Art.
278(g) When, in his opinion, there exists maintain an effective skeletal workforce of medical and other
a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in
an industry indispensable to the national interest, the
Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction
over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the
Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or
certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining
the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in
the assumption or certification order. If one has already
taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all
striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to
work and the employer shall immediately resume operations
and readmit all workers under the same terms and
conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The
Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission may
seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure
compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as
he may issue to enforce the same.
In line with the national concern for and the highest
respect accorded to the right of patients to life and health,
strikes and lockouts in hospitals, clinics and similar medical
institutions shall, to every extent possible, be avoided, and all
serious efforts, not only by labor and management but
government as well, be exhausted to substantially minimize,
if not prevent, their adverse effects on such life and health,
through the exercise, however legitimate, by labor of its right
to strike and by management to lockout. In labor disputes
adversely affecting the continued operation of such hospitals,
clinics or medical institutions, it shall be the duty of the
striking union or locking-out employer to provide and
health personnel, whose movement and services shall be
unhampered and unrestricted, as are necessary to insure the
proper and adequate protection of the life and health of its
patients, most especially emergency cases, for the duration of
the strike or lockout. In such cases, therefore, the Secretary
of Labor and Employment may immediately assume, within
twenty four (24) hours from knowledge of the occurrence of
such a strike or lockout, jurisdiction over the same or certify it
to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. For this
purpose, the contending parties are strictly enjoined to
comply with such orders, prohibitions and/or injunctions as
are issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment or the
Commission, under pain of immediate disciplinary action,
including dismissal or loss of employment status or payment
by the locking-out employer of backwages, damages and
other affirmative relief, even criminal prosecution against
either or both of them. 
The foregoing notwithstanding, the President of the
Philippines shall not be precluded from determining the
industries that, in his opinion, are indispensable to the
national interest, and from intervening at any time and
assuming jurisdiction over any such labor dispute in order to
settle or terminate the same.
Art. 225 (e)  To enjoin or restrain any actual or
threatened commission of any or all prohibited or unlawful
acts or to require the performance of a particular act in
any labor dispute which, if not restrained or performed
forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any
party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such
party: Provided, That no temporary or permanent injunction
in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute as
defined in this Code shall be issued except after hearing the
testimony of witnesses, with opportunity for cross-
examination, in support of the allegations of a complaint
made under oath, and testimony in opposition thereto, if
offered, and only after a finding of fact by the Commission, to
the effect:
(1) That prohibited or unlawful acts have been
threatened and will be committed unless restrained, or have
been committed and will be continued unless restrained, but
no injunction or temporary restraining order shall be issued
on account of any threat, prohibited or unlawful act, except
against the person or persons, association or organization
making the threat or committing the prohibited or unlawful
act or actually authorizing or ratifying the same after actual
knowledge thereof;
(2) That substantial and irreparable injury to
complainant's property will follow;
(3) That as to each item of relief to be granted, greater
injury will be inflicted upon complainant by the denial of relief
than will be inflicted upon defendants by the granting of
relief;
(4) That complainant has no adequate remedy at law;
and
(5) That the public officers charged with the duty to
protect complainant's property are unable or unwilling to
furnish adequate protection.
Such hearing shall be held after due and personal
notice thereof has been served, in such manner as the
Commission shall direct, to all known persons against whom
relief is sought, and also to the Chief Executive and other
public officials of the province or city within which the
unlawful acts have been threatened or committed, charged
with the duty to protect complainant's property: Provided,
however, That if a complainant shall also allege that, unless a
temporary restraining order shall be issued without notice, a
substantial and irreparable injury to complainant's property
will be unavoidable, such a temporary restraining order may
be issued upon testimony under oath, sufficient, if sustained,
to justify the Commission in issuing a temporary injunction
upon hearing after notice. Such a temporary restraining order
shall be effective for no longer than twenty (20) days and shall
become void at the expiration of said twenty (20) days. No
such temporary restraining order or temporary injunction
shall be issued except on condition that complainant shall
first file an undertaking with adequate security in an amount
to be fixed by the Commission sufficient to recompense those
enjoined for any loss, expense or damage caused by the
improvident or erroneous issuance of such order or
injunction, including all reasonable costs, together with a
reasonable attorney's fee, and expense of defense against
the order or against the granting of any injunctive relief
sought in the same proceeding and subsequently denied by
the Commission.
 The undertaking herein mentioned shall be
understood to constitute an agreement entered into by the
complainant and the surety upon which an order may be
rendered in the same suit or proceeding against said
complainant and surety, upon a hearing to assess damages,
of which hearing, complainant and surety shall have
reasonable notice, the said complainant and surety
submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the Commission
for that purpose. But nothing herein contained shall deprive
any party having a claim or cause of action under or upon
such undertaking from electing to pursue his ordinary
remedy by suit at law or in equity: Provided, further, That the
reception of evidence for the application of a writ of
injunction may be delegated by the Commission to any of
its Labor Arbiters who shall conduct such hearings in such
places as he may determine to be accessible to the parties
and their witnesses and shall submit thereafter his
recommendation to the Commission.
G.R. No. 157163               June 25, 2014
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE AGAPITO L. HONTANOSAS, JR., REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 16, CEBU CITY, SILVERIO BORBON, SPOUSES
XERXES AND ERLINDA FACULTAD, AND XM FACULTAD &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Injunction should not issue except upon a clear showing that the applicant
has a right in esse to be protected, and that the acts sought to be enjoined
are violative of such right. A preliminary injunction should not determine the
merits of a case, or decide controverted facts, for, being a preventive
remedy, it only seeks to prevent threatened wrong, further injury, and
irreparable harm or injustice until the rights of the parties can be settled.
The Case
Under review at the instance of the defendant, now the petitioner herein, is
the decision promulgated on July 9, 2002,  whereby the Court of Appeals
1
(CA) upheld the order issuedon July 5, 2001 in Civil Case No. CEB-26468
entitled Spouses Silverio & Zosima Borbon, et al. v. Bank of the Philippine
Islandsby the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 16, in Cebu City, presided
by Hon. Judge Agapito L. Hontanosas, Jr.
Antecedents
Facultad et al sought the declaration of the nullity of the promissory
notes they had executed in favor of BPI.
