Statutory Construction Digest

TABLE OF CONTENTS
CASE PAGE
NUMBE CASE TITLE NUMBE
R R
1 Caltex v. Palomar, 18 SCRA 247, G.R. No. L-19650, September 29, 1966 2
2 Southern Cross Cement Corporation v. Cement Manufacturers Association, 465 3
SCRA 532 (2005)
3 General v. Barrameda, 69 SCRA 182, G.R. No. L-29906, January 30, 1976 5
4 Molina v. Rafferty, 38 Phil 167, G.R. No. L-11988 (April 4, 1918) 6
5 Endencia v. David G.R. No. L-6355-56, August 31, 1953, 93 Phil 696 7
6 Montelibano v. Ferrer, G.R. No. L-7899 June 23, 1955, 97 Phil 228 8
7 Vicencio v. Villar, 675 SCRA 468 (2012) 9
8 Daong v. Municipal Judge of San Nicolas, G.R. No. L -34568 (1988) 10
9 Abad v. Goldloop Properties, 521 SCRA 131 (2007) 11
10 Accenture v. CIR, G.R. No. 190102 (2012) 13
11 Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue, 152 SCRA 284, G.R. No. 78780, July 15
23, 1987
12 Filoteo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 79543, October 16, 1996, 263 SCRA 222 16
13 Sarmiento v. Mison G.R. No. 79974, December 17, 1987, 156 SCRA 549 18
14 Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives G.R. Nos. 92191-92 July 30, 19
1991, 199 SCRA 549
15 Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81, G.R. No. 141284. August 20
15, 2000
16 Ang Bagong Bayani- OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC, et.al, 359 SCRA 698, G.R. 21
No. 147589 June 26, 2001
17 Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317, G.R. No. 83896 23
(February 22, 1991)
18 Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil 192, G.R. No. L-543. August 31, 1946 25
19 Malinias v. COMELEC, 390 SCRA 480 G.R. No. 146943 October 4, 2002 26
20 Coconut Oil Refiners Association v. Torre G.R. No. 132527. July 29, 2005 28
21 San Pablo Manufacturing Corp. v. CIR G.R. No. 147749 June 22, 2006 29
22 Garvida v. Sales G.R. No. 124893 April 18, 1997 31
23 Cebu Institute of Medicine v. CIM Employee’s Union 360 SCRA 515, G.R. No. 33
141285 July 5, 2001
2|Page GONZALO, ROMADEL C.
Statutory Construction
G.R. No. L-19650 September 29, 1966
CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., petitioner-appellee,

vs.
ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as THE POSTMASTER GENERAL, respondent-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent and appellant.

Ross, Selph and Carrascoso for petitioner and appellee.
THE FACTS: In 1960, Caltex announced its “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest”. The aim thereof is to
let participants estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station
dispense during a specified period. In order to join, no fee or consideration is required to be paid,
no purchase of Caltex products required to be made. Entry forms are to be made available upon
request at each Caltex station where a sealed can will be provided for the deposit of accomplished
entry stubs. Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for
publicizing the contest but also for the transmission of communications relative thereto,
representations were made by Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in
advance for mailing and to make sure that the contest does not violate the anti-lottery provision of
the Revised Administrative Code. Palomar however denied the mailing of such contest rules
according to him violates the said provision. He contends that the contest can be subject to fraud
order if pursued because it falls under “any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of
money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind” which is not
allowed by the Postal Law. Caltex referred the case to the trial court and the trial court ruled in
favor of Caltex. Palomar appealed arguing that Caltex has no sufficient cause of action to seek
declaratory relief (and decisions can only be advisory in nature) and that the proposed contest
does violate the Postal Law.
THE ISSUE: Whether or not the contest violates the Postal Law (Chap 52 of the Revised
Administrative Code).
THE RULING: WHEREFORE, recapitulating, the Court holds that the petition herein states a
sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief, and that the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" as
described in the rules submitted by the appellee does not transgress the provisions of the Postal
Law. The judgment appealed from is affirmed. No costs
THE RATIO: The issue at bar cannot be passed upon. Judgment has to be made otherwise Caltex
will have no definite recourse. Hence, Caltex has sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief.
The term ‘lottery’ extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance, such as policy
playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of gambling. The
three essential elements of a lottery are: First, consideration; second, prize; and third, chance. The
elements of prize and chance are too obvious in the disputed scheme to be the subject of
contention. In respect to the last element of consideration, the law does not condemn the
gratuitous distribution of property by chance, if no consideration is derived directly or indirectly from
the party receiving the chance, but does condemn as criminal schemes in which a valuable
consideration of some kind is paid directly or indirectly for the chance to draw a prize. Nowhere in
the said rules is any requirement that any fee be paid, any merchandise be bought, any service be
rendered, or any value whatsoever be given for the privilege to participate. The scheme does not
only appear to be, but actually is, a gratuitous distribution of property by chance. And that the
purchase of any Caltex product is not a pre-requisite in joining the said contest. Further, the
required element of consideration does not consist of the benefit derived by the proponent of the
contest. The true test is whether the participant pays a valuable consideration for the chance, and
not whether those conducting the enterprise receive something of value in return for the distribution
of the prize. Perspective properly oriented, the standpoint of the contestant is all that matters, not
that of the sponsor. The following, culled from Corpus Juris Secundum, should set the matter at
rest: “The fact that the holder of the drawing expects thereby to receive, or in fact does receive,
some benefit in the way of patronage or otherwise, as a result of the drawing, does not supply the
element of consideration. Gratuitous distribution of property by lot or chance does not constitute
‘lottery’, if it is not resorted to as a device to evade the law and no consideration is derived, directly
or indirectly, from the party receiving the chance, gambling spirit not being cultivated or stimulated
thereby. Lottery and gift enterprise must be construed as the same.
G.R. No. 158540 July 8, 2004
SOUTHERN CROSS CEMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
THE PHILIPPINE CEMENT MANUFACTURERS CORP., THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF TRADE & INDUSTRY, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
FINANCE, and THE COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, respondents.
THE FACTS: Southern Cross Cement Corporation (Southern Cross) is a domestic corporation
engaged in the business of cement manufacturing, production, importation and exportation.
Private respondent Philippine Cement Manufacturers Corporation (Philcemcor) is an association
of domestic cement manufacturers. DTI accepted an application from Philcemcor, alleging that
the importation of gray Portland cement in increased quantities has caused declines in domestic
production, capacity utilization, market share, sales and employment; as well as caused
depressed local prices. Accordingly, Philcemcor sought the imposition a definitive safeguard
measures on the import of cement pursuant to the Safeguard Measures Act.
The Tariff Commission received a request from the DTI for a formal investigation to determine
whether or not to impose a definitive safeguard measure on imports of gray Portland cement. Tariff
Commission’s report states that the elements of serious injury and imminent threat of serious injury
not having been established, it is hereby recommended that no definitive general safeguard
measure be imposed on the importation of gray Portland cement.
After reviewing the report, then DTI Secretary Manuel Roxas II (DTI Secretary) disagreed with the
conclusion of the Tariff Commission that there was no serious injury to the local cement industry
caused by the surge of imports. In view of this disagreement, the DTI requested an opinion from
the Department of Justice (DOJ) on the DTI Secretary’s scope of options in acting on the
Commission’s recommendations. DOJ Secretary Hernando Perez rendered an opinion stating that
Section 13 of the SMA precluded a review by the DTI Secretary of the Tariff Commissions negative
finding, or finding that a definitive safeguard measure should not be imposed.
DTI denied the application for safeguard measures against the importation of gray
Portland cement Philcemcor received a copy of the DTI Decision on 12 April 2002. Ten days
later, it filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
seeking to set aside the DTI Decision, as well as the Tariff Commissions Report. On the other
hand, Southern Cross filed its Comment arguing that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction
over Philcemcors Petition, for it is on the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) that the SMA conferred
jurisdiction to review rulings of the Secretary in connection with the imposition of a safeguard
measure.
THE ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of DTI Secretary, to impose safeguard measures is valid.
THE RULING: the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is
DECLARED NULL AND VOID and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the DTI Secretary dated 25 June
2003 is also DECLARED NULL AND VOID and SET ASIDE. No Costs.
THE RATIO: The Decision held that the DTI head could not impose a safeguard measure without
a positive final determination by the Commission. It said that Section 13 prescribed certain
limitations and restrictions before general safeguard measures could be imposed. But the most
fundamental restriction, contained in Section 5.
The conditions precedent that must be satisfied before the DTI secretary may impose a general
safeguard measure are as follows: one, there must be a positive final determination by the Tariff
Commission that a product is being imported into the country in such increased quantities (whether
absolute or relative to domestic production) as to be a substantial cause of serious injury or threat
to the domestic industry; and, two, in the case of non-agricultural products, the secretary must
establish that the application of a safeguard measure is in the public interest.
Also, the plain meaning of Section 5 was that only if the Tariff Commission rendered a positive
determination could the DTI secretary impose a safeguard measure.
The TC’s power to make a “positive final determination” must be distinguished from the
power to impose general safeguard measures, a power that is vested in the DTI secretary. A
“positive final determination” antecedes, as a condition precedent, the imposition of a general
safeguard measure.
The law explicitly authorizes the DTI secretary to make a preliminary determination, and the
Tariff Commission to make the final one. These functions are not interchangeable. The
Commission makes its determination only after a formal investigation process, which in turn is
undertaken only if there is a positive preliminary determination by the DTI secretary. On the other
hand, the latter may impose a definitive safeguard measure only if there is a positive final
determination by the Commission. In this respect, the DTI head is bound by the TC’s
determination.
G.R. No. L-29906 January 30, 1976
RODOLFO GENERAL and CARMEN GONTANG, petitioners,

