Private Interests,

Public Policy
Ukraine and the Common Economic
Space Agreement
Tor Bukkvoll

Ukrainian foreign policy S EVERAL analysts of Ukrainian foreign policy have

maintains a delicate balance
between private, factional,
and national interests.
TOR BUKKVOLL is a political scientist and researcher at the Norwegian
Defense Research Establishment. He thanks Sabrina P. Ramet, Pavel Baev,
Sven Gunnar Simonsen, Christina Brooks, Taras Kuzio, and two anony-
mous reviewers for their comments and suggestions on earlier versions of
this article.
Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 51, no. 5, September/October 2004, pp. 11–22.
© 2004 M.E. Sharpe, Inc. All rights reserved.
ISSN 1075–8216 / 2004 $9.50 + 0.00.
suggested that, as President Leonid Kuchma derives
his political power from the support of pro-Russian oli-
garch groups, Ukraine’s foreign policy is becoming in-
creasingly pro-Russian.1 As Vladimir Lupatsii and
Tatiana Grebneva concluded in 2002, “The intensifica-
tion in Russian-Ukrainian relations that one can observe
over the past two years is not so much a result of more
similar strategic interests, but more a result of efforts
by the economic and political elites of the two countries
to maintain control over the main companies that oper-
ate in the natural resources and infrastructure branches
of the economy, and to control the export of the two coun-
tries.”2 In this interpretation, Ukraine’s foreign policy does
not arise from calculations of what is in the country’s
national interest, but instead reflects the factional self-
interests of the oligarchic groups and the balance of
power among them. This kind of analysis rests on the
theoretical assumptions of pluralism.3
The present discussion does not reject the above in-
terpretation. There is significant empirical support for
the theory that Ukraine’s foreign policy is oligarch
driven, but it needs to be qualified in two ways. First,
there is a limit, based on self-interest, to how far the
oligarch groups are willing to integrate politically and
economically with Russia. Second, even in oligarch-
dominated Ukraine, some political leaders occasionally
put national interests ahead of faction and personal gain.
The relationship between national, factional, and per-
sonal interests in Ukraine’s approach to Russia can be
Bukkvoll Ukraine and the CES Agreement 11
well illustrated by an examination of the multi-lateral
Common Economic Space (CES) agreement.
The presidents of Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and
Kazakhstan signed the CES agreement in Yalta on Sep-
tember 19, 2003. The agreement was a considerable
breakthrough for Russian efforts to reintegrate the post-
Soviet region. One commentator called it “the boldest
initiative to come out of the CIS [Commonwealth of
Independent States] since its founding in 1991.”4 The
real triumph at Yalta was Ukraine’s participation. Be-
cause of its size and its earlier ambition to serve as un-
official leader of those former Soviet republics skeptical
of Russia’s regional efforts, Ukraine had stymied
Russia’s “gathering of the lands” (zobiranie zemel)
throughout the 1990s.5
Kyiv’s commitment to the CES remains uncertain,
however, and it can easily be broken by one of the sud-
den fluctuations that have become commonplace in
Russian-Ukrainian relations. Ukrainian critics of the
CES agreement decry the “sale” of Ukraine’s indepen-
dence to Russia, and the Ukrainian ambassador to Ro-
mania, Anton Buteiko, resigned in protest. Buteiko
called on Kuchma not to repeat the “mistakes” made by
Bohdan Khmelnitsky, the Cossack leader who accepted
Russian rule in 1654.6
In reality, the agreement is more symbolic than sub-
stantive. Most observers seriously doubt that any of its
provisions will be implemented. The real significance
of the CES is that three financially weaker countries
agreed to submit to Russian economic leadership.
Belarus and Kazakhstan had already done so long be-
fore, but Ukraine had until then resisted.
The present article argues that even if President
Kuchma and the oligarchic clans have shown their
readiness to yield to Russian pressure to secure their
own private interests, this is not the whole story. As
Aleksandr Dergachev wrote in November 2003, “To-
day we have a situation where those who hold power
identify themselves in their contacts with their Rus-
sian colleagues not just as the authorized spokesmen
of an independent state, but also as representatives of
a semi-autonomous caste, an identity that makes them
feel obliged to also be motivated by their private rela-
tions with their Russian colleagues and by the self-
interests of their clan.”7 Despite the fact that few
observers would disagree with this statement, empiri-
cal analysis tends to focus almost exclusively on the
latter motivation and largely disregards the explana-
tory power of individuals who act “as authorized
spokesmen of an independent state.” In fact, Ukraine’s
political leaders should be seen as attempting to strike
12 Problems of Post-Communism September/October 2004
a balance between private, factional self-interests and
national interests.
This article discusses whether Ukraine’s pro-Russian
oligarchs influenced President Kuchma to embrace a
pro-Russian foreign policy, and specifically the CES.
This view rests on three assumptions. First, the domi-
nant oligarchic groups strongly supported the CES
agreement. Second, Kuchma saw it as imperative for
his own self-interest to promote their economic policy
in return for their political support. Third, Kuchma is
motivated more by private interests than by national
interests. Before examining these assumptions, however,
the article begins with a brief description of how
Kuchma handled the CES agreement after it was insti-
gated in February 2003.
Did Kuchma Need the
Common Economic Space?
The presidents of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and
Ukraine declared their intention to create a common
economic space for their countries at a meeting in Mos-
cow in late February 2003. The declaration came as a
surprise, especially in Ukraine. As late as November
2002, Kuchma had categorically ruled out Ukrainian
membership in the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU),
an organization almost identical to the CES.8 Moscow
had been trying to persuade Ukraine to join the EEU
ever since it was established in October 2000. Although
Ukraine had accepted observer status in the organiza-
tion, Kuchma consistently refused full membership,
sending a clear signal that Ukraine would not go fur-
ther than free-trade agreements in its economic rela-
tions with the other post-Soviet countries. Adding to
the February surprise, not only were there no signs that
Kuchma felt he was being pushed into the CES, but he
may have initiated the scheme. Several news reports,
admittedly from pro-Kremlin sources, portrayed
Kuchma as the most eager advocate of the project among
the four presidents.9
Although Kuchma had been elected in 1994 on a plat-
form of economic reintegration with Russia, he quickly
changed his position on this issue once in power. After
only a short time in office, he embarked on a policy that
rejected any integration effort that entailed a transfer of
sovereignty in economic decision-making. The Ukrai-
nian signature at Yalta, therefore, signified a major policy
shift.
Kuchma appointed Mykola Azarov to head the Ukrai-
nian delegation to the working group preparing the fi-
nal text of the CES agreement. Azarov was known for
his pro-Russian sympathies and his unquestionable loy-
alty to the president.10 In a telling statement to the Ukrai-
nian parliament, the Supreme Rada, Azarov defended
the agreement by saying, “What are we [Ukraine] worth?
