MANU/IC/0036/2013

Equivalent Citation: 2013(56)PTC 94(IPAB)

BEFORE THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY APPELLATE BOARD, CHENNAI

CIRCUIT BENCH AT MUMBAI
OA/12 to 14 & 19/2010/TM/MUM and M.P. No. 29/2010 in OA/12/2010/TM/MUM,
M.P. No. 30/2010 in OA/13/2010/TM/MUM, M.P. No. 31/2010 in
OA/14/2010/TM/MUM and M.P. No. 58/2010 in OA/19/2010/TM/MUM
Decided On: 31.05.2013
Appellants: Societe Des Produits Nestle
Vs.
Respondent: Swaraj Industrial and Domestic Appliances Pvt. Ltd. and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
S. Usha, (Vice Chairman) and V. Ravi, Member (T)
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: Shri Hemant Singh, Advocate
For Respondents/Defendant: Shri B.N. Poojari, Advocate
ORDER
S. Usha, (Vice Chairman)
1 . All these four appeals arise out of the order dated 19.9.2009 dismissing the
oppositions and allowing the applications to proceed for registration as per the
procedure.
OA/12/2010/TM/MUM:
The respondents herein filed an application for registration of the trademark Maggi in
Class-11 in respect of electric fans, heater, geysers, bulbs, tube-lights, torch, exhaust
fan, emergency light, transformer, electric fittings, stabilizer, regulator, electric hot
plate for cooking, fridge, air conditioner, water cooler, room cooler. Electric
components, gas lighter and other heating, lighting and cooking apparatus and
utensils under No. 52532. The application was filed on 10.01.1990 claiming user
since January, 1984. The said application was advertised in the Trade Marks Journal
No. 1129 dated 16.06.1996. This was opposed by the appellants herein on various
grounds.
OA/13/2010/TM/MUM:
2. The respondents herein filed an application for registration of the trademark Maggi
under No. 522533 in class-21 in respect of Domestic utensils, household articles,
plasticwares, glasswares vegetable cutters, thermowares, flower plates, buckets,
plant sets, vacuum flasks, water filters, casserolls, caterers (food) brushes, cup,
saucers all being goods included in class 21 in January, 1990 claiming user since
January, 1984. This was advertised in the Trade Mark Journal No. 1129 dated
16.6.1996. This was opposed registration by the appellants.

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 OA/14/2010/TM/MUM:
3. The respondents herein filed an application for registration of the trademark Maggi
in January 1990 under No. 522531 in class-7 in respect of washing machine, grinding
machine, mixer, juicers and slicer attachments and parts thereof claiming user since
January 1984. The same was advertised in the Trade Marks Journal No. 1129 dated
16.06.1996. The appellants herein opposed the registration.
OA/19/2010/TM/MUM:
4 . The respondents herein on 22.03.1994 filed an application for registration of the
trademark Maggi under No. 622735 in Class 8 in respect of hand tools and
implements (hand operated) and cuttery claiming user since August, 1992 which was
advertised in the Trade Marks Journal No. 1299 dated 21.07.2003. The same was
opposed by the appellants herein.
5 . All the four matters were heard together and a common order was passed. The
objection under Sections 9 and 11 of the Act was rejected as the possibility of
confusion among the public was less. Though the marks were identical the goods
were different. The objection under Section 11(2) was not accepted as the opponents
(appellants) have not proved that their trademark is a well known trademark and
therefore objection under Section 11(10) was also not accepted. The respondent's
adoption is not in bad faith. The objection under Section 11(3) is acceptable as the
applicants (respondents) trademark is disentitled to protection in a court of law.
Origin of goods leading to confusion or deception is likely between the competing
goods as the trademarks are identical.
6. The objection under Section 18(1) was not accepted as the application was filed in
January 1994 and March 1994 claiming user since 1984 and 1992 respectively. The
appellants though have their trademark registered since 1970 have not proved the
use whereas the respondents have proved their user since 1984.
7 . The appellants have claimed their trademark Maggi as a well known mark for
which no court order has been filed. In the suit filed by the appellants against the
respondents no interim orders have been granted by the Court and hence, the
objection under Section 11(3) is rejected. The appellants have not proved their user
whereas the respondents have proved their use since 1984 and 1992.
8 . The goods and the purchasers are different. There is no dishonesty in the
respondents adoption. The opposition was therefore dismissed and the application
was allowed to proceed to registration.
9. The appellants are therefore before us against the above order by appeal.
10. The appellant is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling various
culinary products such as noodles, sauce, soups, etc. under the trademark "Maggi" in
various international markets. The word Maggi was derived from the surname of
Julius Maggi founder of the business of Nestle Group carried on from 1886 upto 1947
under the name Maggi Alimantana SA which emerged with the appellant in 1947 and
became Nestle Alimantana SA. The word Maggi is not a dictionary word. The word
Maggi connotes and denotes the goods of the appellants exclusively. The appellants
are the prior user of the trademark Maggi. In view of the distinctiveness acquired in
the trademark Maggi, it has been associated only with the appellants goods and with
none else.

