Case digest Property regime in Marriage

99.
​Salas, Jr., v Aguila,
G.R. No. 202370, SEP 23 2013

Doctrine: Courts can order partition upon determination as to the

existence of a co-ownership. Thus, in relation to Art. 147 FC, partition is
applicable to those property acquired during the marriage between a man
and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or
under a void marriage. It is because those property is prima facie
presumed governed by the rules on co-ownership.

Facts: ​In 1985, Juan S. Salas, Jr. and Eden V. Aguila were married. In
2003, Aguila filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage citing
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. In 2007, The
RTC rendered a Decision declaring the nullity of their marriage with
provision for the dissolution of their acquired properties during marriage.

Aguila manifested to the court to dissolve the properties which she

discovered in Quezon City and Manila. The TCTs of the discovered
properties were entered on 2 July 1999 and 29 September 2003 under the
name of Juan S. Salas. The RTC ordered the partition of the discovered
properties. Salas opposed the manifestation.

Issue:​ Is the order of partition tenable?

Ruling: ​Yes, the order of partition is tenable.

In Lacbayan v. Samoy, Jr., G.R. No. 165427, 21 March 2011, Court can
order partition upon determination as to the existence of a co-ownership.
Thus, based on Art. 147 of the Family Code, partition is applicable to those
property acquired during the marriage between a man and a woman who
are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage
because those property is prima facie presumed governed by the rules on
co-ownership as held in Mercado-Fehr v. Bruno Fehr, 460 Phil.445 (2003).

Here, since The TCTs of the Discovered Properties were entered on 2

July 1999 and 29 September 2003, or during the validity of Salas and
Aguila’s marriage. Hence, applying the regime of property of spouses’
marriage nullified due to psychological incapacity. The discovered
properties are prima facie presumed governed by the rules on
co-ownership.

Therefore, the order of partition is tenable since co-ownership over

the discovered properties exist between former spouses.

100.
Barrido v. Nonato,
G.R. No. 176492, October 20, 2014

Doctrine: ​Art. 129 FC which is the rules of liquidation of property regimes

recognized for valid and voidable marriages, are irrelevant to Art. 147 FC
which is the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between
common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages.

Facts: ​Nonato and Barrido’s marriage was declared void on the ground of
psychological incapacity. Nonato asked Barrido for partition, but the latter
refused. Nonato filed the complaint for partition. The MTCC granted it. On
appeal, the RTC modified it applying Art. 129 FC. Then the CA modified it
further applying Art. 147 instead of Art. 129 FC.

Issue: ​Which provision of the Family Code was applicable to the property
regime, Art. 129 or Art 147?

Ruling: ​Art. 147 FC was applicable to the property regime.

In Valdes v. RTC (1996),​ Art. 129 FC which is the rules of

liquidation of property regimes recognized for valid and voidable
marriages, are irrelevant to Art. 147 FC which is the liquidation of the
co-ownership that exists between common-law spouses or spouses of void
marriages.

101.
​People v. XXX
GR 240441, Dec. 4, 2019

Doctrine: ​The best evidence of step-father and step-daughter relationship

is the marriage contract. This stricter requirement is only proper as such a
relationship is an aggravating circumstance that increases the imposable
penalty and hence must be proven by competent evidence.

Common-law spouse and step-parent are distinct terms bearing different

legal meanings.

Facts: ​XXX was charged and convicted with violation of sec 5 (b), Article
III of R.A. No. 7610, Statutory Rape, and Rape under Article 266-A,
paragraph 1(d) of the RPC. XXX is the common law spouse of AAA’s
mother. The Informations allege that XXX was the stepfather of AAA as she
referred XXX as her step-father. The prosecution was establishing the
qualified aggravating circumstance of relation as step-father and
step-daughter. The CA does not agree to the prosecution.

Issue: ​Is XXX the stepfather of AAA?

Ruling: ​No. XXX is not the stepfather of AAA.

In People v. Abello, the best evidence of step-father and

step-daughter relationship is the marriage contract. This stricter
requirement is only proper as such a relationship is an aggravating
circumstance that increases the imposable penalty and hence must be
proven by competent evidence. Common-law spouse and step-parent are
distinct terms bearing different legal meanings.
 Here, the absence of competent evidence of, XXX as stepfather
shall not be used against him.