We have nothing. We have no industry. We don’t have
this, we don’t have that; our only hope is to join the
CES.” 11 Azarov’s appointment further indicated
Kuchma’s personal stake in the CES agreement.
Azarov’s conduct in the negotiations indicates that his
orders from Kuchma were to make any concession nec-
essary to reach an agreement. Sources close to the Ukrai-
nian delegation claim that Azarov repeatedly used his
position as head of delegation to overrule advice from
his experts and make concessions to move the negotia-
tions forward.12 All reports from the working group ap-
parently went directly to Kuchma. The Ukrainian
government and the parliament were both kept at a safe
distance from the process. If the government had been
a participant, the final document would probably have
been very different. As it was, the government ap-
proached the draft CES agreement with a mixture of
resistance and detachment when it took up the issue in
early September.
Ukrainian law requires the government to discuss
all matters involving participation in international
agreements. The government then sends its recommen-
dations to the president, who is not bound by its ad-
vice. However, since the president appoints the
government in Ukraine, disagreements between the
two are problematic. The government met three times
to discuss the CES, and there were heated discussions
each time. One of the sessions was a joint meeting of
the government and parliament in which most of the
government in addition to about forty legislators par-
ticipated. According to Viacheslav Kirilenko, a legis-
lator present at the meeting, Azarov was out of the
country at the time and in his absence no member of
the government defended the CES documents.13
Despite its lack of enthusiasm, the government still
decided to support the CES, but with the proviso that
the agreement could not contradict the Ukrainian con-
stitution or the goal of Euro-Atlantic integration. This
sparked strong presidential pressure. Kuchma person-
ally telephoned Justice Minister Oleksandr
Lavrynovych, one of the more outspoken critics of the
agreement, demanding that he put his personal convic-
tions aside, and tried to get the documents accepted with-
out reservations (ogovorki).14 A few days later, the Rada
also adopted a statement in support of the CES, and the
final parliamentary approval for entering the CES came
on April 20, 2004.
Presidents, right to left, Aleksandr Lukashenko of Belarus, Nursultan
Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan, Vladimir Putin of Russia, and Leonid Kuchma
of Ukraine shake hands after signing a treaty on creating a common
economic space during their meeting in Yalta, Ukraine, September
19, 2003. (AP Photo/Ukraine’s Presidential Press Service, Pool)
Tuzla Nearly Torpedoes the Agreement
In September 2003, when the agreement was signed in
Yalta, Russian-Ukrainian relations were at an unprec-
edented high point. But less than a month later, Presi-
dent Kuchma was vociferating against Russian
imperialism, and for the first time since independence,
Ukraine dispatched border-guard units to defend its ter-
ritorial integrity against a possible Russian encroach-
ment. This unanticipated turn of events was sparked by
the so-called Tuzla Incident. Tuzla is a tiny island in the
Kerch strait at the entrance to the Sea of Azov. It has
been considered Ukrainian territory since independence,
but Russia never formally recognized this state of af-
fairs, although it made no claim to the island. The in-
habitants—approximately thirty people—regularly
participated in Ukrainian elections and paid taxes to
Ukraine.
Toward the end of September 2003, however, Russia
suddenly began to construct a dam from the Taman pen-
insula to Tuzla, and Moscow declared that the island
was Russian territory. After a few days of bewilderment,
Kyiv launched a wave of protests through both bilat-
eral and multi-lateral channels and moved border-guard
units to the island to prevent the dam builders from
reaching its shore. After a high-level meeting between
Russia’s prime minister, Mikhail Kasianov, and
Ukraine’s prime minister, Viktor Yanukovych, in Mos-
cow on October 21, construction temporarily ceased.
Thus, within a month, Russian-Ukrainian relations
turned from the best in years to the worst in years. Presi-
dent Kuchma issued a presidential decree suggesting
Bukkvoll Ukraine and the CES Agreement 13
that Ukraine should consider vacating the CES as a re-
sponse to the dam building. “In case the Russian side
continues construction of the dam on the Ukrainian ter-
ritory,” the decree stated, the Foreign Ministry was au-
thorized to inform the Russian side that Ukraine was
leaving the CES process.15
Although the Tuzla incursion made Kuchma recon-
sider his position on the CES, this does not mean that
he changed his mind in any fundamental way. He con-
tinued to support Ukrainian CES membership after
Tuzla, but now strongly emphasized that a functioning
free-trade zone must be in place before Ukraine could
accept any further integration.16 Kuchma made these
statements only after Russia stopped building the dam.
He still wanted the CES, but Russia had committed a
breach. Kuchma, as president, could not promote the
agreement with this encroachment still taking place.
The CES and Tuzla issues well illustrate the chief
dilemma that Kuchma faces at home. Naturally, he wants
either to win another term or to ensure a suitable suc-
cessor in the presidential elections in the autumn of
2004. If he decides not to run, he needs a trustworthy
heir to secure his legal immunity and continued influ-
ence. In all probability he feels that he needs Moscow’s
support for this.17 At the same time, he also wants to
secure a decent place in history for himself. This is not
going to happen if he ends his presidency by compro-
mising Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Thus, the Tuzla
problem had to be solved before Kuchma could con-
tinue with the CES.
The Ukrainian Oligarchs and Kuchma
The Ukrainian oligarchy attained financial and politi-
cal prominence in the latter half of the 1990s. Its role as
a power base for politicians is now crucial, so much so
that oligarch support is far more important for the Ukrai-
nian political leadership than for the Russian. Accord-
ing to Anders Åslund, a former economic adviser to the
Ukrainian government, “No post-communist state to-
day is more oligarchic.”18
One major difference between Ukraine and Russia
in this respect is the relationship between the oligarchs
and the segments of the state apparatus that can wield
force, such as the security agencies. In Russia, these
constitute separate centers of power, whereas in Ukraine
oligarchic groups have captured the force-wielding seg-
ments of the state apparatus. According to Oleksandr
Dergachev:
When we talk about the role of business in politics and
14 Problems of Post-Communism September/October 2004
state affairs in our country, then we see that it differs
quite sharply from the situation in Russia. The Ukrai-
nian oligarchs, at a much earlier stage, entered the po-
litical power structures and became their core. If in
Russia the bureaucracy and the power ministries play
the first violin, then these same structures in Ukraine
are employed at the service of big capital. And, they
are relatively strongly controlled.19
When Kuchma was elected in 1994, the East Ukrai-
nian industrial elite that had recently taken possession
of large state-owned enterprises—the “red directors”—
were his power base. Toward the end of the 1990s, how-
ever, after major privatization had taken place, three
regionally defined clans of private owners emerged as
the most important economic players, based respectively
on Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, and Kyiv, and they com-
peted for influence on and support from the president.
