BAIL

Guiding question
Is Bail a constitutional right and therefore automatic?
Generally, the grant of bail is discretionary. Court must always exercise its discretion
judiciously and always give the accused the benefit of doubt. Magistrates and Judges
have interpreted the provisions regarding the conditions and considerations in different
ways with some stating that they must be fulfilled before a person can be granted bail,
while others holding that it is a constitutional right. The right to bail is a constitutional
protection of the right to personal liberty clearly based on the presumption of innocence
which must thus not be denied lightly. An accused person charged with a criminal offence
must be informed of his right to bail. It is not a constitutional right to automatic bail but a
right to apply for bail.

Major case/ Locus classicas

In ​COL (RTD) DR. KIZZA BESIGYE v UGANDA CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 83 OF
2016 the concept of bail was well elucidated by Justice Masalu Musene as follows. Originally bail
meant security given to court by another person that the accused will attend trial on the day
appointed. But now it includes recognizance entered into by the accused himself, conditioning him
to appear, and failure of which may lead to warrant of arrest and confinement in prison till the trial
of the case is heard and finalized. It may also lead to forfeiture of the recognizance by the accused/
applicant and the sureties whereby they are ordered to deposit the money they were bound to court
and state offers. As a long recognized principle under the criminal law, it is a presumption of law
that an accused person is presumed innocent until proven guilty by a competent court and or until
such accused pleads guilty to the charge voluntarily. This presumption is enshrined in Article 28
(3) (a) of the Constitution. In the same constitution, it is provided under Article 23 (1) (b) and (c)
that no person shall be deprived of his personal liberty except (b) in execution of the order of court
made to secure the fulfillment of any obligation imposed on that person by law, and (c) for the
purpose of bringing that person before court in execution of the order of court or upon reasonable
suspicion that the person has committed or is about to commit a criminal offence under the laws of
Uganda. Bail is granted to an accused person to ensure that he appears to stand trial without the
necessity of his being detained in custody in the meantime. The effect of bail is merely to release
the accused from physical custody but he is still under the jurisdiction of the law and is bound to
appear at the appointed time and place. That in granting bail the court must equally bear in mind the
interests of justice and the liberty of the person and neither ought to be sacrificed at the expense of
the other.”

He quoted Hon Justice Ogoola PJ (as he then was) in ​Besigye v Uganda Criminal Misc. Application
No. 228 of 2005 and Criminal Misc. Application No. 229 of 2005 ​who emphasized that the right to
liberty is crucial in a free and democratic society. He had this to say: “Liberty is the very essence of
freedom and democracy. In our constitutional matrix here in Uganda, liberty looms large. The
liberty of one is the liberty of all. The liberty of one must never be curtailed lightly, wantonly or
even worse arbitrarily. Article 23, clause 6 of the Constitution grants a person who is deprived of
his or her liberty the right to apply to a competent court of law for grant of bail. The courts from
which such a person seeks refuge or solace should be extremely wary of sending such a person
away empty handed –except of course for a good cause. Ours are courts of justice. Ours is the duty
and privilege to jealously and courageously guard and defend the rights of all in spite of all”
Musene entirely concurred with that holding of the former principal judge and only added that the
safeguarding of those rights will be within the laws of the land.

