Lomondot vs Balindong

Facts: this case is a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of writ of demolition seeking to
annul the order of the 4th judicial district of the Shariah District Court in Marawi City.

That Petitioners Omaira and Saripa Lomondot filed with the SDC Marawi a complaint for recovery of
possession and damages with prayer for mandatory injuction and TRO against respondents who illegally
entered 100sqm of their property. They claim that they are owners by succession of a 800sqm parcel of
land in marawi. The SDC ruled in favor of the sps. Lomondot on January 2005.

Respondents files an appeal before the SC but was dismissed. January 2005 order became final and
executory. However, said motion was held in abeyance twice due to sultan alioden’s involvement in
the negotiation and the defendant’s motion to re-survey the disputed land since the latter claim that
they have already complied with the January 2005 order and their buildings are not within the disputed
land.

The negotiation efforts became futile and Lomondot asked another writ of demolition, but the defendants
again opposed the said motion and prayed for another surveyance of the disputed land. By this reason, the
court denied lomondot’s motion for a writ of demolition. Lomondot filed for an MR but was denied.

Lomondot appealed before the CA but the CA dismissed the appeal due to the lack of jurisdiction because
the case emanates from the shariah courts which the CA cannot exercise their appellate
jurisdiction.

Issue: w/n Judge Lomondot exercised grave abuse of discretion and w/n the CA has the jurisdiction over
the appeal

Held: The CA don’t have the jurisdiction over the cases emanated from the SDC. The Shariah Appellate
coirt shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari and decisions of the shariah courts.
On the other, the SC found the SDC gravely abused its discretion when it denied Lomondot’s motion for
an issuance of writ of demolition. It is true that an execution of judgment may be postponed by a
supervening event. A supervening event consists of facts that transpire AFTER the judgment became
final and executory, including matters that the parties were not aware of prior to or during the trial
because such matters were not yet in existence at that time. In this case, the matter of whether
respondents’ houses intruded petitioners’ land is the issue in the recovery of possession compliant filed by
petitioners in the SDC which was already ruled upon, thus cannot be considered a supervening event that
would postpone an execution of judgment.

Mun. of Tangkal vs Balindong

Facts: Action for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus with prayer for a TRO.
The heirs of alompo, who are muslims, filed a complaint with the SDC of marawi against the mun. of
tangkal for recovery of possession and ownership of a parcel of land located in that said municipality.
Mun. of Tangkal filed a motion to dismiss the complaint upon the ground of improper venue and lack of
jurisdiction. It argued that the municipality has n religious affiliation and represents no cultural nor
ethnic tribe, hence, it cannot be considered muslim under muslim personal laws. Moreover, since the
complaint involves real action, it should have been filed in the RTC of Lanao del norte.

SDC denied Tangkal’s motion to dismiss. It held that since the mayor of Tangkal is a muslim, hence, the
court may take cognizance of the case. Tangkal filed an MR but was denied.

Issue: w/n SDC of marawi has jurisdiction in an action for possession for recovery filed by muslim
individuals against a municipality whose mayor is a muslim

Held: NO. SDC don’t have jurisdiction over the case. In this case, only one of the parties is a muslim,
and that is the defendants. The municipality of tangkal, through its mayor, even though the latter is a
muslim, cannot be considered as a “muslim” party. Mayor batingolo of tangkal was impleaded only in a
representative capacity, as chief executive of tangkal. When an action is defended by a representative,
that representative is not a real party in interest. The representative remains to ba a third party to the
action. Thus, mayor batingolo being a muslim is irrelevant for purposes of complying with the
jurisdictional requirement of SDC. Moreover, the municipality of tangal is a body politic. As a
government instrumentality, tangkal can only act for secular purposes consistent with the
constitutional rule of nonestablishment clause. Hence, mun. of tangkal is neither Christian and
muslim. The corporate personality of the municipality is separate from its officials. In order for the
SDC to exercise jurisdiction over a case, both parties must be muslims, and in this case, it is clear that the
mun. of tangkal cannot be classified as such.

DBP vs Carpio

Facts: Defendant Abad et al filed a complaint for delivery of cert of title, damages, atty fees and prayed
for a writ of seizure against DBP before the RTC. Abad et al alleged that their TCTs were submitted to
the DBP for safekeeping pursuant to the loan agreement they entered with DBP. The prayer for the writ
of seizure was accompanied by a bond for manual delivery of personal property issued by CBIC.
The RTC issued the writ of seizure.

DBP, however filed to dismiss the motion and to quash the writ of seizure upon the ground of improper
venue. Abad et filed a supplemental opposition and with it, they attached the delivery receipt showing
that they received from the court sheriff 228 TCTs from DBP-GFSME. The RTC granted DBP’s motion
and dismissed the case for improper venue on sept 2001. Afterwards, DBP filed a motion to order abad et
al to return titles to them. The RTC granted the motion.

Abad et al filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the RTC praying for the nullification of its
order to return the TCTs to DBP. The RTC dismissed the petition. DBP filed a motion for execution of
the sept 2001 order. However, abad et al failed to act on such.

Due to the non-delivery of the TCTs by abad et al, DBP filed a motion to call on plaintiff’s surety bond,
praying for the release of the bond issued by CBIC because of the failure to return the TCTs. The RTC
denied the motion upon the ground that the motion was no longer part of the court’s residual power.
it pointed out that although there was an order to return the TCTs. It was not a result of the trial, but a
consequence of the order of dismissal based on improper venue.

DBP appealed to the CA but the same was denied. it argued that damages against the bond must be filed
before the trial or before appeal was perfected or before the judgment became final and executory.

Issue: w/n the CA may take cognizance of the motion to call on the plaintiff’s surety bond

Held: no. the motion is premature because the prayer that is sought did not arise from the trial since there
was no trial to begin with. In this case, the trial was dismissed due to improper venue. Said dismissal was
without prejudice. A dismissal without prejudice has the effect, according to section 1(h) tule 41 of the
rules of court, that no appeal may be taken from an order dismissing an action without prejudice.
Before the RTC may exercise its residual jurisdiction if a trial on the merits have been conducted, the
court has rendered judgment therefrom, and an appeal was filed. In this case, no trial based on merits
happened because the trial was dismissed due to improper venue, a trial dismissed without prejudice.

Unduran vs Aberatsuri

Facts: petitioners maintain that it is the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), not the
regular courts, which has jurisdiction over disputes and controversies involving ancestral domain of the
Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs) and Indigenous Peoples (IPs) regardless of the parties involved.

Issue: w/n NCIP has the jurisdiction in this case

Held: No. pursuant to Section 66 of the Indigenous Peoples’ Right Act (IPRA), the National Commission
on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) shall have jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of
Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) only when they arise between or among
parties belonging to the same ICC/IP group. Primary jurisdiction is the power and authority vested by
the Constitution or by statute upon an administrative body to act upon a matter by virtue of its specific
competence.