Each clan has its oligarchs, its political party and par-
liamentary factions, and its newspapers and television
channels (see Table 1).20 The Kyiv clan has the Social
Democratic Party of Ukraine–United, or SDPU(U), the
Donetsk clan has the Party of Regions, and the
Dnipropetrovsk clan has the Labor Ukraine Party. To
keep this analysis as simple as possible, these political
blocs will be referred to only by the names of the clans,
and their parties and parliamentary factions will not be
discussed.
From 1994 to 1996, the Dnipropetrovsk clan domi-
nated politics in Kyiv. Kuchma gradually broadened his
support base, however, and brought the Kyiv clan into
the inner circles of power. Thus, from 1996 to about
2000, the Dnipropetrovsk clan and the Kyiv clan com-
peted for the president’s attention and patronage. The
inclusion of the Kyiv clan was probably caused by at
least two factors. First, its financial strength would have
made it a dangerous enemy. Second, with two clans in
competition, the balance of power between clans and
president was tilted in the president’s favor. Instead of
being a hostage to one clan, Kuchma could play the
clans against one another and thereby increase the power
of the presidency. Kuchma’s administration has been
defined by his desire to retain as much power as pos-
sible in his own office.21
In 2001, the Donetsk clan returned to the political
stage after a long period of weakness. The Donetsk clan
had been powerful under the first president of indepen-
dent Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, but had withdrawn
from the stage after the post of prime minister went to
Kuchma and the Dnipropetrovsk clan in 1992. Since
then, a new and younger generation had risen to finan-
cial power in Donetsk, and by 2001, they felt strong
Table 1
Rival Clans in Ukrainian Politics
Kyiv clan
Political party Social Democratic Party of
Ukraine (United)—SDPU(U)
Rada faction Faction of SDPU(U)
Number of seats in Rada as of 38
February 13, 2004
(of 450)
Media outlets owned or Newspapers Nasha gazeta,
controlled by clan Kyivskie vedomosti, 2000;
television channels Inter TV,
TET, 1+1, and Enter; Web site
www.temnyk.com.ua
Leading politicians Viktor Medvedchuk, Hryhorii
Surkis, Leonid Kravchuk
enough to re-enter the political game in Kyiv. Their
greatest achievement was the appointment of Viktor
Yanukovych as prime minister in November 2002.
Thus, by 2001, Kuchma based his power on all the
three oligarch clans. According to Mikhail Brodskii,
“There are no oligarchs in the country that are not part
of Kuchma’s court.”22 Since the autumn of 2002, how-
ever, Kuchma has come to rely increasingly on the Kyiv
clan. In November 2002, the leader of the Kyiv clan,
Viktor Medvedchuk, was appointed head of the presi-
dential administration. The Kyiv clan’s power was fur-
ther reinforced by a number of personnel decisions in
the autumn of 2003 and by a November 2003 decree
that moved more foreign policy authority from the For-
eign Ministry to the presidential administration. There
were also a growing number of privatization decisions
in favor of the Kyiv clan. Overall, the Kyiv clan has
succeeded in infiltrating every level of executive power
in Ukraine.23
The fact that Kuchma bases his political power on
these oligarchic clans means that he needs them both
in order to rule the country and at election time. The
clans have much to offer the president. Their financial
and media resources can be used to create a positive
image of the president (especially during elections)
and to control what information goes to the public
about the workings of Ukraine’s political process. In
addition, each clan controls an important bloc in the
parliament and important regional leaders, whose sup-
port the president needs to get policy initiatives ac-
cepted and implemented.
Donetsk clan Dnipropetrovsk clan
Party of Regions Working Ukraine
Regions of Ukraine Working Ukraine
67 27
Newspapers Invest-gazeta and Newspapers Kyivskiy telegraf, and Fakty;
Segodnia; Pro-Ua Internet television channels Era, ICTV, STB, and
newspaper (www.prova.com) Novyi Kanal, Web site versii.com.ua
Viktor Yanukovych, Rinat Viktor Pinchuk, Andriy and Leonid
Akhmetov, Yukhym Zviahilsky Derkach, Serhii Tyhypko, Valery
Khoroshkovskii, Dmytro Tabachnyk
The zenith of the oligarchic clans was from 1996 to
2002. In the 2002 parliamentary elections, the pro-presi-
dential For a United Ukraine bloc, which included the
political parties linked to the Donetsk and
Dnipropetrovsk clans, won barely 11.8 percent of the
vote.24 The outcome of the election demonstrated that
combined media, financial, and administrative resources
of the two clans were unable to deliver a result that
pleased the president. This does not mean that clan sup-
port is no longer important in elections, but it does indi-
cate that the clans cannot guarantee victory. Between
election cycles, though, the oligarchs remain as impor-
tant to the president as before.
The Oligarchs and the CES
The Ukrainian oligarchs made their fortunes through
economic ties with Russia, which explains why some
analysts attribute Ukraine’s “return to Russia” to oli-
garchic interests. Observers have also pointed to the
oligarchs as promoting the CES. Rustem Zhangozha,
for example, maintains that “The establishment of the
CES is not motivated by the national interests of
Ukraine but by the interests of certain financial-politi-
cal groups that have evolved during Ukraine’s time of
independence.”25 This claim, however, can easily be
challenged. Although it is true that leading representa-
tives of all three major clans spoke positively of the
agreement, many distanced themselves when the rel-
evant documents were discussed in the government
and the parliament.
Bukkvoll Ukraine and the CES Agreement 15
 The Donetsk clan and elements of the Dnipropetrovsk
clan believe that Ukraine should use the CES process
to create a free-trade zone—nothing more. In practice,
however, this position is close to a repudiation of the
CES in its entirety. Russian officials have made it abun-
dantly clear that there is no way Russia will give free
access to its market without deeper integration in re-
turn. Whereas Ukrainian proponents portray the CES
as a pragmatic and purely economic agreement that in
no way contradicts Ukraine’s officially stated goals of
joining the EU and NATO, the Russian side refers to
the agreement as a political-economic alliance. Russia’s
former privatization tsar, Anatolii Chubais, galvanized
the Ukrainian opponents of the CES, when, soon after
the signing ceremony, he commented that Russia should
try to create a “liberal empire” in the post-Soviet area
in the next thirty to fifty years.26 Similarly, Vadim
Gustov, a member of the Russian Federation Council’s
Committee for CIS Matters, has described the CES as
“A new superpower,”27 and Deputy Prime Minister
Viktor Khristenko revealed that Moscow plans to es-
tablish an “economic constitution” for the four coun-
tries.28 According to the Russian Union of Industrialists,
“The economic rationale for the establishment of the
CES is close to zero.”29
Prime Minister Kasianov has stated that Russia will
accept nothing less than a customs union.30 If Ukraine
enters into a customs union with Russia, that would seem
to end the possibility of Ukrainian EU membership. The
EU is not going to allow a member state to simulta-
neously participate in two customs unions.
