 59-61.
[14]
 Id. at 62-67.
[15]
 Id. at 66-67.
[16]
 Id. at 65.
[17]
 Id. at 66.
[18]
 Id. at 3 1-32.
[19]
 Id. at 39.
[20]
 Id. at 34-36.
[21]
 Id. at 105-112.
[22]
 Id. at 41-42.
[23]
 ART. 992. An illegitimale child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children

49
and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same
manner from the illegitimale child.
[24]
 Rollo, p. 115.
[25]
 Id. at 119.

ART. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and

(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before
the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and
wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.

ART. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article
45.

An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
[27]
 Rollo, pp. 15-17.
[28]
 Id. at 134-144.
[29]
 Id. at 141.
[30]
 581 Phil. 160(2008).
[31]
 G.R. No. 191696, April 10, 2013, 695 SCRA 599.
[32]
 Id. at 611.
[33]
 29 Phil. 215 (1915).
[34]
 Id. at 221.
[35]
 Cercado-Siga v. Cercado, Jr., G.R. No. 185374, March 11, 2015, 752 SCRA 5 14, 525-526.
[36]
 Sarmiento v. CA, 364 Phil. 613, 620 (1999).

 Macua Vila, de Avenido v. Avenido, G.R. No. 173540, January 22, 2014, 714 SCRA 447, 455,
[37]

citing Añonuevo, et al, v. Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni, 651 Phil. 137, 147(2010).
[38]
 Rollo, pp. 120-121.
[39]
 Id.
[40]
 102 Phil. 1050(1958).
[41]
 Rollo, p. 17.

 Remiendo v. People, 618 Phil. 273 (2009); Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties,
[42]

Inc., 578 Phil. 441, 454 (2008), citing REVISED RULES ON EVIDENCE, Rule 132, Section
23; People v. Delantar, 543 Phil. 107, 127(2007).

 Court Resolution dated July 13, 2011 in G.R. No. 190745 entitled "Lourdes T. Buhay v. Letecia
[43]

A. Buhay Dela-Peña."
[44]
 Tomas P. Tan, Jr. v. Jose G. Hosana, G.R. No. 190846, February 3, 2016.

50
[45]
 Supra note 40.
[46]
 LAW ON REGISTRY OF CIVIL STATUS. Approved on November 26, 1930.
[47]
 elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/elibsearch visited April 14, 2016.
[48]
 Id.

 Social Security System (SSS) v. Lourdes S. Enobiso, G.R. No. 183262, February 13, 2013,
[49]

supra note 47; Sevilla v. Cardenas, 529 Phil. 419, 435 (2006); Vda. de Jacob v. CA, 371 Phil. 693,
708-709 (1999), citing Perido v. Perido, 159 Phil. 710, 716-717 (1975)
[50]
 Id.

G.R. No. 173540               January 22, 2014

PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO, Petitioner,

vs.
TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO, Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.ofthe Rules of Court, assailing the 31
August 2005 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 79444, which reversed
the 25 March 2003 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8 of Davao City, in a
complaint for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage· docketed as Civil Case No. 26, 908-98.

The Facts

This case involves a contest between two women both claiming to have been validly married to
the same man, now deceased.

Respondent Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted on 11 November 1998, a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Peregrina Macua Vda. de Avenido (Peregrina) on the
ground that she (Tecla), is the lawful wife of the deceased Eustaquio Avenido (Eustaquio). In her
complaint, Tecla alleged that her marriage to Eustaquio was solemnized on 30 September 1942
in Talibon, Bohol in rites officiated by the Parish Priest of the said town. According to her, the fact
of their marriage is evidenced by a Marriage Certificate recorded with the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar (LCR) of Talibon, Bohol. However, due to World War II, records were destroyed. Thus,
only a Certification3 was issued by the LCR.

During the existence of Tecla and Eustaquio’s union, they begot four (4) children, namely:
Climaco H. Avenido, born on 30 March 1943; Apolinario H. Avenido, born on 23 August 1948;
Editha A. Ausa, born on 26 July 1950, and Eustaquio H. Avenido, Jr., born on 15 December
1952. Sometime in 1954, Eustaquio left his family and his whereabouts was not known. In 1958,
Tecla and her children were informed that Eustaquio was in Davao City living with another
woman by the name of Buenaventura Sayson who later died in 1977 without any issue.

In 1979, Tecla learned that her husband Eustaquio got married to another woman by the name of
Peregrina, which marriage she claims must be declared null and void for being bigamous – an
action she sought to protect the rights of her children over the properties acquired by Eustaquio.

On 12 April 1999, Peregrina filed her answer to the complaint with counterclaim,4 essentially
averring that she is the legal surviving spouse of Eustaquio who died on 22 September 1989 in
Davao City, their marriage having been celebrated on 30 March 1979 at St. Jude Parish in Davao
City. She also contended that the case was instituted to deprive her of the properties she owns in
her own right and as an heir of Eustaquio.

Trial ensued.

51
Tecla presented testimonial and documentary evidence consisting of:

1) Testimonies of Adelina Avenido-Ceno (Adelina), Climaco Avenido (Climaco) and Tecla

herself to substantiate her alleged prior existing and valid marriage with (sic) Eustaquio;

2) Documentary evidence such as the following:

a. Certification of Loss/Destruction of Record of Marriage from 1900 to 1944

issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar, Municipality of Talibon, Bohol;5

b. Certification of Submission of a copy of Certificate of Marriage to the Office of

the Civil Registrar General, National Statistics Office (NSO), R. Magsaysay Blvd.,
Sta Mesa, Manila;6

c. Certification that Civil Registry records of births, deaths and marriages that
were actually filed in the Office of the Civil Registrar General, NSO Manila, started
only in 1932;7

d. Certification that Civil Registry records submitted to the Office of the Civil
Registrar General, NSO, from 1932 to the early part of 1945, were totally
destroyed during the liberation of Manila;8

e. Certification of Birth of Apolinario Avenido;9

f. Certification of Birth of Eustaquio Avenido, Jr.;10

g. Certification of Birth of Editha Avenido;11

h. Certification of Marriage between Eustaquio Sr., and Tecla issued by the Parish
Priest of Talibon, Bohol on 30 September 1942;12

i. Certification that record of birth from 1900 to 1944 were destroyed by Second
World War issued by the Office of the Municipal Registrar of Talibon, Bohol, that
they cannot furnish as requested a true transcription from the Register of Birth of
Climaco Avenido;13

j. Certificate of Baptism of Climaco indicating that he was born on 30 March 1943

to spouses Eustaquio and Tecla;14

k. Electronic copy of the Marriage Contract between Eustaquio and Peregrina.15

On the other hand, Peregrina testified on, among others, her marriage to Eustaquio that took
place in Davao City on 3 March 1979; her life as a wife and how she took care of Eustaquio when
he already had poor health, as well as her knowledge that Tecla is not the legal wife, but was
once a common law wife of Eustaquio.16 Peregrina likewise set forth documentary evidence to
substantiate her allegations and to prove her claim for damages, to wit:

1) Marriage Contract17 between Pregrina and the late Eustaquio showing the date of
marriage on 3 March 1979;

2) Affidavit of Eustaquio executed on 22 March 1985 declaring himself as single when he

contracted marriage with the petitioner although he had a common law relation with one
Tecla Hoybia with whom he had four (4) children namely: Climaco, Tiburcio, Editha and
Eustaquio, Jr., all surnamed Avenido;18

3) Letter of Atty. Edgardo T. Mata dated 15 April 2002, addressed to the Civil Registrar of
the Municipality of Alegria, Surigao del Norte;19 and

4) Certification dated 25 April 2002 issued by Colita P. Umipig, in her capacity as the Civil
Registrar of Alegria, Surigao del Norte.20

52
In addition, as basis for the counterclaim, Peregrina averred that the case was initiated in bad
faith so as to deprive her of the properties she owns in her own right and as an heir of Eustaquio;
hence, her entitlement to damages and attorney’s fees.

On 25 March 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision21 denying Tecla’s petition, as well as

Peregrina’s counter-claim. The dispositive portion thereof reads:

For The Foregoing, the petition for the "DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE" filed by
petitioner TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO against respondent PEREGRINA MACUA is hereby
DENIED.

The "COUNTERCLAIM" filed by respondent PEREGRINA MACUA against petitioner TECLA

HOYBIA AVENIDO is hereby DISMISSED.22

Not convinced, Tecla appealed to the CA raising as error the trial court’s alleged disregard of the
evidence on the existence of her marriage to Eustaquio.

In its 31 August 2005 Decision,23 the CA ruled in favor of Tecla by declaring the validity of her
marriage to Eustaquio, while pronouncing on the other hand, the marriage between Peregrina
and Eustaquio to be bigamous, and thus, null and void. The CA ruled:

The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the testimonies of [Adelina],
the sister of EUSTAQUIO who testified that she personally witnessed the wedding celebration of
her older brother EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30 September 1942 at Talibon, Bohol; [Climaco],
the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who testified that his mother [Tecla] was married to
his father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary evidence mentioned at the
outset. It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both
constituting the condition sine qua non, for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents,
were shown by the very evidence the trial court has disregarded.24

Peregrina now questions the said ruling assigning as error, among others, the failure of the CA to
appreciate the validity of her marriage to Eustaquio. For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), in its Memorandum25 dated 5 June 2008, raises the following legal issues:

1. Whether or not the court can validly rely on the "presumption of marriage" to overturn
the validity of a subsequent marriage;

2. Whether or not secondary evidence may be considered and/or taken cognizance of,
without proof of the execution or existence and the cause of the unavailability of the best
evidence, the original document;

and

3. Whether or not a Certificate of Marriage issued by the church has a probative value to
prove the existence of a valid marriage without the priest who issued the same being
presented to the witness stand.26

Our Ruling

Essentially, the question before us is whether or not the evidence presented during the trial
proves the existence of the marriage of Tecla to Eustaquio.

The trial court, in ruling against Tecla’s claim of her prior valid marriage to Eustaquio relied on
Tecla’s failure to present her certificate of marriage to Eustaquio. Without such certificate, the trial
court considered as useless the certification of the Office of the Civil Registrar of Talibon, Bohol,
that it has no more records of marriages during the period 1900 to 1944. The same thing was
said as regards the Certification issued by the National Statistics Office of Manila. The trial court
observed:

Upon verification from the NSO, Office of the Civil Registrar General, Manila, it, likewise, issued a
Certification (Exhibit "B") stating that:

53
records from 1932 up to early part of 1945 were totally destroyed during the liberation of Manila
on February 4, 1945. What are presently filed in this office are records from the latter part of 1945
to date, except for the city of Manila which starts from 1952. Hence, this office has no way of
verifying and could not issue as requested, certified true copy of the records of marriage between
[Eustaquio] and [Tecla], alleged to have been married on 30th September 1942, in Talibon,
Bohol.27

In the absence of the marriage contract, the trial court did not give credence to the testimony of
Tecla and her witnesses as it considered the same as mere self-serving assertions. Superior
significance was given to the fact that Tecla could not even produce her own copy of the said
proof of marriage. Relying on Section 3 (a) and Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the trial
court declared that Tecla failed to prove the existence of the first marriage.

The CA, on the other hand, concluded that there was a presumption of lawful marriage between
Tecla and Eustaquio as they deported themselves as husband and wife and begot four (4)
children. Such presumption, supported by documentary evidence consisting of the same
Certifications disregarded by the trial court, as well as the testimonial evidence especially that of
Adelina Avenido-Ceno, created, according to the CA, sufficient proof of the fact of marriage.
Contrary to the trial court’s ruling, the CA found that its appreciation of the evidence presented by
Tecla is well in accord with Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

We uphold the reversal by the CA of the decision of the trial court. Quite recently, in Añonuevo v.
Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni,28 we said, citing precedents, that:

While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not
regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of
marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a
person’s birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his
parents.

The error of the trial court in ruling that without the marriage certificate, no other proof of the fact
can be accepted, has been aptly delineated in Vda de Jacob v. Court of Appeals.29 Thus:

It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both
constituting the conditio sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents,
were shown by the very evidence they have disregarded. They have thus confused the evidence
to show due execution and loss as "secondary" evidence of the marriage. In Hernaez v. Mcgrath,
the Court clarified this misconception thus:

x x x [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol evidence of the execution of
the instrument was barred. The court confounded the execution and the contents of the
document. It is the contents, x x x which may not be proven by secondary evidence when the

instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the execution are not dependent on the existence or non-
existence of the document, and, as a matter of fact, such proofs of the contents: due execution,
besides the loss, has to be shown as foundation for the inroduction of secondary evidence of the
contents.

xxxx

Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily collateral or primary.
It generally consists of parol testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when the document is actually
produced, its authencity is not necessarily, if at all, determined from its face or recital of its
contents but by parol evidence. At the most, failure to produce the document, when available, to
establish its execution may effect the weight of the evidence presented but not the admissibility of
such evidence.

The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on this issue by relying on
Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete. But even there, we said that "marriage may be prove[n] by other
competent evidence.

54
Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing
officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to
whom the parties have previously narrated the execution thereof. The Court has also held that
"[t]he loss may be shown by any person who [knows] the fact of its loss, or by any one who ha[s]
made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the
document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the
document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation
which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument [has] indeed [been] lost."

In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was
present during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The
subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor
Yllana, as relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of
the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence–
testimonial and documentary–may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.30

As correctly stated by the appellate court:

In the case at bench, the celebration of marriage between [Tecla] and EUSTAQUIO was
established by the testimonial evidence furnished by [Adelina] who appears to be present during
the marriage ceremony, and by [Tecla] herself as a living witness to the event. The loss was
shown by the certifications issued by the NSO and LCR of Talibon, Bohol. These are relevant,
competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage
contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence – testimonial and
documentary – may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage. In PUGEDA v. TRIAS, the

Supreme Court held that "marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence. The
testimony by one of the parties to the marriage or by one of the witnesses to the marriage has
been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The person who officiated at the
solemnization is also competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of marriage."

xxxx

The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the testimonies of [Adelina],
the sister of EUSTAQUIO who testified that she personally witnessed the wedding celebration of
her older brother EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30 September 1942 at Talibon, Bohol; [Climaco],
the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who testified that his mother [Tecla] was married to
his father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary evidence mentioned at the
outset. It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both
constituting the condition sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents,
were shown by the very evidence the trial court has disregarded.31

The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage.

As early as the case of Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,32 this Court has elucidated on the rationale
behind the presumption:

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage.1âwphi1 Marriage in
this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance
of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The
reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus
hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of
law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. (Sec.
334, No. 28) Semper – praesumitur pro matrimonio – Always presume marriage.

In the case at bar, the establishment of the fact of marriage was completed by the testimonies of
Adelina, Climaco and Tecla; the unrebutted the certifications of marriage issued by the parish
priest of the Most Holy Trinity Cathedral of Talibon, Bohol.

55
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 79444 is AFFIRMED. The marriage between petitioner Peregrina Macua Avenido
and the deceased Eustaquio Avenido is hereby declared NULL and VOID. No pronouncement as
to costs.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation,
it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
 Rollo, pp. 10-24; Penned by Associate Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal with Associate
Justices Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores and Edgardo A. Camello concurring.

2
 Id. at 225-232; Penned by Judge Salvador M. lbarreta, Jr.

3
 Records, p. 116; Exhibit "A," the certification states:

x x x [T]he records of marriages during the period 1900 to 1944 were totally
destroyed by Second World War. Hence, we cannot issue as requested a true
transcription from the Register of Marriages or true copy of the Certificate of
Marriage between [EUSTAQUIO] and [TECLA], who are alleged to have been
married on September 30, 1942 in this city/municipality.

4
 Id. at 22-28.

56
 5
 Id. at 116; Exhibit "A."

6
 Id.; Exhibit A-1."

7
 Id. at 117; Exhibit "B."

8
 Id.; Exhibit "B-1."

9
 Id. at 118; Exhibit "C."

10
 Id. at 119; Exhibit "D."

11
 Id. at 120; Exhibit "E."

12
 Id. at 121; Exhibit "F."

13
 Id. at 122; Exhibit "G."

14
 Id. at 123; Exhibit "G-1."

15
 Id. at 124; Exhibit "H."

16
 TSN, 25 July 2001, pp. 11-12.

17
 Records, p. 12; Exhibit "1."

18
 Id. at 143; Exhibit "2."

19
 Id. at 144; Exhibit "3."

20
 Id. at 145; Exhibit "4."

21
 Id. at 150-156.

22
 Id. at 156.

23
 Rollo, pp. 10-24.

24
 Id. at 22.

25
 Id. at 361-385.

26
 Id. at 373.

27
 Id. at 229-230.

28
 G.R. No. 178221, 1 December 2010, 636 SCRA 420, 429-430.

29
 371 Phil. 693 (1999).

30
 Id. at 705-707.

31
 Rollo, pp. 20-22.

32
 43 Phil. 43, 56 (1922).

G.R. No. 135216           August 19, 1999

57
TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB, as Special Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Deceased
Alfredo E. Jacob, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO PILAPIL, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS for the Province of
Camarines Sur, and JUAN F. TRIVINO as publisher of "Balalong," respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The contents of a document may be proven by competent evidence other than the document
itself, provided that the offeror establishes its due execution and its subsequent loss or
destruction. Accordingly, the fact of marriage may be shown by extrinsic evidence other than the
marriage contract.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision of
the Court of Appeals1 (CA) dated January 15, 1998, and its Resolution dated August 24, 1998,
denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

The dispositive part of the CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from it being more
consistent with the facts and the applicable law, the challenged Decision dated 05 April
1994 of the RTC, Br. 30, Tigaon, Camarines Sur is AFFIRMED in toto.2

The decretal portion of the trial court Decision3 is as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, decision is hereby rendered in favor of [herein

Respondent] Pedro Pilapil, and against [herein Petitioner] Tomasa Guison as follows:

a) Declaring Exh. B, the so called "reconstructed marriage contract" excluded

under the best evidence rule, and therefore declaring said Exh. B spurious and
non-existent.

b) Declaring Exh. 3 Order dated July 18, 1961, and the signature of the issuing
Judge JOSE L. MOYA (Exh. 34) to be genuine.

c) Permanently setting aside and lifting the provisional writ of injunction earlier
issued; and

d) To pay attorney's fees of P50,000.

And costs against [herein petitioner.]

The Facts

The Court of Appeals narrates the facts thus:

Plaintiff-appellant [petitioner herein] claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased Dr.

Alfredo E. Jacob and was appointed Special Administratix for the various estates of the
deceased by virtue of a reconstructed Marriage Contract between herself and the
deceased.

Defendant-appellee on the other hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son of Alfredo.

In support of his claim, he presented an Order dated 18 July 1961 issued by then
Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya, CFI, Camarines Sur, granting the petition for adoption
filed by deceased Alfredo in favor of Pedro Pilapil.1âwphi1.nêt

During the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Alfredo in Case
No. T-46 (entitled "Tomasa vda. de Jacob v. Jose Centenera, et al) herein defendant-
appellee Pedro sought to intervene therein claiming his share of the deceased’s estate as

58
 Alfredo's adopted son and as his sole surviving heir. Pedro questioned the validity of the
marriage between appellant Tomasa and his adoptive father Alfredo.

Appellant Tomasa opposed the Motion for Intervention and filed a complaint for injunction
with damages (Civil Case No. T-83) questioning appellee's claim as the legal heir of
Alfredo.

The following issues were raised in the court a quo:

a) Whether the marriage between the plaintiff-appellant and deceased Alfredo

Jacob was valid;

b) Whether the defendant-appellee is the legally adopted son of deceased Jacob.

On the first issue, appellant claims that the marriage between her and Alfredo was
solemnized by one Msgr. Florencio C. Yllana, CBCP, Intramuros, Manila sometime in
1975. She could not however present the original copy of the Marriage Contract stating
that the original document was lost when Msgr. Yllana allegedly gave it to Mr. Jose
Centenera for registration. In lieu of the original, Tomasa presented as secondary
evidence a reconstructed Marriage Contract issued in 1978.

During the trial, the court a quo observed the following irregularities in the execution of
the reconstructed Marriage Contract, to wit:

1. No copy of the Marriage Contract was sent to the local civil registrar by the
solemnizing officer thus giving the implication that there was no copy of the
marriage contract sent to, nor a record existing in the civil registry of Manila;

2. In signing the Marriage Contract, the late Alfredo Jacob merely placed his
"thumbmark" on said contract purportedly on 16 September 1975 (date of the
marriage). However, on a Sworn Affidavit executed between appellant Tomasa
and Alfredo a day before the alleged date of marriage or on 15 September 1975
attesting that both of them lived together as husband and wife for five (5) years,
Alfredo [af]fixed his customary signature. Thus the trial court concluded that the
"thumbmark" was logically "not genuine". In other words, not of Alfredo Jacob’s;

3. Contrary to appellant’s claim, in his Affidavit stating the circumstances of the

loss of the Marriage Contract, the affiant Msgr. Yllana never mentioned that he
allegedly "gave the copies of the Marriage Contract to Mr. Jose Centenera for
registration". And as admitted by appellant at the trial, Jose Centenera (who
allegedly acted as padrino) was not present at the date of the marriage since he
was then in Australia. In fact, on the face of the reconstructed Marriage Contract,
it was one "Benjamin Molina" who signed on top of the typewritten name of Jose
Centenera. This belies the claim that Msgr. Yllana allegedly gave the copies of
the Marriage Contract to Mr. Jose Centenera;

4. Appellant admitted that there was no record of the purported marriage entered
in the book of records in San Agustin Church where the marriage was allegedly
solemnized.

Anent the second issue, appellee presented the Order dated 18 July 1961 in Special
Proceedings No. 192 issued by then Presiding Judge Moya granting the petition for
adoption filed by deceased Alfredo which declared therein Pedro Pilapil as the legally
adopted son of Alfredo.

Appellant Tomasa however questioned the authenticity of the signature of Judge Moya.

In an effort to disprove the genuineness and authenticity of Judge Moya's signature in the
Order granting the petition for adoption, the deposition of Judge Moya was taken at his
residence on 01 October 1990.

59
 In his deposition, Judge Moya attested that he could no longer remember the facts in
judicial proceedings taken about twenty-nine (29) years ago when he was then presiding
judge since he was already 79 years old and was suffering from "glaucoma".

The trial court then consulted two (2) handwriting experts to test the authenticity and
genuineness of Judge Moya's signature.

A handwriting examination was conducted by Binevenido C. Albacea, NBI Document

Examiner. Examiner Albacea used thirteen (13) specimen signatures of Judge Moya and
compared it with the questioned signature. He pointed out irregularities and "significant
fundamental differences in handwriting characteristics/habits existing between the
questioned and the "standard" signature" and concluded that the questioned and the
standard signatures "JOSE L. MOYA" were NOT written by one and the same person.

On the other hand, to prove the genuineness of Judge Moya's signature, appellee
presented the comparative findings of the handwriting examination made by a former NBI
Chief Document Examiner Atty. Desiderio A. Pagui who examined thirty-two (32)
specimen signatures of Judge Moya inclusive of the thirteen (13) signatures examined by
Examiner Albacea. In his report, Atty. Pagui noted the existence of significant similarities
of unconscious habitual pattern within allowable variation of writing characteristics
between the standard and the questioned signatures and concluded that the signature of
Judge Moya appearing in the Order dated 18 July 1961 granting the petition for adoption
was indeed genuine.

Confronted with two (2) conflicting reports, the trial court sustained the findings of Atty.
Pagui declaring the signature of Judge Moya in the challenged Order as genuine and
authentic.

Based on the evidence presented, the trial court ruled for defendant-appellee sustaining
his claim as the legally adopted child and sole heir of deceased Alfredo and declaring the
reconstructed Marriage Contract as spurious and non-existent."4 (citations omitted,
emphasis in the original)

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In affirming the Decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals ruled in this wise:

Dealing with the issue of validity of the reconstructed Marriage Contract, Article 6, par. 1
of the Family Code provides that the declaration of the contracting parties that they take
each other as husband and wife "shall be set forth in an instrument signed by the parties
as well as by their witnesses and the person solemnizing the marriage." Accordingly, the
primary evidence of a marriage must be an authentic copy of the marriage contract.

And if the authentic copy could not be produced, Section 3 in relation to Section 5, Rule
130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. — When the subject of

inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than
the original document itself, except in the following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;

xxx     xxx     xxx

Sec. 5. When the original document is unavailable. — When the original

document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror,
upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without
bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy. Or by a recital of its
contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the
order stated.

60
 As required by the Rules, before the terms of a transaction in reality may be established
by secondary evidence, it is necessary that the due execution of the document and
subsequent loss of the original instrument evidencing the transaction be proved. For it is
the due execution of the document and subsequent loss that would constitute the
foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence to prove the contents of such
document.

In the case at bench, proof of due execution besides the loss of the three (3) copies of the
marriage contract has not been shown for the introduction of secondary evidence of the
contents of the reconstructed contract. Also, appellant failed to sufficiently establish the
circumstances of the loss of the original document.

With regard to the trial court's finding that the signature of then Judge Moya in the
questioned Order granting the petition for adoption in favor of Pedro Pilapil was genuine,
suffice it to state that, in the absence of clear and convincing proof to the contrary, the
presumption applies that Judge Moya in issuing the order acted in the performance of his
regular duties.

Furthermore, since the signature appearing in the challenged Order was subjected to a
rigid examination of two (2) handwriting experts, this negates the possibility of forgery of
Judge Moya's signature. The value of the opinion of a handwriting expert depends not
upon his mere statement of whether a writing is genuine or false, but upon the assistance
he may afford in pointing out distinguishing marks, characteristics, and discrepancies in
and between genuine and false specimens of writing of which would ordinarily escape
notice or dete[c]tion from an unpracticed observer. And in the final analysis, the
assessment of the credibility of such expert witnesses rests largely in the discretion of the
trial court, and the test of qualification is necessarily a relative one, depending upon the
subject under investigation and the fitness of the particular witness. Except in
extraordinary cases, an appellate court will not reverse on account of a mistake of
judgment on the part of the trial court in determining qualifications of this case.

Jurisprudence is settled that the trial court's findings of fact when ably supported by
substantial evidence on record are accorded with great weight and respect by the Court.
Thus, upon review, We find that no material facts were overlooked or ignored by the court
below which if considered might vary the outcome of this case nor there exist cogent
reasons that would warrant reversal of the findings below. Factual findings of the trial
court are entitled to great weight and respect on appeal especially when established by
unrebutted testimony and documentary evidence.5 (citations omitted, emphasis in the
original)

Disagreeing with the above, petitioner lodged her Petition for Review before this Court.6

The Issues

In her Memorandum petitioner presents the following issues for the resolution of this Court:

a) Whether or not the marriage between the plaintiff Tomasa Vda. De Jacob and
deceased Alfredo E. Jacob was valid; and

b) Whether defendant Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted son of Alfredo E. Jacob.7

The Court's Ruling

The Petition is meritorious. Petitioner's marriage is valid, but respondent’s adoption has not been
sufficiently established.

First Issue:

Validity of Marriage

Doctrinally, a void marriage may be subjected to collateral attack, while a voidable one may be
assailed only in a direct proceeding.8 Aware of this fundamental distinction, Respondent Pilapil

61
contends that the marriage between Dr. Alfredo Jacob and petitioner was void ab initio, because
there was neither a marriage license nor a marriage ceremony.9 We cannot sustain this
contention.

To start with, Respondent Pedro Pilapil argues that the marriage was void because the parties
had no marriage license. This argument is misplaced, because it has been established that Dr.
Jacob and petitioner lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.10 An affidavit to
this effect was executed by Dr. Jacob and petitioner.11 Clearly then, the marriage was exceptional
in character and did not require a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code.12 The Civil
Code governs this case, because the questioned marriage and the assailed adoption took place
prior the effectivity of the Family Code.

When Is Secondary Evidence Allowed?

"It is settled that if the original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court,
upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction, or unavailability, its contents may be proved
by a copy or a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by recollection of
witnesses."13 Upon a showing that the document was duly executed and subsequently lost,
without any bad faith on the part of the offeror, secondary evidence may be adduced to prove its
contents.14

The trial court and the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when they (1) excluded the
testimonies of petitioner, Adela Pilapil and Msgr. Florencio Yllana and (2) disregarded the
following: (a) photographs of the wedding ceremony; (b) documentary evidence, such as the
letter of Monsignor Yllana stating that he had solemnized the marriage between Dr. Jacob and
petitioner, informed the Archbishop of Manila that the wedding had not been recorded in the Book
of Marriages, and at the same time requested the list of parties to the marriage; (c) the
subsequent authorization issued by the Archbishop — through his vicar general and chancellor,
Msgr. Benjamin L. Marino — ordaining that the union between Dr. Jacob and petitioner be
reflected through a corresponding entry in the Book of Marriages; and (d) the Affidavit of
Monsignor Yllana stating the circumstances of the loss of the marriage certificate.

