Guns in Ethiopia

Author(s): Richard Pankhurst

Source: Transition , 1965, No. 20 (1965), pp. 26-33
Published by: Indiana University Press on behalf of the Hutchins Center for African
and African American Research at Harvard University

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2934388

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 TRANSMON 20
FIREARMS AND THEIR ROLE IN ETHIOPIA'S INDEPENDENCE
G uns n
Ethiopia RICHARD PANKHURST
AFRICANS AND PERSONS INTERESTLD in Africa the world
over have often commented on the fact that Ethiopia,
alone of all the countries of the continent, succeeded in
maintaining her independence throughout the period of
the Scramble for Africa. The preservation of the count-
ry's independence has obviously many reasons, geo-
graphical, political, diplomatic and economic, which we
cannot enter into here. Independence, however, was
largely maintained by the sword or, more precisely, by
thousands and later hundreds of thousands of rifles,
the possession of which differentiated the strategic position
in Ethiopia from that in most areas of the continent.
This was particularly the case at the Battle of Adowa of
March 1, 1896, the most important African victory of
the nineteenth century, when the Emperor Menelik II
won great fame and prestige by inflicting a crushing
military defeat on an Italian army of invasion, thus
destroying an Italian claim to have established a Pro-
tectorate over his entire country by the Treaty of Uccialli province of Tigre, despatched his English servant Coffin
of May 2, 1889.
The significance of these events has often been
discussed. The Paris Liberte, commenting on the out-
come of the battle at the time, remarked that the Italians
without intending it had brought Ethiopia out of its
shell, and that all European countries would be obliged
to make a place for this "new brother" who stepped
forth ready to play in the Dark Continent the role of
Japan in the Far East. Almost half a century later
Daniel Thwaite wrote in Study of Black Nationalism
1882-1935: "Ethiopia's prestige in Africa consequent
upon her triumphant success in repelling invasion, and
in having remained unconquered throughout the
centuries, is practically unfathomable. To the Africans
in general, not only to those who invoked her as a
liberator, she stands as a granite monument, a living
exponent and testimony of the innate puissance of the
black race, the shrine enclosing the last sacred spark of
African political freedom, the impregnable rock of
black resistance against white invasion, a living symbol,
an incarnation of African independence." The signifi-
cance of Ethiopian independence for early African
nationalism is also referred to by none other than Jomo
Kenyatta, who, in Facing Mount Kenya, refers to the
Biblical passage: "Princes shall come out of Africa:
Ethiopia shall stretch forth her hands to God."
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SEAL OF DEJAZMACH BALCHA SHOWING TWO CANNONS
The purpose of the present article is to examine the
manner in which Ethiopia, almost alone among African
countries, was able to build up relatively well-armed
forces capable of holding their own against European
armies and thereby of maintaining the national integrity
of their country. Though fire-arms were first introduced
into Ethiopia during the reign of the Ethiopian Emperor
Lebna Dengel (1508-1540) and had played a decisive
role
in the victories and subsequent defeat of the great
Muslim conqueror, Ahmad Gragn, they were still
relatively scarce at the beginning of the Nineteenth
Century.
The rulers of the country, which was then in a state
of disunity, were most anxious to import fire-arms from
abroad. Thus Ras Sabagardis, the chief of the northerly
in 1828 to Bombay, Egypt and later to England in quest
of arms and he carried a letter from the chief requesting
"one hundred light horsemen for one or two years."
The chairman of the British Commission for Indian
Affairs gave this request his support, expressing the view
that Ethiopia could become the emporium of East
African trade, and that the Ras if assisted could be ex-
pected to annihilate the slave trade. Taking the view
that the said cavalry would not be "really useful" even
if they could be sent, Mount Norris proposed that a
gift of matchlocks should be sent instead. On November
19, 1829, he drew up a report in which he stated that he
had seen large numbers of old matchlocks in the stores
of the East India Company; these weapons were no
longer used by the British and "certainly would not be
sold to the native powers in India." In a subsequent
letter of March 19, 1831, in which he suggested that
"some barrels of gunpowder" should be given in addition
to the said matchlocks, he reverted to the value of the
proposed gift, declaring: "with occasional assistance
there is every reason to hope that the present king may
be able to recover those parts of his kingdom which
were overrun by his barbarous and pagan neighbours
during the period that Abyssinia had been torn by civil
war." Negotiations on the proposed gift were slow, but
in the summer of 1831 the British Foreign Secretary,
Lord Palmerston, and the directors of the British

East India Company, gave their approval to the gift
of the arms, but not of the gunpowder; Coffin was in
due course sent back to Ethiopia with the long expected
arms. The British traveller, Beke, describes them as
"a large number of muskets," while a French traveller,
d'Abbadie, says they numbered 3,000.