Another group of Ukrainian oligarchs sees the free-
trade zone as a necessary first step. As they see it, how-
ever, if this zone is implemented, Ukraine should be
willing to proceed with deeper integration. This seems
to be the position of the Kyiv clan, elements of the
Dnipropetrovsk clan, and, most important, Kuchma and
his protégé, Azarov.
Not surprisingly, the Kyiv clan has displayed the most
unified support for the CES. The clan is strongly con-
trolled by the very pro-Russian leader of the presiden-
tial administration, Viktor Medvedchuk. After the CES
plans were made public in February 2003, Medvedchuk
said, “The SDPU(U) should become the foremost de-
fender of friendly relations with Russia in the Ukrai-
nian political landscape.”31 Mikhail Pohrebinskii, the
Kyiv clan’s chief “ideological adviser,” scornfully called
those who opposed the CES “Euro-romantics” and dis-
missed their slogans about a return to Europe as no more
serious than the “empty babble about the restoration of
the Soviet Union.”32 Nevertheless, the Kyiv clan did
16 Problems of Post-Communism September/October 2004
not actively lobby for the CES until after the second
cabinet meeting on the issue. Thus, despite relatively
unified support, the clan does not consider the CES a
major issue.
The Donetsk clan, personified by Prime Minister
Yanukovych, turned out to be skeptical about the whole
idea. Although Yanukovych’s government ultimately
approved the CES, provided that it did not contradict
the constitution or Euro-Atlantic integration,
Yanukovych did nothing to promote the plan. His pri-
ority was not adopting the documents, but avoiding a
full split in the government. Egor Sobolev called
Yanukovych’s maneuvers a “silent fight against the
CES,” and there were no signs that the clan resented
Yanukovych’s “silent fight.”33 A few other members of
the Donetsk clan made specific comments about the
CES.
The Dnipropetrovsk clan seemed to be divided, how-
ever. Valery Khoroshkovskii, a leading member of the
Dnipropetrovsk clan and former minister of economics
and European integration, was and remains one of the
main Ukrainian antagonists of the CES. He actively
fought the plan from the beginning and was only will-
ing to accept it with revisions so radical that Russia
would never have signed. Khoroshkovskii is a close
business associate of Viktor Pinchuk, who, together with
Serhii Tyhypko, is one of the prominent oligarchs of
the Dnipropetrovsk clan. Pinchuk is also President
Kuchma’s son-in-law. Pinchuk was silent on the issue,
but Tyhypko defended the agreement. He even threat-
ened to remove Khoroshkovskii from the Dni-
propetrovsk clan “quota” in the government unless the
latter changed his position on the CES, but
Khoroshkovskii did not flinch, and no punitive steps
were taken. Tyhypko emphasized that the main task for
the CES should be the establishment of a free-trade zone.
He was willing, however, to consider a customs union
after implementation of the free-trade zone. At the same
time, he said, “If we receive signals from the EU that
Ukrainian membership might become a reality, then we
will go no further than the free-trade zone.”34
In sum, although all three clans gave token support
to the CES, a number of factors make it difficult to con-
clude that President Kuchma was acting to defend the
clans’ foreign policy interests on this issue. The Donetsk
clan, represented by Prime Minister Yanukovych, op-
posed the CES and therefore did nothing to promote it
in the government. The Kyiv clan was in favor, but less
vigorously than one would have expected, and the
Dnipropetrovsk clan was seriously divided on the is-
sue. Given the varied clan positions on the CES issue, it
is unlikely that Kuchma would have lost significant
political support from them if he had stuck to his old
policy of steering Ukraine away from close economic
integration with Russia.
Why Should the Oligarchs
Be Suspicious?
The Ukrainian oligarchs’ lack of enthusiasm—and even
outright opposition—toward the CES may seem sur-
prising. All three clans earn the greatest part of their
financial income from close economic relations with
Russia. Furthermore, in the last three to four years, al-
most all the leading oligarchs and political figures in
the three clans have at times acted as pro-Russian lob-
byists. There are, nonetheless, a number of factors that
may explain the oligarchs’ somewhat surprising suspi-
cion of and reservations about the CES.
Across all sectors of the Ukrainian economy, the
business elites think that a functioning free-trade agree-
ment with Russia would be a good thing. They differ
sharply, though, on the strategic concessions Ukraine
should be willing to make for such an agreement. The
more economic decision-making authority that is trans-
ferred from the national level to the planned CES su-
pra-national level, which in practice means into Russian
hands, the less Ukrainian tycoons will be able to con-
trol their own futures. Andrei Ermolaev claims that the
CES, if implemented, “might mean the loss of economic
independence for Ukrainian financial-industrial
groups.”35 Thus, even the most pro-Russian Ukrainian
oligarchs are likely to defend some degree of Ukrai-
nian independence, from self-interest if not patriotism.
As noted by Aleksandr Dergachov, “Almost everybody
in Kyiv is fully aware of the dangers in being left alone
with Russia.”36 This point may become even more rel-
evant as the remaining state enterprises are privatized.
As long as binding agreements with Russia do not in-
terfere, the Ukrainian oligarchs anticipate that the state
will help them purchase the best enterprises for them-
selves, even if Russian entrepreneurs are able to offer
more money. A prime example is the June 2004
privatization of the Krivorozhal steel mill. The mill was
sold to Viktor Pinchuk from the Dnipropetrovsk clan
and Rinat Akhmetov from the Donets clan, even though
Russian bids were higher.
The Russian media have emphasized this motive to
explain Prime Minister Yanukovych’s initial opposition
to the CES treaty. They claim that his main goal was to
prevent Russian capital from competing with the
Donetsk clan for the remaining Ukrainian state enter-
prises.37 Although the CES documents include provi-
sions about easing the movement of capital among the
participating countries, Russian capital had few prob-
lems entering Ukrainian markets even before the CES.
Therefore, the CES may not make any fundamental
changes in this respect.
Although big business in Ukraine was built on close
relations with Moscow, some of Ukraine’s established
business magnates envision a different future. Accord-
ing to Julia Mostovaia,
Among large- and medium-sized businesses, there are
already a substantial number of property owners who,
not from a romantic but from a pragmatic perspective,
have come to the conclusion that it is possible to real-
ize their private interests within the framework of the
national interest of integrating Ukraine with the civi-
lized world community. It is for this reason that the
businessmen who are engaged in the production of
goods that can compete on the world markets think that
the President’s agreement to the CES was a mistake.38
It is important to remember that the European mar-
ket is about ten times larger than the CES market. In
consequence, companies able to produce goods that are
competitive in price and quality are much more con-
cerned about free access to the European market than
to the Russian market. The problem is, of course, that
very few Ukrainian products can withstand the compe-
tition. Hitherto, the problem has been moderated by
Russia’s demand for these goods, but the situation is
slowly changing because of the Russian strategy of
import substitution. The gas-pipe factories controlled
by Pinchuk illustrate how changes in business opportu-
nities may have influenced the foreign policy thinking
of some oligarchs.