vs.
LEONCIO BARRAMEDA, respondent.
Augusto A. Pardalis for petitioners.
E.V. Guevarra for respondent.
THE FACTS: Leoncio Barrameda seeks to redeem the land formerly embraced in Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 1418, containing an area of 59.4687 hectares, situated in barrio Taban,
Minalabac Camarines Sur; to annul any and all contracts affecting said property between the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and Rodolfo General and Carmen Gontang and to
recover damages, attorney's fees and costs.
The land in dispute was mortgaged by plaintiff to the DBP to secure a loan of
P22,000.00. For failure of the mortgagor to pay in full the installments as they fall due, the
mortgagee foreclosed extrajudicially pursuant to the provisions of Act 3135. On April 23, 1962,
the provincial sheriff conducted an auction sale in which the mortgagee, as the highest bidder,
bought the mortgaged property for P7,271.22. On May 13, 1963, the sheriff executed a final
deed of sale in favor of the DBP (Exhibit 2) and the DBP executed an affidavit of consolidation of
ownership (Exhibit 3). Upon registration of the sale and affidavit on September 2, 1963 (Exhibit
1), TCT No. 1418 in the name of plaintiff was cancelled and TCT No. 5003 issued to the DBP
(Exhibit-5) in its stead. On September 3, 1963, defendants Rodolfo General and Carmen
Gontang purchased the land from their codefendant.
Prior to the date last mentioned, or on November 20, 1963, Barrameda offered to
redeem the land. In view of the refusal of the DBP to allow the redemption, plaintiff commenced
this suit. The original complaint was filed in court on November 23, 1963. On August 12, 1964,
plaintiff deposited with the clerk of court the sum of P7,271.22, representing the repurchase
price of the land.
The trial court held that the one-year period of redemption began to run on April 23,
1962, when the sale at public auction was held, and ended on April 24, 1963; that the plaintiff's
offer to redeem on November 20, 1963 and the deposit of the redemption price on August 12,
1964 were made beyond the redemption period; and that defendants Rodolfo General and
Carmen Gontang 'are legitimate purchasers for value.
THE ISSUE: Whether or not the interpretation and application of Section 31, Commonwealth
Act 459 shall the period of redemption start from the date of the registration of the sale in the
register of deeds as the respondent Appellate Court held.
THE RULING: WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Appellate Court is affirmed, with
costs against petitioners.
THE RATIO: The one year period of redemption that start from the time of registration of the sale
would better serve the ends of justice and equity. The Court found no compelling reason to
deviate from the aforequoted ruling and not apply the same to the present case. The petitioners'
main contention that there is a great deal of difference in legislative intent in the use of the words
94 auction sale" in Sec. 31 of Commonwealth Act 459 and the word "sale" in See. 32 of Act 2938,
and See. 30 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, pales into insignificance in the light of our stand that
those words used interchangeably refer to one thing, and that is the public auction sale required
by law in the disposition of properties foreclosed or levied upon. Our stand in the Salazar case
and in those mentioned therein is firmly planted on the premise that registration of the deed of
conveyance for properties brought under the Torrens System is the operative act to transfer title
to the property and registration is also the notice to the whole world that a transaction involving
the same had taken place.
As it is, affirmance of the Appellate Court's decision would not result in any loss to
petitioners since the amount of P7,271.22 they paid to the Bank will be returned to 'them. What
further strengthens our stand is the fact found by the respondent Appellate Court that respondent
Barrameda has always been in possession of the disputed land.
G.R. No. L-11988 April 4, 1918
JACINTO MOLINA, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JAMES J. RAFFERTY, Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Paredes for appellant.

Araneta & Zaragoza for appellee.
THE FACTS: Jacinto Molina was the owner of various fish ponds in Bulacan. He was required to
pay the merchant’s tax required by the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Molina protested that he was
an agriculturist and not a merchant and therefore exempt from the taxes imposed by the Internal
Revenue Law upon the gross sales of merchants
Jacinto Molina contends that the fish produced by him are to be regarded as an
"agricultural product" within the meaning of that term as used in paragraph (c) of section 41 of Act
No. 2339 (now section 1460 of the Administrative Code of 1917), in forced when the disputed tax
was levied, and that he is therefore exempt from the percentage tax on merchants' sales
established by section 40 of Act No. 2339, as amended.
THE ISSUE: Whether or not fish produce is included or considered as agricultural product.
THE RULING: We are therefore of the opinion, and so hold, that the decision heretofore rendered
herein must be set aside, and the judgment of the lower court affirmed. So ordered.
THE RATIO: It has been stipulated in this case that fish cultivated in ponds subsist largely upon
aquatic plants which grow from roots which attach themselves to the bottom of the pond, and are
therefore in a real sense a product of the land.
The purpose of the Legislative had in mind in establishing the exemption contained in the
clause now under consideration. It seems reasonable to assume that it was due to the belief on the
part of the law-making body that by exempting agricultural products from this tax the farming
industry would be favored and the development of the resources of the country encouraged. It is
fairly to be inferred from the statute that the object and purpose of the Legislature was, in general
terms, to levy the tax in question, significantly termed the "merchant's tax," upon all persons
engaged in making a profit upon goods produced by others, but to exempt from the tax all persons
directly producing goods from the land.
In order to accomplish this purpose, the Legislature, instead of attempting an enumeration

of exempted products, has grouped them all under the general designation of "agricultural
products.
The land occupied by the ponds in which the fish in question are grown is agricultural land
within the meaning of the Acts of Congress and of the Philippine Commission under consideration
in the case of Map vs. Insular Government. The admission that the land upon which these
fishponds are constructed is not to be classified as mineral or forest land, does not lead of
necessity to the conclusion that everything produced upon them is for that reason alone to be
deemed an "agricultural product" within the meaning of the statute under consideration.
G.R. No. L-6355-56 August 31, 1953
PASTOR M. ENDENCIA and FERNANDO JUGO, plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
SATURNINO DAVID, as Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Jose P. Alejandro for appellant.
Manuel O. Chan for appellees.
THE FACTS: Petition is a joint appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila
declaring section 13 of Republic Act No. 590 unconstitutional, and ordering the appellant
Saturnino David as Collector of Internal Revenue to re-fund to Justice Pastor M. Endencia the
sum of P1,744.45, representing the income tax collected on his salary as Associate Justice of
the Court of Appeals in 1951, and to Justice Fernando Jugo the amount of P2,345.46,
representing the income tax collected on his salary from January 1,1950 to October 19, 1950,
as Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, and from October 20, 1950 to December 31,1950,
as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, without special pronouncement as to costs.
Because of the similarity of the two cases, involving as they do the same question of
law, they were jointly submitted for determination in the lower court. Judge Higinio B. Macadaeg
presiding, in a rather exhaustive and well considered decision found and held that under the
doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, 85 Phil., 552, the collection of
income taxes from the salaries of Justice Jugo and Justice Endencia was a diminution of their
compensation and therefore was in violation of the Constitution of the Philippines, and so
ordered the refund of said taxes.
THE ISSUE: Whether or not Republic Act no. 590 is constitutional, even after the decision of the
Supreme Court which deemed it to be unconstitutional.
THE RULING: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with no
pronouncement as to costs.
THE RATIO: The Supreme Court is the body that has the power to interpret laws. The decisions
of the Supreme Court can not be reversed hence, this decision is final. The Supreme Court in a
decision interpreting the constitution, particularly section 9, Article VIII, has held that judicial
officers are exempt from payment of income tax on their salaries, because the collection thereof
was a diminution of such salaries, specifically prohibited by the Constitution.
The Legislative department make, enact, and repeal laws. The Executive department is
assigned to execute the provisions made by the Legislative department. The interpretation and
application of these laws belong to the Judicial department, giving them the authority to interpret
and apply the laws, making sure that all of these laws are constitutional.
G.R. No. L-7899 June 23, 1955
ALFREDO MONTELIBANO, PASTOR MALLORCA, GONZALGO DE LA TORRE, and JOSE

ARTICULO, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FELIX S. FERRER, as Judge of the Municipal Court of Bacolod, and JOSE
F. BENARES, respondents-appellees.
Arrieta and Nolan for appellants.

Parreño and Banzon for appellees.
THE FACTS: On June 13, 1953, respondent Jose F. Benares filed, with the Municipal Court of
the City of Bacolod, a criminal complaint, which was docketed as Case No. 2864 of said court,
against petitioners herein, Alfredo Montelibano, Pastor Mallorca, Gonzalgo de la Torre and Jose
Articulo, charging them with the crime of malicious mischief. It is alleged in said complaint:
That on or about the 5th, the 7th and the 8th of June, 1953, in the City of Bacolod,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this court, Alfredo Montelibano, as author by
inducement, Pastor Mallorca, Gonzalo de la Torre and Jose Articulo, as authors by direct
participations, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and deliberately cause damage to the sugarcane plantation belonging
to Jose F. Benares, the offended party herein, intentionally and using bulldozer and destroying
completely eighteen (18) hectares of sugarcanes obviously under the impulse of hatred and a
desire for revenge, as the accused, Alfredo Montelibano, failed in his attempt to have the herein
offended party punished for contempt of Court in Civil Case No. 1896 of the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental, thereby causing upon said Jose F. Benares damage in the
amount of more than P13,000.00.
THE ISSUE: Whether or not the municipal court may entertain complaint relying upon section
22 of Commonwealth Act No. 326, otherwise known as the Charter of the City of Bacolod.
THE RULING: In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from must be, as it is hereby,
reversed and another one shall be entered annulling the warrant of arrest issued by respondent
Judge and enjoining the latter to refrain from entertaining the complaint aforementioned and to
dismiss the same. With cost against respondent Jose F. Benares. It is so ordered.
THE RATIO: The municipal court has no jurisdiction over the case. This provision was mutatis
mutandis reproduced, firstly, in section 2437 of the Old Administrative Code (Act No. 2657),
then in section 2465 of the Revised Administrative Code, and lastly in section 38 of Republic Act
no. 409. We do not see, and respondents herein have not pointed out, any reason why the
above quoted provision of the Charter of the City of Bacolod, should be interpreted differently
from said sections of the Charter of the City of Manila, which are substantially identical thereto.
On the contrary, considering that said provisions of the Charter of the City of Manila had been
consistently construed in the manner above indicated before being incorporated in the Charter
of the City of Bacolod, the conclusion is inevitable that the framers of the latter had reproduced
the former with intent of adopting, also its settled interpretation by the judicial department.
G.R. No. 182069 July 03, 2012
ARNOLD D. VICENCIO, Petitioner
vs.
HON. REYNALDO A. VILLAR and HON. JUANITO G. ESPINO, JR., in their capacity as Acting
Chairman and Commissioner, respectively, of the Hon. Commission on Audit, and ELIZABETH
ZOSA, Respondents.
THE FACTS: This is a Pctitiur; for Certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules or
Court, secking to annul Decision No. 2008-022 dated 15 February 2008 of the Commission on
Audit (COA).
On 30 October 2003, the City Council or the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Malabon