King Sahle Sellassie, the ruler of the southern
province of Shoa, was no less interested in obtaining
modern weapons of war. The missionary, Krapf,
writing in April 1839, stated that this monarch had
imported several small cannons through Tajurah,
paying a female slave for each camel required for trans-
portation. On July 3, 1840, Krapf wrote an important
report to the British Consul-General in Egypt in which he
revealed that a French envoy, Rochet d'Hericourt,
had brought Sahle Sellassie a mill for the manufacture
of gunpowder and had ingratiated himself with the
monarch by offers of further military aid. The French-
man had told the king that if he "wished to become the
ruler of the whole Abyssinia it were indispensably
necessary to organise his troops according to the mili-
tary system of France." To this end it was necessary
to obtain "better materials of war" than those then
in the country. Rochet had accordingly offered to go to
France to request "guns, cannons and other means of
war." Sahle Sellassie had expressed himself "well
pleased" with the Frenchman's ideas and had given him
letters and presents for the king of France in March,
taking the precaution, however, of requesting Krapf to
approach the British in the hope of obtaining assistance
from them also. Rochet d'Hericourt, according to
Johnston, returned in due course with 140 muskets.
Meanwhile Sahle Sellassie, anxious to increase his
strength, wrote to the British East India Company on
June 28, 1840, declaring:
"God has given me a good and large kingdom;
but arts and sciences have not yet come to my country,
as they have to yours. May it therefore please you to
assist me, particularly in sending guns and cannon and
other things." The result was the despatch of a British
mission led by Captain Cornwallis Harris which two
years later visited Shoa and presented the King with 2
cannons, 300 muskets, and 100 pistols.
Sahle Sellassie's interest in fire-arms was noticed by
all the travellers of the period. The Englishman, John-
ston, relates that the King, fully aware of the need for
better gunpowder, asked him to make some for him.
The result was that the Englishman's garden soon
"exhibited a lively scene, several men standing around
huge mortars two feet and a half high, made out of the
round trunks of trees, and pounding the charcoal, or
else the saltpetre into fine powder. The pestles consisted
of heavy pieces of wood three feet long, which were
generally kept going up and down by two men standing
opposite each other, who were relieved three or four
times in the course of an hour. Several others were on
their knees upon the ground, leaning over coarse flat
stones, grinding the sulphur beneath another heavy one
they moved with the hands." A representative of the
King came with a learned scribe "who had been desired
by the Negus to watch the proceedings and mark the
proportionate amounts of saltpetre, charcoal and
sulphur." On another occasion, Johnston relates, the
King asked him about the relative merits of gun-barrels: this request his full support, proposed to the British
"I had to describe how they were manufactured: what was Government on November 25, 1857 that it should pre-
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TRANSITION 20
the difference between plain and twisted, in what manner
thv grooves on the rifle were most economical for service.
As regarded the latter query, the monarch showed his
quickness in detecting an anomaly, or apparent contra-
diction; for having before asserted that the best gun he
had showed me today was a strong two-ounce rifle,
double-barrelled, I said that the long Arab match-lock
barrel was most inconvenient by reason of its great
weight, when he instantly took the rifle and placed it in
my hands, to show me that it was at least twice the weight
of the one I now condemned."
Sahle Sellassie's interest in the manufacture of arms
is confirmed from other sources. Krapf tells us that the
monarch frequently visited the palace gunmakers,
while the Frenchmen, Combes and Tamisier, relate that
on reaching his capital at Angolola they were closely
questioned by one of the King's secretaries as to whether
they could make rifles or gunpowder. On the follow-
ing day, after the ceremonial formalities were over, he
repeated the questions which his servants had asked
on the previous day.
Ras Wubie, a later ruler of Tigre, also evinced an
acute interest in fire-arms but faced considerable diffi-
culty in obtaining them as Massawa, the principal port
upon which he relied, was under the hostile rule of the
Ottoman Turks. On October 20, 1853, he wrote a letter
to the British Consul in Ethiopia, Walter Plowden, in
which he demanded:
"What were the terms of our friendship? That I
should do what you demand of me, and that you should
do what I ask of you.
"Now if it be possible, do you go for me to your
country; if not, some person in your confidence, who
understands guns, should go ... I wish to buy guns and
pistols of different kinds and of good quality.
"I shall have the money ready after a few months."
The money was in due course handed to Plowden,
who wrote to the Foreign Secretary on July 1, 1954,
that though it was only sufficient to buy some fowling
pieces and rifles for the chief's own use, they were sure
to be seized by the governor of Massawa. The Consul
therefore requested a distinct order for- the passage of
these arms and other personal property belonging to
Wubie. The British Government, however, was un-
willing to offend the Turks; nothing was therefore done
to meet Wubie's request, and he was obliged to rely,
as before, on arms brought in as contraband.
The warlike Emperor Theodore (1855-1868) who
rose in the west of Ethiopia by force of arms and was
consumed with the desire to unify the country, also
had very great need of fire-arms and wished to make
them the basis of his military might. He was nonetheless
always short of arms, the more so as he was geographic-
ally in a very difficult position to import them. Deeply
conscious of the importance of modern weapons he
endeavoured as early as 1853 to construct a cannon.
It was made out of a tree trunk which was bored through
and reinforced with iron. He also commissioned Greeks
to buy muskets for him and to smuggle them in through
Turkish occupied territory.
Later, after being proclaimed Emperor, he appealed,
like his predecessors, for British help. Plowden, who gave
27
 TRANSITION 20
sent Theodore with a substantial gift of arms. He ex-
plained that he had asked the Emperor, "in what manner
can we prove our friendship?" The latter, who was a
proud man, would not answer, but for his own part he
recommended the British Government should make the
Emperor an immediate present of 200 or 300 percussion
guns of any old pattern no longer in use, with a quantity
of caps to match, for his soldiers, and a handsome piece
for his own use.