Pinchuk once had a monopoly on the manufacture
and distribution of a certain category of large-diameter
pipe. Since 2002, however, the Volzhskii Pipeline Fac-
tory has been producing the same kind of pipes for the
Russian market, and other Russian pipeline factories
plan to do the same.39 Khoroshkovskii’s resistance to
the CES may reflect, at least in part, the realization of
his patron, Pinchuk, that import substitution is forcing
pipe manufacturers to look for business opportunities
in the West, and this will necessitate Ukrainian integra-
tion into Europe.40 Similar examples of import substi-
tution apply to other goods that Ukrainian enterprises
traditionally shipped to the Russian market. In light of
this, the oligarchic skepticism about the CES can be
interpreted as an indication that lost business opportu-
nities on the Russian market have made some of them
look more to Europe for the future of their businesses,
Bukkvoll Ukraine and the CES Agreement 17
and as a result they are now more interested in Euro-
pean integration.
The “oligarchization” of Ukraine’s economy in the
latter half of the 1990s is another factor that helps to
explain why Ukrainian big business did not forcefully
support the CES. Sectoral lobbying was a significant
feature of the Ukrainian political scene until about 1997–
98, but it became outmoded as the oligarchs acquired
more enterprises.41 Almost all the oligarchs began their
careers in the relatively pro-Russian oil and gas sector,
but later they expanded into any lucrative operation
available. As a result, the machine-building sector can,
for example, no longer speak in one voice on foreign
policy options. The major enterprises in the machine-
building sector are no longer controlled by sector-
minded “red directors,” but by oligarchs who have
business interests in many branches of the economy.
Thus sectoral lobbying for the CES was by 2003 not as
easy as it would have been in the 1990s.
The Ukrainian oligarchy’s partial resistance to the
CES has implications outside of the CES context and
is relevant to how the oligarchs act as a force in Ukrai-
nian foreign policy in general. At the least, it calls
into question the common assumption that they would
willingly betray the principles of Ukrainian indepen-
dence for the sake of private business dealings with
the Russians.
From Private Actor to Statesman
Political actors bring their own interests and percep-
tions when they take public office, and these charac-
teristics are likely to affect their job performance. At
the same time, the new role of public servant is likely
to modify the actor’s interests and perceptions.42 In
Ukraine, the extremely close connection between busi-
ness and politics means that a considerable number of
oligarchs and other business figures have held gov-
ernmental offices. Although an executive may enter
political life to defend factional interests, once he as-
sumes an official post, there will be a normative pres-
sure to also see the world in terms of national
interests.43 When Kuchma abandoned his promise to
reorient Ukrainian foreign policy toward Russia after
1994, analysts said that he had developed the outlook
of a derzhavnik (statesman). One assumes that he de-
veloped this statesmanlike tendency because of his
position as president.
Position also influenced Viktor Yanukovych’s per-
ceptions and policy following his appointment as
prime minister in November 2002. Capturing the
18 Problems of Post-Communism September/October 2004
prime minister’s office was seen as a major victory
for the Donetsk clan. Analysts expected that
Yanukovych would promote the clan’s interests and
would be guided by its presumed pro-Russian atti-
tudes.44 Analysts also predicted that the staunch busi-
ness orientation of the Donetsk clan would encourage
Yanukovych to pursue factional self-interests. Unlike
the other two clans, the Donetsk clan has generally
been interested in politics only as far as its affects
their business interests.45 Yanukovych, however, did
not become a staunch defender of Donetsk and Rus-
sian interests. To the contrary, he was seen as “trying
to defend the state interest, even when it is to his
own disadvantage, although this is clearly very diffi-
cult for him.”46 Furthermore, Yanukovych wants to run
for president in the autumn 2004 presidential elections.
His initial opposition to the CES endangered his presi-
dential ambitions. By going against the will of the presi-
dent, Yanukovych risked being fired as prime minister,47
and without this post as a start, his chances in the presi-
dential elections would be very poor. Opposing the CES
might also lose him Moscow’s support in the elections,
and, as well, would probably cost him many votes in
eastern Ukraine, where the idea of the CES is quite
popular.
According to members of the working group that
prepared the CES documents, one of the main reasons
for Yanukovych’s resistance to the CES was his grow-
ing resentment about the conduct and manner of Rus-
sian delegations.48 Yanukovych may have interpreted
their insolence as an attack on his identity as the prime
minister of an independent state, and this may explain
his CES resistance. The leader of the Rada’s Regula-
tory Politics and Business Committee, Inna
Bogoslovska, claims that this is a common phenom-
enon in Russian-Ukrainian relations:
Only those [Ukrainians] who have had nothing to do
with the Russians for a long time are able to remain
their zealous supporters. This is particularly true in
business and in politics. Working with the Russians is a
most effective medicine against Russophilia. The more
Ukrainians negotiate with Russians in business or in
politics, the more we will appreciate our good fortune
for living in an independent state.49
However, Yanukovych’s emergence as a statesman
suffered a setback when the CES agreement came up
for a final vote in the Rada on April 20, 2004. By then
Yanukovych had been officially designated as the presi-
dential candidate of the united pro-Kuchma centrist
political forces, and the presidency was suddenly more
attainable. Thus he did not seek to obstruct the CES and
instead actively promoted the agreement.50 Ukrainian
observers saw this change of mind as a setback for
Yanukovych’s image as a statesman, and a clear example
of opportunism in terms of securing Russian support
for his presidential bid.51
Valery Khoroshkovski is another government min-
ister whose resistance to the CES was somewhat un-
expected. Khoroshkovskii, a former minister of
economy and European integration, is a close ally of
Pinchuk. Pinchuk has often been accused of lobbying
for Russian interests, and Khoroshkovskii’s own capi-
tal structures are closely interlinked with Russian capi-
tal. In December 2001, Khoroshkovskii and several
other young businessmen founded a political party, the
Winter Generation, that was seen as a Pinchuk experi-
ment. The party had as one of its main goals the estab-
lishment of close economic relations with Russia.
Thus, many observers were surprised when
Khoroshkovskii, in late 2003, became an outspoken
foe of the CES agreement. After he resigned from the
government in early 2004, the independent weekly
Zerkalo nedely stated that Khoroshkovskii was no hero,
but he had made an honest attempt to let national in-
terests guide his actions when in office.52 It remains to
be seen how much his resistance to the CES has dam-
aged his business dealings with Russian big capital
and the Russian government.
Kuchma, Russia, and the CES
Why was it so important for Kuchma to get the CES
agreement signed in September 2003? Why was he will-
ing to consider scuttling the same agreement one month
later in an effort to pressure the Russians in connection
with the Tuzla incident?