(SPM), presided over by Hon. Benjamin Galauran, then acting Vice-Mayor, adopted and
approved City Ordinance No. 15-2003, entitled "An Ordinance Granting Authority to the City
Vice-Mayor, Hon. Jay Jay Yambao, to Negotiate and Enter into Contract for Consultancy
Services for Consultants in the Sanggunian Secretariat Tasked to Function in their Respective
Areas of Concern.
Arnold Vicencio was elected City Vice-Mayor of Malabon. By virtue of this office, he also
became the Presiding Officer of the SPM and, at the same time, the head of the Sanggunian
Secretariat. Vicencio, representing the City Government of Malabon City, entered into Contracts
for Consultancy Services. After the signing of their respective contracts, the three consultants
rendered consultancy services to the SPM. Thereafter, the three consultants were
correspondingly paid for their services pursuant to the contracts therefor. However, an Audit
Observation Memorandum (AOM) was issued disallowing the amount for being improper
disbursement. Aggrieved by the disallowance, Vicencio appealed it to the Adjudication and
Settlement Board (ASB) of the Commission on Audit (COA) which subsequently denied it.
THE ISSUE: Whether or not COA committed seriouserrors and grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it affirmed ASB’s decision relative to the
disallowance of disbursements concerning the services rendered by hired consultants for the
SPM.
THE RULING: WHEREFORE, the Commission on Audit Decision dated 4 January 2008 is
hereby AFFIRMED.
THE RATIO: COA did not commit any grave abuse of discretion.
Under Section 456 of R.A. 7160, or the Local Government Code, there is no inherent
authority on the part of the city vice-mayor to enter into contracts on behalf of the local
government unit, unlike that provided for the city mayor. Thus, the authority of the vice-mayor to
enter into contracts on behalf of the city was strictly circumscribed by the ordinance granting it.
Ordinance No. 15-2003 specifically authorized Vice-Mayor Yambao to enter into contracts for
consultancy services. As this is not a power or duty given under the law to the Office of the
Vice-Mayor, Ordinance No. 15-2003 cannot be construed as a “continuing authority” for any
person who enters the Office of the Vice-Mayor to enter into subsequent, albeit similar,
contracts.
The COA’s assailed Decision was made in faithful compliance with its mandate and in judicious
exercise of its general audit power as conferred on it by the Constitution. The COA was merely
fulfilling its mandate in observing the policy that government funds and property should be fully
protected and conserved; and that irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant
expenditures or uses of such funds and property should be prevented. Thus, no grave abuse of
discretion may be imputed to the COA.
10 | P a g e GONZALO, ROMADEL C.
G.R. No. L-34568 March 28, 1988
RODERICK DAOANG, and ROMMEL DAOANG, assisted by their father, ROMEO

DAOANG, petitioners,
vs.
THE MUNICIPAL JUDGE, SAN NICOLAS, ILOCOS NORTE, ANTERO AGONOY and
AMANDA RAMOS-AGONOY, respondents.
THE FACTS: On 23 March 1971, the respondent spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a
petition with the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, seeking the adoption of the
minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos. The case, entitled: "In re Adoption of the Minors
Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos, Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy, petitioners",
was docketed therein as Spec. Proc. No. 37.
The petition was set for hearing on 24 April 1971 and notices thereof were caused to be
served upon the office of the Solicitor General and ordered published in the ILOCOS TIMES, a
weekly newspaper of general circulation in the province of Ilocos Norte, with editorial offices in
Laoag City.
On 22 April 1971, the minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang, assisted by their father and
guardian ad litem, the petitioners herein, filed an opposition to the aforementioned petition for
adoption, claiming that the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy had a legitimate daughter
named Estrella Agonoy, oppositors' mother, who died on 1 March 1971, and therefore, said
spouses were disqualified to adopt under Art. 335 of the Civil Code.
After the required publication of notice had been accomplished, evidence was
presented. Thereafter, the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte rendred its decision,
granting the petition for adoption. Hence, the present recourse by the petitioners.
THE ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents Antero and Amanda Agonoy are disqualified to
adopt under par 1, Art. 335 of the Civil Code.
THE RULING: the petition is DENIED. The judgment of the Municipal Court of San Nicolas,
Ilocos Norte in Spec. Proc. No. 37 is AFFIRMED.
THE RATIO: The respondents can adopt because the law does not include grandchildren as
one of the prohibitions in adopting/adoption. In enacting the Civil Code of the Philippines, the
legislators, obviously intended that only those persons who have certain classes of children, are
disqualified to adopt. The Civil Code of Spain, which was once in force in the Philippines, and
which served as the pattern for the Civil Code of the Philippines, in its Article 174, disqualified
persons who have legitimate or legitimated descendants from adopting. Under this article, the
spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy would have been disqualified to adopt as they have
legitimate grandchildren, the petitioners herein. But, when the Civil Code of the Philippines was
adopted, the word "descendants" was changed to "children", in paragraph (1) of Article 335.
Adoption used to be for the benefit of the adoptor. It was intended to afford to persons
who have no child of their own the consolation of having one, by creating through legal fiction,
the relation of paternity and filiation where none exists by blood relationship. The present
tendency, however, is geared more towards the promotion of the welfare of the child and the
enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy life, and every intendment is sustained
to promote that objective. Under the law now in force, having legitimate, legitimated,
acknowledged natural children, or children by legal fiction, is no longer a ground for
disqualification to adopt.
G.R. No. 168108 April 13, 2007
ENRIQUE C. ABAD, JOSEPH C. ABAD, MA. SABINA C. ABAD, ADELAIDA C. ABAD, CECILIA
C. ABAD, VICTORIA C. ABAD, VICTOR C. ABAD, CENON C. ABAD, JR., AND JUANITA C.
ABAD, Petitioners,
vs.
GOLDLOOP PROPERTIES, INC., Respondent.
THE FACTS: Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 77559. The
ruling of the appellate court affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Pasig City, Branch 167, in Civil Case No. 67192.
Petitioners Enrique C. Abad, Joseph C. Abad, Ma. Sabina C. Abad, Adelaida C. Abad,
Cecilia C. Abad, Victoria C. Abad, Victor C. Abad, Cenon C. Abad, Jr., and Juanita C. Abad
were the owners of 13 parcels of titled agricultural land 2 covering a total of 53,562 square
meters. The lots were situated in the S.C. Malabon Estate in Tanza, Cavite.
On August 29, 1997, respondent Goldloop Properties Inc., through its President,
Emmanuel R. Zapanta, entered into a Deed of Conditional Sale 3 with petitioners at the price of
₱650.00 per square meter, or a total of ₱34,815,300.00 for the entire land area. The parties
agreed on the following terms of payment:
a. EARNEST MONEY: An earnest money of ONE MILLION PESOS (Php1,000,000.00)

[EARNEST MONEY] has been given by the BUYER to the SELLER on June 30, 1997,
as evidenced by MBTC Check No. 2930037 dated July 02, 1997, receipt of which is
hereby acknowledged.
b. FIRST PAYMENT: SIX MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED SIXTY-FIVE THOUSAND SIX

