Page 1 of the CrimLaw Outline
became one of the principal
EX POST FACTO LAWS
G.R. No. L-46228 January 17, 1978 (81
SCRA 95)
THE PEOPLE OF THKHOSROW
MINUCHER, petitioner, vs. HON.
COURT OF APPEALS and
ARTHUR SCALZO, respondents
GR No. 142396
February 11, 2003
Topic: DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY
It is a well-established principle of
international law that diplomatic
representatives, such as
ambassadors or public ministers and
their official retinue, possess
immunity from the criminal
jurisdiction of the country of their
sojourn and cannot be sued,
arrested or punished by the law of
that country.
FACTS
Khosrow Minucher, an Iranian
national appointed as Labor Attaché
for the Iranian Embassies in Tokyo,
Japan and Manila, came to the
Philippines to study in the University
of the Philippines in 1974. He
became a refugee of the United
Nations and continued to stay in the
Philippines and headed the Iranian
National Resistance Movement in
the Philippines.
Minucher, and one Abbas Torabian
was charged with an information for
violation of Republic Act No. 6425,
otherwise known as “Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972”. They were
accompanied by the private
respondent, Arthur Scalzo who
witnesses for the prosecution.
On 8 January 1988, Presiding Judge
Eutropio Migrino rendered a decision
acquitting the two accused.
On 3 August 1988, Minucher filed
Civil case before the RTC Branch 19
of Manila for damages on account of
what he claimed to have been
trumped-up charges of drug
trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo.
Scalzo filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that, being
a special agent of the United States
Drug Enforcement Administration, he
was entitled to diplomatic immunity.
He attached to his motion Diplomatic
Note of the United States Embassy
addressed to DOJ of the Philippines
and a Certification of Vice Consul
Donna Woodward, certifying that the
note is a true and faithful copy of its
original. Trial court denied the
motion to dismiss.
ISSUE: Whether or not Scalzo is
entitled to diplomatic immunity.
RULING:
Yes, Scalzo is entitled to
diplomatic immunity.
A foreign agent, operating within a
territory, can be cloaked with
immunity from suit as long as it can
be established that he is acting
within the directives of the sending
state.
The consent or imprimatur of the
Philippine government to the
activities of the United States Drug
Enforcement Agency, however, can
be gleaned from the undisputed
facts in the case.
 The official exchanges of
communication between
agencies of the government
of the two countries
 Certifications from officials of
both the Philippine
Department of Foreign Affairs
and the United States
Embassy
 Participation of members of
the Philippine Narcotics
Command in the “buy-bust
operation” conducted at the
residence of Minucher at the
behest of Scalzo
These may be inadequate to support
the “diplomatic status” of Scalzo but
they give enough indication that the
Philippine government has given its
imprimatur, if not consent, to the
activities within Philippine territory of
agent Scalzo of the United States
Drug Enforcement Agency.
The job description of Scalzo has
tasked him to conduct surveillance
on suspected drug suppliers and,
after having ascertained the target,
to inform local law enforcers who
would then be expected to make the
arrest.
In conducting surveillance activities
on Minucher, later acting as the
poseur-buyer during the buy-bust
operation, and then becoming a
principal witness in the criminal case
against Minucher,
Scalzo hardly can be said to have
acted beyond the scope of his official
function or duties.
E PHILIPPINES, petitioner, 
vs.
HON. ROLANDO R. VILLARAZA (as City
Judge of Cagayan de Oro City), and
CAESAR PUERTO, respondents.
Francisco P. Rabanes, Edgardo Y. Raagas,
Casiano A. Gamotin, Jr., Office of the City
Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City for petitioner.
Eric Menchavez for respondent Caesar
Puerto.
FACTS:
Ceasar Puerto was charged with estafa in the
city court of Cagayan De Oro for issuing a two
bouncing checks on October 1974.
City Judge Rolando R. Villaraza in his order
March 31, 1976 noted that the accused had
waived the second stage of the preliminary
investigation. He directed that the case be
elevated, for trial, to the court of First Instance
or the Circuit Criminal Court.
However, the Court of First Instance returned
the case to the city court because the case falls
on the jurisdiction of the city court.
The city judge redirected the evaluation of the
case because the said case fall withing the
jurisdiction of the CFI and estafa is punishable
by prision mayor, which took effect on Oct. 22,
1975.
ISSUE:
Whether the case in which the two bouncing
check, issued on October 1974, is punishable by
prision mayor which took effect on Oct. 1975.
HELD:
The estafa imputed to Caesar Puerto is
punishable by arresto mayor maximum to
prision correccional minimum or four months
and one day to two years and four months.