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 11. The appellants products Maggi were sold in Switzerland as early as 1886 and in
France, Austria and Germany since 1887, in South East Asia countries since 1936, in
Singapore since 1939 and in Malaysia since 1960. The trademark Maggi features into
the publication titled "World's Greatest Brands" (1996 Edition) published by 'Inter
Brands' which ranked Maggi amongst world's top 50 brands. The appellants have sold
Maggi products in India since 1974 and are the registered proprietors of the
trademark Maggi.
1 2 . The appellants' trademark Maggi is registered under No. 267814 dated
02.11.1970 in class-30 in respect of farinaceous products, cereals and preparations
made from cereals, rice and rice preparations, all for human consumption, flour,
pastry, bread, biscuits and cakes (not animals) preparation included in class-30 for
making puddings, sweets, candy, honey and artificial honey, sugar, chocolates,
cocoa, ice cream, sauces, tea and tea extracts, coffee and coffee extracts, coffee
essences, vinegar, flavourings (other than essential oils) condiments (for food),
spices (other than poultry spices). They have also obtained registration of the
trademark Maggi under No. 267813 in Class 29 in respect of meat and meat products
including meat extracts, fish and other crustacean and moluscous animal products,
prepared foods consisting of vegetables, fruit, meat and animal products all the
aforesaid being food products included in class 29, jams, fruit preserves and
vegetable preserves, eggs, milk and other dairy products (for food) edible oils and
edible fats, marmalades soups and preparations included in class-29 for use as
sandwich spreads, bouillon.
13. The trademark Maggi has been extensively advertised worldwide including India
through various medias at large financial expenses without territorial limitation. The
advertisement and promotional expenses incurred by the appellant in its trademark
Maggi for the year 1984 was Rs. 5 crores and for the year 2007 was in excess of Rs.
37 crores.
1 4 . On account of such extensive advertisement and sales promotion campaigns
undertaken, the same has acquired formidable goodwill and reputation, the public
identify and associate the goods with the appellants only. The annual sales turnover
runs to Rs. 6 crores in the year 1984 and increased to Rs. 673 crores in the year
2007. On account of prior adoption, long and continuous use the trademark Maggi
has acquired enviable goodwill and reputation among the public and trade. The
goodwill and reputation is the result of decades of huge financial investment. The 3rd
respondent ignored the evidence filed by the appellants while passing the impugned
order.
15. The 3rd respondent has given a finding that the user claim is not clear as the
appellants are not firm in their claim. This is arbitrary and contrary as the affidavit
filed by the appellants are clear and the claim is clearly stated as 1974 and the sales
figures were also given from the period 1974 as well the advertisement expenses
from the period from 1978. The annual report for the period from 1974 were not
considered by the 3rd respondent. All these evidence were neither denied nor
disputed by the 1st respondent and therefore, there was no reason for the 3rd
respondent to discard the evidence. The fact that Maggi is a well known trademark
was not considered by the 3rd respondent. The 3rd respondent failed to consider the
fact that the appellants are registered proprietors of the trademark Maggi since 1916
worldwide and since 1970 in India.
1 6 . In an identical matter where one M/s. Jain Ram Tradings had obtained