On May 22, 2001, respondents Spouses Silverio and Zosima Borbon,
Spouses Xerxes and Erlinda Facultad,and XM Facultad and Development
Corporation (Falcutad et al) commenced Civil Case No. CEB-26468 to seek
the declaration of the nullity of the promissory notes,real estate and chattel
mortgages and continuing surety agreement they had executed in favor of
the BPI.
They further sought damages and attorney’s fees, and applied for a
temporary restraining order (TRO) or writ of preliminary injunction to
prevent the petitioner from foreclosing on the mortgages against their
properties.
The complaint alleged that the respondents had obtained a loan from the
petitioner, and had executed promissory notes binding themselves, jointly
and severally, to pay the sum borrowed; that as security for the payment of
the loan, they had constituted real estate mortgages on several parcels of
land in favor of the petitioner; and that they had been made to sign a
continuing surety agreement and a chattel mortgage on their Mitsubishi
Pajero.
It appears that the respondents’ obligation to the petitioner had reached
₱17,983,191.49, but they had only been able to pay ₱13 Million because
they had been adversely affected by the economic turmoil in Asia in 1997.
BPI required them to issue postdated checks to cover the loan under threat
of foreclosing on the mortgages. Thus, the complaint sought a TRO or a writ
of preliminary injunction to stay the threatened foreclosure.
On June 6, 2001, the petitioner filed its answer with affirmative defenses and
counterclaim, as well as its oppositionto the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction, contending that the foreclosure of the mortgages was
within itslegal right to do.
2
Also on June 6, 2001 the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss reiterating its
affirmative defenses, to wit:
I) THAT THE COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE
VENUE IS IMPROPERLYLAID. (RULE 16, SECITON 1,
PARAGRAPH (C);
II) THAT THE COURT HAS NOTACQUIRED JURISDICTION
OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OFTHE CLAIM BECAUSE THE
PROPER LEGAL FEES HAS NOT BEEN PAID IN ACCORDANCE
WITH RULE 14, OF THE RULES OF COURT AND CIRCULAR
NO. 7 OF THE SUPREME COURT, SERIES OF 1988;
III) THAT ZOSIMA BORBON’S COMPLAINT SHOULD BE
DISMISSED BECAUSE PLAINTIFF ZOSIMA BORBON HAS NO
 LEGAL PERSONALITY TO SUE BEING DECEASED, SPOUSE
OF PLAINTIFF SILVERIO BORBON. (RULE 16, SECTION 1(d);
IV) THAT THE ESTATE OF ZOSIMA BORBON BEING AN
INDISPENSABLE PARTY, THE COMPLAINT SHOULD BE
AMENDED TO INCLUDE THE ESTATE OF ZOSIMA BORBON.
(RULE 16, SECTION 1(j);
V) THAT THE COMPLAINT OFPLAINTIFF XM FACULTAD AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, SHOULD BE DISMISSED
BECAUSE THERE IS NO BOARD RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING
THE FILING OF THIS CASE. [RULE 16, SECTION 1 (d)];
VI) THAT THE PLEADING ASSERTING THE CLAIM STATES NO
CAUSE OF ACTION. 3
On July 5, 2001, the RTC denied the petitioner’s motion to dismissfor being
unmeritorious,  but granted the respondents’ application for preliminary
4
injunction,  to wit:
5
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the application for preliminary
injunction is GRANTED. Upon filing by the plaintiffapplicants of a bond in the
amount of ₱2,000,000 in favor of defendant to the effect that applicants will
pay to adverse party all damages which it may sustain by reason of the
injunction, let a writ of preliminary injunction be issued directing the
defendant and its agents or representatives, to cease and desist from
commencing foreclosure and sale proceedings of the mortgaged properties;
from taking possession of the Mitsubishi Pajero subject of the chattel
mortgage; and from using the questioned post-dated checks as evidence for
the filing of complaint against plaintiffs Facultad for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22, while the present case is pending litigation.
This writ of preliminary injunction shall continue until further orders from the
Court.
Notify the parties of this Order.
SO ORDERED. 6
The RTC later denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration through its
order  of August 22, 2001.
7
Ruling of the CA
Dissatisfied, the petitioner assailed the orders of the RTC by petition for
certiorariin the CA, submitting the lone issue of:
WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT ISSUED AN ORDER DENYING THE
MOTION TO DISMISS AND GRANTING THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
MANDATORY INJUNCTION.
On July 9, 2002, however, the CArendered the adverse decision under
review, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed order of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 16 dated July 5, 2001 and August 22,
2001 are hereby AFFIRMED. Let the original records of this case be
remanded immediately to the court a quo for further proceedings. SO
ORDERED. 8
The CA held that the petitioner’s averment of non-payment of the proper
docket fee by the respondents asthe plaintiffs in Civil Case No. CEB-26468
was not substantiated; that even if the correct docket fee was not in fact
paid, the strict application of the rule thereon could be mitigated in the
interest of justice;  and that Civil Case No. CEB-26468, being a personal
9
action, was properly filed in Cebu City where respondent XM Facultad and
Development Corporation’s principal office was located. 10
The CA further held that ZosimaBorbon’s death rendered respondent
Silverio Borbon, her surviving spouse, the successor to her estate; that
although there was a valid transfer of interest pending the litigation, the
dismissal of the complaintwould not be in order because it was permissible
under the rules to continue the action in the name of the original party;  and
11
that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of
preliminary injunction because it thereby only applied the pertinent law and
jurisprudence. 12
The CA denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsiderationthrough its
resolution of February 12, 2003. 13
Issues
Hence, this appeal, with the petitioner positing as follows:
 1. Whether or not Civil Case No. CEB-26468 should be dismissed
for (a) non-payment of the correct amount of docket fee; and (b)
improper venue; 14
2. Whether or not the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction against the petitioner, its agents and
representatives, was in order.
Ruling of the Court
The appeal is partly meritorious.
1. Civil Case No. CEB-26468 was a personal action; hence, venue was
properly laid
The CA and the RTC held that Civil Case No. CEB-26468, being for the
declaration of the nullity of a contract of loan and its accompanying
continuing surety agreement, and the real estate and chattel mortgages, was
a personal action; hence, its filing in Cebu City, the place of business of one
of the plaintiffs, was correct under Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.
The petitioner contends, however, that Civil Case No. CEB-26468 was a real
action that should be commenced and tried in the proper court having
jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion
thereof, was situated; and thatconsequently the filing and docket fees for the
complaintshould be based on the value of the property as stated in the
certificate of sale attached thereto.