First, Kuchma’s personal interest in either running
for a third term in the 2004 elections or getting his des-
ignated candidate elected prompted the president to ini-
tiate the entire CES process.53 If Kuchma could choose
his successor, he would retain some political influence
after leaving office and could extract guarantees that he
would not be prosecuted for things he has done during
his presidency (as Putin had done for Yeltsin in Rus-
sia). Kuchma probably thought that the CES could se-
cure him Russian support in late 2004 and win him many
votes both in eastern and southern Ukraine. Opinion
polls showed that between 60 and 70 percent of the popu-
lation supported Ukrainian membership in the CES, and
the figures are probably higher in eastern and southern
Ukraine.54 Since the 2002 parliamentary race had shown
the limits of the oligarchs’ power to sway elections,
Kuchma needed to appeal directly to Russia and the
Ukrainian electorate.
It seems less likely that Kuchma initiated the CES
process because he thought the agreement would be in
Ukraine’s national interest. If that had been the case, he
would hardly have threatened to scrap the whole agree-
ment because of the Tuzla incident. His opposition to
Ukrainian membership in the structurally similar Eur-
asian Economic Union also suggests that national in-
terest was not his motive for promoting the CES. If he
had thought close economic integration with Russia was
in Ukraine’s national interest, he would not have op-
posed Ukrainian membership in the EEU. Politicians
do change their views of the national interest, but there
were no indications of such a change prior to the Febru-
ary 2003 announcement. This fact, combined with the
personal benefits for Kuchma discussed above, suggests
that private self-interest, not national interest, was his
main motivation for embracing the CES.
However, Kuchma wants more than good terms for
himself after leaving office. According to Inis Claude,
“The lovers of naked power are far less typical than
those who aspire to clothe themselves in the mantle of
legitimate authority; emperors may be nude, but they
do not like to be so, to think themselves so, or to be so
regarded.”55 A motivation of this kind helps explain the
presidential decree hinting that Ukraine would withdraw
from the CES because of Tuzla. Kuchma could not be
seen as willing to negotiate Ukrainian territorial integ-
rity in return for support in the upcoming elections, and
he therefore had to protest Russia’s behavior in the Tuzla
incident even if it could cost him Russian support in the
2004 elections.
Kuchma only needs Moscow’s support through the
autumn 2004 elections. Afterward, Russian support will
still be welcome but not critical. Thus, the entire CES
process may only be a scheme to get Russian backing
in the elections—Kuchma may never have intended
actual implementation of the CES.56 If so, this would
have some costs in terms of provoking Russia, but Rus-
sia has been disappointed in Kuchma before and still
not turned its back on him. The domestic propaganda
value of being able to claim “Ukraine is with us and not
the West” has probably outweighed any Kremlin desire
to punish Kuchma for earlier disappointments.
Nonetheless, if Kuchma has no intention of imple-
menting the CES, he must be aware that such a cha-
rade damages Ukraine’s efforts for European
integration. Official EU reactions are rather muted. A
free-trade agreement with Russia, Belarus, and
Kazakhstan would not necessarily undermine closer
Bukkvoll Ukraine and the CES Agreement 19
Ukrainian relations with the EU, but Ukraine cannot
become a EU member if it establishes a customs union,
unified economic and trade policies, and potentially
supra-national bodies with the same post-Soviet coun-
tries. Aside from the technicalities, there also seems
to be an element of geopolitics in the EU’s reaction.57
The EU has promised Ukraine almost nothing in terms
of integration, but as some EU officials see it all the
same, Ukraine cannot give its political allegiance to
both Brussels and Moscow, and must decide between
them. Thus, the EU is likely to interpret Ukrainian
participation in the CES in geopolitical terms even if
little of the agreement is actually implemented.
Kuchma’s decision to promote the CES and a num-
ber of other acts acquiescing to Russian interests have
led to accusations that he was never serious about seek-
ing Ukrainian membership in Euro-Atlantic structures.
That may be too harsh a judgment. Under Kuchma’s
leadership, Ukraine abandoned its neutrality and de-
clared its intention to join NATO. This shift came at a
time when Kuchma had lost all personal Western sup-
port because of his regime’s authoritarian tendencies,
so it is hard to see how promoting NATO membership
could have had anything to do with strengthening his
personal power. Anatoliy Zlenko, former minister of
foreign affairs, writes in his memoirs that Kuchma was
able to “overcome his own ideological barriers, and
become the main inspirer and promoter of Ukraine’s
integration into NATO.”58 When a series of political
scandals and accusations of illegal arms-trade led NATO
to exclude Kuchma from a November 2002 summit in
Prague, he decided to endure the personal humiliation
of appearing uninvited to show how seriously he sought
NATO membership. Zlenko also claims that Kuchma’s
1998 declaration of Ukraine’s aspiration to become a
full member of the EU should be seen as a watershed in
Ukrainian foreign policy and in Kuchma’s political
thinking.59 In this respect, Kuchma’s CES policy could
be seen as a deviation from promoting national inter-
ests—steering Ukraine toward Europe—to self-inter-
est, namely, securing Russian support in the upcoming
elections.
Conclusion
The findings in this article support the argument that
individual and factional self-interest rather than strate-
gic calculations of the national interest explain Ukraine’s
position on the CES. Nevertheless, they do not support
the argument that President Kuchma blindly promotes
the pro-Russian foreign policy interests of the oligar-
20 Problems of Post-Communism September/October 2004
chic clans in order to secure their political backing. There
are at least three factors that contradict this picture.
First, although all the oligarchic clans made their ini-
tial fortunes based on close economic relations with
Russia, today they are quite skeptical about excessively
close economic integration with Russia. This skepticism
runs especially deep in the Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk
clans. The Kyiv clan is the one most willing to continue
along the eastern integration path, but does not regard
the CES as a critical issue.
Second, whereas the president needs the oligarchs’
considerable financial, administrative, and media re-
sources, they failed to deliver in the 2002 parliamen-
tary elections. As a consequence, Kuchma realized that
he needs to find support outside the clans. The CES
initiative can thus be seen as an attempt to garner sup-
port from the Ukrainian public (particularly in the east
and south) and from Russia.
Third, although both the president and many of the
oligarchs may at times be willing to submit to Russian
demands on behalf of the Ukrainian state to secure their
private interests, there are limits to their willingness.
As demonstrated in the Tuzla incident, neither the presi-
dent nor the oligarchic clans was willing to continue
integration efforts with a country that did not respect
Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Only after Russia bowed
to Ukrainian demands and ended the dam project was it
possible again to talk about the CES. The real signifi-
cance of the Tuzla incident does not lie in the value of
this sandbank in the Kerch strait, but in Russia’s blatant
lack of respect for Ukrainian independence.