Dalauta vs. LBP

Dalauta is an owner of an agricultural land in Butuan City. The land was placed by DAR under
compulsory acquisition of the CARP. Land Bank offered P192,782.59 as compensation for the land, but
Dalauta rejected such valuation for being too low. The case was referred to Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD) of Butuan City. the PARAD affirmed the valuation made by LBP. Dalauta filed a
petition for determination of just compensation with the RTC, sitting as SAC. SAC recommended that the
value of the land be pegged at P100,000.00 per hectare. Dalauta prayed that the compensation for his land
be pegged at P2.6M. The SAC ruled in favor of Dalauta.  LBP appealed to the CA contending that
PARAD’s decision sustaining the LBP valuation is final and SAC violated CARL and DAR A.O. No. 06-
92, in fixing the just compensation. The CA maintained Dalauta’s computation. 

Issue: w/n the trial court had properly taken jurisdiction over the case despite the finality of the PARAD's
Resolution.

Held: Yes. It is true that In agrarian reform cases, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR, more
specifically, in the DARAB (PARAD) if the case involves Agrarian Disputes. Also, EO 299 also
vested the DAR with (1) quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters; and
(2) jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform. However, the RTC,
sitting as SAC, is expressly granted by law with original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions
for the determination of just compensation to landowners. the valuation of property in eminent
domain is essentially a judicial function which cannot be vested in administrative agencies. The
executive department or the legislature may make the initial determination, but when a party claims a
violation of his rights, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall
prevail over the court’s findings. Since the determination of just compensation is a judicial function,
the SC must abandon its ruling that a petition for determination of just compensation before the
SAC shall be proscribed and adjudged dismissible if not filed within the 15-day period prescribed
under the DARAB Rules. Under Section 57 of R.A. No. 6657, (CARL) Congress expressly granted the
RTC, acting as SAC, the original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation to landowners. Considering that the payment of just compensation is an obligation created
by law, it should only be ten (10) years from the time the landowner received the notice of coverage in
accordance to art.1144 of the civil code. 

PCIA vs Schonfeld

Facts: Schonfeld is a Canadian citizen and a resident of Canada. He was employed before by PCIJ, a
subsidiary company of PPI. The president of PPI transmitted a letter of employment to schonfeld in
Canada. In that said letter, it is mentioned that any settlement, employment, and legal concerns “is
binding to both parties through written submission by the court of arbitration in London”
Schonfeld filed with PPI several money claims including unpaid salary, air fare, leave pay, etc. Schonfeld
then soon filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioners PPI and its president before the
Labor Arbiter.

PPI and its president filed for a motion to dismiss upon the ff grounds: 1. Labor arbiter has no jurisdiction
over the case and 2. Improper venue. They averred that by the principal of lex loci contractus, the
complaint should have been filed before their main office in Tokyo, Japan.

Labor arbiter and NLRC granted the motion of PPI and its president. Schonfeld appealed before the CA
and the CA reversed LA and NLRC ruling.

Issue: w/n the proper venue of the present complaint be under NLRC and not the court of arbitration in
London.

Held: Yes. The proper venue should be under NLRC for labor disputes. It is a settled rule that while they
are considered valid and enforceable, venue stipulations in a contract do not supersede the gen rule that
in the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, they should be treated as merely permissive or as
an agreement or additional place, not as limiting venue to the specified place. If the intentions of the
party were to restrict venue, they could have done it so by using a language that is clear and categorically
expressing their purpose to restrict the venue to that stipulated place.

Biaco vs PCRB

Facts: Ernesto Biaco is the husband of petitioner Ma. Teresa Chaves Biaco. While employed in the
Philippine Countryside Rural Bank (PCRB) as branch manager, Ernesto obtained several loans from the
respondent bank.

As security for the payment of the said loans, Ernesto executed a real estate mortgage in favor of the bank
covering the parcel of land which the real estate mortgages bore the signatures of the spouses Biaco.
When Ernesto failed to settle the above-mentioned loans on its due date, respondent bank through counsel
sent him a written demand,however, proved futile.

Respondent bank filed a complaint for foreclosure of mortgage against the spouses Ernesto and Teresa
Biaco before the RTC of Misamis Oriental. Summons was served to the spouses Biaco through Ernesto at
his office (Export and Industry Bank). The RTC ruled against them; a writ of execution was served on the
spouses.

Petitioner sought the annulment of the Regional Trial Court decision contending, among others, that the
trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction because summons were served on her through her husband
without any explanation as to why personal service could not be made. The CA affirmed RTC decision
invoking that judicial foreclosure proceedings are actions quasi in rem. As such, jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is not essential as long as the court acquires jurisdiction over the res.

ISSUE: Whether or not the case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner?

RULING: No. The Court ruled that RTC may take cognizance and decide the case. In a proceeding in
rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer
jurisdiction on the court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over
the res is acquired either (1) by the seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into
actual custody of the law; or (2) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of
the court is recognized and made effective.

In this case, the judicial foreclosure proceeding instituted by respondent bank undoubtedly vested the trial
court with jurisdiction over the res. A judicial foreclosure proceeding is an action quasi in rem. As such,
jurisdiction over the person of petitioner is not required, it being sufficient that the trial court is vested
with jurisdiction over the subject matter.

BPI vs sps Yujuico

Facts: the City of Manila filed a complaint against the sps yujuico for the expropriation of parcels of land
that is under their name in tondo. Said lands were mortgages to CBP bank. Years after, RTC Manila ruled
to expropriate the said land. The judgment became final and executory. BPI filed a motion to intervene
but the RTC denied the same being late. BPI then decided to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage
constituted on the two parcels of land subject to the sps yujuico’s loan.

BPI turned out the highest bidder in the public auction and the sheriff awarded the lot to it. Because the
lot foreclosed was not the whole lot, BPI filed for recovery of deficiency against the sps yujuico in
Makati RTC. Sps yujuico filed a motion to dismiss but the same was denied. sps yujuico then moved for
an MR and then BPI opposed the former’s motion. In their reply to the opposition, spouses yujuico raised
for the first time their objection upon the ground of improper venue. They argued that the case at hand is a
real action, hence, the disputed land being in tondo, the proper venue should be in the RTC Manila.
Makati RTC, however, denied the motion. Sps. Yujuico appealed to the CA and the CA granted the
motion

Issue: w/n the venue should be in manila not in Makati RTC

Held: no. the case is one of a personal action. Therefore, the venue may be at the plaintiff’s residence or,
in the case of a corporation, in its main office, or at the defendant’s place, the venue being dependent
upon the plaintiff’s election. In this case, it is evident that an action to recover the deficiency after the
extrajudicial foreclosure o the real property mortgage is a personal action, for it does not affect title to,
possession of real property, or any interests therein.

Planters development bank vs sps. Ramos

Facts: sps. Ramos applied for a loan with PDB for construction of a warehouse. Said loan was secured by
a mortgage. due to financial problems, sps ramos were not able to pay the loan upon due date. They
appealed to PDB for deferment of debt but it failed. As a result, PDB filed a petition for extrajudicial
foreclosure of the mortgaged properties before the RTC of San Jose, Nueva Ecija. PDB acquired
the property through public bidding.