We sustain the lower courts’ holdings.
The determinants of whether an action is of a real or a personal nature have
been fixed by the Rules of Courtand relevant jurisprudence. According to
Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real action is one that affects title
to or possession of real property, or an interest therein. Such action is to be
commenced and tried in the proper court having jurisdiction over the area
wherein the real property involved, ora portion thereof, is situated, which
explains why the action is also referred to as a localaction. In contrast, the
Rules of Courtdeclares all other actionsas personal actions.  Such actions
15
may include those brought for the recovery of personal property, or for the
enforcement of some contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for
the recovery of damages for the commission of an injury to the person or
property.  The venue of a personal action isthe place where the plaintiff or
16
any of the principal plaintiffs resides,or where the defendant or any of the
principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant
where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff,  for which reason the
17
action is considered a transitory one.
The complaintin Civil Case No. CEB-26468 pertinently alleged as follows: 18
xxxx
3.1 Plaintiffs signed blank pre-printed forms of promissory note no.
501253-000, continuing surety agreement, real estate mortgages,
chattel mortgage which violates the principle of mutuality of
contracts. These contracts are in the nature of contracts of
adhesion with provisions favouring defendant bank and plaintiffs
had nothing to do except to sign the unjust stipulations which
should be declared as NULL AND VOID. These contracts do not
reflect the real agreement of the parties and the stipulations are
tilted infavor of defendant bank.
3.2 Moreover, these real estate mortgages, chattel mortgages and
continuing surety agreement are securing specific amounts of
obligation and upon the payment of ₱13,000,000 to defendant
bank, automatically, these became functus de oficioand should be
released immediately without the encumbrance.
3.3 As the chattel mortgage involving the Mitsubishi Pajero secured
only ₱600,000.00, upon liquidation of more than ₱800,000.00
principal payment, the same became null and void, and defendant
bank should be ordered to cancel the mortgage and to be directed
not to take any appropriate action to take possession.
3.4 In addition, Penbank Checks Nos. 11237 to 11242 with
amounts of ₱200,000.00 each and BPI Check Nos. 019098 &
019099 with amounts of ₱400,000.00 each, issued against the will
of plaintiffs Facultad and without any consideration, should be
declared null and void. Defendant bank should be directed not to
deposit the samefor collection with the drawee bank.
xxxx
3.6 Furthermore, the total obligation of plaintiffs is void and
baseless because it is based on illegal impositions of exorbitant
 interest and excessive charges. Interest was converted into
principal which in turn earns interest. These illegal impositions are
considered by law and jurisprudence as null and void. These
excessive interest and charges should be applied to the principal
unless there isapplication, defendant bank is enriching itself at the
expense of plaintiffs. x x x x
Based on the aforequoted allegations of the complaintin Civil Case No. CEB-
26468, the respondents seek the nullification of the promissory notes,
continuing surety agreement, checks and mortgage agreements for being
executed against their will and vitiated by irregularities, not the recovery of
the possession or title to the properties burdened by the mortgages. There
was no allegation that the possession of the properties under the mortgages
had already been transferred to the petitioner in the meantime. Applying the
determinants, Civil Case No. CEB-26468 was unquestionably a personal
action, for, as ruled in Chua v. Total Office Products and Services
(Topros),Inc.:19
Well-settled is the rule that an action to annul a contract of loan and its
accessory real estate mortgageis a personal action. In a personal action, the
plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal property, the enforcement of a
contractor the recovery of damages. In contrast, in a real action, the plaintiff
seeks the recovery of real property, or, as indicated in Section 2 (a), Rule 4
of the then Rules of Court, a real action is an action affecting title to real
property or for the recovery of possession, or for partition or condemnation
of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property.
In the Pascual case, relied upon by petitioner, the contract of sale of the
fishpond was assailed as fictitious for lack of consideration. We held that
there being no contract to begin with, there is nothing to annul. Hence, we
deemed the action for annulment of the said fictitious contract therein as one
constituting a real action for the recovery of the fishpond subject thereof.
We cannot, however, apply the foregoing doctrine to the instant case. Note
that in Pascual, title to and possession of the subject fishpond had already
passed to the vendee. There was, therefore, a need to recover the said
fishpond. But in the instant case, ownership of the parcels of land subject of
the questioned real estatemortgage was never transferred to petitioner, but
remained with TOPROS. Thus, no real action for the recovery of real
property is involved. This being the case, TOPROS’ action for annulment of
the contracts of loan and real estate mortgage remains a personal action.
xxxx
The Court of Appeals finds that Hernandez v. Rural Bank of Lucena,
Inc.provides the proper precedent in this case. In Hernandez, appellants
contended that the action of the Hernandez spouses for the cancellation of
the mortgage on their lots was a real action affecting title to real property,
which should have been filed in the place where the mortgaged lots were
situated. Rule 4, Section 2 (a), of the then Rules of Court, was applied, to
wit:
SEC. 2. Venue in Courts of First Instance. – (a) Real actions. – Actions
affecting title to, or for recovery of possession, or for partition or
condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property, shall be
commenced and tried in the province where the property or any part thereof
lies.
The Court pointed out in the Hernandezcase that with respect to mortgage,
the rule on real actions only mentions an action for foreclosure of a real
estate mortgage. It does not include an action for the cancellation of a real
estate mortgage. Exclusio unios est inclusio alterius. The latter thus falls
under the catch-all provision on personal actions under paragraph (b) of the
above-cited section, to wit:
SEC. 2 (b) Personal actions. – All other actions may be commenced and
tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found,
or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the
plaintiff.
In the same vein, the action for annulment of a real estate mortgage in the
present case must fall under Section 2 of Rule 4, to wit:
SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions. – All other actions may be commenced
and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, orwhere
the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a
nonresident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
Thus, Pasig City, where the parties reside, is the proper venue of the action
to nullify the subject loan and real estate mortgage contracts. The Court of
Appeals committed no reversible error in upholding the orders of the
Regional Trial Court denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss the case on the
ground of improper venue.
Being a personal action, therefore, Civil Case No. CEB-26468 was properly
brought in the RTC in Cebu City, where respondent XM Facultad and
Development Corporation, a principal plaintiff, had its address.
Upon the same consideration, the petitioner’s contention that the filing and
docket fees for the complaintshould be based on the assessed values of the
mortgaged real properties due to Civil Case No. CEB-26468 being a real
action cannot be upheld for lack of factual and legal bases.