It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both
constituting the conditio sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents,
were shown by the very evidence they have disregarded. They have thus confused the evidence
to show due execution and loss as "secondary" evidence of the marriage. In Hernaez
v. Mcgrath,15 the Court clarified this misconception thus:

. . . [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol evidence of the
execution of the instrument was barred. The court confounded the execution and the
contents of the document. It is the contents, . . . which may not be prove[n] by secondary
evidence when the instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the execution are not
dependent on the existence or non-existence of the document, and, as a matter of fact,
such proofs precede proofs of the contents: due execution, besides the loss, has to be
shown as foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence of the contents.

xxx     xxx     xxx

Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily collateral or
primary. It generally consists of parol testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when the
document is actually produced, its authenticity is not necessarily, if at all, determined from
its face or recital of its contents but by parol evidence. At the most, failure to produce the
document, when available, to establish its execution may affect the weight of the
evidence presented but not the admissibility of such evidence. (emphasis ours)

The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on this issue by relying
on Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete.16 But even there, we said that "marriage may be prove[n] by other
competent evidence."17

Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing
officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to
whom the parties have previously narrated the execution thereof.18 The Court has also held that

62
"[t]he loss may be shown by any person who [knows] the fact of its loss, or by any one who ha[s]
made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the
document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the
document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation
which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument [has] indeed [been] lost."19

In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was
present during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The
subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor
Yllana, as well as by petitioner's own declaration in court. These are relevant, competent and
admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly
shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence — testimonial and documentary — may
be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.

The trial court pointed out that on the face of the reconstructed marriage contract were certain
irregularities suggesting that it had fraudulently been obtained.20 Even if we were to agree with
the trial court and to disregard the reconstructed marriage contract, we must emphasize that this
certificate is not the only proof of the union between Dr. Jacob and petitioner.

Proof of Marriage

As early as Pugeda v. Trias,  21 we have held that marriage may be proven by any competent and
relevant evidence. In that case, we said:

Testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the witnesses to the

marriage, has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The person who
officiated at the solemnization is also competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of
marriage.22 (emphasis supplied)

In Balogbog v. CA,23 we similarly held:

[A]lthough a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, the failure to

present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other evidence may be presented to
prove marriage. (emphasis supplied, footnote ommitted)

In both cases, we allowed testimonial evidence to prove the fact of marriage. We reiterated this
principle in Trinidad v. CA,24 in which, because of the destruction of the marriage contract, we
accepted testimonial evidence in its place.25

Respondent Pedro Pilapil misplaces emphasis on the absence of an entry pertaining to 1975 in
the Books of Marriage of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila and in the National Census and
Statistics Office (NCSO).26 He finds it quite "bizarre" for petitioner to have waited three years
before registering their marriage.27 On both counts, he proceeds from the wrong premise. In the
first place, failure to send a copy of a marriage certificate for record purposes does not invalidate
the marriage.28 In the second place, it was not the petitioner’s duty to send a copy of the marriage
certificate to the civil registrar. Instead, this charge fell upon the solemnizing officer.29

Presumption in Favor of Marriage

Likewise, we have held:

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is . . . of marriage. Marriage in
this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the
maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of
the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special
to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society,
and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be
living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our
Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and
wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage." Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio — Always presume marriage.30 (emphasis supplied)

63
This jurisprudential attitude31 towards marriage is based on the prima facie presumption that a
man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract
of marriage.32 Given the undisputed, even accepted,33 fact that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived
together as husband and wife,34 we find that the presumption of marriage was not rebutted in this
case.

Second Issue:

Validity of Adoption Order

In ruling that Respondent Pedro Pilapil was adopted by Dr. Jacob and that the signature of Judge
Moya appearing on the Adoption Order was valid, the Court of Appeals relied on the presumption
that the judge had acted in the regular performance of his duties. The appellate court also gave
credence to the testimony of respondent’s handwriting expert, for "the assessment of the
credibility of such expert witness rests largely on the discretion of the trial court . . . "35

We disagree. As a rule, the factual findings of the trial court are accorded great weight and
respect by appellate courts, because it had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses
and to note telltale signs indicating the truth or the falsity of a testimony. The rule, however, is not
applicable to the present case, because it was Judge Augusto O. Cledera, not the ponente, who
heard the testimonies of the two expert witnesses. Thus, the Court examined the records and
found that the Court of Appeals and the trial court "failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if
properly considered, will justify a different conclusion."36 Hence, the present case is an exception
to the general rule that only questions of law may be reviewed in petitions under Rule 45.37

Central to the present question is the authenticity of Judge Moya's signature on the questioned
Order of Adoption. To enlighten the trial court on this matter, two expert witnesses were
presented, one for petitioner and one for Respondent Pilapil. The trial court relied mainly on
respondent’s expert and brushed aside the Deposition of Judge Moya himself.38 Respondent
Pilapil justifies the trial judge’s action by arguing that the Deposition was ambiguous. He contends
that Judge Moya could not remember whether the signature on the Order was his and cites the
following portion as proof:39

Q. What was you[r] response, sir?

A: I said I do not remember.

Respondent Pilapil's argument is misleading, because it took the judge's testimony out of its
context. Considered with the rest of the Deposition, Judge Moya's statements contained no
ambiguity. He was clear when he answered the queries in the following manner:

Atty. Benito P. Fabie

Q. What else did she tell you[?]

A. And she ask[ed] me if I remembered having issued the order.

Q. What was your response sir[?]

A. I said I do not remember.40

The answer "I do not remember" did not suggest that Judge Moya was unsure of what he was
declaring. In fact, he was emphatic and categorical in the subsequent exchanges during the
Deposition:

Atty. Benito P. Fabie

Q. I am showing to you this Order, Exh. "A" deposition[;] will you please recall whether
you issued this Order and whether the facsimile of the signature appearing thereon is
your signature.

64
 A. As I said, I do not remember having issued such an order and the signature reading
Jose[;] I can’t make out clearly what comes after the name[;] Jose Moya is not my
signature.41

Clearly, Judge Moya could not recall having ever issued the Order of Adoption. More importantly,
when shown the signature over his name, he positively declared that it was not his.

The fact that he had glaucoma when his Deposition was taken does not discredit his statements.
At the time, he could with medication still read the newspapers; upon the request of the defense
counsel, he even read a document shown to him.42 Indeed, we find no reason – and the
respondent has not presented any – to disregard the Deposition of Judge Moya.

Judge Moya's declaration was supported by the expert testimony of NBI Document Examiner
Bienvenido Albacea, who declared:

Atty. Paraiso

Q   And were you able to determine [w]hat purpose you had in your examination of this
document?

A   Yes sir, [based on] my conclusion, [I] stated that the questioned and the standard
signature Jose L. Moya were not written by one and the same person. On the basis of my
findings that I would point out in detail, the difference in the writing characteristics [was] in
the structural pattern of letters which is very apparent as shown in the photograph as the
capital letter "J".43

It is noteworthy that Mr. Albacea is a disinterested party, his services having been sought without
any compensation. Moreover, his competence was recognized even by Respondent Pilapil’s
expert witness, Atty. Desiderio Pagui.44

Other considerations also cast doubt on the claim of respondent. The alleged Order was
purportedly made in open court. In his Deposition, however, Judge Moya declared that he did not
dictate decisions in adoption cases. The only decisions he made in open court were criminal
cases, in which the accused pleaded guilty.45 Moreover, Judge Moya insisted that the branch
where he was assigned was always indicated in his decisions and orders; yet the questioned
Order did not contain this information. Furthermore, Pilapil’s conduct gave no indication that he
recognized his own alleged adoption, as shown by the documents that he signed and other acts
that he performed thereafter.46 In the same vein, no proof was presented that Dr. Jacob had
treated him as an adopted child. Likewise, both the Bureau of Records Management47 in Manila
and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Tigaon, Camarines Sur,48 issued Certifications that
there was no record that Pedro Pilapil had been adopted by Dr. Jacob. Taken together, these
circumstances inexorably negate the alleged adoption of respondent.49

The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such relationship.50 This
Respondent Pilapil failed to do. Moreover, the evidence presented by petitioner shows that the
alleged adoption is a sham.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage between Petitioner Tomasa Vda. de Jacob and the
deceased Alfredo E. Jacob is hereby recognized and declared VALID and the claimed adoption
of Respondent Pedro Pilapil is DECLARED NONEXISTENT. No pronouncement as to
costs.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

Melo, Vitug, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

65
 1
 Sixth Division composed of J. Jesus M. Elbinias (chairman), J. Omar U. Amin (ponente),
and J. Hector L. Hofileña.

2
 CA Decision, p. 10; rollo, p. 59.

3
 Penned by Judge Angel S. Malaya. The case was heard by several judges; namely,
Judges Alfredo A. Cabral, Nilo A. Malanyaon, Ceferino P. Barcinas, Bonifacio C. Initia,
and Augusto O. Cledera.

4
 CA Decision, pp. 3-7; rollo, pp. 52-56.

5
 CA Decision, pp. 7-9; rollo, pp. 56-58.

6
 This case was deemed submitted for resolution on June 8, 1999, upon receipt by the
Court of respondent's Memorandum.

7
 Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 11; rollo, p. 83.

8
 Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines: Commentaries and Jurisprudence, Vol. I, 1987
ed., p. 265.

9
 Respondents' Memorandum, p. 8; rollo, p. 120.

10
 See note 34, infra.

11
 See CA Decision, p. 5; rollo, p. 54.

12
 Art. 76 of the Civil Code provides:

No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have
attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The
contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oath. The official, priest or minister who
solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to
ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he
found no legal impediment to the marriage.

13
 De Guzman v. CA, 260 SCRA 389, 395, August 7, 1996, per Mendoza, J. See Rule
130, § 5, Rules of Court.

14
 See De Vera v. Aguilar, 218 SCRA 602, February 9, 1993.

15
 91 Phil. 565, 573, July 9, 1952, per Tuason, J.

16
 66 SCRA 425, August 29, 1975.

17
 Ibid., p. 469, per Barredo, J.

18
 De Vera v. Aguilar, supra, pp. 606-607, citing Michael & Co v. Enriquez, 33 Phil. 87, 89-
90, December 24, 1915. See also De Guzman v. CA, supra.

19
 Ibid., p. 607, citing Michael & Co v. Enriquez, supra. (emphasis ours)

20
 CA Decision, pp. 4-5; rollo, pp. 53-54.

21
 4 SCRA 849, 855, March 31, 1962, per Labrador, J.

66
 22
 Ibid., citing 55 CJS, p. 900.

23
 269 SCRA 259, 266, March 7, 1997; per Mendoza, J.

24
 289 SCRA 188, April 20, 1998.

25
 Ibid., p. 204, per Panganiban, J.

26
 Respondent’s Memorandum, p. 8; rollo, p. 120.

27
 Respondent’s Memorandum, p. 10; rollo, p. 122.

28
 See Madridejo v. De Leon, 55 Phil. 1, 3, October 6, 1930; cited in Jones v. Hortigüela,
64 Phil. 179, 184, March 6, 1937. Article 53 of the New Civil Code. Cf. Petition, p.
22; rollo, p. 29.

29
 Art. 68, Civil Code.

30
 Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97, 103, March 12, 1975, per Makalintal, CJ, citing Adong v.
Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 56, March 3, 1922.

31
 See Trinidad v. CA, supra; Balogbog v. CA, supra; People v. Borromeo, 133 SCRA
110, October 31, 1984; Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97, March 12, 1975.

32
 Sec. 3 (aa), Rule 131, Rules of Court. Cf. Sec. 5 (bb), Rule 131, 1964 Rules of Court
and Article 220 of the Civil Code.

33
 Respondent’s Memorandum, p. 12; rollo, p. 124.

34
 This is evidenced by the "Affidavit of Marriage Between a Man and Woman Who Have
Lived for at Least Five Years," the authenticity of which was not questioned by
respondent.

35
 CA Decision, p. 9; rollo, p. 58.

36
 Fuentes v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 703, February 26, 1997, per Panganiban, J.

37
 Alcantara v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 353, January 25, 1996; Cayabyab v. IAC, 232
SCRA 1, April 18, 1994.

38
 See RTC Decision, p. 11; Records, Vol. III, p. 1,506.

39
 Respondent’s Memorandum, pp. 13-14; rollo, pp. 125-126.

40
 Deposition of Judge Jose L. Moya, p. 2, October 1, 1990; Records, Vol. 3, p. 1,128.

41
 Ibid. (Emphasis supplied)

42
 Ibid., p. 4; Records, Vol. 3, p. 1,130.

43
 TSN, p. 9, May 3, 1991; Records, p. 1,266, vol. 3.

44
 TSN, p. 7, December 8, 1992; Records, Vol. 3, p. 1,422.

45
 Deposition of Judge Jose L. Moya, p. 4; Records, Vol. 3, p. 1,130.

46
 Petitioner’s Memorandum, pp. 31-36; rollo, pp. 103-108.

47
 Records, Vol. I, p. 40.

67
 48
 Records, Vol. I, p. 41.

49
 Eusebio v. Valmores, 97 Phil. 163, May 31, 1955.

50
 Lazatin v. Campos, 92 SCRA 250, July 30, 1979.

G.R. No. 198780               October 16, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules t of Court assailing the
September 29, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414, which
affirmed the April 25, 2008Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC). declaring
the marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer (Fringer) and respondent Liberty Albios (A/bios) as void from
the beginning.

The facts

On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge Ofelia
I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a
Certificate of Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588.3

On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity 4 of her
marriage with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and
never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering into a
married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She described their
marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio .

Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios
filed a motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC ordered the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and determine the existence of a
collusion. On October 2, 2007, the Assistant Prosecutor complied and reported that she could not
make a determination for failure of both parties to appear at the scheduled investigation.

At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the
hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on the merits
ensued.

Ruling of the RTC

In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of

Liberty Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer as void from the very beginning. As a necessary
consequence of this pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using the surname of respondent as
she never acquired any right over it and so as to avoid a misimpression that she remains the wife
of respondent.

xxxx

SO ORDERED.6

The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only. Giving
credence to the testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage

68
to enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay
him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that
Fringer returned to the United States and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn,
she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship. The
RTC, thus, ruled that when marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the establishment
of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception.

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
filed a motion for reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order, 7 dated February 5, 2009, denying
the motion for want of merit. It explained that the marriage was declared void because the parties
failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it
and used it only as a means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.

Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.

Ruling of the CA

In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found
that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. The CA stated that the parties clearly did not
understand the nature and consequence of getting married and that their case was similar to a
marriage in jest. It further explained that the parties never intended to enter into the marriage
contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family. It concluded that their
purpose was primarily for personal gain, that is, for Albios to obtain foreign citizenship, and for
Fringer, the consideration of $2,000.00.

Hence, this petition.

Assignment of Error

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN IT HELD THAT A

MARRIAGE CONTRACTED FOR THEPURPOSE OF OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP
WAS DONEIN JEST, HENCE, LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OFCONSENT.8

The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American citizenship and for
Fringer to be paid $2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent to the marriage, as they
knowingly and willingly entered into that marriage and knew the benefits and consequences of
being bound by it. According to the OSG, consent should be distinguished from motive, the latter
being inconsequential to the validity of marriage.

The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a marriage in jest.
The parties here intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were
otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship would be rendered futile.

On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment9 to the petition, reiterating her stand that her
marriage was similar to a marriage by way of jest and, therefore, void from the beginning.

On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10 reiterating its arguments in its petition for review on
certiorari.

Ruling of the Court

The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a marriage, contracted for the
sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the
ground of lack of consent?

The Court resolves in the negative.

Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the phenomenon of marriage fraud for
the purposes of immigration.

Marriage Fraud in Immigration

69
The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the development of
marriage fraud for the sole purpose of availing of particular benefits. In the United States,
marriages where a couple marries only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire specific
benefits, have been referred to as "limited purpose" marriages.11 A common limited purpose
marriage is one entered into solely for the legitimization of a child.12 Another, which is the subject
of the present case, is for immigration purposes. Immigration law is usually concerned with the
intention of the couple at the time of their marriage,13 and it attempts to filter out those who use
marriage solely to achieve immigration status.14

In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,15 established the
principal test for determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a
"marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time
they were married. "This standard was modified with the passage of the Immigration Marriage
Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that
the marriage was not "entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United
States." The focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to establish a life together, to
determining the intention of evading immigration laws.16 It must be noted, however, that this
standard is used purely for immigration purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the
legal validity or existence of a marriage.

The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or fraudulent for the
limited purpose of immigration is also legally void and in existent. The early cases on limited
purpose marriages in the United States made no definitive ruling. In 1946, the notable case of

United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein in order to allow an alien to stay in the
country, the parties had agreed to marry but not to live together and to obtain a divorce within six
months. The Court, through Judge Learned Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert temporary into
permanent permission to stay in the country was not a marriage, there being no consent, to wit:

x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual consent is necessary to
every contract; and no matter what forms or ceremonies the parties may go through indicating the
contrary, they do not contract if they do not in fact assent, which may always be proved. x x x
Marriage is no exception to this rule: a marriage in jest is not a marriage at all. x x x It is quite true
that a marriage without subsequent consummation will be valid; but if the spouses agree to a
marriage only for the sake of representing it as such to the outside world and with the
understanding that they will put an end to it as soon as it has served its purpose to deceive, they
have never really agreed to be married at all. They must assent to enter into the relation as it is
ordinarily understood, and it is not ordinarily understood as merely a pretence, or cover, to
deceive others.18

(Italics supplied)

On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines,19 which declared
as valid a marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain entry to the United States, stating
that a valid marriage could not be avoided "merely because the marriage was entered into for a
limited purpose."20 The 1980 immigration case of Matter of McKee,21 further recognized that a
fraudulent or sham marriage was intrinsically different from a non subsisting one.

Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been recognized as
problematic. The problem being that in order to obtain an immigration benefit, a legal marriage is
first necessary.22 At present, United States courts have generally denied annulments involving"
limited purpose" marriages where a couple married only to achieve a particular purpose, and
have upheld such marriages as valid.23

The Court now turns to the case at hand.

Respondent’s marriage not void

In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was entered
into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and
should not be recognized from its inception. In its resolution denying the OSG’s motion for
reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that the marriage was declared void because the

70
parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally
bound by it and used it only as a means for the respondent to acquire American citizenship.
Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. It held
that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting married. As in
the Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest considering
that the parties only entered into the marriage for the acquisition of American citizenship in
exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a marriage contract and never intended
to live as husband and wife or build a family.

The CA’s assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties’ supposed lack of consent.
Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the
same Code provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab
initio.

Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the
presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties
willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not
vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles45 and 46 of the
Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence.24 Consent must also be
conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the
nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act.25 Their understanding
should not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.26

Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real
consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent
was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and
inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their
consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American
citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately
contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as
to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and
complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that
precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.

In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as akin to a
marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into
as a joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear
understanding that the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct
indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation.27 It is a pretended marriage not intended to be
real and with no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine
consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but
for a complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent because the parties have
absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.

The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest.1âwphi1 Albios and

Fringer had an undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to
allow the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married
would allow them to further their objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly
support an application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the
actual marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent
was, therefore, clearly present.

The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to establish
a conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real
intention to establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered
into in accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and
incidents of marriage are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus,
only be declared void or voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that
declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law
declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and
formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds
provided by law, it shall be declared valid.28

71
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot
dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle
would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional
questions.29 The right to marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in
almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love
one another or not, and so on.30 Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or
otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they
comply with all the legal requisites,31 are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a
marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by
law, may validly support a marriage.

Although the Court views with disdain the respondent’s attempt to utilize marriage for dishonest
purposes, It cannot declare the marriage void. Hence, though the respondent’s marriage may be
considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is not void ab initio and
continues to be valid and subsisting.

Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of
the Family Code. Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code may constitute
fraud, namely, (1) non- disclosure of a previous conv1ctwn involving moral turpitude; (2)
concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a sexually
transmitted disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No
other misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a
marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not
qualify under any of the listed circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of
fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent party. In the present case, there is no
injured party because Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter into the sham marriage.

Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage
with Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court
cannot declare such a marriage void in the event the parties fail to qualify for immigration
benefits, after they have availed of its benefits, or simply have no further use for it. These
unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to use the courts as instruments in their fraudulent
schemes. Albios already misused a judicial institution to enter into a marriage of convenience;
she should not be allowed to again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient situation.

No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.32 It must, therefore, be safeguarded
from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the impression
that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily
nullified when no longer needed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is DISMISSED for
utter lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO* ARTURO D. BRION**

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

72
 ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

PRESBITER J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation,
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen
per Special Order No. 1570 dated October 14. 2013.

** Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad. Per Special
Order No. 1554dated September 19, 2013.

1
 Rollo. pp. 26-32; penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez. Jr. and concurred in by
Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato. Jr. and Associate Justice Fiorito S. Macalino of the
Fifth Division. Manila.

2
 Id. at 38-39.

3
 Id. at 37.

4
 Id. at 33-35.

5
 Id. at 38-39.

6
 Id. at 39.

7
 Id. at 48-49.

8
 Id. at 13.

9
 Id. at 61-71.

10
 Id. at 89-95.

11
 Abrams, Kerry. Marriage Fraud . 100 Cal. L. Rev. 1
(2012);http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2000956. Lutwak v. United
States , 344 U.S. 604, 612-613 (U.S. 1953).

12
 Abrams, Kerry. Marriage Fraud . 100 Cal. L. Rev. 1
(2012);http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2000956; citing Schibi v.
Schibi , 69 A.2d 831 (Conn. 1949) (denying annulment where parties married only to give
a name to a prospective child); Bishop v. Bishop , 308 N.Y.S.2d 998 (Sup. Ct. 1970);
Erickson v. Erickson , 48 N.Y.S.2d 588 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (holding similarly to Schibi );

73
 Delfino v.Delfino , 35 N.Y.S.2d 693 (Sup. Ct. 1942) (denying annulment where purpose of
marriage was to protect the girl’s name and there was an understanding that the parties
would not live together as man and wife); Bove v. Pinciotti , 46 Pa. D. & C. 159 (1942);
Campbell v. Moore , 189 S.E.2d 497 (S.C.1939) (refusing an annulment where parties
entered marriage for the purpose of legitimizing a child); Chander v. Chander , No.2937-
98-4, 1999 WL 1129721 (Va. Ct. App. June 22, 1999) (denying annulment where wife
married husband to get his pension with no intention to consummate marriage because
husband knew that was the purpose of the marriage).

13
 Abrams, Kerry. Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage; 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1625
(2007);http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/01/Abrams_Final.pdf; citing Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),
§ 237(a)(1)(G), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(G) (2000).

14
 Abrams, Kerry. Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage ; 91 Minn. L. Rev.
1625 (2007);http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/01/Abrams_Final.pdf; citing 132 CONG.REC. 27,012, 27,015
(1986) (statement of Rep Mc Collum) (promoting the Immigration Marriage Fraud
Amendments of 1986).

15
 511 F.2d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir. 1975).

16
 Abrams, Kerry. Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage; 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1625
(2007);http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/01/Abrams_Final.pdf.

17
 151 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1945).

18
 United States v. Rubenstein , 151 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1945).

19
 Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd. , 323 F. Supp. 865 (S.D. Tex. 1969), aff’d , 440 F.2d 1163
(5th Cir. 1971).

20
 Abrams, Kerry. Marriage Fraud . 100 Cal. L. Rev. 1
(2012);http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2000956; citing Mpiliris v.
Hellenic Lines, Ltd. , 323 F. Supp. 865 (S.D. Tex. 1969), aff’d, 440F.2d 1163 (5th Cir.
1971).

21
 Matter of McKee, 17 I. & N. Dec. 332, 333 (B.I.A. 1980).

22
 Lynn D. Wardle and Laurence C. Nolan, Family Law in the USA, (The Netherlands:
Kluwer Law International, 2011) p. 86.

23
 Abrams, Kerry. Marriage Fraud. 100 Cal. L. Rev. 1
(2012);http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2000956.

24
 Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, (Quezon City,
Philippines: Joer Printing Services, 2005), p. 4.

25
 Melencio S. Sta. Maria, Jr., Persons and Family Relations Law, (Quezon City,
Philippines: Rex Printing Company, Inc., 2010), Fifth Edition, p. 121.

26
 Arturo M. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the
Philippines, (Manila, Philippines: Central Book Supply, Inc., 2004), Volume I, p. 231.

27
 Arturo M. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the
Philippines, (Manila, Philippines: Central Book Supply, Inc., 2004), Volume I, p. 231; citing
McClurg v. Terry, 21 N.J. 225.

28
 Article 4, Family Code.

74
 29
 Bark v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 511 F.2d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir. 1975).

30
 Abrams, Kerry. Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage; 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1625
(2007);http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/01/Abrams_Final.pdf; citing McGuire v. McGuire , 59 N.W.2d 336,
337 (Neb. 1953). Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965).

31
 Article 4, Family Code.

32
 Const. ( 1987), Article XV, Section 2.

G.R. No. 201061               July 3, 2013

SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Petitioner,
vs.
BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR., Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 17 August 2011 Decision2 and the 14
March 2012 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.

The Antecedent Facts

On 15 March 2004, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin) filed a petition for declaration of a non-
existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 43 (trial court). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 04109401. Benjamin
alleged that on 10 September 1973, he married Azucena Alegre (Azucena) in Caloocan City.
They had three children, namely, Rizalyn, Emmamylin, and Benjamin III.

In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally GoBangayan (Sally) who was a
customer in the auto parts and supplies business owned by Benjamin’s family. In December
1981, Azucena left for the United States of America. In February 1982, Benjamin and Sally lived
together as husband and wife. Sally’s father was against the relationship. On 7 March 1982, in
order to appease her father, Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City where
they signed a purported marriage contract. Sally, knowing Benjamin’s marital status, assured him
that the marriage contract would not be registered.

Benjamin and Sally’s cohabitation produced two children, Bernice and Bentley. During the period
of their cohabitation, they acquired the following real properties:

(1) property under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 61722 registered in the names of
Benjamin and Sally as spouses;

(2) properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of Benjamin,
married to Sally;

(3) properties under Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) Nos. 8782 and 8783
registered in the name of Sally, married to Benjamin; and

(4) properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 registered in the name of Sally as a
single individual.

The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally left for Canada, bringing
Bernice and Bentley with her. She then filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public
documents against Benjamin, using their simulated marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in
turn, filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of

75
marriage before the trial court on the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it
lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage. Benjamin also asked the trial court for the
partition of the properties he acquired with Sally in accordance with Article 148 of the Family
Code, for his appointment as administrator of the properties during the pendency of the case, and
for the declaration of Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate children. A total of 44 registered
properties became the subject of the partition before the trial court. Aside from the seven
properties enumerated by Benjamin in his petition, Sally named 37 properties in her answer.

After Benjamin presented his evidence, Sally filed a demurrer to evidence which the trial court
denied. Sally filed a motion for reconsideration which the trial court also denied. Sally filed a
petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals and asked for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or injunction which the Court of Appeals never issued. Sally then refused to
present any evidence before the trial court citing the pendency of her petition before the Court of
Appeals. The trial court gave Sally several opportunities to present her evidence on 28 February
2008, 10 July 2008, 4 September 2008, 11 September 2008, 2 October 2008, 23 October 2008,
and 28 November 2008. Despite repeated warnings from the trial court, Sally still refused to
present her evidence, prompting the trial court to consider the case submitted for decision.

The Decision of the Trial Court

In a Decision4 dated 26 March 2009, the trial court ruled in favor ofBenjamin. The trial court gave
weight to the certification dated 21 July 2004 from the Pasig Local Civil Registrar, which was
confirmed during trial, that only Marriage License Series Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued
for the month of February 1982 and the purported Marriage License No. N-07568 was not issued
to Benjamin and Sally.5 The trial court ruled that the marriage was not recorded with the local civil
registrar and the National Statistics Office because it could not be registered due to Benjamin’s
subsisting marriage with Azucena.

The trial court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not bigamous. The trial
court ruled that the second marriage was void not because of the existence of the first marriage
but because of other causes, particularly, the lack of a marriage license. Hence, bigamy was not
committed in this case. The trial court did not rule on the issue of the legitimacy status of Bernice
and Bentley because they were not parties to the case. The trial court denied Sally’s claim for
spousal support because she was not married to Benjamin. The trial court likewise denied
support for Bernice and Bentley who were both of legal age and did not ask for support.

