Republic of the Philippines | SUPREME COURT | Manila | EN BANC

B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL C.
ARGOSINO, petitioner.
RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:
A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 101, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other individuals, with
the crime of homicide in connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan on 8 September
1991. The death of Raul Camaligan stemmed from the infliction of severe physical injuries
upon him in the course of "hazing" conducted as part of university fraternity initiation rites.
Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then entered into plea bargaining with the prosecution
and as a result of such bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide through
reckless imprudence. This plea was accepted by the trial court. In a judgment dated 11
February 1993, each of the fourteen (14) accused individuals was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment for a period ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to
four (4) years.
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation
with the lower court. The application for probation was granted in an Order dated 18 June
1993 issued by Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro T. Santiago. The period of probation was
set at two (2) years, counted from the probationer's initial report to the probation officer
assigned to supervise him.
Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to Take
the 1993 Bar Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction
and his then probation status. He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations in this
Court's En Banc Resolution dated 14 August 1993. 1 He passed the Bar Examination. He was
not, however, allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.
On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the
attorney's oath of office and to admit him to the practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro
T. Santiago had terminated his probation period by virtue of an Order dated 11 April 1994.
We note that his probation period did not last for more than ten (10) months from the time
of the Order of Judge Santiago granting him probation dated 18 June 1993. Since then, Mr.
Argosino has filed three (3) Motions for Early Resolution of his Petition for Admission to the
Bar.
The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to
everyone who demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens ofgood
moral character, with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified. 2 The
essentiality of good moral character in those who would be lawyers is stressed in the
following excerpts which we quote with approval and which we regard as having persuasive
effect:
In Re Farmer: 3
xxx xxx xxx
This "upright character" prescribed by the statute, as a condition precedent to
the applicant's right to receive a license to practice law in North Carolina, and
of which he must, in addition to other requisites, satisfy the court, includes all
the elements necessary to make up such a character. It is something more
than an absence of bad character. It is the good name which the applicant has
acquired, or should have acquired, through association with his fellows. It
means that he must have conducted himself as a man of upright character
ordinarily would, or should, or does. Such character expresses itself, not in
negatives nor in following the line of least resistance, but quite often, in the will
to do the unpleasant thing if it is right, and the resolve not to do the pleasant
thing if it is wrong. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is eminently
proper. Consider for a moment the duties of a lawyer. He is sought as
counsellor, and his advice comes home, in its ultimate effect, to every man's
fireside. Vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient
of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with is client's
property, reputation, his life, his all. An attorney at law is a sworn officer of the
Court, whose chief concern, as such, is to aid the administration of justice. . . .
xxx xxx xxx4
In Re Application of Kaufman,5 citing Re Law Examination of 1926 (1926) 191
Wis 359, 210 NW 710:
It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater temptations to
deviate from the straight and narrow path than in the multiplicity of
circumstances that arise in the practice of profession. For these reasons the
wisdom of requiring an applicant for admission to the bar to possess a high
moral standard therefore becomes clearly apparent, and the board of bar
examiners as an arm of the court, is required to cause a minute examination to
be made of the moral standard of each candidate for admission to practice. . . .
It needs no further argument, therefore, to arrive at the conclusion that the
highest degree of scrutiny must be exercised as to the moral character of a
candidate who presents himself for admission to the bar. The evil must, if
possible, be successfully met at its very source, and prevented, for, after a
lawyer has once been admitted, and has pursued his profession, and has
established himself therein, a far more difficult situation is presented to the
court when proceedings are instituted for disbarment and for the recalling and
annulment of his license.
In Re Keenan:6
The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every citizen, as in
the right to carry on an ordinary trade or business. It is a peculiar privilege
granted and continued only to those who demonstrate special fitness in
intellectual attainment and in moral character. All may aspire to it on an
absolutely equal basis, but not all will attain it. Elaborate machinery has been
set up to test applicants by standards fair to all and to separate the fit from the
unfit. Only those who pass the test are allowed to enter the profession, and
only those who maintain the standards are allowed to remain in it.
Re Rouss:7
 Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and a fair
private and professional character is one of them; to refuse admission to an
unworthy applicant is not to punish him for past offense: an examination into
character, like the examination into learning, is merely a test of fitness.
Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court:8
Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and ability, so that they may
not only protect the rights and interests of their clients, but be able to assist
court in the trial of the cause. Yet what protection to clients or assistance to
courts could such agents give? They are required to be of good moral
character, so that the agents and officers of the court, which they are, may not
bring discredit upon the due administration of the law, and it is of the highest
possible consequence that both those who have not such qualifications in the
first instance, or who, having had them, have fallen therefrom, shall not be
permitted to appear in courts to aid in the administration of justice.
It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater
importance so far as the general public and the proper administration of justice are
concerned, than the possession of legal learning:
. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10
Ann./Cas. 187):
The public policy of our state has always been to admit no person
to the practice of the law unless he covered an upright moral
character. The possession of this by the attorney is more
important, if anything, to the public and to the proper
administration of justice than legal learning. Legal learning may be
acquired in after years, but if the applicant passes the threshold of
the bar with a bad moral character the chances are that his
character will remain bad, and that he will become a disgrace
instead of an ornament to his great calling  — a curse instead of a
benefit to his community — a Quirk, a Gammon or a Snap, instead
of a Davis, a Smith or a Ruffin.9
All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those
seeking admission to the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly
broader than inquiry into the moral proceedings for disbarment:
Re Stepsay: 10
The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a proceeding for his
admission to practice is broader in scope than in a disbarment proceeding.
Re Wells: 11
. . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for admission to the
California Bar the court cannot reject him for want of good moral character
unless it appears that he has been guilty of acts which would be cause for his
disbarment or suspension, could not be sustained; that the inquiry is broader
in its scope than that in a disbarment proceeding,  and the court may
receive any evidence which tends to show the applicant's character as respects
honesty, integrity, and general morality,  and may no doubt refuse admission
 upon proofs that might not establish his guilt of any of the acts declared to be
causes for disbarment.
The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek
admission to the bar must of necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct
expected from members of the general public. There is a very real need to prevent a
general perception that entry into the legal profession is open to individuals with
inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of such a perception would signal the
progressive destruction of our people's confidence in their courts of law and in our legal
system as we know it.12
Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far short of
the required standard of good moral character. The deliberate (rather than merely
accidental or inadvertent) infliction of severe physical injuries which proximately led to the
death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character flaws on the
part of those who inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused had failed to
discharge their moral duty to protect the life and well-being of a "neophyte" who had, by
seeking admission to the fraternity involved, reposed trust and confidence in all of them
that, at the very least, he would not be beaten and kicked to death like a useless stray dog.
Thus, participation in the prolonged and mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul
Camaligan constituted evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible
behavior, which makes impossible a finding that the participant was then possessed of
good moral character.
Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired, the Court is
prepared to consider de novo the question of whether applicant A.C. Argosino has purged
himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above. We stress that good
moral character is a requirement possession of which must be demonstrated not only at
the time of application for permission to take the bar examinations but also, and more
importantly, at the time of application for admission to the bar and to take the attorney's
oath of office.
Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and consideration,
evidence that he may be now regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral
character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar. His evidence may consist, inter
alia, of sworn certifications from responsible members of the community who have a good
reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of
time, particularly since the judgment of conviction was rendered by Judge Santiago. He
should show to the Court how he has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless
student to the family of the deceased student and to the community at large. Mr. Argosino
must, in other words, submit relevant evidence to show that he is a different person now,
that he has become morally fit for admission to the ancient and learned profession of the
law.
Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by appropriate written
manifestation, of the names and addresses of the father and mother (in default thereof,
brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan), within ten (10) day from notice hereof. Let a
copy of this Resolution be furnished to the parents or brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul
Camaligan.
 FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 7437, August 17, 2016
AVIDA LAND CORPORATION (FORMERLY LAGUNA PROPERTIES HOLDINGS, INC.), Complainant, v. ATTY. AL C.
ARGOSINO, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, C.J.:
The only issue before Us is whether respondent's act of filing numerous pleadings, that
caused delay in the execution of a final judgment, constitutes professional misconduct in
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath.

In its questioned Resolution1, the Board of Governors (Board) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation 2 of the
Investigating Commissioner,3 who found respondent guilty of violating Canon 12, Rule
12.044 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for delaying the enforcement of a writ of
execution, and recommended that the latter be reprimanded or censured with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same behavior in the future shall merit a harsher
penalty.5chan
robleslaw
ANTECEDENT FACTS

Complainant is a Philippine corporation engaged in the development and sale of subdivision

houses and lots.6Respondent was counsel for Rodman Construction & Development
Corporation (Rodman).7chanrobleslaw

Complainant entered into a Contract to Sell with Rodman, 8 under which the latter was to
acquire from the former a subdivision house and lot in Santa Rosa, Laguna through bank
financing. In the event that such financing would be disapproved, Rodman was supposed to
pay the full contract price of P4,412,254.00, less the downpayment of P1,323,676.20,
within 15 days from its receipt of the loan disapproval. 9chanrobleslaw

After settling the downpayment, Rodman took possession of the property. 10chanrobleslaw

In three separate letters11, complainant demanded that Rodman pay the outstanding
balance of P3,088,577.80.12 Both parties agreed that the amount would be paid on a
deferred basis within 18 months.13chanrobleslaw

Rodman made a partial payment of P404,782.56 on 22 March 1999. It also claimed to have
made other payments amounting to P1,458,765.06 from March 1999 to July 1999, which
complainant disputed.14chanrobleslaw

Consequently, complainant rescinded the Contract to Sell by notarial act, and demanded
that Rodman vacate the subject property. 15chanrobleslaw
As Rodman remained in possession of the property, 16 complainant filed an unlawful
detainer case against the former before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Makati
City.17chanrobleslaw

Soon after, Rodman filed a Complaint before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) seeking the nullification of the rescission of the Contract to Sell. It also prayed for
the accounting of payments and the fixing of the period upon which the balance of the
purchase price should be paid.18chanrobleslaw

The MTC took cognizance of Rodman's HLURB Complaint, and dismissed the unlawful
detainer case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. 19chanrobleslaw

HLURB Regional Office No. IV (HLURB Regional Office), through its arbiter Atty. Ma.
Perpetua Y. Aquino, similarly dismissed Rodman's Complaint and ordered it to pay damages
and attorney's fees.20 Rodman appealed the ruling to the HLURB Board of Commissioners
(HLURB Board).21chanrobleslaw

In its subsequent Decision,22 the HLURB Board modified the arbiter's ruling, directing
Rodman "to immediately pay its outstanding balance failing in which respondent shall have
the right to rescind the contract subject to a refund of all the sums paid by complainant less
deductions as may be stipulated in the contract and less monthly compensation for the use
of the premises at the rate of 1% of the contract price per month." 23chanrobleslaw

Complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration 24 of the HLURB Board's Decision,
questioning the order to refund the sums paid by Rodman less deductions in case of a
rescission of the contract. Rodman filed a Comment/Opposition25cralawredto complainant's
motion and sought a clarification of certain aspects of the Decision, 26 but did not move for
reconsideration.

The HLURB Board thereafter issued a Resolution 27 modifying its earlier Decision.
Thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
xxx [T]he complainant (Rodman) is directed to immediately pay to the respondent (herein
complainant) its outstanding balance of P1,814,513.27, including interests and penalties
which may have accrued in the meantime, failing in which, the respondent shall have the
right to rescind the contract subject to a refund of all the sums paid by the complainant less
deductions as may be stipulated in the contract and less monthly compensation for the use
of the premises at the rate of 1% of the contract price per month.
As neither of the parties appealed the judgment within the period allowed, it became final
and executory.
The parties thereafter attempted to arrive at a settlement on the judgment, but their
efforts were in vain.28 With the judgment award still not satisfied after the lapse of six
months, complainant filed a motion for writs of execution and possession 29 before the
HLURB Board.

Respondent filed an Opposition/Comment on the motion and subsequently a Rejoinder 30 to

complainant's Reply.31chanrobleslaw

In an Order32 dated 10 August 2006, the HLURB Board granted complainant's motion and
remanded the case records to the HLURB Regional Office for proceedings on the execution
of the judgment and/or other appropriate disposition.