2. Respondents were not entitled to the writ of preliminary injunction
In their application for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, the
respondents averred that the nullity of the loan and mortgage agreements
entitled them to the relief of enjoining the petitioner from:
(a) foreclosing the real estateand chattel mortgages;
(b)taking possession, by replevin, of the Mitsubishi Pajero; and
(c) depositing the postdated checks;
that respondents Spouses Facultad would suffer injustice and irreparable
injury should the petitioner foreclose the mortgages and file criminal
complaints for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.22 against them; and that
such threatened acts, if done, would render ineffectual the judgment of the
trial court.  They prayed that the petitioner be enjoined from doing acts that
20
would disturb their material possession of the mortgaged properties,
manifesting their willingness to post a bond for the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction. 21
As mentioned, the RTC issued the writ of preliminary injunction on July 16,
2001 based on the foregoing allegations of the respondents’
application,  and the CA upheld the issuance in its assailed July 9, 2002
22
decision. 23
BPI submits that the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
constituted a violation of Administrative Circular (AC) No. 07-99 dated
June 25, 1999, and thus subjected respondent Judge to administrative
sanction;  that injunction could not issue to enjoin the prosecution of the
24
criminal offenses because such prosecution was imbued with public
interest;  and that the petitioner, as the mortgagee, could not be prohibited
25
from exercising its legal right to foreclose the mortgages because
foreclosure of the mortgages was its proper remedy under the law. 26
AC No. 07-99 was issued as a guideline for lower court judges in the
issuance of TROs and writs of preliminary injunctions to prevent the
implementation of infrastructure projects, or the seizure and forfeiture
proceedings by the Bureau of Customs, viz:
ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 07-99 June 25, 1999
TO: ALL JUDGES OF LOWER COURTS RE: EXERCISE OF UTMOST
CAUTION, PRUDENCE, AND JUDICIOUSNESS IN ISSUANCE OF
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDERS AND WRITS OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTIONS
Despite well-entrenched jurisprudence and circulars regarding exercise of
judiciousness and care in the issuance of temporary restraining orders
(TRO) or grant of writs ofpreliminary injunction, reports or complaints on
abuses committed by trial judges in connection therewith persist. Some even
intimated that irregularities, including corruption, might have influenced the
issuance oft he TRO or the writ of preliminary injunction.
No less than the President of the Philippines has requested this Court to
issue a circular reminding judges to respect P.D. No. 1818, which prohibits
the issuance of TROs in cases involving implementation of government
infrastructure projects. The Office of the President has likewise brought to
the attention of this Court orders of judges releasing imported articles under
seizure and forfeiture proceedings by the Bureau of Customs.
Judges are thus enjoined to observe utmost caution, prudence and
judiciousness in the issuance of TRO and in the grant of writs of preliminary
injunction to avoid any suspicion that its issuance or grant was for
considerations other than the strict merits of the case.
Judges should bear in mind that in Garcia v. Burgos(291 SCRA 546, 571-
572 [1998]), this Court explicitly stated:
Sec. 1 of PD 1818 distinctly provides that "[n]o court in the Philippines shall
have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary injunction, or
preliminary mandatory injunction in any case, dispute, orcontroversy
involvingan infrastructure project . . . of the government, . . . to prohibit any
person or persons, entity or government official from proceeding with, or
continuing the execution or implementation of any such project . . . or
pursuing any lawful activity necessary for such execution, implementation or
operation." At the risk of being repetitious, we stress that the foregoing
statutory provision expressly deprives courts of jurisdiction to issue injunctive
writs against the implementation or execution of an infrastructure project.
Their attention is further invited to Circular No. 68-94, issued on 3 November
1994 by the OCA OIC Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez, on
the subject "Strict Observance of Section 1 of P.D. 1818 Envisioned by
Circular No. 13-93 dated March 5, 1993, and Circular No. 20-92 dated March
24, 1992.
Finally, judges should never forget what the Court categorically declared in
Mison v. Natividad(213 SCRA 734, 742 [1992] that "[b]y express provision of
law, amply supported by well-settled jurisprudence, the Collector of Customs
has exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proceedings, and
regular courts cannot interfere with his exercise thereof or stifleor put it to
naught."
The Office of the Court Administrator shall see to it that this circular is
immediately disseminated and shall monitor implementation thereof.
STRICT OBSERVANCE AND COMPLIANCE of this Circular is hereby
enjoined.
AC No. 07-99 was irrelevant herein, however, because Civil Case No. CEB-
26468 did not involve the implementation of infrastructure projects, or the
seizure and forfeiture proceedings by the Bureau of Customs. Consequently,
the petitioner’s urging that respondent Judge be held administratively liable
for violating AC No. 07-99 was misplaced.
However, the RTC’s issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction to
enjoin the BPI from proceeding with the foreclosure of the mortgages
was plainly erroneous and unwarranted.
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action
prior to the judgment or final order requiring a party or a court, agency
or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts.   27
It is the "strong arm of equity," an extraordinary peremptory remedy that
must be used with extreme caution, affecting as it does the respective rights
of the parties.  
28
The requirements for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or TRO
are enumerated in Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A
preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and
the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the
commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of,
or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, eitherfor a
limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of
the act or acts complained of during the litigation would
probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing,
threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering
to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights
of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or
proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
In City Government of Butuan v. Consolidated Broadcasting System (CBS),
Inc.,  the Court restated the nature and concept of a writ of preliminary
29
injunction, as follows:
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or
proceeding prior to the judgment orfinal order requiring a party or a court, an
agency, or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It may also
require the performance of a particular act or acts, in which case it is known
as a preliminary mandatory injunction. Thus, a prohibitory injunction is one
that commands a party to refrain from doing a particular act, while a
mandatory injunction commands the performance of some positive act to
correct a wrong in the past.
As with all equitable remedies, injunction must be issued only at the
instance of a party who possesses sufficient interest in or title to the
right or the property sought to be protected. It is proper only when the
applicant appears to be entitled to the relief demanded in the complaint,
which must aver the existence of the right and the violation of the right, or
whose averments must in the minimum constitute a prima facieshowing of a
right to the final relief sought.
 Accordingly, the conditions for the issuance of the injunctive writ are:
(a) that the right to be protected exists prima facie;
(b) that the act sought to be enjoined is violative of that right; and
(c) that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent
serious damage.
An injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse, or a right which is
merely contingent and may never arise; or to restrain an act which does not
give rise to a cause of action; or to prevent the perpetration of an act
prohibited bystatute. Indeed, a right, to be protected by injunction, means a
right clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of
law. (Bold emphasis supplied)
Under the circumstances averred in the complaintin Civil Case No. CEB-
26468, the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction upon the
application of the respondents was improper. They had admittedly
constituted the real estate and chattel mortgages to secure the performance
of their loan obligation to the petitioner, and, as such, they were fully aware
of the consequences on their rights in the properties given as collaterals
should the loan secured be unpaid. The foreclosure of the mortgages would
be the remedy provided by law for the mortgagee to exact payment.  In fact,
30
they did not dispute the petitioner’s allegations that they had not fully paid
their obligation, and that Civil Case No. CEB-26468 was precisely brought by
them in order to stave off the impending foreclosure of the mortgages based
on their claim that they had been compelled to sign pre-printed standard
bank loan forms and mortgage agreements.
It is true that the trial courts are given generous latitude to act on
applications for the injunctive writ for the reason that conflicting claims in an
application for the writ more often than not involve a factual determination
that is not the function of the appellate courts;  and that the exercise of
31
sound discretion by the issuing courts in injunctive matters ought not to be
interfered with except when there is manifest abuse.  Nonetheless, the
32
exercise of such discretion must be sound, that is, the issuance of the writ,
though discretionary, should be upon the grounds and in the manner
provided by law.  
33
Judges should always bear in mind that the writ of preliminary
injunction is issued upon the satisfaction of two requisite conditions,
namely:
(1) the right to be protected exists prima facie; and
(2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right.
According to Saulog v. Court of Appeals,  the applicant must have a
34
sufficient interest or right to be protected, but it is enough that:-
x x x for the court to act, there must be an existing basis of facts affording a
present right which is directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined.
And while a clear showing ofthe right claimed is necessary, its existence
need not be conclusively established. In fact, the evidence to be submitted to
justify preliminary injunction at the hearing thereon need not be conclusive or
complete but need only be a "sampling" intended merely to give the court an
idea of the justification for the preliminary injunction pending the decision of
the case on the merits. This should really be so since our concern here
involves only the propriety of the preliminary injunction and not the merits of
the case still pending with the trial court.
Thus, to be entitled to the writ of preliminary injunction, the private
respondent needs only to show that it has the ostensible right to the final
relief prayed for in its complaint x x x.
It is also basic that the power to issue a writ of injunction is to be exercised
only where the reason and necessity therefor are clearly established, and
only in cases reasonably free from doubt.  For, truly, a preliminary injunction
35
should not determine the merits of a case,  or decide controverted facts.  As
36 37
a preventive remedy, injunction only seeks to prevent threatened
wrong,  further injury,  and irreparable harm  or injustice  until the rights of
38 39 40 41
the parties can be settled.  As an ancillary and preventive remedy, it may be
1âwphi1
resorted to by a party to protect or preserve his rights during the pendency of
the principal action, and for no other purpose.  Such relief will accordingly
42
protect the ability of the court to render a meaningful decision;  it will further
43
serve to guard against a change of circumstances that will hamper orprevent
the granting of proper relief after a trial on the merits.  Verily, its essential
44
function is to preserve the status quo between the parties until the merits of
the case can be heard. 45
Moreover, the applicant must prove that the violation sought to be prevented
would cause an irreparable injustice.  But the respondents failed to establish
46
the irreparable injury they would suffer should the writ of preliminary
injunction not be issued. Theyprincipally feared the loss of their possession
and ownership of the mortgaged properties, and faced the possibility of a
criminal prosecution for the post-dated checks they issued. But such fear of
potential loss ofpossession and ownership, or facing a criminal prosecution
did not constitute the requisite irreparable injury that could have warranted
the issuance of the writ of injunction. "An injury is considered irreparable,"
according to Philippine National Bank v. Castalloy Technology Corporation, 47
x x x if it is of such constant and frequent recurrence that no fair or
reasonable redress can be had therefor ina court of law, or where there is no
standard by which their amount canbe measured with reasonable accuracy,
that is, it is not susceptible of mathematical computation. The provisional
remedy of preliminary injunction may only be resorted to when there is a
pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be
remedied under any standard of compensation.
The injury being feared by the herein respondents is not of such nature.
Ultimately, the amount to which the mortgagee-bank shall be entitled will be
determined by the disposition of the trial court in the main issue of the case.
We have explained in Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. v. OJMark Trading, Inc.that
all is not lost for defaulting mortgagors whose properties were foreclosed by
creditors-mortgagees. The respondents will not be deprived outrightly of their
property, given the right of redemption granted to them under the law.
Moreover, in extrajudicial foreclosures, mortgagors have the right toreceive
any surplus in the selling price. Thus, if the mortgagee is retaining more of
the proceeds of the sale than he is entitled to, this fact alone will not affect
the validity of the sale but will give the mortgagor a cause of action to
recover such surplus.
As a general rule, the courts will not issue writs of prohibition or injunction –
whether preliminary or final – in order to enjoin or restrain any criminal
prosecution.  But there are extreme cases in which exceptions to the general
48
rule have been recognized, including:
(1) when the injunction is necessary to afford adequate protection to the
constitutional rights of the accused;
(2) when it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid
oppression or multiplicity of actions;
(3) when there is a prejudicial question that is sub judice;
(4) when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
(5) when the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
(6) when double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
(7) when the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
(8) when it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
(9) when the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for
vengeance; and
(10) when there is clearly no prima faciecase against the accused and a
motion to quash on that ground has been denied.   49
However, the respondents did not sufficiently show that Civil Case No. CEB-
26468 came under any of the foregoing exceptions. Hence, the issuance by
the RTC of the writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the petitioner from
instituting criminal complaints for violation of BP No. 22 against the
respondents was unwarranted.