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 registration of the trademark Maggi in class 29. The appellants filed a rectification of
the trademark. This Board had held that the appellants mark Maggi had acquired a
wide reputation and the mark on the register is likely to cause confusion and
deception. This was brought to the notice of the 3rd respondent and the same was
not considered.
17. The 1st respondent claims that the trademark Maggi was adopted in the year
1984, but no evidence was produced nor any reason given for the adoption of the
mark. The order passed by IPAB was placed before the 3rd respondent where it was
held that the trademark Maggi is a well known trademark. But, the 3rd respondent
held that there is no order placed to prove that Maggi is a well known trademark.
18. The 3rd respondent has not given any valid reason for rejecting the objection
under Section 11(3) of the Act except that no permanent injunction was granted by
the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in S. No. 1187/93 & S. No. 3047/96. As no final
decision has been given by the High Court in the suit, the finding of the 3rd
respondent is erroneous.
19. The finding of the 3rd respondent that Maggi is a common surname as pleaded
by the 1st respondent is not supported by them except for few internet printouts of
some users of Maggi in India. Internet download does not constitute commercial use
of the trademark. The use claimed by the respondent since 1984 is neither prior use
nor recent use.
20. The 1st respondent i.e., the applicant Swaraj Industrial and Domestic Appliances
Pvt. Ltd. is a company incorporated under the Companies Act. The use claimed since
1984 was by a proprietor Mr. Rajesh Mehta trading as Supreme Electricals which was
converted into a partnership firm by the name of Essar Industries. There is no deed
of assignment placed to prove the connection between the respondent and Essar
Industries. This fact has not been gone into by the 3rd respondent.
21. In report, the 1st respondent filed their counter statement. The stated that in
view of the original and honest adoption and bona fide use established the
respondent is entitled to claim proprietorship under Section 18(1) of the Act. In
1982, M/s. Supreme Electrical original conceived and adopted the trademark Maggi in
respect of mixing and grinding machines for domestic use. By an assignment deed
dated 20.09.1989 the business was assigned in favour of M/s. Essar Industries which
in turn assigned the business by deed dated 05.03.1993 to the 1st respondent.
2 2 . The appellants on their own admission have stated that Maggi is a popular
feminine name. They had also accepted that they are using the same in respect of
culinary products namely, soup and noodle.
2 3 . The 1st respondent's trademark is a feminine name and is capable of
distinguishing the goods from those of others in the course of trade. The respondents
trademark Maggi, by virtue of long and continuous use since 1984 has acquired
distinctiveness. The use of the trademark Maggi by the respondent is not likely to
cause confusion and deception. The goods are different and therefore, the customers
are not likely to be misled.
24. The trademark Maggi is used by many others in respect of various goods. The
appellants alleged goods and goods covered under the present application are not in
common trade channel. There is no connection between the goods. Appellants have
failed to prove that their trademark is a well known trademark. The rest of the

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 averments were denied by the respondents.
25. On completion of the pleadings, the matter was heard. In all the appeals, Mr.
Hemanth Singh, learned counsel appeared for and on behalf of the appellant and Mr.
Poojari, learned counsel appeared for and on behalf of the respondents.
2 6 . The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that there were four
applications filed by the 1st respondent in classes 7, 8, 11 and 21. The user claimed
is since 1984. It is not clear as to how the respondent has claimed user since 1984
when they have not placed any evidence in proof of use.
2 7 . The impugned order is passed in an arbitrary manner. The appellants use is
insufficient and rejected the claim that their trademark is a well known mark.
28. It becomes obligatory on the part of the Court to interfere in an order where the
discretion has been exercised arbitrarily and capriciously or where the order under
scrutiny ignores the settled principles of law [vide: Laxmikant V. Patel v. Chetanbhat
Shah MANU/SC/0763/2001 : AIR 2002 SC 275]
2 9 . The counsel further submitted that they had clearly stated in their nature of
opposition that they are the registered proprietors of the trademark Maggi as of 1970
in India and earlier in other countries worldwide. The marks are identical and that the
possibility of confusion is certain.
30. The respondents state that their predecessors had adopted the trademark Maggi
in 1984. There is nothing stated as to how the present applicants i.e., the
respondents are claiming proprietorship.
31. The appellants adopted and used the trademark Maggi as early as 1886 outside
India. They are the registered proprietors of the trademark in India as early as 1970.
3 2 . The respondents have not produced any evidence for the adoption of the
trademark Maggi. It goes to say that the adoption is only to trade upon the goodwill
of the appellant. The respondents are subsequent users and their adoption is
dishonest, for these reasons, the 3rd respondent is not the proprietor and the
registration ought not to be granted. The only defence of the respondent was that the
goods are different.
33. The appellants had filed an interlocutory petition to take on record the additional
evidence and the same was allowed and all evidence were taken on record. In the
various affidavits filed by one Mr. M.S.I. Lakdawala, Vice President (legal) and
Company Secretary of Nestle India Ltd. and Charles, Vice President of Societe Des
Produits Nestle SA., the appellants have claimed user at least since 1986 and given
the sales figures for the period from 1986.
34. The respondents evidence - the first advertisement is of the year 1990 and not
earlier.
3 5 . The appellants in the affidavit of Ms. Vanita Gabriel, Constituted Attorney of
Societe Des Produits Nestle SA have stated that the trademark Maggi was adopted in
the year 1883 by Mr. Julius Maggi. The word Maggi formed part of their corporate
name as "The Maggi Company" (Maggi Alimentane SA).
36. The trademark Maggi is a well known trademark. In the year 2001, the Readers'
Digest Magazine had identified Maggi as a Super Brand. As early as 1936, the

