Dr.

Shakuntala Misra National Rehabilitation

University,Lucknow

PROJECT ON

STATUTORY LIABILITY

SUBMITED TO: - SUBMITED BY:

Mr. Bhanu Pratap singh Harsh gupta
Guest Faculty of Law Roll No- 12
SUBJECT: -
Law of criminal procedure

Annexure ‘A’– Front-

page and Cover
 TITLE OF PROJECT

Statutory Liability

Submitted by
Harsh gupta

B.COM L.L.B(Hons.) 6rd Semester

Roll No…12
Of
Faculty of Law
Dr. Shakuntala Misra National Rehabilitation University, Lucknow
In
March ,2020
Under the guidance of
Mr.Bhanu Pratap singh
Facualty Of Law
 Annexure ‘B’– Certificate
CERTIFICATE
The project entitled “ Statutory Liability " submitted to
the Faculty of Law, Dr. Shakuntala Misra National
Rehabilitation University, Lucknow for Law of
criminal procedure, as part of Internal assessment, is
based on my original work carried out under the guidance
of Mr. Bhanu Pratap singh.
The research work has not been submitted elsewhere
for award of any degree. The material borrowed from
other sources and incorporated in the thesis has been duly
acknowledged. I understand that I myself could be held
responsible and accountable for plagiarism, if any,
detected later on.
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to express my special thanks of gratitude to my teacher Mr.
Bhanu Pratap singh as well as our Head of Department Mrs. Shephali
Yadav who gave me the golden opportunity to do this wonderful project
on the topic" Statutory Liability ", which also helped me in doing a lot
of Research and i came to know about so many new things I am really
thankful to them.
Secondly i would also like to thank my parents and
friends who helped me a lot in finalizing this project within the limited
time frame.
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Statutory liability
Definition
Statutory Rape
Case of statutory liability
1) Sarjoo Prasad Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh [1960] INSC
303 (16 December 1960)

2) R v Prince (1875) LR 2 CCR 154.

3) Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132.
4) R v Blake (1996) The Times, 14 August.
5) Alphacell Ltd v Woodward [1972] AC 824
6) Cundy v Le Cocq (1884) 13 QBD 207.

7) PSGB v Storkwain Ltd [1986] 2 All ER 635 House of

Lords
8) Leocal v. Ashcroft (03-583) 543 U.S. 1 (2004)
 Statutory liability
Definition
Strict liability or statutory criminal liability refers to that situation
wherein law itself excludes mens rea either by express provisions or by
necessary implications thus, in case of statutory criminal liability only the
element of actus reus,forbidden consequences would be suffice to
prosecute and convict the offender.

In criminal law, strict liability is liability for which mens rea (guilty mind)
does not have to be proven in relation to one or more elements comprising
the actus reus (guilty act) although intention, recklessness or knowledge
may be required in relation to other elements of the offense. The liability is
said to be strict because defendants will be convicted even though they
were genuinely ignorant of one or more factors that made their acts or
omissions criminal. The defendants may therefore not be culpable in any
real way, i.e. there is not even criminal negligence, the least blameworthy
level of mens rea.

It is within the power of the legislature to make a certain illegal act or

omission penal and fix an absolute liability upon any person, if, a breach of
a certain enactment is made. Once absolute liability is fixed, then a
particular intent or state of mind is not the essence of the offence.
However, such liability must be specifically imposed by the terms of the
statute or at least the fact of implied liability must be sufficiently discernible
from the provisions of the statute. In fact, strict liability clauses in statutes
might result in the agent being made liable for the act of the master.

Strict liability can be described as criminal or civil liability notwithstanding

the lack mens rea or intent by the defendant. Not all crimes require specific
intent, and the threshold of culpability required may be reduced or
demoted. For example, it might be sufficient to show that a defendant acted
negligently, rather than intentionally or recklessly. In offenses of absolute
liability, other than the prohibited act, it may not be necessary to show the
act was intentional. Generally, crimes must include an intentional act, and
"intent" is an element that must be proved in order to find a crime occurred.
The idea of a "strict liability crime" is an oxymoron. The few exceptions are
not truly crimes at all – but are administrative regulations and civil penalties
created by statute, such as crimes against the traffic or highway code.