On the issue of partition, the trial court ruled that Sally could not claim the 37 properties she
named in her answer as part of her conjugal properties with Benjamin. The trial court ruled that
Sally was not legally married to Benjamin. Further, the 37 properties that Sally was claiming were
owned by Benjamin’s parents who gave the properties to their children, including Benjamin, as
advance inheritance. The 37 titles were in the names of Benjamin and his brothers and the
phrase "married to Sally Go" was merely descriptive of Benjamin’s civil status in the title. As
regards the two lots under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860, the trial court found that they were
bought by Benjamin using his own money and that Sally failed to prove any actual contribution of
money, property or industry in their purchase. The trial court found that Sally was a registered co-
owner of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 61722, N-193656, and 253681 as well as the two
condominium units under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783. However, the trial court ruled that the lot
under TCT No. 61722 and the two condominium units were purchased from the earnings of
Benjamin alone. The trial court ruled that the properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720, and
190860 and CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were part of the conjugal partnership of Benjamin and
Azucena, without prejudice to Benjamin’s right to dispute his conjugal state with Azucena in a
separate proceeding.

The trial court further ruled that Sally acted in bad faith because she knew that Benjamin was
married to Azucena. Applying Article 148 of the Family Code, the trial court forfeited Sally’s share
in the properties covered under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 in favor of Bernice and Bentley
while Benjamin’s share reverted to his conjugal ownership with Azucena.

The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads:

ACCORDINGLY, the marriage of BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR. and SALLY S. GO on March 7,

1982 at Santolan, Pasig, Metro Manila is hereby declared NULL and VOID AB INITIO. It is further
declared NONEXISTENT.

76
Respondent’s claim as co-owner or conjugal owner of the thirtyseven (37) properties under TCT
Nos. 17722, 17723, 17724, 17725, 126397, RT-73480, and RT-86821; in Manila, TCT Nos.
188949, 188950, 188951, 193035, 194620, 194621, 194622, 194623, 194624, 194625, 194626,
194627, 194628, 194629, 194630, 194631, 194632, 194633, 194634, 194635, 194636, 194637,
194638, 194639, 198651, 206209, 206210, 206211, 206213 and 206215 is DISMISSED for lack
of merit. The registered owners, namely: Benjamin B. Bangayan, Jr., Roberto E. Bangayan,
Ricardo B. Bangayan and Rodrigo B. Bangayan are the owners to the exclusion of "Sally Go"
Consequently, the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City and Manila are directed to delete the words
"married to Sally Go" from these thirty-seven (37) titles.

Properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720 and 190860, CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 are properties
acquired from petitioner’s money without contribution from respondent, hence, these are
properties of the petitioner and his lawful wife. Consequently, petitioner is appointed the
administrator of these five (5) properties. Respondent is ordered to submit an accounting of her
collections of income from these five (5) properties within thirty (30) days from notice hereof.
Except for lot under TCT No. 61722, respondent is further directed within thirty (30) days from
notice hereof to turn over and surrender control and possession of these properties including the
documents of title to the petitioner.

On the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and N-253681, these properties are under co-
ownership of the parties shared by them equally. However, the share of respondent is declared
FORFEITED in favor of Bernice Go Bangayan and Bentley Go Bangayan. The share of the
petitioner shall belong to his conjugal ownership with Azucena Alegre. The liquidation, partition
and distribution of these two (2) properties shall be further processed pursuant to Section 21 of
A.M. No. 02-11-10 of March 15, 2003.

Other properties shall be adjudicated in a later proceeding pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-
11-10.

Respondent’s claim of spousal support, children support and counterclaims are DISMISSED for
lack of merit. Further, no declaration of the status of the parties’ children.

No other relief granted.

Furnish copy of this decision to the parties, their counsels, the Trial Prosecutor, the Solicitor
General and the Registry of Deeds in Manila, Quezon City and Caloocan.

SO ORDERED.6

Sally filed a Verified and Vigorous Motion for Inhibition with Motion for Reconsideration. In its
Order dated 27 August 2009,7 the trial court denied the motion. Sally appealed the trial court’s
decision before the Court of Appeals.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

In its 17 August 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals partly granted the appeal. The Court of
Appeals ruled that the trial court did not err in submitting the case for decision. The Court of
Appeals noted that there were six resettings of the case, all made at the instance of Sally, for the
initial reception of evidence, and Sally was duly warned to present her evidence on the next
hearing or the case would be deemed submitted for decision. However, despite the warning,
Sally still failed to present her evidence. She insisted on presenting Benjamin who was not
around and was not subpoenaed despite the presence of her other witnesses.

The Court of Appeals rejected Sally’s allegation that Benjamin failed to prove his action for
declaration of nullity of marriage. The Court of Appeals ruled that Benjamin’s action was based on
his prior marriage to Azucena and there was no evidence that the marriage was annulled or
dissolved before Benjamin contracted the second marriage with Sally. The Court of Appeals ruled
that the trial court committed no error in declaring Benjamin’s marriage to Sally null and void.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally was governed by
Article 148 of the Family Code. The Court of Appeals ruled that only the properties acquired by
the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by

77
them in common in proportion to their respective contribution. The Court of Appeals ruled that the
37 properties being claimed by Sally rightfully belong to Benjamin and his siblings.

As regards the seven properties claimed by both parties, the Court of Appeals ruled that only the
properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of Benjamin belong to him
exclusively because he was able to establish that they were acquired by him solely. The Court of

Appeals found that the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 and under CCT Nos.
8782 and 8783 were exclusive properties of Sally in the absence of proof of Benjamin’s actual
contribution in their purchase. The Court of Appeals ruled that the property under TCT No. 61722
registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally shall be owned by them in common, to be shared
equally. However, the share of Benjamin shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under his
existing marriage with Azucena while Sally’s share shall accrue to her in the absence of a clear
and convincing proof of bad faith.

Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that Sally failed to present clear and convincing evidence that
would show bias and prejudice on the part of the trial judge that would justify his inhibition from
the case.

The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed
Decision and Order dated March 26, 2009 and August 27, 2009, respectively, of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43, in Civil Case No. 04-109401 are hereby AFFIRMED with
modification declaring TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 to be exclusively owned by the petitioner-
appellee while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 as well as CCT Nos. 8782
and 8783 shall be solely owned by the respondent-appellant. On the other hand, TCT No. 61722
shall be owned by them and common and to be shared equally but the share of the petitioner-
appellee shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under his first marriage while the share of
respondent-appellant shall accrue to her. The rest of the decision stands.

SO ORDERED.8

Sally moved for the reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’ decision. In its 14 March 2012
Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied her motion.

Hence, the petition before this Court.

The Issues

Sally raised the following issues before this Court:

(1) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial court’s
ruling that Sally had waived her right to present evidence;

(2) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial court’s
decision declaring the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and
non-existent; and

(3) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming with
modification the trial court’s decision regarding the property relations of Benjamin and
Sally.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition has no merit.

Waiver of Right to Present Evidence

Sally alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s ruling that she waived her
right to present her evidence. Sally alleges that in not allowing her to present evidence that she

78
and Benjamin were married, the trial court abandoned its duty to protect marriage as an inviolable
institution.

It is well-settled that a grant of a motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right
but is addressed to the discretion of the trial court.9 In this case, Sally’s presentation of evidence
was scheduled on28 February 2008. Thereafter, there were six resettings of the case: on 10 July
2008, 4 and 11 September 2008, 2 and 28 October 2008, and 28 November 2008. They were all
made at Sally’s instance. Before the scheduled hearing of 28 November 2008, the trial court
warned Sally that in case she still failed to present her evidence, the case would be submitted for
decision. On the date of the scheduled hearing, despite the presence of other available
witnesses, Sally insisted on presenting Benjamin who was not even subpoenaed on that day.
Sally’s counsel insisted that the trial court could not dictate on the priority of witnesses to be
presented, disregarding the trial court’s prior warning due to the numerous resettings of the case.
Sally could not complain that she had been deprived of her right to present her evidence because
all the postponements were at her instance and she was warned by the trial court that it would
submit the case for decision should she still fail to present her evidence on 28 November 2008.

We agree with the trial court that by her continued refusal to present her evidence, she was
deemed to have waived her right to present them. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals, Sally’s
continued failure to present her evidence despite the opportunities given by the trial court showed
her lack of interest to proceed with the case. Further, it was clear that Sally was delaying the case
because she was waiting for the decision of the Court of Appeals on her petition questioning the
trial court’s denial of her demurrer to evidence, despite the fact that the Court of Appeals did not
issue any temporary restraining order as Sally prayed for. Sally could not accuse the trial court of
failing to protect marriage as an inviolable institution because the trial court also has the duty to
ensure that trial proceeds despite the deliberate delay and refusal to proceed by one of the
parties.10

Validity of the Marriage between Benjamin and Sally

Sally alleges that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals recognized her marriage to
Benjamin because a marriage could not be nonexistent and, at the same time, null and void ab
initio. Sally further alleges that if she were allowed to present her evidence, she would have
proven her marriage to Benjamin. To prove her marriage to Benjamin, Sally asked this Court to
consider that in acquiring real properties, Benjamin listed her as his wife by declaring he was
"married to" her; that Benjamin was the informant in their children’s birth certificates where he
stated that he was their father; and that Benjamin introduced her to his family and friends as his
wife. In contrast, Sally claims that there was no real property registered in the names of Benjamin
and Azucena. Sally further alleges that Benjamin was not the informant in the birth certificates of
his children with Azucena.

First, Benjamin’s marriage to Azucena on 10 September 1973 was duly established before the
trial court, evidenced by a certified true copy of their marriage contract. At the time Benjamin and
Sally entered into a purported marriage on 7 March 1982, the marriage between Benjamin and
Azucena was valid and subsisting.

On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally, Teresita Oliveros (Oliveros), Registration
Officer II of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City, testified that there was no valid marriage
license issued to Benjamin and Sally. Oliveros confirmed that only Marriage Licence Nos.
6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month of February 1982. Marriage License No. N-07568
did not match the series issued for the month. Oliveros further testified that the local civil registrar
of Pasig City did not issue Marriage License No. N-07568 to Benjamin and Sally. The certification
from the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license and
absent any suspicious circumstance, the certification enjoys probative value, being issued by the
officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage
license.11 Clearly, if indeed Benjamin and Sally entered into a marriage contract, the marriage
was void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license.12

It was also established before the trial court that the purported marriage between Benjamin and
Sally was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. The lack of
record was certified by Julieta B. Javier, Registration Officer IV of the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of the Municipality of Pasig;13 Teresita R. Ignacio, Chief of the Archives Division of the
Records Management and Archives Office, National Commission for Culture and the Arts;14 and

79
Lourdes J. Hufana, Director III, Civil Registration Department of the National Statistics
Office.15 The documentary and testimonial evidence proved that there was no marriage between
Benjamin and Sally. As pointed out by the trial court, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally
"was made only in jest"16 and "a simulated marriage, at the instance of Sally, intended to cover
her up from expected social humiliation coming from relatives, friends and the society especially
from her parents seen as Chinese conservatives."17 In short, it was a fictitious marriage.

The fact that Benjamin was the informant in the birth certificates of Bernice and Bentley was not a
proof of the marriage between Benjamin and Sally. This Court notes that Benjamin was the
informant in Bernice’s birth certificate which stated that Benjamin and Sally were married on 8
March 198218 while Sally was the informant in Bentley’s birth certificate which also stated that
Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March 1982.19 Benjamin and Sally were supposedly
married on 7 March 1982 which did not match the dates reflected on the birth certificates.

We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab
initio and, at the same time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage
solemnized without a license, except those covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary,
"shall be void from the beginning." In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was
solemnized without a license. It was duly established that no marriage license was issued to them
and that Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license numbers issued by
the local civil registrar of Pasig City for the month of February 1982. The case clearly falls under
Section 3 of Article 3520 which made their marriage void ab initio. The marriage between
Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the general rules on void or inexistent
contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely simulated or
fictitious are "inexistent and void from the beginning."21 Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in
sustaining the trial court’s ruling that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was null and void
ab initio and non-existent.

Except for the modification in the distribution of properties, the Court of Appeals affirmed in all
aspects the trial court’s decision and ruled that "the rest of the decision stands."22 While the Court
of Appeals did notdiscuss bigamous marriages, it can be gleaned from the dispositive portion of
the decision declaring that "the rest of the decision stands" that the Court of Appeals adopted the
trial court’s discussion that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally is not
bigamous.1âwphi1 The trial court stated:

On whether or not the parties’ marriage is bigamous under the concept of Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code, the marriage is not bigamous. It is required that the first or former marriage
shall not be null and void. The marriage of the petitioner to Azucena shall be assumed as the one
that is valid, there being no evidence to the contrary and there is no trace of invalidity or
irregularity on the face of their marriage contract. However, if the second marriage was void not
because of the existence of the first marriage but for other causes such as lack of license, the
crime of bigamy was not committed. In People v. De Lara [CA, 51 O.G., 4079], it was held that
what was committed was contracting marriage against the provisions of laws not under Article
349 but Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code. Concluding, the marriage of the parties is
therefore not bigamous because there was no marriage license. The daring and repeated stand
of respondent that she is legally married to petitioner cannot, in any instance, be sustained.
Assuming that her marriage to petitioner has the marriage license, yet the same would be
bigamous, civilly or criminally as it would be invalidated by a prior existing valid marriage of
petitioner and Azucena.23

For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for
validity except for the existence of a prior marriage.24 In this case, there was really no subsequent
marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a purported marriage contract without a marriage
license. The supposed marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National
Statistics Office. In short, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived
together and represented themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.

Property Relations Between Benjamin and Sally

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally is governed
by Article 148 of the Family Code which states:

80
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the
absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to
be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of
credit.

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue
to the absolute community of conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who
acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the
manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.

Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties
acquired by them through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be
owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Thus, both the trial
court and the Court of Appeals correctly excluded the 37 properties being claimed by Sally which
were given by Benjamin’s father to his children as advance inheritance. Sally’s Answer to the
petition before the trial court even admitted that "Benjamin’s late father himself conveyed a
number of properties to his children and their respective spouses which included Sally x x x."25

As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the decision of the Court of Appeals is
more in accord with the evidence on record. Only the property covered by TCT No. 61722 was
registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses.26 The properties under TCT Nos.
61720 and 190860 were in the name of Benjamin27 with the descriptive title "married to Sally."
The property covered by CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were registered in the name of Sally28 with the
descriptive title "married to Benjamin" while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681
were registered in the name of Sally as a single individual. We have ruled that the words "married
to" preceding the name of a spouse are merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered
owner.29 Such words do not prove co-ownership. Without proof of actual contribution from either
or both spouses, there can be no co-ownership under Article 148 of the Family Code.30

Inhibition of the Trial Judge

Sally questions the refusal of Judge Roy G. Gironella (Judge Gironella) to inhibit himself from
hearing the case. She cited the failure of Judge Gironella to accommodate her in presenting her
evidence. She further alleged that Judge Gironella practically labeled her as an opportunist in his
decision, showing his partiality against her and in favor of Benjamin.

We have ruled that the issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound
discretion on the part of the judge.31 To justify the call for inhibition, there must be extrinsic
evidence to establish bias, bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error
which may be inferred from the decision or order itself.32 In this case, we have sufficiently
explained that Judge Gironella did not err in submitting the case for decision because of Sally’s
continued refusal to present her evidence.

We reviewed the decision of the trial court and while Judge Gironella may have used
uncomplimentary words in writing the decision, they are not enough to prove his prejudice against
Sally or show that he acted in bad faith in deciding the case that would justify the call for his
voluntary inhibition.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 17 August 2011 Decision and the 14 March 2012 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

81
 ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN* MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation,
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Designated additional member per Raffle dated 8 October 2012.

1
 Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

2
 Rollo, pp. 29-40. Penned by Associate Justice (now Supreme Court Associate Justice)
Estela M. PerlasBernabe with Associate Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes (now also a
Supreme Court Associate Justice) and Samuel H. Gaerlan, concurring.

3
 Id. at 52. Penned by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan with Associate Justices
Amelita G. Tolentino and Ramon R. Garcia, concurring.

4
 Id. at 107-123. Penned by Presiding Judge Roy G. Gironella.

5
 Records, Vol. 2, p. 461.

6
 Id. at 122-123.

7
 Id. at 124-128.

8
 Id. at 40.

9
 See Bautista v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157219, 28 May 2004, 430 SCRA 353.

10
 Id.

11
 Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño, 403 Phil. 861 (2001).

12
 Article 35 of the Family Code states:

82
 Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with
the consent of parents or guardians;

(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform

marriages unless such marriages were contracted with either or both
parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal
authority to do so;

(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the

preceding Chapter;

(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 41;

(5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the

identity of the other; and

(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.

13
 Records, Vol. 2, p. 458.

14
 Id. at 459.

15
 Id. at 460.

16
 Rollo, p. 112.

17
 Id.

18
 Records, Vol. 1, p. 65.

19
 Id. at 66.

20
 Supra note 12.

21
 Article 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning:

xxxx

(2) Those which are absolutely simulated or fictitious;

xxxx

22
 Rollo, p. 40.

23
 Id. at 112-113.

24
 See Nollora, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 191425, 7 September 2011, 657 SCRA 330.

25
 Records, Vol. 1, p. 50.

26
 Id. at 23.

27
 Id. at 24-26.

28
 Id. at 27-28.

29
 Acre v. Yuttikki, 560 Phil. 495 (2007).

83
 30
 Id.

31
 Kilosbayan Foundation v. Janolo, Jr., G.R. No. 180543, 27 July 2010, 625 SCRA 684.

32
 Ramiscal, Jr. v. Hernandez, G.R. Nos. 173057-74, 27 September 2010, 631 SCRA
312.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 183896 : January 30, 2013

SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner, v. GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, questioning the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 11,
2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760, which reversed the Decision2 in Civil Case No. 03-
0382-CFM dated October 5, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 109,
Pasay City, and the CA Resolution dated July 24, 2008, denying petitioner's Motion
for Reconsideration of the CA Decision.

The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed)
for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria) with the
RTC of Pasay City, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM, and raffled to RTC
Branch 109. Syed alleged the absence of a marriage license, as provided for in
Article 4, Chapter I, Title 1 of Executive Order No. 269, otherwise known as the
Family Code of the Philippines, as a ground for the annulment of his marriage to
Gloria.

In the Marriage Contract3 of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage License No.
9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993, was presented to the
solemnizing officer. It is this information that is crucial to the resolution of this case.

At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino
citizen, in Taiwan in 1991, and they were married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei
Mosque in Taiwan.4 He arrived in the Philippines in December of 1992. On January 9,
1993, at around 5 oclock in the afternoon, he was at his mother-in-laws residence,
located at 2676 F. Muñoz St., Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-law arrived with
two men. He testified that he was told that he was going to undergo some
ceremony, one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of
the nature of said ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document.
He claimed that he did not know that the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told
him later. He further testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a
marriage license, and that he had never resided in that area. In July of 2003, he
went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on their
marriage license, and was asked to show a copy of their marriage contract wherein
the marriage license number could be found.5 The Municipal Civil Registrar,
Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that
the marriage license number appearing in the marriage contract he submitted,
Marriage License No. 9969967, was the number of another marriage license issued
to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.6 Said certification reads as
follows:cralawlibrary

11 July 2003

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:cralawlibrary

84
This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License filed in this office,
Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued in favor of MR. ARLINDO GETALADO and
MISS MYRA MABILANGAN on January 19, 1993. ???ñr?bl?š ??r†??l l?? l?br?rÿ

No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. SYED AZHAR ABBAS
and MISS GLORIA F. GOO on January 8, 1993.

This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for whatever legal purpose
or intents it may serve.7?r?l1

On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy cases against him
in 2001 and 2002, and that he had gone to the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite to get certification on whether or not there was a marriage license on advice
of his counsel.8?r?l1

Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of the Municipal

Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic appeared under a letter of authority from
the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, and brought documents pertaining
to Marriage License No. 9969967, which was issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra
Mabilangan on January 20, 1993.9?r?l1

Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for marriage licenses and that
the numbers are issued chronologically.10 He testified that the certification dated July
11, 2003, was issued and signed by Leodivina Encarnacion, Registrar of the
Municipality of Carmona, Cavite, certifying that Marriage License No. 9969967 was
issued for Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 19, 1993, and that their
office had not issued any other license of the same serial number, namely 9969967,
to any other person.11?r?l1

For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented Reverend Mario Dauz,
Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and May Ann Ceriola.

Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of the Gospel and
a barangay captain, and that he is authorized to solemnize marriages within the
Philippines.12 He testified that he solemnized the marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas and
Gloria Goo at the residence of the bride on January 9, 1993.13 He stated that the
witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and Mary Ann Ceriola.14 He
testified that he had been solemnizing marriages since 1982, and that he is familiar
with the requirements.15 Rev. Dauz further testified that Atty. Sanchez gave him the
marriage license the day before the actual wedding, and that the marriage contract
was prepared by his secretary.16 After the solemnization of the marriage, it was
registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and Rev. Dauz submitted the
marriage contract and copy of the marriage license with that office.17?r?l1

Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the wedding of Syed
Abbas and Gloria Goo by the mother of the bride, Felicitas Goo.18 He testified that he
requested a certain Qualin to secure the marriage license for the couple, and that
this Qualin secured the license and gave the same to him on January 8, 1993.19 He
further testified that he did not know where the marriage license was obtained.20 He
attended the wedding ceremony on January 9, 1993, signed the marriage contract as
sponsor, and witnessed the signing of the marriage contract by the couple, the
solemnizing officer and the other witness, Mary Ann Ceriola.21?r?l1

Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed Azhar Abbas is her
son-in-law, and that she was present at the wedding ceremony held on January 9,
1993 at her house.22 She testified that she sought the help of Atty. Sanchez at the
Manila City Hall in securing the marriage license, and that a week before the
marriage was to take place, a male person went to their house with the application
for marriage license.23 Three days later, the same person went back to their house,
showed her the marriage license before returning it to Atty. Sanchez who then gave

85
it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer.24 She further testified that she did not read
all of the contents of the marriage license, and that she was told that the marriage
license was obtained from Carmona.25 She also testified that a bigamy case had been
filed by Gloria against Syed at the Regional Trial Court of Manila, evidenced by an
information for Bigamy dated January 10, 2003, pending before Branch 47 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila.26?r?l1

As to Mary Ann Ceriolas testimony, the counsels for both parties stipulated that: (a)
she is one of the sponsors at the wedding of Gloria Goo and Syed Abbas on January
9, 1993; (b) she was seen in the wedding photos and she could identify all the
persons depicted in said photos; and (c) her testimony corroborates that of Felicitas
Goo and Atty. Sanchez.

The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and presented the
marriage contract bearing their signatures as proof.27 She and her mother sought the
help of Atty. Sanchez in securing a marriage license, and asked him to be one of the
sponsors. A certain Qualin went to their house and said that he will get the marriage
license for them, and after several days returned with an application for marriage
license for them to sign, which she and Syed did. After Qualin returned with the
marriage license, they gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz,
the solemnizing officer. Gloria testified that she and Syed were married on January
9, 1993 at their residence.28?r?l1

Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on June 15, 1993.29?
r?l1

Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had married a
certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura during the existence of the previous marriage,
and that the case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 02A-03408, with the RTC of
Manila.30?r?l1

Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August 9, 1992 in
Taiwan, but that she did not know if said marriage had been celebrated under
Muslim rites, because the one who celebrated their marriage was Chinese, and those
around them at the time were Chinese.31?r?l1

The Ruling of the RTC

In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid marriage
license was issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of
Gloria and Syed, as Marriage License No. 9969967 had been issued to Arlindo
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan, and the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite
had certified that no marriage license had been issued for Gloria and Syed.32 It also
took into account the fact that neither party was a resident of Carmona, Cavite, the
place where Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued, in violation of Article 9 of the
Family Code.33 As the marriage was not one of those exempt from the license
requirement, and that the lack of a valid marriage license is an absence of a formal
requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed on January 9, 1993 was void ab initio.

The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:cralawlibrary

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner, and against the
respondent declaring as follows:cralawlibrary

1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and
respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas is hereby annulled;

86
2. Terminating the community of property relations between the petitioner and the
respondent even if no property was acquired during their cohabitation by reason of
the nullity of the marriage of the parties.

3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar General, National
Statistics Office, are hereby ordered to cancel from their respective civil registries
the marriage contracted by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-
Abbas on January 9, 1993 in Manila. ???ñr?bl?š ??r†??l l?? l?br?rÿ

SO ORDERED.34?r?l1

Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005, but the RTC
denied the same, prompting her to appeal the questioned decision to the Court of
Appeals.

The Ruling of the CA

In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following assignment of

errors:cralawlibrary

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE

PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT AS NULL AND VOID DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF A
MARRIAGE LICENSE DESPITE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING THAT THERE WAS ONE.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS A REQUISITE OF A VALID

MARRIAGE, THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A MARRIAGE
CEREMONY TOOK PLACE WITH THE APPEARANCE OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES
BEFORE THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND THEIR PERSONAL DECLARATION THAT
THEY TOOK EACH OTHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE IN THE PRESENCE OF NOT LESS
THAN TWO WITNESSES OF LEGAL AGE.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE ISSUE OF ESTOPPEL BY LACHES
ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER, AN ISSUE TIMELY RAISED IN THE COURT
BELOW.35?r?l1 ???ñr?bl?š ??r†??l l?? l?br?rÿ

The CA gave credence to Glorias arguments, and granted her appeal. It held that the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent
search for the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held that
said certification could not be accorded probative value.36 The CA ruled that there
was sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed had been
validly married and that there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by
law.37?r?l1

It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the marriage
contract. The CA also considered that the parties had comported themselves as
husband and wife, and that Syed only instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a
case against him for bigamy.38?r?l1

The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:cralawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 05

October 2005 and Order dated 27 January 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City, Branch 109, in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and

87
the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is DISMISSED. The marriage
between Shed [sic] Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo Abbas contracted on 09 January
1993 remains valid and subsisting. No costs.

SO ORDERED.39?r?l1

Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 200840 but the same was
denied by the CA in a Resolution dated July 24, 2008.41?r?l1

Hence, this petition.

Grounds in Support of Petition

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN

CITING REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AS THE SAME IS DIAMETRICALLY
INCONSISTENT AND CONTRARY TO THE COURTS OWN FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING AND SETTING

ASIDE, WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS, THE DECISION OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY
OF MARRIAGE.42?r?l1

The Ruling of this Court

The petition is meritorious.

As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993, Executive
Order No. 209, or the Family Code of the Philippines, is the applicable law. The
pertinent provisions that would apply to this particular case are Articles 3, 4 and
35(3), which read as follows:cralawlibrary

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:cralawlibrary

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this
Title; and

(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting
parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take
each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of
legal age. ???ñr?bl?š ??r†??l l?? l?br?rÿ

Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the
marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as
provided in Article 45.

An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but
the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable.

Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:cralawlibrary

88
 xxx

(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding
Chapter.

There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the Family Code, nor
with the formal requisites of the authority of the solemnizing officer and the conduct
of the marriage ceremony. Nor is the marriage one that is exempt from the
requirement of a valid marriage license under Chapter 2, Title I of the Family Code.
The resolution of this case, thus, hinges on whether or not a valid marriage license
had been issued for the couple. The RTC held that no valid marriage license had
been issued. The CA held that there was a valid marriage license.

We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.

Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof,
and relied on the marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to
prove the existence of said license. To prove that no such license was issued, Syed
turned to the office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had
allegedly issued said license. It was there that he requested certification that no such
license was issued. In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals43 such certification
was allowed, as permitted by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which
reads:cralawlibrary

SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an officer having the
custody of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or
entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied
by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his
office contain no such record or entry.

In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil Registrar of Pasig to
prove the non-issuance of a marriage license, the Court held:cralawlibrary

The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify that despite
diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular
entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public
documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of
maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all applications for
marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage
license was issued and such other relevant data.44?r?l1

The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed
probative value, as his duty was to maintain records of data relative to the issuance
of a marriage license.

The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of
Gloria and Syed was allegedly issued, issued a certification to the effect that no such
marriage license for Gloria and Syed was issued, and that the serial number of the
marriage license pertained to another couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.
A certified machine copy of Marriage License No. 9969967 was presented, which was
issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do not appear
in the document.

In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the certification, stating that
it did not comply with Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.

The CA deduced that from the absence of the words "despite diligent search" in the
certification, and since the certification used stated that no marriage license appears

89
to have been issued, no diligent search had been conducted and thus the certification
could not be given probative value.

To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals.45 It is
worth noting that in that particular case, the Court, in sustaining the finding of the
lower court that a marriage license was lacking, relied on the Certification issued by
the Civil Registrar of Pasig, which merely stated that the alleged marriage license
could not be located as the same did not appear in their records. Nowhere in the
Certification was it categorically stated that the officer involved conducted a diligent
search, nor is a categorical declaration absolutely necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court to apply.

Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that
an official duty has been regularly performed, absent contradiction or other evidence
to the contrary. We held, "The presumption of regularity of official acts may be
rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty."46 No
such affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in
performing her duty of checking the records of their office, thus the presumption
must stand. In fact, proof does exist of a diligent search having been conducted, as
Marriage License No. 996967 was indeed located and submitted to the court. The
fact that the names in said license do not correspond to those of Gloria and Syed
does not overturn the presumption that the registrar conducted a diligent search of
the records of her office.

It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to
the court. She failed to explain why the marriage license was secured in Carmona,
Cavite, a location where, admittedly, neither party resided. She took no pains to
apply for the license, so she is not the best witness to testify to the validity and
existence of said license. Neither could the other witnesses she presented prove the
existence of the marriage license, as none of them applied for the license in
Carmona, Cavite. Her mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the contents
of the license, having admitted to not reading all of its contents. Atty. Sanchez, one
of the sponsors, whom Gloria and Felicitas Goo approached for assistance in securing
the license, admitted not knowing where the license came from. The task of applying
for the license was delegated to a certain Qualin, who could have testified as to how
the license was secured and thus impeached the certification of the Municipal Civil
Registrar as well as the testimony of her representative. As Gloria failed to present
this Qualin, the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys probative
value.

It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage contract and a
copy of the marriage license were submitted to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.
Thus, a copy of the marriage license could have simply been secured from that office
and submitted to the court. However, Gloria inexplicably failed to do so, further
weakening her claim that there was a valid marriage license issued for her and Syed.

In the case of Cariño v. Cariño,47 following the case of Republic,48 it was held that the
certification of the Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage
license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license. The case of Cariño
further held that the presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been
overcome, and that it became the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to
prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required marriage license had been
secured.49 Gloria has failed to discharge that burden, and the only conclusion that
can be reached is that no valid marriage license was issued. It cannot be said that
there was a simple irregularity in the marriage license that would not affect the
validity of the marriage, as no license was presented by the respondent. No marriage
license was proven to have been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on the certification
of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and Glorias failure to produce a
copy of the alleged marriage license.

90
To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its conclusion that Gloria
and Syed were validly married. To quote the CA:cralawlibrary

Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and documentary, that
appellant and appellee have been validly married and there was compliance with all
the requisites laid down by law. Both parties are legally capacitated to marry. A
certificate of legal capacity was even issued by the Embassy of Pakistan in favor of
appellee. The parties herein gave their consent freely. Appellee admitted that the
signature above his name in the marriage contract was his. Several pictures were
presented showing appellant and appellee, before the solemnizing officer, the
witnesses and other members of appellants family, taken during the marriage
ceremony, as well as in the restaurant where the lunch was held after the marriage
ceremony. Most telling of all is Exhibit "5-C" which shows appellee signing the
Marriage Contract.

xxx

The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and has [sic] one
offspring, Aliea Fatima Goo Abbas, who was born on 15 June 1993. It took appellee
more than ten (10) years before he filed on 01 August 2003 his Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 4 of the Family Code. We take serious
note that said Petition appears to have been instituted by him only after an
Information for Bigamy (Exhibit "1") dated 10 January 2003 was filed against him for
contracting a second or subsequent marriage with one Ma. Corazon (Maryam) T.
Buenaventura. We are not ready to reward (appellee) by declaring the nullity of his
marriage and give him his freedom and in the process allow him to profit from his
own deceit and perfidy.50?r?l1

All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted
and a marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid
marriage license. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, "The absence of
any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio,
except as stated in Article 35(2)." Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that
a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except those
exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of
the same Code.51 Again, this marriage cannot be characterized as among the
exemptions, and thus, having been solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab
initio.

As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be
that his motives are less than pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as
it may, the same does not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove that
they had a valid marriage license, given the weight of evidence presented by
petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage license cannot be attributed to him, as it was
Gloria who took steps to procure the same. The law must be applied. As the
marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and
Syed is void ab initio.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed
Decision dated March 11, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City dated October 5, 2005
in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM annulling the marriage of petitioner with respondent
on January 9, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

91
Endnotes:

1
 Penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo and concurred in by Associate
Justices Regalado E. Maambong and Myrna Dimaranan Vidal.

2
 Penned by Judge Tingaraan U. Guiling.

3
 Rollo, p. 13.

4
 Id. at 47.

5
 Id.

6
 Id. at 12.

7
 Id. at 10.

8
 Id. at 48.

9
 Id. at 49, "January 19, 1993" in some parts of the records.

10
 Id.

11
 Id. at 49-50.

12
 Id. at 50.

13
 Id.

14
 Id.

15
 Id.

16
 Id. at 51.

17
 Id.

18
 Id.

19
 Id.

20
 Id. at 52.

21
 Id.

22
 Id. at 53.

23
 Id. at 54.

24
 Id.

25
 Id.

92
26
 Id.

27
 Id. at 55.

28
 Id.

29
 Id. at 56.

30
 Id. at 57.

31
 Id.

32
 Id. at 58.

33
 Article 9. A Marriage License shall be issued by the Local Civil Registrar of the city
or municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, except in marriages
where no license is required in accordance with Chapter 2 of this Title.

34
 Rollo, pp. 58-59.

35
 Id. at 122.

36
 Id. at 128.

37
 Id. at 129.

38
 Id. at 130.

39
 Id. at 131.

40
 Id. at 135-146.

41
 Id. at 173-174.

42
 Id. at 31.

43
 G.R. No. 103047, September 2, 1994, 236 SCRA 257.

44
 Id. at 262.

45
 Supra note 43.

46
 Alcantara v. Alcantara, G.R. No. 167746. August 28, 2007, 531 SCRA 446, 456.

47
 403 Phil. 861, 869 (2001).

48
 Supra note 43.

49
 Supra note 47, at 870.

50
 Rollo, pp. 129-130.

51
 Art. 27. In case either or both of the contracting parties are at the point of death,
the marriage may be solemnized without necessity of a marriage license and shall
remain valid even if the ailing party subsequently survives.

93
Art. 28. If the residence of either party is so located that there is no means of
transportation to enable such party to appear personally before the local civil
registrar, the marriage may be solemnized without necessity of a marriage license.

Art. 29. In the cases provided for in the two preceding articles, the solemnizing
officer shall state in an affidavit executed before the local civil registrar or any other
person legally authorized to administer oaths that the marriage was performed in
articulo mortis or that the residence of either party, specifying the barrio or
barangay, is so located that there is no means of transportation to enable such party
to appear personally before the local civil registrar and that the officer took the
necessary steps to ascertain the ages and relationship of the contracting parties and
the absence of legal impediment to the marriage.

Art. 30. The original of the affidavit required in the last preceding article, together
with a legible copy of the marriage contract, shall be sent by the person solemnizing
the marriage to the local civil registrar of the municipality where it was performed
within the period of thirty days after the performance of the marriage.

Art. 31. A marriage in articulo mortis between passengers or crew members may
also be solemnized by a ship captain or by an airplane pilot not only while the ship is
at sea or the plane is in flight, but also during stopovers at ports of call.

Art. 32. A military commander of a unit, who is a commissioned officer, shall likewise
have authority to solemnize marriages in articulo mortis between persons within the
zone of military operation, whether members of the armed forces or civilians.

Art. 33. Marriage among Muslims or among members of the ethnic cultural
communities may be performed validly without the necessity of marriage licenses,
provided they arc solemnized in accordance with their customs, rites or practices.

Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who
have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal
impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing
facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The
solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications
of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage.

G.R. No. 141528             October 31, 2006

OSCAR P. MALLION, petitioner,
vs.
EDITHA ALCANTARA, respondent.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising a question of
law: Does a previous final judgment denying a petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of
psychological incapacity bar a subsequent petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of lack
of marriage license?

The facts are not disputed:

94
On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar P. Mallion filed a petition1 with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 29, of San Pablo City seeking a declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent
Editha Alcantara under Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209, as amended, otherwise known as
the Family Code, citing respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity. The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. SP 4341-95. After trial on the merits, the RTC denied the petition in a
decision2 dated November 11, 1997 upon the finding that petitioner "failed to adduce
preponderant evidence to warrant the grant of the relief he is seeking."3 The appeal filed with the
Court of Appeals was likewise dismissed in a resolution4 dated June 11, 1998 for failure of
petitioner to pay the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period.

After the decision in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95 attained finality, petitioner filed on July 12, 1999
another petition5 for declaration of nullity of marriage with the RTC of San Pablo City, this time
alleging that his marriage with respondent was null and void due to the fact that it was celebrated
without a valid marriage license. For her part, respondent filed an answer with a motion to
dismiss6 dated August 13, 1999, praying for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of res
judicata and forum shopping.

In an order7 dated October 8, 1999, the RTC granted respondent’s motion to dismiss, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, for Forum Shopping and Multiplicity of Suits, the Motion to Dismiss is
GRANTED. This case is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.8

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was also denied in an order9 dated January 21, 2000.

Hence, this petition which alleges, as follows:

A. IN DISMISSING PETITIONER’S PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION OF HIS

MARRIAGE AS NULL AND VOID AB INITIO FOR LACK OF THE REQUISITE
MARRIAGE LICENSE BECAUSE OF (THE) DISMISSAL OF AN EARLIER PETITION
FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF THE SAME MARRIAGE ON THE GROUND OF
HIS WIFE’S PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY
CODE, THE TRIAL COURT HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE WHICH
HAS PROBABLY NOT HERETOFORE BEEN DETERMINED SQUARELY AND
DEFINITIVELY BY THIS COURT, OR HAD DECIDED IT IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD
WITH LAW.

B. IN DISMISSING PETITIONER’S PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION OF NULLITY

OF HIS MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF THE REQUISITE MARRIAGE LICENSE, THE TRIAL
COURT HAD CONFUSED, DISTORTED AND MISAPPLIED THE FUNDAMENTAL
RULES AND CONCEPTS ON RES JUDICATA, SPLITTING OF A CAUSE OF ACTION
AND FORUM SHOPPING.10

Petitioner argues that while the relief prayed for in the two cases was the same, that is, the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent, the cause of action in the earlier case was
distinct and separate from the cause of action in the present case because the operative facts
upon which they were based as well as the evidence required to sustain either were different.
Because there is no identity as to the cause of action, petitioner claims that res judicata does not
lie to bar the second petition. In this connection, petitioner maintains that there was no violation of
the rule on forum shopping or of the rule which proscribes the splitting of a cause of action.

On the other hand, respondent, in her comment dated May 26, 2000, counters that while the
present suit is anchored on a different ground, it still involves the same issue raised in Civil Case
No. SP 4341-95, that is, the validity of petitioner and respondent’s marriage, and prays for the
same remedy, that is, the declaration of nullity of their marriage. Respondent thus contends that
petitioner violated the rule on forum shopping. Moreover, respondent asserts that petitioner
violated the rule on multiplicity of suits as the ground he cites in this petition could have been
raised during the trial in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95.

The petition lacks merit.

95
The issue before this Court is one of first impression. Should the matter of the invalidity of a
marriage due to the absence of an essential requisite prescribed by Article 4 of the Family Code
be raised in the same proceeding where the marriage is being impugned on the ground of a
party’s psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code?

Petitioner insists that because the action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity and the action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
absence of marriage license constitute separate causes of action, the present case would not fall
under the prohibition against splitting a single cause of action nor would it be barred by the
principle of res judicata.

The contention is untenable.

Res judicata is defined as "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or
matter settled by judgment. It also refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits
by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all
later suits on points and matters determined in the former suit."11

This doctrine is a rule which pervades every well-regulated system of jurisprudence and is
founded upon the following precepts of common law, namely: (1) public policy and necessity,
which makes it to the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation, and (2) the
hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause. A contrary doctrine
would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer the
gratification of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the preservation of the public
tranquility and happiness.12

In this jurisdiction, the concept of res judicata is embodied in Section 47 (b) and (c) of Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court, thus:

SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. — The effect of a judgment or final order
rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or
final order, may be as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing or in respect to the probate
of a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the
personal, political, or legal condition or status of a particular person or his relationship to
another, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to the thing, the will or
administration, or the condition, status or relationship of the person; however, the probate
of a will or granting of letters of administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the
death of the testator or intestate;

(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly
adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto,
conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent
to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same
thing and under the same title and in the same capacity; and,

(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest,
that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order
which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and
necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.

The above provision outlines the dual aspect of res judicata.13 Section 47 (b) pertains to it in its
concept as "bar by prior judgment" or "estoppel by verdict," which is the effect of a judgment as a
bar to the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action. On
the other hand, Section 47 (c) pertains to res judicata in its concept as "conclusiveness of
judgment" or otherwise known as the rule of auter action pendant which ordains that issues
actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between
the same parties involving a different cause of action.14 Res judicata in its concept as a bar by
prior judgment obtains in the present case.

96
Res judicata in this sense requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) the former
judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; (3) it is a judgment or an order on the merits; and (4) there is -- between the first and the
second actions -- identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.15

Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the first three requisites. What is in issue is the
presence of the fourth requisite. In this regard, the test to determine whether the causes of action
are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain both actions, or whether there
is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions. If the same facts or
evidence would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same, and a judgment in the first
case is a bar to the subsequent action.16

Based on this test, petitioner would contend that the two petitions brought by him seeking the
declaration of nullity of his marriage are anchored on separate causes of action for the evidence
necessary to sustain the first petition which was anchored on the alleged psychological incapacity
of respondent is different from the evidence necessary to sustain the present petition which is
anchored on the purported absence of a marriage license.

Petitioner, however, forgets that he is simply invoking different grounds for the same cause of
action. By definition, a cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates the right of
another.17 In both petitions, petitioner has the same cause - the declaration of nullity of his
marriage to respondent. What differs is the ground upon which the cause of action is predicated.
These grounds cited by petitioner essentially split the various aspects of the pivotal issue that
holds the key to the resolution of this controversy, that is, the actual status of petitioner and
respondent’s marriage.

Furthermore, the instant case is premised on the claim that the marriage is null and void because
no valid celebration of the same took place due to the alleged lack of a marriage license. In Civil
Case No. SP 4341-95, however, petitioner impliedly conceded that the marriage had been
solemnized and celebrated in accordance with law. Petitioner is now bound by this admission.
The alleged absence of a marriage license which petitioner raises now could have been
presented and heard in the earlier case. Suffice it to state that parties are bound not only as
regards every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat their claims or demand but as to
any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose and of all other
matters that could have been adjudged in that case.18

It must be emphasized that a party cannot evade or avoid the application of res judicata by
simply varying the form of his action or adopting a different method of presenting his case. 19 As
this Court stated in Perez v. Court of Appeals:20

x x x the statement of a different form of liability is not a different cause of action, provided
it grows out of the same transaction or act and seeks redress for the wrong. Two actions
are not necessarily for different causes of action simply because the theory of the second
would not have been open under the pleadings in the first. A party cannot preserve the
right to bring a second action after the loss of the first merely by having circumscribed and
limited theories of recovery opened by the pleadings in the first.

It bears stressing that a party cannot divide the grounds for recovery. A plaintiff is
mandated to place in issue in his pleading, all the issues existing when the suit
began. A lawsuit cannot be tried piecemeal. The plaintiff is bound to set forth in his
first action every ground for relief which he claims to exist and upon which he
relied, and cannot be permitted to rely upon them by piecemeal in successive
action to recover for the same wrong or injury.

A party seeking to enforce a claim, legal or equitable, must present to the court,
either by the pleadings or proofs, or both, on the grounds upon which to expect a
judgment in his favor. He is not at liberty to split up his demands, and prosecute it
by piecemeal or present only a portion of the grounds upon which a special relief is
sought and leave the rest to the presentment in a second suit if the first fails. There
would be no end to litigation if such piecemeal presentation is allowed. (Citations
omitted.)

97
In sum, litigants are provided with the options on the course of action to take in order to obtain
judicial relief. Once an option has been taken and a case is filed in court, the parties must
ventilate all matters and relevant issues therein. The losing party who files another action
regarding the same controversy will be needlessly squandering time, effort and financial
resources because he is barred by law from litigating the same controversy all over again.21

Therefore, having expressly and impliedly conceded the validity of their marriage celebration,
petitioner is now deemed to have waived any defects therein. For this reason, the Court finds that
the present action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license
is barred by the decision dated November 11, 1997 of the RTC, Branch 29, of San Pablo City, in
Civil Case No. SP 4341-95.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1
 Rollo, pp. 39-42.

2
 Id. at 43-53.

3
 Id. at 53.

4
 Records, p. 33.

5
 Id. at 3-10.

6
 Id. at 15-33.

7
 Id. at 74-77.

8
 Rollo, p. 28.

9
 Records, p. 90.

10
 Rollo, pp. 7-8.

11
 Gutierrez v. CA, G.R. No. 82475, January 28, 1991, 193 SCRA 437.

12
 Cruz v. CA, G.R. No. 164797, February 13, 2006, 482 SCRA 379, quoting Heirs of the
Late Faustina Adalid v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122202, May 26, 2005, 459 SCRA 27.

13
 NHA v. Baello, G.R. No. 143230, August 30, 2004, 437 SCRA 86.

14
 Spouses Rasdas v. Estenor, G.R. No. 157605, December 13, 2005, 477 SCRA 538.

15
 Luzon Development Bank v. Conquilla, G.R. No. 163338, September 21, 2005, 470
SCRA 533.

16
 Sangalang v. Caparas, G.R. No. L-49749, June 18, 1987, 151 SCRA 53.

98
 17
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 2, Section 2.

18
 Carlet v. CA, G.R. No. 114275, July 7, 1997, 275 SCRA 97.

19
 Linzag v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122181, June 26, 1998, 291 SCRA 304.

20
 G.R. No. 157616, July 22, 2005, 464 SCRA 89.

21
 Carlet v. CA, supra note 18.

G.R. No. 175581               March 28, 2008

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 179474

FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No. 179474 are Petitions for
Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the Philippines and Felisa
Tecson-Dayot (Felisa), respectively, both challenging the Amended Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared the marriage
between Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab initio.

The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married at the Pasay City
Hall. The marriage was solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza.2 In lieu of a marriage license,
Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit,3 also dated 24 November 1986, attesting that both of
them had attained the age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years.

On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint4 for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Biñan, Laguna, Branch 25. He contended that his marriage
with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that he
did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at
least five years; and that his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud.

In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing of the same.
According to Jose, he was introduced to Felisa in 1986. Immediately thereafter, he came to live
as a boarder in Felisa’s house, the latter being his landlady. Some three weeks later, Felisa
requested him to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a package
sent to her by her brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall, upon a pre-arranged signal
from Felisa, a man bearing three folded pieces of paper approached them. They were told that
Jose needed to sign the papers so that the package could be released to Felisa. He initially
refused to do so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him that his refusal could get both of them
killed by her brother who had learned about their relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the pieces
of paper, and gave them to the man who immediately left. It was in February 1987 when he
discovered that he had contracted marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece of paper
lying on top of the table at the sala of Felisa’s house. When he perused the same, he discovered
that it was a copy of his marriage contract with Felisa. When he confronted Felisa, the latter
feigned ignorance.

99
In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Jose’s allegations and defended the validity of their
marriage. She declared that they had maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the
legality of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had deferred contracting marriage with
him on account of their age difference.5 In her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that while her
marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual
(Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose.
Subsequently, she filed an administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of the
Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were both employees of the National Statistics and
Coordinating Board.6 The Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable for disgraceful and
immoral conduct, and meted out to him the penalty of suspension from service for one year
without emolument.7

On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision8 dismissing the Complaint. It disposed:

WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the evidence presented by both parties,
this Court finds and so holds that the [C]omplaint does not deserve a favorable consideration.
Accordingly, the above-entitled case is hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs against [Jose].9

The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage celebrated
between Jose and Felisa on 24 November 1986 was valid. It dismissed Jose’s version of the
story as implausible, and rationalized that:

Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any attempt to make him or her sign a
blank sheet of paper. [Jose] could have already detected that something was amiss, unusual, as
they were at Pasay City Hall to get a package for [Felisa] but it [was] he who was made to sign
the pieces of paper for the release of the said package. Another indirect suggestion that could
have put him on guard was the fact that, by his own admission, [Felisa] told him that her brother
would kill them if he will not sign the papers. And yet it took him, more or less, three months to
"discover" that the pieces of paper that he signed was [sic] purportedly the marriage contract.
[Jose] does not seem to be that ignorant, as perceived by this Court, to be "taken in for a ride" by
[Felisa.]

[Jose’s] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied by the fact that he
acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his wife when he wrote [Felisa’s] name in the duly notarized
statement of assets and liabilities he filled up on May 12, 1988, one year after he discovered the
marriage contract he is now claiming to be sham and false. [Jose], again, in his company I.D.,
wrote the name of [Felisa] as the person to be contacted in case of emergency. This Court does
not believe that the only reason why her name was written in his company I.D. was because he
was residing there then. This is just but a lame excuse because if he really considers her not his
lawfully wedded wife, he would have written instead the name of his sister.

When [Jose’s] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath, she testified that she signed her
name voluntarily as a witness to the marriage in the marriage certificate (T.S.N., page 25,
November 29, 1996) and she further testified that the signature appearing over the name of Jose
Dayot was the signature of his [sic] brother that he voluntarily affixed in the marriage contract
(page 26 of T.S.N. taken on November 29, 1996), and when she was asked by the Honorable
Court if indeed she believed that Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her brother she answered
yes. The testimony of his sister all the more belied his claim that his consent was procured
through fraud.10

Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Jose’s action had prescribed. It cited Article
8711 of the New Civil Code which requires that the action for annulment of marriage must be
commenced by the injured party within four years after the discovery of the fraud. Thus:

That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was obtained by [Felisa] through
fraud, trickery and machinations, he could have filed an annulment or declaration of nullity of
marriage at the earliest possible opportunity, the time when he discovered the alleged sham and
false marriage contract. [Jose] did not take any action to void the marriage at the earliest
instance. x x x.12

100
Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals. In a
Decision dated 11 August 2005, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to be without merit. The
dispositive portion of the appellate court’s Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.13

The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between Jose and Felisa as it was
solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The appellate court observed that the
circumstances constituting fraud as a ground for annulment of marriage under Article 8614 of the
Civil Code did not exist in the marriage between the parties. Further, it ruled that the action for
annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud was filed beyond the prescriptive period provided
by law. The Court of Appeals struck down Jose’s appeal in the following manner:

Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was employed on Jose in giving his
consent to the marriage, the action for the annulment thereof had already prescribed. Article 87
(4) and (5) of the Civil Code provides that the action for annulment of marriage on the ground that
the consent of a party was obtained by fraud, force or intimidation must be commenced by said
party within four (4) years after the discovery of the fraud and within four (4) years from the time
the force or intimidation ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly discovered by Jose in
February, 1987 then he had only until February, 1991 within which to file an action for annulment
of marriage. However, it was only on July 7, 1993 that Jose filed the complaint for annulment of
his marriage to Felisa.15

Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose’s assertion that his marriage to Felisa was
void ab initio for lack of a marriage license. It ruled that the marriage was solemnized under
Article 7616 of the Civil Code as one of exceptional character, with the parties executing an
affidavit of marriage between man and woman who have lived together as husband and wife for
at least five years. The Court of Appeals concluded that the falsity in the affidavit to the effect that
Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife for the period required by Article 76 did
not affect the validity of the marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by the
statements contained therein. In this manner, the Court of Appeals gave credence to the good-
faith reliance of the solemnizing officer over the falsity of the affidavit. The appellate court further
noted that on the dorsal side of said affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the solemnizing
officer, stated that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting
parties and found no legal impediment to their marriage. Finally, the Court of Appeals dismissed
Jose’s argument that neither he nor Felisa was a member of the sect to which Rev. Tomas V.
Atienza belonged. According to the Court of Appeals, Article 5617 of the Civil Code did not require
that either one of the contracting parties to the marriage must belong to the solemnizing officer’s
church or religious sect. The prescription was established only in Article 718 of the Family Code
which does not govern the parties’ marriage.

Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration
thereof.1avvphi1 His central opposition was that the requisites for the proper application of the
exemption from a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully attendant in
the case at bar. In particular, Jose cited the legal condition that the man and the woman must
have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage.
Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him and Felisa
was false.

The Court of Appeals granted Jose’s Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself. Accordingly,
it rendered an Amended Decision, dated 7 November 2006, the fallo of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED and SET ASIDE and another
one entered declaring the marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson void ab initio.

Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City.19

In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of this Court in Niñal v.
Bayadog,20 and reasoned that:

In Niñal v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a marriage solemnized without a marriage
license on the basis of their affidavit that they had attained the age of majority, that being

101
unmarried, they had lived together for at least five (5) years and that they desired to marry each
other, the Supreme Court ruled as follows:

"x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from
the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the
absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of
the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity – meaning no
third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity – that is unbroken.
Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to
whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the
law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships
and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage
being a special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly
observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded
any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing element
as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from
securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the
exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two
persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of
any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.

Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized without a marriage license,
save marriages of exceptional character, shall be void from the beginning. Inasmuch as the
marriage between Jose and Felisa is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a
marriage license, it is, therefore, void ab initio because of the absence of a marriage license.21

Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no avail. The appellate court
rendered a Resolution22 dated 10 May 2007, denying Felisa’s motion.

Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
filed a Petition for Review before this Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying that the Court of Appeals’
Amended Decision dated 7 November 2006 be reversed and set aside for lack of merit, and that
the marriage between Jose and Felisa be declared valid and subsisting. Felisa filed a separate
Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly assailing the appellate court’s
Amended Decision. On 1 August 2007, this Court resolved to consolidate the two Petitions in the
interest of uniformity of the Court rulings in similar cases brought before it for resolution.23

The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments for the allowance of its
Petition, to wit:

RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY OF

HIS MARRIAGE TO FELISA.

II

RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS AND SHOULD
NOT BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM HIS OWN FRAUDULENT CONDUCT.

III

RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF HIS MARRIAGE

FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E.24

Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals misapplied Niñal.25 She
differentiates the case at bar from Niñal by reasoning that one of the parties therein had an
existing prior marriage, a circumstance which does not obtain in her cohabitation with Jose.
Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose only sought the annulment of their marriage after a criminal
case for bigamy and an administrative case had been filed against him in order to avoid liability.

102
Felisa surmises that the declaration of nullity of their marriage would exonerate Jose from any
liability.

For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa. To reach a considered
ruling on the issue, we shall jointly tackle the related arguments vented by petitioners Republic of
the Philippines and Felisa.

The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give rise to the presumption
that a valid marriage exists between Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa echoes the claim that
any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage by citing this Court’s ruling in
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals.26 To buttress its assertion, the Republic points to the affidavit
executed by Jose and Felisa, dated 24 November 1986, attesting that they have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years, which they used in lieu of a marriage license. It is the
Republic’s position that the falsity of the statements in the affidavit does not affect the validity of
the marriage, as the essential and formal requisites were complied with; and the solemnizing
officer was not required to investigate as to whether the said affidavit was legally obtained. The
Republic opines that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license
was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by the fact that the parties
incorporated a fabricated statement in their affidavit that they cohabited as husband and wife for
at least five years. In addition, the Republic posits that the parties’ marriage contract states that
their marriage was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also bears the signature of
the parties and their witnesses, and must be considered a primary evidence of marriage. To
further fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces the following documents: (1) Jose’s notarized
Statement of Assets and Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988 wherein he wrote Felisa’s name as his
wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July 1993 issued by the Barangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District
24 of Pasay City, attesting that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife in said
barangay; and (3) Jose’s company ID card, dated 2 May 1988, indicating Felisa’s name as his
wife.

The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the effect of a false
affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil Code. A survey of the prevailing rules is in order.

It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on 24 November 1986,
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their union. Article
53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a contract:

ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character. (Emphasis ours.)

Article 5827 makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being
issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually
resides, save marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those
under Article 75.28 Article 80(3)29 of the Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage performed
without the corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate
consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage contract.30 This
is in stark contrast to the old Marriage Law,31 whereby the absence of a marriage license did not
make the marriage void. The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license under
the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the
proper government official has inquired into their capacity to contract marriage.32

Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III,
comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the
point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote places, (2) consular marriages,33 (3)
ratification of marital cohabitation, (4) religious ratification of a civil marriage, (5) Mohammedan or
pagan marriages, and (6) mixed marriages.34

103
The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil Code,
which provides:

ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained
the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts
in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or
minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to
ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal
impediment to the marriage.

The reason for the law,35 as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the publicity attending a
marriage license may discourage such persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation from
legalizing their status.36

It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed without a marriage
license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit declaring that "they have attained the age of
maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years; and that because of this union, they desire to marry each other."37 One of the central
issues in the Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation,
where the parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively
renders the marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.