102.
Belcodero v. CA 227 SCRA 303
G.R. No. 89667 October 20, 1993

Doctrine: Art. 144 of the Civil Code (even Article 147 and Article 148 of
the Family Code) about rules of co-ownership cannot apply since it is
repudiated when either or both spouses suffered from an impediment to
marry. The applicable provision is under both the new Civil Code (Article
160) and the old Civil Code (Article 1407), "​all property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." Hence, property title
named to the second spouse under marriage with legal impediment
created by operation of law such implied trust.

Facts: In 1927, The husband Alayo married Juliana. In 1946, he left the
conjugal home, and he forthwith started to live instead with Josefa Rivera
with whom he later begot one child, named Josephine Bosing, now
Josephine Balcobero (petitioner). Alayo purchased a parcel of land. In
1958, Alayo married Josefa. In 1967, Alayo died. Josefa and Josephine
executed a document of extrajudicial partition of the lot in question. In
1980, Juliana filed an action for reconveyance. The court grant the
reconveyance. However, Balcobero appealed.

Issue: ​Were Art. 144 of the CC, Art. 147 and 148 FC the property regime?

Ruling: ​No.​ ​Art 144 of the CC​, ​Art. 147 and 148 FC were not the property
regime but conjugal partnership, (in the Family Code absolute Community
Property)
 In Jeroniza vs Jose, Art. 144 of the Civil Code (even Article 147 and Article
148 of the Family Code) about rules of co-ownership cannot apply since it
is repudiated when either or both spouses suffered from an impediment to
marry. The applicable provision is under both the new Civil Code (Article
160) and the old Civil Code (Article 1407), "​all property​ of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." Hence, property title
named to the second spouse under marriage with legal impediment
created by operation of law such implied trust.

103.
Agapay vs Agapay (Palang*)
276 SCRA 340

Doctrine: ​As to the property regime:

Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties
through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall
be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. If the actual contribution of the party is not proved, there
will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.

As to the allegation of property ownership exist prior cohabitation of

spouses with legal impediment marriage:

Even assuming that the subject property was bought before cohabitation,
the rules of co-ownership would still apply and proof of actual contribution
would still be essential.

Facts: ​Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage in 1949 to Carlina

Palang, respondent and his second marriage in 1973 to Erlinda Agapay,
petitioner. A Transfer Certificate of Title covering a rice land was issued to
Miguel and Erlinda not later than 1973. In 1981 Miguel died. Carlina
instituted an action for recovery of ownership and possession of the
riceland Binalonan, Pangasinan. ​Petitioner claims that the riceland was
bought two months before Miguel and Erlinda actually cohabited.
Issue: ​Did Erlinda own the riceland?

Ruling:

As to the property regime:

Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties
through their ​actual joint contribution of money, property or industry​ shall
be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. ​If the actual contribution of the party is not proved,​ ​there
will be no co-ownership ​and no presumption of equal shares.

As to the allegation of property ownership exist prior cohabitation of

spouses with legal impediment marriage:

Even assuming that the subject property was bought before cohabitation,
the rules of co-ownership would still apply and proof of actual contribution
would still be essential.

Here, since no actual proof of contributed money to buy the riceland,

Erlinda did not own the riceland.

104.
Tumlos vs. Sps. Fernandez
G.R. No. 137650, Apr 12, 2000

Doctrine: ​Agapay v. Palang (1997) doctrine

Facts: ​Mario and Lourdes Fernandez filed an action for ejectment against
Guillerma Tumlos. The MTC granted it. Upon Appeal to the RTC, Tumlos
alleged that she and Mario Fernandez had an amorous relationship, and
that they acquired the property in question as their "love nest.

Issue: ​Did Tumlos co-own the property?

Ruling: No. ​Tumlos did not co-own the property.

In Agapay v. Palang (1997), Under Article 148, only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. If the actual contribution of
the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption
of equal shares.

Here, since no actual proof of contributed money to acquire the property,

Tumlos did not own the property.

105.
Atienza vs.de Castro
G.R. No. 1695698, Nov. 29, 2006

Doctrine: ​Agapay v. Palang (1997) doctrine

Facts: ​Petitioner Atienza, then the President and General Manager of

Enrico Shipping Corporation and Eurasian Maritime Corporation, hired the
services of respondent Yolanda U. De Castro as accountant for the two
corporations.