Every court should remember that an injunction should not be granted lightly
or precipitately because it isa limitation upon the freedom of the defendant's
action. It should be granted only when the court is fully satisfied that the law
permits it and the emergency demands it,  for no power exists whose
50
exercise is more delicate, which requires greater caution and deliberation, or
is more dangerous in a doubtful case, than the issuance of an injunction. 51
In view of the foregoing, the CA grossly erred in not declaring that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the application of the
respondents as the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. CEB-26468. The RTC
apparently disregarded the aforecited well-known norms and guidelines
governing the issuance of the writ of injunction. Thereby, the RTC acted
capriciously and arbitrarily. Grave abuse of discretion means either that
the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the
respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually
refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law,
such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
52
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition for review on
certiorari; MODIFIES the decision promulgated on July 9, 2002 by annulling
and setting aside the writ of preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. CEB-
26468 issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, in Cebu City for being
devoid of factual and legal bases; ORDERS the Regional Trial Court, Branch
16, in Cebu City to proceed with dispatch in Civil Case No. CEB-26468; and
DIRECTS the respondents to pay the costs of suit.
 [G.R. NO. 175371 : April 30, 2008]
BENITO J. BRIZUELA, Petitioner, v. ABRAHAM DINGLE and
NICANDRO LEGASPI, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court is the Resolution1 dated 3 May 2006 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 94005 denying the prayer for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) of petitioner Benito J.
Brizuela; and the Resolution2 dated 20 September 2006 of the
same court denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
BRIZUELA is the president and registered owner of 49% of
the authorized capital stock of Philippine Media Post, Inc.
(PMPI),3 the publisher of the newspaper Philippine Post.
Respondent Abraham Dingle was hired by PMPI as Associate
Editor under probation on 20 July 1999; and was eventually
confirmed as a regular Associate Editor on 23 September 1999,
with a salary of P22,000.00 per month. On the other hand,
respondent Nicandro Legaspi started working at PMPI as City
Editor on 9 November 1999, with a monthly salary of P22,000.00;
and was eventually promoted as News Editor on 7 January 2000,
with a monthly salary of P25,000.00.
On 19 May 2003,4 LEGASPI et al. filed a Complaint with the
Labor Arbiter against PMPI and petitioner for nonpayment
and/or underpayment of salaries, editorial fees, legal and holiday
pay, premium pay for holiday pay, service incentive leave pay,
13th month pay, vacation and sick leave pay, separation pay,
moral, exemplary, and actual damages, and attorney's fees.
According to the Complaint:
4. As Associate Editor of the Post, [herein respondent] Dingle was
tasked, among other things, to decide main news stories, edit
some of the reporter's copies and supervise the making up of the
front and jump pages of the newspaper until they are ready for the
printing press. On his part, [herein respondent] Legaspi, as News
Editor, was tasked, among other things, to distribute reporters'
copies to sub-editors, suggests to top editors possible front page
stories, check all news pages, help edit approved stories and puts
them in the proper pages. Eventually, both [respondents], as
editors, were also tasked to write editorials when this writing chore
was transferred from non-staff writers to the editors;
5. Due to the demands of their work, [respondents] Dingle and
Legaspi had a six (6) day week schedule and at times had to work
even on Sundays and holidays (legal and special) but they were
not paid for said overtime work at all;
xxx
14. On 16 November 2000, Post employees (including
[respondents] Dingle and Legaspi), did not put out an issue of the
Post anymore since they refused to work any further as [PMPI and
herein petitioner Brizuela] refused to pay them their salaries and
other benefits contrary to what they have repeatedly promised
earlier;
15. Sometime in December 2000, [respondents] Dingle and
Legaspi visited [petitioner] Brizuela to find out what was
happening to their unpaid salaries, editorial fees and other
employment benefits but were informed by [petitioner]
Brizuela that he owed them nothing as he had settled
everything with Executive Editor Mariano. [Respondents]
insisted that [petitioner] Brizuela still owed them a lot in terms of
salaries, editorial fees and other benefits but the latter told them
to prove their claims. When [respondents] asked to see the Post
records, [petitioner] Brizuela lamely said he did not know where
they were.5
On the other hand, petitioner brought to the attention of the
Labor Arbiter that PMPI had already stopped publishing
Philippine Post and altogether ceased operations in the year
2000 because of grave financial losses. He averred that PMPI
was in "deep financial trouble" and its publication turned out to be
a losing venture.6
Settlement efforts among the parties failed, for which reason, they
were directed by the Labor Arbiter to file their respective position
papers.
PMPI never appeared before nor filed any pleading with the Labor
Arbiter.7 Respondents thus moved that PMPI be considered to have
waived its right to present evidence in its defense.
The Labor Arbiter concluded that while closure of an establishment
due to serious business losses is one of the authorized causes for
termination of employment, under the Labor Code,8 nonetheless,
she found that there is no conclusive factual and legal basis for
PMPI to close its operations on the ground of serious business
losses.9
In a Decision dated 30 April 2004, Labor Arbiter Virginia T. Luyas-
Azarraga held:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, [PMPI and herein petitioner]
Benito Brizuela are hereby jointly and severally ordered to pay
[herein respondents], as follows:
1. Abraham Dingle - P187,000.00
2. Nicandro Legaspi - P212,000.00
representing separation pay, unpaid salaries and 13th month pay
plus 10% of the total award as Attorney's fees.
All other claims are dismissed. 10
Respondents and petitioner appealed the foregoing Decision of the
Labor Arbiter to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
Respondents appealed in view of the denial of the Labor Arbiter of
their claim for editorial fees, overtime pay, premium pay for
holiday and rest day, damages, legal and holiday pay, service
incentive leave pay and vacation and sick leave pay. On the other
hand, petitioner appealed the finding by the Labor Arbiter that he
is personally liable, that PMPI failed to prove serious business
losses, and that the respondents are entitled to separation pay.11
In their Comment12 to petitioner's Notice of Appeal with
Memorandum, respondents prayed for the dismissal of petitioner's
appeal emphasizing that petitioner did not post the
required supersedeas bond in the amount equivalent to the
monetary award for the perfection of the appeal. Petitioner
countered by filing a Motion for Additional Time to Post Appeal
Bond, which respondents again opposed.13 Petitioner filed a Motion
to Reduce Bond and posted a cash bond in the amount
of P5,000.00.14 On 31 August 2004, the NLRC issued an Order
directing petitioner to post additional bond15 in the amount
of P394,000.00.16 Petitioner asked for an additional period of 15
days to comply with said NLRC Order in view of the short notice
given to him.17 Petitioner then filed a Motion for Leave to Admit
Additional Appeal Bond praying that "this Honorable Commission
admit the herein attached supersedeas bond issued by the Premier
Insurance & Surety Corporation dated 6 October 2004 in the
amount of P394,000.00, along with supporting documents and,
thereafter, give due course to petitioner's appeal."