We answer in the affirmative.

Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the
indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory
construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly38 but reasonably construed.39 They
extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of
the general provisions rather than the exception.40 Where a general rule is established by statute
with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former or add to the latter by implication.41 For the
exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman must
have attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years.

A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency but to read
the law as it is plainly written. The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to
those who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry
each other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five
years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is
precise. The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the
language of the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact
cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one
that partakes of a mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that
the contracting parties shall state the requisite facts42 in an affidavit before any person authorized
by law to administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage
shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of
the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.

It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time
they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and
Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of
their marriage.43 The Court of Appeals also noted Felisa’s testimony that Jose was introduced to
her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA
Revolution.44 The appellate court also cited Felisa’s own testimony that it was only in June 1986
when Jose commenced to live in her house.45

Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the minimum five-year
requisite is factual in nature. A question of fact arises when there is a need to decide on the truth
or falsehood of the alleged facts.46 Under Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not subject to this
Court’s review.47 It is already well-settled that:

104
The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on this Court. A
recognized exception to this rule is when the Court of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case
the administrative body, make contradictory findings. However, the exception does not apply in
every instance that the Court of Appeals and the trial court or administrative body disagree. The
factual findings of the Court of Appeals remain conclusive on this Court if such findings are
supported by the record or based on substantial evidence.48

Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose and Felisa to
exempt them from the requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question.

We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the parties’
affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were
complied with. The argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the
marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage
license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they
should have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from
the requirement of a marriage license.

Anent petitioners’ reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds that the same finds
no applicability to the case at bar. Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is
with reference to the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.49 Restated more explicitly,
persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married.50 The present case does not
involve an apparent marriage to which the presumption still needs to be applied. There is no
question that Jose and Felisa actually entered into a contract of marriage on 24 November 1986,
hence, compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage, which spawned the instant consolidated Petitions.

In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code51 that every intendment of law or fact leans
towards the validity of marriage will not salvage the parties’ marriage, and extricate them from the
effect of a violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into without the
requisite marriage license or compliance with the stringent requirements of a marriage under
exceptional circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear
violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against
innocent and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making
a prior license a prerequisite for a valid marriage.52 The protection of marriage as a sacred
institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid
one as well.53 To permit a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to allow an
abject circumvention of the law. If this Court is to protect the fabric of the institution of marriage,
we must be wary of deceptive schemes that violate the legal measures set forth in our laws.

Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a
license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage
not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for at least five years
as required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity of the
marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage license at all.
Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and
Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the
requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential
fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the
essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force
and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.

In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that based on equity,
Jose should be denied relief because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit
from his wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must be stated that equity finds no room
for application where there is a law.54 There is a law on the ratification of marital cohabitation,
which is set in precise terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are
consistent that the declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage is without prejudice to their
criminal liability.55

105
The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed estopped from
assailing the legality of his marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and
Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Jose’s subsequent marriage to
Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven years before he sought the
declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.

This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible.56 Jose and Felisa’s marriage
was celebrated sans a marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except that it is void
ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised
any time.

Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-law
cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period computed back from the date of
celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a
marriage.57 It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by
exclusivity - meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years - and continuity
that is unbroken.58

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
7 November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to Felisa
Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to their criminal liability, if any. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

DANTE O. TINGA* PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.**

Associate Justice Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Acting Chairperson’s
attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

106
Footnotes

* Per Special Order No. 497, dated 14 March 2008, signed by Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno designating Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga to replace Associate Justice
Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, who is on official leave under the Court’s Wellness Program
and assigning Associate Justice Alicia Austria-Martinez as Acting Chairperson.

** Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. was designated to sit as additional member replacing
Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura per Raffle dated 12 September 2007.

1
 Penned by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon with Associate Justices Mario L. Guariña
III and Santiago Javier Ranada, concurring; rollo (G.R. No. 175581), pp. 65-70; rollo,
(G.R. No. 179474), pp. 156-161.

2
 Records, p. 170.

3
 Id.

4
 Id. at 1-8.

5
 The marriage contract shows that at the time of the celebration of the parties’ marriage,
Jose was 27 years old, while Felisa was 37.

6
 The Administrative complaint before the Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the Office
of the Ombudsman was docketed as OMB-ADM-0-93-0466; Records, pp. 252-258.

7
 Id. at 257.

8
 Id. at 313-323.

9
 Id. at 323.

10
 Id. at 321-322.

11
 ART. 87. - The action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by the parties
and within the periods as follows:

(1) For causes mentioned in Number 1 of Article 85, by the party whose parent or
guardian did not give his or her consent, within four years after attaining the age
of twenty or eighteen years, as the case may be; or by the parent or guardian or
person having legal charge, at any time before such party has arrived at the age
of twenty or eighteen years;

(2) For causes mentioned in Number 2 of Article 85, by the spouse who has been
absent, during his or her lifetime; or by either spouse of the subsequent marriage
during the lifetime of the other;

(3) For causes mentioned in Number 3 of Article 85, by the sane spouse, who had
no knowledge of the other's insanity; or by any relative or guardian of the party of
unsound mind, at any time before the death of either party;

(4) For causes mentioned in Number 4, by the injured party, within four years after
the discovery of the fraud;

(5) For causes mentioned in Number 5, by the injured party, within four years from
the time the force or intimidation ceased;

(6) For causes mentioned in Number 6, by the injured party, within eight years
after the marriage.

12
 Records, p. 322.

107
 13
 Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 125.

14
 ART. 86. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in number
4 of the preceding article:

(1) Misrepresentation as to the identity of one of the contracting parties;

(2) Nondisclosure of the previous conviction of the other party of a crime involving
moral turpitude, and the penalty imposed was imprisonment for two years or
more;

(3) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was
pregnant by a man other than her husband;

No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune or chastity

shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of
marriage.

15
 Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 122.

16
 ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have
attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall
state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer
oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an
affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting
parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.

17
 ART. 56. Marriage may be solemnized by:

(1) The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court;

(2) The Presiding Justice and the Justices of the Court of Appeals;

(3) Judges of the Courts of First Instance;

(4) Mayors of cities and municipalities;

(5) Municipal judges and justices of the peace;

(6) Priests, rabbis, ministers of the gospel of any denomination, church, religion or
sect, duly registered, as provided in Article 92; and

(7) Ship captains, airplane chiefs, military commanders, and consuls and vice-
consuls in special cases provided in Articles 74 and 75.

18
 ART. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:

(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction;

(2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or religious sect duly
authorized by his church or religious sect and registered with the civil registrar
general, acting within the limits of the written authority granted him by his church
or religious sect and provided that at least one of the contracting parties belongs
to the solemnizing officer's church or religious sect;

(3) Any ship captain or airplane chief only in the cases mentioned in Article 31;

(4) Any military commander of a unit to which a chaplain is assigned, in the

absence of the latter, during a military operation, likewise only in the cases
mentioned in Article 32; or

108
 (5) Any consul-general, consul or vice-consul in the case provided in Article 10.

19
 CA rollo, p. 279.

20
 384 Phil. 661 (2000).

21
 CA rollo, pp. 278-279.

22
 Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), pp. 173-174.

23
 Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 180.

24
 Rollo (G.R. No. 175581), pp. 44-45.

25
 Erroneously cited as Niño v. Bayadog; rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 18.

26
 377 Phil. 919 (1999).

27
 ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of this
Title, but not those under Article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized without a license
first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting
party habitually resides.

28
 ART. 75. Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be solemnized by consuls
and vice-consuls of the Republic of the Philippines. The duties of the local civil registrar
and of a judge or justice of the peace or mayor with regard to the celebration of marriage
shall be performed by such consuls and vice-consuls.

29
 ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxxx

(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional

character.

30
 People v. De Lara, No. 12583-R, 14 February 1955, 51 O.G. 4079, 4082.

31
 The Marriage Law, otherwise known as Act No. 3613, requires the following essential
requisites: (1) legal capacity of the contracting parties; and (2) their mutual consent.

32
 Report of the Code Commission, pp. 79-80; see also Ambrosio Padilla, Civil Code
Annotated, 1956 Edition, Vol. I, p. 195.

33
 Must be read with Article 58 of the Civil Code which provides:

ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of

this Title, but not those under Article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized without
a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where
either contracting party habitually resides.

34
 Edgardo L. Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated (1984 Eleventh Ed.), pp.
302-310.

35
 In Niñal v. Bayadog (supra note 20 at 668-669), this Court articulated the spirit behind
Article 76 of the Civil Code, thus:

"However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a
marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76,
referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken

109
 period of at least five years before the marriage. The rationale why no license is
required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside
a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant’s name for a marriage
license. The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such
persons from legitimizing their status. To preserve peace in the family, avoid the
peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip
arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve
their privacy and exempt them from that requirement."

36
 The Report of the Code Commission states that "No marriage license shall be
necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the age of majority and who,
being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years desire to
marry each other. In such case, the publicity attending a marriage license may discourage
such persons from legalizing their status," Report of the Code Commission, p. 80.

37
 Records, p. 49. The affidavit was denominated by the parties as an "Affidavit on (sic)
Marriage Between Man and Woman Who Haved (sic) Lived Together as Husband and
Wife for at Least Five Years."

38
 Benedicto v. Court of Appeals, 416 Phil. 722, 744 (2001).

39
 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 363 Phil. 130, 137 (1999).

40
 Id.

41
 Id. citing Samson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-43182, 25 November 1986, 145
SCRA 654, 659.

42
 The first part of Article 76 states, "No marriage license shall be necessary when a man
and a woman who have attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other x x
x."

43
 Rollo (G.R. No. 175581), p. 38.

44
 Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 158, citing TSN (Civil Case No. B-4143), 15 April 1999.

45
 Id. at 159.

46
 First Dominion Resources Corporation v. Peñaranda, G.R. No. 166616, 27 January
2006, 480 SCRA 504, 508.

47
 Civil Service Commission v. Ledesma, G.R. No. 154521, 30 September 2005, 471
SCRA 589, 605.

48
 Id.

49
 Vda. de Jacob v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 693, 708 (1999).

50
 Id.

51
 ART. 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus,
every intendment of law or fact leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of
the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of property during
marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the validity of defense for any
member of the family in case of unlawful aggression.

52
 People v. De Lara, supra note 30 at 4083.

53
 Malcampo-Sin v. Sin, 407 Phil. 583, 588 (2001).

110
 54
 Salavarria v. Letran College, 357 Phil. 189, 196 (1998); Aparente, Sr. v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 387 Phil. 96, 108 (2000).

55
 Supra note 33 at 306. Alicia V. Sempio-Diy in A Handbook on the Family Code of the
Philippines (1995 Ed., p. 38) wrote that "If the parties falsify their affidavit in order to have
an instant marriage, although the truth is that they have not been cohabiting for five years,
their marriage will be void for lack of a marriage license, and they will also be criminally
liable." Article 76 of the Civil Code is now Article 34 of the Family Code, which reads:

ART. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman
who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without
any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the
foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer
oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the
qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the
marriage.

56
 Niñal v. Bayadog, supra note 20 at 134.

57
 Id. at 130-131.

58
 Id.

A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant,

vs.

JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY, respondent.

ROMERO, J.:p

The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte,
Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by
respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits
gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law.

First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A.
Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his
first wife.

Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo
and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent
judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos,
Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge's residence in the
municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta.
Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa,
Surigao del Norte.

In his letter-comment to the office of the Court Administrator, respondent judge avers that the
office and name of the Municipal Mayor of Dapa have been used by someone else, who, as the
mayor's "lackey," is overly concerned with his actuations both as judge and as a private person.
The same person had earlier filed Administrative Matter No 94-980-MTC, which was dismissed
for lack of merit on September 15, 1994, and Administrative Matter No. OCA-IPI-95-16, "Antonio
Adapon v. Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy," which is still pending.

111
In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of having
solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife, and
Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge
of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other
for almost seven years. 1 With respect to the second charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the
marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the
Family Code which states that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of
the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;" and that article 8 thereof applies to the case in
question.

The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the pleadings submitted were
considered sufficient for a resolution of the case. 2

Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of complainant have not been
sufficiently proven, they will not be dwelt upon. The acts complained of and respondent judge's
answer thereto will suffice and can be objectively assessed by themselves to prove the latter's
malfeasance.

The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga states
that Tagadan's civil status is "separated." Despite this declaration, the wedding ceremony was
solemnized by respondent judge. He presented in evidence a joint affidavit by Maurecio A.
Labado, Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer, subscribed and sworn to before Judge Demosthenes C.
Duquilla, Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar. 3 The affidavit was not issued by the latter
judge, as claimed by respondent judge, but merely acknowledged before him. In their affidavit,
the affiants stated that they knew Gaspar Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D.
Peñaranda in September 1983; that after thirteen years of cohabitation and having borne five
children, Ida Peñaranda left the conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she has not
returned nor been heard of for almost seven years, thereby giving rise to the presumption that
she is already dead.

In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is sufficient proof of
Ida Peñaranda's presumptive death, and ample reason for him to proceed with the marriage
ceremony. We do not agree.

Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:

A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous

marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an
absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided
in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis added.)

There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the law is clear
and simple. Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in
order to contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been precisely
incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven
that the previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively
dead, in accordance with pertinent provisions of law.

In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of
his first wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida
Peñaranda. Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge
to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law
has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, "

112
The following marriage shall be void from the beginning: (4) Those bigamous . . . marriages not
falling under Article 41."

The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the court's
jurisdiction, covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus:

Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by :

(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;

xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied.)

Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers the judge or in
open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general,
consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of
marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places in accordance with
Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing officer in
writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place
designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.

Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justification for his having
solemnized the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his
court's jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be held outside of the
judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in
remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a
sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the
point of death or in the remote place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the
respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario. 4

More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the
solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of the
solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any
incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory
provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the
authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance
herewith will not invalidate the marriage.

A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized
to do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court
Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize
marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with.
However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within
said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction,
there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not
affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability. 5

Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos,
he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del
Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced
authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles of
civil law.

Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The legal
principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention are elementary and uncomplicated,
prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is due to a lack of
comprehension of the law.

The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the law
they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in
understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal
principles like the ones involved in instant case. 6 It is not too much to expect them to know and
apply the law intelligently. 7 Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a shaky foundation indeed,

113
compounded by the errors committed by those not learned in the law. While magistrates may at
times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge
exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the
status of married persons.

The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and void, there
being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Peñaranda.

The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the Court, a six-month
suspension and a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely. Considering that one of the marriages in question resulted in a bigamous union
and therefore void, and the other lacked the necessary authority of respondent judge, the Court
adopts said recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more circumspect in applying the law
and to cultivate a deeper understanding of the law.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is hereby

SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months and given a STERN WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Regalado, Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 7-8.

2 Uy v. Dizon-Capulong, A.M. No. RTJ-91-766, April 7, 1993; Montemayor v. Collado,

A.M. No. 2519-MTJ, September 10, 1981; Ubongon v. Mayo, A.M. No. 1255-CTJ, August
6, 1980, 99 SCRA 30.

3 Rollo, p. 12.

4 Rollo, pp. 10-11.

5 Article 4, Family Code.

6 Lim v. Domogas, A.M. No. RTJ-92-899, October 15, 1993, 227 SCRA 258,
263 citing Ubongan v. Mayor, 99 SCRA 30 and Ajeno v. Inserto, 71 SCRA 166.

7 . . . . Realty Co. v. Arranz, A.M. No. MTJ-93-978 October 27, 1994, 237 SCRA 771.

FIRST DIVISION

[A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211. January 28, 2000.]

ZENAIDA S. BESO, Complainant, v. Judge JUAN DAGUMAN, MCTC, Sta.

Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan, Samar, Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

In this administrative complaint, respondent Judge stands charged with Neglect of

Duty and Abuse of Authority. In a Complaint-Affidavit dated December 12, 1997,
Zenaida S. Beso charged Judge Juan J. Daguman, Jr. with solemnizing marriage
outside of his jurisdiction and of negligence in not retaining a copy and not
registering the marriage contract with the office of the Local Civil Registrar alleging
—

114
"a. That on August 28, 1997, I and my fiancee (sic) BERNARDITO A. YMAN got
married and our marriage was solemnized by judge (sic) Juan Daguman in his
residence in J.P.R. Subdivision in Calbayog City, Samar; . . .chanrobles
virtuallawlibrary

b. That the ceremony was attended by PACIFICO MAGHACOT who acted as our
principal sponsor and spouses RAMON DEAN and TERESITA DEAN; . . .

c. That after our wedding, my husband BERNARDINO YMAN abandoned me without

any reason at all;

d. That I smell something fishy; so what I did was I went to Calbayog City and wrote
the city Civil Registrar to inquire regarding my Marriage Contract;

e. That to my surprise, I was informed by the Local Civil Registrar of Calbayog City
that my marriage was not registered; . . .

f. That upon advisement of the Local Civil Registrar, I wrote Judge Juan Daguman, to
inquire;

g. That to my second surprise, I was informed by Judge Daguman that all the copies
of the Marriage Contract were taken by Oloy (Bernardito A. Yman);

h. That no copy was retained by Judge Daguman;

i. That I believe that the respondent judge committed acts prejudicial to my interest
such as:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. Solemnizing our marriage outside his jurisdiction;

2. Negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering our marriage before the
office of the local Civil Registrar."cralaw virtua1aw library

The Affidavit-Complaint was thereafter referred to respondent Judge for comment.

In his Comment, respondent Judge averred that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. The civil marriage of complainant Zenaida Beso and Bernardito Yman had to be
solemnized by respondent in Calbayog City though outside his territory as municipal
Judge of Sta. Margarita, Samar due to the following and pressing
circumstances:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1.1. On August 28, 1997 respondent was physically indisposed and unable to report
to his station in Sta. Margarita. In the forenoon of that date, without prior
appointment, complainant Beso and Mr. Yman unexpectedly came to the residence of
respondent in said City, urgently requesting the celebration of their marriage right
then and there, first, because complainants said she must leave that same day to be
able to fly from Manila for abroad as scheduled; second, that for the parties to go to
another town for the marriage would be expensive and would entail serious problems
of finding a solemnizing officer and another pair of witnesses or sponsors, while in
fact former Undersecretary Pacifico Maghacot, Sangguniang Panlungsod [member]
Ramon Dean were already with them as sponsors; third, if they failed to get married
on August 28, 1997, complainant would be out of the country for a long period and
their marriage license would lapse and necessitate another publication of notice;
fourth, if the parties go beyond their plans for the scheduled marriage, complainant
feared it would complicate her employment abroad; and, last, all other alternatives
as to date and venue of marriage were considered impracticable by the parties;

1.2. The contracting parties were ready with the desired cocuments (sic) for a valid

115
marriage, which respondent found all in order.chanrobles.com.ph:red

1.3. Complainant bride is an accredited Filipino overseas worker, who, respondent

realized, deserved more than ordinary official attention under present Government
policy.

2. At the time respondent solemnized the marriage in question, he believed in good

faith that by so doing he was leaning on the side of liberality of the law so that it
may be not be too expensive and complicated for citizens to get married.

3. Another point brought up in the complaint was the failure of registration of the
duplicate and triplicate copies of the marriage certificate, which failure was also
occasioned by the following circumstances beyond the control of
respondent:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

3.1. After handing to the husband the first copy of the marriage certificate,
respondent left the three remaining copies on top of the desk in his private office
where the marriage ceremonies were held, intending later to register the duplicate
and triplicate copies and to keep the forth (sic) in his office.

3.2. After a few days following the wedding, respondent gathered all the papers
relating to the said marriage but notwithstanding diligent search in the premises and
private files, all the three last copies of the certificate were missing. Promptly,
respondent invited by subpoena . . . Mr. Yman to shed light on the missing
documents and he said he saw complainant Beso put the copies of the marriage
certificate in her bag during the wedding party. Unfortunately, it was too late to
contact complainant for a confirmation of Mr. Yman’s claim.

3.3. Considering the futility of contracting complainant now that she is out of the
country, a reasonable conclusion can be drawn on the basis of the established facts
so far in this dispute. If we believe the claim of complainant that after August 28,
1997 marriage her husband, Mr. Yman, abandoned her without any reason . . . but
that said husband admitted "he had another girl by the name of LITA
DANGUYAN." . . it seems reasonably clear who of the two marriage contracting
parties probably absconded with the missing copies of the marriage certificate.

3.4. Under the facts above stated, respondent has no other recourse but to protect
the public interest by trying all possible means to recover custody of the missing
documents in some amicable way during the expected hearing of the above
mentioned civil case in the City of Marikina, failing to do which said respondent
would confer with the Civil Registrar General for possible registration of reconstituted
copies of said documents.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in an evaluation report dated August 11,
1998 found that respondent Judge." committed non-feasance in office" and
recommended that he be fined Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) with a warning that
the commission of the same or future acts will be dealt with more severely pointing
out that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"As presiding judge of the MCTC Sta. Margarita Tarangnan-Pagsanjan, Samar, the
authority to solemnize marriage is only limited to those municipalities under his
jurisdiction. Clearly, Calbayog City is no longer within his area of jurisdiction.

Additionally, there are only three instances, as provided by Article 8 of the Family
Code, wherein a marriage may be solemnized by a judge outside his chamber[s] or
at a place other than his sala, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) when either or both of the contracting parties is at the point of death;

(2) when the residence of either party is located in a remote place;

116
(3) where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case
the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn
statement to that effect.

The foregoing circumstances are unavailing in the instant case.

Moreover, as solemnizing officer, respondent Judge neglected his duty when he

failed to register the marriage of complainant to Bernardito Yman.

Such duty is entrusted upon him pursuant to Article 23 of the Family Code which
provides:chanrobles virtua| |aw |ibrary

"It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of the
contracting parties the original of the marriage certificate referred to in Article 6 and
to send the duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificates not later than fifteen
days after the marriage, to the local civil registrar of the place where the marriage
was solemnized. . ." (Emphasis ours)

It is clearly evident from the foregoing that not only has the respondent Judge
committed non-feasance in office, he also undermined the very foundation of
marriage which is the basic social institution in our society whose nature,
consequences and incidents are governed by law. Granting that respondent Judge
indeed failed to locate the duplicate and triplicate copies of the marriage certificate,
he should have exerted more effort to locate or reconstitute the same. As a holder of
such a sensitive position, he is expected to be conscientious in handling official
documents. His imputation that the missing copies of the marriage certificate were
taken by Bernardito Yman is based merely on conjectures and does not deserve
consideration for being devoid of proof."cralaw virtua1aw library

After a careful and thorough examination of the evidence, the court finds the
evaluation report of the OCA well-taken.

Jimenez v. Republic 1 underscores the importance of marriage as a social institution

thus:" [M]arriage in this country is an institution in which the community is deeply
interested. The state has surrounded it with safeguards to maintain its purity,
continuity and permanence. The security and stability of the state are largely
dependent upon it. It is the interest and duty of each and every member of the
community to prevent the bringing about of a condition that would shake its
foundation and ultimately lead to its destruction."cralaw virtua1aw library

With regard to the solemnization of marriage, Article 7 of the Family Code provides,
among others, that —

"ARTICLE 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(i) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction; . . .
(Emphasis ours)

In relation thereto, Article 8 of the same statute mandates that:chanrob1es virtual

1aw library

ARTICLE 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge
or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-
general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in
cases of marriages contracted at the point of death or in remote places in accordance
with Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing officer in
writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place
designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect." (Emphasis ours)

117
As the above-quoted provision clearly states, a marriage can be held outside the
judge’s chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: 1.] at the point of
death; 2.] in remote places in accordance with Article 29, or 3.] upon the request of
both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect.

In this case, there is no pretense that either complainant Beso or her fiancé Yman
was at the point of death or in a remote place. Neither was there a sworn written
request made by the contracting parties to respondent Judge that the marriage be
solemnized outside his chambers or at a place other than his sala. What, in fact,
appears on record is that respondent Judge was prompted more by urgency to
solemnize the marriage of Beso and Yman because complainant was" [a ]n overseas
worker, who, respondent realized deserved more than ordinary official attention
under present Government policy." Respondent Judge further avers that in
solemnizing the marriage in question," [h]e believed in good faith that by doing so
he was leaning on the side of liberality of the law so that it may not be too expensive
and complicated for citizens to get married." chanrobles.com : red

A person presiding over a court of law must not only apply the law but must also live
and abide by it and render justice at all times without resorting to shortcuts clearly
uncalled for. 2 A judge is not only bound by oath to apply the law; 3 he must also be
conscientious and thorough in doing so. 4 Certainly, judges, by the very delicate
nature of their office should be more circumspect in the performance of their duties.
5

If at all, the reasons proffered by respondent Judge to justify his hurried

solemnization of the marriage in this case only tends to degrade the revered position
enjoyed by marriage in the hierarchy of social institutions in the country. They also
betray respondent’s cavalier proclivity on its significance in our culture which is more
disposed towards an extended period of engagement prior to marriage and frowns
upon hasty, ill-advised and ill-timed marital unions.

An elementary regard for the sacredness of laws — let alone that enacted in order to
preserve so sacrosanct an inviolable social institution as marriage — and the stability
of judicial doctrines laid down by superior authority should have given respondent
judge pause and made him more vigilant in the exercise of his authority and the
performance of his duties as a solemnizing officer. A Judge is, furthermore,
presumed to know the constitutional limits of the authority or jurisdiction of his
court. 6 Thus respondent Judge should be reminded that —

A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his ordinary to marry the faithful, is
authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his
Bishop. An appellate court justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the
entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the
requisites of the law are complied with. However, Judges who are appointed to
specific jurisdictions may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond.
Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction, there is a
resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may
not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
administrative liability. 7

Considering that respondent Judge’s jurisdiction covers the municipality of Sta.

Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan, Samar only, he was not clothed with authority to
solemnize a marriage in the City of Calbayog. 8

Furthermore, from the nature of marriage, aside from the mandate that a judge
should exercise extra care in the exercise of his authority and the performance of his
duties in its solemnization, he is likewise commanded to observe extra precautions to
ensure that the event is properly documented in accordance with Article 23 of the
Family Code which states in no uncertain terms that —

118
ARTICLE 23. It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish
either of the contracting parties, the original of the marriage contract referred to in
Article 6 and to send the duplicate and triplicate of the certificate not later than
fifteen days after the marriage, to the local civil registrar of the place where the
marriage was solemnized. Proper receipts shall be issued by the local civil registrar
to the solemnizing officer transmitting copies of the marriage certificate. The
solemnizing officer shall retain in his file the quadruplicate copy of the marriage
certificate, the original of the marriage license and, in proper cases, the affidavit of
the contracting party regarding the solemnization of the marriage in a place other
than those mentioned in Article 8. (Emphasis supplied)

In view of the foregoing, we agree with the evaluation of the OCA that respondent
Judge was less than conscientious in handling official documents. A judge is charged
with exercising extra care in ensuring that the records of the cases and official
documents in his custody are intact. There is no justification for missing records save
fortuitous events. 9 However, the records show that the loss was occasioned by
carelessness on respondent Judge’s part. This Court reiterates that judges must
adopt a system of record management and organize their dockets in order to bolster
the prompt and efficient dispatch of business. 10 It is, in fact, incumbent upon him
to devise an efficient recording and filing system in his court because he is after all
the one directly responsible for the proper discharge of his official functions. 11

In the evaluation report, the OCA recommended that respondent Judge be fined Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) and warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts
will be dealt with more severely. This Court adopts the recommendation of the OCA.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondent Judge is hereby FINED Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar infractions will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1. 109 Phil. 273 [1960].

2. Ortiz v. Palaypon, 234 SCRA 391 [1994].

3. Caram Resources Corp. v. Contreras, 237 SCRA 724 [1994].

4. Benjamin, Sr. v. Alaba, 261 SCRA 429 [1996].

5. Galvez v. Eduardo, 252 SCRA 570 [1996].

6. Guieb v. Fontanilla, 247 SCRA 348 [1995].

7. Navarro v. Domagtoy, 259 SCRA 129 [1996], citing Art. 4 Family Code; Emphasis
supplied.

8. See Sempio-Diy A.V. Handbook On The Family Code Of The Philippines, 1988 ed.,
p. 70.

9. Sabitsana v. Villamor, 209 SCRA 435 [1991], citing Longboan v. Polig, 186 SCRA
567 [1990].

10. Bernardo v. Judge Amelia A. Fabros, AM No. MTJ-99-1189, 12 May 1999.

119
11. OCA v. Judge Francisco D. Villanueva, 279 SCRA 267 [1997], citing Agcaoili v.
Ramos, 229 SCRA 705 [1994]; see also OCA v. RTC Judge Amelita DK Benedicto,
296 SCRA 62 [1998]; Mamamayan ng Zapote I. Bacoor, Cavite v. Balderian, 265
SCRA 360 [1996]; Celino v. Abrogar, 245 SCRA 304 [1995].