Throughout Kuchma’s presidency, there have been
trade-offs between the temptation to self-interestedly
compromise his proclaimed pro-European policy in or-
der to secure private backing in Russia and the desire to
win a place in history as the president who began
Ukraine’s integration into Europe. At the moment, he
wants to control the autumn 2004 elections and counts
on Russian backing, but he does not want to be remem-
bered as the president who let himself be bullied by his
dam-building neighbor, or who made Ukraine turn its
back on Europe and return to the Russian fold.
The final test of Kuchma’s European conversion,
however, is what he decides to do in the autumn of
2004. There seem to be two options. He may decide to
run for a third term and win the elections by means of
manipulation, fraud, and Russian support or to secure
victory for a designated successor such as Yanukovych
in a similar fashion. In this case, the proclaimed Euro-
pean choice will no longer have any credibility, and
Kuchma knows that. Second, if Yanukovych runs and
wins, he would need to reassure Europe about
Ukraine’s western orientation. Alternatively, Kuchma
could make a deal with the opposition in which he lets
the elections run their course without interference in
return for guarantees against legal prosecution after
his term ends. Since this would most likely make op-
position leader Victor Yushchenko president, the op-
position might accept such a deal. In terms of
continuing to embrace Europe, this would be Kuchma’s
most convincing alternative.
Notes
1. The term “oligarch” as used here designates an individual with a
strong position in domestic business who is also heavily involved in
Ukraine’s political life.
2. Vladimir Lupatsii and Tatiana Grebneva, “Rasshcheplenie vlasti”
(The Split of Power), Kompanion, no. 42 (October 28–November 1, 2002).
For similar interpretations, see Rosaria Puglisi, “Clashing Agendas? Eco-
nomic Interests, Elite Coalitions, and Prospects for Cooperation Between
Russia and Ukraine,” Europe-Asia Studies 55, no. 6 (November 2003): 827–
45; Aleksandr Dergachev, “Tiazhkii krest istoricheskoi druzhby” (The Heavy
Cross of Historical Friendship), Zerkalo nedely, no. 44 (November 15–21,
2003).
3. According to Alexander Wendt, “Pluralists attempt to reduce the
state to interest groups and individuals in society,” and Richard Little
says that pluralists “undermine the conception of the national interest
which provides the starting point for most realist analysis. The Ameri-
can pluralists argued that the idea of the national interest did no more
than serve as a useful tool for propaganda.” Alexander Wendt, Social
Theory of International Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1999), p. 200; Richard Little, “The Growing Relevance of Pluralism?”
in International Theory: Positivism & Beyond, ed. Steve Smith, Ken
Booth, and Marysia Zalewski (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1996), p. 71.
4. Jeremy Bransten, “CIS: Common Economic Space May Yet Run
Aground,” RFE/RL Feature (September 24, 2003). The CES documents
refer to five major areas of economic integration: a free-trade zone, a cus-
toms union, coordination of foreign economic policies, unified entry into
the World Trade Organization, and the establishment of a supra-national
political organ to implement the first four. Decisions by this latter institu-
tion will be compulsory for the member states, and the division of votes
within the institution will be distributed according to the size of each
country’s GDP. This means that Russia will have a majority of the votes.
The implementation of all these points is planned to take from five to seven
years after the parliaments of all the member states have ratified the agree-
ment. The agreement explicitly states that the member states may imple-
ment the five different areas of integration at different speeds. The latter
point was a concession to Ukraine.
5. This is an allusion to the expansion of the Russian empire that be-
gan in the sixteenth century.
6. In 1654, Bohdan Khmelnitsky, leader of the then-semi-indepen-
dent Ukrainian Cossacks, signed an agreement whereby the Cossacks would
submit “to the tsar’s hand” but continue to enjoy the autonomy, rights, and
privileges that they had previously enjoyed under Polish rule. This agree-
ment marked the beginning of Russian control of much of the region where
Ukrainian was spoken. On Buteiko’s resignation, see Evgenia Poliakova,
“Nakanune EEP: Kuchma protiv diplomatov” (The Day Before the CES:
Kuchma Against the Diplomats), Ukrainska pravda (September 17, 2003).
7. Dergachev, “Tiazhkii krest.”
8. The Eurasian Economic Union consists of Belarus, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan. The agreement on which this organiza-
tion is based is similar to the one for the CES.
9. See Igor Guzhva, “Proekt chetyrekh prezidentov” (The Project of
Four Presidents), Ekspert (March 3, 2003); Aleksandr Bekker and Oleg
Gavrish, “Siurpriz iz Kyiva” (The Surprise from Kyiv), Vedomosti (Sep-
tember 11, 2003).
10. On Azarov’s unquestioning loyalty, see Iurii Tymchuk, “Peremennaia
konstanta” (The Changing Constant], Kontext (November 10, 2003) (avail-
able at www.context-ua.com/print/politperson/39203.html).
11. Quoted in interview with Inna Bogoslavska in Zerkalo nedely, no. 3
(January 24–30, 2004).
12. Tatiana Silina, “Bespridannitsa—v polskuiu Krinitsu-Gurskuiu
president ne edet. Emu tam nechego skaztat” (Girl Without Dowry—The
President Is Not Going to the Polish Town of Krinitsa-Gurska. He Has
Nothing to Say There), Zerkalo nedely, no. 33 (August 30–September 5,
2003).
13. Sergei Solodkii and Natalia Trofimova, “Ukraina—ne Rossiia”
(Ukraine Is Not Russia), Den (September 13, 2003).
14. Tatiana Silina, “Kak zakalialas stal” (How the Steel Was Tempered),
Zerkalo nedely, no. 35 (September 13–19, 2003).
15. Interfax-Ukraine (October 23, 2003).
16. See Forum (November 29, 2003) (http://ukr.for-ua.com/news/2003/
11/29/162951.html).
17. According to Julia Mostovaia of Zerkalo nedely, Moscow has in-
formed Kuchma that it is not going to support a third term for him. See
Julia Mostovaia, “Chuzhoi i eshche chuzhee” (Strange and Even Stranger),
Zerkalo nedely (February 7–13, 2004).
18. Anders Åslund, “Left Behind: Ukraine’s Uncertain Transformation,”
National Interest 14 (fall 2003): 109.
19. Interview with Dergachev in Kompanion, no. 45 (November 7–13,
2003).
20. The Ukrainian business clans should not be seen as tightly knit
unitary organizations. They are clusters of businessmen, bureaucrats, and
politicians who have certain common interests and an allegiance to one
another. This does not mean that there is no competition or conflict among
members of the same clan. but such conflicts coexist with a readiness to
defend fellow clan member when they are in competition with members of
other clans and to seek support first from within one’s own clan.
21. For more on this, see the excellent article by Dmytro Vydrin, “Epokha
Prezidenta Kuchmy (i nemnogo posle)” (The Epoch of President Kuchma—
and a Little Bit Afterward), Zerkalo nedely, no. 37 (September 27–October
3, 2003).