This proposal was accepted by the British Foreign
Secretary, the Earl of Malmesbury, in a letter of the
following April 8, in which he asked Plowden how the
present should be conveyed from Massawa. Plowden
recommended that the articles should be shipped to
Aden pending a favourable opportunity for them to be
transmitted to the Emperor. He feared that difficulties
with the Turkish authorities at the port were "of course
to be expected," but urged that the only course to be
followed was for the British Government to "insist on a
free transit through Massawa on all occasions." The
Foreign Office, however, being unwilling to oppose the
Turks, replied to Plowden on May 31, 1859, stating that
"Her Majesty's Government do not consider it ad-
visable, under present circumstances, to issue muskets of
any description." The Emperor was thus prevented from
obtaining any gift of arms.
Theodore thereupon turned to the foreign mission-
aries. In his coronation year, 1855, he had accepted an
offer by the Protestant Bishop of Jerusalem, Gobat, to
send out a group of young missionaries who had re-
ceived technical training at the Chrishona Institute
at Basle. They brought the Emperor gifts of religious
books, but Theodore later acknowledged that he "would
have been more pleased with a box of English gunpowder
than, as he said, with books he already possessed." He
nonetheless treated the foreigners with kindness and settl-
ed them at Gafat, near Debra Tabor,h is principal place of
residence. The first group of missionaries included two
German gunsmiths, but they died en route. In 1858,
however, the first party was joined by a French gun-
smith called Bourgaud, a Polish deserter from the
Russian Army called Moritz Hall, and a couple of gradu-
ates of the Chrishona Institute. At about the same time
the Emperor imported one or two gunpowder makers
and the requisite machinery.
In 1861 a French metal caster called Jaquin declared formed by the melting of the fine sand of the bricks;
himself willing to make the Emperor a mortar, but
asked for the assistance of the other European workers.
The result, reports Waldmeier, one of the missionaries,
was that "the King wrote us a letter ordering us to stand
by Jaquin in every way, to support him with advice and
action, and serve him as translators. We could make no
objection to this for we had been recommended as
people who possessed technical skill and who were
ready to help with anything required." Little, however,
came of the attempt, for as Waldmeier says, "M. Jaquin
soon observed that the work had failed, for the furnace,
which was made of poor material, began to melt before
the iron ore reached melting point. The Frenchman
began to lament and weep; he went half-mad, cried
wildly and finally asked the King's permission to leave.
After obtaining it he left the land."
Not long afterwards, Waldmeier continues, "the
King came to Gafat and swore upon his death that we
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should not abandon Jaquin's work, but should go on
trying. We replied, 'Your Majesty, we have neither
knowledge nor experience in this matter, and are quite
ignorant of it, and we are afraid to undertake what is
above our strength.' 'That does not matter,' answered
the King. 'If you are my friends, then try. If God allows
it to succeed, it will be well: if not, it will also be well."'
The events which followed were well described by an
English traveller, Dufton, who met the missionaries in
1862-3. "Things", he said, "went smoothly for some time,
until one day orders came from His Majesty to the effect
that he wished them to commence the construction of
mortars and bombshells. The order came upon them
like the bursting of a bomb itself, for none of them had
ever had an idea that they would have been required to
undertake work of that description. They of course
demurred, informing the king that, not having learnt the
founding of cannon, they were totally unprepared to
enter an engagement of that description, and that if he
really desired to have these war implements in his
country, manufacturers in Germany, England or
France would supply him with a much better article
than they could possibly produce." This argument, it
will be apparent, naturally carried no weight in view of
the Turkish blockade. "The king," Dufton continues,
"was dissatisfied with their reply; he wished to have
these things made in his own country, and to be quite
independent of other nations. They still, nevertheless,
objected, more on grounds of inability than unwilling-
ness; but their refusal only vexed the king the more, and
he now seized all their servants and put them in chains,
there to remain until their masters gave consent to carry
out his will".
Since the Emperor would not relent in his demands,
the craftsmen had no option but to obey. "In their per-
plexity," writes Dufton, "they could not do otherwise
than promise to try. Only one of them, Herr Moriz,
could be said to have the slightest acquaintance with
the work at all, and his knowledge only extended to
the formation of the mould; the clay to be used in the
construction of the fire-bricks, the formation of the
furnace, the proportion of the metals, and the making
of the fuse being equally unknown to him as to the rest.
However, by putting their heads together, and seeking
information from books, they eventually managed to
turn out something. What? A mass of vitreous matter
the metal refused to flow. Their only resource was to
try again; and away they went over the country to seek
better fire-brick clay, and now another venture was
made. The result was a flow of metal that came pouring
out in a molten stream now, and all hearts are hopeful
that at last their object is gained; but alas! the metal
had stopped, and the mould was only half full. They
tried again. To the inexpressible joy of these persevering
men, and the intense delight of the king himself, their
wishes are accomplished, and Debra Tabor for the
first time saw the balls soaring up into the air and burst-
ing with a loud crash, which made the hills resound
with a hundred echoes.
"The success was the cause of great favour being
conferred by the grateful king on his 'children', as he
called them. Shirts of honour, horses and mules with
gold and silver trappings, and 1,000 dollars apiece,
were the reward of their persevering efforts."