HUNDRED SIXTY PESOS (PHP6,765,660.00) [FIRST PAYMENT] shall be paid by the
BUYER to the SELLER on August 17, 1997 covered by MBTC Check No. 2930037198,
upon signing of this DEED OF CONDITIONAL SALE.
c. FULL PAYMENT
The remaining balance, representing full and final payment of the total contract price, in
the amount of TWENTY-SEVEN MILLION FORTY-NINE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FORTY
PESOS (PHP27,049,640.00) shall be paid by the BUYER to the SELLER on or before 31
December 1997 and upon the fulfillment of certain conditions.
The petitioners contended that they are not obliged to return the first payment because
GP did not request for an extension within the stipulated period. Thus, GP has no right to
demand the refund of the first payment. But the respondents aver that the sale did not
materialize, the obligation of the petitioners to return the first payment became unqualified and
unconditional. Pursuant to the contract, the petitioners are only entitled to the earnest money,
and not the first payment.
Petitioners now contented that the remedy available to GP is not to demand the first
payment but to ask the Court to fix the period within which to return the first payment, pursuant
to Art. 1197 of the Civil Code. While there was no period indicated in the contract.
The CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed in toto the ruling of the trial court.16 Citing
Article 1370 of the Civil Code and related cases, it declared that if the terms of a contract are
clear with no doubt as to the intentions of the contracting parties, then the literal meaning of the
stipulations shall control. It held that the disputed paragraph 8 of the deed is plain and
unambiguous: in case respondent failed to pay the balance, the earnest money would be
forfeited, but the first payment shall be returned to respondent. The appellate court declared that
petitioner's obligation to return the first payment was an unconditional one.
THE ISSUE: Whether or not the obligation of the petitioners to return the first payment is an
unconditional obligation; and
Whether or not the court must first fix the duration of the period within which petitioners
have to comply with their obligation before respondent can demand from petitioners the
fulfillment of the said obligation.
THE RULING: the Court resolved to DENY the petition. The Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 77559 are AFFIRMED.
THE RATIO: Paragraph 8 of the contract is clear and unambiguous. As the trial and appellate
courts ruled, unlike the P1,000,000.00 earnest money which would be forfeited in favor of
petitioners in case of respondent's failure to deliver the balance of the total consideration, the
first payment would be returned to respondent. This obligation to return the first payment can be
gleaned from the second part of the disputed provision, which states: "but the first payment
check of SIX MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED SIXTY-FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIXTY
PESOS (PHP6,765,660.00) shall be returned to the BUYER without any additional charges to
the SELLER."
The cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts is embodied in the first paragraph of Article
1370 of the Civil Code: "[i]f the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the
intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control." This
provision is akin to the "plain meaning rule" applied by Pennsylvania courts, which assumes that
the intent of the parties to an instrument is "embodied in the writing itself, and when the words
are clear and unambiguous the intent is to be discovered only from the express language of the
agreement."25 It also resembles the "four corners" rule, a principle which allows courts in some
cases to search beneath the semantic surface for clues to meaning. 26 A court’s purpose in
examining a contract is to interpret the intent of the contracting parties, as objectively
manifested by them. The process of interpreting a contract requires the court to make a
preliminary inquiry as to whether the contract before it is ambiguous. A contract provision is
ambiguous if it is susceptible of two reasonable alternative interpretations. Where the written
terms of the contract are not ambiguous and can only be read one way, the court will interpret
the contract as a matter of law. If the contract is determined to be ambiguous, then the
interpretation of the contract is left to the court, to resolve the ambiguity in the light of the
intrinsic evidence.
G.R. No. 190102 July 11, 2012
ACCENTURE, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.
THE FACTS: Accenture, Inc. (Accenture) is a corporation engaged in the business of providing
management consulting, business strategies development, and selling and/or licensing of
software. It is duly registered with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) as a Value Added Tax
(VAT) taxpayer or enterprise in accordance with Section 236 of the National Internal Revenue
Code (Tax Code).3Ï‚rÎ½ll
On 9 August 2002, Accenture filed its Monthly VAT Return for the period 1 July 2002 to
31 August 2002 (1st period). It’s Quarterly VAT Return for the fourth quarter of 2002, which
covers the 1st period, was filed on 17 September 2002; and an Amended Quarterly VAT Return,
on 21 June 2004.
The monthly and quarterly VAT returns of Accenture show that, notwithstanding its
application of the input VAT credits earned from its zero-rated transactions against its output
VAT liabilities, it still had excess or unutilized input VAT credits in the amount of
P37,038,269.18. Thus, Accenture filed with the Department of Finance (DoF) an administrative
claim for the refund or the issuance of a Tax Credit Certificate (TCC). When the DoF did not act
on the claim, Accenture filed a Petition for Review with CTA praying for the issuance of a TCC
in its favor.
The CIR answered that the sale by Accenture of goods and services to its clients are not
zero-rated transactions and that Accenture has failed to prove that it is entitled to a refund,
because its claim has not been fully substantiated or documented. Ruling that Accenture’s
services would qualify for zero-rating under the 1997 National Internal Revenue Code of the
Philippines (Tax Code) only if the recipient of the services was doing business outside of the
Philippines, the Division of the CTA ruled that since Accenture had failed to present evidence to
prove that the foreign clients to which the former rendered services did business outside the
Philippines, it was not entitled to refund.
On appeal before the CTA, Accenture argued that because the case pertained to the
third and the fourth quarters of taxable year 2002, the applicable law was the 1997 Tax Code,
and not R.A. 9337 and that prior to the amendment introduced by (R.A.) 9337, there was no
requirement that the services must be rendered to a person engaged in business conducted
outside the Philippines to qualify for zero-rating. Nevertheless, the CTA en banc affirmed the
decision of the division. Hence this present petition for review before the SC.
THE ISSUE: Whether or not the CTA erred in the interpretation of section 108 of the 1997 Tax
Code.
THE RULING: the petition is DENIED. The 22 September 2009 Decision and the 23 October 2009
Resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc in C.T.A. EB No. 477, dismissing the Petition for the
refund of the excess or unutilized input VAT credits of Accenture, Inc., are AFFIRMED.
THE RATIO: The CTA did not err in the interpretation of section 108 of the 1997 Tax Code.
In the Burmeister case, the Supreme Court harmonized both Sections 102(b) (1) and
102(b) (2) of the 1977 Tax Code, as amended, pertaining to zero-rated transactions. A parallel
approach should be accorded to the renumbered provisions of Sections 108(B)(2) and 108(B)
(1) of the 1997 NIRC. This means that Section 108(B) (2) must be read in conjunction with
Section 108(B) (1). Section 108(B)(2) requires as follows: a) services other than processing,
manufacturing or repacking rendered by VAT registered persons in the Philippines; and b) the
transaction paid for in acceptable foreign currency duly accounted for in accordance with BSP
rules and regulations. The same provision made reference to Section 108(B)(1) further imposing
the requisite c) that the recipient of services must be performing business outside of Philippines.
Otherwise, if both the provider and recipient of service are doing business in the Philippines, the
sale transaction is subject to regular VAT as explained in the Burmeister case.
Clearly, the Supreme Court’s pronouncements in the Burmeister case requiring that the
recipient of the services must be doing business outside the Philippines as mandated by law
govern the instant case. Even though Accenture s Petition was filed before Burmeister was
promulgated, the pronouncements made in that case may be applied to the present one without
violating the rule against retroactive application. When this Court decides a case, it does not
pass a new law, but merely interprets a preexisting one.
When this Court interpreted Section 102(b) of the 1977 Tax Code in Burmeister, this
interpretation became part of the law from the moment it became effective. It is elementary that
the interpretation of a law by this Court constitutes part of that law from the date it was originally
passed, since this Court's construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative
intent that the interpreted law carried into effect.
G.R. No. 78780 July 23, 1987
DAVID G. NITAFAN, WENCESLAO M. POLO, and MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO, JR., petitioners,

vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and THE FINANCIAL OFFICER, SUPREME
COURT OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
THE FACTS: Petitioners, the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over Branches 52,
19 and 53, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, all with
stations in Manila, seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin respondents, the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of
withholding taxes from their salaries.
In a nutshell, they submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation
as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision
of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandating that "(d)uring their continuance in
office, their salary shall not be decreased," even as it is anathema to the Ideal of an
independent judiciary envisioned in and by said Constitution."
Petitioners seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin respondents from making any
deductions of withholding taxes from their salaries. They claim that any taxation withheld from
their salaries constitute a decrease or diminution of their salaries which is in violation of Section
10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution: “The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their
continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased.”
On June 4, 1987, the Court en banc had reaffirmed the Chief Justice's directive to the
Fiscal Management and Budget Office of this Court to continue with the deduction of the
withholding taxes from the salaries of the Justices of the Supreme Court as well as from the
salaries of all other members of the judiciary.
THE ISSUE: Whether or not salaries of justices and judges are subject to income taxation.
THE RULING: the instant petition for Prohibition is hereby DISMISSED.
THE RATIO: The Court reiterates that the salaries of justices and judges are properly subject to
a general income tax law applicable to all income earners, and the tax does not fall within the
constitutional protection against decrease of their salaries during their continuance in office.
The salaries of members of the Judiciary are subject to the general income tax applied
to all taxpayers. Although such intent was somehow and inadvertently not clearly set forth in the
final text of the 1987 Constitution, the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
regarding the constitutional provision in question until it was finally approved by the Commission
disclosed that the true intent of the framers was to make the salaries of members of the
Judiciary taxable.
The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of
constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people
adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain
and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the
adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the
Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.
Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to the intent of the people, through the
discussions and deliberations of their representatives, in the spirit that all citizens should bear
their aliquot part of the cost of maintaining the government and should share the burden of
general income taxation equitably.
G.R. No. 79543 October 16, 1996
JOSE D. FILOTEO, JR., petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
THE FACTS: Petitioner Jose D. Filoteo, Jr. was a police investigator of the Western Police
District in Metro Manila, an old hand at dealing with suspected criminals. A recipient of various
awards and commendations attesting to his competence and performance as a police officer, he
could not therefore imagine that one day he would be sitting on the other side of the
investigation table as the suspected mastermind of the armed hijacking of a postal delivery van.
On or about the 3rd day of May, 1982, in the municipality of Meycauayan, province of
Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, two
of whom were armed with guns, conspiring, confederating together and helping one another, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent of gain and by means of violence,
threat and intimidation, stop the Postal Delivery Truck of the Bureau of Postal while it was
traveling along the MacArthur Highway of said municipality, at the point of their guns, and then
take, rob and carry away with them a Postal Delivery Truck, Social Security System Medicare
Checks and Vouchers, Social Security System Pension Checks and Vouchers, Treasury
warrants, Several Mail Matters from abroad in the total amount of P253,728.29 more or less,
belonging to US Government Pensionados, SSS Pensionados, SSS Medicare Beneficiaries and
Private Individuals from Bulacan, Pampanga, Bataan, Zambales and Olongapo City, to the
damage and prejudice of the owners in the aforementioned amount.
Along with his co-accused Martin Mateo, Jr. y Mijares, PC/Sgt. Bernardo Relator, Jr. y
Retino, CIC Ed Saguindel y Pabinguit, Ex-PC/Sgt. Danilo Miravalles y Marcelo and civilians
Ricardo Perez, Reynaldo Frias, Raul Mendoza, Angel Liwanag, Severino Castro and Gerardo
Escalada, petitioner Filoteo was charged with such Information.
On separate dates, Accused Filoteo, Mateo, Saguindel, Relator and Miravalles, assisted
by their respective counsel, pleaded not guilty. Their co-accused Perez, Frias, Mendoza,
Liwanag, Castro and Escalada were never arrested and remained at large. Accused Mateo
escaped from police custody and was tried in absentia in accordance with Article IV, Section 19
of the 1973 Constitution. Accused Saguindel and Relator failed to appear during the trial on
February 21, 1985 and on March 31, 1986, respectively, and were thus ordered arrested but
remained at large since then. Like in the case of Mateo, proceedings against them were held in
absentia. Only Filoteo filed this petition, after the respondent Court rendered its assailed
Decision and Resolution.
Filoteo filed with the Supreme Court an instant alternative petition for certiorari charging
the Sandiganbayan with having abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
and with reversible error, claiming that the Sandiganbayan should have deemed his extrajudicial
confession unconstitutional and inadmissible as evidence by retroactively applying to his case
paragraph 1, Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution i.e. "Any person under investigation
for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent
and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.”
THE ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in admitting his extrajudicial confession
notwithstanding uncontradicted testimony and documentary proof that he was made to sign the
same through torture, maltreatment, physical compulsion, threats and intimidation and without
the presence and assistance of counsel.
THE RULING: the petition is DENIED, but the first paragraph of the dispositive portion of the
assailed Decision is partially MODIFIED.
THE RATIO: The 1987 Constitutional provision on the right against an uncounseled waiver of
the right to counsel and judicial decisions interpreting such rights in the 1973 Constitution apply
prospectively. The specific provision of the 1987 Constitution requiring that a waiver by an
accused of his right to counsel during custodial investigation must be made with the assistance
of counsel may not be applied retroactively or in cases where the extrajudicial confession was
made prior to the effectivity of said Constitution. Accordingly, waivers of the right to counsel
during custodial investigation without the benefit of counsel during the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution should, by such argumentation, be admissible.
Although a number of cases held that extrajudicial confessions made while the 1973
Constitution was in force and effect, should have been made with the assistance of counsel, the
definitive ruling was enunciated only on April 26, 1983 when this Court, through Morales, Jr. v.
Enrile, issued the guidelines to be observed by law enforcers during custodial investigation. The
Court specifically ruled that" the right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid
unless made with the assistance of counsel.
While the Morales-Galit doctrine eventually became part of Section 12(1) of the 1987
Constitution, that doctrine affords no comfort to appellant Luvendino for the requirements and
restrictions outlined in Morales and Galit have no retroactive effect and do not reach waivers
made prior to 26 April 1983 the date of promulgation of Morales."
Pursuant to the above doctrine, petitioner may not claim the benefits of the Morales and
Galit rulings because he executed his extrajudicial confession and his waiver to the right to
counsel on May 30, 1982, or before April 26, 1983.
G.R. No. 79974 December 17, 1987
ULPIANO P. SARMIENTO III AND JUANITO G. ARCILLA, petitioners,