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 appellants had registered their trademark in Philippines. At page 261 in the annual
report of the company in the year 1974 where the trademark Maggi was seen
mentioned.
37. The two goods i.e., the appellants and the respondents' goods are found in the
kitchen side by side. There is intimate and inseparable connection between the
goods. The food items and the kitchen-wares are available in the same shop.
Therefore, there is trade connection between the goods. They are allied and cognate
goods.
3 8 . The respondents manufacturing licence is issued in the name of M/s. Essar
Industries which is valid from 30.12.1990. It is not clear as to the connection
between the respondents and M/s. Essar Industries.
39. The appellants relied on few judgments:
(1) N.R. Dongre v. Whirlpool Corporation I(MANU/SC/1223/1996 : 1996 PTC
(16) 583) - In the absence of any satisfactory explanation by the applicant as
to how they came to adopt the trademark, the adoption of the trademark
cannot prima facie be regarded as honest.
(2) M/s. Hindustan Pencils Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s. India Stationery Products Co.
(MANU/DE/0383/1989 : AIR 1990 Del 19) - Adoption if not bona fide, the
applicants' mark cannot continue.
(3) Sunder Paramanand v. Caltex (India) Ltd. (MANU/MH/0063/1969 : AIR
1969 Bom 24) - In an application for registration, the onus of proving that
the mark is not calculated to deceive or cause confusion lies on the 3
applicant. If the marks are identical for different goods, then the public who
were aware of one mark and then, if used by another would be made to think
that the goods are from the same manufacturer even if the goods are
different.
(4) Daimler Benz Aktiegesellschaft v. Hybo Hindustan (MANU/DE/0035/1994
: AIR 1994 Del 239] - None should be continued to be allowed to use a
world famed name to goods which have no connection with the type of goods
which have generated the worldwide reputation.
(5) Larsen & Tourbro Ltd. v. Lachmi Narain Traders & Ors.
(MANU/DE/0187/2008 : 2008 (36) PTC 223 (Del) (DB)) - Test of field of
activity is no more valid question. Question is one of real likelihood of
confusion and deception among the consumers and the resultant damages.
(6) Sony Kabushiki Kaisha v. Mahaluxmi Textile Mills (MANU/WB/0026/2009
: 2009 (41) PTC 184 (Cal) (FB)) - Even if the goods or services of the rival
traders are different, in our opinion, this factor alone would not altogether
eliminate the possibility of confusion and deception. If a highly distinctive
trademark is applied to a class of goods which its proprietor does not deal
with, consumers may always wonder as to whether the proprietors of the
trademark have launched a new product.
(7) Honda Motors Co. Ltd. v. Charanjit Singh (MANU/DE/1845/2002 : 2003
(26) PTC 1 (Del))-The plaintiffs trademark Honda has acquired international
repute, the use of an identical trademark by the defendant is to acquire the