Uganda v Col (Rtd) Dr.Kiiza Besigye Constitutional Reference No.20 of 2005 ​- whether bail is
automatic
Court laid out some general observations on the reasonable conditions the court should keep in
mind when deciding to grant or to refuse to grant bail. It held: “While considering bail, the court
would need to balance the constitutional rights of the applicant, the needs of society to be protected
from lawlessness and the considerations which flow from people being remanded in prison custody
which adversely affects their welfare and that of their families and not least the effect on prison
conditions if large numbers of unconvicted people are remanded in custody. In this respect various
factors have to be born in mind such as the risk of absconding and interference with the course of
justice…While the seriousness of the offence and the possible penalty which could be meted out
are considerations to be taken into account in deciding whether or not to grant bail, the applicants
must be presumed innocent until proven guilty or until that person has pleaded guilty. The court
has to be satisfied that the applicant will appear for trial and would not abscond. The applicant
should not be denied of his/her freedom unreasonably and bail should not be refused merely as a
punishment as this would conflict with the presumption of innocence. The court must consider and
give the ​applicant the full benefit of his/her constitutional rights and freedoms by exercising its
discretion judicially. Bail should not be refused mechanically simply because the state wants such
orders. The refusal to grant bail should not be based on mere allegations. The grounds must be
substantiated. Remanding a person in custody is a judicial act and as such the court should summon
its judicial mind to bear on the matter before depriving the applicant of their liberty.”
Court thus held that ​in both article 23(6)(b) and (c) the court has discretion to determine the
conditions of bail. “The context of Article 23 (6) (a) confers discretion upon the court whether to
grant bail or not to grant bail. Bail is not automatic”

1.​ ​Law applicable

Constitution – Art. 23(6)
MCA – S. 75-84
TIA – S. 14 and 15
2.​ ​Definition of bail
In the Ugandan legal system, there is no Act of Parliament that defines the term “bail”.

Uganda v. Lawrence Luzinda [1986] HCB 33

Held:
Okello J as he then was stated that: “Bail is an agreement between the court and an
applicant consisting of a bond with or without a surety for a reasonable amount as the
circumstances of the case permit conditioned upon the applicant appearing before such a
court on a date and time as named in the bond to start his trial. This agreement can only
be lawfully cancelled when it is proved to the satisfaction of a court by which the
agreement was made that there is a breach of the same or that it is about to be breached.”

Black’s law dictionary 8​th edition defines bail as a security such as cash or a bond; esp.,
security required by a court for the release of a prisoner who must appear at a future time
Ayume – Originally bail meant security given to court by another person that he accused
will attend his trial on the day appointed. But now it includes recognizance entered into by
the accused himself conditioning him to appear, and failure of which may result in the
forfeiture of the recognizance.

From the above definitions, it is evident that the accused is given his freedom of liberty on
conditions designed to ensure his attendance at court when required.
Two basic ideas underlie bail. First, the accused is not guilty until proved so under ​Art. 28
Second, it would therefore, be unfair to in certain circumstances to keep the accused in
prison without trial.
Mpuuma K. Leonard v. Uganda HCMA No. 325/2006
Held:
The right to apply for bail accrues after a person has been remanded into custody or has
been arrested and is brought in court in connection with the crime.

3.​ ​The right to bail

This right flows from the provisions of Art. 28(3)(a) of the Constitution which is to the effect
that every person who is charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed to be innocent
until proved guilty or until that person has pleaded guilty.
The right to bail is a fundamental right because it operationalizes the right to liberty and
the right to a fair trial.

Col (Rtd) Dr. Kizza Besigye v Uganda, Criminal Application No. 83 Of 2016
Held:
It is a trite principle of criminal law that an accused person is presumed to be innocent until
proved guilty by a competent court and or until such accused pleads guilty to the charge
voluntarily. This presumption is enshrined in Article 28 (3)(a) of the Constitution.
The right to bail is cemented as a constitutional right under Art. 23(6)(a) which stipulates
that every accused person is entitled to apply to the court to be released on bail, and the
court may grant that person bail on such conditions as the court considers reasonable.
Art. 23(6)(b) provides that in the case of an offence which triable by the HC as by a
subordinate court, if that person has been remanded in custody in respect of the offence
for sixty days before trial, that person shall be released on bail on such conditions as the
court considers reasonable.
Art. 23(6)(c) – in the case of an offence triable by only the HC, if that person has been
remanded in custody for one hundred and eighty days before the case is committed to the
HC, that person shall be released on bail on such conditions the court considers
reasonable.