~~~~ ..... . .~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~X
THEODORE'S GREAT MORTAR 1SEVASTOPOL"
As soon as the success of the experiment was appa-
rent the Emperor gave orders for larger scale production
to commence. Dufton says that by the time of his visit
in 1862-3 "all the Europeans" at Gafat were engaged
in the manufacture of cannon and mortars, and that
their Ethiopian assistants and trainees were "beginning
to profit by intercouse with these artisans."
"Subsequently Theodore asked the workman to
make him a cannon that would fire a 1,000 pound shell;
it weighed many tons and "was called Sebastapol";
the Emperor declared the day of its casting one of the
happiest of his life.
Notwithstanding such pioneer work Dufton con-
cluded that there were still "not many pieces of cannon"
in the country, that most of the muskets were still in
the possession of the soldiers from Tigre and that
flint-locks predominated as in previous decades. He
adds that the musket was still generally speaking con-
sidered "ess effective than the spear," and that because
of the soldiers' general lack of training in fire-arms "the
amount of powder and shot wasted must be enormous."
Theodore's ambitious plan to inaugurate what, as it
turned out, maybe termed Ethiopia's abortive Industrial
Revolution, was wrecked by his conflict with Britain
which culminated in the despatch of a British expedition
against his mountain fortress of Magdala. After his
defeat and death in April, 1868, his arsenal with all its
guns collected or manufactured with so much difficulty
was destroyed by British troops. Thus Ethiopia's first
major attempt at arming herself adquately, in face of
a hostile world, was brought to an abrupt end.
* * *
Notwithstanding this grave setback supplies of arms
and ammunition were destined to increase immensely
during the reign of the Emperor Yohannes (1872-1889)
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TRANSITION 20
. ..
though it is interesting to note that matchlocks dating
from the early seventeenth century of the Portuguese
were still in Service at the end of the nineteenth century
Understanding that the collapse of Theodore could
largely be attributed to his insufficient firepower, Yohan-
nes determined to import arms on an even greater
scale, and being based in Tigre was in a far better
position to do so than his predecessor who had
been largely isolated in the West. Yohannes began
his reign relatively well armed for in return for
giving the British support in their conflict with Theodor
he had been given six mortars, 200 rounds of ammunition
and six howitzers with 50 rounds of ammunition apiece,
725 muskets with bayonets, 130 rifles, 354,230 rounds
of small arms ammunition, 28 barrels of gunpowder
and 585,480 percussion caps, as many horses and mules
and much superfluous baggage. This armament had in
fact played an important role in enabling him to assume
the imperial power. He also succeeded in importing
modest supplies despite the blockade of the Egyptians
who had replaced the Turks as rulers of Massawa in
May 1868.
Growing fire-power enabled Yohannes to defeat
Egyptian aggression at the very remarkable battles of
Gundet in November 1875 and Gura in March 1876,
when the forces of 15,000 to 20,000 exceedingly well
armed European-trained Egyptians were routed by some
60,000 Ethiopians, perhaps 10,000 of whom had rifles.
The two engagements were of importance for in them the
Emperor captured something like 20,000 Remingtons,
the most modern rifles of the day, a considerable amount
of artillery, including 25 to 30 cannon, as well as many
horses, mules, camels and food supplies. Understandably
enough the Emperor refused all Egyptian demands
for the return of his booty. Kirkham, his British military
29
 TRANSITION 20
advisor, discussing the situation after the first of these
battles, observed: "The Abyssinians are better armed
with fire-arms than is commonly supposed. They have
matchlocks (to ignite the powder the soldier wears a
cotton belt with one end burning), short guns, Brown-
Besses-part of the English present to King John-
Snyders, now Remingtons, and a variety of other
fire-arms." Yohannes was thus infinitely better armed
than Theodore only a decade earlier.
Rohlfs, a German observer, confirmed this picture,
for, writing of 1881, he noted that he had seen large
numbers of Remingtons in the possession of the Ethio-
pian troops. A great change, he explained, had taken
place since the reign of Theodore. Then there had been
but very few rifles, mostly of an antedeluvian type, the
soldiers relying mainly on spears, swords and shields.
Such conventional weapons could still be seen in 1881,
but were going out of fashion, as could be deduced
from the fact that one seldom saw the formerly so highly
prized luxury shields ornamented with gold and silver
filigree work. Almost all soldiers now carried fire-arms,
and if match-locks and flint-locks were still common,
there were numerous guns firing percussion caps, as
well as very many breach-loaders.
Ethiopia was already modestly well-armed at the
opening of the Scramble for Africa, which, as far as
this part of the continent was concerned, may be said
to have begun on February 5, 1885, when the Italians
occupied the port of Massawa. Five years later the
Italian colony of Eritrea was proclaimed in what had
hitherto been Northern Ethiopia.
* * * *
Menelik, the ruler of Shoa who was destined to
succeed Yohannes as Emperor of all Ethiopia in 1889,
had meanwhile also been doing his utmost to import
arms from abroad, and was, moreover, in a better posi-
tion to import them in substantial quantities than any
previous ruler. Possessing fairly convenient access to
the coast through the Italian port of Assab and the
posts of the French Somali Coast-all of Which were
only then being developed-he had the additional
advantage that the Italian and French Governments
were both most anxious to win his friendship for their
own purposes: the Italians to help them against Yohan-
nes, their enemy in Northern Ethiopia, and the French
to help'them in their long drawn out rivalry with Eng-
land. Menelik, writes Enid Starkie in her study of the
gun-running poet, Rimbaud, "was ready to buy any
number of guns, any quantity of ammunition, and he
paid well those prepared to provide him with them."
