VOL.

397, FEBRUARY 6, 2003

75

Light Rail Transit Authority vs. Navidad

G.R. No. 145804. February 6, 2003.*

LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN, petitioners, vs. MARJORIE NAVIDAD, Heirs of the
Late NICANOR NAVIDAD & PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY, respondents.

Civil Law; Contracts; Contract of Carriage; The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely
using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances.—The law
requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons
with due regard for all circumstances. Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its passengers
so obligates it not only during the course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its
premises and where they ought to be in pursuance to the contract of carriage.

Same; Same; Same; Instances when a common carrier becomes liable for death of or injury to
passengers.—The statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or injury to
passengers (a) through the negligence or willful acts of its employees or b) on account of willful acts or
negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the common carrier’s employees through the exercise
of due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or omission. Light Rail Transit Authority vs.
Navidad, 397 SCRA 75, G.R. No. 145804 February 6, 2003

Same; Same; Same; As common carriers, the Fabres were bound to exercise “extraordinary diligence”
for the safe transportation of the passengers to their destination.—As common carriers, the Fabres were
bound to exercise “extraordinary diligence” for the safe transportation of the passengers to their
destination. This duty of care is not excused by proof that they exercised the diligence of a good father
of the family in the selection and supervision of their employee.

Fabre, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 259 SCRA 426, G.R. No. 111127 July 26, 1996

Common Carriers; Customs Brokers; A customs broker is a common carrier—the concept of “common
carrier” under Article 1732 of the Civil Code may be seen to coincide nearly with the notion of “public
service,” under the Public Service Act (Commonwealth Act No. 1416) which at least partially
supplements the law on common carriers set forth in the Civil Code.—Petitioner contends that contrary
to the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, she is not a common carrier but a private
carrier because, as a customs broker and warehouseman, she does not indiscriminately hold her
services out to the public but only offers the same to select parties with whom she may contract in the
conduct of her business. The contention has no merit. In De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, the Court
dismissed a similar contention and held the party to be a common carrier, thus—The Civil Code defines
“common carriers” in the following terms: “Article 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations,
firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by
land, water, or air for compensation, offering their services to the public.” The above article makes no
distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both,
and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity . . . Article 1732 also carefully avoids making
any distinction between a person

______________

* SECOND DIVISION.

511

VOL. 379, MARCH 19, 2002

511

Calvo vs. UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc.

or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such
service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a
carrier offering its services to the “general public,” i.e., the general community or population, and one
who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population. We think
that Article 1732 deliberately refrained from making such distinctions. So understood, the concept of
“common carrier” under Article 1732 may be seen to coincide neatly with the notion of “public service,”
under the Public Service Act (Commonwealth Act No. 1416, as amended) which at least partially
supplements the law on common carriers set forth in the Civil Code.

Same; Same; There is greater reason for holding a person who is a customs broker to be a common
carrier because the transportation of goods is an integral part of her business.—There is greater reason
for holding petitioner to be a common carrier because the transportation of goods is an integral part of
her business. To uphold petitioner’s contention would be to deprive those with whom she contracts the
protection which the law affords them notwithstanding the fact that the obligation to carry goods for
her customers, as already noted, is part and parcel of petitioner’s business.

Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Extraordinary Diligence,” Explained; Common carriers, from the
nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in
the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all
the circumstances of such case.—As to petitioner’s liability, Art. 1733 of the Civil Code provides:
Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to
observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers
transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case. . . . In Compania Maritima v. Court
of Appeals, the meaning of “extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over goods” was explained thus: The
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods tendered for shipment requires the common
carrier to know and to follow the required precaution for avoiding damage to, or destruction of the
goods entrusted to it for sale, carriage and delivery. It requires common carriers to render service with
the greatest skill and foresight and “to use all reasonable means to ascertain the nature and
characteristic of goods tendered for shipment, and to exercise due care in the handling and stowage,
including such methods as their nature requires.”

Calvo vs. UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc., 379 SCRA 510, G.R. No. 148496 March 19, 2002

Common Carriers; Definition of; Art. 1732 of the Civil Code makes no distinctions between a person or
enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and such service on an
occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis.—The Civil Code defines “common carriers” in the following
terms: “Article 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms, or associations engaged in the
business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air for
compensation, offering their services to the public.” The above article makes no distinction between one
whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such
carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local idiom, as “a sideline”). Article 1732 also carefully avoids
making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or
scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither
does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the “general public,” i.e., the
general community or population, and one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow
segment of the general population. We think that Article 1733 deliberately refrained from making such
distinctions.

________________

* THIRD DIVISION.