Uganda v Col. Rtd. Dr. Kizza Besigye, Constitutional Reference No. 20 of 2008
Held:
Where an accused is charged with an offence triable only by the High Court but has not
spent the statutory period of 180 days in custody before committal, the court may refuse to
grant bail where the accused fails to show to the satisfaction of the court exceptional
circumstances under S.15 (3) of the Trial on Indictment Act.
Joseph Tumushabe v. AG Constitutional Petition No. 6/2004
Held:
The right to bail is a fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 23(6) of the Constitution. Its
basis is to be found in Art. 28(3)(a) which stipulates that an accused person is innocent
until proven guilty. It also provides that an accused is entitled to a speedy trial before an
independent and impartial court or tribunal established by law. Those two principles are
part of the right to a fair hearing which is declared inviolable by Art. 44 of the Constitution.
The idea that a person presumed innocent and who is entitled to a speedy trial should not
be kept behind bars for unnecessarily long before trial. That is the rationale for Article
23(6).

4.​ ​Nature of bail

Automatic or Discretionary
Granting or denying bail application is an exercise of judicial discretion. This was deduced
by the constitutional court from the usage of the word “may” which implied permissive,
optimal or discretion and not mandatory.

Florence Byabazaire v Uganda High Court Misc. Application 284 of 2006

Held:
Akiiki Kiiza J. reiterated that the accused person has no automatic right to bail but rather
the accused has the right to apply for bail and Article 23 (6) confer discretion on court to
decide whether to grant bail or not to grant it.

Uganda v Dr. Kiiza Besigye

Held:
The constitutional court automatically declared that the grant of bail is at discretion which
court exercises for accordance with the law.

Article 23(6) (c) ​unveils the supposedly imperative nature of bail under the Constitution.
This Article was interpreted in the case of ​Uganda V Col. (Rtd) Dr. Kizza Besigye,
Constitutional Reference No. 20 of 2005 ​where it was emphasised that ​“the court has no
discretion to grant or not to grant bail after the accused has shown that he/she has been
on
remand in custody for 60 days before trial or 180 days before committal to the High Court.”

Accordingly, it could be argued that the Constitution regarding this provision permits
automatic bail upon reasonable conditions. ​Despite the above legal framework that
provides for bail as a right, there are some conditions ​and qualifications that have to be
considered by judges under their discretion before bail is ​granted. In ​Foundation for
Human Rights Initiative v. Attorney General Constitutional ​petition, No.20 of 2006​,
Deputy Chief Justice Kikonyogo while addressing the above matter ​stated that ​“...the
accused’s right to bail is not absolute…”

However, as courts must respect the accused person’s constitutional right to liberty and
the presumption of his or her innocence, it is important that the rights are exercised within
the confines of law, in that they are not abused. Thus, principles of natural justice should
be adhered to.

However, in ​Joseph Tumushabe v Attorney General​, it was strongly stated that; all other
laws on bail in this court that are inconsistent with, or which contravene this Article
23(6)(a)(b)&(c) are null and void to the extent of inconsistency, bearing in mind that the
constitution is the supreme law of the land.

5.​ ​Who may grant bail

-​ ​High Court
HC may release an accused person on bail – S. 14 TIA
Offences for which the HC may grant bail are specified in S. 15 (2) TIA.
-​ M
​ agistrates Court

A MC has power to release an accused person on bail – S. 75(1) MCA

Offences excluded from the grant of bail by a MC are specified in S. 75(2) MCA
-​ P
​ olice officer in charge of a police station

Has power to release a person taken into custody without a warrant, on that person
executing a bond if it is not practicable to bring such a person before a court within 48
hours of arrest, unless the offence appears to be of a serious nature. Called police bond
(See S. 24 and 38 Police Act)

S. 24 Police Act – Arrest as preventive action

ss. 2) A person detained under subsection (1) shall be released—once the peril, risk of
loss, damage or injury or obstruction has been sufficiently removed;
a. ​on the execution of a bond with or without surety where provision is made for him or her
to appear at regular intervals before a senior police officer, if so required; or
b. ​upon any other reasonable terms and conditions specified by the inspector general in
writing.
ss. 3) If the person detained under this section is not resident in Uganda, the bond referred
to in subsection (2) may be secured by a surety resident in Uganda.
ss. 4) Any person so arrested or any other person on his or her behalf who has reason to
believe that any person is being unlawfully detained under this section may apply to a
magistrate to have such person released with or without security.