22. Interview with Mikhail Brodskii in Kompanion (November 7, 2003).
23. For an illuminating discussion, see Sergei Rudenko, “Kadrovyi
rozarii” (The Cadre Bouquet], Delovaia nedelia (January 22–28, 2004).
24. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Organiza-
tion for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Final Report on Parliamen-
tary Elections in Ukraine, 31 March 2002 (www.osce.org/odhir/).
25. Interview with Rustem Zhangozha, Kontext (September 18, 2003).
26. Boris Gorlin, “Anatolii Chubais vystupil s predvybornoi rechiu”
(Anatolii Chubais Made a Pre-Election Speech), Kommersant (September
26, 2003).
27. Interview with Vadim Gustov, Finansovii kontrol (June 25, 2003).
28. Tatiana Vysotskaia, “Igra v odni vorota” (Playing the Same Goal),
Delovaia nedelia (January 22–28, 2004).
29. Interview with Sergei Maksimenko, leader of Kyiv’s East-West In-
stitute, Den (October 3, 2003).
30. Ruslan Ilichev, Mikhail Ignatiev, Natalia Babina, and Svetlana
Ezhova “Gosudarstvo i ekonomika” (The State and the Economy), Biznes
(September 15, 2003).
31. Vladimir Lupatsii, “Igra v dve ruki” (Playing with Two Hands),
Kompanion (April 25, 2003).
32. See Vladimir Arev, “Ranshe dumai o rodine” (First Think of the
Motherland), Zerkalo nedely, no. 38 (October 4–10, 2003).
33. Egor Sobolev, “Troechniki” (Weak Students), Zerkalo nedely, no.
35 (September 13–19, 2003).
34. Interview with Sergei Tyhypko in Zerkalo nedely, no. 36 (Septem-
ber 20–26, 2003).
35. Ermolaev quoted in Iurii Tymchuk, “Ukrainskaia biznes-elita
Bukkvoll Ukraine and the CES Agreement 21
raskololas v otnoshenii EEP” (The Ukrainian Business Elite Is Divided
over the CES Issue), Kontext (September 15, 2003).
36. Dergachev, “Tiazhkii krest.”
37. Bekker and Gavrish, “Siurpriz iz Kyiva.”
38. Interview with Julia Mostovaia in Zerkalo nedely, no. 44 (Novem-
ber 15–21, 2003).
39. Mikhail Baranov and Nikolai Makeev, “Ukraina peretiagivaet u
Rossii trubu” (Ukraine Is Pulling the Plug on Russia), Gazeta (November
19, 2003); Mikhail Ignatiev, “Rossiiskii trubnii rynok: mnogo nas, a on
odin,” (The Russian Pipeline Market: There Are Many of Us, But It Is
Alone), Neftegazovaia vertikal (November 7, 2003).
40. “K voprosu o motivatsii otritsatelnoi pozitsii po uchastiu Ukrainy v
EEP” (On the Motivation for the Negative Stance on Ukrainian Member-
ship in the CES], Ekspress-Inform Information Agency (October 1, 2003)
(http://ei.com.ua).
41. On this point, see Tor Bukkvoll, “Defining a Ukrainian Foreign
Policy Identity: Business Interests and Geopolitics in the Formulation of
Ukrainian Foreign Policy 1994–1999,” in Ukrainian Foreign and Security
Policy–Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives, ed. Jennifer D.P.
Moroney, Taras Kuzio, and Mikhail Molchanov (Westport, CT: Praeger,
2003), pp. 131–53.
42. For a detailed discussion of individuals’ roles as motives for politi-
cal action, see James N. Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 210–42.
43. On this point, see the discussion by Adam Przeworski, States and
Markets: A Primer in Political Economy (New York: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2003), pp. 85–88.
44. On Yanukovych being perceived as pro-Russian, see Taras Kuzio,
“Moscow’s Energy Strategy,” Jane’s Intelligence Digest (December 20,
2002).
45. Sergei Rakhmanin, “Razvod po-Donetskii” (Divorce Donetsk Style),
Zerkalo nedely, no. 43 (November 8–14, 2003).
46. Sobolev, “Troechniki.”
47. Dmitrii Dzhangirov, “Tretii srok kak ultima ratio” (Three Terms
Maximum), Ponedelnik, no. 35 (October 13, 2003).
48. Silina, “Kak zakalialas stal.”
49. Interview with Inna Bogoslovska in Den (November 29, 2003).
22 Problems of Post-Communism September/October 2004
50. Danilo Pobut, “EEP: smert Ukraiiny, koma chy ii nove
narodzhennia?” (CES: The Death of Ukraine, or Is It Her New Revival?),
Ukrainska pravda (April 21, 2004).
51. See Tatiana Silina, “Souchastniki” (Accomplices], Zerkalo nedely,
no. 16 (April 24–30, 2004); Irina Pogorelova, “Ekstsess ispolniteliei” (Ex-
aggerations of the Executive], Ukrainska pravda (April 21, 2004); Aleksandr
Mikhelson, “Kamo griadeshi, EEP?” (Whither Goes the CES?], Glavred
(April 21, 2004) (www.glavred.info).
52. See “Ministr ekonomiki podal v otstavku” (The Minister of Economy
Resigned), Zerkalo Nedely, no. 1 (January 10–16, 2004).
53. See Aleksandr Palii, “Vchera byl EEP” (Yesterday Was CES],
Ukryinska pravda (September 22, 2003); Aleksei Kordun’s comments to
the Internet site Forum (September 10, 2003) (http://rus.for-ua.com/
print.php?u=comments/2003/09/10/145706.html); Dmytro Vydrin’s com-
ments to Lvivska hazeta (September 19, 2003).
54. See the figures for the SOTSI Gallup institute in Iurii Tymchuk,
“Ukrainskaia biznes-elita raskololas v otnoshenii EEP” (Ukrainian Busi-
ness Elite Is Divided over the CES Issue], Kontext (September 15, 2003),
and the figures of the Razumkov Centre at www.uceps.com.ua/ukr/all/so-
ciology/2003_02/35.gif.
55. Inis I. Claude, Jr., “Collective Legitimization as a Political Func-
tion of the United Nations,” International Organization, no. 20 (1966):
368.
56. Tatiana Silina, in Zerkalo nedely, claims that a number of Ukrainian
observers adhere to this interpretation. See Tatiana Silina, “EEPeiskii vybor”
(The CES Choice), Zerkalo nedely, no. 36 (September 20–26, 2003).
57. See especially the interview with Jan Marinus Virsma, one of the
chairs of the Ukraine-EU Committee of Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation,
in Zerkalo nedely, no. 38 (October 4–10, 2003).
58. Anatolii Zlenko, Diplomatia i politika (Diplomacy and Politics)
(Kharkiv: Folio, 2003), p. 527.
59. Ibid., p. 131.
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