As soon as the port of Assab was open the Italians
began to pour arms through it in a steady stream into
Shoa; the French did the same through their protec-
torate, first at Obokh and next at Tajoura. French
traders now made large profits, buying up obsolete
rifles in France and Belgium and trading them to Mene-
lik at inflated prices. According to Rimbaud, he and his
colleagues were purchasing rifles in Europe at seven or
eight francs a piece and could sell them in Ethiopia
for about 40. Ethiopian arms purchases at this time were
made partly against cash, and partly in exchange for
ivory, gold and civet.
The Italians were also active. In November, 1884,
Antonelli, the Italian representative in Shoa, signed two
contracts with Menelik. In the first he agreed to supply
50,QOO Remingtons and 10 million cartridges, both on
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the basis of annual instalments over a ten year period;
in the second he was to supply 4,000 Wetterly rifles and
400,000 cartridges immediately.
The sale of arms to Ethiopia, then one of few organ-
ised states on the African continent, had important
diplomatic consequences in the era of the Scramble
for Africa. Carried out by the Italians and French the
trade was strongly opposed by the British, who were,
however, unable to prevent it without the agreement
of the other imperialist powers. Starkie, discussing the
various considerations motivating her British comn-
patriots, writes: "Some people were genuinely apprehen-
sive on humanitarian grounds, thinking it a crime to
arm the native people, fearing that these arms might
fall into the hands of the Somali tribes . . . Some people
viewed with particular apprehension the arming of
Menelik on account of the danger this might have for
England; some were anxious lest the arms should,
in the Northern Ethiopia, fall into the hands of the
Dervishes . . . and ultimately be used against British
power in Egypt. Some people thought it a pity that so
lucrative a trade should be solely in the hands of foreig-
ners. They considered that if England would not engage
in the trade itself, it should be prohibited entirely.
And, finally, there were some who were disturbed
by the reflection that the country which sold arms to
Abyssinia would undoubtedly become, eventually, the
country with most prestige and influence there."
British opposition to the supply of arms to Menelik
failed, however, to deter either the French or the Italians,
both of whom, as we have seen, had strong reasons of
their own to continue the trade. An Italian observer,
Robecchi-Brichetti, estimated that Menelik in one way
or another obtained 25,000 rifles between 1878 and 1886,
while Rimbaud gave the same number of guns of all
kinds as arriving between 1882 and 1887. Within half a
decade Menelik's fire-power must thus have increased
several fold. For the first time in Ethiopian history,
moreover, the troops had relatively abundant supplies
of good ammunition. The days of home-made gun-
powder, badly fashioned bullets and stones were over.
The Italians, as already noted, had been presenting
and selling arms to Menelik in the hope of winning
his friendship which was of great importance in view of
their anticipated conflict with the Emperor Yohannes,
who, as ruler of the north, barred their expansion from
Eritrea. On January 13, 1888, the Italian Prime Minister,
Crispi, for example, despatched Menelik 1,000 Reming-
tons and a supply of ammunition to go with them,
declaring, "May these increase your power and carry
destruction among your enemies and those of my coun-
try." Similar consignments followed; total supplies
from Italy in 1888 were reported to have comprised
4,000 Remington rifles with 200,000 cartridges, 5,000
other rifles and 4000,00 Weterley cartridges. Shortly
afterwards, on January 28, 1889, Antonelli brought
Menelik a further welcome gift of 5,000 rifles, and
1,000,000 Weterley cartridges.
Italian hopes of using Menelik against Yohannes
were, however, destined to be shattered within a matter
of months. On March 11 the Emperor was killed fighting
against the Sudanese Mahdists. Menelik thereupon
assumed the imperial throne and became the sovereign
responsible for the defence of the whole Empire against
the Italian aggression which was then being planned.

The Italians were not slow to act. Less than two
months after the death of the Emperor Yohannes they
succeeded in signing the Ucciali Treaty of Friendship
and Commerce with Menelik which soon was to become
famous. Article XVII, like the treaty as a whole, was
written in two languages: Italian and Amharic, the
national language of Ethiopia. The Amharic text,
which Menelik alone understood, provided that he
should have the power to avail himself of the services
of the Italian authorities for any communications he
might wish to have forwarded to other Governments.
The Italian version, which was prepared by the Italian
envoy Antonelli, made it obligatory for the Emperor
to conduct all his transactions through the Italian
Government. On the basis of this latter reading the
Italian immediately claimed to have established a
Protectorate over Ethiopia on the basis of the General
Act of Berlin, the international document which the
European Powers had signed in 1885 to give rules for
the Scramble for Africa.
Menelik did not immediately denounce theTreaty
of Uccialli. On the contrary, he continued to import
arms and also insisted on obtaining further arms from
Italy. The Italians, not yet confident of their position,
continued for a little while to supply him with weapons.