Respondents objected to the additional appeal bond being posted
by petitioner stating that it was grossly defective because said
bond in the amount of P394,000.00 was issued by Premier
Insurance & Surety Corporation on behalf of the assured, PMPI,
which had no legal standing in the appeal.
In its Decision dated 28 October 2005, the NLRC ruled as follows:
[Herein petitioner] Brizuela contends that [PMPI] is not liable to
pay [herein respondents] their separation pay because [PMPI]
closed its business due to serious financial losses. We do not
agree. [Petitioner] presented the audited financial statements of
[PMPI] for the years 2000 and 2001. A perusal of said audited
financial statements reveals that [PMPI] had a net loss for the year
1999 and 2000 of P40,062,972.96 and P18,233,157.44
respectively while in the year 2001 [PMPI] suffered net loss in the
amount of P2,925,003.45. Contrary to [petitioner's] allegations,
the losses of income of [PMPI] is actually diminishing or abating
indicating that the business is picking up and retrenchment being a
drastic move should no longer be resorted to. (PSBA v. NLRC, 223
SCRA 305.)
Moreover, records do not show that [petitioner] complied with the
requirements for valid closure because it failed to serve a written
notice to the employees as well as to the Department of Labor and
Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date of
closure as required under Article 283 of the Labor Code. The notice
to DOLE is necessary to enable the proper authorities to determine
if such closure is being done in good faith or resorted to as a
means to evade compliance with the obligations of the employer to
the employees affected. If indeed, closure of [PMPI] was done in
good faith, the [petitioner] should have complied with the
requirement of due notice to effect a valid closure.
However, we find [petitioner] Benito Brizuela not jointly and
severally liable to [respondents] at this time. It is settled that
corporations have a separate personality from its stockholders and
officers. Said [petitioner] Brizuela is held liable in his official
capacity.
[Respondents], on appeal, aver that the Labor Arbiter committed
grave abuse of discretion and serious errors in law and findings of
facts when she denied [respondents'] claims for editorial fees,
overtime pay, holiday pay, premium pay for holidays and rest days
as well as damages. We do not agree. The said claims, even if not
specifically refuted by [petitioner] must nevertheless be proven by
[respondents] to be entitled to the same. As correctly held by the
Labor Arbiter, mere allegation is not enough. In this connection,
the Supreme Court, in Masagana Concrete Products v. NLRC, G.R.
No. 106916, promulgated 3 September 1999 citing PNB v. CA (266
SCRA 136) and Martinez v. NLRC (272 SCRA 793), has held that
mere allegation is neither equivalent to proof not evidence.
However, we find [respondents] entitled to their vacation and sick
leave pay as shown by Annex "E" (pp. 36 to 39, Records) of their
position paper which was duly prepared and signed by [PMPI's]
Personnel Supervisor and Administrative Manager.
Lastly, the award of 10% attorney's fees shall be based on unpaid
salaries, 13th month pay and vacation/sick leaves, follows Art. 111
of the Labor Code.
WHEREFORE, the decision dated 30 April 2004 is hereby
MODIFIED. [PMPI] is held liable to pay [respondents] Abraham
Dingle and Nicandro Legaspi additional amount of P8,407.64 and
P6,568.48, respectively, representing their vacation and sick leave
pay in addition to awards decreed in the Decision. The award of
10% attorney's fees shall be based on awards representing unpaid
salaries, 13th month pay, vacation/sick leaves. [Petitioner] Benito
Brizuela is liable in his official capacity.18
Respondents and petitioner filed their respective Motions for Partial
Reconsideration of the 28 October 2005 Decision of the NLRC. The
motions of the parties were, however, denied by the NLRC in a
Resolution dated 31 January 2006.19 BRIZUELA then filed a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 94005, assailing the
Decision dated 28 October 2005 of the NLRC.20
On 11 April 2006, LEGASPI et al. filed with the Labor Arbiter a
Motion for the issuance of a Writ of Execution to implement
the 28 October 2005 Decision of the NLRC.21
Alarmed, petitioner filed an application for TRO and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction with the Court of Appeals,22 in which he
averred that:
1. On 11 April 2006, private respondents filed, with the Labor
Arbiter a quo, a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution dated 3
April 2006 praying for the issuance of a writ of execution to
implement public respondent NLRC's Decision dated 28 October
2005 which decision is subject of the instant petition.
2. Private Respondents' endeavor to execute public respondent's
Decision dated 28 October 2006 is an attempt to pre-empt and to
render moot whatever decision this Honorable Court may make in
the instant case.
3. Execution of public respondent NLRC's Decision dated 28
October 2005 will work injustice, and cause grave and irreparable
injury, to petitioner. Considering that private respondents are
attempting to do exactly this, the matter of issuance of a
temporary restraining order becomes one of utmost and absolute
importance. Thus, it is prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining public respondent National Labor Relations Commission
and the Labor Arbiter a quo from implementing the questioned
resolution be issued by this Honorable Court.
4. Petitioner is ready and able to post a bond in such amount as
this Honorable Court may fix, conditioned to answer for all
damages that private respondents may directly suffer by the
issuance by this Honorable Court of a restraining order or a
preliminary injunction, should it be finally adjudged that petitioner
was not entitled thereto.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays that this Honorable
Court:
1. Issue a temporary restraining order immediately upon the filing
of this petition directing the public respondent NLRC and the Labor
Arbiter a quo to cease and desist from implementing the Decision
dated 28 October 2005 in NLRC CA No. 040868-04 (NLRC-NCR
Case No. 00-05-05876-03);
2 Thereafter, issue a writ of preliminary injunction directing the
public respondent NLRC and the Labor Arbiter a quo to cease and
desist from implementing the Decision dated 28 October 2005 in
NLRC CA No. 040868-04 (NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-05-05876-03).
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's application for the
issuance of a TRO in a Resolution23 dated 3 May 2006, ruling
thus:
Petitioner's prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order is hereby DENIED.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration24 of the
aforementioned Resolution, which the Court of Appeals again
denied in another Resolution dated 20 September 2006,25 finding
that:
The motion has no merit. The grounds relied upon by petitioner
are mere reiteration of the issues and matters already considered,
weighed and passed upon during the deliberation of the assailed
resolution.
Petitioner also seeks to clarify this Court's purported "perfunctory
one-sentence denial of petitioner's application for preliminary
injunctive relief" as one tantamount to a denial of due process.