S. 38 Police Act - No fee on bail bonds taken by police.

1.​ ​Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, no fee or duty
shall be charged on the following, issued or taken by a police officer—
a.​ ​a bail bond in a criminal case;
b.​ ​a recognisance to prosecute or give evidence; or
c. ​a recognisance for personal appearance or otherwise issued or taken by a police

officer.

-​ J​ ustice of the Peace

Has same power as a magistrate to release a person on bail under S. 3 of the Justice of
the Peace Act.

6.​ ​When may bail be granted

 a.​ ​Stage at which granted
At any stage of the proceedings (S. 14 TIA, S. 75(1) MCA)
b.​ ​Bail pending appeal
S. 205 MCA – An appellant may, at any time before the determination of his or her appeal,
apply for bail to the appellant, and the appellant court may grant the bail.
It is a rule of practice that bail pending appeal will be granted only in exceptional
circumstances.
Arvind Patel v. Uganda SCCA No. 1/2003 – Considerations for bail pending appeal
Held:
set out the conditions to be considered to grant bail to the applicant as follows:
a)​ ​The character of the applicant.
b)​ ​Whether he or she is a first offender or not.
c)​ ​Whether the crime of which the applicant was convicted involved personal violence.
d)​ ​Whether the appeal is not frivolous and has a reasonable possibility of success.
e)​ ​The substantial delay in the determination of the appeal.
f) ​Whether the applicant has complied with bail conditions granted after the applicant’s
conviction and during the pendency of appeal (if any).
His Lordship Justice order observed: “In my view, it is not necessary that all the conditions
should be present in every case. A combination of two or more criteria may be sufficient.
Each case must be considered on its own facts and circumstances”.

These principles were applied by the Court in the ​David Chandi Jamwa v. Uganda CoA
Cri. Application No. 20 of 2011. ​The Court was satisfied that that the applicant had
proved that he is a first offender and has been of good character in that he abided by all
the bail conditions during his trial in the High court thus justifying the grant of bail pending
appeal.

The following considerations should be taken into account:

Likelihood of success of the appeal
Christopher Lubale v. Uganda HCMSA 2/95
Issue:
Whether ground sufficient for application for bail pending appeal
Held:
Mr. Kania argued that the case has chances of success on appeal and that the appeal
is not frivolous. On his part Mr. Okwanga felt that after reading through the record he
saw no chances of the case succeeding on appeal. It was stated in the case of: ​Lamba
v. R. (1958) EA 337 at page 338 that the burden is upon the applicant to prove that his
case had got chances of success. In his affidavit the applicant did not establish the
grounds on which he based his notion that his case had chances of success; I quite
agree with the learned counsel for the respondent when he says that the case may not
have chances of success.

The likelihood of a delay in hearing the appeal

Kilanda and others v. Uganda 1984 HCB 18
Discussed in ​Lubaale ​which held that ​as regards to the third ground, it was argued on
behalf of the applicant that the record of the lower court was ready but all the same the
delay of the hearing of the appeal was still a possibility. Considering the fact that the
Resident Judge continuously sits at Jinja and that the proceedings of the lower court have
already been typed I cannot see any reason why the appeal should take long to be heard.
The facts of this case must be distinguished from those in the case of: Kilanda (supra)
which was quoted to this court by the learned counsel for the applicant, of the lower court
due to lack of typing materials which is not the case in the present case, the state also did
not oppose the application in Kilanda’s case but in the present case the state has strongly
opposed the application.