Thus later in the year the Emperor's cousin, Ras Mako-
nnen, visited Rome and was presented on Ethiopia's
behalf with a large gift of 39,000 rifles and 28 cannon
by King Umberto of Italy. Thus, despite the Treaty
of Uccialli, Menelik was able steadily to increase his
fire-power. A popular Ethiopian song composed some
years later, after the subsequent Italian invasion, refer-
red to these Italian supplies in the following phrases:
"What kind of fools are the men of the country of the
Europeans! Having themselves made the instruments
of their death they presented them to us. With the Wet-
terley which they brought, with the munitions they
brought, Menelik roasted and crackled this barley from
overseas."
* * * Ethiopian relations, the Italian Government supplied
Menelik, who was by now already well armed, was
fully aware of the impending threat of an Italian attack
and made every possible effort to purchase more arms.
In the summer of 1890 the French trader, Chefneux,
supplied him with ten quick-firing rifles. At about the
same time another Frenchman, Bremond, landed 1,000
rifles at Jibuti, while there was also talk of the importa-
tion of seven small cannon. The position in the following
year, 1891, was summed up by the Russian, Lieutenant
Vasili Mashkov, who estimated that in the previous
two decades Ethiopia had obtained some 100,000 rifles
from Britain, Italy and France, a good proportion of
them Wetterlies and Remingtons. He himself brought
the Emperor a gift from the Russian Government of
10,000 rifles which arrived in Jibuti in July. Russian
assistance in arms, though shrouded from publicity,
was not negligible; the modern writer, Jesman, states
that such transactions were "usually handled by neutral
middlemen."
Menelik, each year increased his imports, the more
so as Italian ambitions were now becoming more and
more ominous. An Italian journalist writing in May,
1891, stated that Harar was then an important centre
for the arms trade and that Greeks as well as French-
men were doing a brisk trade in rifles. British diplomatic
correspondence for 1891 tells a similar tale. O~n April
28, Lieut. Merewether reported:
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TRANSITION 20
"The French are sending arms in quantity to Harar.
There are 150 stand of them now there, and 60,000
rifles on the way. They are moreover furnishing....
quick-firing guns, believed to be Hotchkiss, or something
in that way." In May a British official, Stace, observed
that French traders were "introducing large quantities
of arms for Harar and Abyssinia." On July 30, the same
observer recorded: "considerable quantities of rifles
are still being sent to Abyssinia, via Jibuti, and, it is
also asserted, machine-guns." On August 16, he added:
"I am again informed that machine-guns have been sent
in." Reverting to the question on September 2, he dec-
lared: "a considerable number of guns have been sent
to Harar . . . the greater number are mountain-guns,
with some machine-guns. A native of India who has
been two years in Harar . . . told me that he saw 15
or 16. An Italian traveller also saw them. Report says
that others are on the way.
"Jibuti and Obokh appear to me to be becoming
centres for the distribution of weapons. It is known that
a considerable number of rifles of new patterns have
been distributed for sale from both these places."
In October, it was learnt that a ship had left Marseilles
for Jibuti with 30 tons of war material which, it was
suspected, had been at least partly purchased with Russian
funds. In the same month Stace was informed that Ras
Makonnen's army of 20,000 men was "mostly armed
with Remingtons." The report added that the Ras had
"a good many machine guns," and that ammunition
was "pouring in from Jibuti." In November, the British
Government gave permission to one of the Ras' agents
to import 100 Winchester rifles and 20,000 cartridges
via Zeila. Major Swayne who made an expedition through
Somaliland in 1892 said he saw arms "stacked high"
in the Ethiopian customs enclosure at Gildessa and
passed 'caravan a f t e r caravan" of ammunition on
the Jibuti-Gildessa road.
Early in 1893 on the eve of the final rupture of Italo-
Menelik with a further two million cartridges, while in
July, 1893, the German Ambassador in Rome reported
that his Government, anxious to avoid offending the
Italians, had refused to allow a Hamburg firm to supply
an order for 100,000 rifles and 10 million cartridges
for Menelik. In October, the Italian envoy in Harar,
Dr. Nerazzini, reported that 1,000 camels were engaged
in the trade from Jibuti and Zeila, from which he de-
duced on the basis of an average camel load of 48 rifles
and the need to carry other items that it was impossible
for Ethiopia to import more than 25,000 rifles a year.
Since this exceeded the number of Italian troops in
Africa the figure was, however, from the Italian point
of view alarming.
Early in the following year, 1894, it was reported
in February that the Austrian Lloyd's Steam Navigation
Company had applied for a licence to tranship via
Aden a large cargo of 100 tons of empty cartridge cases
which at the lowest computation must have constituted
about four million cartridge cases. In March the Italian
Ambassador in London referred to a "considerable
sale of guns" at Obok, and mentioned the recent arrival
at that, port of two consignments, one of which comprised
3,000 rifles. In July the Italian journal La Nazione
stated that Menelik was modernizing his army, and,
having received 2,000 Gras rifles from France, was
planning to obtain many more. A French traveller,
31
 TRANSITION 20
Vanderheym, who visited Addis Ababa that year, saw
no less than 40 Hotchkiss guns and half a
dozen mountain guns at the palace; he reported that
Ras Makonnen had perhaps a further 10 cannon, but
that the other major chiefs had no more than two each.
In November two Italian observers, Piano and Traversi,
estimated that there were 82,000 rifles in Ethiopia as
well as 51 million cartridges.