vs.
SALVADOR MISON, in his capacity as COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS,
AND GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET, respondents, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, intervenor.
THE FACTS: Respondent Salvador Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs by then President (Corazon) Aquino. The said appointment made by the President is
being questioned by petitioner Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito Arcilla who are both taxpayers,
members of the bar, and both Constitutional law professors, stating that the said appointment is
not valid since the appointment was not submitted to the Commission On Appointment (COA)
for approval. Under the Constitution, the appointments made for the "Heads of Bureau" requires
the confirmation from COA.
THE ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of bureau heads should be subject to the approval
of the Commission on Appointments.
THE RULING: They ruled that the President of the Philippines acted within her constitutional
authority and power in appointing respondent Salvador Mison, Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs, without submitting his nomination to the Commission on Appointments for
confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise the full authority and functions of the office and to
receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto.
The petition and petition in intervention should be, as they are, hereby DISMISSED.
THE RATIO: Under the 1987 Constitution, Heads of Bureau are removed from the list of officers
that needed confirmation from the Commission On Appointment. Under Section 10, Art. VII of
the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential appointments required the consent or confirmation
of the Commission on Appointments. As a result, the Commission became very powerful,
eventually transforming into a venue for horse-trading and similar malpractices.
On the other hand, consistent with the authoritarian pattern in which it was molded and
remolded by successive amendments, the 1973 Constitution placed the absolute power of
appointment in the President with hardly any check on the part of the legislature.
According to the Court, only the presidential appointments of the first group of public
officers are subject to the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. A review of the
deliberations would show that bureau heads have been deleted from the first group, precisely
because they are lower in rank as compared to other officers enumerated in the same group.
Hence, Mison's appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs need not be confirmed
by the Commission on Appointments.
G.R. Nos. 92191-92 July 30, 1991
ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner,
vs.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG,
JR., respondents.
Hechanova & Associates for petitioner Co.

Brillantes, Nachura, Navarro and Arcilla Law Offices for respondent Ong, Jr.
THE FACTS: Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second
legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the
private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.
Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of
Northern Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the
following grounds:
1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.
The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This
was, however, denied by the HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989.
Respondent HRET found for Ong, hence his petition for certiorari. Ong was born of a
natural-born citizen mother and a Chinese father who was later naturalized while Ong was a
minor. Ong was born in the said district of Samar and grew up there. Their house was twice
burned and, in both times, they rebuilt their residence in the same place. After elementary, he
pursued his studies in Manila and practiced his profession as CPA in the Central Bank of the
Phils. Later, he engaged himself in the management of the family business in Manila. He
married a Filipina. In between, he made periodical journeys back to his home province.
THE ISSUE: Whether or not Ong is a naturally-born Filipino citizen.
THE RULING: WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision of
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal is AFFIRMED. Respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is
declared a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar.
THE RATIO: Ong is a natural-born Filipino citizen. When Ong’s father was naturalized, Sec 15
of the Revised Naturalization Act squarely applies its benefit to him for he was then a minor
residing in this country. Thus, it was the law itself which elected Philippine citizenship to him
when he was only 9. Election through a sworn statement when he turned 21 (age of majority)
would have been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who is already a Filipino
citizen. Moreover, formal declaration is a requirement for those who still have to elect
citizenship. For those already Filipinos, when the time to elect came up, there are acts of
deliberate choice which cannot be less binding and, in this case, Ong’s establishment of his life
here are themselves formal manifestations of choice.
The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who
elect Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of
Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date.
G.R. No. 141284 August 15, 2000
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, GEN. PANFILO M. LACSON, GEN. EDGAR B. AGLIPAY, and
GEN. ANGELO REYES, respondents.
THE FACTS: The President, in a verbal directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct
joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression. Then, the PNP Chief
formulated through Police Chief Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of
Instruction 02/20001 (the "LOI") which detailed the manner by which the joint visibility patrols,
called Task Force Tulungan, would be conducted.
Also, the President confirmed his previous directive on the deployment of the Marines in
a Memorandum, addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the PNP Chief. In the
Memorandum, the President expressed his desire to improve the peace and order situation in
Metro Manila through a more effective crime prevention program including increased police
patrols. The President further stated that to heighten police visibility in the metropolis,
augmentation from the AFP is necessary.
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with
each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in
preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence.
Finally, the President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime
campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when
the situation shall have improved. Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the "IBP") filed the instant
petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines, null and
void and unconstitutional, arguing among others that the deployment of soldiers is in derogation
of Art. II Section 3 of the Constitution as there is no emergency situation obtained in Metro
Manila as would justify the need for the calling of the military to assist the police force.
THE ISSUE: Whether or not the action of the President in calling the Armed Forces to aid the
PNP in visibility patrols acted within the military powers as stated in the constitution.
THE RULING: the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
THE RATIO: In calling the Armed Forces to aid the PNP in visibility patrols, the President acted
within the military powers conferred within the Constitution.
There is a clear textual commitment under the Constitution to bestow on the President
full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the
exercise of such power. Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which embodies the powers
of the P
The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the
commander- in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against external and
internal threats to its existence. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in
times of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining
peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the
horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of
peace is not in any way diminished by the relative want of an emergency specified in the
commander- in-chief provision. For in making the President commander-in-chief the
enumeration of powers that follow cannot be said to exclude the President’s exercising as
Commander-in-Chief powers short of the calling of the armed forces, or suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace, and
maintain public order and security.
G.R. No. 147589 June 26, 2001
ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY (under the acronym OFW), represented herein
by its secretary-general, MOHAMMAD OMAR FAJARDO, petitioner,
vs.
ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY GO! GO! PHILIPPINES; THE TRUE MARCOS
LOYALIST ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES; PHILIPPINE LOCAL AUTONOMY;
CITIZENS MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE, ECONOMY, ENVIRONMENT AND PEACE;
CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE BUILDERS ASSOCIATION; SPORTS & HEALTH
ADVANCEMENT FOUNDATION, INC.; ANG LAKAS NG OVERSEAS CONTRACT WORKERS
(OCW); BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION and others under "Organizations/Coalitions" of
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785; PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO; LAKAS NUCD-UMDP;
NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION; LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO; AKSYON
DEMOKRATIKO; PDP-LABAN; LIBERAL PARTY; NACIONALISTA PARTY; ANG BUHAY
HAYAANG YUMABONG; and others under "Political Parties" of Omnibus Resolution No.
3785. respondents.
THE FACTS: The COMELEC received several Petitions for registration filed by sectoral parties,
organization and political parties which took a longer process to review in order to arrive at a
decision and as a result the two divisions promulgated a separate Omnibus Resolution and
individual resolution on political parties. The registered parties and organizations, along with
other sectoral and political parties and organizations whose registrations were denied, filed their
respective Manifestations stating their intentions to participate in the party-list elections.
The COMELEC approved the Manifestations or accreditations of 154 parties and organizations
keeping only those who substantially complied with the rules and regulations and more
importantly the sufficiency of the Manifestations or evidence on the Motions for
Reconsiderations or Oppositions in Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. Several petitions were filed
before the COMELEC praying that some of the parties or organizations be deleted from the
Certified List of Political Parties/Sectoral Parties/Coalitions participating in the Party list system
for the 2001 Elections.
The Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party filed a petition before the Supreme Court
assailing the Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. The Petitioner contends that the inclusion of the
political parties in the party-list system is the most objectionable portion of the questioned
Resolution. Also, the Office of the Solicitor General, like the impleaded political parties, submits
that the Constitution and R.A. No. 794 (AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ELECTION OF
PARTY- LIST REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM, AND
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFORE) allow political parties to participate in the party-list
elections. It argued that the party-list system is, in fact, open to all registered national, regional
and sectoral parties or organizations.
THE ISSUE: Whether or not political parties may qualify for party-list elections.
THE RULING: the Court held that, having obtained at least two percent of the total valid votes
cast in the last party-list elections, the following qualified participants are DECLARED elected
with one nominee each: BUHAY, AMIN, ABA, COCOFED, PM, SANLAKAS and ABANSE!
PINAY. To enable the Commission on Elections to proclaim -- upon finality of this Resolution --
these winners and their respective nominees, we hereby partially LIFT our Temporary
Restraining Order dated May 9, 2001, in regard to them only. It is made PERMANENT in regard
to the rest that did not qualify and win.
THE RATIO: Political parties may qualify for party-list elections. However, not all political parties
or organizations/groups may participate in party-list elections.
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the party-list system, is couched in