BoP that an appeal has a good chance of success lies on the applicant for bail pending
appeal.
Christopher Lubaale v Uganda – ​see above
Held:
Mr. Okwanga who appeared for the respondent on his part strongly opposed the
application ​on the ground that the applicant had the duty to prove that there w
​ ere special
circumstances to warrant his being released on bail pending the hearing of his appeal and
that in the present case the applicant had not discharged that burden. It was stated in the
case of: ​Lamba v. R. (1958) EA 337 at page 338 that the burden is upon the applicant to
prove that his case had got chances of success.

c.​ ​Bail pending revision by the HC

S. 164(1) MCA
The Grade I Mag has no power to release an accused on bail pending revision. This
power is only vested in the Chief Magistrate.
Uganda v. Kahira 1988-90 HCB 30

d.​ ​Bail pending confirmation

S. 174(1) MCA – Whenever a MC passes a sentence which requires confirmation, the
court imposing the sentence may, in its discretion, release the person sentenced on bail
pending confirmation.

e.​ ​Restrictions on pretrial remand

Art. 23(6)(b)
Art 23(6(c)

f.​ ​Bail in capital and other serious offences

7.​ ​Application for bail
8.​ ​Considerations for bail in the Magistrates Court
S. 77(1) MCA – Where any person appears before a MC charged with an offence for
which bail may be granted, the court shall inform the person of his or her right to apply for
bail.

S. 77(2) MCA – Considerations for bail

a)​ ​Nature of the accusation
Ayume – The court is entitled to know whether the prosecution evidence prima facie
supports the charge as laid. It should be enough if the prosecution tells the court the
substance and nature of the evidence in their possession.
b) ​The gravity of the offence charged and the severity of the punishment which conviction
might entail
Ayume – Once there is evidence to support the charge, the gravity of the offence and the
severity of the sentence in the event of a conviction will, no doubt, be seriously taken into
account by the court in granting or refusing bail. It is more likely that bail will be refused
where the offence is so grave as to warrant a severe penalty.
c)​ ​Antecedents of the applicant so far as they are known
May include past and previous conduct of the accused.
R v. Armstrong [1951] 2 ALL ER 219
Held:
It is clear that it is the duty of the justices to inquire into the antecedents of the man
applying to them for bail, and if they find he has a bad record - particularly, a record which
suggests that he is likely to commit similar offences while on bail- that is a matter which
they must consider before granting bail.
d)​ ​Whether the applicant has a fixed abode within the area of the court’s jurisdiction
The fact that an applicant is married with several children may be an indication that he is
unlikely to abscond. But this itself cannot be a ground for releasing a person on bail.
Livingstone Mukasa and 5 Others v. Uganda [1976] HCB 117
Held:
Saied CJ; The fact that accused persons may be married or have permanent abodes
within the jurisdiction of Ugandan courts are not by themselves, cogent reason for granting
bail. Where the considerations concerning liberty of the person are involved, courts must
equally bear in mind the interests of justice and neither ought to be sacrificed at the
expense of the other.
e) ​Whether the applicant is likely to interfere with any of the witnesses for the prosecution
or any of the evidence to be tendered in support of the charge
Uganda v. Wilberforce Nadiope and 5 others M.B 153/69
Held:
Bail was refused on the ground that because of the accused person’s prominence and
apparent influence in life there was every likelihood of his using his influence to interfere
with witnesses.

Uganda v. James Kalis Kanamwangi Crim. Rev No. 91/ 1972

Held:
In cancelling the accused person’s bail, Kiwanuka C.J considered inter alia the fact that an
accused person of this category will almost interfere with witnesses for the prosecution.

9.​ ​Bail in the HC

S. 14 TIA

10.​​Conditions for bail in HC in exceptional circumstances

S. 15 (1) TIA – The Court may refuse to grant bail to a person accused of an offence
specified in ss. 2 if he does not prove to the satisfaction of the court –
 a.​ ​that exceptional circumstances exist justifying his or her release on bail; and
b.​ ​that he or she will not abscond when released on bail.
S. 15(3) TIA – Exceptional circumstances means any of the following-
a. grave illness certified by a medical officer of the prison or other institution or
place where the accused is detained as being incapable of adequate medical
treatment while the accused is in custody
b. a certificate of no objection signed by the DPP; or
c. the infancy or advanced age of the accused.