613

VOL. 168, DECEMBER 22, 1988

613

De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals

Same; Same; Same; The concept of “common carrier” under Art. 1732 coincides with the notion of
“Public Service” under the Public Service Act (CA No. 1416).—So understood, the concept of “common
carrier” under Article 1732 may be seen to coincide neatly with the notion of “public service,” under the
Public Service Act (Commonwealth Act No. 1416, as amended) which at least partially supplements the
law on common carriers set forth in the Civil Code. Under Section 13, paragraph (b) of the Public Service
Act, “public service” includes: “x x x every person that now or hereafter may own, operate, manage, or
control in the Philippines, for hire or compensation, with general or limited clientele, whether
permanent, occasional or accidental, and done for general business purposes, any common carrier,
railroad, street railway, traction railway, subway motor vehicle, either for freight or passenger, or both,
with or without fixed route and whatever may be its classification, freight or carrier service of any class,
express service, steamboat, or steamship line, pontines, ferries and water craft, engaged in the
transportation of passengers or freight or both, shipyard, marine repair shop, wharf or dock, ice plant,
ice-refrigeration plant, canal, irrigation system, gas, electric light, heat and power, water supply and
power petroleum, sewerage system, wire or wireless communications systems, wire or wireless
broadcasting stations and other similar public services. x x x.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; A certificate of public convenience is not a requisite for the incurring of
liability under the Civil Code provisions governing common carriers.—The Court of Appeals referred to
the fact that private respondent held no certificate of public convenience, and concluded he was not a
common carrier. This is palpable error. A certificate of public convenience is not a requisite for the
incurring of liability under the Civil Code provisions governing common carriers. That liability arises the
moment a person or firm acts as a common carrier, without regard to whether or not such carrier has
also complied with the requirements of the applicable regulatory statute and implementing regulations
and has been granted a certificate of public convenience or other franchise. To exempt private
respondent from the liabilities of a common carrier because he has not secured the necessary certificate
of public convenience, would be offensive to sound public policy; that would be to reward private
respondent precisely for failing to comply with applicable statutory requirements. The business of a
common carrier impinges directly and intimately upon the safety and well being and property of those
members of the general community who happen to deal with such carrier. The law imposes duties and
liabilities upon common carriers for the safety and protection of those who utilize their services and the
law cannot allow a common carrier to render such duties and liabilities merely facultative by simply
failing to obtain the necessary permits and authorizations.

Same; Same; Same; Liability of common carriers in case of loss, destruction or deterioration or
destruction of goods they carry; Extraordinary diligence, required; Exceptions.—Common carriers, “by
the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy,” are held to a very high degree of care and
diligence (“extraordinary diligence”) in the carriage of goods as well as of passengers. The specific
import of extraordinary diligence in the care of goods transported by a common carrier is, according to
Article 1733, “further expressed in Articles 1734, 1735 and 1745, numbers 5, 6 and 7” of the Civil Code.
Article 1734 establishes the general rule that common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction
or deterioration of the goods which they carry, “unless the same is due to any of the following causes
only: (1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity; (2) Act of the public
enemy in war, whether international or civil; (3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
(4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers; and (5) Order or act of
competent public authority.” It is important to point out that the above list of causes of loss, destruction
or deterioration which exempt the common carrier for responsibility therefor, is a closed list. Causes
falling outside the foregoing list, even if they appear to constitute a species of force majeure, fall within
the scope of Article 1735.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The hijacking of the carriers truck does not fall within any of the five
(5) categories of exempting causes in Art. 1734.—Applying the above-quoted Articles 1734 and 1735, we
note firstly that the specific cause alleged in the instant case—the hijacking of the carrier’s truck—does
not fall within any of the five (5) categories of exempting causes listed in Article 1734. It would follow,
therefore, that the hijacking of the carrier’s vehicle must be dealt with under the provisions of Article
1735, in other words, that the private respondent as common carrier is presumed to have been at fault
or to have acted negligently. This presumption, however, may be overthrown by proof of extraordinary
diligence on the part of private respondent.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Under Art. 1745(6), a common carrier is held responsible even for acts
of strangers like thieves or robbers except where such thieves or robbers acted “with grave or
irresistible threat, violence or force.”—As noted earlier, the duty of extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance over goods is, under Article 1733, given additional specification not only by Articles 1734 and
1735 but also by Article 1745, numbers 4, 5 and 6. Article 1745 provides in relevant part: “Any of the
following or similar stipulations shall be considered unreasonable, unjust and contrary to public policy:
xxx xxx xxx (5) that the common carrier shall not be responsible for the acts or omissions of his or its
employees; (6) that the common carrier’s liability for acts committed by thieves, or of robbers who do
not act with grave or irresistible threat, violence or force, is dispensed with or diminished; and (7) that
the common carrier shall not responsible for the loss, destruction or deterioration of goods on account
of the defective condition of the car, vehicle, ship, airplane or other equipment used in the contract of
carriage.” Under Article 1745 (6) above, a common carrier is held responsible and will not be allowed to
divest or to diminish such responsibility—even for acts of strangers like thieves or robbers, except where
such thieves or robbers in fact acted “with grave or irresistible threat, violence or force.” We believe and
so hold that the limits of the duty of extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods carried are
reached where the goods are lost as a result of a robbery which is attended by “grave or irresistible
threat, violence or force.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Common carriers are not made absolute insurers against all risks of
travel and of transport of goods and are not liable for fortuitous events; Case at bar.—In these
circumstances, we hold that the occurrence of the loss must reasonably be regarded as quite beyond
the control of the common carrier and properly regarded as a fortuitous event. It is necessary to recall
that even common carriers are not made absolute insurers against all risks of travel and of transport of
goods, and are not held liable for acts or events which cannot be foreseen or are inevitable, provided
that they shall have complied with the rigorous standard of extraordinary diligence. We, therefore,
agree with the result reached by the Court of Appeals that private respondent Cendaña is not liable for
the value of the undelivered merchandise which was lost because of an event entirely beyond private
respondent’s control. De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals, 168 SCRA 612, No. L-47822 December 22, 1988