The best example of statutory criminal liability are:

Statutory rape:

At the center of a long-standing debate on whether its commission should

require proof of a criminal mens rea to engage in sexual conduct with an
underage person, the prosecution of statutory rape offers a revealing look
at the struggle to demarcate the parameters of the public welfare offense
doctrine. Not simply relegated to the administrative infraction first
envisioned,the doctrine’s modern expansive reach enables courts and
legislatures to reject traditional notions of proof of mens rea in favor of the
more prosecutor-friendly use of strict liability. Specifically, with respect to
statutory rape, disagreement is deep and entrenched on whether statutory
rape should be categorized as a public welfare offense, which would render
irrelevant defendant’s lack of knowledge of the victim’s age. And despite
wholesale revamping of state statutory rape laws on issues of
gender,relative ages of victim and perpetrator, and potential grading and
punishment, the debate on whether to require a criminal mens rea or
embrace.
 Cases of statutory criminal liability

1) Sarjoo Prasad Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh [1960] INSC 303
(16 December 1960)

SHAH, J.C.

KAPUR, J.L.

HIDAYATULLAH, M.

CITATION: 1961 AIR 631 1961 SCR (3) 324

CITATOR INFO :

R 1966 SC 43 (4) RF 1966 SC 128 (16) RF 1975 SC1309 (18)

ACT:

Food Adulteration-Sale of adulterated oil by servant- Servant, whether

liable-Manresa, if necessary-Second offence--Sentence, lesser than
minimum prescribed when can be given--Prevention of Food
Adulteration Act, 1954 (37 of 1954) ss. 7, 16.

HEADNOTE:

The appellant was an employee of one T, a vendor of edible oils. He

was found to have sold adulterated mustard oil and he and T were
prosecuted for an offence under S. 7 read with S....16 of the
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.
Both were found guilty; T was sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 200, but
in view of a previous conviction the appellant was sentenced to one
year's rigorous imprisonment and RS. 2,000 fine, the minimum
prescribed by S. 16(ii). The appellant contended: (i) that a servant who
sold food on behalf of his employer was not liable unless it was known
that he had done so with the knowledge that the food was adulterated,
and (ii) that there were special and adequate reasons justifying the
imposition of a penalty less than the minimum prescribed for a second
offence.

Held, that S. 7 of the Act enjoins everyone, whether an employer or a

servant, not to sell adulterated food, and anyone who contravenes this
provision is punishable under S. 16 without proof of means rea.

325 Re: S. Moses, I. L. R. (1959) Mad. 418, disapproved.

Held, further, that the facts that the appellant was a mere employee of
T, that it had not been shown that he had made any profit for himself,
and that T had been sentenced to a fine of RS. 200 only, were special
and adequate reasons within the meaning of the proviso to S. 16(ii) to
justify the imposition of a penalty less than the minimum prescribed by
S. 16(ii).

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION :Criminal Appeal No. 147 of

1959.

Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated July 21,
1959 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Revision No. 503 of
1958 arising out of the judgment and order dated March 27, 1958, of
the Sessions Judge, Allahabad, in Criminal Appeal No. 745 of 1957.

C. B. Agarwala and K. P. Gupta, for the appellant.

G. C. Mathur and C. P. Lal, for the respondent.

1960. December 16. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SHAH, J.-The appellant, Sarjoo Prasad was convicted by P. M.

Agra, Magistrate First Class, Allahabad of an offence under s. 7 read

with s. 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (37 of
1954)hereinafter referred to as the Act-and in view of a previous
conviction for a similar offence was sentenced to suffer rigorous
imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000. The
conviction and sentence were confirmed in appeal by the Court of
Session at Allahabad and by the High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad in revision. The appellant has appealed to this court with
special leave under Art. 136 of the Constitution.

The appellant was an employee of one Thakur Din who carries on

business at 92-C, Mirganj, Allahabad as a vendor of edible oils and
provisions. On September 22, 1956, a Food Inspector of the
Allahabad Municipality purchased from the appellant a sample of
mustard oil exposed for sale in the shop which on analysis was found
to be adulterated with linseed oil. Thakur Din and the appellant were
prosecuted in the court of the First Class Magistrate, Allahabad for
326 selling adulterated food. The Magistrate convicted Thakur Din and
the appellant and sentenced Thakur Din to pay a fine of Rs. 200 and
the appellant to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay a
fine of Rs. 2,000.

The expression "sale" is defined by s. 2(xiii) in the Act as meaning

sale of any article of food, whether for cash or on credit or by way of
exchange and whether by wholesale or retail, for human consumption
or use, or for analysis, and inc
2). R v Prince (1875) LR 2 CCR 154.