G.R. No. 152577 September 21, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,

vs.
CRASUS L. IYOY, Respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Republic of
the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, prays for the reversal of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001,1 affirming the
Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-
20077, dated 30 October 1998,2 declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and
Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the filing of a Complaint3 for declaration of
nullity of marriage by respondent Crasus on 25 March 1997. According to the said Complaint,
respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford Memorial Church, Jones
Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their union, they had five children – Crasus, Jr., Daphne,
Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos – who are now all of legal ages. After the celebration of their
marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was "hot-tempered, a nagger and
extravagant." In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving
all of their five children, the youngest then being only six years old, to the care of respondent
Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter from her
requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said request. Sometime
in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely
got married to an American, with whom she eventually had a child. In 1987, Fely came back to
the Philippines with her American family, staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel in Cebu City. Respondent
Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely because he was afraid he might not be able to bear the
sorrow and the pain she had caused him. Fely returned to the Philippines several times more: in
1990, for the wedding of their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the brain operation of their
fourth child, Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown reasons. Fely continued to live with her American
family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly using the surname of her American husband
in the Philippines and in the U.S.A. For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had invitations
made in which she was named as "Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus." At the time the Complaint was filed, it
had been 13 years since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was no more
possibility of reconciliation between them. Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that
Fely’s acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her
psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being
incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article
36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the Philippines.

Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim4 with the RTC on 05 June 1997. She asserted therein
that she was already an American citizen since 1988 and was now married to Stephen Micklus.
While she admitted being previously married to respondent Crasus and having five children with
him, Fely refuted the other allegations made by respondent Crasus in his Complaint. She
explained that she was no more hot-tempered than any normal person, and she may had been
indignant at respondent Crasus on certain occasions but it was because of the latter’s
drunkenness, womanizing, and lack of sincere effort to find employment and to contribute to the
maintenance of their household. She could not have been extravagant since the family hardly
had enough money for basic needs. Indeed, Fely left for abroad for financial reasons as
respondent Crasus had no job and what she was then earning as the sole breadwinner in the

120
Philippines was insufficient to support their family. Although she left all of her children with
respondent Crasus, she continued to provide financial support to them, as well as, to respondent
Crasus. Subsequently, Fely was able to bring her children to the U.S.A., except for one, Calvert,
who had to stay behind for medical reasons. While she did file for divorce from respondent
Crasus, she denied having herself sent a letter to respondent Crasus requesting him to sign the
enclosed divorce papers. After securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely married her
American husband and acquired American citizenship. She argued that her marriage to her
American husband was legal because now being an American citizen, her status shall be
governed by the law of her present nationality. Fely also pointed out that respondent Crasus
himself was presently living with another woman who bore him a child. She also accused
respondent Crasus of misusing the amount of ₱90,000.00 which she advanced to him to finance
the brain operation of their son, Calvert. On the basis of the foregoing, Fely also prayed that the
RTC declare her marriage to respondent Crasus null and void; and that respondent Crasus be
ordered to pay to Fely the ₱90,000.00 she advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral and
exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses.

After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their respective Pre-Trial Briefs,5 the RTC afforded
both parties the opportunity to present their evidence. Petitioner Republic participated in the trial
through the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.6

Respondent Crasus submitted the following pieces of evidence in support of his Complaint: (1)
his own testimony on 08 September 1997, in which he essentially reiterated the allegations in his
Complaint;7 (2) the Certification, dated 13 April 1989, by the Health Department of Cebu City, on
the recording of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely in the Register of
Deeds, such marriage celebration taking place on 16 December 1961;8 and (3) the invitation to
the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, wherein Fely openly used her American husband’s
surname, Micklus.9

Fely’s counsel filed a Notice,10 and, later on, a Motion,11 to take the deposition of witnesses,
namely, Fely and her children, Crasus, Jr. and Daphne, upon written interrogatories, before the
consular officers of the Philippines in New York and California, U.S.A, where the said witnesses
reside. Despite the Orders12 and Commissions13 issued by the RTC to the Philippine Consuls of
New York and California, U.S.A., to take the depositions of the witnesses upon written
interrogatories, not a single deposition was ever submitted to the RTC. Taking into account that it
had been over a year since respondent Crasus had presented his evidence and that Fely failed to
exert effort to have the case progress, the RTC issued an Order, dated 05 October
1998,14 considering Fely to have waived her right to present her evidence. The case was thus
deemed submitted for decision.

Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment declaring the marriage of
respondent Crasus and Fely null and void ab initio, on the basis of the following findings –

The ground bearing defendant’s psychological incapacity deserves a reasonable consideration.

As observed, plaintiff’s testimony is decidedly credible. The Court finds that defendant had indeed
exhibited unmistakable signs of psychological incapacity to comply with her marital duties such as
striving for family unity, observing fidelity, mutual love, respect, help and support. From the
evidence presented, plaintiff adequately established that the defendant practically abandoned
him. She obtained a divorce decree in the United States of America and married another man
and has establish [sic] another family of her own. Plaintiff is in an anomalous situation, wherein
he is married to a wife who is already married to another man in another country.

Defendant’s intolerable traits may not have been apparent or manifest before the marriage, the
FAMILY CODE nonetheless allows the annulment of the marriage provided that these were
eventually manifested after the wedding. It appears to be the case in this instance.

Certainly defendant’s posture being an irresponsible wife erringly reveals her very low regard for
that sacred and inviolable institution of marriage which is the foundation of human society
throughout the civilized world. It is quite evident that the defendant is bereft of the mind, will and
heart to comply with her marital obligations, such incapacity was already there at the time of the
marriage in question is shown by defendant’s own attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff.

In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff which is defendant’s psychological incapacity to comply
with the essential marital obligations which already existed at the time of the marriage in question

121
has been satisfactorily proven. The evidence in herein case establishes the irresponsibility of
defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy, firmly.

Going over plaintiff’s testimony which is decidedly credible, the Court finds that the defendant had
indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of such psychological incapacity to comply with her marital
obligations. These are her excessive disposition to material things over and above the marital
stability. That such incapacity was already there at the time of the marriage in question is shown
by defendant’s own attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff. And for these reasons there is a
legal ground to declare the marriage of plaintiff Crasus L. Iyoy and defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy
null and void ab initio.15

Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quoted Judgment of the RTC was contrary to law and
evidence, filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, though, in its Decision,
dated 30 July 2001, affirmed the appealed Judgment of the RTC, finding no reversible error
therein. It even offered additional ratiocination for declaring the marriage between respondent
Crasus and Fely null and void, to wit –

Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiff-appellee abroad, has remarried, and is now
permanently residing in the United States. Plaintiff-appellee categorically stated this as one of his
reasons for seeking the declaration of nullity of their marriage…

Article 26 of the Family Code provides:

"Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

"WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND A FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY

CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS THEREAFTER VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY THE
ALIEN SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO REMARRY, THE FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL
LIKEWISE HAVE CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW."

The rationale behind the second paragraph of the above-quoted provision is to avoid the absurd
and unjust situation of a Filipino citizen still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the
latter is no longer married to the Filipino spouse because he or she has obtained a divorce
abroad. In the case at bench, the defendant has undoubtedly acquired her American husband’s
citizenship and thus has become an alien as well. This Court cannot see why the benefits of Art.
26 aforequoted can not be extended to a Filipino citizen whose spouse eventually embraces
another citizenship and thus becomes herself an alien.

It would be the height of unfairness if, under these circumstances, plaintiff would still be
considered as married to defendant, given her total incapacity to honor her marital covenants to
the former. To condemn plaintiff to remain shackled in a marriage that in truth and in fact does not
exist and to remain married to a spouse who is incapacitated to discharge essential marital
covenants, is verily to condemn him to a perpetual disadvantage which this Court finds abhorrent
and will not countenance. Justice dictates that plaintiff be given relief by affirming the trial court’s
declaration of the nullity of the marriage of the parties.16

After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated 08 March 2002,17 denied its Motion for
Reconsideration, petitioner Republic filed the instant Petition before this Court, based on the
following arguments/grounds –

I. Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondent’s wife do not per se constitute

psychological incapacity.

II. The Court of Appeals has decided questions of substance not in accord with law and
jurisprudence considering that the Court of Appeals committed serious errors of law in ruling that
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code is inapplicable to the case at bar.18

122
In his Comment19 to the Petition, respondent Crasus maintained that Fely’s psychological
incapacity was clearly established after a full-blown trial, and that paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code of the Philippines was indeed applicable to the marriage of respondent Crasus and
Fely, because the latter had already become an American citizen. He further questioned the
personality of petitioner Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, to institute
the instant Petition, because Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines authorizes the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the trial court, not the Solicitor General, to intervene on
behalf of the State, in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.

After having reviewed the records of this case and the applicable laws and jurisprudence, this
Court finds the instant Petition to be meritorious.

The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support the finding of psychological
incapacity of Fely.

Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial provisions of the Family Code of the
Philippines, reads –

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes psychological incapacity. In a series of cases,
this Court laid down guidelines for determining its existence.

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,20 the term psychological incapacity was defined, thus –

". . . [P]sychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of
the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated…21

The psychological incapacity must be characterized by –

(a) Gravity – It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out
the ordinary duties required in a marriage;

(b) Juridical Antecedence – It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and

(c) Incurability – It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved.22

More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code of
the Philippines were handed down by this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina,23 which, although quite lengthy, by its significance, deserves to be reproduced below –

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on
the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

123
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them,
could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's."
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to
the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job…

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element
in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also
be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts…

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear
as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with
the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from
the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.24

A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,25 further clarified that there is no requirement that the

defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a
condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological
incapacity. Such psychological incapacity, however, must be established by the totality of the
evidence presented during the trial.

Using the guidelines established by the afore-mentioned jurisprudence, this Court finds that the
totality of evidence presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish the alleged
psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis for declaring their marriage
null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

124
The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before the RTC was his
testimony, which can be easily put into question for being self-serving, in the absence of any
other corroborating evidence. He submitted only two other pieces of evidence: (1) the
Certification on the recording with the Register of Deeds of the Marriage Contract between
respondent Crasus and Fely, such marriage being celebrated on 16 December 1961; and (2) the
invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, in which Fely used her American
husband’s surname. Even considering the admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer to
respondent Crasus’s Complaint filed with the RTC, the evidence is not enough to convince this
Court that Fely had such a grave mental illness that prevented her from assuming the essential
obligations of marriage.

It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines contemplates
downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital
obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant
spouse.26 Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and
abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the
said Article.27

As has already been stressed by this Court in previous cases, Article 36 "is not to be confused
with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest
themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume."28

The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt and embarrassed respondent
Crasus and the rest of the family. Her hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance; her abandonment
of respondent Crasus; her marriage to an American; and even her flaunting of her American
family and her American surname, may indeed be manifestations of her alleged incapacity to
comply with her marital obligations; nonetheless, the root cause for such was not identified. If the
root cause of the incapacity was not identified, then it cannot be satisfactorily established as a
psychological or mental defect that is serious or grave; neither could it be proven to be in
existence at the time of celebration of the marriage; nor that it is incurable. While the personal
examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer mandatory for the declaration of
nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, by virtue of this
Court’s ruling in Marcos v. Marcos,29 respondent Crasus must still have complied with the
requirement laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina 30 that the root cause of the
incapacity be identified as a psychological illness and that its incapacitating nature be fully
explained.

In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.31 No less than the
Constitution of 1987 sets the policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social
institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.32

II

Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not applicable to the case at bar.

According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines –

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple
getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was
celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the
case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her
divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely
herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent
Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in 1984, after which she married her
American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American

125
citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and
pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal
capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do
not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly
obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.

III

The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the Republic, in proceedings for
annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.

Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines, respondent Crasus argued that only the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the RTC may intervene on behalf of the State in
proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages; hence, the Office of the Solicitor
General had no personality to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State. Article 48 provides –

ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall
order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take
steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated
or suppressed.

That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General does not bar him or his Office
from intervening in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages. Executive
Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, appoints the Solicitor
General as the principal law officer and legal defender of the Government.33 His Office is tasked
to represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials
and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers.
The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as such,
shall discharge duties requiring the services of lawyers.34

The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to ensure that the interest of the
State is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of
marriages by preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or suppression of
evidence; and, bearing in mind that the Solicitor General is the principal law officer and legal
defender of the land, then his intervention in such proceedings could only serve and contribute to
the realization of such intent, rather than thwart it.

Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor General is authorized to bring or defend
actions on behalf of the People or the Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before
this Court or the Court of Appeals.35 While it is the prosecuting attorney or fiscal who actively
participates, on behalf of the State, in a proceeding for annulment or declaration of nullity of
marriage before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General takes over when the case is elevated
to the Court of Appeals or this Court. Since it shall be eventually responsible for taking the case
to the appellate courts when circumstances demand, then it is only reasonable and practical that
even while the proceeding is still being held before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General
can already exercise supervision and control over the conduct of the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal therein to better guarantee the protection of the interests of the State.

In fact, this Court had already recognized and affirmed the role of the Solicitor General in several
cases for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages that were appealed before it,
summarized as follows in the case of Ancheta v. Ancheta36 –

In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals [268 SCRA 198 (1997)], this Court laid down the
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which
concerns the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the State:

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear
as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with

126
the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from
the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. [Id., at
213]

This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin [355 SCRA 285 (2001)] reiterated its
pronouncement in Republic v. Court of Appeals [Supra.] regarding the role of the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State…37

Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,38 which became effective on 15 March 2003, should dispel
any other doubts of respondent Crasus as to the authority of the Solicitor General to file the
instant Petition on behalf of the State. The Rule recognizes the authority of the Solicitor General
to intervene and take part in the proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages
before the RTC and on appeal to higher courts. The pertinent provisions of the said Rule are
reproduced below –

Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition. –

(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on the Office of
the Solicitor General and the Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the
date of its filing and submit to the court proof of such service within the same period.

Sec. 18. Memoranda. – The court may require the parties and the public prosecutor, in
consultation with the Office of the Solicitor General, to file their respective memoranda in support
of their claims within fifteen days from the date the trial is terminated. It may require the Office of
the Solicitor General to file its own memorandum if the case is of significant interest to the State.
No other pleadings or papers may be submitted without leave of court. After the lapse of the
period herein provided, the case will be considered submitted for decision, with or without the
memoranda.

Sec. 19. Decision. –

(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public prosecutor, shall be served with
copies of the decision personally or by registered mail. If the respondent summoned by
publication failed to appear in the action, the dispositive part of the decision shall be published
once in a newspaper of general circulation.

(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days from notice to the parties. Entry
of judgment shall be made if no motion for reconsideration or new trial, or appeal is filed by any of
the parties, the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.

Sec. 20. Appeal. –

(2) Notice of Appeal. – An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may appeal from the decision
by filing a Notice of Appeal within fifteen days from notice of denial of the motion for
reconsideration or new trial. The appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal on the
adverse parties.

Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a conclusion contrary to those of the RTC and the Court
of Appeals, and sustains the validity and existence of the marriage between respondent Crasus

127
 and Fely. At most, Fely’s abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give respondent Crasus
grounds to file for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines, but not
for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the same Code. While this Court
commiserates with respondent Crasus for being continuously shackled to what is now a hopeless
and loveless marriage, this is one of those situations where neither law nor society can provide
the specific answer to every individual problem.39

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001, affirming the Judgment of the RTC of Cebu City,
Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.

The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and
subsisting.

SO ORDERED.

  MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO

Associate Justice

Chairman

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

   
   
   
DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

  REYNATO S. PUNO

Associate Justice

Chairman, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman’s Attestation, it
is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

  HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

128
Footnotes

G.R. No. 221029

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner

vs

MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, Respondent

RESOLUTION

PERALTA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) seeks to reverse
and set aside the September 18, 2014 Decision1 and October 12, 2015 Resolution2 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076. The dispositive portion of the Decision states:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 15 October 2012 of the
Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, First Judicial Region, Branch 43, in SPEC. PROC. NO.
2012-0005 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila.

SO ORDERED.3

The facts are undisputed.

On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for
cancellation of

Entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan , Metro Manila, by virtueof a judgment of
divorce Japanese court.

Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in substance, Branch 43 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Dagupan City set the case for initial hearing on April 25, 2012. The petition and
the notice of initial hearing were published once a week for three consecutive weeks in
newspaper of general circulation. During the initial hearing, counsel for Manalo marked the
documentary evidence (consisting of the trial courts Order dated January 25, 2012, affidavit of
publication, and issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March
5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012) for purposes of compliance with the jurisdictional requirements.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for petitioner Republic of the
Philippines authorizing the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dagupan to appear on its behalf.
Likewise, a Manifestation and Motion was filed questioning the title and/or caption of the petition
considering that based on the allegations therein, the proper action should be a petition for
recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment.

As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended Petition, which the court granted. The Amended
Petition, which captioned that if it is also a petition for recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgment alleged:

2. That petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national named

YOSHINO MINORO as shown by their Marriage Contract xxx;

129
3. That recently, a case for divorce was filed by herein [petitioner] in Japan and after die
proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6, 2011 was rendered by the Japanese Court x x
x;

4. That at present, by virtue of the said divorce decree, petitioner and her divorce Japanese
husband are no longer living together and in fact, petitioner and her daughter are living separately
from said Japanese former husband;

5. That there is an imperative need to have the entry of marriage in Civil Registry of San Juan,
Metro Manila cancelled, where the petitioner and the former Japanese husband's marriage was
previously registered, in order that it would not appear anymore that petitioner is still married to
the said Japanese national who is no longer her husband or is no longer married to her, she shall
not be bothered and disturbed by aid entry of marriage;

6. That this petition is filed principally for the purpose of causing the cancellation of entry of the
marriage between the petitioner and the said Japanese national, pursuant to Rule 108 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which marriage was already dissolved by virtue of the aforesaid divorce
decree; [and]

7. That petitioner prays, among others, that together with the cancellation of the said entry of her
marriage, that she be allowed to return and use her maiden surname, MANALO.4

Manalo was allowed to testify in advance as she was scheduled to leave for Japan for her
employment. Among the documents that were offered and admitted were:

1. Court Order dated January 25, 2012, finding the petition and its attachments to be sufficient in
form and in substance;

2. Affidavit of Publication;

3. Issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and
March 6-12, 2012;

4. Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former Japanese husband;

5. Divorce Decree of Japanese court;

6. Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the

Notification of Divorce; and

7. Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce.5

The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the allegations of Manalo.

On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the divorce
obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of the
New Civil Code, the Philippine law "does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce whether
they are in the country or living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they
celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in another country" and that unless Filipinos "are
naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall have control over issues related to
Filipinos' family rights and duties, together with the determination of their condition and legal
capacity to enter into contracts and civil relations, inclusing marriages."6

On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the Family Code of the
Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her
Japanese husband because the decree may obtained makes the latter no longer married to the
former, capacitating him to remarry. Conformably with Navarro, et al. V. Exec. Secretary Ermita,
et al.7 ruling that the meaning of the law should be based on the intent of the lawmakers and in
view of the legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be height of injustice to consider Manalo
as still married to the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer married to her. For the
appellate court, the fact that it was Manalo who filed the divorce case is inconsequential. Cited as

130
similar to this case was Van Dorn v. Judge Romilo, Jr.8 where the mariage between a foreigner
an a Filipino was dissolved filed abroad by the latter.

The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence, this petition.

We deny the petition and partially affirm the CA decision.

Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after the marriage, are of two
types: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited
divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.9 In this
jurisdiction, the following rules exist:

1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.10

2. Consistent with Articles 1511 and 1712 of the New Civil Code, the marital bond between two
Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained abroad.13

3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who both aliens, may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.14

4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed to contract a
subsequent marriage in case the absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.15

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Executive Order (E.O.) No.
209, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, which took effect on August 3,
1988.16 Shortly thereafter , E.O. No. 227 was issued on July 17, 1987.17 Aside from amending
Articles 36 and 39 of the Family Code, a second paragraph was added to Article 26.18 This
provision was originally deleted by the Civil Code Revision Committee (Committee),but it was
presented and approved at a Cabinet meeting after Pres. Aquino signed E.O. No. 209.19 As
modified, Article 26 now states:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the where country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him her to remarry under
Philippine law.

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign
divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the
dissolution of the marriage.20 It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce
decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce.21 Philippine courts cannot try the
case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a divorce case.22 Under the principles of
comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by the spouse of foreign nationality,
but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the children or property
relations of the spouses, must still be determined by our courts.23

According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Committee, the idea of the amendment is
to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as still being married to his or her alien spouse,
although the latter is no longer married to the former because he or she had obtained a divorce
abroad that is recognized by his or national law.24 The aim was that it would solved the problem of
many Filipino women who, under the New Civil Code, are still considered married to their alien
husbands even after the latter have already validly divorced them under their (the husbands')
national laws and perhaps have already married again.25

In 2005, this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to a case where, at the time
of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them
acquired foreign citizenship by naturalization, initiated a divorce proceeding, and obtained a
favorable decree. We held in Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III:26

131
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals. In Quita, the
parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became naturalized
American citizen n 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The court therein hinted, by the
way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer
married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time
of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as foreign citizen and obtains divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be
allowed to remarry as if the other party were foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the
marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. x x x

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to
the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article
26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner;
and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of marriage,
but their citizenship at the time valid divorced obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
the latter to remarry.

Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision, a Filipino citizen has the
capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and
obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry.
Specifically, Manalo pleads for the recognition of enforcement of the divorced decree rendered by
the Japanese court and for the cancellation of the entry of marriage in the local civil registry " in
order that it would not appear anymore that she is still married to the said Japanese national who
is no longer her husband or is no longer married to her; [and], in the event that [she] decides to
be remarried, she shall not be bothered and disturbed by said entry of marriage," and to use her
maiden surname.

We rule in the affirmative.

Both Dacasin v. Dacasin28 and Van Dorn29 already recognized a foreign divorce decree that was
initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child
custody and property relation, respectively.

In Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses executed an Agreement for the joint custody of their
minor daughter. Later on, the husband who is a US citizen, sued his Filipino wife enforce the
Agreement, alleging that it was only the latter who exercised sole custody of their child. The trial
court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, on the ground, among others, that the divorce
decree is binding following the "nationality rule" prevailing in this jurisdiction. The husband moved
to reconsider, arguing that the divorce decree obtained by his former wife is void, but it was
denied. In ruling that the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit bu not to enforce the
Agreement, which is void, this Court said:

Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree's alleged invalidity - not because the Illinois court
lacked jurisdiction or that the divorced decree violated Illinois law, but because the divorce was
obtained by his Filipino spouse - to support the Agreement's enforceability . The argument that
foreigners in this jurisdiction are not bound by foreign divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dron
v. Romillo settled the matter by holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce
decree obtained abroad. There, we dismissed the alien divorcee's Philippine suit for accounting

132
of alleged post-divorce conjugal property and rejected his submission that the foreign divorce
(obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not valid in this jurisdiction x x x.30

Van Dorn was decided before the Family Code took into effect. There, a complaint was filed by
the ex-husband , who is a US citizen, against his Filipino wife to render an accounting of a
business that was alleged to be a conjugal property and to be declared with right to manage the
same. Van Dorn moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action was barred by
previous judgment in the divorce proceedings that she initiated, but the trial court denied the
motion. On his part, her ex-husband averred that the divorce decree issued by the Nevada court
could not prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that
the acts and declaration of a foreign court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public
policy, divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction . In
dismissing the case filed by the alien spouse, the Court discussed the effect of the foreign divorce
on the parties and their conjugal property in the Philippines. Thus:

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the
United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance,
private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is
contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same
being contrary to local law and public policy.

Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorce
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage
from standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the
Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794,799:

"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of
competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife,
and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as stone party, ceases
to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law.
When the law provides in the nature of penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that
party, as well as the other, is still absolutely feed from the bond of the former marriage."

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. As he is estopped by his own representation before said court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still
married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of
the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe
respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to
be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated
against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.31

In addition, the fact that a validity obtained foreign divorce initiated by the Filipino spouse can be
recognized and given legal effects in the Philippines is implied from Our rulings in Fujiki v.
Marinay, et al.32 and Medina v. Koike.33

In Fujiki, the Filipino wife, with the help of her husband, who is a Japanese national, was able to
obtain a judgment from Japan's family court. Which declared the marriage between her and her
second husband, who is a Japanese national, void on the ground of bigamy. In resolving the
issue of whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his her spouse and a foreign citizen on the
ground of bigamy, We ruled:

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the
judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the

133
personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and
Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.

There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the
integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no
doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil
registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the
substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) his most
intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the
moment he contracts marriage. These property interests in marriage included the right to be
supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family" and preserving the property regime
of the marriage.

Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, but a spouse's right in
a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations
between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. x x x34

On the other hand, in Medina, the Filipino wife and her Japanese husband jointly filed for divorce,
which was granted.1âwphi1 Subsequently, she filed a petition before the RTC for judicial
recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to Paragraph 2 of
Article 26. The RTC denied the petition on the ground that the foreign divorce decree and the
national law of the alien spouse recognizing his capacity to obtain a divorce must be proven in
accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. This Court
agreed and ruled that, consistent with Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, et al.35 and Garcia v. Recio,36 the
divorce decree and the national law of the alien spouse must be proven. Instead of dismissing the
case, We referred it to the CA for appropriate action including the reception of evidence to
determine and resolve the pertinent factual issues.

There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned rulings. When this Court
recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and
extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, it should not stop
short in a likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and necessary consequences of absolute
divorce is the right to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together and
observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist, the civil status and the
domestic relation of the former spouses change as both of them are freed from the marital bond.

The dissent is of the view that, under the nationality principle, Manalo's personal status is subject
to Philippine law, which prohibits absolute divorce. Hence, the divorce decree which she obtained
under Japanese law cannot be given effect, as she is, without dispute, a national not of Japan, bit
of the Philippines. It is said that that a contrary ruling will subvert not only the intention of the
framers of the law, but also that of the Filipino peopl, as expressed in the Constitution. The Court
is, therefore, bound to respect the prohibition until the legislature deems it fit to lift the same.

We beg to differ.

Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 speaksof "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only
requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand
that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree
was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the
respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute;
neither can We put words in the mouth of lawmakers.37 The legislature is presumed to know the
meaning of the words to have used words advisely and to have expressed its intent by the use of
such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words if a
statute there should be departure."38

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean that
the divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow
the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would
otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act.39 Law have ends to
achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and
purposes.40 As held in League of Cities of the Phils. et al. v. COMELEC et. al.: 41

134
The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which the resulting
law is couched. Thus, applying a verba legis or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may render
it meaningless and lead to inconvience, an absurd situation or injustice. To obviate this
aberration, and bearing in mind the principle that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself,
resort should be to the rule that the spirit of the law control its letter.

To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is
effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The
provision is a corrective measure is free to marry under the laws of his or her countr.42 Whether
the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving
the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result:
the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign
divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstances as a Filipino who is at the
receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a
distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the
foreign divorce decree on a Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by
operations of their alien spouses are severed by operation on the latter's national law.

Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such principle, found under Article 15
of the City Code, is not an absolute and unbending rule. In fact, the mer e existence of Paragraph
2 of Article 26 is a testament that the State may provide for an exception thereto. Moreover, blind
adherence to the nationality principle must be disallowed if it would cause unjust discrimination
and oppression to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected by law. The
courts have the duty to enforce the laws of divorce as written by the Legislature only if they are
constitutional.43

While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification and that its
decision is accorded recognition and respect by the court of justice, such classification may be
subjected to judicial review.44 The deference stops where the classification violates a fundamental
right, or prejudices persons accorded special protection by the Constitution.45 When these
violations arise, this Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional
guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional limitations.46 If a
legislative classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or
operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class strict judicial scrutiny is required since it
is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to prove that the
classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive
means to protect such interest.47

"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause
are those basic liberties explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution.48 It includes the right
to free speech, political expression, press, assembly, and forth, the right to travel, and the right to
vote.49 On the other hand, what constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale
rights and powers arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history.50 It is akin to the
paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties must give way, such as the
promotion of public interest, public safety or the general welfare.51 It essentially involves a public
right or interest that, because of its primacy, overrides individual rights, and allows the former to
take precedence over the latter.52

Although the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress, the same principle applies with
respect to the acts of the President which have the force and effect of law unless declared
otherwise by the court. In this case, We find that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 violates one of the
essential requisites53 of the equal protection clause.54 Particularly, the limitation of the provision
only to a foreign divorce decree initiated by the alien spouse is unreasonable as it is based on
superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification.