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 benefit of its goodwill and reputation so as to create deception among the
public.
(8) T.V. Venugopal v. Ushodaya Enterprises Ltd. (MANU/SC/0169/2011 :
2011) 4 SCC 85) - Permitting a person to sell his product with the mark
Eenadu would be encroaching on the reputation and goodwill of the other
person and this would constitute invasion of proprietary rights vested in the
respondent company.
(9) Societe Des Produits Nestle SA v. Jai Ram trading as M/s. R.K. Industries
(MANU/IC/0091/2008 : 2009 (39) PTC 514 (IPAB)) - The trademark Maggi
has acquired wide reputation among the public at large by sales and
advertisement.
40. In reply, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that they had been
using the trademark Maggi since 1984. The rival goods are different. The appellants
in one place state that Maggi is an invented and coined word and in another place,
state that it is a surname. The concept of well known trademark was not present in
the Old Act and the same does not apply in the instant case.
41. There is no instance of confusion and deception among the public and therefore,
registration granted ought to be allowed.
(1) Jugmug Elec. Industries v. Telerad Pvt. Ltd. (IPLR 1977 73) - Difference
in the nature of goods becomes material. If one trademark is used to denote
two entries which are not in common trade channel, then, even a common
trademark is not likely to create an impression in the minds of the customers
that they are made by the same maker.
The counsel further submitted that they had given their sales turnover since
1986 which was Rs. 3,92,316/- and which increased to Rs. 34,44,000/- in
the year 2009. Their first invoice is of the year 1998 at page-46 (Exhibit 4)
of the counter statement to the grounds of appeal.
(2) Bajaj Electricals Ltd. v. Metals & Allied Products [AIR 1988 Bombay 167]
- Family name of defendant identical to trade name of plaintiff - defendant
using its family name as trading style but as trademark or trade sign - such
user is not permissible.
(3) Consolidated Foods Corporation v. Brandon & Co. Private Limited [1961
BLR 612] - A trader acquires a right of property in a distinctive mark merely
by using it upon or in connection with his goods irrespective of the length of
such user and the extent of his trade.
42. We have heard and considered the arguments of both the counsel and have gone
through the pleadings and documents.
4 3 . The impugned trademark is Maggi. The appellants mark is also Maggi. The
impugned application for registration of the trademark Maggi is in respect of various
household articles falling in classes 7, 8, 11 & 21. For goods falling under classes 7,
8 & 11, the user is claimed since 1984 and in class 21, the user is since 1992.
44. We shall first deal with the issue of proprietorship of the trademark Maggi. As
per the provisions of Section 21 of the Act, the applicant must prove that he is the

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 proprietor of the trademark Maggi. On perusal of the impugned application, it is seen
that all the invoices are in the name of Supreme Electrical Appliances. It is not clear
as to how he claims proprietorship of the trademark Maggi from Supreme Electrical
Appliances. Though this plea was raised in the affidavit of evidence, the respondent
had not answered nor had they filed any evidence to prove the same.
45. The respondent on the other hand, has filed two assignment deeds before us.
The appellants objected to filing of these documents at the appeal stage without
leave being obtained. We have looked into those 2 deeds (1) deed of assignment
dated 20.09.1989 by Smt. Namrata Mehta of M/s. Magnetic Controls in favour of Shri
Rajnath S. Dubey and Shri Rajesh O Mehta of M/s. Essar Industries. This relates to
assignment of the trademark Sony. (2) Deed of assignment dated 05.03.1993 by Shri
Rajesh O Mehta & Shri Rajnath S. Dubey of M/s. Essar Industries in favour of Shri
Rajesh O Mehta, Managing Director of Swaraj Industrial and Domestic Appliances.
These two deeds were though objected to be taken on record by the appellant, we
looked into those documents to see if they would be relevant to decide this case on
hand. In our view, these deeds were not relevant. If we had decided or considered
them to be relevant, we would have afforded an opportunity to the appellant to rebut
the same.
4 6 . In our considered view, the deed of assignment dated 20.09.1989 has no
relevance to the case on hand. We do not find the name, Supreme Electrical
Appliances in any of these assignment deeds. It is worth quoting the observation of
Lloyd Jacob, J. in 1956 RPC 1, In the matter of Vitamins Ltd.'s Application for
trademark at p. 12 and particularly the following,
A proprietary right in a mark sought to be registered can be obtained in a
number of ways. The mark can be originated by a person or can be acquired,
but in all cases, it is necessary that the person putting forward the
application should be in possession of some proprietary right which, if
questioned, can be substantiated.
47. In the case on hand, the applicant i.e., the respondent has failed to establish the
proprietorship. Even assuming Shri Rajesh O Mehta was holding charge either as a
partner or as Managing Director or Proprietor, there is no linkage between the various
firms. There is nothing to prove the link between Supreme Electrical Appliances and
the present applicant (respondent). The respondent has failed to satisfy the claim of
proprietorship.
48. Now, we shall deal with the issue of adoption of the trademark. The respondent
has no reason or explanation for the adoption of the trademark, Maggi. The
appellants have established their business under the trademark, Maggi in India and
abroad. The appellants goods bearing the trademark Maggi has thus acquired a good
reputation and goodwill among the public and trade. The respondents adoption in
such circumstances cannot be said to be honest and it is only to trade upon the
goodwill and reputation of the appellants.
49. As held in Eenadu case (cited supra), permitting the respondent to carry on the
business under the trademark, Maggi would be approving their dishonest and willful
conduct. This would also amount to encouraging the respondent to practice fraud on
the public. When the respondents have no reason for their adoption, that such
adoption or use shall not be allowed to be used or registered.
5 0 . The next would be the issue of confusion and deception. The well settled

