ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

AGLIPAY VS. RUIZ 64 PHIL 201

FACTS:

The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, seeks the
issuance from this court of a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of Posts from issuing
and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress. In
May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issuance of
postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty- third International
Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. In spite of the protest of the petitioner's
attorney, the respondent publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of the
postage for printing

ISSUE: Is there a violation of principle of separation of church and state?

HELD:

In the case at bar, it appears that the respondent Director of Posts issued the postage stamps in
question under the provisions of Act. No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature. Act No. 4052 contemplates
no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the discretionary power to determine
when the issuance of special postage stamps would be "advantageous to the Government." Of course,
the phrase "advantageous to the Government" does not authorize the violation of the Constitution. It
does not authorize the appropriation, use or application of public money or property for the use, benefit
or support of a particular sect or church. In the present case, however, the issuance of the postage
stamps in question by the Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications was
not inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a particular church or religious denominations. The stamps
were not issued and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from
the sale of the stamps given to that church. On the contrary, it appears from the letter of the Director of
Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2 of the petitioner's complaint, that the only purpose in
issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists to this
country." The officials concerned merely took advantage of an event considered of international
importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people". It is significant to note that the stamps
as actually designed and printed, instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally planned,
contains a map of the Philippines and the location of the City of Manila, and an inscription as follows:
"Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937." What is emphasized is not the
Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as the seat of that congress. It is
obvious that while the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be inseparably linked
with an event of a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic
Church, was not the aim and purpose of the Government. We are of the opinion that the Government
should not be embarrassed in its activities simply because of incidental results, more or less religious in
character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate
legislation. The main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordination to mere incidental results
not contemplated. There is no violation of the principle of separation of church and state. The issuance
and sale of the stamps in question maybe said to be separably linked with an event of a religious
character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Catholic Church, was not the aim and
purpose of the government (to promote tourism).

ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

SARMIENTO VS. MISON (156 SCRA 154, 1987)

FACTS: The petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and professors of Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin the respondent Salvador Mison from performing
the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and the respondent Guillermo
Carague, as Secretary of the Department of Budget, from effecting disbursements in payment of Mison's
salaries and emoluments, on the ground that Mison's appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. The respondents, on the other hand, maintain the constitutionality of respondent
Mison's appointment without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.

ISSUES:

1. What are the groups of officers whom the President shall appoint?

2. W/N confirmation of the appointments of Commissioners of the Bureau of Customs by the

Commission on Appointments required.

HELD:

1. Under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, just quoted, there are four (4) groups of officers whom
the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups, to which we will hereafter refer from time to time,
are: First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; Second, all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; Third, those whom the President may be
authorized by law to appoint; Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by
law vest in the President alone. The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the
nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President appoints. Those belonging
to second, third and fourth groups may be appointed by the President without such confirmation with
COA.

2. NO. It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not
one of those within the first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on
Appointments is required. As a matter of fact, as already pointed out, while the 1935 Constitution
includes "heads of bureaus" among those officers whose appointments need the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, the 1987 Constitution, on the other hand, deliberately excluded the
position of "heads of bureaus" from appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments.
ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

NITAFAN VS. COMMISSION OF INTERNAL REVENUE 152 SCRA 284 [1987]

FACTS:

Petitioners David Nitafan Wenceslao Polo and Maximo Savellano are duly appointed and qualified
Judges of the RTC, NCR Manila. They sought to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin respondent
Commission of Internal Revenue and Finance Office of the SC from making any deductions of
withholding taxes from their salaries. They submit that a tax withheld from their compensation as
judicial officers constitute a decrease or diminution of their salaries contrary to the provision of Sec.10
of Art.VIII of the Constitution mandating that "during their continuance in office, their salary shall not be
decreased.

ISSUE: Is the deduction in the said salaries in violation of Sec.10 of Art.VIII?

HELD: YES. The draft proposal of Sec 10 Art VIII reads as "their salary shall not be decreased" and the
words "not subjected to income tax" was deleted so as to give substance to equality among the three
branches of government. Thus, the clear intent of the Constitutional Commission was to delete the
proposed express grant of exemption from payment of income tax to members of the Judiciary. In the
course of deliberations, it was made clear that the salaries of members of the Judiciary would be subject
to general income tax does not fall within their continuance in office. The court disregarded the ruling in
Perfecto vs. Meer that declared the salaries of members of the Judiciary exempt from payment of
income tax and considered such payment as diminution of their salaries during their continuance in
office. Furthermore, in constructing Sec 10 Art VIII of the 1987 Constitution, it is plain that the
Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing another rate of compensation of Justice and Judges
but such rate must be higher than that which they are receiving at the time of the enactment, of if
lower, it would be applicable only to the appointed after its approval. It would be strained construction
to read into the provision an exemption from taxation when the true intent of the framers was to make
the salaries of the Judiciary taxable.