Golden Rule

It is the duty of the Court to give effect to the meaning of an Act when the meaning can
be fairly gathered from the words used, that is to say, if one construction would lead to an
absurdity while another will give effect to what common sense would show, as obviously
intended, the construction which would defeat the ends of the Act must be rejected. Indeed, the
law require the courts sometimes even to modify the grammatical and ordinary sense of the
words to avoid absurdity and inconsistency.

The Court should not be astute to defeat the provision of the Act whose meaning is, on
the face of it, reasonably plain. Of course, this does not mean that an Act or any part of it can be
recast.

Unless the words are without meaning or absurd, it would be safe to give words their
natural meaning because the framer is presumed to use the language which conveys the intention
and it would not be in accord with any sound principle of construction to refuse to give effect to
the provisions of a statute on the very elusive ground that to give them their ordinary meaning
leads to consequences which are not in accord with the notions of propriety or justice entertained
by the Court.

The Golden Rule can be used in two ways. Which is the narrow way and broader way.

For Narrow Way, the golden rules lays down that if the words used are unambiguous, the
court should adopt an interpretation, which avoids an absurd result.

For Broader Way, the golden rule is sometimes used in preference to the literal rule
where the words can only have one literal meaning. Ordinary senses of words need to be adhered
to unless they lead to absurdity with the rest of instrument.

It also involves a modification of the words of an Act, where their ordinary meaning
creates an absurdity. Courts would not follow literal meaning if the words lead to absurdity. This
is especially so where considerations of public policy intervene to discourage the obnoxious
interpretation.

In Becke v Smith, Parke B remarked/said: “It is a very useful rule in the construction of a
statute to adhere to the ordinary meaning of the words used, and to the grammatical construction,
unless that is at variance with the intention of the Legislature to be collected from the statute
itself, or leads to any manifest absurdity or repugnance, in which case the language may be
varied or modified so as to avoid such inconvenience, but not further.”

It means that Literal Rule is useful when interpreting statute because it applies the
ordinary and grammatical meaning of the words in the statute, however, when there is difference
with the intention of the statute or the meaning of the words is absurd, the court shall modify the
language of the statutes to avoid such results but nothing more than that.
 In Re An Advocate, Wylie CJ remarked: “Although this is a departure from the meaning
of the language used in the case where, taken on its own, the meaning of the provision is clear, I
am satisfied, notwithstanding the judicial warnings of recent years about relying on absurd
results to justify departing from the language of a statute, that this case where the literal meaning
would produce a result repugnant to the other provisions of the Ordinance and defeat their
purpose including one of the Ordinance. Consequently this departure from the literal meaning is
justified.”

It means that although changing the meaning of the words in the language use in the case
when the meaning of the provision is already clear, the literal meaning of the words would
produce a result inconsistent with the other provisions of the same law and defeat the intention of
the legislation despite the warnings of the other judges about relying on absurd results to justify
the changing of the literal meaning of the words.

In Grey v Pearson, Lord Wensleydale wrote that: “the grammatical and ordinary sense of
the words is to be adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity or inconsistency with the
rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be
modified, so as to avoid that absurdity or inconsistency, but not farther.”

The meaning is when the meaning of the words in the statute are clear and ordinary, the
literal rule shall be applied. However, in the case where the meaning id absurd or inconsistent
with the other provisions of the statute, the clear and ordinary meaning of the words may be
modified only to prevent absurdity and inconsistency.

In R v Allen, the British Law Commission noted that, the rule provided no clear means to
test the existence of the characteristics of absurdity, inconsistency or inconvenience, or to
measure their quality or extent. As it seemed that “absurdity” was in practice judged by reference
to whether a particular interpretation was irreconcilable with the general policy of the legislature
“the golden rule turns out to be less explicit from of the mischief rule”.