In the course of time, the relationship between Atienza and De Castro

became intimate. Despite Lupo being a married man, he and Yolanda
eventually lived together in consortium beginning the later part of 1983.
Out of their union, two children were born. However, after the birth of their
second child, their relationship turned sour until they parted ways.

Atienza filed in the RTC a complaint against De Castro for the judicial
partition of a Makati property. He presented documents pertaining to the
ins and outs of the dollar accounts of the two corporation and their joint
bank account. De Castro presented the Contract to Sell, the Deed of
Assignment of Redemption and the Deed of Transfer, all entered into by
and between the respondent and the vendor of said property, to the
exclusion of Atienza.

Issue: ​Did Atienza co-own the property?

Ruling: ​No. Atienza did not co-own the property.

In Agapay v. Palang,1997, Under Article 148, only the properties acquired

by both of the parties through their ​actual joint contribution of money,
property or industry​ shall be owned by them in common in proportion to
their respective contributions. ​If the actual contribution of the party is not
proved​, ​there will be no co-ownership a ​ nd no presumption of equal shares.
Also, in Luxuria Homes v. CA 1999, the burden of proof rests upon the
party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case,
asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent
evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the party’s own
evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense.

Here, The facts pertaining to the ins and outs of the dollar accounts of the
two corporation and their joint bank account do not prove that the money
she used in buying the disputed property came from said withdrawals.
Atienza failed to prove his actual contribution in the purchase of the said
property. The documentary evidence of Contract to Sell, the Deed of
Assignment of Redemption and the Deed of Transfer, all entered into by
and between the respondent and the vendor of said property, to the
exclusion of Atienza make it more burdensome to him to prove actual
contribution.

Therefore, Atienza did not co-own the property.

106.
Signey v. SSS
GR No. 173582, Jan. 28, 2008
Doctrine: ​Based on Section 8(e) of R. A. No. 8282, a surviving spouse
claiming death benefits as a dependent must be the legal spouse.

Facts: ​Rodolfo Signey, a member of the SSS, died in 2001. In his

member’s records, he had designated Yolanda Signey (petitioner) as
primary beneficiary and his four children with her as secondary
beneficiaries. Petitioner filed a claim for death benefits with the public
respondent SSS. She revealed in her SSS claim that the deceased had a
common-law wife, Gina Servano, with whom he had two minor children
namey, Ginalyn Servano, and Rodelyn Signey. The SSS found that the
March 20 1992 marriage between Yolanda and the deceased Rodolfo was
null and void because of a prior subsisting marriage contracted on October
29, 1967 between the deceased and Editha. Thus, The SSS denied the
death benefit claim of the petitioner. However, it recognized Ginalyn and
Rodelyn, the minor children of the deceased with Gina, as the primary
beneficiaries under the SSS Law.

Issue: ​Was Yolanda disqualified to be a beneficiary?

Ruling: ​Yes, Yolanda is disqualified to be a beneficiary.

Based on Section 8(e) of R. A. No. 8282, a surviving spouse claiming death

benefits as a dependent must be the legal spouse.

Here, since marriage between Yolanda and the deceased Rodolfo was null
and void because of a prior subsisting marriage contracted on 29 October
1967 between the deceased and Editha,, Yolanda is not the legal spouse.

Therefore, Yolanda is disqualified to be a beneficiary.

107.
Borromeo v. Descallar
GR No. 159310, Feb. 24, 2009
Doctrine:​ Factual application of Art. 128 FC.

Facts:

Jambrich, an Austrian, arrived in the Philippines in 1983 fell in love with

Descallar and decided to live together. Respondent Decallar was still legally
married to another when she and Jambrich lived together.

Jambrich was gainfully employed at Simmering-Graz Panker A.G., an

Austrian company. He was earning an estimated monthly salary of
₱50,000.00. Then, Jambrich was assigned to Syria for almost one year
where his monthly salary was approximately ₱90,000.00.

The DSWD Child Study Report for the adoption of her children by
Jambirch, before Decallar met Jambrich, she was only working as a
waitress at the St. Moritz Hotel with an income of ₱1,000.00 a month and
was living only in at a squatter area; that Jambrich took pity of her and the
situation of her children that he offered her a better life which she readily
accepted.

A Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 16, 1987 was likewise issued to
Jambrich and Descallar. However, when the Deed of Absolute Sale was
presented for registration before the Register of Deeds, registration was
refused on the ground that Jambrich was an alien and could not acquire
alienable lands of the public domain. Consequently, Jambrich’s name was
erased from the document. But it could be noted that his signature
remained on the left hand margin of page 1, beside respondent’s signature
as buyer on page 3, and at the bottom of page 4 which is the last page.
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 24790, 24791 and 24792 over the
Agro-Macro properties were issued in Descallar’s name alone.Jambrich and
Descallar relationship lasted only until April 1991. The properties are worth
more than ₱700,000.00.

Jambrich purchased an engine for his boat from petitioner Borromeo, for
which he became indebted to the latter for about ₱150,000.00. To pay for
his debt, he sold his rights and interests in the Agro-Macro properties to
petitioner for ₱250,000. On July 2, 1991, when the petitioner sought to
register the deed of assignment, he discovered that titles to the three lots
have been transferred in the name of respondent. On August 2, 1991,
petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for recovery of real
property before the RTC. Petitioner alleged that the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated November 16, 1987 over the properties which identified both
Jambrich and respondent as buyers do not reflect the true agreement of
the parties since respondent did not pay a single centavo of the purchase
price and was not in fact a buyer; that it was Jambrich alone who paid for
the properties using his exclusive funds; that Jambrich was the real and
absolute owner of the properties; and, that petitioner acquired absolute
ownership by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment dated July
11, 1991 which Jambrich executed in his favor.

Issue:​ Did respondent present sufficient proof that she contributed to the
purchase of the subject property in accordance with Art. 148 FC?

Ruling: ​No. Respondent did not present sufficient proof that she
contributed to the purchase of the subject property in accordance with Art.
148 FC.

At the time of the acquisition of the properties in 1985 to 1986, Jambrich

was gainfully employed at Simmering-Graz Panker A.G., an Austrian
company. He was earning an estimated monthly salary of ₱50,000.00.
Then, Jambrich was assigned to Syria for almost one year where his
monthly salary was approximately ₱90,000.00.

On the other hand, before Decallar met Jambrich, she was only working as
a waitress at the St. Moritz Hotel with an income of ₱1,000.00 a month and
was living only in at a squatter area; that Jambrich took pity of her and the
situation of her children that he offered her a better life which she readily
accepted.

It is highly improbable that she could acquire the properties under

litigation or could contribute any amount for their acquisition which was
worth more than ₱700,000.00 when while she was working as a waitress at
St. Moritz Hotel earning ₱1,000.00 a month as salary and tips of more or
less ₱2,000.00 she could not even provide for the daily needs of her family
so much so that it is safe to conclude that she was really in financial
distress when she met and accepted the offer of Jambrich to come and live
with him because that was a big financial opportunity for her and her
children who were already abandoned by her husband.

Therefore, the respondent did not present sufficient proof that she
contributed to the purchase of the subject property in accordance with Art.
148 FC.

108.
Heirs of Maramag v. De Guzman
GR 181132, June 5, 2009

Doctrine: ​The shares of a concubine in the insurance proceeds, whether

forfeited by the court in view of the prohibition on donations under Article
739 of the Civil Code or by the insurers themselves for reasons based on
the insurance contracts, must be awarded to the designated beneficiaries,
to the exclusion of the legal heirs. It is only in cases where the insured has
not designated any beneficiary or when the designated beneficiary is
disqualified by law to receive the proceeds, that the insurance policy
proceeds shall redound to the benefit of the estate of the insured.

Facts: A petition filed against respondents with the RTC for revocation of
insurance proceeds from Insular life and Grepalife. The petitioners were
the legitimate wife and children of Loreto Maramag (Loreto), while
respondents were Loreto’s illegitimate family; (2) Eva de Guzman
Maramag (Eva) was a concubine. Petitioner argument is that the insurance
proceed for Eva who was a concubine should be their claim as based on
Article 2012 of the CC, any person who is forbidden from receiving any
donation under article 739 cannot be named beneficiary of a life insurance
policy by the person who cannot make any donation to him, according to
said article.

Issue: ​Could the legal heir claim the forfeited share of Eva as a concubine
under Article 2012?