Ethiopian fire-power on the eve of the war was thus
fairly considerable. An American observer, Donaldson
Smith, who saw large numbers of Remingtons as well
as French breachloaders in the possession of the Ethio-
pians, aptly commented: "any nation attacking them
would have its hands full."
Supplies of arms, however, continued to pour into
Ethiopia. In January, 1895, Italian intelligence reported
that the Emperor's Swiss advisor, Ilg, was in Paris to
buy arms, and that Menelik was supposed to have
written a letter to him containing the orders: "Let me
have at once 5,000 cartridges for guns. These at once.
The other ammunition you can bring at your leisure.
And the more there is of it the better." At about this
time we find the Emperor purchasing a further 15 or
16 quick-firing guns from one French merchant and
a little later a simlar consignment from another. An
Italian contemporary account suggests that this
later consignment was in fact slightly larger, made up
of 18 cannon and 2 machine-guns. The trader is also
reported to have supplied 20,000 dollars' worth of rifles
at this time. It was reported by the Italians in April,
1895, that Menelik was awaiting a supply of 20,000
rifles and 2 million cartridges from Europe. On August
10 an Ethiopian mission which had been touring Russia
left Odessa with 135 cases of rifles and numerous cases
of ammunition. In October it was reported that a French
ship, the Seribean, had reached Jibuti with a cargo of
arms, including 250,000 cartridges for Menelik. The
Italian historian, Conti Rossini, writes that though the
estimate of 120,000 rifles arriving in 1895 is exaggerated,
imports that year were higher than before and numbered
many thousands. A British report at the end of the year
stated that no less than 7,000 rifles had been supplied
from Liege alone, apparently through the intermediary
of an Armenian.
The position at this time was well summed up by
the Italian journalist, Mercatelli, who reported on Oc-
tober 13, 1895: "Shoa, they say, is ready for war . . .
the troops of the Negus are all armed with breach-
loaders, Remington, Watterley or Gras. They have at
their disposal much ammunition, having recently received
two and a half million cartridges for the Gras rifles.
The Negus has received many of these rifles as gifts
but has also acquired them on the market at fair prices.
The Negus has also received many cannon, machine-
guns and quick firing cannon."
The result of a decade and a half of systematic arms
purchase and acquisition was that Menelik was, as we
have seen, by no means badly prepared for the final
struggle against the Italians; he could in fact bring into
play greater fire-power and several times as many
rifles as the invaders who were reluctant to despatch
large numbers of men on a purely colonial venture.
Estimates of the strength of the Ethiopian army at
the time of the final conflict with the Italians in 1895-6
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vary, but there is no doubt that it was immense. Besides
40 cannon Menelik was able to put into the field an
immense number of rifles which were estimated by various
observers at anything between 80,000 and 120,000.
The invaders' army which took part in the decisive
Battle of Adowa amounted to 17,000 men, of whom 10,
596 were Italians and the rest Eritrean levies. In addition
51 Italian officers, and 1,415 other ranks and 1,600
Eritreans were in camp: some 900 unarmed Eritreans
were employed to lead mules. In the battle the invader
thus operated with 14,519 rifles, 56 guns and no cavalry,
and was in fact hopelessly outnumbered, except in the
field of heavy guns where they had a slight advantage.
Under such circumstances an Ethiopian victory was
well - nigh inevitable, the more so as the enemy had
little knowledge of the terrain in which the fighting took
place and was resolutely opposed by local population.
The invaders' losses were remarkably high. Official
Italian figures record 261 European officers, 2,918 non-
commissioned officers and men, and about 2,000 Askaris
were killed, and that a further 954 Italian soldiers were
permanently missing and must therefore be presumed
killed. Total Italian casualties thus amounted to over
7,560, or nearly 43 per cent, of their original fighting
force of 10,596 Italians and about 7,100 native troops.
In addition to the Italians killed and wounded, Berkeley,
the historian of the battle estimates that 1,865 Italians
were taken prisoner of whom 14 officers and 92 men
died in captivity, the number of prisoners subsequently
returning to Italy being 54 officers and 1,705 men.
About 2,000 Askaris were also captured while even
larger numbers deserted. All the artillery with which the
Italians had planned to conquer an empire also fell into
Menelik hands.
* * *
Ethiopia by the end of the nineteenth century
would have been a difficult country to conquer, as its
mountainous people were very well armed. This may
be seen from the observations of scores of foreign eye-
witnesses. Vivian, for example, estimated that there
were 300,000 rifles in the country, while Powell-Cotton
said that the Emperor could put into the field no less
than 500,000 rifles and 100 pieces of mountain artillery,
"to say nothing of innumerable swarms of spearmen
mounted on foot"; Le Reoux and Skinner, on the other
hand claimed that Menelik could control as many as
600,000 rifles, half of which, the latter says, comprised
Gras, Berdens and Lee-Metfords. A few years later
Lieutenant Collat asserted that Menelik had distributed
100,000 to 150,000 rifles in the decade since Adowa,
with the result that there were by then in the country
probably 300,000 to 400,000 rifles, of which perhaps
two-thirds were Gras.