Fact
The defendant ran off with an under-age girl. He was charged with an
offence of taking a girl under the age of 16 out of the possession of her
parents contrary to s55 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (now
s20 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956). The defendant knew that the girl
was in the custody of her father but he believed on reasonable grounds that
the girl was aged 18. It was held that knowledge that the girl was under the
age of 16 was not required in order to establish the offence. It was
sufficient to show that the defendant intended to take the girl out of the
possession of her father.
Judgement
The British Appellate Court affirmed.
The Appellate Court found that regardless of whether or not the defendant
knew the girl was of age that it be a crime, the act was wrong in itself,
therefore he had the right mens rea in that he committed the act and is
guilty.
The Appellate Court agreed that Prince honestly believed that Annie was
18, and that that belief was reasonable, but the law did not say that a
person will be guilty only if "he believes the girl to be under 16."
That would be adding an extra element that the prosecution would need to
prove.
In a dissent it was argued that Prince had made a mistake of fact, and
Prince had not mens rea to commit any crime at all.
The dissent argued that if someone meant to commit a crime, and ended
up committing a more serious crime then they could be found guilty of the
more serious crime, but if they meant to commit no crime at all, mistake of
fact should be a valid excuse.
For example, under the dissent's reasoning, if you assault some chump
and they turn out to be a policeman, you can still be held guilty for
assaulting a policeman even though you didn't know it.
The basic point of this case is that under the common law, ignorance is no
excuse. Unless a Statute specifically says that you have to have knowledge
that your actions are a crime, then you are still guilty even if you didn't think
you were doing anything wrong.

3). Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132.

Facts
The defendant was a landlady of a house let to tenants. She retained one
room in the house for herself and visited occasionally to collect the rent and
letters. While she was absent the police searched the house and found
cannabis. The defendant was convicted under s5 of the Dangerous Drugs
Act 1965 (now replaced), of "being concerned in the management of
premises used for the smoking of cannabis". She appealed alleging that
she had no knowledge of the circumstances and indeed could not expect
reasonably to have had such knowledge.
Judgment
The House of Lords, quashing her conviction, held that it had to be proved
that the defendant had intended the house to be used for drug-taking, since
the statute in question created a serious, or "truly criminal" offence,
conviction for which would have grave consequences for the defendant.
Lord Reid stated that "a stigma still attaches to any person convicted of a
truly criminal offence, and the more serious or more disgraceful the offence
the greater the stigma". And equally important, "the press in this country
are vigilant to expose injustice, and every manifestly unjust conviction
made known to the public tends to injure the body politic [people of a
nation] by undermining public confidence in the justice of the law and of its
administration."

Lord Reid went on to point out that in any event it was impractical to
impose absolute liability for an offence of this nature, as those who were
responsible for letting properties could not possibly be expected to know
everything that their tenants were doing.
4). R v Blake (1996) The Times, 14 August.

Facts

Investigation officers heard an unlicensed radio station broadcast and

traced it to a flat where the defendant was discovered alone standing in
front of the record decks, still playing music and wearing a set of
headphones. Though the defendant admitted that he knew he was using
the equipment, he claimed that he believed he was making demonstration
tapes and did not know he was transmitting. The defendant was convicted
of using wireless telegraphy equipment without a licence, contrary to s1(1)
Wireless Telegraphy Act 1949 and appealed on the basis that the offence
required mens rea.
Judgment
The Court of Appeal held that the offence was an absolute (actually a strict)
liability offence. The Court applied Lord Scarman's principles in Gammon
and found that, though the presumption in favour of mens rea was strong
because the offence carried a sentence of imprisonment and was,
therefore, "truly criminal", yet the offence dealt with issues of serious social
concern in the interests of public safety (namely, frequent unlicensed
broadcasts on frequencies used by emergency services) and the imposition
of strict liability encouraged greater vigilance in setting up careful checks to
avoid committing the offence.

NOTE: The court seems to have been inconsistent in its use of terminology
in the present case. The offence is one of strict liability as the defendant
had to be shown to have known that he was using the equipment.
5). Alphacell Ltd v Woodward [1972] AC 824

Facts
The appellant factory owner was convicted of causing polluted matter to
enter a river under the Rivers (Prevention of Pollution) Act 1951. The
offence related to an underground pipe which had become disconnected
due to a blockage. The appellant was unaware of the pollution and it was
not alleged that they had been negligent.
Judgment

As a matter of public policy the offence was one of strict liability and
therefore the appeal was dismissed and the conviction upheld.

Lord Salmon:

"If this appeal succeeded and it were held to be the law that no conviction
be obtained under the 1951 Act unless the prosecution could discharge the
often impossible onus of proving that the pollution was caused intentionally
or negligently, a great deal of pollution would go unpunished and
undeterred to the relief of many riparian factory owners. As a result, many
rivers which are now filthy would become filthier still and many rivers which
are now clean would lose their cleanliness. The legislature no doubt
recognised that as a matter of public policy this would be most unfortunate.
Hence s2(1)(a) which encourages riparian factory owners not only to take
reasonable steps to prevent pollution but to do everything possible to
ensure that they do not cause it."