Respondent moved for reconsideration of the Order dated 10 August 2006, 33 raising issues
on the computation of interests. Complainant filed an Opposition 34 and Rejoinder,35 to
which respondent filed a Reply36 and Surrejoinder.37chanrobleslaw

On 17 January 2007, the HLURB Board issued an Order 38 denying Rodman's Motion for
Reconsideration. It said that the computation of interests and penalties, as well as other
matters concerning the implementation of the final and executory Decision, shall be dealt
with in the execution proceedings before the Regional Office. It furthermore enjoined the
parties from filing any pleading in the guise of an appeal on collateral issues or questions
already passed upon.39chanrobleslaw

On 5 March 2007, respondent filed a Motion for Computation of Interest 40 before the
HLURB Regional Office, citing the disagreement between the parties as to the reckoning
date of the accrual of interest. Complainant filed its Opposition with Motion for Issuance of
Writ of Execution and Possession.41chanrobleslaw

In its Order42 dated 31 July 2007, the HLURB Regional Office accordingly computed the
interest due, arriving at the total amount of P2,685,479.64 as payment due to complainant.
It also directed the issuance of a Writ of Execution implementing the HLURB Board's earlier
Resolution.43chanrobleslaw

Instead however of complying with the Order and the Writ of Execution, 44 respondent, on
behalf of Rodman, filed a Motion (1) to Quash the Writ of Execution; (2) for Clarification;
and (3) to Set the Case for Conference. 45 The said motion injected new issues and claims
and demanded the inclusion in the Order of a "provision that upon actual receipt of the
amount of P2,685,479.64, [complainant] should simultaneously turn-over the duplicate
original title to Rodman." (Emphasis omitted)

Respondent also filed a Petition46 to Cite Complainant in Contempt for issuing a demand
letter to Rodman despite the pendency of the latter's Motion to Quash the Writ of
Execution.

On 7 November 2007, the HLURB Regional Office summoned the parties to a conference to
thresh out the problems with the execution of the writ. The conference, however, failed to
serve its purpose.

Respondent thereafter moved for the inhibition of Atty. Aquino as arbiter of the case and
for the setting of a hearing on the Petition to Cite Complainant in Contempt. 47 The motion
alleged that Arbiter Aquino had shown bias in favor of complainant, and that she had failed
to set the Petition for hearing.48chanrobleslaw

In an Order dated 23 April 2008, 49 the HLURB Regional Office (1) denied the motion for
inhibition; (2) granted complainant's Motion for Issuance of Alias Writ of Execution and
Writ of Possession; and (3) directed complainant to comment on the Petition citing the
latter for contempt.

Respondent moved for reconsideration of the aforementioned Order, reiterating that

Arbiter Aquino should inhibit herself from the case because of her bias. Arbiter Aquino
eventually yielded and ordered the re-raffle of the case, which went to Arbiter Raymundo
A. Foronda.

When complainant filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Resolve Pending Motion for the

Issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution, respondent submitted his vehement Opposition. He
insisted that his Motion to be Furnished with Notice of Re-raffle should be acted upon first
and argued that "the merits of the instant case as well as the motions filed in relation
thereto must be re-evaluated by the new handling arbiter after the re-raffling x x x."

On 5 January 2009, respondent filed a Manifestation on the Notice of Conference issued by

Arbiter Foronda. The Manifestation stated that Rodman would be attending the
conference, not to submit itself to the jurisdiction of Arbiter Foronda, but to facilitate the
re-raffling of the case.

On 16 January 2009, respondent filed a Motion for Inhibition against Arbiter Foronda,
claiming that his designation violated due process. He said the re-raffle was questionable
because he was not notified of its conduct despite his earlier Motion to be Furnished with
Notice of Re-raffle.

Thereafter, the parties submitted various pleadings on the issue of whether or not Arbiter
Foronda could rule on the pending motions.
In a Resolution dated 22 September 2009, Arbiter Foronda held that (1) the notice of re-
raffle was not an indispensable prerequisite for a substitute arbiter to have jurisdiction over
a case at the execution stage; (2) the claim of Rodman that its Motion for Reconsideration
of the 23 April 2008 Order had remained unresolved was rendered moot by Arbiter
Aquino's eventual inhibition from the case; and (3) Rodman's prayer for the summary
dismissal of complainant's motions to resolve the Motion for the Issuance of an Alias Writ
of Execution was denied.

The 22 September 2009 Resolution put an end to the long-drawn-out dispute, as

respondent did not file any more pleadings.
ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT AGAINST RESPONDENT

On 21 February 2007, in the midst of the squabble over the HLURB case, complainant -
through its vice president for project development Steven J. Dy - filed a Complaint-
Affidavit50 against respondent for alleged professional misconduct and violation of the
Lawyer's Oath. The Complaint alleged that respondent's conduct in relation to the HLURB
case manifested a disregard of the following tenets:51
1. Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit
or proceeding or delay any man's cause.
2. Canon 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness, and good faith to the court.
3. Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them
to defeat the ends of justice.
4. Canon 12 - A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice.
5. Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a
judgment or misuse court processes.
In his Comment,52 respondent claimed that what primarily caused the delays in the HLURB
case were the legal blunders of complainant's counsel, to wit:
1. It took complainant's counsel a period of six months to file a Motion for Writ of
Execution of the HLURB Board's Decision dated 22 June 2005. 53chanrobleslaw
2. The Motion for Writ of Execution was filed before the HLURB Board, which as an
appellate body had no jurisdiction to issue the writ.54
Respondent also raised the issue of complainant's counsel's erroneous acts of notarial
rescission and filing of an ejectment suit before the trial court. These acts allegedly
contributed to the delay in the resolution of the dispute. 55chanrobleslaw

Further, respondent argued that he could not have possibly caused delays in the execution
of the Decision dated 22 June 2005 at the time the instant Complaint was filed on 21
February 2007, as complainant filed its Motion for Writ of Execution before the HLURB
Regional Office only in April 2007. 56chanrobleslaw

Lastly, respondent asserted that he merely followed his legal oath by defending the cause
of his client with utmost dedication, diligence, and good faith. 57chanrobleslaw

As respondent allegedly continued performing dilatory and frivolous tactics, complainant

filed Supplemental Complaints58 against him.

The Court referred this case to the IBP for investigation, report, and
recommendation.59chanrobleslaw

On 22 June 2013, the IBP issued a Resolution adopting and approving the Investigating
Commissioner's Report and Recommendation on the Complaint. 60 Neither party filed a
motion for reconsideration or a petition within the period allowed.61chanrobleslaw
THE RULING OF THE COURT

Respondent is guilty of professional misconduct.

Despite the simplicity of the issue involved in the HLURB case, the path towards its
resolution became long, tedious, and frustrating because of the deliberate attempts of
respondent to delay the actual execution of the judgment therein. He continued to file
pleadings over issues already passed upon even after being enjoined not to do so, and
made unfounded accusations of bias or procedural defects. These acts manifest his
propensity to disregard the authority of a tribunal and abuse court processes, to the
detriment of the administration of justice.

The defense that respondent is merely defending the cause of his client is untenable.

As a lawyer, respondent indeed owes fidelity to the cause of his client and is expected to
serve the latter with competence and diligence. As such, respondent is entitled to employ
every honorable means to defend the cause of his client and secure what is due the
latter.62chanrobleslaw

Professional rules, however, impose limits on a lawyer's zeal and hedge it with necessary
restrictions and qualifications.63 Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyers are
required to exert every effort and consider it their duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.64 The Code also obliges lawyers to employ only fair and honest
means to attain the lawful objectives of their client.65chanrobleslaw

In Millare v. Montero,66 the Court ruled that it is unethical for a lawyer to abuse or

wrongfully use the judicial process - such as the filing of dilatory motions, repetitious
litigation, and frivolous appeals - for the sole purpose of frustrating and delaying the
execution of a judgment.
In Garcia v. Francisco,67 a lawyer willfully and knowingly abused his rights of recourse - all of
which were rebuffed - to get a favorable judgment. He was found to have violated his duty
as a member of the bar to pursue only those acts or proceedings that appear to be just, and
only those lines of defense he believed to be honestly debatable under the law.

Respondent cannot hide behind the pretense of advocating his client's cause to escape
liability for his actions that delayed and frustrated the administration of justice.

He even attempted to turn the tables on complainant by pointing out that the "legal
blunders" of the latter's counsel contributed to the delay in the execution of the judgment.
Whether or not the actions or omissions of complainant's counsel brought dire
consequences to its client's cause is not a factor in the instant case. Even assuming for
argument's sake that complainant's counsel committed procedural errors that prolonged
some of the case incidents, these errors did not prejudice the delivery of justice, as they
were later cured. More important, the so-called "blunders" were independent of
respondent's actions, which were the direct cause of the delay.

Respondent argues that he could not have possibly delayed the execution of the judgment,
as no Motion for Execution of Judgment had been filed when the instant administrative
case was instituted. This argument can no longer be considered viable, as he continued to
employ dilatory tactics even after the Writ of Execution had already been issued, and
complainant later filed Supplemental Complaints against him.

What is patent from the acts of respondent — as herein narrated and evident from the
records - is that he has made a mockery of judicial processes, disobeyed judicial orders, and
ultimately caused unjust delays in the administration of justice. These acts are in direct
contravention of Rules 10.3 and 12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provide:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to
defeat the ends of justice.

Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of judgment or
misuse court processes.
Further, respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath 68 by disobeying the legal orders of a duly
constituted authority, and disregarding his sworn duty to "delay no man for money or
malice."

While the IBP similarly found respondent guilty of professional misconduct, we find that its
recommended penalty of reprimand is not commensurate with respondent's transgression.

Under the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline's Guidelines for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
(IBP Guidelines), reprimand is generally appropriate as a penalty when a lawyer's
negligence causes injury or potential injury to a client or a party. 69 In this case, respondent's
injurious acts were clearly not caused by his negligence in following procedures or court
orders. He knowingly abused the legal process and violated orders of the HLURB Board and
Regional Office with the intent of delaying the execution of a judgment that had long been
final and executory. That he continued to do so even if a Complaint was already filed
against him proved that his acts were deliberate.

Further, ethical violations analogous to respondent's infractions have not been treated as
lightly by the Court.

In Foronda v. Guerrero, the respondent therein was suspended for two years from the
practice of law for filing multiple petitions before various courts concerning the same
subject matter in violation of Canon 1270 and Rule 12.0471 of the of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

In Saladaga v Astorga,72 the respondent was found guilty of (1) breach of the Lawyer's
Oath; (2) unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct; and (3) disrespect for the Court and
causing the undue delay of cases. For these offenses, a penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for two years, as recommended by the IBP, was imposed.

The respondents in Millare73 and Garcia,74 meanwhile, were suspended for one year from

the practice of law.

In Saa v. IBP,75 the petitioner was found to have violated Canon 12, 76 Rule 12.04,77 and Rule
1.0378 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for delaying the resolution of a case. He
was also suspended from practice of law for one year.

Thus, We have meted out the penalty of one to two years' suspension in cases involving
multiple violations of professional conduct that have caused unjust delays in the
administration of justice. The IBP Guidelines similarly provide that "suspension is
appropriate when a lawyer knows that he is violating a court order or rule, and there is
injury or potential injury to a client or a party, or interference or potential interference with
a legal proceeding."79chanrobleslaw

Respondent, therefore, should not receive a mere reprimand; he should be suspended from
the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Al C. Argosino is found GUILTY of violating

Rules 10.03 and 12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath, for
which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year effective upon the finality
of this Resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of a similar offense shall be
dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, the Public Information Office, and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts. Likewise, a Notice of Suspension shall be
appropriately posted on the Supreme Court website as a notice to the general public.

Upon his receipt of this Decision, respondent shall forthwith be suspended from the
practice of law and shall formally manifest to this Court that his suspension has started. He
shall furnish all courts and quasi-judicial bodies where he has entered his appearance a
copy of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993

MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner, 
vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.
R E SO L U T I O N

REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing
advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said
petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements
pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law."
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am—
6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE.
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal
Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext.
Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence.
Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign
Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC.1 Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are
champterous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the
confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a
member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements,
hence the reliefs sought in his petition as hereinbefore quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said
advertisement at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in
the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the use of modern
computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the
services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these services should be
allowed supposedly 
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona,2reportedly
decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein, we
required the (1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA),
(3) Philippine Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5)
Women Lawyers Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federacion International de
Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their respective position papers on the controversy and,
thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The said bar associations readily responded and extended
their valuable services and cooperation of which this Court takes note with appreciation
and gratitude.
The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services
offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law
and, in either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements
herein complained of.
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper
and enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers
adopted by the aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda submitted by them
on the issues involved in this bar matter.
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to
distinguish the two terms, i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal services",
common sense would readily dictate that the same are essentially without
substantial distinction. For who could deny that document search, evidence
gathering, assistance to layman in need of basic institutional services from
government or non-government agencies like birth, marriage, property, or
business registration, obtaining documents like clearance, passports, local or
foreign visas, constitutes practice of law?
xxx xxx xxx
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with
respondent's foreign citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its
position manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the view espoused by
respondent (to the effect that today it is alright to advertise one's legal
services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to
respondent's act of establishing a "legal clinic" and of concomitantly
advertising the same through newspaper publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this
Honorable Court to perpetually restrain respondent from undertaking highly
unethical activities in the field of law practice as aforedescribed.4
xxx xxx xxx
A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that
respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it renders legal
services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the
public, the advertisements in question give the impression that respondent is
offering legal services. The Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as
earlier mentioned, apparently because this (is) the effect that the
advertisements have on the reading public.
The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first
of all, to the very name being used by respondent — "The Legal Clinic, Inc."
Such a name, it is respectfully submitted connotes the rendering of legal
services for legal problems, just like a medical clinic connotes medical services
for medical problems. More importantly, the term "Legal Clinic" connotes
lawyers, as the term medical clinic connotes doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements
subject of the present case, appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all the
more reinforces the impression that it is being operated by members of the
bar and that it offers legal services. In addition, the advertisements in question
appear with a picture and name of a person being represented as a lawyer
from Guam, and this practically removes whatever doubt may still remain as to
the nature of the service or services being offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal
support services" as claimed by it, or whether it offers legal services as any
lawyer actively engaged in law practice does. And it becomes unnecessary to
make a distinction between "legal services" and "legal support services," as the
respondent would have it. The advertisements in question leave no room for
doubt in the minds of the reading public that legal services are being offered
by lawyers, whether true or not.
B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of
acts contrary to law, morals, public order and public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in
question are only meant to inform the general public of the services being
offered by it. Said advertisements, however, emphasize to Guam divorce, and
any law student ought to know that under the Family Code, there is only one
instance when a foreign divorce is recognized, and that is:
Article 26. . . .
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as
follows:
Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent
union between a man and woman entered into accordance with
 law for the establishment of conjugal and family life.  It is the
foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose
nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not
subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix
the property relation during the marriage within the limits
provided by this Code.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the
message being conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a
marriage celebrated in accordance with our law, by simply going to Guam for a
divorce. This is not only misleading, but encourages, or serves to induce,
violation of Philippine law. At the very least, this can be considered "the dark
side" of legal practice, where certain defects in Philippine laws are exploited
for the sake of profit. At worst, this is outright malpractice.
Rule 1.02. — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as
that shown in Annex "A" of the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor
vehicle with the words "Just Married" on its bumper and seems to address
those planning a "secret marriage," if not suggesting a "secret marriage,"
makes light of the "special contract of permanent union," the inviolable social
institution," which is how the Family Code describes marriage, obviously to
emphasize its sanctity and inviolability. Worse, this particular advertisement
appears to encourage marriages celebrated in secrecy, which is suggestive of
immoral publication of applications for a marriage license.
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be
concluded that the above impressions one may gather from the
advertisements in question are accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby
Concepcion example alone confirms what the advertisements suggest. Here it
can be seen that criminal acts are being encouraged or committed 
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply
because the jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not extend to the place
where the crime is committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services" respondent
offers do not constitute legal services as commonly understood, the
advertisements in question give the impression that respondent corporation is
being operated by lawyers and that it offers legal services, as earlier discussed.
Thus, the only logical consequence is that, in the eyes of an ordinary
newspaper reader, members of the bar themselves are encouraging or
inducing the performance of acts which are contrary to law, morals, good
customs and the public good, thereby destroying and demeaning the integrity
of the Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing
the publication of the advertisements in question, or any other advertisements
similar thereto. It is also submitted that respondent should be prohibited from
further performing or offering some of the services it presently offers, or, at
the very least, from offering such services to the public in general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research,
electronic data gathering, storage and retrieval, standardized legal forms,
investigators for gathering of evidence, and like services will greatly benefit the
legal profession and should not be stifled but instead encouraged. However,
when the conduct of such business by non-members of the Bar encroaches
upon the practice of law, there can be no choice but to prohibit such business.
Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better
performed by specialists in other fields, such as computer experts, who by
reason of their having devoted time and effort exclusively to such field cannot
fulfill the exacting requirements for admission to the Bar. To prohibit them
from "encroaching" upon the legal profession will deny the profession of the
great benefits and advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using a
computer will be doing better than a lawyer using a typewriter, even if both
are (equal) in skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or
tolerate the illegal practice of law in any form, not only for the protection of
members of the Bar but also, and more importantly, for the protection of the
public. Technological development in the profession may be encouraged
without tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention of illegal practice.
There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of
its services, but only if such services are made available exclusively to members
of the Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be offering technical assistance,
not legal services. Alternatively, the more difficult task of carefully
distinguishing between which service may be offered to the public in general
and which should be made available exclusively to members of the Bar may be
undertaken. This, however, may require further proceedings because of the
factual considerations involved.
It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought to
be prohibited outright, such as acts which tend to suggest or induce
celebration abroad of marriages which are bigamous or otherwise illegal and
void under Philippine law. While respondent may not be prohibited from
simply disseminating information regarding such matters, it must be required
to include, in the information given, a disclaimer that it is not authorized to
practice law, that certain course of action may be illegal under Philippine law,
that it is not authorized or capable of rendering a legal opinion, that a lawyer
should be consulted before deciding on which course of action to take, and
that it cannot recommend any particular lawyer without subjecting itself to
possible sanctions for illegal practice of law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively
at members of the Bar, with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not
authorized to practice law or perform legal services.
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody
should be allowed to represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without such
term being clearly defined by rule or regulation, and without any adequate and
effective means of regulating his activities. Also, law practice in a corporate
form may prove to be advantageous to the legal profession, but before
allowance of such practice may be considered, the corporation's Article of
Incorporation and By-laws must conform to each and every provision of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of Court. 5
2. Philippine Bar Association:
xxx xxx xxx.
Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged
in giving legal support services to lawyers and laymen, through experienced
paralegals, with the use of modern computers and electronic machines" (pars.
2 and 3, Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably, respondent's acts of
holding out itself to the public under the trade name "The Legal Clinic, Inc.,"
and soliciting employment for its enumerated services fall within the realm of
a practice which thus yields itself to the regulatory powers of the Supreme
Court. For respondent to say that it is merely engaged in paralegal work is to
stretch credulity. Respondent's own commercial advertisement which
announces a certain Atty. Don Parkinson to be handling the fields of law belies
its pretense. From all indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." is offering
and rendering legal services through its reserve of lawyers. It has been held
that the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court, but
includes drawing of deeds, incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising
clients as to their legal right and then take them to an attorney and ask the
latter to look after their case in court See Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1984
ed., p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law,
and such limitation cannot be evaded by a corporation  employing competent
lawyers to practice for it. Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which
respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the public and solicits
employment of its legal services. It is an odious vehicle for deception, especially
so when the public cannot ventilate any grievance for malpracticeagainst the
business conduit. Precisely, the limitation of practice of law to persons who
have been duly admitted as members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised
Rules of Court) is to subject the members to the discipline of the Supreme
Court. Although respondent uses its business name, the persons and the
lawyers who act for it are subject to court discipline. The practice of law is not
a profession open to all who wish to engage in it nor can it be assigned to
another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal rightlimited to persons who have
qualified themselves under the law. It follows that not only respondent but
also all the persons who are acting for respondent are the persons engaged in
unethical law practice.6
3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:
The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues stated
herein, are wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;
2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also
misleading and patently immoral; and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish the
Legal Clinic and its corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of law and
for its unethical, misleading and immoral advertising.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it
merely renders "legal support services" to answers, litigants and the general
public as enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of
Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment). But its advertised
services, as enumerated above, clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed
engaged in law practice, albeit outside of court.
As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and
Family Relations Law, particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment of
marriages, secret marriages, absence and adoption; Immigration Laws,
particularly on visa related problems, immigration problems; the Investments
Law of the Philippines and such other related laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid
law, the legal principles and procedures related thereto, the legal advices
based thereon and which activities call for legal training, knowledge and
experience.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the
activities of respondent fall squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and
laymen equally term as "the practice of law."7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:
In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration
should be given to the protection of the general public from the danger of
being exploited by unqualified persons or entities who may be engaged in the
practice of law.
At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course
of study on top of a four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to
take and pass the bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer qualified to practice
law.
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to the
administration of justice, there are in those jurisdictions, courses of study
and/or standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal with the general
public as such. While it may now be the opportune time to establish these
courses of study and/or standards, the fact remains that at present, these do
not exist in the Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable Court may decide
to make measures to protect the general public from being exploited by those
who may be dealing with the general public in the guise of being "paralegals"
without being qualified to do so.
In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the
dangers which may be brought about by advertising of legal services. While it
appears that lawyers are prohibited under the present Code of Professional
Responsibility from advertising, it appears in the instant case that legal services
are being advertised not by lawyers but by an entity staffed by "paralegals."
Clearly, measures should be taken to protect the general public from falling
prey to those who advertise legal services without being qualified to offer such
services. 8
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to
give the impression that information regarding validity of marriages, divorce,
annulment of marriage, immigration, visa extensions, declaration of absence,
adoption and foreign investment, which are in essence, legal matters , will be
given to them if they avail of its services. The Respondent's name — The Legal
Clinic, Inc. — does not help matters. It gives the impression again that
Respondent will or can cure the legal problems brought to them. Assuming
that Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely by paralegals, it also gives the
misleading impression that there are lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.,
as there are doctors in any medical clinic, when only "paralegals" are involved
in The Legal Clinic, Inc.
Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its
President and majority stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on the
structure and main purpose of Respondent corporation in the aforementioned
"Starweek" article."9
5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:
Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases
for the purpose of gain which, as provided for under the above cited law, (are)
illegal and against the Code of Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this
country.
Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to
solicit cases, but it is illegal in that in bold letters it announces that the Legal
Clinic, Inc., could work out/cause the celebration of a secret marriage which is
not only illegal but immoral in this country. While it is advertised that one has
to go to said agency and pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly fooling the
public for valid marriages in the Philippines are solemnized only by officers
authorized to do so under the law. And to employ an agency for said purpose
of contracting marriage is not necessary.
No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the trend
is towards allowing lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable people to
obtain from qualified practitioners legal services for their particular needs can
justify the use of advertisements such as are the subject matter of the petition,
for one (cannot) justify an illegal act even by whatever merit the illegal act may
serve. The law has yet to be amended so that such act could become
justifiable.
We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret
marriages and divorce are possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it is
not so, are highly reprehensible.
It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about
having a secret marriage here, when it cannot nor should ever be attempted,
and seek advice on divorce, where in this country there is none, except under
the Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is also against good
morals and is deceitful because it falsely represents to the public to be able to
do that which by our laws cannot be done (and) by our Code of Morals should
not be done.
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that
solicitation for clients by an attorney by circulars of advertisements, is
unprofessional, and offenses of this character justify permanent elimination
from the Bar. 10
6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:
xxx xxx xxx
1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as
management consultancy firms or travel agencies, whether run by lawyers or
not, perform the services rendered by Respondent does not necessarily lead to
the conclusion that Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. In the same
vein, however, the fact that the business of respondent (assuming it can be
engaged in independently of the practice of law) involves knowledge of the law
does not necessarily make respondent guilty of unlawful practice of law.
. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can render
effective service unless he is familiar with such statutes and
regulations. He must be careful not to suggest a course of conduct
which the law forbids. It seems . . . .clear that (the consultant's)
knowledge of the law, and his use of that knowledge as a factor in
determining what measures he shall recommend, do not
constitute the practice of law . . . . It is not only presumed that all
men know the law, but it is a fact that most men have
considerable acquaintance with broad features of the law . . . .
Our knowledge of the law — accurate or inaccurate — moulds our
conduct not only when we are acting for ourselves, but when we
are serving others. Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen generally
possess rather precise knowledge of the laws touching their
particular business or profession. A good example is the architect,
who must be familiar with zoning, building and fire prevention
codes, factory and tenement house statutes, and who draws plans
and specification in harmony with the law. This is not practicing
law.
But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower,
replies that it is required by the statute. Or the industrial relations
expert cites, in support of some measure that he recommends, a
decision of the National Labor Relations Board. Are they practicing
law? In my opinion, they are not, provided no separate fee is
charged for the legal advice or information, and the legal question
is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem.
It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.
If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to
engage a lawyer to advise him and the architect in respect to the
building code and the like, then an architect who performed this
function would probably be considered to be trespassing on
territory reserved for licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the industrial
relations field had been pre-empted by lawyers, or custom placed
a lawyer always at the elbow of the lay personnel man. But this is
not the case. The most important body of the industrial relations
experts are the officers and business agents of the labor unions
and few of them are lawyers. Among the larger corporate
employers, it has been the practice for some years to delegate
special responsibility in employee matters to a management
group chosen for their practical knowledge and skill in such
matter, and without regard to legal thinking or lack of it. More
recently, consultants like the defendants have the same service
that the larger employers get from their own specialized staff.
The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized
profession for which appropriate courses are offered by our
leading universities. The court should be very cautious about
declaring [that] a widespread, well-established method of
conducting business is unlawful, or that the considerable class of
men who customarily perform a certain function have no right to
do so, or that the technical education given by our schools cannot
be used by the graduates in their business.
In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should
consider his work for any particular client or customer, as a whole.
I can imagine defendant being engaged primarily to advise as to
the law defining his client's obligations to his employees, to guide
his client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client along
the path charted by law. This, of course, would be the practice of
the law. But such is not the fact in the case before me.
Defendant's primarily efforts are along economic and
psychological lines. The law only provides the frame within which
he must work, just as the zoning code limits the kind of building
the limits the kind of building the architect may plan. The
incidental legal advice or information defendant may give, does
not transform his activities into the practice of law. Let me add
that if, even as a minor feature of his work, he performed services
which are customarily reserved to members of the bar, he would
be practicing law. For instance, if as part of a welfare program, he
drew employees' wills.
Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of the
employer in the adjustment of grievances and in collective
bargaining, with or without a mediator. This is not per se the
 practice of law. Anyone may use an agent for negotiations and
may select an agent particularly skilled in the subject under
discussion, and the person appointed is free to accept the
employment whether or not he is a member of the bar. Here,
however, there may be an exception where the business turns on
a question of law. Most real estate sales are negotiated by brokers
who are not lawyers. But if the value of the land depends on a
disputed right-of-way and the principal role of the negotiator is to
assess the probable outcome of the dispute and persuade the
opposite party to the same opinion, then it may be that only a
lawyer can accept the assignment. Or if a controversy between an
employer and his men grows from differing interpretations of a
contract, or of a statute, it is quite likely that defendant should
not handle it. But I need not reach a definite conclusion here,
since the situation is not presented by the proofs.
Defendant also appears to represent the employer before
administrative agencies of the federal government, especially
before trial examiners of the National Labor Relations Board. An
agency of the federal government, acting by virtue of an authority
granted by the Congress, may regulate the representation of
parties before such agency. The State of New Jersey is without
power to interfere with such determination or to forbid
representation before the agency by one whom the agency
admits. The rules of the National Labor Relations Board give to a
party the right to appear in person, or by counsel, or by other
representative. Rules and Regulations, September 11th, 1946, S.
203.31. 'Counsel' here means a licensed attorney, and ther
representative' one not a lawyer. In this phase of his work,
defendant may lawfully do whatever the Labor Board allows, even
arguing questions purely legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d
800, cited in Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp.
154-156.).
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling
(which may involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice of law
provided that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal
problem;.
(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the
bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.
All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as
a whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of
Professional Responsibility succintly states the rule of conduct:
Rule 15.08 — A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation
concurrently with the practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he
is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.
1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services
(See Annex "A" Petition). Services on routine, straightforward marriages, like
securing a marriage license, and making arrangements with a priest or a judge,
may not constitute practice of law. However, if the problem is as complicated
as that described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby
Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then what may be involved is actually the
practice of law. If a non-lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such services
then it is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence,
annulment of marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely
giving informational materials may not constitute of law. The business is
similar to that of a bookstore where the customer buys materials on the
subject and determines on the subject and determines by himself what
courses of action to take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving
information, the Legal Clinic's paralegals may apply the law to the particular
problem of the client, and give legal advice. Such would constitute
unauthorized practice of law.
It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which
publication of a legal text which purports to say what the law is
amount to legal practice. And the mere fact that the principles or
rules stated in the text may be accepted by a particular reader as a
solution to his problem does not affect this. . . . . Apparently it is
urged that the conjoining of these two, that is, the text and the
forms, with advice as to how the forms should be filled out,
constitutes the unlawful practice of law. But that is the situation
with many approved and accepted texts. Dacey's book is sold to
the public at large. There is no personal contact or relationship
with a particular individual. Nor does there exist that relation of
confidence and trust so necessary to the status of attorney and
client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE — THE
REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR PERSON IN A
PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the book assumes to offer
general advice on common problems, and does not purport to
give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a
designated or readily identified person. Similarly the defendant's
publication does not purport to give personal advice on a specific
problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person in a
particular situation — in their publication and sale of the kits, such
publication and sale did not constitutes the unlawful practice of
law . . . . There being no legal impediment under the statute to the
sale of the kit, there was no proper basis for the injunction against
 defendant maintaining an office for the purpose of selling to
persons seeking a divorce, separation, annulment or separation
agreement any printed material or writings relating to
matrimonial law or the prohibition in the memorandum of
modification of the judgment against defendant having an interest
in any publishing house publishing his manuscript on divorce and
against his having any personal contact with any prospective
purchaser. The record does fully support, however, the finding
that for the change of $75 or $100 for the kit, the defendant gave
legal advice in the course of personal contacts concerning
particular problems which might arise in the preparation and
presentation of the purchaser's asserted matrimonial cause of
action or pursuit of other legal remedies and assistance in the
preparation of necessary documents (The injunction therefore
sought to) enjoin conduct constituting the practice of law,
particularly with reference to the giving of advice and counsel by
the defendant relating to specific problems of particular
individuals in connection with a divorce, separation, annulment of
separation agreement sought and should be affirmed. (State v.
Winder, 348, NYS 2D 270 [1973], cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-
diagnostic, non-advisory. "It is not controverted, however, that if the services
"involve giving legal advice or counselling," such would constitute practice of
law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this light that FIDA submits that a factual
inquiry may be necessary for the judicious disposition of this case.
xxx xxx xxx
2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the
impression (or perpetuate the wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage.
With all the solemnities, formalities and other requisites of marriages (See
Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no Philippine marriage can be secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph
thereof (which is not necessarily related to the first paragraph) fails to state
the limitation that only "paralegal services?" or "legal support services", and
not legal services, are available." 11
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for
the proper determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note
that the clause "practice of law" has long been the subject of judicial construction and
interpretation. The courts have laid down general principles and doctrines explaining the
meaning and scope of the term, some of which we now take into account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to
perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is
to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice
and counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights are
secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three
principal types of professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform
them of their rights and obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring
knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients
before public tribunals which possess power and authority to determine rights of life,
liberty, and property according to law, in order to assist in proper interpretation and
enforcement of law. 14
When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the
practice of law. 15 One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and
then takes the business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is
also practicing law. 16 Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights
of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who
renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to
that extent, practicing law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in several cases, we
laid down the test to determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is
not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of
litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of
legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters
connected with the law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title Abstract and
Trust Co. v. Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also considered to be in
the practice of law when he:
. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person,
firms, associations or corporations as to their right under the law, or appears in
a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings, pending or
prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee,
or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and
there, in such representative capacity, performs any act or acts for the purpose
of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise
stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of
advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs
any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged
in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S. W.
2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-
177),stated:
 The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions
and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on
behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In
general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation
services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure
of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency
proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters or
estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves
the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work
performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to
proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a
large variety of subjects and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and
other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with
court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation.
They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience
with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex
situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear
an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid
distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn
between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in
court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his
office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold
customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning
and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy
trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments
on the Rules o Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In Re Opinion of the
Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile
Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144).
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying
the aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and
observations of the aforestated bar associations that the activities of respondent, as
advertised, constitute "practice of law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be
seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own
description of the services it has been offering, to wit:
Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by trained
paralegals to laymen and lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-
advisory, through the extensive use of computers and modern information
technology in the gathering, processing, storage, transmission and
 reproduction of information and communication, such as computerized legal
research; encoding and reproduction of documents and pleadings prepared by
laymen or lawyers; document search; evidence gathering; locating parties or
witnesses to a case; fact finding investigations; and assistance to laymen in
need of basic institutional services from government or non-government
agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or business registrations; educational
or employment records or certifications, obtaining documentation like
clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving information about laws of
other countries that they may find useful, like foreign divorce, marriage or
adoption laws that they can avail of preparatory to emigration to the foreign
country, and other matters that do not involve representation of clients in
court; designing and installing computer systems, programs, or software for
the efficient management of law offices, corporate legal departments, courts
and other entities engaged in dispensing or administering legal services. 20
While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve
mechanical and technical knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems and
programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of research
aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen
and lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more
apparent than real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage,
divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all the respondent
corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop
there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will
necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on
the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its
advertisements represent and for the which services it will consequently charge and be
paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law."
Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not
represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited
merely giving legal advice, contract drafting and so forth.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13,
1991 issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for
Legal Problems," where an insight into the structure, main purpose and operations of
respondent corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with
offices on the seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U. N. Avenue in
Manila. No matter what the client's problem, and even if it is as complicated as
the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of
lawyers, who, like doctors are "specialists" in various fields can take care of it.
The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal
problems, labor, litigation, and family law. These specialist are backed up by a
battery of paralegals, counsellors and attorneys.
 Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the
medical field toward specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford the
services of the big law firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come, we start by
analyzing the problem. That's what doctors do also. They ask you how you
contracted what's bothering you, they take your temperature, they observe
you for the symptoms and so on. That's how we operate, too. And once the
problem has been categorized, then it's referred to one of our specialists.
There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up
treatment. These The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things
like preparing a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of loss can be taken care of
by our staff or, if this were a hospital the residents or the interns. We can take
care of these matters on a while you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa hospital,
out-patient, hindi kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a common cold or
diarrhea," explains Atty. Nogales.
Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with
accordingly. "If you had a rich relative who died and named you her sole heir,
and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of property, we would refer you to a
specialist in taxation. There would be real estate taxes and arrears which
would need to be put in order, and your relative is even taxed by the state for
the right to transfer her property, and only a specialist in taxation would be
properly trained to deal with the problem. Now, if there were other heirs
contesting your rich relatives will, then you would need a litigator, who knows
how to arrange the problem for presentation in court, and gather evidence to
support the case. 21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling.
What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the
services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions
against the advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this
proceeding.
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts
sufficiently establish that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of
sorts for various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple
documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services
are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of
lawyers engaged in the practice of law. 22
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent
which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly
admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the
provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to
practice law. 23
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly
qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an
individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper
standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the
court, the client and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to
practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the court. 24
The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish
to draw support for his thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is
limited to those who meet the requirements for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and
various statutes or rules specifically so provide. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful
business except for members of the bar who have complied with all the conditions required
by statute and the rules of court. Only those persons are allowed to practice law who, by
reason of attainments previously acquired through education and study, have been
recognized by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of legal science entitling them
to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights claims, or liabilities of their clients,
with respect to the construction, interpretation, operation and effect of law. 26 The
justification for excluding from the practice of law those not admitted to the bar is found,
not in the protection of the bar from competition, but in the protection of the public from
being advised and represented in legal matters by incompetent and unreliable persons over
whom the judicial department can exercise little control.27
We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the
United States of paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be adopted
in this jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this
should first be a matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption
as it has done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there
are schools and universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education,
while there are none in the Philippines. 28 As the concept of the "paralegals" or "legal
assistant" evolved in the United States, standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the
general public. One of the major standards or guidelines was developed by the American
Bar Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant Education
Programs (1973). Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal assistants. There are
also associations of paralegals in the United States with their own code of professional
ethics, such as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal
Association. 29
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be
considered as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to
practice law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of another or to
render legal services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law,
rules or regulations granting permission therefor. 30
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of
constitutional or statutory authority, a person who has not been admitted as an attorney
cannot practice law for the proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the
unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice of
law. 31 That policy should continue to be one of encouraging persons who are unsure of
their legal rights and remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons licensed to
practice law in the state. 32
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true,
honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed
to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-
laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor
shall he pay or give something of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation
of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business. 35 Prior to the adoption of the code of
Professional Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers
should not resort to indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as
furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be published
in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the
manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the
lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation. 36
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A
lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill as
in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37 The prescription against
advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental
postulate that the that the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case of The Director
of Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an advertisement, similar to those of
respondent which are involved in the present proceeding, 39 was held to constitute
improper advertising or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by
the respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of
business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among
other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is
highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant
advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades
himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of
mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a
member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities
as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worthy
and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . . is the
establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character
and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a
lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which
must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a
client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public
attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and
proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to
magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able
service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the
profession enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define
the extent to which they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories,
namely, those which are expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from
the restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent
with the standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative
data. "Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's
name and the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable
addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar;
schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinction;
public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions;
membership and offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific
societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names
and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients regularly
represented." 42
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a
mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is
published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish
his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or
society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the
conduct, management or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the
public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only
a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address,
telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple
announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates,
firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not
objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under
a designation of special branch of law. 44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which
respondent is being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by
said respondent corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold that the same
definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned
exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked
and constitutes the justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to
the case at bar. Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly
allows a lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to
publish a statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the availability upon request
of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific
services. No such exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly, whether in our former
Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides,
even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions stated
therein are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such authority
in that state." 46 This goes to show that an exception to the general rule, such as that being
invoked by herein respondent, can be made only if and when the canons expressly provide
for such an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in the case at bar.
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the
decision in Bates, on the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television
commercials, it was found that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to these
characteristics of lawyers:
Trustworthy from 71% to 14%
Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial
systems, to allow the publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would
only serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal
profession whose integrity has consistently been under attack lately by media and the
community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such
negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that level of professional
conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high esteem
formerly accorded to the legal profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary
action, to advertise his services except in allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the
unauthorized practice of law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime
incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the
Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar acts which are involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more severely.
While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s
for which the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and determined, we are
constrained to refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within
the adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding which is merely administrative in
nature. It is, of course, imperative that this matter be promptly determined, albeit in a
different proceeding and forum, since, under the present state of our law and
jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be organized for or engage in the practice of law in this
country. This interdiction, just like the rule against unethical advertising, cannot be
subverted by employing some so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the alleged
support services.
The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and
province of the Solicitor General who can institute the corresponding quo
warrantoaction, 50 after due ascertainment of the factual background and basis for the
grant of respondent's corporate charter, in light of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-
off from the instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor General for such action as may be
necessary under the circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal
Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in
any form which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this
petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction
proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this
resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant
and the Office of the Solicitor General for appropriate action in accordance herewith.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon,
Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 202666               September 29, 2014

RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA and DAVID SUZARA, Petitioners, 

vs.
ST. THERESA'S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, and JOHN DOES,Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The individual's desire for privacy is never absolute, since participation in society is an
equally powerful desire. Thus each individual is continually engaged in a personal
adjustment process in which he balances the desire for privacy with the desire for
disclosure and communication of himself to others, in light of the environmental conditions
and social norms set by the society in which he lives.
- Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967)
The Case
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, in
relation to Section 19 of A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, 1 otherwise known as the "Rule on the Writ of
Habeas Data." Petitioners herein assail the July 27, 2012 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City (RTC) in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB, which dismissed their
habeas data petition.
The Facts
Nenita Julia V. Daluz (Julia) and Julienne Vida Suzara (Julienne), both minors, were, during
the period material, graduating high school students at St. Theresa's College (STC), Cebu
City. Sometime in January 2012, while changing into their swimsuits for a beach party they
were about to attend, Julia and Julienne, along with several others, took digital pictures of
themselves clad only in their undergarments. These pictures were then uploaded by Angela
Lindsay Tan (Angela) on her Facebook3 profile.
Back at the school, Mylene Rheza T. Escudero (Escudero), a computer teacher at STC’s high
school department, learned from her students that some seniors at STC posted pictures
online, depicting themselves from the waist up, dressed only in brassieres. Escudero then
asked her students if they knew who the girls in the photos are. In turn, they readily
identified Julia, Julienne, and Chloe Lourdes Taboada (Chloe), among others.
Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in to their respective personal Facebook
accounts and showed her photos of the identified students, which include: (a) Julia and
Julienne drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a bar; and (b) Julia and Julienne
along the streets of Cebu wearing articles of clothing that show virtually the entirety of
their black brassieres. What is more, Escudero’s students claimed that there were times
when access to or the availability of the identified students’ photos was not confined to the
girls’ Facebook friends,4 but were, in fact, viewable by any Facebook user.5
Upon discovery, Escudero reported the matter and, through one of her student’s Facebook
page, showed the photosto Kristine Rose Tigol (Tigol), STC’s Discipline-in-Charge, for
appropriate action. Thereafter, following an investigation, STC found the identified students
to have deported themselves in a manner proscribed by the school’s Student Handbook, to
wit:
1. Possession of alcoholic drinks outside the school campus;
2. Engaging in immoral, indecent, obscene or lewd acts;
3. Smoking and drinking alcoholicbeverages in public places;
4. Apparel that exposes the underwear;
5. Clothing that advocates unhealthy behaviour; depicts obscenity; contains sexually
suggestive messages, language or symbols; and 6. Posing and uploading pictures on
the Internet that entail ample body exposure.
On March 1, 2012, Julia, Julienne, Angela, and the other students in the pictures in
question, reported, as required, to the office of Sr. Celeste Ma. Purisima Pe (Sr. Purisima),
STC’s high school principal and ICM 6 Directress. They claimed that during the meeting, they
were castigated and verbally abused by the STC officials present in the conference,
including Assistant Principal Mussolini S. Yap (Yap), Roswinda Jumiller, and Tigol. What is
more, Sr. Purisima informed their parents the following day that, as part of their penalty,
they are barred from joining the commencement exercises scheduled on March 30, 2012.
A week before graduation, or on March 23, 2012, Angela’s mother, Dr. Armenia M. Tan
(Tan), filed a Petition for Injunction and Damages before the RTC of Cebu City against STC,
et al., docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-38594. 7 In it, Tan prayed that defendants therein be
enjoined from implementing the sanction that precluded Angela from joining the
commencement exercises.
On March 25, 2012,petitioner Rhonda Ave Vivares (Vivares), the mother of Julia, joined the
fray as an intervenor. On March 28, 2012, defendants inCivil Case No. CEB-38594 filed their
memorandum, containing printed copies of the photographs in issue as annexes. That same
day, the RTC issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) allowing the students to attend the
graduation ceremony, to which STC filed a motion for reconsideration.
Despite the issuance of the TRO,STC, nevertheless, barred the sanctioned students from
participating in the graduation rites, arguing that, on the date of the commencement
exercises, its adverted motion for reconsideration on the issuance ofthe TRO remained
unresolved.
Thereafter, petitioners filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas
Data, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB8 on the basis of the following considerations:
1. The photos of their children in their undergarments (e.g., bra) were taken for
posterity before they changed into their swimsuits on the occasion of a birthday
beach party;
2. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at "Friends Only."
They, thus, have a reasonable expectation of privacy which must be respected.
3. Respondents, being involved in the field of education, knew or ought to have
known of laws that safeguard the right to privacy. Corollarily, respondents knew or
ought to have known that the girls, whose privacy has been invaded, are the victims
in this case, and not the offenders. Worse, after viewing the photos, the minors were
called "immoral" and were punished outright;
4. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced
without their consent. Escudero, however, violated their rights by saving digital
copies of the photos and by subsequently showing them to STC’s officials. Thus, the
Facebook accounts of petitioners’ children were intruded upon;
5. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of information,
data, and digital images happened at STC’s Computer Laboratory; and
6. All the data and digital images that were extracted were boldly broadcasted by
respondents through their memorandum submitted to the RTC in connection with
Civil Case No. CEB-38594. To petitioners, the interplay of the foregoing constitutes an
invasion of their children’s privacy and, thus, prayed that: (a) a writ of habeas databe
issued; (b) respondents be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all soft
and printed copies of the subjectdata before or at the preliminary hearing; and (c)
after trial, judgment be rendered declaring all information, data, and digital images
accessed, saved or stored, reproduced, spread and used, to have been illegally
obtained inviolation of the children’s right to privacy.
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC, through an Order dated July
5, 2012, issued the writ of habeas data. Through the same Order, herein respondents were
directed to file their verified written return, together with the supporting affidavits, within
five (5) working days from service of the writ.
In time, respondents complied with the RTC’s directive and filed their verified written
return, laying down the following grounds for the denial of the petition, viz: (a) petitioners
are not the proper parties to file the petition; (b) petitioners are engaging in forum
shopping; (c) the instant case is not one where a writ of habeas data may issue;and (d)
there can be no violation of their right to privacy as there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy on Facebook.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On July 27, 2012, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for habeas data. The
dispositive portion of the Decision pertinently states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
The parties and media must observe the aforestated confidentiality.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.9
To the trial court, petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened
violation of the minors’ right to privacy, one of the preconditions for the issuance of the
writ of habeas data. Moreover, the court a quoheld that the photos, having been uploaded
on Facebook without restrictions as to who may view them, lost their privacy in some way.
Besides, the RTC noted, STC gathered the photographs through legal means and for a legal
purpose, that is, the implementation of the school’s policies and rules on discipline.
Not satisfied with the outcome, petitioners now come before this Court pursuant to Section
19 of the Rule on Habeas Data.10
The Issues
The main issue to be threshed out inthis case is whether or not a writ of habeas datashould
be issued given the factual milieu. Crucial in resolving the controversy, however, is the
pivotal point of whether or not there was indeed an actual or threatened violation of the
right to privacy in the life, liberty, or security of the minors involved in this case.
Our Ruling
We find no merit in the petition.
Procedural issues concerning the availability of the Writ of Habeas Data
The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life,
liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official
or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or
storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of
the aggrieved party.11 It is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the
image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to
provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to
protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in
which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve
unlawful ends.12
In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an individual’s right to
informational privacy, among others. A comparative law scholar has, in fact, defined habeas
dataas "a procedure designed to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the
information age."13 The writ, however, will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged
unauthorized access to information about a person.Availment of the writ requires the
existence of a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life,
liberty or security on the other.14 Thus, the existence of a person’s right to informational
privacy and a showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation
of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim are indispensable before the
privilege of the writ may be extended.15
Without an actionable entitlement in the first place to the right to informational privacy, a
habeas datapetition will not prosper. Viewed from the perspective of the case at bar,this
requisite begs this question: given the nature of an online social network (OSN)––(1) that it
facilitates and promotes real-time interaction among millions, if not billions, of users, sans
the spatial barriers,16 bridging the gap created by physical space; and (2) that any
information uploaded in OSNs leavesan indelible trace in the provider’s databases, which
are outside the control of the end-users––is there a right to informational privacy in OSN
activities of its users? Before addressing this point, We must first resolve the procedural
issues in this case.
a. The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances
Contrary to respondents’ submission, the Writ of Habeas Datawas not enacted solely for
the purpose of complementing the Writ of Amparoin cases of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances.
Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:
Sec. 2. Who May File. – Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ of habeas data.
However, in cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, the petition may be
filed by:
(a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party, namely: the spouse,
children and parents; or
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the
fourth civil degreeof consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the
preceding paragraph. (emphasis supplied)
Had the framers of the Rule intended to narrow the operation of the writ only to cases of
extralegal killings or enforced disappearances, the above underscored portion of Section 2,
reflecting a variance of habeas data situations, would not have been made.
Habeas data, to stress, was designed "to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the
information age."17 As such, it is erroneous to limit its applicability to extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances only. In fact, the annotations to the Rule preparedby the
Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court, after explaining that the Writ of Habeas
Data complements the Writ of Amparo, pointed out that:
The writ of habeas data, however, can be availed of as an independent remedy to enforce
one’s right to privacy, more specifically the right to informational privacy. The remedies
against the violation of such right can include the updating, rectification, suppression or
destruction of the database or information or files in possession or in control of
respondents.18 (emphasis Ours) Clearly then, the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Datamay
also be availed of in cases outside of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
b. Meaning of "engaged" in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
Respondents’ contention that the habeas data writ may not issue against STC, it not being
an entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding
the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party, while valid to a point,
is, nonetheless, erroneous.
To be sure, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection shall be
available only against abuses of a person or entity engaged in the businessof gathering,
storing, and collecting of data. As provided under Section 1 of the Rule:
Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any person whose
right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home
and correspondence of the aggrieved party. (emphasis Ours)
The provision, when taken in its proper context, as a whole, irresistibly conveys the idea
that habeas data is a protection against unlawful acts or omissions of public officials and of
private individuals or entities engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing data about the
aggrieved party and his or her correspondences, or about his or her family. Such individual
or entity need not be in the business of collecting or storing data.
To "engage" in something is different from undertaking a business endeavour. To "engage"
means "to do or take part in something."19 It does not necessarily mean that the activity
must be done in pursuit of a business. What matters is that the person or entity must be
gathering, collecting or storing said data or information about the aggrieved party or his or
her family. Whether such undertaking carries the element of regularity, as when one
pursues a business, and is in the nature of a personal endeavour, for any other reason or
even for no reason at all, is immaterial and such will not prevent the writ from getting to
said person or entity.
To agree with respondents’ above argument, would mean unduly limiting the reach of the
writ to a very small group, i.e., private persons and entities whose business is data
gathering and storage, and in the process decreasing the effectiveness of the writ asan
instrument designed to protect a right which is easily violated in view of rapid
advancements in the information and communications technology––a right which a great
majority of the users of technology themselves are not capable of protecting.
Having resolved the procedural aspect of the case, We now proceed to the core of the
controversy.
The right to informational privacy on Facebook
a. The Right to Informational Privacy
The concept of privacyhas, through time, greatly evolved, with technological advancements
having an influential part therein. This evolution was briefly recounted in former Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno’s speech, The Common Right to Privacy, 20where he explained the
three strands of the right to privacy, viz: (1) locational or situational privacy; 21 (2)
informational privacy; and (3) decisional privacy. 22 Of the three, what is relevant to the case
at bar is the right to informational privacy––usually defined as the right of individuals to
control information about themselves.23
With the availability of numerous avenues for information gathering and data sharing
nowadays, not to mention each system’s inherent vulnerability to attacks and intrusions,
there is more reason that every individual’s right to control said flow of information should
be protected and that each individual should have at least a reasonable expectation of
privacy in cyberspace. Several commentators regarding privacy and social networking sites,
however, all agree that given the millions of OSN users, "[i]n this [Social Networking]
environment, privacy is no longer grounded in reasonable expectations, but rather in some
theoretical protocol better known as wishful thinking."24
It is due to this notion that the Court saw the pressing need to provide for judicial remedies
that would allow a summary hearing of the unlawful use of data or information and to
remedy possible violations of the right to privacy. 25 In the same vein, the South African High
Court, in its Decision in the landmark case, H v. W,26promulgated on January30, 2013,
recognized that "[t]he law has to take into account the changing realities not only
technologically but also socially or else it will lose credibility in the eyes of the people. x x x
It is imperative that the courts respond appropriately to changing times, acting cautiously
and with wisdom." Consistent with this, the Court, by developing what may be viewed as
the Philippine model of the writ of habeas data, in effect, recognized that, generally
speaking, having an expectation of informational privacy is not necessarily incompatible
with engaging in cyberspace activities, including those that occur in OSNs.
The question now though is up to whatextent is the right to privacy protected in OSNs?
Bear in mind that informational privacy involves personal information. At the same time,