Ruling: ​No. The legal heir could not claim the forfeited share of Eva as a
concubine under Article 2012.
 The shares of a concubine in the insurance proceeds, whether forfeited by
the court in view of the prohibition on donations under Article 739 of the
Civil Code or by the insurers themselves for reasons based on the
insurance contracts, must be awarded to the designated beneficiaries, to
the exclusion of the legal heirs. It is only in cases where the insured has
not designated any beneficiary according to Vda. de Consuegra v.
Government Service Insurance System (1971), or when the designated
beneficiary is disqualified by law to receive the proceeds according to
Insular Life v. Ebrado (1977), that the insurance policy proceeds shall
redound to the benefit of the estate of the insured.

Here, since there was a designated beneficiaries, the forfeited share must
be awarded to the designated beneficiaries to the exclusion of the legal
heirs.

109.
Lacbayan v Samoy
GR 165427, March 21, 2013

Doctrine: ​Factual application of Art. 148 FC

Facts: ​Despite Samoy being already married, his relationship with

Lacbayan developed until Lacbayan gave birth to the respondent's son on
October 12, 1979. During their illicit relationship, petitioner and
respondent, together with three more incorporators, were able to establish
a manpower services company and acquired parcels of land. their
relationship turned sour and they decided to part ways. They decided to a
partition agreement but later disagreed with their demands. Petitioner filed
a complaint for partition. The Petitioner admitted that the properties were
acquired not from her own personal funds but from the income of the
manpower services company over which she owns a measly 3.33% share.

Issue: ​Were the properties involved were not acquired by the petitioner
through her actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry in
accordance with Art. 148 FC?
Ruling: ​No. The properties involved were not acquired by the petitioner
through her actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry in
accordance with Art. 148 of FC.

The RTC decided to give considerable weight to petitioner’s own admission

that the properties were acquired not from her own personal funds but
from the income of the manpower services company over which she owns
a measly 3.33% share.

110.
Go- Bangayan v Bangayan
G.R. No. 201061, July 3, 2013

Doctrine: ​Art. 148 of FC is the property regime of those who cohabitate

without the benefit of marriage and either or both are already married.

Facts: ​In 1973, Benjamin Bangayan married Azucena. In 1979, Benjamin

developed a romantic relationship with Sally Go-Bangayan (Sally) who was
a customer in the auto parts and supplies business owned by Benjamin’s
family. In December 1981, Azucena left for the United States of America.
In February 1982, Benjamin and Sally lived together as husband and wife.
Sally’s father was against the relationship. In 1982, in order to appease
her father, Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City
where they signed a purported marriage contract. Sally, knowing
Benjamin’s marital status, assured him that the marriage contract would
not be registered. The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994
when Sally left for Canada,

In 2004, Benjamin filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and

partition in accordance with Art. 148 before the RTC.

Issue: ​Was Art. 148 FC the property regime?

Ruling: ​Yes. Art. 148 FC was the property regime.

Art. 148 FC is the property regime of those who cohabitate without the
benefit of marriage and either or both are already married.

Here, since Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage
and Benjamin was already married.

111.
Lavadia vs. Heirs of Luna
G.R. No. 171914, July 23, 2014

Doctrine: Factual application of Art. 148 FC

Facts: Atty. Luna married Eugenia in 1947. Both live apart since 1966.
ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with EUGENIA and
contracted another marriage with SOLEDAD from Dominican Republic in
1976.

A Memorandum of Agreement and the Deed of Absolute Sale involving a

lawfirm condominium units signed by Atty. Luna and his partner in 1978.
The Condominium titles were in the name of JUAN LUCES married to
Soledad L. Luna

ATTY. JUAN died in 1997. According to his heirs, Atty. Luna has a loan to
Banco Filipino paid by a check issued on April 29, 1978 in the amount of
₱97,588.89.

The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in a condominium unit as well

as the law books, office furniture and equipment became the subject of the
complaint filed by SOLEDAD against the heirs of ATTY. JUAN with the RTC.

Soledad claimed that 4 checks were indeed used for the acquisition of the
share of ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit, to wit:

1. The first check for ₱55,000.00 payable to Atty. Teresita Cruz Sison
was issued on January 27, 1977.
2. Second check issued on April 29, 1978 in the amount of ₱97,588.89,
was payable to Banco Filipino.
 3. The third check which was for ₱49,236.00 payable to PREMEX was
dated May 19, 1979.
4. The fourth check for ₱4,072.00 was dated December 17, 1980.