A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a Filipino who is married
to a foreign citizen. There are real, material and substantial differences between them. Ergo, they
should not be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and liabilities imposed. Without a doubt,
there are political, economic cultural, and religious dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems
and procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino national who is married to an alien spouse has
to contend with. More importantly, while a divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino against

135
another Filipino is null and void, a divorce decree obtained by an alien against his her Filipino
spouse is recognized if made in accordance with the national law of the foreigner.55

On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a
foreign divorce proceedings a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or
her alien spouse . In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos
who have the same rights and obligations in a alien land. The circumstances surrounding them
are alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner spouses
who are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between them based
merely on the superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is
utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against
the other.

Further, the differentiation in Paragraph 2 Article 26 is arbitrary. There is inequality in treatment

because a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by a Filipino citizen against his
or her alien spouse would not be recognized even if based on grounds similar to Articles 35, 36,
37 and 38 of the Family Code.56 In filing for divorce based on these grounds, the Filipino spouse
cannot be accused of invoking foreign law at whim, tantamount to insisting that he or she should
be governed with whatever law he or she chooses. The dissent's comment that Manalo should be
"reminded that all is not lost, for she may still pray for the severance of her martial ties before the
RTC in accordance with the mechanism now existing under the Family Code" is anything but
comforting. For the guidance of the bench and the bar, it would have been better if the dissent
discussed in detail what these "mechanism" are and how they specifically apply in Manalo's case
as well as those who are similarly situated. If the dissent refers to a petition for declaration of
nullity or annulment of marriage, the reality is that there is no assurance that our courts will
automatically grant the same. Besides, such proceeding is duplicitous, costly, and protracted. All
to the prejudice of our kababayan.

It is argued that the Court's liberal interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 encourages Filipinos
to marry foreigners, opening the floodgate to the indiscriminate practice of Filipinos marrying
foreign nationals or initiating divorce proceedings against their alien spouses.

The supposition is speculative and unfounded.

First, the dissent falls into a hasty generalization as no data whatsoever was sworn to support
what he intends to prove. Second, We adhere to the presumption of good faith in this jurisdiction.
Under the rules on evidence, it is disputable presumed (i.e., satisfactory if uncontradicted and
overcome by other evidence) that a person is innocent of crime or wrong,57 that a person takes
ordinary care of his concerns,59 that acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced
in was conformable to the law and fact, 60 that a man and woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage,61 and that the law has been
obeyed.62 It is whimsical to easily attribute any illegal, irregular or immoral conduct on the part of
a Filipino just because he or she opted to marry a foreigner instead of a fellow Filipino. It is
presumed that interracial unions are entered into out of genuine love and affection, rather than
prompted by pure lust or profit. Third, We take judicial notice of the fact that Filipinos are relatively
more forbearing and conservative in nature and that they are more often the victims or losing end
of mixed marriages. And Fourth, it is not for Us to prejudge the motive behind Filipino's decision
to marry an alien national. In one case, it was said:

Motive for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot
dictated on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle
would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions.
The right marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way
they see it fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or
not, and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as
convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal
requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not
the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support
a marriage.63

The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.64 Nevertheless, it was not meant to
be a general prohibition on divorce because Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon, in

136
response to a question by Father Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, was categorical about this point.65 Their exchange reveal as follows:

MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I ask that Commissioner Bernas be recognized.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco). Commissioner Bernas is recognized.

FR. BERNAS. Just one question, and I am not sure if it has been categorically answered. I refer
specifically to the proposal of Commissioner Gascon. Is this be understood as a prohibition of a
general law on divorce? His intention is to make this a prohibition so that the legislature cannot
pass a divorce law.

MR. GASCON. Mr. Presding Officer, that was not primarily my intention. My intention was
primarily to encourage the social institution of marriage, but not necessarily discourage divorce.
But now that the mentioned the issue of divorce, my personal opinion is to discourage it. Mr.
Presiding Officer.

FR. BERNAS. No my question is more categorical. Does this carry the meaning of prohibiting a
divorce law?

MR. GASCON. No Mr. Presiding Officer.

FR. BERNAS. Thank you.66

Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in our country. Effectivity March 11, 1917,
Philippine courts could grant an absolute divorce in the grounds of adultery on the part of the wife
or concubinage on the part of the husband by virtue of Act No. 2710 of the Philippine
Legislature.67 On March 25, 1943, pursuant to the authority conferred upon him by the
Commander-in-Chief fo the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines and with the approval of
the latter, the Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission promulgated an E.O. No. 141
("New Divorce Law"), which repealed Act No. 2710 and provided eleven ground for absolute
divorce, such as intentional or unjustified desertion continuously for at least one year prior to the
filing of the action, slander by deed or gross insult by one spouse against the other to such an
extent as to make further living together impracticable, and a spouse's incurable insanity.68 When
the Philippines was liberated and the Commonwealth Government was restored, it ceased to
have force and effect and Act No. 2710 again prevailed.69 From August 30, 1950, upon the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 836 or the New Civil Code, an absolute divorce obatined by Filipino
citizens, whether here or abroad, is no longer recognized.70

Through the years, there has been constant clamor from various sectors of the Philippine society
to re-institute absolute divorce. As a matte of fcat, in the currnet 17th Congress, House Bill (H.B.)
Nos. 11671 106272 238073 and 602774 were filed in the House of representatives. In substitution of
these bills, H.B. No. 7303 entitled "An Act Instituting Absolute Divorce and Dissolution of
Marriage in the Philippines" or the Absolute Divorce Act of 2018 was submitted by the House
Committee on Population

And Family Relations of February 8, 2018. It was approved on March 19, 2018 on Third Reading
- with 134 in favor, 57 against, and 2 absentations. Under the bill, the grounds for a judicial
decree of absolute divorce are as follows:

1. The grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code, modified or amended, as
follows:

a. Physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child,
or a child of the petitioner;

b. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political
affiliation;

c. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of a

petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;

137
d. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six (6) years, even if
pardoned;

e. Drug addiction or habitual alchoholism ro chronic gambling of respondent;

f. Homosexuality of the respondent;

g. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the Philippines

or abroad;

h. Marital infidelity or perversion or having a child with another person other than one's spouse
during the marriage, except when upon the mutual agreement of the spouses, a child is born to
them by in vitro or a similar procedure or when the wife bears a child after being a victim of rape;

i. attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner, a common child or a child of a
petitioner; and

j. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one (1) year.

When the spouses are legally separated by judicial decree for more thath two (2) years, either or
both spouses can petition the proper court for an absolute divorce based on said judicial decree
of legal separation.

1. Grounds for annulment of marriage under Article 45 of the Family Code restated as follows:

a. The party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen (18) years
of age or over but below twety-one (21), and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of
the parents guradian or personl having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order,
unless after attaining the age of twenty-one (21) such party freely cohabited with the other and
both lived together as husband and wife;

b. either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited
with the other as husband and wife;

c. The consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards with full
knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other husband and wife;

d. consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the same
having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband
and wife;

e. Either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other and such
incapacity continues or appears to be incurable; and

f. Either part was afflicted with the sexually transmissible infection found to be serious or appears
to be incurable.

Provided, That the ground mentioned in b, e and f existed either at the time of the marriage or
supervening after the marriage.

1. When the spouses have been separated in fact for at least five (5) years at the time the petition
for absolute divorce is filed, and the reconciliation is highly improbable;

2. Psychological incapacity of either spouse as provided for in Article 36 of the Family Code,
whether or not the incapacity was present at the time of the celebration of the marriage or later;

3. When one of the spouses undergoes a gender reassignment surgery or transition from one sex
to another, the other spouse is entitled to petition for absolute divorce with the transgender or
transsexual as respondent, or vice-versa;

138
4. Irreconcilable marital differences and conflicts which have resulted in the total breakdown of
the marriage beyond repair, despite earnest and repeated efforts at reconciliation.

To be sure, a good number of Filipinos led by the Roman Catholic Church react adversely to any
attempt to enact a law on absolute divorce, viewing it as contrary to our customs, morals, and
traditions that has looked upon marriage and family as an institution and their nature of
permanence,

In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with
religion, it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do. They can neither cause the
government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they cause the
government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere
to a particular religion and, thus establish a state religion.76

The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the
rest of the citizenry nor can it demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it is sincerely
believes that they are good for country.77 While marriage is considered a sacrament, it has civil
and legal consequences which are governed by the Family Code.78 It is in this aspect, bereft of
any ecclesiastical overtone, that the State has a legitimate right and interest to regulate.

The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is a foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State, should not be read in total isolation but must be
harmonized with other constitutional provision. Aside from strengthening the solidarity of the
Filipino family, the State is equally mandated to actively promote its total development.79 It is also
obligated to defend, among others, the right of children to special protection from all forms of
neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development.80 To
Our mind, the State cannot effectively enforce these obligation s if We limit the application of
Paragraph 2 or Article 26 only those foreign divorce initiated by the alien spouse. It is not amiss to
point that the women and children are almost always the helpless victims of all forms of domestic
abuse and violence. In fact, among the notable legislation passed in order to minimize, if not
eradicate, the menace are R.A. No. 9262 ("Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act
of 2004") R.A. No. 9710 ("The Magna Carta of Women"), R.A. No 10354 ("The Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012") and R.A. No 9208 ("Anti-Trafficking in Person
Act of 2003"), as amended by R.A. No. 10364 ("ExpandedAnti-Trafficking in Persons Act of
2012"). Moreover, in protecting and strengthening the Filipino family as a basic autonomous
social institution, the Court must not lose sight of the constitutional mandate to value the dignity of
every human person, guarantee full respect for human rights, and ensure the fundamental
equality before the law of women and men.81

A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good. If We disallow a
Filipino citizen who initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the coverage of Paragraph 2
Article 26 and still require him or her to first avail of the existing "mechanisms" under the Family
Code, any subsequent relationship that he or she would enter in the meantime shall be
considered as illicit in the eyes of the Philippine law. Worse, any child born out such "extra-
marital" affair has to suffer the stigma of being branded as illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a
few of the adverse consequences, not only to the parent but also to the child, if We are to hold a
restrictive interpretation of the subject provision. The irony is that the principle of inviolability of
marriage under Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution is meant to be tilted in favor of marriage
and against unions not formalized by marriage, but without denying State protection and
assistance to live-in arrangements or to families formed according to indigenous customs.82

This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present time. With the advancement
of communication and information technology, as well as the improvement of the transportation
system that almost instantly connect people from all over the world, mixed marriages have
become not too uncommon. Likewise, it is recognized that not all marriages are made in heaven
and that imperfect humans more often than not create imperfect unions.83 Living in a flawed
world, the unfortunate reality for some is that the attainment of the individual's full human
potential and self fulfillment is not found and achieved in the context of a marriage. Thus it is
hypocritical to safeguard the quantity of existing marriages and, at the same time, brush aside the
truth that some of them are rotten quality.

Going back, we hold that marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties,
cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from

139
the marital bond while the other remains bound to it.84 In reiterating that the Filipino spouse
should not be discriminated against in his or her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served, San Luis v. San Luis85 quoted:

x x x In Alonzo v. Intermediate Applellate Court, the Court stated:

But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results: and likewise, we may add, by its
purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the
judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law
should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the
legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of
the legislature, is to render justice.

Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law
and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that,
while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because only of our
nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What
we do instead is find a balance between the sord and the will, that justice may be done even as
the law is obeyed.

As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it
worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence.
"Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of law," so we are warned, by Justice
Holmes agaian, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond them."

xxxx

More that twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to
render every one of his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the
facts and the law in ever case brought to it for decisions. Justice is always an essential ingredient
of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrant, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice,
presuming that it was the intention if the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with
justice.86

Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to
mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed
according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law.87 A
statute may therefore, be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as
they come within its spirit or intent.88

The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet write finis to this controversy by granting Manalo's
petition to recognize and enforce the divorce decree rendered by the Japanese court and to
cancel the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila.

Jurisprudence has set guidelines before the Philippine courts recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of foreign country.
Presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice.89 The fact of divorce must still first be
proven.90 Before a a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it
must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.91

x x x Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first
be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce
decree itself. The decree purports to be written act or record of an act of an official body or
tribunal of foreign country.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven
as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy
thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in
the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b)authenticated by the seal of his office.92

140
In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted:

In this case, Petitioner was able to submit before the court a quo the 1) Decision of the Japanese
Court allowing the divorce; 2) the Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippines Consulate
General in Osaka, Japan of the Decree of Divorce; and 3) Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce
byu the Petitioner and the Japanese national. Under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to
Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules of Court, these documents sufficiently prove the subject
Divorce Decree as a fact. Thus, We are constrained to recognize the Japanese Court's judgment
decreeing the divorce.93

If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the divorce decree is rendered
admissible a a written act of the foreign court.94 As it appears, the existence of the divorce decree
was not denied by the OSG; neither was the jurisdiction of the divorce court impeached nor the
validity of its proceedings challenged on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or
law, albeit an opportunity to do so.95

Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.

x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing
necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of
proving the material defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their
answer when they introduce new matters. x x x

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like
any other facts, they must alleged and proved. x x x The power of judicial notice must be exercise
d with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.96

Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent Japanese law
validating it, as well as her former husband's capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her.
Japanese laws on persons and family relations are not among those matters that Filipino judges
are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The September 18, 2014 Decision
and October 12, 2015 Resolution if the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV. No. 100076, are
AFFIRMED IN PART. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings and
reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.

SO ORDERED

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

On leave

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO*

Chief Justice

Chairperson

141
ALEXANDER G. GESMUNDO

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Acting Chief Justice

Footnotes

*
On leave

**
Acting Chief Justice per Special Order No. 2539 dated February 28, 2018.

***
No part

1
Penned by Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion, with Associate Justices Vicente S.E.
Veloso and Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela concurring; rollo, pp. 23-21.

2
Rollo, pp. 32-33.

3
Id. at 30. (emphasis in the original)

4
Id. at 42-43.

5
Id. at 25, 37-38.

6
Id. at 40-41.

7
663 Phil. 546 (2011).

8
223 Phil. 357 (1985).

9
Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals, 543 Phil. 568, 575 (2007), citing Garcia v. Recio, 418 Phil.
723, 735-736 (2001).

10
Garcia v. Recio, supra, at 730 and Medina v. Koike, G.R. No. 215723, July 27, 2016, 798
SCRA 733, 739.

142
11
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a)

12
Art 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills and other public instruments shall be
governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.

When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic
of the Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution.

Prohobited laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object
public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgements promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
(11a)

13
Techaves v. Escano, et al., 122 Phil. 752, 759-760 (1965), as cited in Cang v. Court of
Appeals, 357 Phil. 129, 162 (1998); Llorente v. Court of Appeals, 399 Phil. 342, 356 (2000); and
Perez v. Court of Appeals, 516 Phil. 204, 211 (2006). See also Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9, at
730; Republic v. Iyoy, 507 Phil. 485, 504 (2005); and Lavadia v. Heirs of Juan Luces Luna, 739
Phil. 331, 341-342 (2014).

14
Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9, at 730-731.

15
FAMILY CODE, Article 26, Paragraph 2. See also Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9, at 730 and
Medina v. Koike , supra Note 10.

16
Republic of the Phils. V. Orbecido III, 509 Phil. 108, 112 (2005), as cited in San Luis v. San
Luis, 543 Phil. 275, 291 (2007).

17
Id. at 112-113, as cited in San Luis v. San Luis, supra.

18
Id. at 113, as cited in San Luis v. San Luis, supra.

19
Sempio-Diy, Alicia V., HANDBOOK ON THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 1988, PP.
26-27.

20
Medina v. Koike, supra note 10 and Fujiki v. Marinay 712 Phil. 524, 555 (2013).

21
Fujiki v. Marinay, supra.

22
Id.

23
See Vda. de Catalan v. Catalan-Lee, 681 Phil. 493, 498 (2012); Roehr v. Rodriguez, 452 Phil.
608, 717-618 (2003); and 2003); and Llorenre v. Court of Appeals, supra note 13.

24
Supra note 19, at 27, See also Republic of the Phils. V. Orbecido III, supra note 16, at 114, as
cited in Fujiki v. Marinay, supra note 20, at 555 and San Luis v. San Luis, supra note 16, at 292.

25
Supra note 19, at 27

26
Supra note 16.

27
Id. at 114-115 (Citations omitted).

28
625 Phil. 494 (2010).

29
Supra note 8.

30
Dacasin v. Dacasin, supra, at 507. (Citations omitted; underscoring ours)

31
Van Dorn v. Judge Romillo, Jr. supra note 8, at 361-363 (Citations omitted).

143
32
Supra note 20.

33
Supra note 10.

34
Fujiki v. Marinay et al. supra note 20, at 549-550. (Citations omitted).

35
642 Phil. 420 (2010).

36
Supra note 9.

37
Commissioner of Customs v. Manila Star Ferry, Inc. 298 Phil. 79, 86 (1993).

38
Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. v. NLRC, 283 Phil. 649, 660 (1992), as cited in Victoria
v. Commission on Elections, 299 Phil. 263, 268 (1994); Enjay Inc. v. NLRC, 315 Phil. 648, 656
(1995); and Pioneer Texturizing Corp. v. NLRC, 345 Phil. 1057, 1073 (1997). See also National
Food Authority v. Masada Security Agency, Inc. 493 Phil. 241, 251 (2005); Rural Bank of the San
Miguel, Inc. v. Monetary Board, 545 Phil. 62, 72 (2007); Rep. of the Phils. v. Lacap, 546 Phil. 87,
100 (2007); and Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corp. (PAGCOR) v. Phil. Gaming Jurisdiction Inc.
(PEJI), et al., 604 Phil. 547, 553 (2009).

39
Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC, 312 Phil. 259, 268 (1995).

40
Id.

41
623 Phil. 531, 564-565 (2009)

42
Fujiki v. Marinay supra note 20, at 555.

43
See Barreto Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 58 Phil. 67, 72 (1933), as cited in Techavez v. Escaño, et
al. supra note 13, at 762.

44
See Assn. of Small Landowners in the Phils., Inc. v. Hon. Secretary of Agrarian Reform , 256
Phil. 777, 808 (1989) and Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. v. Cabiles, 740 Phil. 403,
436 (2014).

45
Central Bank Employees Assn., Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 487 Phil. 531, 597 (2004)
as cited in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. 601 Phil. 245, 436 (2009). See also Puno
C.J., Separate Concurring Opinion, Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, 632 Phil. 32, 100
(2010); Brion J., Separate Opinion, Biraogo v. Phil. Truth Commission of 2010, 651. 374, 550
(2010); and Leonardo-De Castro, Jr., Concurring Opinion, Garcia v. Judge Drillon, et al., 712 Phil
44, 125 (2013).

46
Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, supra.

47
Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. et al. 601 Phil. 245, 282 (2009) and Mosqueda
Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association , Inc. G.R. Nos, 189185 & 189305, August 16,
2016, 800 SCRA 313, 360. See also Brion, J., Separate Opinion, Biraogo v. Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010, supra Velasco, Jr., J. Concurring Opinion, International Service for the
Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc., v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Phils.) , et al., 774
Phil. 508, 706 (2015); and Jardeleza, J., March 8, 2016, 786 SCRA 1, 904.

48
Brion, J., Separate Opinion, Biraogo v. Philippines Truith Commission of 2010, supra note 45,
at 553.

49
See Morales, J., Dissenting Opinion, Central Bank Employees Assn., Inc. v. Bangko Senral ng
Pilipinas, 487 Phil. 531, 697-698 (2004) as cited by Brion, J. Separate Opinion, Biraogo v.
Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, supra note 45, at 533, and Leonen, J., Separate Opinion,
Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442 August 8, 2017.

50
Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. , et al., 601 Phil. 245, 298 (2009).

144
51
Id.

52
Brion J., Separate Concurring Opinion, Sps. Imbong v. Hon. Ochoa, Jr., et al., 732 Phil. 1, 326-
327 (2014).

53
To be valid, the classification must conform to the following requirements:

1.) It must rest on substantial distinctions.

2.) It must be germane to the purpose of the law.

3.) It must not be limited to existing conditions only.

4.) It must apply to all members of the same class. (See PAGCOR v. Bureau of Internal
Revenue, 660 Phil. 636, 648 [2011]; Maj. Gen. Garcia v. The Executive Secretary et. al. 692 Phil.
114, 141-142 [2012]; Corpuz v. People, 734 Phil. 353, 405 [2014]; Ferrer, Jr. v. Mayor Bautista,
762 Phil. 233, 277 (2015); Drugstores Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. National Council on
Disability Affairs, G.R. No. 194561, September 14, 2016, 803 SCRA 25, 22; Ocampo v. Enriquez,
G.R. Nos. 225973, 225984, 226097, 226116, 226120 & 226294, November 8, 2016; and
Mindanao Shopping Destination Corp. v. Duterte, G.R. No. 211093, June 6, 2017).

54
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution states:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

55
Tenchavez v. Escano, et al., supra note 13, as cited in Cang v. Court of Appeals, supra note
13;; Llorente v. Court of Appeals supra note 13; and Perez v. Court of Appeals, supra note 13.
See also Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9, at 730; Republic v. Iyoy, supra, note 13; and Lavadia v.
Heirs of Juan Luces Luna, supra note 13. FAMILY CODE, Article 26 Pragraph 2. See also Garcia
v. Recio, supra note 9, at 730 and Medina v. Koike, supra note 10.

56
Art. 35 The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of parents
or guardians;

(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such
marriages were contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing
officer had the leagl authority to do so;

(3) Those solemnized without a license, except covered by preceding Chapter;

(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriage not falling under article 41;

(5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other; and

(6) those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after solemnization. (As amended
by E.O. 227)

Art 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether the
relationship between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate:

(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and

(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of full or half blood.

145
Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy:

(1) Between collateral blood relatives, whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil
degree;

(2) Between step-parents and step-children;

(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;

(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;

(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;

(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;

(7) Between the adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;

(8) Between the adopted children of the same adopter; and

(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other person's
spouse or his her own spouse. (82)

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall
be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had
been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has well founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under
the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only
two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the
absent spouse. (83a)

Art. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, and he delivery of the children's presumptive
legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise,
the same shall not affect third persons.(n)

Art. 53 Either of the former spouses may marry again after complying with the requirements of the
immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the subsequent marriage shall be null and void.

57
REL 131, Section 3(a).

58
Id., Section 3(c).

59
Id., Section 3(d).

60
Id., Section 3(x)..

61
Id., Section 3(aa).

62
Id., Section 3(ff).

63
Rep. of the Phils. v. Albios, 719 Phil. 622, 636 (2013).

64
1987 CONSTITUTION, Article XV, Section 2. This echoed the Family Code provision, which
provides:

146
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered
into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of
the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.

65
Bernas, Joaquin G., S.J., THE INTENT OF THE 1986 CONSTITUTION WRITERS, 1995
Edition , pp. 1132 citing V. RECORD 41.

66
Reconrd of the Constitutional Commission: Proceedings and Debates, Volume V September
24, 1986, p. 41.

67
See Garcia Valdez v. Soteraña Tuason, 40 Phil. 943, 944 (1920); Francisco v. Tayao, 50 Phil.
42 (1927); People v. Bitdu, 58 Phil. 817 (1933); Sikat v. Cason, 67 Phil. 207 (1939); and Arca, et
al. v. Javier, 95. Phil. 579 (1954)

68
See Baptista v. Castañeda, 76 Phil. 461 (1946); Luz v. Court of First Instance of Tacloban, 77
Phil. 679 (1946); Antonio v. Reyes, 519 Phil. 337 (2006).

69
Baptista v. Castañeda supra at 463.

70
Tenchavez v. Escano, et. al., supra note 13; and Perez v. Court of Appeals, supra note 13. See
also Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9, at 730; Republic v. Iyoy, supra note 13; and Lavadia v. Heirs
of Juan Luces Luna, 739 Phil, 331, 341-342 (2014).

71
Entitled "Instituting Absolute Divorce in the Philippines, Amending for the Purpose,' with
Representative Edcel C. Lagman as Principal Author.

72
Entitled "An Act Amending Title I, Chapter 3 of Executive No. 209, Otherwise known as the
Family Code of the Philippines, Prescribing Additional Ground for Annulment," with
Representative Robert Ace Barbers as Principal Author.

73
Entitled "An Act Introducing Divorce in the Philippines, Amending foe the Purpose Articles 26,
55 to 66 and Repealing Article 36 Under Title II of Executive Order No. 209, As Amended,
Otherwise Known as the Family Code of the Philippines, and For Other Purposes," with Gabriela
Women's Party Representatives Emmi A. De Jesus and Arlene D. Brosas as principal authors.

74
Entitled "An Act Providing for Grounds for the Dissolution of Marriage," with Representatives
Teddy B. Baguilat, Jr. Rodel M. Batocabe, Arlene D. Brosas, Ariel B. Casilao, France L. Castro,
Nancy A. Catamco, Pia S. Cayetano, Emmi A. De Jesus, Sarah Jane I. Elago, Gwedolyn F.
Garcia, Ana Cristina Siquian Go. Edcel C. Lagman, Pantaleon D. Alvarez, Antonio L. Tinio, and
Carlos Isagani T. Zarate as Principal Authors.

75
See Leone, J. dissenting in Matudan v. Republic, G.R. No 203284, November 14, 2016.

76
Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC (Resolution), March 7, 2017.

77
See Sps. Imbong , et al. v. Hon. Ochoa , Jr. et al., 732 Phil. 1, 167 (2014).

78
Tilar v. Tilar G.R. No. 214529, July 12, 2017.

79
Article XV, Section 1.

80
Article XV, Section 3(2).

81
Article II, Sectioons 11, 12 and 14. See also Republic Act Nos. 7192 ("Women in Development
and Nation Building Act") and 9710 ("The Magna Carta of Women").

82
Bernas, Joaquin G. S.J., THE INTENT OF THE 1986 CONSTITUTION WRITERS, 1995
Edition, pp. 1132, citing V. RECORD 40, 44.

147
83
See Paras v. Paras, 555 Phil.786, 804 (2007)

84
San Luis v. San Luis, supra note 16, at 292-293.

85
Supra note 16.

86
San Luis v. San Luis, supra note 16, at 293-294.

87
Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III, supra note 16, at 115.

88
Id.

89
Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9, at 731, as cited in Vda. de Catalan v. Catalan-Lee, supra note
23, at 501.

90
Fujiki v. Marinay, supra note 20, at 544 and Vda. de Catalan v. Catalan-Lee, supra note 23, at
499.

91
Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9, at 731, as cited in Medina v. Koike, supra note 10 and Republic
of the Phils. v. Orbecido III, supra note 16, at 116. See also Bayot v. The Hon. Court of Appeals,
et al. 591 Phil. 45, 470 (2008).

92
Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9, at 732-733. (Citations omitted). See also Vda. de Catalan v.
Catalan-Lee, supra note 23, at 499 and 501-502 and San Luis v. San Luis, supra note 16, at 294.

93
Rollo, pp. 29-30.

94
Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9, at 733-734.

95
See Bayot v. Hoen Coutrt of Appeals, et al., supra note 75, at 470-471; and Roehr v.
Rodriguez, supra note 23, at 617.

96
Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9 at 735. (Citations omitted). See also Vda. de Catalan v. Catalan-
Lee, supra note 23, at 500-501; San Luis v. San Luis, supra note 16, at 295; Republic of the
Phils. v. Orbecido, III, supra note 16, at 116; Llorente v. Court of Appeals, supra note 13,
354.G.R. No. 224548

MARLYN MONTON NULLADA, Petitioner

vs.

THE HON. CIVIL REGISTRAR OF MANILA, AKIRA ITO, SHIN ITO AND ALL PERSONS WHO
HAVE OR CLAIM ANY INTEREST, Respondents

DECISION

A. REYES, JR., J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which
seeks to assail the Decision1 dated January 21, 2016 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
43 of Manila in Special Proceedings Case No. 14-132832, that denied the recognition of a foreign
divorce that was obtained by petitioner Marlyn Monton Nullada (Marlyn) with Japanese national
Akira Ito (Akira).