Months after, sps. Ramos filed a complaint for annulment of real estate mortgages and promissory
notes, accounting and application of payments, injunction with preliminary injunction, and TRO
against PDB before the RTC OF San Jose, Nueva Ecija. Instead of answering, PDB filed a motion to
dismiss, alleging that the venue of the action was improper because the real estate mortgagees signed by
the parties contained a stipulation that any suit arising therefrom shall be filed in Makati city ONLY.
The RTC denied the motion to dismiss. PDB filed for an MR on the ruling of their failed motion instead
of replying to the complaint by sps ramos, this prompted sps ramos to file a motion to declare PDB in
default. RTC denied both motions. PDB appealed before the CA but the CA denied the petition.

Issue:

Alday vs FGU

Facts: FGU fied a complaint with Makati RTC against Alday and they alleged that the latter owed 114K
representing unliquidated cash advances, unremitted costs of premiums, and other violations by alday
during the latter’s time as an insurance agent for FGU. Alday answered by way of counterclaim and
justified her actions that she was entitled to such. FGU filed a motion to “strike out answer with
compulsory counterclaim and to declare Alday in default” because Alday’s answer was allegedly filed out
of time. RTC denied said motion. FGU again filed a motion to dismiss alday’s counterclaim, contending
that the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over the counterclaim of alday because of the latter’s non
payment of docket fees. Alday asked for exemption over the payment of docket fees because a
counterclaim is a compulsory response, otherwise alday will be declared in default.

RTC granted FGU’s motion to dismiss alday’s counterclaim and denied the latter’s motion. RTC found
alday’s motion merely a permissive in nature and ruled that alday’s failure to pay docket fees prevented
the court on having its jurisdiction. Alday appealed before the CA and contended that FGU is estopped
from assailing the jurisdiction of the court because FGU did not raise said issue when it filed its first
motion – the motion “to strike out answer with compulsory counterclaim and to declare the defendant in
default”. CA sustained RTC’s ruling.

Issue: 1. w/n FGU is estopped from assailing the non-payment of alday’s docket fees despite of the
absence of assailment from its first motion

2. w/n alday’s counterclaim is compulsory or permissive in nature

Held:
1. no. Estoppel by laches arises from the negligence or omission to assert aright within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or
declined to assert it. In this case, however, respondent cannot be considered as estopped from assailing
RTC’s jurisdiction over petitioner’s counterclaim since this issue was raised by respondent with the trial
court itself—the body where the action is pending—even before the presentation of any evidence by the
parties and definitely, way before any judgment could be rendered by the trial court.

2. it is permissive A compulsory counterclaim is an one which, being cognizable by the regular

courts of justice, arises out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject
matter of the opposing party’s claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties
of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. There is a test to determine if a counterclaim is
compulsory or permissive. Such test is to determine the logical relationship between the claim and
counterclaim, that is, where the separate trials of the claims would entail a substantial duplication of
effort and time by the parties and court. In this case, alday’s counterclaim is merely permissive based on
the causes of actions in her counterclaim. The evidence required to prove alday’s claims differs from that
needed to establish FGU’s demands for the recovery of cash accountabilities. The recovery of alday’s
claims is not dependent upon establishing FGU’s counterclaim, such that conducting separate trials will
not result in the substantial duplication of the time and effort of the court and the parties. This conclusion
is further evidenced by alday’s admissions she declared in her answer that FGU’s cause of action,
unlike her own, was not based upon the Special Agent Contract. However, Alday’s claims for
damages, allegedly suffered because of FGU’s filing of the complaint, was compulsory. Hence, there
is no need for alday to pay docket fees for her compulsory counterclaim which is the motion to
claim for damages.
Korea Tech vs Lerma

Facts: Korea Tech is a Korean corporation engaged in installation of LPG cylinder manufacturing plants
while respondent PGSMC is a domestic corporation. The two executed a contract whereby Korea Tech
would set up a LPG cylinder in cavite. The contract was executed in the Philippines. However, the
subsequent amendment to the contract was executed in Korea. They agreed that Korea Tech will ship the
machineries needed for manufacturing LPG cylinders and they themselves would also install such
equipment for an amount of 1.5M USD. upon performing their obligation, korea tech received USD 1.2M
from PGSMC as initial payment. Meanwhile, PGSMC entered a contract of lease with WORTH
properties for use of the latter’s property
However, due to some financial problems of PGSMC, Korea Tech was deemed to have completed its
obligations as agreed upon by both parties. PGSMC’s remaining balance was paid through post-dated
checks.

When korea tech deposited said checks, they were dishonored because the check bounced. Korea Tech
sent a demand letter against PGSMC threatening the latter that they would file a case for BP22 in case of
non-payment.

PGSMC’s president’s wife replied on the letter and complained that korea tech violated some of its
obligations like delivering of diff brand of equipment and the non-deliverance of some equipment paid
for. she also stated that they informed korea tech of the said issues and their non-response resulted to the
stoppage of payment reflected in the checks. Consequently, PGSMC filed a case of estafa against Korea
Tech and decided to rescind its contract with them.

Korea Tech wrote a letter to PGSMC informing the latter that disputes should be settled in Korean
Arbitration Board. Afterwards, Korea Tech filed a complaint for specific performance before
Muntinlupa RTC, alleging that the argument of PGSMC that Korea Tech violated their obligation is
without basis since PGSMC itself certified its completion. They also averred that PGSMC violated their
arbitration clause since PGSMC attempted to unilaterally rescind from their contract without resorting to
arbitration.

PGSMC answered the complaint by a compulsory counterclaim. They asserted that Korea Tech is
not entitled to the remaining balance because of their violation of their obligation, they also asserted
that they have the right to dismantle the equipment installed by korea tech since they were already
paid for in full. PGSMC also ask for claims for damages due to alleged “dadag-bawas” scheme of
korea tech (lowering the quality and altering the quantity of machines and equipment) and for their
wasted rent cost to worth since due to the violation of korea tech’s obligation, the plant was never
operational.

The RTC denied Korea Tech’s writ of preliminary injunction regarding the dismantling of their
equipment by PGSMC and the arbitration clause.

Afterwards, Korea Tech filed its answer to PGSMC’a counterclaim. Korea Tech denied the accusations
against them and averred that whatever was unfinished was PGSMC’s faut because it failed to procure
raw materials due to lack of funds. Korea Tech also moved to dismiss PGSMC’s counterclaim.

In the meantime, PGSMC filed a motion for inspection to determine if there was indeed an alteration of
quantity and lowering of quality of the equipment brought by Korea Tech. Korea Tech opposed said
motion and argued that those issues fell under the coverage of the arbitration clause.
RTC ruled granting the motion for inspection and denied Korea Tech’s motion to dismiss PGSMC’s
counterclaim because the counterclaim followed the requisites. Korea Tech filed for an MR but did not
wait for the RTC’s judgment on the said motion and head straight to the CA.
Aggrieved, Korea Tech appealed before CA for certiorari. Korea Tech prayed for prohibition, mandamus,
and preliminary injunction. They also averred that it is improper for the court to issue inspection since the
sheriff does not have the technical expertise to check the machineries and equipment. Korea Tech also
raised the issue of PGSMC’s non-payment of docket fees and non-attachment of certificate of non-forum
shopping. The CA affirmed RTC’s rulings and ruled that the counterclaims of PGSMC were
compulsory and payment of docket fees and certificate of non-forum shopping was not required.
The CA also declared that the petition for certiorari filed by Korea tech to the CA is premature
since korea tech did not wait for the RTC ‘s ruling to the MR; hence, the assailed ruling before the CA
for certiorari was merely interlocutory hence, premature.