Issue: Did Soledad discharge her burden of proof on the co-ownership?

Ruling: No. Soledad did not discharge her burden of proof on the
co-ownership.

She failed to establish that the four (4) checks that she presented were
indeed used for the acquisition of the share of ATTY. LUNA in the
condominium unit, to wit:

5. The first check for ₱55,000.00 payable to Atty. Teresita Cruz Sison
was issued on January 27, 1977, which was 13 months before the
Memorandum of Agreement, was signed.
6. Second check issued on April 29, 1978 in the amount of ₱97,588.89,
was payable to Banco Filipino. According to the plaintiff, this was in
payment of the loan of Atty. Luna.
7. The third check which was for ₱49,236.00 payable to PREMEX was
dated May 19, 1979, also for payment of the loan of Atty. Luna.
8. The fourth check for ₱4,072.00 was dated December 17, 1980. None
of the foregoing prove that the amounts delivered by plaintiff to the
payees were for the acquisition of the subject condominium unit.

The Deed of Absolute Sale covering the condominium unit was in the name
of Atty. Luna, together with his partners in the law firm. The name of
Soledad did not appear as vendee or as the spouse of Atty. Luna. The
same was acquired for the use of the Law firm of Atty. Luna.

The fact that the condominium titles were in the name of "JUAN LUCES
LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna" was no proof that SOLEDAD was a
co-owner of the condominium unit. Acquisition of title and registration
thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that registration does not
confer title but merely confirms one already existing. The phrase "married
to" preceding "Soledad L. Luna" is merely descriptive of the civil status of
ATTY. LUNA.
SOLEDAD, the second wife, was not even a lawyer. So it is but logical that
SOLEDAD had no participation in the law firm or in the purchase of books
for the law firm. SOLEDAD failed to prove that she had anything to
contribute and that she actually purchased or paid for the law office
amortization and for the law books. It is more logical to presume that it
was ATTY. LUNA who bought the law office space and the law books from
his earnings from his practice of law rather than embarrassingly beg or ask
from SOLEDAD money for use of the law firm that he headed.

112.
Banguis-Tambuyat v. Balcom-Tambuyat,
G.R. No. 202805 March 23, 2015

Doctrine: ​Factual application of Art. 148 FC

Facts: ​Adriano Tambuyat and respondent Wenifreda Balcom-Tambuyat

were married in 1965. During their marriage, Adriano acquired several real
properties in Bulacan in 1991. The deed of sale over the said property was
signed by Adriano alone as vendee; one of the signing witnesses to the
deed of sale was petitioner Banguis-Tambuyat, who signed therein as
Rosario Banguis. The TCT was made under the name of ADRIANO M.
TAMBUYAT married to ROSARIO E. BANGUIS.

All this time, petitioner Banguis remained married to Nolasco and Nolasco
was alive, and his marriage to Adriano subsisted and was never annulled.
In 1998, Adriano died intestate.

In 1999, ​Balcom-Tambuyat filed a Petition for Cancellation​13​of title, to the

RTC. She alleged therein that she was the surviving spouse of Adriano;
that the title was erroneously registered and made in the name of
“ADRIANO M. TAMBUYAT married to ROSARIO E. BANGUIS;”

Banguis claimed that she alone paid for the property using her own funds
and money borrowed from her sister. She acknowledged that Adriano is a
co-owner thereof.
Issue:​ Did Banguis present sufficient proof that she contributed to the
purchase of the subject property in accordance with Art. 148 FC?

Ruling: ​No. Banguis did not present sufficient proof that she contributed
to the purchase of the subject property in accordance with Art. 148 FC.

Here:
1. The deed of sale covering the subject property showed that Adriano
alone was the vendee;
2. while Banguis claimed that she alone paid for the property using her
own funds and money borrowed from her sister, she nonetheless
acknowledged that Adriano was a co-owner thereof, thus implying
that he contributed to its acquisition. Such contradictory statements
cast serious doubts on her claim;
Basically, if she were the sole purchaser of the property, it would only be
logical and natural for her to require that her name be placed on the deed
of sale as the vendee, and not as mere witness – which is what actually
occurred in this case. On the other hand, if Adriano contributed to its
purchase, Banguis would have required that her name be placed on the
deed as a co-vendee just the same.