the very purpose of OSNs is socializing––sharing a myriad of information, 27some of which
would have otherwise remained personal.
b. Facebook’s Privacy Tools: a response to the clamor for privacy in OSN activities
Briefly, the purpose of an OSN is precisely to give users the ability to interact and to stay
connected to other members of the same or different social media platform through the
sharing of statuses, photos, videos, among others, depending on the services provided by
the site. It is akin to having a room filled with millions of personal bulletin boards or "walls,"
the contents of which are under the control of each and every user. In his or her bulletin
board, a user/owner can post anything––from text, to pictures, to music and videos––
access to which would depend on whether he or she allows one, some or all of the other
users to see his or her posts. Since gaining popularity, the OSN phenomenon has paved the
way to the creation of various social networking sites, includingthe one involved in the case
at bar, www.facebook.com (Facebook), which, according to its developers, people use "to
stay connected with friends and family, to discover what’s going on in the world, and to
share and express what matters to them."28
Facebook connections are established through the process of "friending" another user. By
sending a "friend request," the user invites another to connect their accounts so that they
can view any and all "Public" and "Friends Only" posts of the other.Once the request is
accepted, the link is established and both users are permitted to view the other user’s
"Public" or "Friends Only" posts, among others. "Friending," therefore, allows the user to
form or maintain one-to-one relationships with other users, whereby the user gives his or
her "Facebook friend" access to his or her profile and shares certain information to the
latter.29
To address concerns about privacy, 30 but without defeating its purpose, Facebook was
armed with different privacy tools designed to regulate the accessibility of a user’s
profile31 as well as information uploaded by the user. In H v. W, 32 the South Gauteng High
Court recognized this ability of the users to "customize their privacy settings," but did so
with this caveat: "Facebook states in its policies that, although it makes every effort to
protect a user’s information, these privacy settings are not foolproof." 33
For instance, a Facebook user canregulate the visibility and accessibility of digital
images(photos), posted on his or her personal bulletin or "wall," except for the user’sprofile
picture and ID, by selecting his or her desired privacy setting:
(a) Public - the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;
 (b) Friends of Friends - only the user’s Facebook friends and their friends can view the
photo;
(b) Friends - only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;
(c) Custom - the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of
the Facebook user; and
(d) Only Me - the digital image can be viewed only by the user.
The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook users, designed to set up barriers to
broaden or limit the visibility of his or her specific profile content, statuses, and photos,
among others, from another user’s point of view. In other words, Facebook extends its
users an avenue to make the availability of their Facebook activities reflect their choice as
to "when and to what extent to disclose facts about [themselves] – and to put others in the
position of receiving such confidences."34 Ideally, the selected setting will be based on one’s
desire to interact with others, coupled with the opposing need to withhold certain
information as well as to regulate the spreading of his or her personal information.
Needless to say, as the privacy setting becomes more limiting, fewer Facebook users can
view that user’s particular post.
STC did not violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to privacy
Without these privacy settings, respondents’ contention that there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy in Facebook would, in context, be correct. However, such is not the
case. It is through the availability of said privacy tools that many OSN users are said to have
a subjective expectation that only those to whomthey grant access to their profile will view
the information they post or upload thereto.35
This, however, does not mean thatany Facebook user automatically has a protected
expectation of privacy inall of his or her Facebook activities.
Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her OSN activity, it is first necessary
that said user, in this case the children of petitioners,manifest the intention to keepcertain
posts private, through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its
visibility.36 And this intention can materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of the
OSN’s privacy tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation,in
cyber world, of the user’s invocation of his or her right to informational privacy. 37
Therefore, a Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy tool to grant or deny access
to his or her post orprofile detail should not be denied the informational privacy right which
necessarily accompanies said choice.38 Otherwise, using these privacy tools would be a
feckless exercise, such that if, for instance, a user uploads a photo or any personal
information to his or her Facebook page and sets its privacy level at "Only Me" or a custom
list so that only the user or a chosen few can view it, said photo would still be deemed
public by the courts as if the user never chose to limit the photo’s visibility and accessibility.
Such position, if adopted, will not only strip these privacy tools of their function but it
would also disregard the very intention of the user to keep said photo or information within
the confines of his or her private space.
We must now determine the extent that the images in question were visible to other
Facebook users and whether the disclosure was confidential in nature. In other words, did
the minors limit the disclosure of the photos such that the images were kept within their
zones of privacy? This determination is necessary in resolving the issue of whether the
minors carved out a zone of privacy when the photos were uploaded to Facebook so that
the images will be protected against unauthorized access and disclosure.
Petitioners, in support of their thesis about their children’s privacy right being violated,
insist that Escudero intruded upon their children’s Facebook accounts, downloaded copies
ofthe pictures and showed said photos to Tigol. To them, this was a breach of the minors’
privacy since their Facebook accounts, allegedly, were under "very private" or "Only
Friends" setting safeguarded with a password. 39 Ultimately, they posit that their children’s
disclosure was only limited since their profiles were not open to public viewing. Therefore,
according to them, people who are not their Facebook friends, including respondents, are
barred from accessing said post without their knowledge and consent. Aspetitioner’s
children testified, it was Angelawho uploaded the subjectphotos which were only viewable
by the five of them,40 although who these five are do not appear on the records.
Escudero, on the other hand, stated in her affidavit 41 that "my students showed me some
pictures of girls cladin brassieres. This student [sic] of mine informed me that these are
senior high school [students] of STC, who are their friends in [F]acebook. x x x They then
said [that] there are still many other photos posted on the Facebook accounts of these girls.
At the computer lab, these students then logged into their Facebook account [sic], and
accessed from there the various photographs x x x. They even told me that there had been
times when these photos were ‘public’ i.e., not confined to their friends in Facebook."
In this regard, We cannot give muchweight to the minors’ testimonies for one key reason:
failure to question the students’ act of showing the photos to Tigol disproves their
allegation that the photos were viewable only by the five of them. Without any evidence to
corroborate their statement that the images were visible only to the five of them, and
without their challenging Escudero’s claim that the other students were able to view the
photos, their statements are, at best, self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration. 42
It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s sworn account that her
students, who are the minors’ Facebook "friends," showed her the photos using their own
Facebook accounts. This only goes to show that no special means to be able to viewthe
allegedly private posts were ever resorted to by Escudero’s students, 43 and that it is
reasonable to assume, therefore, that the photos were, in reality, viewable either by (1)
their Facebook friends, or (2) by the public at large.
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is"Public," it can be surmised that
the photographs in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof
that petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If suchwere
the case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to informational privacy.
The ensuing pronouncement in US v. Gines-Perez44 is most instructive:
[A] person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to forsake and
renounce all privacy rights to such imagery, particularly under circumstances suchas here,
where the Defendant did not employ protective measures or devices that would have
controlled access to the Web page or the photograph itself.45
Also, United States v. Maxwell46 held that "[t]he more open the method of transmission is,
the less privacy one can reasonably expect. Messages sent to the public at large inthe chat
room or e-mail that is forwarded from correspondent to correspondent loses any
semblance of privacy."
That the photos are viewable by "friends only" does not necessarily bolster the petitioners’
contention. In this regard, the cyber community is agreed that the digital images under this
setting still remain to be outside the confines of the zones of privacy in view of the
following:
(1) Facebook "allows the world to be more open and connected by giving its users
the tools to interact and share in any conceivable way;" 47
(2) A good number of Facebook users "befriend" other users who are total
strangers;48
(3) The sheer number of "Friends" one user has, usually by the hundreds; and
(4) A user’s Facebook friend can "share"49 the former’s post, or "tag"50 others who are
not Facebook friends with the former, despite its being visible only tohis or her own
Facebook friends.
It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a post’s or profile detail’s privacy to
"Friends" is no assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another user who is not
Facebook friends with the source of the content. The user’s own Facebook friend can share
said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user
tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is
shared or when a person is tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the person who
shared the post or who was tagged can view the post, the privacy setting of which was set
at "Friends."
To illustrate, suppose A has 100 Facebook friends and B has 200. A and B are not Facebook
friends. If C, A’s Facebook friend, tags B in A’s post, which is set at "Friends," the initial
audience of 100 (A’s own Facebook friends) is dramatically increased to 300 (A’s 100 friends
plus B’s 200 friends or the public, depending upon B’s privacy setting). As a result, the
audience who can view the post is effectively expanded––and to a very large extent.
This, along with its other features and uses, is confirmation of Facebook’s proclivity towards
user interaction and socialization rather than seclusion or privacy, as it encourages
broadcasting of individual user posts. In fact, it has been said that OSNs have facilitated
their users’ self-tribute, thereby resulting into the "democratization of fame." 51 Thus, it is
suggested, that a profile, or even a post, with visibility set at "Friends Only" cannot easily,
more so automatically, be said to be "very private," contrary to petitioners’ argument.
As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the sanctioned
students’ Facebook friends, respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived
privacy invasion since it was the minors’ Facebook friends who showed the pictures to
Tigol. Respondents were mere recipients of what were posted. They did not resort to any
unlawful means of gathering the information as it was voluntarily given to them by persons
who had legitimate access to the said posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the friends of
the minors. Curiously enough, however, neither the minors nor their parents imputed any
violation of privacy against the students who showed the images to Escudero.
Furthermore, petitioners failed to prove their contention that respondents reproduced and
broadcasted the photographs. In fact, what petitioners attributed to respondents as an act
of offensive disclosure was no more than the actuality that respondents appended said
photographs in their memorandum submitted to the trial court in connection with Civil
Case No. CEB-38594.52 These are not tantamount to a violation of the minor’s informational
privacy rights, contrary to petitioners’ assertion.
In sum, there can be no quibbling that the images in question, or to be more precise, the
photos of minor students scantily clad, are personal in nature, likely to affect, if
indiscriminately circulated, the reputation of the minors enrolled in a conservative
institution. However, the records are bereft of any evidence, other than bare assertions
that they utilized Facebook’s privacy settings to make the photos visible only to them or to
a select few. Without proof that they placed the photographs subject of this case within the
ambit of their protected zone of privacy, they cannot now insist that they have an
expectation of privacy with respect to the photographs in question.
Had it been proved that the access tothe pictures posted were limited to the original
uploader, through the "Me Only" privacy setting, or that the user’s contact list has been
screened to limit access to a select few, through the "Custom" setting, the result may have
been different, for in such instances, the intention to limit access to the particular post,
instead of being broadcasted to the public at large or all the user’s friends en masse,
becomes more manifest and palpable.
On Cyber Responsibility
It has been said that "the best filter is the one between your children’s ears." 53 This means
that self-regulation on the part of OSN users and internet consumers ingeneral is the best
means of avoiding privacy rights violations. 54 As a cyberspace communitymember, one has
to be proactive in protecting his or her own privacy. 55 It is in this regard that many OSN
users, especially minors, fail.Responsible social networking or observance of the
"netiquettes"56 on the part of teenagers has been the concern of many due to the
widespreadnotion that teenagers can sometimes go too far since they generally lack the
people skills or general wisdom to conduct themselves sensibly in a public forum.57
Respondent STC is clearly aware of this and incorporating lessons on good cyber citizenship
in its curriculum to educate its students on proper online conduct may be mosttimely. Too,
it is not only STC but a number of schools and organizations have already deemed it
important to include digital literacy and good cyber citizenshipin their respective programs
and curricula in view of the risks that the children are exposed to every time they
participate in online activities.58 Furthermore, considering the complexity of the cyber world
and its pervasiveness,as well as the dangers that these children are wittingly or unwittingly
exposed to in view of their unsupervised activities in cyberspace, the participation of the
parents in disciplining and educating their children about being a good digital citizen is
encouraged by these institutions and organizations. In fact, it is believed that "to limit such
risks, there’s no substitute for parental involvement and supervision." 59
As such, STC cannot be faulted for being steadfast in its duty of teaching its students to
beresponsible in their dealings and activities in cyberspace, particularly in OSNs, whenit
enforced the disciplinary actions specified in the Student Handbook, absenta showing that,
in the process, it violated the students’ rights.
OSN users should be aware of the risks that they expose themselves to whenever they
engage incyberspace activities.1âwphi1 Accordingly, they should be cautious enough to
control their privacy and to exercise sound discretion regarding how much information
about themselves they are willing to give up. Internet consumers ought to be aware that,
by entering or uploading any kind of data or information online, they are automatically and
inevitably making it permanently available online, the perpetuation of which is outside the
ambit of their control. Furthermore, and more importantly, information, otherwise private,
voluntarily surrendered by them can be opened, read, or copied by third parties who may
or may not be allowed access to such.
It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to exercise due diligence in their online dealings
and activities and must not be negligent in protecting their rights. Equity serves the vigilant.
Demanding relief from the courts, as here, requires that claimants themselves take utmost
care in safeguarding a right which they allege to have been violated. These are
indispensable. We cannot afford protection to persons if they themselves did nothing to
place the matter within the confines of their private zone. OSN users must be mindful
enough to learn the use of privacy tools, to use them if they desire to keep the information
private, and to keep track of changes in the available privacy settings, such as those of
Facebook, especially because Facebook is notorious for changing these settings and the
site's layout often.
In finding that respondent STC and its officials did not violate the minors' privacy rights, We
find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and case disposition of the court a quo.
In light of the foregoing, the Court need not belabor the other assigned errors.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated July
27, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB is
hereby AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City

SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200               April 2, 2014

(formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2834-RTJ)

ANTONIO M. LORENZANA, Complainant, 
vs.
JUDGE MA. CECILIA I. AUSTRIA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Batangas City,Respondent.

DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve in this Decision the administrative complaints1 filed by Antonio M. Lorenzana
(complainant) against Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria (respondent), Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 2, Batangas City.
The records show that the administrative complaints arose from the case "In the Matter of
the Petition to have Steel Corporation of the Philippines Placed under Corporate
Rehabilitation with Prayer for the Approval of the Proposed Rehabilitation Plan," docketed
as SP. Proc. No. 06-7993, where the respondent was the presiding judge. The complainant
was the Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of Steel Corporation of the
Philippines (SCP), a company then under rehabilitation proceedings.
i. Complaint
In his verified complaint dated January 21, 2008, the complainant alleged that in the course
of SP. Proc. No. 06-7993, the respondent committed Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave
Abuse of Authority, Gross Misconduct, Grave Incompetence, Irregularity in the
Performance of Duty, Grave Bias and Partiality, Lack of Circumspection, Conduct
Unbecoming of a Judge, Failure to Observe the Reglementary Period and Violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, as shown by the following instances:
1. The respondent appointed Atty. Santiago T. Gabionza, Jr. as rehabilitation receiver
over SCP’s objections and despite serious conflict of interest in being the duly
appointed rehabilitation receiver for SCP and, at the same time, the external legal
counsel of most of SCP’s creditors; he is also a partner of the law firm that he
engaged as legal adviser.
2. The respondent conducted informal meetings (which she termed as "consultative
meetings" in her Order2 dated May 11, 2007) in places outside her official jurisdiction
(i.e., a first class golf club, a hotel and sports club facilities in Metro Manila) and
where she arbitrarily dictated the terms, parameters and features of the
rehabilitation plan she wanted to approve for SCP. She also announced in the
meetings that she would prepare the rehabilitation plan for SCP.
3. The modified rehabilitation plan submitted by Atty. Gabionza is a replica of what
the respondent dictated to him. Thus, the respondent exceeded the limits of her
authority and effectively usurped and pre-empted the rehabilitation receiver’s
exercise of functions.
4. The respondent ordered that the proceedings of the informal meetings be off-
record so that there would be no record that she had favored Equitable-PCI Bank
(EPCIB).
5. The respondent had secret meetings and communications with EPCIB to discuss
the case without the knowledge and presence of SCP and its creditors.
6. The respondent appointed Gerardo Anonas (Anonas) as Atty. Gabionza’s financial
adviser and, at the same time, as her financial adviser to guide her in the formulation
and development of the rehabilitation plan, for a fee of ₱3.5M at SCP’s expense.
Anonas is also the cousin-in-law of the managing partner of Atty. Gabionza’s law firm.
7. The respondent encouraged EPCIB to raise complaints or accusations against SCP,
leading to EPCIB’s filing of a motion to create a management committee.
8. When requested to conduct an evidentiary meeting and to issue a subpoena (so
that SCP could confront EPCIB’s witnesses to prove the allegation that there was a
 need for the creation of a management committee), the respondent denied SCP’s
requests and delayed the issuance of the order until the last minute.
9. At the hearing of September 14, 2007, the respondent intimidated SCP’s counsel,
Atty. Ferdinand Topacio; blocked his every attempt to speak; refused to recognize his
appearances in court; and made condescending and snide remarks.
10. The respondent failed to observe the reglementary period prescribed by the
Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation (Rules). She approved the
rehabilitation plan beyond the 180 days given to her in the Rules, without asking for
permission to extend the period from the Supreme Court (SC).
11. The respondent erroneously interpreted and applied Section 23, Rule 4 of the
Rules (the court’s power to approve the rehabilitation plan) to include the power to
amend, modify and alter it.
12. The respondent took a personal interest and commitment to decide the matter in
EPCIB’s favor and made comments and rulings in the proceedings that raised
concerns regarding her impartiality.
13. The respondent adamantly refused to inhibit herself and showed special interest
and personal involvement in the case.
ii. Supplemental Complaint
The complainant likewise filed a supplemental complaint3 dated April 14, 2008 where he
alleged that the respondent committed an act of impropriety when she displayed her
photographs in a social networking website called "Friendster" and posted her personal
details as an RTC Judge, allegedly for the purpose of finding a compatible partner. She also
posed with her upper body barely covered by a shawl, allegedly suggesting that nothing
was worn underneath except probably a brassiere.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in its 1st Indorsement 4 dated March 18, 2008,
referred the complaints to the respondent for comment.
a. Comment to January 21, 2008 Complaint
The respondent vehemently denied the allegations against her. While she admitted that
she crafted a workable, feasible rehabilitation plan best suited for SCP, she maintained that
she did so only to render fairness and equity to all the parties to the rehabilitation
proceedings. She also submitted that if indeed she erred in modifying the rehabilitation
plan, hers was a mere error of judgment that does not call for an administrative disciplinary
action. Accordingly, she claimed that the administrative complaints were premature
because judicial remedies were still available.5
The respondent also argued that the rules do not prohibit informal meetings and
conferences. On the contrary, she argued that informal meetings are even encouraged in
view of the summary and non-adversarial nature of rehabilitation proceedings. Since
Section 21, Rule 4 of the Rules6 gives the rehabilitation receiver the power to meet with the
creditors, then there is all the more reason for the rehabilitation judge, who has the
authority to approve the plan, to call and hold meetings with the parties. She also pointed
out that it was SCP which suggested that informal meetings be called and that she only
agreed to hold these meetings on the condition that all the parties would attend.
As to her alleged failure to observe the reglementary period, she contended that she
approved the rehabilitation plan within the period prescribed by law. She argued that the
matter of granting extension of time under Section 11, Rule 4 of the Rules 7 pertains not to
the SC, but to the rehabilitation court.
The respondent likewise refuted the allegations of bias and partiality. First, she claimed that
her denial of the complainant’s motion for inhibition was not due to any bias or prejudice
on her part but due to lack of basis. Second, she argued that her decision was not
orchestrated to favor EPCIB, as evidenced by the fact that EPCIP itself (as some other
creditors did) promptly appealed her decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). Third, she did
not remove Atty. Gabionza as SCP’s rehabilitation receiver because she disagreed that the
grounds the complainant raised warranted his removal.
She also found no merit to the allegation of conflict of interest. Lastly, she maintained that
the rest of the complainant’s allegations were not substantiated and corroborated by
evidence.
The respondent further alleged that she did not gravely abuse her authority in not issuing a
subpoena as Section 1, Rule 3 of the Interim Rules on Corporate Rehabilitation of the Rules
specifically states that the court may decide matters on the basis of affidavits and other
documentary evidence.
On the allegation of conflict of interest, she maintained that the allegations were not
proven and substantiated by evidence. Finally, the respondent also believed that there was
nothing improper in expressing her ideas during the informal meetings.
b. Comment to April 14, 2008 Supplemental Complaint
In her comment8 on the supplemental complaint, the respondent submitted that the
photos she posted in the social networking website "Friendster" could hardly be considered
vulgar or lewd. She added that an "off-shouldered" attire is an acceptable social outfit
under contemporary standards and is not forbidden. She further stated that there is no
prohibition against attractive ladies being judges; she is proud of her photo for having been
aesthetically made. Lastly, she submitted that the ruling of the Court in the case of Impao v.
Judge Makilala9 should not be applied to her case since the facts are different.
On July 4, 2008, the complainant filed a reply, 10 insisting that the respondent’s acts of
posting "seductive" pictures and maintaining a "Friendster" account constituted acts of
impropriety, in violation of Rules 2.01,11 2.0212 and 2.03,13Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct.
In a Resolution14 dated September 9, 2009, the Court re-docketed the complaints as regular
administrative matters, and referred them to the CA for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The CA’s Report and Recommendation
On November 13, 2009, Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison, the Investigating Justice,
conducted a hearing, followed by the submission of memoranda by both parties. In her
January 4, 2010 Report and Recommendation, 15 Justice Gonzales-Sison ruled that the
complaints were partly meritorious. She found that the issues raised were judicial in nature
since these involved the respondent’s appreciation of evidence.
She also added that while the CA resolved to set aside the respondent’s decision in the
rehabilitation proceedings, it was not by reason of her ignorance of the law or abuse of
authority, but because the rehabilitation plan could no longer be implemented in view of
SCP’s financial predicament.
On the allegation of grave bias and partiality in handling the rehabilitation proceedings,
Justice Gonzales-Sison ruled that the complainant failed to present any clear and convincing
proof that the respondent intentionally and deliberately acted against SCP’s interests; the
complaint merely relied on his opinions and surmises.
On the matter of the respondent’s inhibition, she noted that in cases not covered by the
rule on mandatory inhibition, the decision to inhibit lies within the discretion of the sitting
judge and is primarily a matter of conscience.
With respect to the respondent’s informal meetings, Justice Gonzales-Sison found nothing
irregular despite the out-of-court meetings as these were agreed upon by all the parties,
including SCP’s creditors. She also found satisfactory the respondent’s explanation in
approving the rehabilitation plan beyond the 180-day period prescribed by the Rules.
The foregoing notwithstanding, Justice Gonzales-Sison noted the respondent’s unnecessary
bickering with SCP’s legal counsel and ruled that her exchanges and utterances were
reflective of arrogance and superiority. In the words of the Justice Gonzales-Sison:
Rather than rule on the manifestations of counsels, she instead brushed off the matter with
what would appear to be a conceited show of a prerogative of her office, a conduct that
falls below the standard of decorum expected of a judge. Her statements appear to be
done recklessly and were uncalled for. xxx. Section 6[,] Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary states that: judges shall maintain order and decorum in
all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to
litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judicial
decorum requires judges to be temperate in their language at all times. Failure on this
regard amounts to a conduct unbecoming of a judge, for which Judge Austria should be
held liable.16
On the respondent’s Friendster account, she believes that her act of maintaining a personal
social networking account (displaying photos of herself and disclosing personal details as a
magistrate in the account) – even during these changing times when social networking
websites seem to be the trend – constitutes an act of impropriety which cannot be legally
justified by the public’s acceptance of this type of conduct. She explained that propriety
and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a
judge and that judges shall conduct themselves in a manner consistent with the dignity of
the judicial office.
Finally, Justice Gonzales-Sison noted the CA’s May 16, 2006 Decision 17 in CA-G.R. SP No.
100941 finding that the respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the
creation of a management committee without first conducting an evidentiary hearing in
accordance with the procedures prescribed under the Rules. She ruled that such
professional incompetence was tantamount to gross ignorance of the law and procedure,
and recommended a fine of ₱20,000.00. She also recommended that the respondent be
admonished for failing to observe strict propriety and judicial decorum required by her
office.
The Action and Recommendation of the OCA
In its Memorandum18 dated September 4, 2013, the OCA recommended the following:
RECOMMENDATION: It is respectfully recommended for the consideration of the Honorable
Court that:
 1) the Report dated January 4, 2010 of Investigating Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison
be NOTED;
2) respondent Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, Branch 2, Regional Trial Court, Batangas
City, Batangas, be found GUILTY of conduct unbecoming a judge and for violation of
Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct;
3) respondent Judge Austria be FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(Php20,000.00); and
4) respondent Judge Austria be ADMONISHED to refrain from further acts of
impropriety with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or any similar act will
be dealt with more severely.19
In arriving at its recommendation the OCA found that the respondent was not guilty of
gross ignorance of the law as the complainant failed to prove that her orders were
motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption.
The OCA also found that the charges of bias and partiality in handling the rehabilitation
proceedings were not supported by evidence. It accepted the respondent’s explanation in
the charge of failure to observe the reglementary period.
Lastly, the OCA maintained that the allegations of grave abuse of authority and gross
incompetence are judicial in nature, hence, they should not be the subject of disciplinary
action. On the other hand, on allegations of conduct unbecoming of a judge, violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code), lack of circumspection and impropriety, the
OCA shared Justice Gonzales-Sison’s observations that the respondent’s act of posting
seductive photos in her Friendster account contravened the standard of propriety set forth
by the Code.
The Court’s Ruling
We agree with the recommendation of both Justice Gonzales-Sison and the OCA for the
imposition of a fine on the respondent but modify the amount as indicated below. We
sustain Justice Gonzales-Sison’s finding of gross ignorance of the law in so far as the
respondent ordered the creation of a management committee without conducting an
evidentiary hearing. The absence of a hearing was a matter of basic due process that no
magistrate should be forgetful or careless about.
On the Charges of Grave Abuse of Authority;
Irregularity in the Performance of Duty; Grave
Bias and Partiality; and Lack of Circumspection
It is well settled that in administrative cases, the complainant bears the onus of proving the
averments of his complaint by substantial evidence. 20 In the present case, the allegations of
grave abuse of authority, irregularity in the performance of duty, grave bias and partiality,
and lack of circumspection are devoid of merit because the complainant failed to establish
the respondent’s bad faith, malice or ill will. The complainant merely pointed to
circumstances based on mere conjectures and suppositions. These, by themselves,
however, are not sufficient to prove the accusations. "[M]ere allegation is not evidence and
is not equivalent to proof."21
"[U]nless the acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice or ill-will, bad
faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice, [the] respondent judge may not be held