Issue: w/n the CA erred in ruling that PGSMC’s counterclaims are all compulsory

Held: No. PGSMC filed its counterclaim way back in 1998. At that time, a compulsory counterclaim can
be exempt from docket fees. However, AM 04-2-04-SC amended Sec. 4 Rule 141 of the rules of court;
said amendment now requires that a compulsory counterclaim be now required to be paid its docket fees.
in this case, PGSMC’s compulsory counterclaim was filed as a responsive pleading and not an initiatory
pleading. with this effect, a certificate of non-forum shopping is not required.

Mercado vs CA

Facts: Mercado is a distributor of respondent SMC’s beer products in Manila. SMC increased his credit
line to 7.5M allowing him to withdraw goods on credit. To secure his purchases, Mercado assigned 3
chinabank certificates of deposit amounting to 5M to SMC and executed a continuing hold-out
agreement. One time, SMC notified chinabank that Mercado failed to pay for the items he purchased
on credit. In conformance to the hold-out agreement, Chinabank released the proceeds of the
assigned certificates of deposit and informed Mercado.
 Mercado filed an action to annul the hold out agreement and deed of assignment with Manila
RTC. He alleged that he already settled his recent purchases on credit, but SMC erroneously
applied said payments to his old accounts not covered by the hold out agreement.

SMC filed its answer with counterclaim against mercado. It alleged that Mercado delivered only 2
Chinabank certificates of deposit amounting to 4.5M and asserted that the execution of the hold out
agreement was a recognized business practice. SMC also averred that because mercado admitted his
outstanding liabilities, SMC sought payment of the products he withdrew or purchased based on credit
worth 7.4M. SMC filed a third-party complaint against EASCO. It sought to collect the surety bonds of
Mercado.

Mercado filed to dismiss the complaint. He claimed that he was no longer interested in annulling the
hold-out agreement. The RTC denied the motion and set the case for trial. During the trial, Mercado
acknowledged the accuracy of SMC’s computation of his outstanding liability. consequently, RTC
dismissed the case and ordered that EASCO and Mercado pay SMC.

Mercado and EASCO appealed before the CA insisting that Mercado did not default in payment of his
obligations to SMC. The CA affirmed RTC’s ruling in total. Throughout the pendency of the case, the
original petitioner died, and his heirs took over. The heirs averred that RTC was without jurisdiction
when it ruled SMC’s counterclaim, ordering to mercado to pay because said counterclaim was merely
permissive and SMC did not pay docket fees for such action.

Issue: w/n SMC’s counterclaim was permissive in nature

Held: No. A counterclaim that 1. Is necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of the opposing party’s claim; 2. Falls within the jurisdiction of the court and 3. Does not
require for its adjudication the presence of third parties which the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, is
compulsory. In this case, Mercado sought to annul the hold out agreement and deed of assignment for the
purposes of securing his credit purchases. While he admitted having outstanding obligation, he
nevertheless asserted that his account on chinabank is not related to such obligation. For its part, SMC
sought to collect the payment of Mercado for the value of goods he purchased on credit. Hence,
mercado’s complaint and SMC’s counterclaim both touched the issues of w/n the hold out agreement was
valid and w/n Mercado has outstanding liabilities to SMC. The same evidence would support or refute
mercado and SMC’s claims.
Proton pilipinas vs BNP

Facts: Proton availed credit facilities of BNP worth USD 2M. To guarantee payment of its obligation,
together with 3 other company petitioners, they executed a corporate guarantee with BNP. Under the
said guarantee, proton would receive imported motor vehicles and hold them in trust for BNP. Here,
proton’s sale of the motor vehicles will be delivered to BNP. In case the vehicles were not sold, proton
would return them to BNP.

Proton failed to deliver the sale and return of the unsold motor vehicles.
BNP demanded from proton the payment of USD 1.5M representing proton’s outstanding obligations.
However, proton refused to pay.

BNP filed a complaint against proton for payment of the said demand plus interests with Makati
RTC. They paid the docket fees based on the aggregate amount of their recovery claim exclusive,
however, of interests.

Proton filed a motion to dismiss due to BNP’s failure to pay properly docket fees t hus, the RTC has
no jurisdiction over its case. Proton also averred that the action was filed prematurely because BNP
did not send a demand letter to Proton. RTC denied the motion to dismiss. the RTC has yet to order
the payment of the docket fees. thus, the said motion to dismiss was filed prematurely. on the matter
regarding the demand letter, the RTC denied the same because demand letter is an evidentiary fact and
does not form part of the required allegations to the complaint. Hence, failure of issuance of said demand
letter is not a ground for dismissal of the complaint.

Proton appealed before the CA but the same denied the appeal.

Proton the filed the case before the SC for review on certiorari. They alleged that BNP failed to pay the
correct docket fees because under Court Admin Circular No. 11-94, interests should be included in the
computation of the docket fees which BNP did not pay, they also averred the incorrect ccomputation of
docket fees due to the exchange rate of dollar and peso. Hence, there is underpayment of docket fees and
due to that, the court did not acquire jurisdiction.

Issue: w/n BNP incorrectly paid docket fees

Held: Yes. The clerk of court erred in the computation of docket fees because of its wrong conversion of
money from dollar to peso and for not including accrued interest prayed by BNP in the computation. 1. It
is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the
prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of
an action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket
fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period; 2. The same rule applies to permissive
counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings. 3. Where the trial court acquires
jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed
filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or, if
specified, the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor
shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly
authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee. In this case, BNP merely
relied on the wrong computation of the clerk of court.
BDO vs Tansipek

Facts: JOCI, a construction firm, entered a contract with Duty Free. As actual construction started,
payments were received by JOCI directly through Tansipek, collector of JOCI. Tansipek initially remitted
payments to JOCI. However, one payment, a PNB check named to JOCI amounting to 4M, was not
remitted to JOCI but instead, tansipek deposited the same to his acct in PCIB. PCIB allowed the said
deposit despote the check was named to JOCI. PCIB refused to pay JOCI the amount deposited by
tansipek despite demands. JOCI filed a complaint for recovery of money against PCIB with the RTC.

PCIB filed a motion to dismiss the complaint but the RTC denied the motion.

PCIB filed a motion to admit amended third-party complaint wherein it filed a third party complaint
against tansipek. Tansipek was given a time to file his answer on the said complaint. However, he was
declared in default because of his failure to answer to the complaint. Tansipek filed an MR but the same
was denied. because of this, tansipek filed a motion for certiorari with the CA.

CA also dismissed the appeal for the failure to attach the assailed order. Tansipek filed an MR but the
same was denied due to being late.

Issue: w/n an MR of the default ruling was the correct remedy

Held: No. said remedy was erroneous at the very beginning. Tansipek should instead filed a motion to lift
order of default and not an MR.