clear terms: the mechanics of the system shall be provided by law. Pursuant thereto, Congress
enacted RA 7941. In understanding and implementing party-list representation, we should
therefore look at the law first. Only when we find its provisions ambiguous should the use of
extraneous aids of construction be resorted to.
The intent of the law is obvious and clear from its plain words. Section 2 thereof
unequivocally states that the party-list system of electing congressional representatives was
designed to "enable underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-
defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole x x x." The criteria for participation
is well defined. Thus, there is no need for recourse to constitutional deliberations, not even to
the proceedings of Congress. In any event, the framers' deliberations merely express their
individual opinions and are, at best, only persuasive in construing the meaning and purpose of
the constitution or statute.
The Supreme Court ruled that political parties may participate in the party-list elections
does not mean, however, that any political party -- or any organization or group for that matter -
- may do so. The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with
the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5,
Article VI of the Constitution.
The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under the party-list
system are enumerated in Section 5 of RA 7941. The declared policy of RA 7941 contravenes
the position of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). We stress that the party-list system
seeks to enable certain Filipino citizens – specifically those belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties – to be elected to the House of
Representatives.
G.R. No. 83896 February 22, 1991
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, petitioner,

vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondent.
G.R. No. 83815 February 22, 1991
ANTI-GRAFT LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. and CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners,

vs.
PHILIP ELLA C. JUICO, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform; CARLOS DOMINGUEZ, as
Secretary of Agriculture; LOURDES QUISUMBING, as Secretary of Education, Culture and
Sports; FULGENCIO FACTORAN, JR., as Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources;
VICENTE V. JAYME, as Secretary of Finance; SEDFREY ORDOÑEZ, as Secretary of Justice;
FRANKLIN N. DRILON, as Secretary of Labor and Employment; LUIS SANTOS, as Secretary
of Local Government; FIDEL V. RAMOS, as Secretary of National Defense; TEODORO F.
BENIGNO, as Press Secretary; JUANITO FERRER, as Secretary of Public Works and
Highways; ANTONIO ARRIZABAL, as Secretary of Science and Technology; JOSE
CONCEPCION, as Secretary of Trade and Industry; JOSE ANTONIO GONZALEZ, as
Secretary of Tourism; ALFREDO R.A. BENGZON, as Secretary of Health; REINERIO D.
REYES, as Secretary of Transportation and Communication; GUILLERMO CARAGUE, as
Commissioner of the Budget; and SOLITA MONSOD, as Head of the National Economic
Development Authority, respondents.
Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio R. Quintos and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83896.
Antonio P. Coronel for petitioners in 83815.
THE FACTS: Petitioner, Civil Liberties Union, seeks for a declaration of the unconstitutionality
of Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987 on
grounds that The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure as provided in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
The respondent interpreted that Section 13, Article VII and par. (2) of Section 7 is
“reasonably valid and constitutionally firm,” and that Executive Order No. 284, promulgated
pursuant to DOJ Opinion No. 73, series of 1987 is consequently constitutional.
According to petitioners, by virtue of the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution,” the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in
Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (1) The Vice-President may be
appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII thereof; and (2) the
Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section
8 (1), Article VIII. The petitioner insisted that because of the phrase “unless otherwise provided
in this Constitution” used in Section 13 of Article VII, the exception must be expressly provided
in the Constitution.
Petitioners further argue that the exception to the prohibition in Section 7, par. (2), Article
IX-B on the Civil Service Commission applies to officers and employees of the Civil Service in
general and that said exceptions do not apply and cannot be extended to Section 13, Article VII
which applies specifically to the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet and their
deputies or assistants.
Public respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the phrase “unless otherwise
provided in the Constitution” in Section 13, Article VII refers to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B
insofar as the appointive officials mentioned therein are concerned.
THE ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon Aquino is
unconstitutional as stated in Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution.
THE RULING: subject to the qualification above-stated, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive
Order No. 284 is hereby declared null and void and is accordingly set aside.
THE RATIO: Article VII, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution provides that “The
President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall
not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during
their tenure”. The intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on
the President and his official family in so far as holding other offices or employment in the
government or elsewhere is concerned.
This being the case, the qualifying phrase “unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution” in Section 13, Article VII cannot possibly refer to the broad exceptions provided
under Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. To construe said qualifying phrase as
respondents would have us do, would render nugatory and meaningless the manifest intent and
purpose of the framers of the Constitution to impose a stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-
President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies, and assistants with respect to holding other
offices or employment in the government during their tenure.
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the
Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the
provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted
as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject
should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the
Constitution18 and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable
construction, the two can be made to stand together.
G.R. No. L-543 August 31, 1946
JOSE O. VERA, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
JOSE A. AVELINO, ET AL., respondents.
Jose W. Diokno and Antonio Barredo for petitioners.

Vicente J. Francisco and Solicitor General Tañada for respondents.
J. Antonio Araneta of the Lawyers' Guild as amicus curiae.
THE FACTS: Commission on Elections submitted last May 1946 to the President and the
Congress of the Philippines a report regarding the national elections held the previous month. It
stated that by reason of certain specified acts of terrorism and violence in the province of
Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac, the voting in said region did not reflect the true
and free expression of the popular will.
During the session, when the senate convened on May 25, 1946, a pendatum
resolution was approved referring to the report ordering that Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and
Jose E. Romero – who had been included among the 16 candidates for senator receiving the
highest number of votes, proclaimed by the Commissions on Elections – shall not be sworn, nor
seated, as members of the chamber, pending the termination of the of the protest lodged
against their election.
Petitioners thus immediately instituted an action against their colleagues responsible for
the resolution, praying for an order to annul it and compelling respondents to permit them to
occupy their seats and to exercise their senatorial prerogative. They also allege that only the
Electoral Tribunal had jurisdiction over contests relating to their election, returns and
qualifications. Respondents assert the validity of the pendatum resolution.
THE ISSUE: Whether or not the Senate conducted grave abuse of its discretion.
THE RULING: the case is dismissed.
THE RATIO: Senate has not because the present case is well within its mandated powers, and
not in ET. Section 17, Art. VI provides that ET is “the sole judge of the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly”. A correct interpretation of the
provision, however, denotes that the tribunal has jurisdiction over all “contests” relating to
election, returns, and qualifications. Gleaning on the framers’ intent, they had no intention of
putting all powers on ET but power over “contests” only. Contest are herein defined as “statutory
contests in which the contestant seeks not only to oust the intruder, but also to have himself
inducted into the office.”
To illustrate the residual power on Senate. Suppose, the Court says, that a former
convict is elected as Congressman. No opponents, hence no protest. But, any member of the
House can prompt an investigation on the Congressman. This does not constitute election
protest, but the power of the House relating to qualification standards.
G.R. No. 146943 October 4, 2002
SARIO MALINIAS, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, TEOFILO CORPUZ, ANACLETO TANGILAG and
VICTOR DOMINGUEZ, respondents.
THE FACTS: Petitioner Malinias was a candidate for governor whereas Pilando was a
candidate for congressional representative of Mountain Province in the May 11, 1998 elections.6
On July 31, 1998, Malinias and Pilando filed a complaint with the COMELEC's Law Department
for violation of Section 25 of R.A. No. 6646, and Sections 232 and 261 (i) of B.P. Blg. 881,
against Victor Dominguez, Teofilo Corpuz, Anacleto Tangilag, Thomas Bayugan, Jose Bagwan
who was then Provincial Election Supervisor, and the members of the Provincial Board of
Canvassers. Victor Dominguez ("Dominguez" or brevity) was then the incumbent Congressman
of Poblacion, Sabangan, Mountain Province. eofilo Corpuz ("Corpuz" for brevity) was then the
Provincial Director of the Philippine National Police in Mountain Province while Anacleto
Tangilag ("Tangilag" for brevity) was then the Chief of Police of the Municipality of Bontoc,
Mountain Province.
Malinias and Pilando alleged that on May 15, 1998 a police checkpoint at Nacagang, Sabangan,
Mountain Province blocked their supporters who were on their way to Bontoc, and prevented
them from proceeding to the Provincial Capitol Building. Malinias and Pilando further alleged
that policemen, upon orders of private respondents, prevented their supporters, who
nevertheless eventually reached the Provincial Capitol Building, from entering the capitol
grounds.
Among the private respondents, only Corpuz and Tangilag submitted their joint counter-affidavit
wherein they admitted that they ordered the establishment of checkpoints all over the province
to enforce the COMELEC Gun Ban andits other pertinent rules. Moreover, the said that the
presence of the policemen within the said area is to prevent some groups who had the intent to
disrupt the election canvassing and proceedings since it had already happened in the past,
contending that the petitioners were among them.
After investigating the allegations, COMELEC ruled to dismiss the petition against the