The prision mayor applies only to swindling by

means of issuing bouncing checks which was
committed on or after October 22, 1975. In this
case, the 2 bouncing checks was issued a in
1974, therefore the correct penalty for the said
case should be prision correccional which is
under the jurisdiction of the city court.

If the increased penalty is applied to Ceasar

Puerto, it would make the decree an ex post
facto law and it retroactive application is
prohibited by Art. 21 and 22 of the revised
penal code and sec. 12 of Art. 4 of the
Constitution.

RULINfG:

EX POST FACTO LAWS:

WHEREFORE, the order of the Court of First
Instance, returning the case to the city court, is
affirmed and the two orders of the respondent
city judge, elevating the case to the Court of
First Instance, are set aside. The city court is
directed to try the case. No costs.
G.R. No. L-32485 October 22, 1970 (35
SCRA 529)
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR
THE DECLARATION OF THE
PETITIONER'S RIGHTS AND DUTIES
UNDER SEC. 8 OF R.A. No. 6132.

KAY VILLEGAS KAMI, INC., petitioner.

FACTS:

Kay Villegas Kami, Inc., claiming to be a duly

recognized and existing non-stock and non-
profit corporation created under the laws of the
land, argued that the Sec. 8 of R.A 6132 violates
the due process clause, right of association, and
freedom of expression and that it is an ex post
facto law.

ISSUE:
Whether Sec. 8 of R.A 6132 is an ex post facto
Law

HELD:

It is said that an ex post fact law is one which:

(1) makes criminal an act done before the

passage of the law and which was innocent
when done, and punishes such an act;

(2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than

it was, when committed;

(3) changes the punishment and inflicts a

greater punishment than the law annexed to
the crime when committed;

(4) alters the legal rules of evidence, and

authorizes conviction upon less or different
testimony than the law required at the time of
the commission of the offense;

(5) assuming to regulate civil rights and

remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or
deprivation of a right for something which when
done was lawful; and

(6) deprives a person accused of a crime of

some lawful protection to which he has become
entitled, such as the protection of a former

conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of

amnesty.

In the case at bar, the SEc. 8 does not consitute

ex post facto law because the penalty is
imposed only for acts committed after the
approval of the law and not those perpetrated
prior thereto.

RULING:

The prayer of the petition is hereby denied and

paragraph 1 of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 is not
unconstitutional. Without costs.
 PAGE 2 OF THE CRIMLAW OUTLINE
G.R. Nos. L-32613-14 December 27,
1972
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner,  FACTS:
vs.
HON. SIMEON. FERRER (in his
capacity as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Tarlac, Branch I),
FELICIANO CO alias LEONCIO CO
alias "Bob," and NILO S. TAYAG alias
Romy Reyes alias "Taba," respondents.
FACTS:
The respondents were filed a criminal complaint
for the violation of the Sec. 4 of Anti-Subversion
Act. In which they were accused of aiming to
overthrow the government by means of force,
subversion, and other illegal means.
The respondents contends that the Anti-
Subversion act is a bill of attainder.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Anti- Subversion Act is a bill
of attainder.
HELD:
Anti- Subversion Act is not a bill of attainder. For
an act to be considered as a Bill of attainder, it
should inflict punishments without trial.
People vs. Galacgac CA 54 O.G. 1027
The respondent was charged of multiple
criminal cases such as attempted homicide with
physical injuries, illegal possession of
firearms,and frustrated homicide.
The respondent appealed claiming that the
firearm was a present for his wife and he as well
claimed that he is an American Citizen therefore
he is exempted from the charges and also
added that the possession of gun is a
constitutional right in the U.S
ISSUE:
Whether the respondent was liable for the
crimes committed.
HELD:
As a general rule, criminal law is binding on all
people who sojourn in the Philippines.
Therefore possessing a firearm which is
prohibited in the Philippines, constitutes a crime
and can be subject to a criminal case even if the
respondent is a U.S Citizen.