A motion to lift Order of Default is different from an ordinary motion. The said motion should be
verified; and must show fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and meritorious defenses. For a
motion to lift order of default to be proper, the allegations of 1 fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence, and 2 meritorious defenses must concur.

It is important to note that a party declared in default is not barred from appealing from the judgment
on the main case, whether he had previously filed a motion to set aside order of default, and regardless of
the result of the latter and the appeals therefrom. However, the appeal should be based on the
decision’s being contrary to law or the evidence already presented, and not on the alleged invalidity
of the default order.

Salvador vs Rabaja
Facts: Sps Rabaja learned that sps Salvador were looking for a buyer of the subject property. Herminia
Salvador personally introduced Gonzales to sps. Rabaj as the administrator of the subject property.

Sps. Salvador even handed to Gonzales the duplicate TCT of the subject property. Sps. Rabaja made an
initial payment of 48k to Gonzales in the presence of Herminia.

For added proof of authenticity, Gonzales presented an SPA issued by Rolando Salvador. On that same
day, parties executed the contract to sell which stipulated that sps. Salvador sold the subject property for
an amount of 5M to sps rabaja.

Sps. Rabaja made several payments totalling to 950K which were received by Gonzales and the
improvised receipts signed by Herminia.

Years after, Sps Salvador complained to Sps. Rabaja that they did not receive any payment from
Gonzales. This prompted sps. Rabaja to suspend payment. Consequently, they received a notice to vacate
the subject property for non-payment of rentals

Sps. Salvador then instituted an action for ejectment against sps. Rabaja before Mandaluyong MeTC. In
turn, sps rabaja filed an action for recission of contract against sps Salvador and Gonzales. The court
ruled in favor of sps. Salvador.

Sps rabaja appealed before the Mandaluyong RTC. The latter reversed lower court’s ruling.

A recission case has likewise been filed by sps, rabaja against sps. Salvador and Gonzales. After filing
their answer, sps. Salvador failed to attend pre-trial conference because of the negligence of their counsel.
Their counsel forgot to update his calendar, Gonzales on the other hand, managed to attend.

Issue: w/n failure of the sps. Salvador to attend pre-trial conference warrants the presentation of evidence
ex-parte by sps. Rabaja

Held: Yes. the SC reiterates the rule that the failure to attend pre-trial conference does not result in the
default of an absent party. Under the rules of civpro, a defendant is only declared in default if he fails to
file his answer within the reglementary period. On the other, if a defendant fails to attend the pre-trial
hearing, the plaintiff can present his evidence ex parte.

In this case, the failure of sps. Salvador to appear in the pre-trial hearing has an adverse consequence. if
the absent party is the plaintiff, which in this case, sps rabaja, then his case shall be dismissed with
prejudice. if the the defendant, which is this case, sps. Salvador, failed to appear, then the plaintiff
is now allowed to present his evidence ex parte. And the court shall render judgment based on the
evidence presented therein. Thus, the consequence of the defendant’s absence is by giving the plaintiff the
privilege to present his evidence without having the defendant the opportunity to rebut plaintiff’s
evidence.
This rule emphasizes the importance of pre-trial hearing. Pre-trial is an answer to the call for the
speedy disposition of cases. In this case, the RTC could only render judgment based on the evidence
given by sps rabaja and Gonzales who was the defendant who managed to attend the pre-trial hearing.
BITTE vs Jonas

Facts: this case originated from a contract of sale of a property initially owned by elsa Jonas and was
presently under the name of sps. Yap.

Before elsa Jonas went to Australia, she executed an SPA authorizing her mother, andrea to sell the
property.

Cipriano, son of andrea and, of course, brother of elsa Jonas, offered the property for sale to sps. Bitte
showing them the authority of andrea, granting him, allegedly, the right to sell the subject property.
Cipriano received 600K in total from sps. Bitte.

Sps. Bitte sought a meeting for final negotiation with elsa Jonas. Shortly after her arrival in the PH, elsa
Jonas revoked the SPA and handed the copy thereof to andrea.

The parties met at bitte’s office, but no final agreement was reached. Elsa withdrew from the transaction.

Sps bitte filed with the RTC a complaint for specific performance with damages seeking to compel elsa,
andrea, and Cipriano to transfer to their names the title over the subject property. RTC rendered judgment
in favor of sps. Bitte; Jonas appealed before the CA and the rtc ruling was reversed. Sps. Bitte filed an
MR but was denied.

Sps bitte filed a petition for certiorari before the SC.

In their comment, Jonas informed the SC the fact that sps. Bitte had been declared in default by the RTC.
They contended that, being in default, sps. Bitte has lost their legal standing to file a petition for
certiorari.

Issue: w/n sps bitte may avail themselves of the right to appeal on certiorari despite being declared In
default

Held: No. the rule is that, the right to appeal from the judgment of default is not lost and can be done
on grounds that the amount of judgment is excessive or is different in kind from that prayed for, or
that the plaintiff failed to prove the material allegations of this complaint, or that the decision is
contrary to law. If a party who has been declared in default has in his arsenal the remedy of appeal from
the judgment of default on the basis of the decision having been issued against the evidence or the law,
that person cannot be denied the remedy and opportunity to assail the judgment in the appellate court.
Despite being burdened by the circumstances of default, the petitioners may still use all other
remedies available to question not only the judgment of default but also the judgment on appeal
before this Court. Those remedies necessarily include an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
PLEADINGS

Yujuico vs URAMI

Facts: stockholders of STRADEC, a corporation engaged in business development and investment,

executed pledge arrangements where they pledge stocks in favor of URAMI. These pledges serves as
securities to the loan obtained by STRADEC from URAMI. Among those stockholders who pledged in
ffavor of URAMI was Yujiico.

STRADEC failed to comply with its payment obligations. A certain atty. Nethercott notified STRADEC
that an impending auction sale of the pledged stocks will be held to satisfy STRADEC’s outstanding
obligations.

Yujuico filed an injunction complaint before Pasig RTC to prevent the said auction. Yujuico averred that
atty nethercrott has no authority to represent URAMI for any purpose. During the pendency of the
complaint, the public auction took place. Later, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injuction preventing
URAMI form appropriating the stocks it purchased from the auction. Year later, URAMI filed a motion
to leave to file an answer. In that answer, URAMI admitted that the auction was void and that it
never authorized atty. Nethercott to cause the sale.

Yujuico filed a motion for summary judgment since there is no longer any issue left due to URAMI’s
admission. The decision thereof was deferred due to a TRO issued by the court

Years later, URAMI changed counsel and subsequently filed an amended answer with compulsory
counterclaim. URAMI vouched for the dismissal of the injunction complaint as they reneged their
previous admission in their original answer; this time, they alleged that the said auction was valid and that
it duly authorized atty. Nethercott to issue the said auction.

Issue: w/n the amended answer may be allowed even if it was filed more than a year after the original
answer has been submitted.