In Gaoiran v. Alcala (419 SCRA 354), the Supreme Court held that
what is repugnant to due process is the denial of the opportunity
to be heard. But for so long as a party is given the opportunity to
advocate his/her cause or defend his/her interest in due course, it
cannot be said that there was denial of due process.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration and/or Clarification is
hereby DENIED.
Since the respondents had already filed their Comment to
petitioner's Petition for Certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 94005, and
petitioner had submitted his Reply thereto, the Court of Appeals
issued a Resolution26 dated 14 November 2006, submitting the
petition for decision.27
In the meantime, petitioner filed the instant Petition under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court assailing alone the denial by the Court of
Appeals of his application for the issuance of a TRO. Petitioner
asserts:
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT PERFUNCTORILY DENIED
PETITIONER'S APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER DESPITE THE CLEAR SHOWING THAT PETITIONER IS
ENTITLED THERETO.28
In consideration of the present Petition, the Court of Appeals held
in abeyance the proceedings in CA-G.R. SP No. 94005 in a
Resolution dated 9 March 2007.29 Records of the case were
forwarded to this Court.
The Court finds no merit in the instant Petition, and
accordingly dismisses the same.
At the outset, it bears stressing that the subject of the
instant Petition is only the denial of petitioner's application
for TRO by the Court of Appeals. This Court may not touch on
the merits of the 28 October 2005 Decision of the NLRC
considering that said decision is already the subject of petitioner's
Petition for Certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 94005, still pending
resolution before the Court of Appeals.
There is no question that the Court of Appeals, before which CA-
G.R. SP No. 94005 is still pending, may issue a TRO to enjoin the
proceedings before the NLRC and/or the Labor Arbiter. According
to Rule 65, Section 7 of the Rules of Court:
SECTION 7. Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief. - The court
in which the petition [for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus] is
filed may issue orders expediting the proceedings, and it may also
grant a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties
pending such proceedings. The petition shall not interrupt the
course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or
a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public
respondent from further proceeding in the case.
The question, however, is whether petitioner is entitled to
the grant of a TRO and, subsequently, a writ of preliminary
injunction.
A writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO are injunctive reliefs and
preservative remedies for the protection of substantive rights and
interests.30 An application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or TRO may be granted upon the filing of a verified
application showing facts entitling the applicant to the relief
demanded.31
Essential for granting the injunctive relief is the existence of an
urgent necessity for the writ in order to prevent serious damage. A
TRO issues only if the matter is of such extreme urgency
that grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise unless it
is issued immediately.32 Under Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rule of
Court,33 a TRO may be issued only if it appears from the facts
shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great
or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before
the writ of preliminary injunction could be heard.
The burden is thus on BRIZUELA to show in his application that
there is meritorious ground for the issuance of a TRO in his favor.
However, BRIZUELA failed to discharge this burden. The only
ground on which he bases his application for a TRO is the
danger that execution by the Labor Arbiter of the 28
October 2005 Decision of the NLRC may render moot and
academic his Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 94005 which is yet
to be decided by the Court of Appeals. Then he makes an
encompassing claim that the issuance of a writ of execution by the
Labor Arbiter would cause him injustice and grave and irreparable
injury.
This Court is unconvinced for the following reasons:
First, this Court must point out that no writ of execution has
yet been issued by the Labor Arbiter. Respondents have only
filed a motion for the issuance thereof. The Labor Arbiter has not
ruled on the motion. Just as there exists the possibility that the
Labor Arbiter shall grant respondents' motion, there also exists the
possibility that the Labor Arbiter shall deny the same. Evidently,
petitioner's application for a TRO and writ of preliminary
injunction is, as of yet, based on purely speculative
grounds, jumping the gun, so to speak, on the Labor
Arbiter, and already assuming that she would grant
respondents' motion and issue a writ of execution. Of the
same nature as an injunction, a TRO is not designed to protect
contingent or future rights; the possibility of irreparable damage
without proof of actual existing right is not a ground for the
issuance thereof.34
Second, this Court already pronounced in Carlos v. Court of
Appeals,35 that prescinding from Section 10, Rule XI of the
NLRC Rules of Procedure, which reads '
SECTION 10. Effect of Petition for Certiorari on Execution. - A
Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals or the Supreme
Court shall not stay the execution of the assailed decision
unless a restraining order is issued by said courts. [Emphasis
supplied.]
Given the foregoing, the Court of Appeals correctly denied
petitioner's application since there is a marked absence of any
urgent necessity for the issuance of a TRO or writ of preliminary
injunction.38 Hence, the Court of Appeals could not have committed
grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing its Resolution dated 3 May 2006. It is a rule
well-settled that for the extraordinary writ of certiorari to lie, there
must be capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of
power.39 There is none in this case.

a party may already move for the execution of the monetary
award of the NLRC even during the pendency of the Petition
for Certiorari of the NLRC decision awarding the same with the
Court of Appeals or this Court. This rule is in harmony with the
social justice principle that poor employees who have been
deprived of their only source of livelihood should be provided the
means to support their families.
WHEREFORE premises considered, the Petition
for Certiorari is DISMISSED. The records of this case
are ORDERED returned to the Court of Appeals for the
continuation of the proceedings in CA-G.R. SP No. 94005 until its
termination.
Cost against petitioner Benito J. Brizuela.

Third, Legaspi et al. may seek issuance of a writ of execution

of the 28 October 2005 Decision of the NLRC on the basis
that PMPI did not move for the reconsideration thereof nor
filed its own Petition for Certiorari to assail the same.
Consequently, the said Decision should already be considered final
and executory as to PMPI.36 Once a judgment has become final,
the prevailing party, the respondents, in this case, can have the
judgment executed as a matter of right.37

Fourth, the Court cannot see how petitioner shall suffer

grave and irreparable injury if the monetary awards in favor
of respondents in the 28 October 2005 Decision of the NLRC
are executed. The monetary awards may be collected from PMPI
and any of its remaining assets. It must be emphasized that the
NLRC, in its decision, explicitly states that petitioner is not
solidarily liable with PMPI but is liable only in his official
capacity. In the event that the monetary awards are actually
executed on petitioner's properties, and his Petition
for Certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 94005 is eventually granted, the
damage against petitioner shall not be irreparable for respondents
can simply be ordered to return to petitioner the amounts they
received, with interests, if appropriate.