Grave illness
Christopher Lubaale v. Uganda HCMSA 2/95
Issue:
Chronic sickness with AIDS
Held:
Arguing the first ground of the application Mr. Kania maintained that the applicant was
a victim of AIDs and that be needed special attention which cannot be done while in
​ isfortune which must be considered
prison. While court treats ​AIDs as a catastrophic m
with sympathy, I have been unable to find any authority suggesting that sickness of
whatever nature can be a ground for releasing a person on bail pending the hearing of
his appeal. I agree with Mr. Okwanga when he says that AIDs has no cure whether ​in
prison or outside prison. To release a person suffering from such an incurable disease
on bail pending the hearing of his appeal may result in real absurdity when the appeal
is heard and dismissed, because at that stage the prisoner might become weaker and
therefore incapable of going back to serve part of his sentence. I find that the first
ground of this application unhelpful to the applicant much as I am sympathetic to his ill
health.

Wilberforce Serunkuma v. Uganda [1995] II KALR 32

The applicant was charged with aggravated robbery and had been on remand for eight
months. He brought an application for bail basing on the exceptional circumstances of
grave illness. In his affidavit supporting the application, the applicant deponed that he was
an AIDS Victim and needed constant care which he could not get while in prison. He
brought documents to prove that he had been attending AIDS clinics like TASO.
Issue:
Whether AIDS falls under exceptional circumstances of grave illness under S. 15(a) TIA
justifying grant of bail
Held:
The court emphasised that grave illness can prompt a grant of bail. ​Where satisfactory
evidence of AIDS is adduced, a court may consider the circumstances of the case and in
the absence of a certificate from the medical board, hold that AIDS is grave illness, and to
justify grant of bail, the applicant has to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he was
incapable of getting adequate treatment whilst in custody. In this case, all the applicant
had were documents from TASO indicating that he was an AIDS victim and no report was
made by any doctor who treated him at Luzira or Mbuya military hospital to show that he
could get adequate treatment whilst in custody.
Infancy of accused
Although the term infancy is not legally defined anywhere, under the law governing grant
of bail, the court has to resort to its own resources and discretion in the construction of the
provisions of the section (​Musa Ssekana​).
The term “infancy‟ as used in the section is neither restricted to neutral infancy, which is a
period of no-responsible life which ends with the seventh year, nor does it denote the state
of a person under the age of 12 years which is the age of criminal responsibility.
Gerald Bakojja v Uganda [1996] HCB 4
Held:
Section 88 of Children Act, where it was stated that the minimum age of criminal
responsibility shall be 12 years.

Dr. Alex Kamugisha v. Uganda High court Kampala Misc. Cause No. 94 of 2007 - as
to what amounts to advanced age
Held:
The court observed in the case of that any age above 50 may be considered advanced
age.

A Kamoga v. Uganda [1992-93] HCB 57

Held:
Court noted that bail can be granted on exceptional circumstances one being that the
applicant is in infancy or advanced age. Since the appellant who was 16 and half years did
not fall within the definition of an infant and the ground that his schooling would be put in
jeopardy by staying in prison was not tenable, his application for bail was dismissed.

Advanced age of accused

Mutyaba Semu v. Uganda H.C Crim. MA No. 99/92
The accused was a sixty-year-old man and suffered from diabetes and he brought an
application for bail on the ground that he was of advanced age.
Issue:
Whether 60 years of age was advanced age for purposes of granting bail to the applicant
Held:
60 years per se was not advanced age but this coupled with the fact that the accused
suffered from diabetes, a disease that required a good diet which could not be provided by
prison authorities he would be granted bail.