Held: Our rules of procedure allow a party in a civil action to amend his pleading as a matter of right, so
long as the pleading is amended only once and before a responsive pleading is served (or, if the pleading
sought to be amended is a reply, within ten days after it is served). 31 Otherwise, a party can only amend
his pleading upon prior leave of court.YES. THE AMENDMENT SHOULD BE ALLOWED. One of the
key documents that URAMI plans to present during trial, which it also attached in its amended answer as
is URAMI’s Board Resolution that evinces Atty. Nethercott’s authority to cause the foreclosure on the
pledged stocks on behalf of URAMI. With the existence of such board resolution, the statement in
URAMI’s original answer pertaining to the lack of authority of Atty. Nethercott to initiate the auction sale
thus appears mistaken, if not entirely baseless and unfounded. Hence, we find it only right and fair, that
URAMI should be given a chance to file its amended answer in order to rectify such mistakes in its
original answer. The amended answer aims to correct certain allegations of fact in the original answer
which, needless to state, are crucial to a full and proper disposition of the case. It is, therefore, in the best
interest of justice and equity that URAMI should be allowed to file the amended answer. We find
absolutely no cause to overrule the grant of leave granted to URAMI to file its amended answer. The said
grant is consistent with our time-honored judicial policy of affording liberal treatment to amendments to
pleadings, especially those made before the conduct of trial. We should always remember that our rules of
procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their application should never be
allowed to frustrate the truth and the promotion of substantial justice.
LEI vs BDO

Syllabus: Amendment of pleadings, Responsive pleading

Facts:

- LOLITA soriano filed a complaint against LILIAN soriano and BDO for annulment of mortgage
with prayer for TRO and preliminary injunction with damages before Legazpi RTC.
- Lolita alleged that she is a stockholder of LEI and a member of its Board of Directors, designated
as its corporate secretary. She also alleged that lilian Soriano, LEI’s president and treasurer, and
her husband obtained a loan, in their personal capacity, from BDO amounting to 20M. As
security for the payment of the said loan, Sps Soriano, without authority and consent of the board
of LEI, with the use of falsified board reso, executed a real estate mortgage over one of the
properties of LEI in favor of BDO. Further, Lolita alleged that BDO instigated lilian to amend the
mortgage and transfer the loan obligations to LEI itself instead of sps Soriano in their private
capacity. Upon discovery of the said fraudulent scheme, payments for the loan were suspended
until the subject property became the subject of foreclosure sale/auction.
- After service of summons on lilian and BDO, the RTC issued a TRO and writ of Prelim
injunction enjoining BDO to proceed with the auction sale of the subject property.
- Lilan filed an answer stating that they were duly authorized by LEI to mortgage the subject
property, and that proceeds of the loan from BDO were for the use and benefit of LEI. Lilian also
alleged in her answer that she is the one that should be entitled to moral damages and legal fees.
- BDO then filed a motion to dismiss the complaint of Lolita and LEI on grounds of legal capacity
to sue, failure to state cause of action, and litis pendencia. Petitioners filed an opposition while
BDO filed a motion to suspend action.
- RTC dismissed LEI and lolita’s complaint. As a response, they filed an MR. while waiting for
the resolution of the said MR, they also filed a motion to admit amended complaint, and
added in their complaint, this complaint at hand, was for the benefit and best interest of
LEI because Lolita allegedly demanded the board of LEI to take legal action regarding the
fraudulent scheme but there was no legal action taken. Thus, this case being for the benefit
of LEI.
- RTC denied both the MR and the motion to admit amended complaint. It held that Lolita did not
raise new argument in their MR to address the fact of LEI’s failure to allege in its complaint that
Lolita made demands before the board. Further, the RTC did not admit the amendment of the
complaint because it changed petitioner’s cause of action.
- Petitioners filed a motion for certiorari before the SC.

ISSUE: w/n the rtc erred in denying admission to petitioner’s amended complaint.

HELD: YES.
 - Rule 10 of the Rules of Courts states that:

Sec. 2. Amendments as a matter of right.—A party may amend his pleadings once as a matter of right at
any time before a responsive pleading is served x x x.
Sec. 3 Amendments by leave of court.—Except as provided in the next preceding section, substantial
amendments may be made only upon leave of court. But such leave may be refused if it appears to the
court that the motion was made with intent to delay.

- It should be noted that respondents Lilian S. Soriano and the Estate of Leandro A. Soriano, Jr.
already filed their Answer, to petitioners’ complaint, and the claims being asserted were made
against said parties. A responsive pleading having been filed, amendments to the complaint may,
therefore, be made only by leave of court and no longer as a matter of right.

- The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid a multiplicity of

suits and in order that the real controversies between the parties are presented, their rights
determined, and the case decided on the merits without unnecessary delay. This liberality is
greatest in the early stages of a lawsuit, especially in this case where the amendment was
made before the trial of the case, thereby giving the petitioners all the time allowed by law
to answer and to prepare for trial.

- Furthermore, amendments to pleadings are generally favored and should be liberally allowed in
furtherance of justice in order that every case, may so far as possible, be determined on its real
facts and in order to speed up the trial of the case or prevent the circuitry of action and
unnecessary expense. Unless there are circumstances such as inexcusable delay or the taking of
the adverse party by surprise or the like, which might justify a refusal of permission to amend.

- Since, as explained above, amendments are generally favored, it would have been more fitting for
the trial court to extend such liberality towards petitioners by admitting the amended complaint
which was filed before the order dismissing the original complaint became final and executory. It
is quite apparent that since trial proper had not yet even begun, allowing the amendment would
not have caused any delay. Moreover, doing so would have served the higher interest of justice as
this would provide the best opportunity for the issues among all parties to be thoroughly threshed
out and the rights of all parties finally determined. Hence, the SC overrules the trial court’s denial
of the motion to admit the amended complaint and orders the admission of the same.

TIU vs PBCOM

Syllabus: Amendment of pleadings, leave of court

Facts:
 - In June 1993, AWRI, represented by tiu, applied for a real estate loan with PBCOM. The
petitioners submitted a board resolution in support of the said loan. The loan was guaranteed by a
collateral over the property. AWRI applied for a bigger loan and PBCOM required that a surety
agreement be signed by all its board members to approve the loan. The said was notarized and the
copies thereof were sent to PBCOM.
- AWRI failed to pay its obligations to PBCOM. And PBCOM now demands for full payment for
the loan.
- Despite demand, AWRI failed to pay its loan. This gave PBCOM a cause of action against AWRI
and the former filed a complaint against the latter for collection of sums of money.
- Tiu filed its answer, it alleged that they were not personally liable on the obligation of AWRI
because they signed the surety agreement as officers of AWRI. They alleged that the attached
copy of surety agreement PBCOM filed in their complaint was falsified because it shows that the
signatories signed the surety agreement in their personal capacity but the same was not present
when they signed the surety agreement.
- The matter was investigated by PBCOM’s counsel and found out that their attached document in
their complaint was falsified.
- Tiu asked PBCOM to explain such alteration. And PBCOM explained that it was the doing of
their bank auditor.
- Tiu filed a counterclaim against PBCOM
- PBCOM then filed a reply and answer to counterclaim with motion for leave of court to
amend complaint to substitute the attached falsified document for the original duplicate copy.
PBCOM also admitted their mistake in making the alteration and argued that such alteration does
not affect the case of PBCOM against the petitioners since the latter admitted that they signed the
surety agreement voluntarily.
- RTC allowed the amendment
- Tiu filed an MR for the said interlocutory order but the same was denied.
- Tiu filed a petition for certiorari before the SC.