6). Cundy v Le Cocq (1884) 13 QBD 207.

Facts

The defendant was convicted of unlawfully selling alcohol to an intoxicated

person, contrary to s13 of the Licensing Act 1872. On appeal, the
defendant contended that he had been unaware of the customer's
drunkenness and thus should be acquitted. The Divisional Court interpreted
s13 as creating an offence of strict liability since it was itself silent as to
mens rea, whereas other offences under the same Act expressly required
proof of knowledge on the part of the defendant. It was held that it was not
necessary to consider whether the defendant knew, or had means of
knowing, or could with ordinary care have detected that the person served
was drunk. If he served a drink to a person who was in fact drunk, he was
guilty.

Judgment

Appeal dismissed and conviction was upheld.

S.13 was silent as to mens rea, whereas other offences under the same
Act expressly required proof of knowledge on the part of the defendant. It
was therefore taken that the omission to refer to mens rea was deliberate
and the offence was one of strict liability.

Stephen J:
"Here, as I have already pointed out, the object of this part of the Act is to
prevent the sale of intoxicating liquor to drunken persons, and it is perfectly
natural to carry that out by throwing on the publican the responsibility of
determining whether the person supplied comes within that category."

7). PSGB v Storkwain Ltd [1986] 2 All ER 635 House of Lords

Facts
The appellant, a pharmacist was convicted of an offence under s.58(2) of
the Medicines Act 1968 of supplying prescription drugs without a
prescription given by an appropriate medical practitioner. The appellant had
allowed prescription drugs to be supplied on production of fraudulent
prescriptions whereby a doctor’s signature had been copied. The appellant
was not party to the fraud and had no knowledge of the forged signatures
and believed the prescriptions were genuine.
Judgment:
The offence was one of strict liability and the conviction was upheld. The
House of Lords looked at other sections of the Medicines Act 1968 and
found that some sections referred to a requirement of mens rea whereas
other sections did not. They concluded that the omission to refer to mens
rea in s.58 must therefore have been deliberate and so the presumption of
mens rea was rebutted

.
8). Leocal v. Ashcroft (03-583) 543 U.S. 1 (2004)

Fact
Josue Leocal is a citizen of Haiti who has been a lawful permanent resident
of the United States since 1987. In 2000, he was convicted in Florida of
driving under the influence (DUI). Proceedings were then instituted to
deport Leocal, and an immigration judge concluded that Leocal's DUI
conviction constituted a "crime of violence" and hence an aggravated
felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Because of his conviction
for an aggravated felony, Leocal was ordered deported in October 2001.
The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed this decision, and Leocal
sought review in the Eleventh Circuit. In an unpublished opinion, the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that the DUI conviction was an "aggravated
felony," and hence it had no jurisdiction to review the lawfulness of the
deportation order. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to review the case.
Judgment:
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, any alien convicted of an
aggravated felony is deportable and may be deported upon an order of the
Attorney General. An "aggravated felony" includes any crime classified
under federal law as a "crime of violence." And a "crime of violence," in
turn, is any crime that
(a) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person or property of another, or (b) is a felony
and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against
the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing
the offense.

In order to determine whether Leocal's DUI conviction qualified as a "crime

of violence," the Court examined the elements of the statutory definition of
the crime rather than the particular facts.

Under Florida law, it is a third-degree felony for any person to operate a

vehicle under the influence and, "by reason of such operation, caus[e]...
[s]erious bodily injury to another." This statute has no mens rea element—it
does not require the defendant to have any particular level of intent to
commit the crime. In Florida, DUI does not entail the attempted or
threatened use of physical force; if DUI is to qualify as a crime of violence,
it must so qualify because it involves the use of physical force. The "use" of
physical force "most naturally suggests a higher degree of intent than
negligent or merely accidental conduct." Likewise, DUI does not entail a
"substantial risk" that physical force will be used. Furthermore, the fact that
in another subsection of the Immigration and Nationality Act, Congress
expressly distinguished between DUI crimes and "crimes of violence"
bolstered the Court's conclusion that Florida's DUI statute was not a "crime
of violence" because it did not require proof of any particular mental state,
and thus criminalized merely negligent conduct.
Bibliography
Books Referred:-

1. Criminal Law - PSA Pillai's

2. Wikipedia

Sites/ Links

1. https://indiankanoon.org
2. www.e-lawresources.co.uk