Dennis Obua Otima v. Uganda HCCrim. Application No. 18/2005

The applicant was charged with embezzlement and causing financial loss applied for bail
on the assertion that he was of advanced age and that he is such a person entitled to be
released on bail.
Held:
Justice Remmy Kasule looked at the considerations in light of other factors which court
uses to deny bail. First, is whether the accused is likely to interfere with the prosecution
evidence. Where it is found to be the case, the court would exercise its discretion by
refusing bail. Second, is to prevent a perception of the justice system as being a mockery
of justice. This discretion to refuse bail is vested by the constitution Article 23 (6) (a).
It was emphasised by the judge that despite being of advanced age bail is also granted by
considering other issues like the perception of justice system as being a mockery of justice
and the accused’s likeliness of interfering with the prosecution’s evidence. It follows then
that even though ​S. 14 (3) of the T.I.A ​provides for the ground of age, it is still subject to
the judge’s discretion.

9.​ ​Abscondment
S. 15(4) TIA

10.​​Recognisance
S. 14 TIA, S. 75 MCA– The accused will be released on his/her entering a recognizance
consisting of a bond for a fixed amount to appear before the court on a date and time
stipulated in the bond. Bail money may be paid up by the accused or someone on his/her
behalf. A person released on bail may or may not be asked to put up people as his/her
sureties to stand up for him or her before the court.
Black’s law dictionary 8​th​ edition - A person who is primarily liable for the payment of
another's debt or the performance of another's obligation.
A Surety gives security to the court that the accused will attend his trial on the hearing
date fixed by the court. Recognizance is a security entered into before a court with a
condition to perform some act required by law; on failure to perform that act, the sum is
forfeited. Bail allows an accused to be temporarily released from custody (usually on
condition that the recognizance usually in form of a sum of money guarantees their
attendance at the trial). Bail money should not be excessively high so that the accused is
unable to pay it.

Ssekana – The normal practice is for the court to fix the amount of the recognizance which
must be reasonable and which may be cash or not cash. The amount must be reasonable
in the circumstances of the case.
Charles Onyango Obbo and Andrew Mwenda v Uganda
The accused were charged with publishing false news. They were released on cash bail pf
Ugx. 2million.
Issue:
Whether bail of Ugshs. 2million for a person accused of publishing false news c/s 24 PCA
is excessive.
Whether the magistrate failed to exercise his discretion judiciously.
Held:
The High Court was empowered to interfere with the discretion of the lower court while
granting bail under s.75 (4)(a) MCA where it was shown that the discretion was not
exercised judiciously. The imposition of a condition that each accused should pay
2.000.000/- was a failure by the lower court to judiciously exercise its discretion according
to Bossa J. Justice Bossa strongly emphasised that while court should take into account
the accused’s ability to pay, while exercising their discretion to grant bail on certain
conditions, the court should not impose such tough conditions that bail looks like a
punishment to the accused.

9.​ ​Deposit instead of recognizance

S. 78(a) MCA is to the effect that the court has power to allow an accused person to
deposit a specific article or a sum of money instead of executing a bond.

10.​​Sureties
Get blacks law definition
See Ayume, p. 59, 60, 61 duties of sureties
Uganda v. Hajji Abbas Mugerwa and another [1975] HCB 218
Held:
It was the responsibility of the sureties to secure the attendance of the accused in court in
terms of the bond and on hearing about his intention to leave the jurisdiction of the court to
report the matter and have the accused arrested, and for them to ask to be discharged as
none of them could secure his attendance once he left the jurisdiction.

The surety is liable to pay the amount specified in the bond if the accused does not appear
to stand his/ her trial.

S. 79 MCA
S. 80(1) MCA, S.18(1) TIA
Mahmood v. R. [1974] EA 300

S. 81 MCA, S. 19 TIA
11.​​Reduction or increase of bail
See Ssekana p. 207
12.​​Forfeiture of recognizance
See Ssekana p. 208
13.​​Application to the CMag or HC where bail is refused
See Odoki
14.​​Application and procedure for bail
See Ssekana p. 213