ISSUE: w/n the amendment of PBCOM’s complaint should be allowed

HELD: Yes.

- The granting of leave to file amended pleading is a matter particularly addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court; and that discretion is broad, subject only to the limitations that the
amendments should not substantially change the cause of action or alter the theory of the case, or
that it was not made to delay the action. Nevertheless, as enunciated in Valenzuela, even if the
amendment substantially alters the cause of action or defense, such amendment could still be
allowed when it is sought to serve the higher interest of substantial justice; prevent delay; and
secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of actions and proceedings.

- The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid a multiplicity of suits
and in order that the real controversies between the parties are presented, their rights determined,
and the case decided on the merits without unnecessary delay. This liberality is greatest in the
early stages of a lawsuit, especially in this case where the amendment was made before the trial
 of the case, thereby giving the petitioners all the time allowed by law to answer and to prepare for
trial.

PROOFS OF SERVICE

VALMONTE vs CA

Syllabus: Summons, Parties, Pleadings, Jurisdiction, Substituted Service, non-resident defendant

FACTS:
 - Lou valmonte and al valmonte were spouses. They are residents of US. Al valmonte, a Philippine
atty, practices his profession in the Philippines, commuting for this purpose between his residence
in US and his office in Manila.

- On March 1992, respondent Rosita, also a resident of US and sister of petitioner lou, filed a
complaint for partition of real property and accounting of rentals against sps valmonte before
Manila RTC. She alleged in her complaint that since both of the parties are non-residents, the
summons against sps. Valmonte may be served at the latter’s law office in Manile where al can
be found.

- Meanwhile, lou sent a letter to rosita’s counsel referring her husband as the party to whom all
communications intended for her should be sent.

- Service of summons was then made upon Al valmonte, who at the time, at his office in Manila.
Al accepted the summons but refused to accept the summons for his wife, on the ground that he
was not authorized to accept the prices on her behalf.

- The process server left without leaving a copy of summons and complaint for Lou Valmonte.

- Al filed his answer with counterclaim while lou did not file her answer. Because of this, Rosita
moved to declare lou in default. Al valmonte entered a special appearance on behalf of his wife
and opposed rosita’s motion.

- RTC denied rosita’s motion to declare Rosita in default.

- Rosita filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with the CA.

- CA granted the motion of Rosita and declared lou valmonte in default. CA ruled that Lou was
validly served with summons. A copy of the decision was received by his husband, Al, in his
office in Manila.

ISSUE: w/n Lou Valmonte was validly served with summons

HELD: No.

- In an action in personam, personal service of summons or, if this is not possible and he cannot be
personally served, substituted service is essential for the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction
over the person of a defendant who does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the
court.

- If defendant cannot be served with summons because he is temporarily abroad, but otherwise he
is a Philippine resident, service of summons may, by leave of court, be made by publication.
 Otherwise stated, a resident defendant in an action in personam, who cannot be personally served
with summons, may be summoned either by means of substituted service or by publication

- On the other hand, if the action is in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is not essential for giving the court jurisdiction so long as the court acquires
jurisdiction over the res. If the defendant is a nonresident and he is not found in the country,
summons maybe served exterritorialy in accordance with Rule 14, §17.

- Applying the foregoing rules to the case at bar, private respondent’s action, which is for partition
and accounting under Rule 69, is in the nature of an action quasi in rem. Such an action is
essentially for the purpose of affecting the defendant’s interest in a specific property and not to
render a judgment against him

- As petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a nonresident who is not found in the Philippines, service
of summons on her must be in accordance with Rule 14, §17. Such service, to be effective outside
the Philippines, must be made either (1) by personal service; (2) by publication in a newspaper of
general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy
of the summons and order of the court should be sent by registered mail to the last known address
of the defendant; or (3) in any other manner which the court may deem sufficient

- Since in the case at bar, the service of summons upon petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was not
done by means of any of the first two modes, the question is whether the service on her attorney,
petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte, can be justified under the third mode, namely, “in any . . .
manner the court may deem sufficient.” We hold it cannot. This mode of service, like the first
two, must be made outside the Philippines, such as through the Philippine Embassy in the foreign
country where the defendant resides.

- must be noted that the period to file an Answer in an action against a resident defendant differs
from the period given in an action filed against a nonresident defendant who is not found in the
Philippines. In the former, the period is fifteen (15) days from service of summons, while in the
latter, it is at least sixty (60) days from notice.
E.B VILLAROSA vs BENITO

Syllabus: Summons, Jurisdiction, Defendant corporation, service of summons, motion to dismiss,

voluntary appearance

FACTS:
- Villarosa and Partner Co. is a corporation with its principal office located at Davao City and has
branch offices on Pque, Manila, and CDO. Villarosa and Benito executed a deed of sale with
development agreement wherein Villarosa agreed to develop certain parcels of land at CDO
belonging to Benito into a housing subdivision.
- They agreed that in any dispute arising therefrom, the venue shall be in Makati
- On April 1998, Benito filed a complaint for breach of contract before Makati RTC.
- Summons and copy of the complaint were served to Villarosa through its branch manager engr.
Wendell at Villarosa’s CDO office.
- Villarosa filed a special appearance with a motion to dismiss on the ground that there was no
valid service of summons and for the court’s lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
- Meanwhile, Benito filed a motion to declare defendant in default alleging that Villarosa failed to
file an answer despite the receipt of summons.
- Benito filed an opposition to the defendant’s motion to dismiss, alleging that Villarosa, through
its branch manager, received the summons.
- RTC denied Villarosa’s motion to dismiss as well as benito’s motion to declare defendant in
default. The RTC ruled that because the summons was received by its branch manager, there was
substantial compliance in the service of summons.
- Villarosa filed an MR but was denied
- Villarosa filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the SC.

ISSUE: w/n there was a valid service of summons

FACTS: No.

- The designation of persons or officers who are authorized to accept summons for a domestic
corporation or partnership is now limited and more clearly specified in Section11, Rule 14 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule now states “general manager– instead of only “manager–;
“corporate secretary– instead of “secretary–; and “treasurer– instead of “cashier.– The phrase “agent,
or any of its directors– is conspicuously deleted in the new rule.

- Strict compliance with the rules has been enjoined; The liberal construction rule cannot be
invoked and utilized as a substitute for the plain legal requirements as to the manner in which
summons should be served on a domestic corporation. Service of summons upon persons other
than those mentioned in Section 13 of Rule 14 (old rule) has been held as improper

- Accordingly, the SC rule that the service of summons upon the branch manager of petitioner at its
branch office at Cagayan de Oro, instead of upon the general manager at its principal office at
 Davao City is improper. Consequently, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person
of the petitioner.

- The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.