respondents for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause. Malinias filed an MR but
it was also denied for failure of adducing additional evidence thereon.
THE ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint for
lack of probable cause.
THE RULING: the instant Petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of public
respondent COMELEC are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
THE RATIO: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of COMELEC and found the conduct of
its investigation and ruling on the case to be in accord with its jurisdiction and duties under the
law. COMELEC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion since there is nothing despotic in
the said complaint hence, SC can not issue the writ of certiorari.
COMELEC and private respondents overlooked that Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 is not
one of the election offenses explicitly enumerated in Sections 261 and 262 of B.P. Blg. 881.
While Section 232 categorically states that it is unlawful for the persons referred therein to enter
the canvassing room, this act is not one of the election offenses criminally punishable under
Sections 261 and 262 of B.P. Blg. 881. Thus, the act involved in Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 is
not punishable as a criminal election offense. Section 264 of B.P. Blg. 881 provides that the
penalty for an election offense under Sections 261 and 262 is imprisonment of not less than one
year but not more than six years.
Under the rule of statutory construction of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, there
is no ground to order the COMELEC to prosecute private respondents for alleged violation of
Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 precisely because this is a non-criminal act.
"It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person,
thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all others. The rule is expressed in the
familiar maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius.”
The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius and its variations are canons of
restrictive interpretation. They are based on the rules of logic and the natural workings of the
human mind. They are predicated upon one's own voluntary act and not upon that of others.
They proceed from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumeration
in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those
expressly mentioned.
The act of Corpuz and Tangilag in setting up the checkpoint was plainly in accordance
with their avowed duty to maintain effectively peace and order within the vicinity of the
canvassing site. Thus, the act is untainted with any color of political activity. There was also no
showing that the alleged closure of the provincial capitol grounds favored the election of the
other candidates.
G.R. No. 147749 June 22, 2006
SAN PABLO MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,* Respondent.
THE FACTS: SPMC is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of milling,

manufacturing and exporting of coconut oil and other allied products. It was assessed and
ordered to pay by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue the total amount
of P8,182,182.852 representing deficiency miller’s tax and manufacturer’s sales tax,3 among
other deficiency taxes,4 for taxable year 1987. The deficiency miller’s tax was imposed on
SPMC’s sales of crude oil to United Coconut Chemicals, Inc. (UNICHEM) while the deficiency
sales tax was applied on its sales of corn and edible oil as manufactured products.
SPMC opposed the assessments but the Commissioner denied its protest. SPMC
appealed the denial of its protest to the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). The CTA cancelled
SPMC’s liability for deficiency manufacturer’s tax on the sales of corn and edible oils but upheld
the Commissioner’s assessment for the deficiency miller’s tax.
SPMC took the case to the CA. The appellate court dismissed the petition on the
principal ground that the verification attached to it was signed merely by SPMC’s chief financial
officer – without the corporate secretary’s certificate, board resolution or power of attorney
authorizing him to sign the verification and certification against forum shopping.
In the petition, SPMC contended that they are not liable for the 3% miller’s tax. It
maintains that the crude oil which is sold to UNICHEM was actually exported by UNICHEM as
an ingredient of fatty acid and glycerine, hence, not subject to miller’s tax pursuant to Sec. 168
of the 1987
Tax Code.
THE ISSUE: Whether or not SPMC is liable for the deficiency miller’s tax.
THE RULING: The petition is DENIED.
THE RATIO: The language of the exempting clause of the Tax Code was clear. The tax
exemption applied only to the exportation of rope, coconut oil, palm oil, copra by-products and
dessicated coconuts, where in their original state or as an ingredient or part of any
manufactured article or products by the proprietor or operator of the factory or by the miller
himself. Since SMPC’s situation was not with the ambit of the exemption, it was subject to th3%
miller’s tax imposed under the Tax Code.
Where the law enumerates the subject or condition upon which it applies, it is to be
constructed as excluding from its effects all of those not expressly mentioned. When one of
more things of a class are expressly mentioned others of the same class are excluded
(Expressio unius est exclusion alterius). Anything that is not included in the enumeration is
excluded therefrom and a meaning that does not appear nor is intended or reflected in the very
language of the statute can not be placed in the statute.
The application of this maxim in this case is consistent with the construction of tax
exemptions. If SPMC’s claim for tax exemption will be allowed, it will violate the established
principles and unduly derogate sovereign authority in juncture with published statutes.
G.R. No. 132527. July 29, 2005
COCONUT OIL REFINERS ASSOCIATION, INC. represented by its President, JESUS L.

ARRANZA, PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF MEAT PROCESSORS, INC. (PAMPI), represented
by its Secretary, ROMEO G. HIDALGO, FEDERATION OF FREE FARMERS (FFF),
represented by its President, JEREMIAS U. MONTEMAYOR, and BUKLURAN NG
MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO (BMP), represented by its Chairperson, FELIMON C.
LAGMAN, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. RUBEN TORRES, in his capacity as Executive Secretary; BASES CONVERSION AND
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, CLARK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, SUBIC BAY
METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY, 88 MART DUTY FREE, FREEPORT TRADERS, PX CLUB,
AMERICAN HARDWARE, ROYAL DUTY FREE SHOPS, INC., DFS SPORTS, ASIA PACIFIC,
MCI DUTY FREE DISTRIBUTOR CORP. (formerly MCI RESOURCES, CORP.), PARK &
SHOP, DUTY FREE COMMODITIES, L. FURNISHING, SHAMBURGH, SUBIC DFS, ARGAN
TRADING CORP., ASIPINE CORP., BEST BUY, INC., PX CLUB, CLARK TRADING,
DEMAGUS TRADING CORP., D.F.S. SPORTS UNLIMITED, INC., DUTY FREE FIRST
SUPERSTORE, INC., FREEPORT, JC MALL DUTY FREE INC. (formerly 88 Mart [Clark] Duty
Free Corp.), LILLY HILL CORP., MARSHALL, PUREGOLD DUTY FREE, INC., ROYAL DFS
and ZAXXON PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondents.
THE FACTS: Petitioners contend that the aforecited issuances are unconstitutional and void as
they constitute executive lawmaking, and that they are contrary to Republic Act No. 7227 and in
violation of the Constitution, particularly Section 1, Article III (equal protection clause), Section
19, Article XII (prohibition of unfair competition and combinations in restraint of trade), and
Section 12, Article XII (preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced
goods).
On March 13, 1992, Republic Act No. 7227 was enacted, providing for, among other
things, the sound and balanced conversion of the Clark and Subic military reservations and
their extensions into alternative productive uses in the form of special economic zones in order
to promote the economic and social development of Central Luzon in particular and the
country in general. They also mentioned that RA no. 7227 clearly limits the grant of tax
incentives to the importation of raw materials, capital and equipment only thereby violating the
equal protection clause of the Constitution. It reads as follows:
The Subic Special Economic Zone shall be operated and managed
as a separate customs territory ensuring free flow or movement of
goods and capital within, into and exported out of the Subic Special
Economic Zone, as well as provide incentives such as tax and duty-
free importations of raw materials, capital and equipment. However,
exportation or removal of goods from the territory of the Subic Special
Economic Zone to the other parts of the Philippine territory shall be
subject to customs duties and taxes under the Customs and Tariff
Code and other relevant tax laws of the Philippines [RA 7227, Sec 12
(b)].
THE ISSUE: Whether or not the wording or construction of RA no. 7227 limits the grant of tax
incentives.
THE RULING: the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Section 5 of Executive Order No. 80 and
Section 4 of BCDA Board Resolution No. 93-05-034 are hereby declared NULL and VOID and
are accordingly declared of no legal force and effect. Respondents are hereby enjoined from
implementing the aforesaid void provisions. All portions of Executive Order No. 97-A are valid
and effective, except the second sentences in paragraphs 1.2 and 1.3 of said Executive Order,
which are hereby declared INVALID.
THE RATIO: It was contended that RA no. 7227 does not limit the grant of tax incentives. The
phrase ‘tax and duty-free importations of raw materials, capital and equipment” was merely cited
as an example of incentives that may be given to entities operating within the zone does not
apply when words are mentioned by the way of example wherein the statutory construction
maxim expressio unius est exclusion alterius (when one or more things of a class are
expressly mentioned others of the same class are excluded) is applied.
G.R. No. 124893 April 18, 1997
LYNETTE G. GARVIDA, petitioner,
vs.
FLORENCIO G. SALES, JR., THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ELECTION
OFFICER DIONISIO F. RIOS and PROVINCIAL SUPERVISOR NOLI PIPO, respondents.
THE FACTS: Petitioner Lynette G. Garvida seeks to annul and set aside the order dated May 2,
1996 of respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc suspending her
proclamation as the duly elected Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan of Barangay San
Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui, Ilocos Norte.
The facts are undisputed. The Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) elections nationwide was
scheduled to be held on May 6, 1996. On March 16, 1996, petitioner applied for registration as
member and voter of the Katipunan ng Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos
Norte. The Board of Election Tellers, however, denied her application on the ground that
petitioner, who was then twenty-one years and ten (10) months old, exceeded the age limit for
membership in the Katipunan ng Kabataan as laid down in Section 3 [b] of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2824.
Lynette Garvida applied for registration as member and voter of the Katipunan ng
Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte on March 16, 1996. However, her
application was denied by the Board of Election Tellers since she exceeded the age limit. She
then filed a “Petition for Inclusion as Registered Kabataan Member and Voter” with the
Municipal Trial Court which was granted by the said court. Then, on April 23, 1996, Garvida filed
her certificate of candidacy for the position of Chairman, Sangguniang Kabataan, Barangay San
Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui, Province of Ilocos Norte.
On the same date, Election Officer Dionisio Rios, per advise of Provincial Election
Supervisor Noli Pipo, disapproved petitioner’s certificate of candidacy again due to her age.
Petitioner then appealed to COMELEC Regional Director Filemon Asperin who set aside the
order of respondents and allowed petitioner to run.
Earlier and without knowledge of COMELEC officials, private respondent and petitioner’s
rival Florencio Sales Jr. filed with the COMELEC en banc a “Petition of Denial and/or
Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy” via facsimile and registered mail on April 29, 1996.
And, on May 2, 1996 respondent Riso issued a memorandum to petitioner informing her
of her ineligibility and giving her 24 hours why her certificate of candidacy should not be
disapproved.
Also on the same date, the COMELEC en banc issued an order directing the Board
Election Tellers and Board of Canvassers to suspend the proclamation of petitioner in the event
she won in the election. This is why on May 6, 1996, Election Day, Garvida was not proclaimed
the winner. She was only proclaimed on June 2, 1996. Said proclamation was “without prejudice
to any further action by the Commission on Elections or any other interested parties.
THE ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC erred in the cancellation of Garvida’s certificate of
candidacy on the ground that she has exceeded the age requirement to run as an elective
official in the SK.
THE RULING: the petition is dismissed and petitioner Lynette G. Garvida is declared
INELIGIBLE for being over the age qualification for candidacy in the May 6, 1996 elections of
the Sangguniang Kabataan, and is ordered to vacate her position as Chairman of the
Sangguniang Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The Sangguniang
Kabataan member voted by simple majority by and from among the incumbent Sangguniang
Kabataan members of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte shall assume the office of
Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte for the
unexpired portion of the term.
THE RATIO: The Supreme Court discussed the one year cycle of successive years in
construing Section 428 of the Local Government Code providing that certain elective officials
should not be more than 21 years of age on the day of their election. Only exception is when the
official reaches the age of 21 years during his incumbency.
Local Government Code will reveal a distinction between the maximum age of a member
in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and the maximum age of an elective SK official. Section 424 of
the Code sets a member's maximum age at 21 years only. There is no further provision as to
when the member shall have turned 21 years of age. On the other hand, Section 428 provides
that the maximum age of an elective SK official is 21 years old "on the day of his election." The
addition of the phrase "or the day of his election" is an additional qualification. The member may
be more than 21 years of age on election day or on the day he registers as member of the
Katipunan ng Kabataan. The elective official, however, must not be more than 21 years old on
the day of election.
The provision that an elective official of the SK should not be more than 21 years of age
on the day of his election is very clear. The Local Government Code speaks of years, not
months nor days. When the law speaks of years, it is understood that years are of 365 days
each. One born on the first day of the year is consequently deemed to be one year old on the
365th day after his birth — the last day of the year. This means on his 21st birthday, he has
completed the entire span of 21 365-day cycles. After this birthday, the 365-day cycle for his
22nd year begins. The day after the 365th day is the first day of the next 365-day cycle and he
turns 22 years old on the 365th day.
The phrase "not more than 21 years of age" means not over 21 years, not beyond 21
years. It means 21 365-day cycles. It does not mean 21 years and one or some days or a
fraction of a year because that would be more than 21 365-day cycles. "Not more than 21 years
old" is not equivalent to "less than 22 years old," contrary to petitioner's claims. The law does
not state that the candidate be less than 22 years on election day.
G.R. No. 141285 July 5, 2001
CEBU INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE and DR. JOSEFINA L. POBLETE, petitioners,