G.R. No. 448           September 20, 1901
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-
appellee,  tribunals is unaffected by the military or other
vs.
PHILIP K. SWEET, defendant-appellant.
Theofilus B. Steele, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta, for
appellee.
FACTS:
The appellant was employed by the United
States military and committed an offense . His
case was given to the Court of First Instance
having proper jurisdiction over the case at bar.
The Court of First Instance has a jurisdiction
when the offense is punishable by penalty with
more than 6 months imprisonment or a fine
exceeding one hundred dollars may be
imposed." The offense was therefore cognizable
by the court below unless the fact that the
appellant was at the time of its alleged
commission an employee of the United States
military authorities in the Philippine Islands, and
the further fact that the person upon whom it is
alleged to have been committed was a prisoner
of war in the custody of such authorities, are
sufficient to deprive it of jurisdiction.
The appellant is contending that the Court of
First Instance has no jurisdiction over the said
case because he is a military in character and is
exempted from the ordinary jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether the CFI has the jurisdiction when the
said appellant happens to be in military in
character.
HELD:
The case is open to the application of the
general principle that the jurisdiction of the civil
special character of the person brought before
them for trial
G.R. No. L-246             March 27, 1946
SILVERIO VALDEZ, petitioner, 
vs.
ANTONIO G. LUCERO, Judge of First
Instance of Ilocos Sur, and CELESTINO
JIMENEZ, Provincial Warden of Ilocos
Sur, respondents.
Severino D. Dagdag for petitioner.
Respondent judge in his own behalf.
No appearance for respondent Warden.
FACTS:
Silverio Valdez was allegedly a member of a
recognized guerrilla and a member of the
United States armed forces in the Philippines
but was later absorbed in the Philippine army.
That, said Silverio Valdez, with an intent to kill,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with cruelty, by deliberately and
inhumanly augmenting the suffering of one Juan
Ponce, kill the latter with bolo, dagger and other
weapons and died instantly.
The case was taken in to the Court of First
Instance where in the said petitioner argued
that the fiscal had no authority to file it and that
the court acquired no jurisdiction of the
defendant.

The petitioner also added that only the military

courts may only take the case wherein a person
subject to military law who commits murder in
time of war shall suffer death or imprisonment
for life.

ISSUE:

Whether the civil courts have jurisdiction to

take cognizance of and try the case for murder
filed against petitioner Silverio Valdez.

HELD:

The Court ruled that that the civil courts of the

Commonwealth of the Philippines are NOT
deprived of their jurisdiction over the petitioner
herein, but have CONCURRENT JURISDICTION
with the military courts or general courts
martial to try and take cognizance of the case of
murder against the petitioner herein.

They are not deprived of their jurisdiction over

murder cases committed by persons subject to
military law.
G.R. No. L-4663             May 30, 1951 whether the prohibition contained in the above
quoted section 17 of our Constitution is
FERDINAND E. MARCOS and MANUEL applicable to the petitioners.
CONCORDIA, petitioners, 
vs.
CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF HELD:
THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., respondents.

x------------------------------------------------------ The word “any court” that prohibits the Senator

---x and members of the House of Representatives
to any criminal cases wherein government
G.R. No. L-4671             May 30, 1951 employees is accused of an offense committed
in relation to his office, refer to not only to a
MANUEL A. CONCORDIA and civil, but also to a military court or a Court-
FERDINAND E. MARCOS, petitioners,  Martial.
vs.
CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF
THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., respondents.
RULING:

Petitioners in their own behalf.