The Antecedents

The action arose from a Petition2 for registration and/or recognition of foreign divorce decree and
cancellation of entry of marriage that was filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, in relation to
Article 26 of the Family Code, by Marlyn in 2014 with the RTC of Manila. She claimed that on July
29, 1997, she and Akira got married in Katsushika-Ku, Tokyo, Japan, as evidenced by a Report

148
of Marriage3 that was issued by the Philippine Embassy in Tokyo, Japan. The document was
registered with both the Office of the Local Civil Registry of Manila and the then National
Statistics Office, Civil Registry Division.4

The union of Marlyn and Akira resulted in the birth of a child, Shin Ito. Their relationship, however,
eventually turned sour and so they later decided to obtain a divorce by mutual agreement. In
2009, Akira and Marlyn secured a divorce decree in Japan. The Divorce Certificate5 that was
issued by the Embassy of Japan in the Philippines reads as follows:

Cert. No. IB12-08573-12

DIVORCE CERTIFICATE

Name: MARLYN MONTON NULLADA

Date of Birth: SEPTEMBER 03, 1968

Nationality: FILIPINO

Name of Spouse: AKIRA ITO

Date of Marriage: JULY 29, 1997

Date of Divorce: NOVEMBER 16, 2009

This is to certify that the above statement has been made on the basis of the Official Family
Register issued by the Head of Katsushika-ku, Tokyo, Japan on February 06, 2013. This
certificate is issued for the purpose of the process of Notification of Foreign Divorce in the
Republic of the Philippines.

Marlyn and Akira's acceptance of the notification of divorce by agreement was supported by an
Acceptance Certificate6 that was issued by the Head of Katsushika-ku in Japan, an English
translation of which forms part of the records.

As she sought a recognition of the divorce decree in the Philippines, Marlyn filed with the RTC the
petition that ended with the following prayer:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that, after notice and hearing,
judgment be rendered as follows:

1. Recognizing the divorce obtained by [Marlyn and Akira], which was validly decreed in Japan
thus dissolving their marriage, to be likewise valid and effective in Philippine jurisdiction;

2. Ordering respondent Hon. Civil Registrar of Manila to cancel the entry of marriage of [Marlyn
and Akira] recorded in the Office of the Local Civil Registry of Manila;

149
3.Ordering respondent Hon. Civil Registrar of Manila to register the Japan divorce decree of
[Marlyn and Akira] in the entry of marriage recorded in the Office of the Local Civil Registry of
Manila, and;

4. Declaring [Marlyn's] marriage to [Akira] as dissolved with a pronouncement that petitioner

[Marlyn] shall have the capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

Petitioner prays for other relief just and equitable under the premises.7

The RTC found the petition to be in due form and substance, and thus, issued an Order of
Hearing8 with order for publication. Copies of the petition were also ordered served upon the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila.9 On February
12, 2015, the OSG entered its appearance for the Republic of the Philippines, and then deputized
the City Prosecutor of Manila for assistance in all the hearings of the case.10 Given proof of
compliance with the action's jurisdictional requirements, trial before the RTC ensued.11

During the trial, Marlyn testified mainly to identify the following pieces of documentary evidence
that were submitted to support the petition:

(1) Report of Marriage12 (Exhibit "H") that was issued by the Embassy of the Republic of the
Philippines in Japan on the registration with the embassy of Akira and Marlyn's marriage on July
29, 1997 in Japan;

(2) Authentication Certificate of the Report of Marriage13 (Exhibit "H-1");

(3) Divorce Certificate14 (Exhibit "J") issued by the Embassy of Japan in the Philippines on the
basis of the Official Family Register issued by the Head of Katsushika-ku, Tokyo, Japan;

(4) Authentication Certificate of the Divorce Certificate15 (Exhibit "J-1");

(5) Acceptance Certificate16 (translated in English) (Exhibit "L"); and

(6) Excerpts of the Japanese Civil Code17 (Exhibit "M").

Marlyn also identified and submitted a Judicial Affidavit18 (Exliibits "N," and "N-1"), which was
adopted as her direct testimony.19 Mary Ann Chico, registration officer of the Local Civil Registrar
of Manila, also testified in court to present original copies of the divorce and authentication
certificates that were filed with local civil registry.20

Akira did not file an Answer to the petition, notwithstanding summons by publication. The
Republic also did not offer any evidence to rebut the case of Marlyn.21

Ruling of the RTC

On January 21, 2016, the RTC rendered its Decision denying the petition. The fallo of the RTC
decision reads:

ACCORDINGLY, the Petition is DENIED.

Notify the parties/counsels/Trial Prosecutor and the Office of the Solicitor General.

SO ORDERED.22

Under the third paragraph of Article 1723 of the New Civil Code is a policy of non-recognition of
divorce. For the trial court, the fact that Marlyn also agreed to the divorce and jointly filed for it
with Akira barred the application of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, which
would have otherwise allowed a Filipino spouse to remarry after the alien spouse had validly
obtained a divorce.24 While the intent of the law is to equalize Filipinos with their foreigner
spouses who are free to marry again after the divorce, the Filipino spouse cannot invoke the
intention of equity behind the law when he or she is an initiator or active participant in procuring
the divorce.25

150
Dissatisfied, Marlyn moved for reconsideration but her motion was denied by the trial court via an
Order dated April 26, 2016.26 This prompted Marlyn to file the present petition for review on
certiorari.

The Present Petition

Marlyn seeks to justify her immediate recourse to the Court by explaining that the present petition
involves a pure question of law based on a lone issue, as follows: Whether or not Article 26,
paragraph 2 of the Family Code has a restrictive application so as to apply only in cases where it
is the alien spouse who sought the divorce, and not where the divorce was mutually agreed upon
by the spouses.27

The Court's Ruling

The Court finds merit in the petition.

At the outset, the Court explains that it allows the direct recourse from the decision of the RTC on
the ground that the petition raises a pure question of law on the proper application of Article 26 of
the Family Code. "[D]irect recourse to this Court from the decisions and final orders of the RTC
may be taken where only questions of law are raised or involved."28 In this case, the RTC's
resolve to dismiss the petition filed before it delved solely on its application of the statutory
provision to the facts undisputed before it. This question of law was directly resolved by the Court
in the recent case of Republic of the Philippines v. Marelyn Tanedo Manalo,29 which was
promulgated by the Court subsequent to the filing of the present petition.

The legal provision that is pertinent to the case is Article 26 of the Family Code, which states:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), [36, 37] and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Underscoring ours)

The facts in Manalo are similar to the circumstances in this case. A divorce decree between a
Filipino and a Japanese national was obtained by the spouses upon a case that was filed in
Japan by Manalo, the Filipino spouse. Initially, the recognition of the divorce decree in the
Philippines was rejected by the RTC where the petition for recognition and enforcement of a
foreign judgment was filed, as the trial court cited Article 15 of the New Civil Code and reasoned
that as a rule, "the Philippine law 'does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce, whether
they are in the country or living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they
celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in another country x x x[.]"' On appeal to the Court
of Appeals (CA), however, the RTC decision was overturned. The appellate court held that Article
26 of the Family Code should apply even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce. The decree made
the Japanese spouse no longer married to Manalo; he then had the capacity to remarry. It would
be unjust to still deem Manalo married to the Japanese who, in turn, was no longer married to
her. The fact that it was Manalo who filed the divorce was inconsequential. This ruling of the CA
was then affirmed by the Court in Manalo upon a petition for review on certiorari that was filed by
the Republic of the Philippines.

Applying the same legal considerations and considering the similar factual milieu that attended in
Manalo, the present case warrants a reversal of the RTC's decision that refused to recognize the
divorce decree that was mutually obtained by Marlyn and her foreigner spouse in Japan solely on
the ground that the divorce was jointly initiated by the spouses. The Court finds no reason to
deviate from its recent disposition on the issue, as made in Manalo, thus:

Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision [Art. 26], a Filipino citizen
has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and
obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry. x x
x.

151
We rule in the affirmative.

In the Manalo decision, the Court went on to cite jurisprudence wherein the legal effects of a
foreign divorce decree, albeit obtained by a Filipino spouse, were acknowledged in our
jurisdiction but limited on the issues of child custody30 and property relations.31 In several other
jurisprudence,32 recognition of the effects of a foreign divorce was also implied from the Court's
disposition of the cases. The specific issue on the binding effect of a divorce decree obtained by
a Filipino spouse on one's marital status was then expressly and directly tackled by the Court. In
determining whether a divorce decree obtained by a foreigner spouse should be recognized in
the Philippines, it is immaterial that the divorce is sought by the Filipino national. The Court
reasoned:

There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned rulings. When this Court
recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and
extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, it should not stop
short in likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and necessary consequences of absolute
divorce is the right to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together and
observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist, the civil status and the
domestic relation of the former spouses change as both of them are freed from the marital bond.

xxxx

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien
capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only
requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand
that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce
decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the
respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute;
neither can We put words in the mouths of the lawmakers. "The legislature is presumed to know
that meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the
use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words
of a statute there should be no departure."

xxxx

To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is
effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The
provision is a corrective measure to address an anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to the
marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. Whether
the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving
the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result:
the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign
divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the
receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a
distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the
foreing divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by
operation of the latter's national law. (Emphasis ours)

While opposition to the foregoing interpretation is commonly raised on the basis of the nationality
principle, such principle is not an absolute and unbending rule. The second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code should be deemed an exception to the general rule.33

Applying the foregoing to the present case, the assailed Decision of the RTC warrants the Court's
reversal. The dismissal of Marlyn's petition based on the trial court's interpretation of Article 26 of
the Family Code is erroneous in light of the Court's disposition in Manalo. The fact that the
divorce was by the mutual agreement of Marlyn and Aldra was not sufficient ground to reject the
decree in this jurisdiction.

While Marlyn and Akira's divorce decree was not disputed by the OSG, a recognition of the
divorce, however, could not extend as a matter of course. Under prevailing rules and
jurisprudence, the submission of the decree should come with adequate proof of the foreign law

152
that allows it. The Japanese law on divorce must then be sufficiently proved. "Because our courts
do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires that both
the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven x x x like any
other fact."34 In ATCI Overseas Corp., et al. v. Echin,35 the Court reiterated the following rules on
proof of foreign laws:

To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with
Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which read:

Sec. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of
Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof
or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the
custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be
made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular
agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept, and authenticated by his seal of office.

Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a document or record is
attested for the purpose of the evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is
a correct copy of the original, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of court having a seal, under the
seal of such court.36

Marlyn failed to satisfy the foregoing requirements. The records only include a photocopy of
excerpts of The Civil Code of Japan, merely stamped LIBRARY, Japan Information and Culture
Center, Embassy of Japan, 2627 Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City 1300.[37] This clearly does not
constitute sufficient compliance with the rules on proof of Japan's law on divorce. In any case,
similar to the remedy that was allowed by the Court in Manalo to resolve such failure, a remand of
the case to the RTC for further proceedings and reception of evidence on the laws of Japan on
divorce is allowed, as it is hereby ordered by the Court.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 21,
2016 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43 of Manila in Special Proceedings Case No. 14-
132832 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further
proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.

SO ORDERED.

Peralta (Chairperson), Leonen, Hernando, and Carandang,* JJ., concur.

Footnotes

*
Designated Member per Special Order No. 2624, dated November 29, 2018.

1
Rendered by Presiding Judge Roy G. Gironella; rollo, pp, 25-29

2
Id. at 31-36.

3
Id. at 37.

4
Id. at 32.

5
Id. at 39.

6
Id. at 41.

7
Id. at 34.

8
Records, pp. 23-25.

153
9
Rollo, p. 23.

10
Records, pp. 49-50.

11
Id. at 59-60.

12
Id. at 67.

13
Id. at 66.

14
Id. at 69.

15
Id. at 68.

16
Id. at 70.

17
Id. at 71-78.

18
Id. at 79-83.

19
TSN, August 28, 2015, p. 16.

20
TSN, October 23, 2015, pp. 6-7

21
Records, p. 104.

22
Id. at 107.

23
Art. 17. x x x.

xxxx

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have, for their object,
public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

24
Rollo, p. 28.

25
Id.

26
Records, p. 131.

27
Rollo, pp. 13-20.

28
Rep. of the Phils. v. Olaybar, 726 Phil. 378, 384 (2014).

29
G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018.

30
Dacasin v. Dacasin, 625 Phil. 494, 502 (2010).

31
Van Dorn v. Judge Romillo, Jr., 223 Phil. 357, 360 (1985).

32
Fujiki v. Marinay, et al., 712 Phil. 524 (2013); and Medina v. Koike, 791 Phil. 645 (2016).

33
Republic of the Philippines v. Marelyn Tanedo Manalo, supra note 29.

34
Ando v. Department of Foreign Affairs, 742 Phil. 37, 48 (2014).

35
647 Phil. 43 (2010).

154
36
Id. at 50.

37
Records, pp. 71-78.

LUZVIMINDA DELA CRUZ MORISONO, PETITIONER, VS. RYOJI* MORISONO AND LOCAL
CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This is a direct recourse to the Court from the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 105
(RTC), through a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2] dated July 18, 2016 of
the RTC in SP. PROC. NO. Q-12-71830 which denied petitioner Luzviminda Dela Cruz
Morisono's (Luzviminda) petition before it.

The Facts

Luzviminda was married to private respondent Ryoji Morisono (Ryoji) in Quezon City on
December 8, 2009.[3] Thereafter, they lived together in Japan for one (1) year and three (3)
months but were not blessed with a child.  During their married life, they would constantly quarrel
mainly due to Ryoji's philandering ways, in addition to the fact that he was much older than
Luzviminda.[4] As such, she and Ryoji submitted a "Divorce by Agreement" before the City Hall of
Mizuho-Ku, Nagoya City, Japan, which was eventually approved on January 17, 2012 and duly
recorded with the Head of Mizuho-Ku, Nagoya City, Japan on July 1, 2012.[5] In view of the
foregoing, she filed a petition for recognition of the foreign divorce decree obtained by her and
Ryoji[6] before the RTC so that she could cancel the surname of her former husband in her
passport and for her to be able to marry again.[7]

After complying with the jurisdictional requirements, the RTC set the case for hearing. Since
nobody appeared to oppose her petition except the government, Luzviminda was allowed to
present her evidence ex-parte. After the presentation and absent any objection from the Public
Prosecutor, Luzviminda's formal offer of evidence was admitted as proof of compliance with the
jurisdictional requirements, and as part of the testimony of the witnesses.[8]

The RTC Ruling

155
In a Decision[9] dated July 18, 2016, the RTC denied Luzviminda's petition. It held that while a
divorce obtained abroad by an alien spouse may be recognized in the Philippines – provided that
such decree is valid according to the national law of the alien – the same does not find
application when it was the Filipino spouse, i.e., petitioner, who procured the same. Invoking the
nationality principle provided under Article 15 of the Civil Code, in relation to Article 26 (2) of the
Family Code, the RTC opined that since petitioner is a Filipino citizen whose national laws do not
allow divorce, the foreign divorce decree she herself obtained in Japan is not binding in the
Philippines;[10] hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the RTC correctly denied Luzviminda's
petition for recognition of the foreign divorce decree she procured with Ryoji.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is partly meritorious.

The rules on divorce prevailing in this jurisdiction can be summed up as follows: first, Philippine
laws do not provide for absolute divorce, and hence, the courts cannot grant the same; second,
consistent with Articles 15[11] and 17[12] of the Civil Code, the marital bond between two (2) Filipino
citizens cannot be dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained abroad; third, an absolute
divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided it is consistent with their respective national laws; and fourth, in mixed marriages
involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed to contract a subsequent
marriage in case the absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.[13]

The fourth rule, which has been invoked by Luzviminda in this case, is encapsulated in Article 26
(2) of the Family Code which reads:

Article 26. x x x

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise. have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

156
This provision confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce
decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of
the marriage. It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely
because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the
merits because it is tantamount to trying a divorce case. Under the principles of comity, our
jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality, but the legal
effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the children or property relations of the
spouses, must still be determined by our courts. The rationale for this rule is to avoid the absurd
situation of a Filipino as still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is no
longer married to the former because he or she had obtained a divorce abroad that is recognized
by his or her national law.[14] In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas,[15] the Court held:

As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse." The legislative intent is for
the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created
by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien
spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. Without the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of
divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in
another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not
recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond; Article 17 of the Civil Code provides
that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a
foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides
the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage
between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.

Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not
limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree
capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is
likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can
make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the
decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law.[16]
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)

According to Republic v. Orbecido III,[17] the following elements must concur in order for Article 26
(2) to apply, namely: (a) that there is a valid marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and (b) that a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry.[18] In the same case, the Court also initially clarified that Article 26 (2) applies not
only to cases where a foreigner was the one who procured a divorce of his/her marriage to a
Filipino spouse, but also to instances where, at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the
parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them acquired foreign citizenship by
naturalization, initiated a divorce proceeding, and obtained a favorable decree.[19]

However, in the recent case of Republic v. Manalo (Manalo),[20] the Court En Banc extended the
application of Article 26 (2) of the Family Code to further cover mixed marriages where it was the
Filipino citizen who divorced his/her foreign spouse. Pertinent portions of the ruling read:

157
Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision, a Filipino citizen has
the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad
and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to
remarry. x x x.

We rule in the affirmative.

xxxx

When this Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by
the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and
property relation, it should not stop short in likewise acknowledging that one of the usual
and necessary consequences of absolute divorce is the right to remarry. Indeed, there is no
longer a mutual obligation to live together and observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed
and ceased to exist, the civil status and the domestic relation of the former spouses change as
both of them are freed from the marital bond.

xxxx

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it
only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not
demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the
divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the
petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the
words of the statute; neither can We put words in the mouths of the lawmakers. "The legislature
is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have
expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est
recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure."

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean that
the divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow
the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would
otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Laws have ends to
achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and
purposes. x x x.

xxxx

To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is
effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The
provision is a corrective measure to address an anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to the
marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. Whether
the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree

158
dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have
the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A
Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like
circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding.
Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is
extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on
Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operation of the latter's
national law.

xxxx

A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a Filipino who is
married to a foreign citizen. There are real, material and substantial differences between
them. Ergo, they should not be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and liabilities
imposed. Without a doubt, there are political, economic, cultural, and religious dissimilarities as
well as varying legal systems and procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino national who is
married to an alien spouse has to contend with. More importantly, while a divorce decree
obtained abroad by a Filipino against another Filipino is null and void, a divorce decree obtained
by an alien against his or her Filipino spouse is recognized if made in accordance with the
national law of the foreigner.

On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated
a foreign divorce proceedings and a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the
instance of his or her alien spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are
considered as Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in an alien land. The
circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both
are still married to their foreigner spouses who are no longer their wives/husbands.
Hence, to make a distinction between them based merely on the superficial difference of
whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the
treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.

xxxx

The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State, should not be read in total isolation but must be
harmonized with other constitutional provisions. Aside from strengthening the solidarity of the
Filipino family, the State is equally mandated to actively promote its total development. It is also
obligated to defend, among others, the right of children to special protection from all forms of
neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development. To our
mind, the State cannot effectively enforce these obligations if We limit the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 only to those foreign divorce initiated by the alien spouse. x x x.

A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good. If We disallow a
Filipino citizen who initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the coverage of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 and still require him or her to first avail of the existing "mechanisms" under the Family
Code, any subsequent relationship that he or she would enter in the meantime shall be
considered as illicit in the eyes of the Philippine law. Worse, any child born out of such "extra-
marital" affair has to suffer the stigma of being branded as illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a
few of the adverse consequences, not only to the parent but also to the child, if We are to hold a
restrictive interpretation of the subject provision. The irony is that the principle of inviolability of

159
marriage under Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution is meant to be tilted in favor of marriage
and. against unions not formalized by marriage, but without denying State protection and
assistance to live-in arrangements or to families formed according to indigenous customs.

This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present time. With the advancement
of communication and information technology, as well as the improvement of the transportation
system that almost instantly connect people from all over the world, mixed marriages have
become not too uncommon. Likewise, it is recognized that not all marriages are made in heaven
and that imperfect humans more often than not create imperfect unions. Living in a flawed world,
the unfortunate reality for some is that the attainment of the individual's full human potential and
self-fulfillment is not found and achieved in the context of a marriage. Thus, it is hypocritical to
safeguard the quantity of existing marriages and, at the same time, brush aside the truth that
some of them are of rotten quality.

Going back, We hold that marriage, being mutual and shared commitment between two
parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered
released from the marital bond while the other remains bound to it. x x x.[21] (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)

Thus, pursuant to Manalo, foreign divorce decrees obtained to nullify marriages between a
Filipino and an alien citizen may already be recognized in this jurisdiction, regardless of who
between the spouses initiated the divorce; provided, of course, that the party petitioning for the
recognition of such foreign divorce decree – presumably the Filipino citizen – must prove the
divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.[22]

In this case, a plain reading of the RTC ruling shows that the denial of Luzviminda's petition to
have her foreign divorce decree recognized in this jurisdiction was anchored on the sole ground
that she admittedly initiated the divorce proceedings which she, as a Filipino citizen, was not
allowed to do. In light of the doctrine laid down in Manalo, such ground relied upon by the RTC
had been rendered nugatory. However, the Court cannot just order the grant of Luzviminda's
petition for recognition of the foreign divorce decree, as Luzviminda has yet to prove the fact of
her. "Divorce by Agreement" obtained, in Nagoya City, Japan and its conformity with prevailing
Japanese laws on divorce. Notably, the RTC did not rule on such issues. Since these are
questions which require an examination of various factual matters, a remand to the court a quo is
warranted.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated July 18, 2016 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 105 in SP. PROC. NO. Q-12-71830 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the instant case is REMANDED to the court a quo for
further proceedings, as directed in this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Peralta, and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.

160
Caguioa, J., maintains dissent in RP vs. Manalo. See separate concurring opinion.

*
"Kyoji" in some parts of the rollo.

[1]
Rollo, pp. 9-25.

[2]
Id. at 26-29. Penned by Presiding Judge Rosa M. Samson.

[3]
Id. at 26 and 30.

[4]
Id. at 27.

[5]
See Divorce Notification; id. at 37-38.

[6]
Dated August 24, 2012. Id. at 30-33.

[7]
See id. at 27.

[8]
See id. at 27-28.

[9]
Id. at 26-29.

[10]
See id. at 28-29.

[11]
Article 15 of the Civil Code reads:

Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity
of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

161
[12]
Article 17 of the Civil Code reads:

Article 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be
governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.

[13]
See Republic v. Manalo, G.R No. 221029, April 24, 2018; citations omitted.

[14]
See id.; citations omitted

[15]
642 Phil. 420 (2010).

[16]
Id. at 430; citations omitted.

[17]
509 Phil. 108 (2005).

[18]
Id. at 115.

[19]
See supra note 13.

[20]
Id.

[21]
See id.; citations omitted.

[22]
See id.; citing Garcia v. Recio, 418 Phil. 723, 731 (2001). See also Medina v. Koike, 791 Phil.
645 (2016); Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, supra note 15; Bayot v.  CA, 591 Phil. 452 (2008); and San
Luis v. San Luis, 543 Phil. 275 (2007).

SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION

162
CAGUIOA, J.:

I concur in the result.

I submit, as I did in the case of Republic v. Manalo[1] (Manalo), that Article 26(2) of the Family
Code had been crafted to serve as an exception to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15
of the Civil Code. Such exception is narrow, and intended only to address the unfair situation that
results when a foreign national obtains a divorce decree against a Filipino citizen, leaving the
latter stuck in a marriage without a spouse.

As stated in my Dissenting Opinion in Manalo:

x x x [R]ather than serving as bases for the blanket recognition of foreign divorce decrees in the
Philippines, I believe that the Court's rulings in [Van Dorn v. Judge Romillo, Jr.[2]], [Republic of the
Philippines v. Orbecido III[3]] and [Dacasin v. Dacasin[4]] merely clarify the parameters for the
application of the nationality principle found in Article 15 of the Civil Code, and the exception
thereto found in Article 26(2) [of] the Family Code. These parameters may be summarized as
follows:

1. Owing to the nationality principle, all Filipino citizens are covered by the prohibition
against absolute divorce. As a consequence of such prohibition, a divorce decree
obtained abroad by a Filipino citizen cannot be enforced in the Philippines. To allow
otherwise would be to permit a Filipino citizen to invoke foreign law to evade an express
prohibition under Philippine law.

2.

3. Nevertheless, the effects of a divorce decree obtained by a foreign national may be

extended to the Filipino spouse, provided the latter is able to prove (i) the issuance of the
divorce decree, and (ii) the personal law of the foreign spouse allowing such divorce. This
exception, found under Article 26(2) of the Family Code, respects the binding effect of the
divorce decree on the foreign national, and merely recognizes the residual effect of such
decree on the Filipino spouse.[5]

Petitioner herein is a Filipino citizen, seeking recognition of a divorce decree obtained in

accordance with Japanese law.

Unlike the divorce decree in question in Manalo, the divorce decree herein had been obtained not
by petitioner alone, but jointly, by petitioner and her then husband, who, in turn, is a Japanese
national. Hence, the twin requisites for the application of the exception under Article 26(2) are
present — there is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a

163
foreigner; and a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry.[6]

Based on these premises, I vote to GRANT the Petition.

[1]
G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018.

[2]
223 Phil. 357 (1985) [Per J. Melencio-Herrera, First Division].

[3]
509 Phil. 108 (2005) [Per J. Quisumbing, First Division].

[4]
625 Phil. 494 (2010) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division].

[5]
J. Caguioa, Dissenting Opinion in Republic v. Manalo, G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018, p. 6.

[6]
Republic v. Orbecido III,supra note 3.

SC Allows Filipina Spouse to Prove Foreign Divorce Decree Obtained in Japan

February 6, 2020

The Supreme Court’s (SC) First Division promulgated a 13-page decision on December 5, 2019
through the ponencia of Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier allowing a Filipina to properly
prove the Japanese law on divorce, with the end view that she may be eventually freed from a
marriage in which she is the only remaining party.

The SC granted the petition for review on certiorari filed by Juliet Rendora Moraña seeking to
reverse the issuances of the Court of Appeals (CA) in In Re: Petition for Judicial Recognition of
Divorce Between Minuro Takahashi and Juliet Rendora Moraña and remanded the case to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC)-Branch 29, Manila for presentation in evidence of the pertinent
Japanese law on divorce following the procedure in Racho v. Tanaka (G.R. No. 199515, June 25,
2018); and thereafter, the court shall render a new decision on the merits.

The SC underscored that in Racho, the Japanese law on divorce was duly proved through a copy
of the English Version of the Civil Code of Japan translated under the authorization of the Ministry
of Justice and the Code of Translation Committee. The SC highlighted that considering that the
fact of divorce was duly proved in this case, the higher interest of substantial justice compels that

164
petitioner, Juliet, be afforded the chance to properly prove the Japanese law on divorce, which
will finally release her from a union declared inexistent under the divorce law of Japan.

The SC also held that a foreign decree of divorce may be recognized in the Philippines although
it was the Filipino spouse who obtained the same. In justifying this, the Court cited the case
of Republic v. Manalo (G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018), which emphasized that even if it was
the Filipino spouse who initiated and obtained the divorce decree, the same may be recognized
in the Philippines. Further, the SC referred to the case of Racho where the Court enunciated that
the prohibition on Filipinos from participating in divorce proceedings will not be protecting our own
nationals. Thus, even if it was Juliet herself or jointly with her Japanese husband, Minuro, who
applied for and obtained the divorce decree, the same may be recognized in our jurisdiction.

Finally, the Court pronounced that time and again, it has held that the court’s primary duty is to
dispense justice; and procedural rules are designed to secure and not override substantial
justice. On several occasions, the court relaxed procedural rules to advance substantial justice.
More so in this case because what was involved is a matter affecting the lives of Juliet and her
children; the case is meritorious; the belated issuance of the Divorce Certificate was not Juliet’s
fault; and the relaxation of the rules will not prejudice the State.

Juliet and Minuro were married in San Juan, Metro Manila in 2002. Two kids and ten years after,
the couple became estranged. Minuro refused to give support to their children and started
cohabiting with another woman. Minuro then suggested they secure a divorce so the Japanese
government would give financial assistance to their children and send them to school. Believing it
was for the good of their children, Juliet agreed to divorce her Japanese husband, Minuro.
Consequently, they jointly applied for divorce before the Office of the Mayor of Fukuyama City,
Japan. The Office of the Mayor of Fukuyama City granted their application for divorce and issued
the corresponding Divorce Report. Juliet then filed with the RTC an action for recognition of the
Divorce Report issued by the Office of the Mayor of Fukuyama City. Records show that she
identified, presented, and formally offered in evidence the Divorce Report. Both the RTC and CA,
nonetheless, declined to consider the Divorce Report as the Divorce Decree itself. According to
the RTC, the Divorce Report was “limited to the report of the divorce granted to the parties.” On
the other hand, the CA held that the Divorce Report “cannot be considered as [an] act of an
official body or tribunal as would constitute the divorce decree contemplated by the Rules.”

Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa wrote a two-page Separate Concurring Opinion.

(G.R. No. 227605, In Re: Petition for Judicial Recognition of Divorce Between Minuro Takahashi
and Juliet Rendora Moraña, December 5, 2019)

165