administratively liable for gross misconduct, ignorance of the law or incompetence of
official acts in the exercise of judicial functions and duties, particularly in the adjudication of
cases."22
Even granting that the respondent indeed erred in the exercise of her judicial functions,
these are, at best, legal errors correctible not by a disciplinary action, but by judicial
remedies that are readily available to the complainant. "An administrative complaint is not
the appropriate remedy for every irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by a judge
where a judicial remedy is available, such as a motion for reconsideration or an
appeal."23 Errors committed by him/her in the exercise of adjudicative functions cannot be
corrected through administrative proceedings but should be assailed instead through
judicial remedies.24
On the Charges of Grave Bias and Partiality
We likewise find the allegations of bias and partiality on the part of the respondent
baseless. The truth about the respondent’s alleged partiality cannot be determined by
simply relying on the complainant’s verified complaint. Bias and prejudice cannot be
presumed, in light especially of a judge’s sacred obligation under his oath of office to
administer justice without respect to the person, and to give equal right to the poor and
rich.25 There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge; mere suspicion
of partiality is not enough.26
In the present case, aside from being speculative and judicial in character, the
circumstances cited by the complainant were grounded on mere opinion and surmises. The
complainant, too, failed to adduce proof indicating the respondent’s predisposition to
decide the case in favor of one party. This kind of evidence would have helped its cause.
The bare allegations of the complainant cannot overturn the presumption that the
respondent acted regularly and impartially. We thus conclude that due to the complainant’s
failure to establish with clear, solid, and convincing proof, the allegations of bias and
partiality must fail.
On the Charges of Grave Incompetence
and Gross Ignorance of the Law
We agree with the findings of the OCA that not every error or mistake of a judge in the
performance of his official duties renders him liable. 27 "[A]s a matter of policy, in the
absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are
not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous." 28
In the present case, what was involved was the respondent’s application of Section 23, Rule
4 of the Rules, which provides:
Sec. 23. Approval of the Rehabilitation Plan. - The court may approve a rehabilitation plan
even over the opposition of creditors holding a majority of the total liabilities of the debtor
if, in its judgment, the rehabilitation of the debtor is feasible and the opposition of the
creditors is manifestly unreasonable.29
The respondent approved the rehabilitation plan submitted by Atty. Gabionza, subject to
the modifications she found necessary to make the plan viable. The complainant alleged
that in modifying the plan, she exceeded her authority and effectively usurped the
functions of a rehabilitation receiver. We find, however, that in failing to show that the
respondent was motivated by bad faith or ill motives in rendering the assailed decision, the
charge of gross ignorance of the law against her should be dismissed. "To [rule] otherwise
would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or
interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment." 30
To constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the decision, order or
actuation of the judge in the performance of his official duties is contrary to existing law
and jurisprudence. It must also be proven that he was moved by bad faith, fraud,
dishonesty or corruption31 or had committed an error so egregious that it amounted to bad
faith.
In the present case, nothing in the records suggests that the respondent was motivated by
bad faith, fraud, corruption, dishonesty or egregious error in rendering her decision
approving the modified rehabilitation plan. Besides his bare accusations, the complainant
failed to substantiate his allegations with competent proof. Bad faith cannot be
presumed32 and this Court cannot conclude that bad faith intervened when none was
actually proven.
With respect to the action of the respondent in ordering the creation of a management
committee without first conducting an evidentiary hearing for the purpose, however, we
find the error to be so egregious as to amount to bad faith, leading to the conclusion of
gross ignorance of the law, as charged.
Due process and fair play are basic requirements that no less than the Constitution
demands. In rehabilitation proceedings, the parties must first be given an opportunity to
prove (or disprove) the existence of an imminent danger of dissipation, loss, wastage or
destruction of the debtor-company’s assets and properties that are or may be prejudicial to
the interest of minority stockholders, parties-litigants or the general public. 33 The
rehabilitation court should hear both sides, allow them to present proof and
conscientiously deliberate, based on their submissions, on whether the appointment of a
management receiver is justified. This is a very basic requirement in every adversarial
proceeding that no judge or magistrate can disregard.
In SCP’s rehabilitation proceedings, SCP was not given at all the opportunity to present its
evidence, nor to confront the EPCIB witnesses. Significantly, the CA, in its May 16, 2006
decision, found that the respondent’s act of denying SCP the opportunity to disprove the
grounds for the appointment of a management committee was tantamount to grave abuse
of discretion. As aptly observed by Justice Gonzales-Sison:
[T]he acts of the respondent judge (Judge Austria) in creating a MANCOM without
observing the procedures prescribed under the IRPGICC clearly constitute grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.34
Indeed, while a judge may not be held liable for gross ignorance of the law for every
erroneous order that he renders, this does not mean that a judge need not observe due
care in the performance of his/her official functions.35 When a basic principle of law is
involved and when an error is so gross and patent, error can produce an inference of bad
faith, making the judge liable for gross ignorance of the law. 36 On this basis, we conclude
that the respondent’s act of promptly ordering the creation of a management committee,
without the benefit of a hearing and despite the demand for one, was tantamount to
punishable professional incompetence and gross ignorance of the law.
On the Ground of Failure to Observe
the Reglementary Period
On the respondent’s failure to observe the reglementary period prescribed by the Rules, we
find the respondent’s explanation to be satisfactory.
Section 11, Rule 4 of the previous Rules provides:
Sec. 11. Period of the Stay Order. – xxx
The petition shall be dismissed if no rehabilitation plan is approved by the court upon the
lapse of one hundred eighty (180) days from the date of the initial hearing. The court may
grant an extension beyond this period only if it appears by convincing and compelling
evidence that the debtor may successfully be rehabilitated. In no instance, however, shall
the period for approving or disapproving a rehabilitation plan exceed eighteen (18) months
from the date of filing of the petition.37
Under this provision, the matter of who would grant the extension beyond the 180-day
period carried a good measure of ambiguity as it did not indicate with particularity whether
the rehabilitation court could act by itself or whether Supreme Court approval was still
required. Only recently was this uncertainty clarified when A.M. No. 00-8-10-SC, the 2008
Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation, took effect.
Section 12, Rule 4 of the Rules provides:
Section 12. Period to Decide Petition. - The court shall decide the petition within one (1)
year from the date of filing of the petition, unless the court, for good cause shown, is able
to secure an extension of the period from the Supreme Court. 38
Since the new Rules only took effect on January 16, 2009 (long after the respondent’s
approval of the rehabilitation plan on December 3, 2007), we find no basis to hold the
respondent liable for the extension she granted and for the consequent delay.
On the Ground of Conduct
Unbecoming of a Judge
On the allegation of conduct unbecoming of a judge, Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct states that:
SECTION 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court
and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and
others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar
conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to their influence, direction
or control.39
A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the dignity,
independence and respect for himself/herself, the Court and the Judiciary as a whole. He
must exhibit the hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint. 40 He
should choose his words and exercise more caution and control in expressing himself. In
other words, a judge should possess the virtue of gravitas. 41
As held in De la Cruz (Concerned Citizen of Legazpi City) v. Judge Carretas, 42 a judge should
be considerate, courteous and civil to all persons who come to his court; he should always
keep his passion guarded. He can never allow it to run loose and overcome his reason.
Furthermore, a magistrate should not descend to the level of a sharp-tongued, ill-
mannered petty tyrant by uttering harsh words, snide remarks and sarcastic comments.
Similarly in Attys. Guanzon and Montesino v. Judge Rufon,43 the Court declared that
"although respondent judge may attribute his intemperate language to human frailty, his
noble position in the bench nevertheless demands from him courteous speech in and out of
court.
Judges are required to always be temperate, patient and courteous, both in conduct and in
language."
Accordingly, the respondent’s unnecessary bickering with SCP’s legal counsel, her
expressions of exasperation over trivial procedural and negligible lapses, her snide remarks,
as well as her condescending attitude, are conduct that the Court cannot allow. They are
displays of arrogance and air of superiority that the Code abhors.
Records and transcripts of the proceedings bear out that the respondent failed to observe
judicial temperament and to conduct herself irreproachably. She also failed to maintain the
decorum required by the Code and to use temperate language befitting a magistrate. "As a
judge, [she] should ensure that [her] conduct is always above reproach and perceived to be
so by a reasonable observer. [She] must never show conceit or even an appearance
thereof, or any kind of impropriety."44
Section 1, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that:
SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is
perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.
In these lights, the respondent exhibited conduct unbecoming of a judge and thus violated
Section 6, Canon 6 and Section 1, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
On the Ground of Impropriety
We are not unaware of the increasing prevalence of social networking sites in the Internet –
a new medium through which more and more Filipinos communicate with each
other.45 While judges are not prohibited from becoming members of and from taking part in
social networking activities, we remind them that they do not thereby shed off their status
as judges. They carry with them in cyberspace the same ethical responsibilities and duties
that every judge is expected to follow in his/her everyday activities. It is in this light that we
judge the respondent in the charge of impropriety when she posted her pictures in a
manner viewable by the public.
Lest this rule be misunderstood, the New Code of Judicial Conduct does not prohibit a judge
from joining or maintaining an account in a social networking site such as Friendster.
Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes that judges, like any
other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression. This right "includes the freedom to
hold opinions without interference and impart information and ideas through any media
regardless of frontiers."46 Joining a social networking site is an exercise of one’s freedom of
expression. The respondent judge’s act of joining Friendster is, therefore, per se not
violative of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, however, also imposes a
correlative restriction on judges: in the exercise of their freedom of expression, they should
always conduct themselves in a manner that preserves the dignity of the judicial office and
the impartiality and independence of the Judiciary.
This rule reflects the general principle of propriety expected of judges in all of their
activities, whether it be in the course of their judicial office or in their personal lives. In
particular, Sections 1 and 2 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct prohibit
impropriety and even the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities:
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.
SECTION 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal
restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so
freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent
with the dignity of the judicial office.
Based on this provision, we hold that the respondent disregarded the propriety and
appearance of propriety required of her when she posted Friendster photos of herself
wearing an "off-shouldered" suggestive dress and made this available for public viewing.
To restate the rule: in communicating and socializing through social networks, judges must
bear in mind that what they communicate – regardless of whether it is a personal matter or
part of his or her judicial duties – creates and contributes to the people’s opinion not just of
the judge but of the entire Judiciary of which he or she is a part. This is especially true when
the posts the judge makes are viewable not only by his or her family and close friends, but
by acquaintances and the general public.
Thus, it may be acceptable for the respondent to show a picture of herself in the attire she
wore to her family and close friends, but when she made this picture available for public
consumption, she placed herself in a situation where she, and the status she holds as a
judge, may be the object of the public’s criticism and ridicule. The nature of cyber
communications, particularly its speedy and wide-scale character, renders this rule
necessary.
We are not also unaware that the respondent’s act of posting her photos would seem
harmless and inoffensive had this act been done by an ordinary member of the public. As
the visible personification of law and justice, however, judges are held to higher standards
of conduct and thus must accordingly comport themselves.47
This exacting standard applies both to acts involving the judicial office and personal
matters.1âwphi1 The very nature of their functions requires behavior under exacting
standards of morality, decency and propriety; both in the performance of their duties and
their daily personal lives, they should be beyond reproach. 48 Judges necessarily accept this
standard of conduct when they take their oath of office as magistrates.
Imposable Penalty
Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross
ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as a serious charge. Under Section 11(A) of
the same Rule, a serious charge merits any of the following sanctions:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public
office, including government-owned or controlled corporations; provided, however,
that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3),
but not exceeding six (6), months; or
3. A fine of more than ₱20,000.00, but not exceeding ₱40,000.00.
On the other hand, conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under
Section 10, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. It is penalized under Section 11(C) thereof by any
of the following: (1) A fine of not less than ₱1,000.00 but not exceeding ₱10,000.00; (2)
Censure; (3) Reprimand; and ( 4) Admonition with warning.
Judge Austria's record shows that she had never been administratively charged or found
liable for any wrongdoing in the past. Since this is her first offense, the Court finds it fair
and proper to temper the penalty for her offenses.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria guilty of GROSS IGNORANCE OF
THE LAW for which she is FINED Twenty-One Thousand Pesos (₱21,000,00). Judge Austria is
likewise hereby ADMONISHED to refrain from further acts of IMPROPRIETY and to refrain
from CONDUCT UNBECOMING OF A JUDGE, with the STERN WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.