European travellers were indeed greatly impressed
by the relative abundance of arms which they saw in
Ethiopia, particularly in comparison with other African
countries. The report of the Duchesne-Fournet mission
of 1901-3 noted that whereas rifles had in former times
only been owned by chiefs, they were by then in the
possession of most ordinary soldiers, many of whom
employed a gun-bearer and also owned a pistol. Major
Austin found that soldiers in the Gore area in 1900
were "4exceedingly well armed," the majority possessing
modern French or Italian breach-loaders with magazines.
John Boyes, who arrived the same year from British
 TRANSITION 20

East Africa where the so-called "natives" were not allow-
ed to carry fire-arms, commented in a veiy revealing
passage: "Practically all the Abyssinians I met were
armed with rifles which were being imported into the
country by the thousand. Nor were they obsolete weapons
On every hand I saw plenty of modern fire-arms, includ-
ing the .303 and the Maus-r magazine rifle. This fact
is significant, and in my opinion it will end in trouble.
The Abyssinians are the best armed Native race in
Africa, and could if required put a hundred thousand
men in the field . . . They could not easily be brought
under subjection by any foreign Power." The dispersion
of arms over the country may be further seen by the
A person carrying a minishir let him come himself.
A person carrying an albin let-him be my lover.
Should he want to be my husband let him buy a
mauser.
It cannot be gainsaid that fire-arms played a basic
role in the preservation of Ethiopian independence,
nor is it surprising that the British colonial adventurer,
Frederick Lugard, when contemplating the occupation
of Uganda, should have thought that part of Africa
easier to colonise than Ethiopia where the inhabitants
had rifles.
* *

same observer's account of a meeting with Dejazmach

The reasons for the preservation of Ethiopian in-
Balcha in the vicinity of Lake Margarita. Boyes, anxious
dependence throughout the era of the Scramble for
to ingratiate himself, presented the chief with a new
Africa no longer held good in the era of Fascism and
Mauser pistol. "I was proceeding to explain its mechan-
Appeasement. By the time of Mussolini's invasion of
ism," the Englishman relates, "when the general quietly
Ethiopia in 1935 the military situation was very different
rose in his seat, turned round, and produced two others
from what it had been during the Italo-Ethiopian war.
exactly like it." The linguist, Armbruster, who travelled
The advent of the aeroplane, the tank and poison gas,
in Gojam in 1904, observed: "The number of rifles
as well as improvements in fire-arms, made war much
and amount of ammunition in the country is enormous.
more costly, and therefore less possible for an under-
I began to compile estimates, but got into such large
developed country such as Ethiopia. The Emperor
figures that I had to abandon the attempt. I can only
Haile Sellassie moreover encountered much greater
say that certainly 80 per cent of the able-bodied males
difficulties than Menelik in importing the means of
have a rifle of some kind, as well as a bandolier, usually
defence, as the British and French were unwilling to
well filled." An equally revealing story was told by the
allow Ethiopia to transport arms across their colonial
British Ambassador in Germany who relates that when
possessions in Somaliland. As a result the Emperor
an Ethiopian delegation led by Dejazmatch Mashasha
Haile Sellassie found it almost impossible to import
visited Hamburg in 1907 it was shown the most modern
the weapons necessary for Ethiopia's defence, while
German fire-arms: "Their hosts," he says, "were much
Mussolini was free to have unlimited supplies produced
astonished at the technical knowledge displayed by them
in the Italian factories. Moreover, as the Italian historian,
in handling the weapons, and at their announcement
Salvemini, notes: "Haile Sellassie's limited financial
that they themselves were in possession of most of the
resources precluded the purchase of all but the scantiest
models shown."
supplies. On the other hand, Mussolini's diplomats
everywhere protested that he would construe the granting
The impact of fire-arms on Ethiopian society was of permits to export arms for Ethiopia as unfriendly
on any showing immense. Historically guns were more acts towards Italy. They simultaneously offered muni-
or less the first mechanical instruments with which the tions-makers higher prices than Haile Sellassie could
Ethiopians became familiar, as is apparent from the afford to pay".
fact that the Amharic term for screw driver is temanja
metcha, or instrument for unscrewing a gun. The various The British and French blockade was justified by the
contemporary makes of rifle were wellknown in Ethiopia two European Powers on the ground that they wished
and passed into the Amharic language, often being to prevent the impending conflict by denying arms to
corrupted in the process. Thus Ethiopians spoke of the either side. Though seemingly a neutral action, this
wujigra, i.e. "fusil Gras," the wechifo, or "wetterley" decision of course favoured one side. As the Emperor
and the sinidir, or "Winchester Snider". Guns have their complained at the time: "Italy is a great manufacturing
place in Amharic poetry and literature, as may be country working day and night to equip her soldiers
illustrated from the following poem recalled by a modern with modern weapons and modern machines. We are
Ethiopian scholar, Ato Alemayehu Mogos: a pastoral and agricultural people without resources
and cannot do more than purchase abroad a few rifles
A person carrying a moskob (i.e.Russian gun) and guns to prevent our soldiers from entering battle
should not pass by my door; with swords and spears only. In what way have we
provoked the war? If we are in the right, and if civilised
nations are unable to prevent this war, at least do not
You will be destroyed in my hands like dried leaves
let them deny us the power of defending ourselves."
in a fire.
The significance in Ethiopia's long and unique
A person carrying a wechifo let him make his voice history of fire-arms and weapons of war generally is
heard to me. surely apparent.

33

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