JOSE vs BOYON

Syllabus: Summons, Service of summons, substituted summons, personal summons, extraterritorial

service, default

FACTS:
 - On July 1998, Sps. Jose filed a complaint before Muntinlupa RTC for specific performance
against sps Boyon to compel them to facilitate the transfer of ownership of a parcel of land
subject of a controverted sale. Summons and copy of complaint were issued to sps. Boyon
- As per the return of the summons, a substituted service was resorted to by the process server
allegedly because efforts to serve the summons personally to sps Boyon failed
- Sps Jose filed before the RTC an ex-parte motion for leave of court to effect summons by
publication. RTC granted said motion and allowed summons by publication.
- After months of no response from sps. Boyon, the RTC declared the defendants in default for
their failure to file their answers. An an effect, sps, Jose were allowed to submit their evidence
ex-parte.
- RTC then ruled in sps. Jose’s pleading in favor of them
- Year after, Helen Boyon, a resident of the US, was surprised to learn from her sister of the case
against her and the ruling of the RTC. Boyon filed an Ad Cautelam motion questioning the
validity of the service of summons
- The RTC denied boyon’s motion on the basis of Boyon’s defaulted standing in court.
- Boyon filed a petition for certiorari before the CA and ruled in favor of boyon. The CA ruled that
RTC never acquired jurisdiction over Boyon because of improper service of summons.

ISSUE: w/n a there was a valid service of summons

HELD: No.
- Where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines, such service may be
done by personal or substituted service

- personal service of summons is preferred to substituted service. Only if the former cannot be
made promptly can the process server resort to the latter. Moreover, the proof of service of
summons must (a) indicate the impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time; (b)
specify the efforts exerted to locate the defendant; and (c) state that the summons was served
upon a person of sufficient age and discretion who is residing in the address, or who is in charge
of the office or regular place of business, of the defendant. It is likewise required that the
pertinent facts proving these circumstances be stated in the proof of service or in the officer’s
return. The failure to comply faithfully, strictly and fully with all the foregoing requirements of
substituted service renders the service of summons ineffective.

- In this case, The Return of Summons shows that no effort was actually exerted, and no positive
step taken by either the process server or petitioners to locate and serve the summons personally
on respondents. At best, the Return merely states the alleged whereabouts of respondents without
indicating that such information was verified from a person who had knowledge thereof.
Certainly, without specifying the details of the attendant circumstances or of the efforts exerted to
serve the summons, a general statement that such efforts were made will not suffice.

- It must be noted that extraterritorial service of summons or summons by publication applies only
when the action is in rem or quasi in rem. The first is an action against the thing itself instead of
 against the defendant’s person; in the latter, an individual is named as defendant, and the purpose
is to subject that individual’s interest in a piece of property to the obligation or loan burdening it.

- In the instant case, what was filed before the trial court was an action for specific performance
directed against respondents. While the suit incidentally involved a piece of land, the ownership
or possession thereof was not put in issue, since they did not assert any interest or right over it.
Moreover, this Court has consistently declared that an action for specific performance is an action
in personam.

- In general, substituted service can be availed of only after aclear showing that personal service of
summons was notlegally possible. Also, service by publication is applicable inactions in rem and
quasi in rem, but not in personal suitssuch as the present one which is for specific performance.

MANOTOC vs CA

Syllabus: Summons, substituted service, presumption of regularity,

FACTS:

- Trajano seeks the enforcement of a foreign court judgment rendered on may 1991 in Hawaii for
the wrongful death of deceased Archimedes trajano committed by the military allegedly under the
command of Imee Marcos.
- Based on the complaint, the RTC issued a summons on July 1993 addressed to Imee at Pasig. The
summons and a copy of complaint were allegedly served upon Macky dela cruz, an alleged
caretaker of imee at the place mentioned.
- Few months after, when Imee failed to file an answer, the RTC declared her in default.
- On a special appearance of counsel, imee filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction of the RTC over the person of Imee upon the grounds that 1. The address of imee
 indicated in the complaint was not her dwelling, residence, or regular place of business; 2. Dela
cruz, who was found at the unit, was neither a representative, employee, nor a resident of the
place; 3. The procedure on substituted service of summons was ignored; 4. Imee was a resident of
Singapore; and 5. Whatever judgment rendered in this case would be void.
- During the hearing on the motion to dismiss, Imee presented Carlos Gonzales, who testified that
he saw Imee as a visitor in the said place only. Imee also showed evidence proving that she is
residing in Singapore. However, Trajano also presented Robert Swift, lead counsel who handled
the case of fucking marcos in Hawaii where they were held guilty, who stated that according to
the deposition records of bongbong putanginang marcos, imee’s residence was at pasig city.
- RTC denied Imee’s motion to dismiss. The trial court relied on the strength of trajano’s case and
the presumption of regularity of the sheriff.
- Imee filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA
- The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and affirmed the findings of the RTC.

ISSUE: w/n there was a proper service of summons

HELD: No.

- In an action strictly inpersonam, personal service on the defendant is the preferredmode of service,
that is, by handing a copy of the summons to thedefendant in person. If defendant, for excusable
reasons, cannotbe served with the summons within a reasonable period, thensubstituted service can be
resorted to. While substituted service ofsummons is permitted, “it is extraordinary in character and
inderogation of the usual method of service.” Hence, it mustfaithfully and strictly comply with the
prescribed requirementsand circumstances authorized by the rules. Indeed, “compliancewith the rules
regarding the service of summons is as muchimportant as the issue of due process as of jurisdiction.”

MENDOZA vs. ALLAS

Syllabus: Quo Warranto

FACTS:
- Mendoza was the Director III, CIIS of BOC and was later temporarily designated as Acting
District Collector on the same gov’t agency. In his place, Allas was appointed as Acting Director
III. Despite Mendoza’s new designation, he continued to receive compensation from that of
Director III.
- A year after, Mendoza received a letter of termination from his position as Director III. Allas was
then appointed as the new Director III. Mendoza wrote to the customs commissioner requesting
his reinstatement but said attempt was futile.
- Mendoza then filed a Quo Warranto petition against Allas before Pque RTC. The court granted
the petition on the grounds that Mendoza was illegally terminated from office without due
process of law and violation of security of tenure, rendering the appointment of Allas as void ab
initio. The court also ordered the reinstatement of Mendoza
- Allas appealed before the CA. While the appeal was pending, Pres. Ramos appointed Allas to
Deputy Commissioner of BOC for Assessment and Operations. Due to this, Mendoza moved to
 dismiss the appeal upon the ground of the case being moot and academic. The CA dismissed the
case.
- Mendoza filed a motion for execution of judgment before the RTC in the case which reinstates
him to his old position. However, the court dismissed the case upon the ground that the position
of Director III was being occupied by Olores who was not a party to the Quo Warranto petition.
- Mendoza files a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus with CA but the same was
dismissed.

ISSUE: w/n the CA erred in dismissing the writ of execution of the Quo Warranto petition

HELD:
- No.
- the rule that a judgment against a public officer in regard to a public right binds his successor in
office IS NOT APPLICABLE in a quo warranto cases; this follows from the nature of the quo
warranto itself. It is never directed to the officer/position as such, BUT ALWAYS AGAINST
THE PERSON – to determine whether he is constitutionally and legally authorized to perform
any act in, or exercise any function of the office to which he lays claim.
- Here, the petition was filed by Mendoza SOLELY against allas. What was decided before the
RTC was the qualification of allas and the right of Mendoza to the contested position and the
same case WAS NOT against Olores.