Judge Advocate General Fred Ruiz
Castro and Leonardo R. Lucena for The court rendered a decision that the
respondents. petitioners are indeed disqualified to appear as
a counsel for the accused before the tribunal
court.
FACTS:

The petitioners filed a two civil actions of

mandamus against the respondents alleging
that the respondents excluded unlawfully the
petitioners their right to appear ass a counsel
for the accused for the said tribunal. On the
ground that they are disqualified or inhibited by
section 17, Article 17 of the Constitution to
appear as counsel for said defendants

The said Section 17 states that no member of

the Senate and the House of Representative
shall take part as a counsel before any court in
any civil case wherein the Government or any
subdivision or instrumentality thereof is the
adverse party, or in any criminal case wherein
an offer or employee of the Government is
accused of an offense committed in relation to
his office.

ISSUE:
 FACTS:

The petitioner was a consul of Urugay at Manila

on June 1934. He was charged in the Court of
Instance of Manila with the crime of falsification
of Documents.

The petitioner argued that the Court of Instance

of Manila has no jurisdiction to the said case
because under the Constitution of the United
States only the United States supreme Court has
the original jurisdiction in all cases including the
consuls. And he further argued that under the
constitution of the Philippines, original
jurisdiction goes to the supreme court of the
Philippines over cases including consuls.

ISSUE:

Whether the jurisdiction stated under the

Constitution of the Philippines regarding a crime
committed by consuls are exclusive by the
Supreme Court.

HELD:

It is true that the Supreme Court has the original

jurisdiction on such cases involving the consuls,
however, at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution, the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court was not exclusive, but
concurrent with the Court of First Instance. And
that such grant of original jurisdiction did not
prevent the congress in conferring original
jurisdiction in cases affecting consuls.

RULING:

The petition for writ of prohibition has been

Schneckenburger vs. Moran
denied.
63 Phil 249
 HELD:

Under the law, all crimes and offenses

committed on the high seas or beyond the
jurisdiction of any country, the place where the
vessel is registered or licensed will take
cognizance of the crime committed on board.

The transport Lawton, the said vessel at bar, not

being a vessel and registered in the Philippines,
the Phil courts have no jurisdiction over the
crime committed.

U.S vs. Fowler

1 Phil 64

FACTS:

The defendants has been accused for stealing

the 16 bottles of champagne with an intent to
appropriate the same, without violence and
intimidation and consent of the owner. The
offense was committed in a cargo vessel
navigating the high seas.

The accused has been brought before the court

and alleging that the Court of First Instance has
no jurisdiction over the crime charged upon him
for the reason that the theft took place on the
high seas and not in the city of manila nor
within the territory of Manila/Philippines, or
upon the seas within the 3 mile limit to which
the jurisdiction of the court extends.

ISSUE: ENLGISH RULE

Whether or not the Court of Instance has the US. Vs. BULL , 15 Phil 7
jurisdiction on the offense committed in a public
vessel navigating the high seas.
FACTS:

The said defendant allegedly committed a crime

of transiting the animals without securing the
animals in a proper manner and the case was
brought in the court of the Philippines.

The defendant contends that there was an

insufficient information for the case to be
brought in front of the Philippines courts
because it the crime was not committed on the
vessel which was registered under the
Philippine Island or within the territorial waters
of the Philippines.

ISSUE:

Whether the Philippine courts have the

jurisdiction over the said case.
US vs AH SING, GR NO. L-13005

HELD:

The ship may be registered on other country but FACTS:

then the ship/vessel came within the 3 mile s of
a line drawn from the headlines which was the
entrance of the manila bay.
When a vessel entered for the purpose of trade
in automatically presumed to be dangerous to
the society, therefore, it would be subject to the
laws of the territory where they are in.
RULING:
The defendant was found guilty.
The defendant was employed as a fireman on
the steamship Shun Chang. The defendant
bought opium from Saigon and that opium was
brought in the Philippines when the Steamship
anchored in Cebu.
The authorities at that time made a search and
found the opium hidden in the steamer’s
engine. The defendant admitted being the
owner of the said opium and purchased it in
Saigon but did not say that he has an intention
to import the prohibited drug into the
Philippines.

ISSUE:
Whether there was an illegal importation of
opium into the Philippines.

HELD:

Under the Opium Law, any persons unlawfully

imports and brings any prohibited drug into the
Philippines shall be within under the
jurisdictional limits of the Philippines.