The meaning is the Golden Rule has no way of testing whether the meaning of the words
in a statute is absurd or inconsistent or the clarity of the words. The absurdity in practice is
measured by reference whether the particular interpretation is inconsistent with the intention of
the legislation and the golden rule is the lesser version of the mischief rule.

In Luke v. R.R.C, Lord Reid said: “An intention to produce unreasonable result is not to
be imputed a statute if there is some other construction available. Where to apply words literally
would defeat the “obvious intention of the legislation and produce a wholly unreasonable result”
we must do some violence to the words and so achieve that obvious intention and produce a
rational construction. Though our standard of drafting is such that it rarely emerges, but a
problem may arise where more than one meaning arc available through the words of the statute,
that meaning should be chosen which is reasonable and rational.”
 This means interpretation that produces an absurd result shall not be if there are other
interpretations available. If the words were literally interpreted, it would defeat the intention of
the legislation as it would lead to absurdity. Therefore we must modified the meaning of the
words to achieve the intention of the parliament. Although such cases rarely occurs in our
legislations, but there may occur cases where the words in the statute have more than one
meaning, and the court should choose the reasonable and rational meaning.

David Wong in Sistem Lingkaran Lebuhraya Kajang Sdn Bhd v Orchard Circle Sdn Bhd
& Ors and other appeals [2018] 2 MLJ 243 stated that “The golden rule of interpretation in
construing a statute is to ascertain the true intention of the Legislature and in doing that the
courts are duty bound to adopt an approach that promotes the purpose or object underlying that
statute. To ascertain the meaning of a clause in a statute, the whole statute must be looked at and
not merely at the clause itself. Where the language of the words employed are clear and succinct
giving rise to no ambiguity, the courts must interpret them as they are. However, when the literal
meaning of the words employed in the legislation leads to absurdity, then the courts must adopt a
purposive approach to the interpretation of legislation as demanded by S 17(A) of the
Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967 which provides that in construing the meaning of provisions
in statute a construction which would promote the purpose or object underlying the Act shall be
preferred to a construction that would not promote that purpose or object..”

It means that the purpose of applying golden rule of interpretation is to reaffirm the true
intention of the Legislature therefore court shall adopt an approach that is consistent with the
intention of the statute. In order to reaffirm the definition of a clause in a statute, the whole
statute must be read and not merely the clause itself. If the words used are clear and concise
(brief), and the meaning is not absurd, the court shall use that meaning. However, if the literal
meaning of the words used in the legislation are absurd, the court shall adopt the interpretation
rule that is consistent with the intention of the legislation as provided by S 17(A) of the
Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967, which states that the court shall apply interpretation that
supports the intention of the statute rather than the interpretation that is not consistent with the
intention of the statute.

In Merck KGaA v Leno Marketing (M) Sdn Bhd [2018] 5 MLJ 1, Raus Sharif (chief
justice) stated that while the Australian approach is arguably not without merit, we are of the
opinion that to read the word ‘appeal’ to mean not an appeal in the natural sense, but in fact an
exercise of the court’s original jurisdiction, is an unduly strained construction. Such a strained
construction may be warranted in certain circumstances, for instance where a literal reading
would be in conflict with the legislative purpose, or would bring about unjust, absurd, or
anomalous results. However, there is no suggestion in this case that any such circumstances
exist. Further, the use of the word ‘appeal’ in s 28 of the TMA is an accurate reflection of the
nature of the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under that section.
 It means that the word ‘appeal’ means not appeal in natural sense, but in fact an exercise
of the court jurisdiction. For instance where a literal meaning is not in accordance to the
legislature purpose. Such interpretation may be justified in some circumstances, whereby the
literal meaning may cause absurdity and does not attain the intention of the legislature. However,
in this case no such circumstances exist. Furthermore, the word ‘appeal’ in s28 of the TMA is a
precise reflection of the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by the high court under that section.

In conclusion, golden rule is the rule that will be applied if the literal approach leads to
absurdity, inconsistency and uncertainty in the actual meaning, so as to attain the intention of the
parliament.