Civil Law; Common Carriers defined.—Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines a common carrier as “(a)
person, corporation or firm, or association engaged in the business of carrying or transporting
passengers or goods or both, by land, water or air, for compensation, offering their services to the
public.” The test to determine a common carrier is “whether the given undertaking is a part of the
business engaged in by the carrier which he has held out to the general public as his occupation rather
than the quantity or extent of the business transacted.” In this case, petitioner herself has made the
admission that she was in the trucking business, offering her trucks to those with cargo to move. Judicial
admissions are conclusive and no evidence is required to prove the same.

Same; Same; No distinction between person offering service on regular basis and one offering service on
occasional basis.—But petitioner argues that there was only a contract of lease because they offer their
services only to a select group of people and because the private respondents, plaintiffs in the lower
court, did not object to the presentation of affidavits by petitioner where the transaction was referred
to as a lease contract. Regarding the first contention, the holding of the Court in De Guzman vs. Court of
Appeals is instructive. In referring to Article 1732 of the Civil Code, it held thus: “The above article makes
no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both,
and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local idiom, as a “sideline”). Article 1732
also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation
service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or
unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the
“general public,” i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers services or solicits
business only from a narrow segment of the general population. We think that Article 1732 deliberately
refrained from making such distinctions.”
Same; Same; Obligation of carrier to observe extraordinary diligence; Presumption of negligence.—
Common carriers are obliged to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods
transported by them. Accordingly, they are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently
if the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated. There are very few instances when the presumption of
negligence does not attach and these instances are enumerated in Article 1734. In those cases where
the presumption is applied, the common carrier must prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence in
order to overcome the presumption.

Same; Same; Same; Liability arising from hijacking.—To exculpate the carrier from liability arising from
hijacking, he must prove that the robbers or the hijackers acted with grave or irresistible threat,
violence, or force. This is in accordance with Article 1745 of the Civil Code which provides: “Art. 1745.
Any of the following or similar stipulations shall be considered unreasonable, unjust and contrary to
public policy: x x x x x x (6) That the common carrier’s liability for acts committed by thieves, or of
robbers who do not act with grave or irresistible threat, violence or force, is dispensed with or
diminished.” Bascos vs. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 318, G.R. No. 101089 April 7, 1993

Transportation; Common Carriers; A trucking company which is an exclusive contractor and hauler of
another company, rendering or offering its services to no other individual or entity, cannot be
considered a common carrier.—On the first issue, the Court finds the conclusion of the trial court and
the Court of Appeals to be amply justified. GPS, being an exclusive contractor and hauler of Concepcion
Industries, Inc., rendering or offering its services to no other individual or entity, cannot be considered a
common carrier. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the
business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for hire or
compensation, offering their services to the public, whether to the public in general or to a limited
clientele in particular, but never on an exclusive basis. The true test of a common carrier is the carriage
of passengers or goods, providing space for those who opt to avail themselves of its transportation
service for a fee. Given accepted standards, GPS scarcely falls within the term “common carrier.” FGU
Insurance Corporation vs. G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation, 386 SCRA 312, G.R. No. 141910 August
6, 2002