Her failure to explain why – despite her claims that she is the purchaser of
the property – she allowed Adriano to be denominated as the sole vendee,
renders her claim of ownership doubtful. Where a party has the means in
his power of rebutting and explaining the evidence adduced against him, if
it does not tend to the truth, the omission to do so furnishes a strong
inference against him according to ​Medija v. Patcho​ (1984). One cannot
also ignore the principle that “the rules of evidence in the main are based
on experience, logic, and common sense according to ​People v. Toledo and
Holgado​ (1928).

113.
Fullido v Grilli
G.R. No. 215014, February 29, 2016

Doctrine: ​Factual application of PD No. 471 which provides that the

maximum period allowable for the duration of leases of private lands to
aliens shall be 25 years, renewable for another period of 25 years upon
mutual agreement of both lessor and lessee. ​Any contract or agreement
made or executed in violation thereof shall be null and void ab initio.

Below is a factual analysis of circumventing foreign lease limitation.

Facts: ​In 1995, Grilli and Fullido decided to have a common-law

relationship. They built a residential house upon financial assistance from
Grilli.

In 1998, Grilli and Fullido executed a contract of lease and a memorandum

of agreement (MOA) and SPA, to define their respective rights over the
house and lot. Among the disputed terms were, to wit:

1. Ownership of the land and the residential building resided with him.
2. Fullido was expressly prohibited from transferring the same without
Grilli's conformity.
3. Grilli would permanently reside in the residential building.
4. Grilli may capriciously dispose of Fullido's property once their
common-law relationship is terminated. This right was recently
exercised when the land was transferred to Guibone.
5. Fullido shall be compelled to transfer the land to Grilli if a law would
be passed allowing foreigners to own real properties in the
Philippines.

The lease contract was for a period of 50 years, to be automatically

renewed for another 50 years upon its expiration in the amount of
P10,000.00 for the ​whole term ​of the lease contract; and that Fullido as
the lessor, was prohibited from selling, donating, or encumbering the said
lot without the written consent of Grilli.

Their relationship turned sour. Grilli sent formal letters to Fullido

demanding that she vacate the property, but these were unheeded. Grilli
filed a complaint for unlawful detainer.

Issue: ​Were the lease contract and the MOA valid?

Ruling: ​The lease contract and the MOA were invalid.

 PD No. 471 provides that the maximum period allowable for the duration
of leases of private lands to aliens shall be 25 years, renewable for another
period of 25 years upon mutual agreement of both lessor and lessee.​ ​Any
contract or agreement made or executed in violation thereof shall be null
and void ab initio.

Here, from the contract, the lease in favor of Grilli was for a period of fifty
(50) years, automatically extended for another fifty (50) years upon the
expiration of the original period. Moreover, it strictly prohibited Fullido
from selling, donating, or encumbering her land to anyone without the
written consent of Grilli. For a measly consideration of PI 0,000.00, Grilli
would be able to absolutely occupy the land of Fullido for 100 years, and
she is powerless to dispose of the same.

Also, The dominion of Grilli over the land based on the MOA as it
reinforced Grilli's property rights over the land because:
1. It brazenly dictated that ownership of the land and the residential
building resided with him.
2. Fullido was expressly prohibited from transferring the same without
Grilli's conformity.
3. Grilli would permanently reside in the residential building.
4. Grilli may capriciously dispose of Fullido's property once their
common-law relationship is terminated. This right was recently
exercised when the land was transferred to Guibone; and
5. Fullido shall be compelled to transfer the land to Grilli if a law would
be passed allowing foreigners to own real properties in the
Philippines.

The term of lease for 100 years was obviously in excess of the allowable
periods under P.D. No. 471. Grilli had been empowered to deprive Fullido
of her land's possession, control, disposition and even its ownership. The
sum of rights which composes ownership of the property were effectively
transferred to Grilli who would safely enjoy the same for over a century.

The said contracts attempted to guise themselves as a lease, but a closer

scrutiny of the same revealed that they were intended to transfer the
dominion of a land to a foreigner in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution. Even if Fullido voluntarily executed the same, no
amount of consent from the parties could legalize an unconstitutional
agreement.

Thus, the lease contract and the MOA circumvent the constitutional
restraint against foreign ownership of lands.

Therefore the lease contract and the MOA is invalid.

The complaint for unlawful detainer was dismissed by lack of cause of

action due to the invalidity of the lease contract and the MOA.