vs.
CEBU INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE EMPLOYEES' UNION-NATIONAL FEDERATION OF
LABOR, respondent.
THE FACTS: Cebu Institute of Medicine (CIM) is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution.
Respondent Cebu Institute of Medicine Employees’ Union-National Federation of Labor
(UNION) is the duly certified bargaining representative of the employees of CIM.
On 2 September 1997 the UNION asked CIM to stop its practice of charging the
employer’s mandatory share in the SSS, Medicare and Pag-Ibig premiums against the seventy
percent (70%) incremental tuition fee increase under Sec. 5, par. (2), of RA 6728. CIM refused.
Eventually, the dispute was submitted to voluntary arbitration.
On 6 January 1999 Voluntary Arbitrator decided in favor of the UNION holding that
charging the employer’s share in the SSS, Medicare and Pag-Ibig contributions against the
seventy percent (70%) incremental tuition fee increase contravened Sec. 19, of RA 1161.
CIM appealed to the Court of Appeals arguing that the Voluntary Arbitrator gravely erred
in disregarding the clear tenor of Sec. 5, par. (2), of RA 6728, and in disallowing petitioners from
deducting the employer’s premiums for SSS and Pag-Ibig benefits from the seventy percent
(70%) portion of the incremental tuition fee increase, and also in ordering a refund of the
employer’s premiums taken from the seventy percent (70%) portion. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the ruling of the Voluntary Arbitrator. The CIM disagree, hence, the petition.
THE ISSUE: Whether or not the Voluntary Arbitrator gravely erred in disregarding the clear
tenor of Sec. 5, par. (2), of RA 6728, and in disallowing petitioners from deducting the
employer’s premiums for SSS and Pag-Ibig benefits from the seventy percent (70%) portion of
the incremental tuition fee increase, and also in ordering a refund of the employer’s premiums
taken from the seventy percent (70%) portion.
THE RULING: the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals of 17 August 1999 and its
Resolution of 13 December 1999 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered allowing
petitioner Cebu Institute of Medicine (CIM) to charge its share in the SSS, Medicare and Pag-Ibig
premiums against the seventy percent (70%) incremental tuition fee increase under Sec. 5, par. (2), RA
6728.
THE RATIO: Salaries, wages, allowances and other benefits of teaching and non-teaching
personnel are to be charged against the seventy percent (70%) incremental tuition fee increase.
SSS, Medicare and Pag-Ibig fall under the category of "other benefits," hence, may very well be
charged against the seventy percent (70%) incremental tuition fee increase which after all is for
the benefit of petitioners’ teaching and non-teaching personnel.
The law speaks of payment of "salaries, wages, allowances and other benefits." There is
no specific prohibition against charging the employer’s share to the incremental tuition fee
increase. The employer’s share in the SSS, Medicare and Pag-Ibig premiums is deemed
integrated in the amount to be allocated for these benefits from the seventy percent (70%)
incremental tuition fee increase. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus.
Where the law does not distinguish courts should not distinguish.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

G.R. No. L-19650 September 29, 1966

CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., petitioner-appellee,

Office of the Solicitor General for respondent and appellant.

G.R. No. 158540 July 8, 2004

SOUTHERN CROSS CEMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,

G.R. No. L-29906 January 30, 1976

RODOLFO GENERAL and CARMEN GONTANG, petitioners,

Augusto A. Pardalis for petitioners.

E.V. Guevarra for respondent.

G.R. No. L-11988 April 4, 1918

Acting Attorney-General Paredes for appellant.

In order to accomplish this purpose, the Legislature, instead of attempting an enumeration

G.R. No. L-6355-56 August 31, 1953

PASTOR M. ENDENCIA and FERNANDO JUGO, plaintiffs-appellees,

G.R. No. L-7899 June 23, 1955

ALFREDO MONTELIBANO, PASTOR MALLORCA, GONZALGO DE LA TORRE, and JOSE

Arrieta and Nolan for appellants.

G.R. No. 182069 July 03, 2012

On 30 October 2003, the City Council or the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Malabon

G.R. No. L-34568 March 28, 1988

RODERICK DAOANG, and ROMMEL DAOANG, assisted by their father, ROMEO

G.R. No. 168108 April 13, 2007

a. EARNEST MONEY: An earnest money of ONE MILLION PESOS (Php1,000,000.00)

b. FIRST PAYMENT: SIX MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED SIXTY-FIVE THOUSAND SIX

G.R. No. 190102 July 11, 2012

G.R. No. 78780 July 23, 1987

DAVID G. NITAFAN, WENCESLAO M. POLO, and MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO, JR., petitioners,

G.R. No. 79543 October 16, 1996

JOSE D. FILOTEO, JR., petitioner,

G.R. No. 79974 December 17, 1987

ULPIANO P. SARMIENTO III AND JUANITO G. ARCILLA, petitioners,

G.R. Nos. 92191-92 July 30, 1991

Hechanova & Associates for petitioner Co.

G.R. No. 141284 August 15, 2000

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

G.R. No. 147589 June 26, 2001

Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the party-list system, is couched in

G.R. No. 83896 February 22, 1991

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, petitioner,

G.R. No. 83815 February 22, 1991

ANTI-GRAFT LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. and CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners,

G.R. No. L-543 August 31, 1946

JOSE O. VERA, ET AL., petitioners,

Jose W. Diokno and Antonio Barredo for petitioners.

G.R. No. 146943 October 4, 2002

After investigating the allegations, COMELEC ruled to dismiss the petition against the

G.R. No. 147749 June 22, 2006

SAN PABLO MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Petitioner,

THE FACTS: SPMC is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of milling,

G.R. No. 132527. July 29, 2005

COCONUT OIL REFINERS ASSOCIATION, INC. represented by its President, JESUS L.

G.R. No. 124893 April 18, 1997

G.R. No. 141285 July 5, 2001

CEBU INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE and DR. JOSEFINA L. POBLETE, petitioners,

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