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 proposition of law is that the onus to establish the fact that there will be no confusion
or deception among the trade and public if the mark is allowed to be registered
would be on the applicant for registration. In this case, the marks are identical. The
goods are allied and cognate goods. The appellants goods are goods falling in classes
29 and 30 - food items. The respondents goods are goods falling in classes 7, 8, 11
& 21 - electrical goods like, fans, light, etc. and household goods like, mixer,
grinder, etc.
51. The appellants goods under the trademark Maggi are food, snacks items which
are being purchased by common man. The household goods of the respondents
would make the common man to think that the goods emanates from the respondents
source. This will lead the common man to associate the household goods under the
trademark Maggi with the Nestle Group i.e., the appellants. Therefore, we are of the
opinion that if the application for registration is allowed, it is likely to cause
confusion and deception.
5 2 . Even if we consider the fact that the goods are different as argued by the
respondent (we do not accept this view), once it is decided that the appellants goods
bearing the trademark has acquired goodwill and reputation and the public associate
those goods only with the appellants. Even though the goods are different, the
possibility of confusion is certain as the marks are identical. The appellants which is
a large company with more sources can expand its field of business. It is worth
mentioning the observation of the Full Bench of the Hon'ble Calcutta High Court in
Sony case (cited supra)
28. xxxx
xxxx Even if the goods or services of the rival traders are different, in our
opinion this factor alone would not altogether eliminate the possibility of
confusion or deception. If a highly distinctive trademark is applied to a class
of goods which its proprietor does not deal with, consumers may always
wonder as to whether the proprietor of the trademark has launched a new
product. The purchasing decision of the consumers may be determined by
this factor.
53. The burden of establishing proprietorship, user, the reasons for adoption and the
likelihood of confusion and deception-all these lie on the applicant for registration.
The applicant i.e., the respondent though claims user since 1984, the first invoice is
dated 1998 which is not that of the respondents. It is in the name of M/s. Supreme
Electrical Appliances, which is not clear as to how the respondent is connected with
M/s. Supreme Electrical Appliances. The respondent has no reason for the adoption of
the trademark. If no reason is given, it is only to ride upon the goodwill and
reputation earned by the appellants. The adoption cannot be said to be honest.
54. The 3rd respondent has held that the trademark is not a well known trademark as
the appellants have not proved the same. The appellants have not proved their use
since 1970. We do not accept the finding of the 3rd respondent. As observed earlier,
the burden is on the applicant to prove their case of use, adoption and if registration
granted, there would be no confusion or deception and it is not for the appellants to
prove the use. As per Section 21 of the Act, any person may oppose the registration
of the trademark.
55. The impugned order has been passed by the Senior Examiner of Trade Marks. We
are unable to understand as to under what authority did the Senior Examiner hear

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 and decide the matter. Though this issue was not raised by either side, we are
expressing our view that the Registrar alone has the power to hear and decide the
matter. As per Section 3 of the Act, the Registrar is the Controller General of Patents,
Designs and Trade Marks appointed by the Central Government. The Central
Government may also appoint Officers who will discharge the functions under the
direction of the Registrar. Section 3 read with Section 91(1) of the Act makes it clear
that any order or decision passed by the Registrar is appealable. Considering this, we
are of the view that the order passed by the Examiner without any authority cannot
be said to be lawful. We are therefore of the opinion that the order passed by the
Senior Examiner is not valid. In view of the above mentioned observations, the
impugned order is set aside and the appeals are allowed. There shall be costs of Rs.
40,000/-(Rs. 10,000/- each). All connected MPs. are closed.
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