G.R. No.
189820               October 10, 2012 Criminal Case No. C-369
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ALBERTO M. BASAO alias "Dodong," JOVEL S. APOLE, MELQUIADES L.
APOLE, ESTRELITA1 G. APOLE, ROLANDO A. APOLE alias "Bebot," VICENTE
C. SALON, JAIME TANDAN, RENATO C. APOLE alias "Boboy," ROLANDO M.
OCHIVILLO alias "Allan," LORENZO L. APOLE, JOHN DOE, PETER DOE and
MIKE DOE, Accused,
JOVEL S. APOLE, ROLANDO A. APOLE, and RENATO C. APOLE, Accused-
Appellants.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
On appeal is the Decision2 dated May 29, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 00428-MIN, which affirmed with modification the Joint Decision3 dated
April 20, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 41 of Cantilan, Surigao del
Sur, finding accused-appellants Jovel S. Apole, Renato C. Apole, and Rolando A.
Apole guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case Nos. C-368 (Robbery with
Violence Against or Intimidation of Persons by a Band) and C-369 (Kidnapping for
Ransom and Serious Illegal Detention).
Accused-appellants, together with seven identified co-accused, namely, Alberto M.
Basao (Basao), Melquiades L. Apole, Estrelita G. Apole, Lorenzo L. Apole, Vicente C.
Salon (Salon), Jaime Tandan (Tandan), and Rolando M. Ochivillo (Ochivillo), plus
three other unidentified persons, were charged under the following criminal
Informations:
Criminal Case No. C-368
For Robbery with Violence Against or Intimidation of Persons by a Band
That on or about the 23rd day of January, 2003 at about 7:30 o’clock in the evening,
more or less, at Barangay Bunga, municipality of Lanuza, province of Surigao del Sur,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to
gain, and armed with a short caliber unlicensed firearms, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, take and carry away from spouses YASUMITSU YASUDA
HASHIBA and EMELIE LOPIO HASHIBA cash money amounting to Forty-Eight
Thousand Pesos (₱ 48,000.00), one (1) eighteen gold carats Sapphire ring, one (1)
carat emerald ring, color green, eighteen carats gold ruby ring, color red, two (2)
eighteen carats wedding rings (engraved with initial E to Y and Y to E) and eighteen
carats gold necklace, and other personal belongings worth more or less Thirty
Thousand Pesos (₱ 30,000.00), in the total amount of Seventy-Eight Thousand
Pesos (₱ 78,000.00), against their consent, to the damage and prejudice of Mr. and
Mrs. Emelie Lopio Hashiba in the aforestated amount.
For Kidnapping (for Ransom) and Serious Illegal Detention
That on the 23rd day of January 2003 at about 7:30 o’clock in the evening, at
Barangay Bunga, municipality of Lanuza, province of Surigao del Sur, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with unlicensed
firearms, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, kidnap one
YASUMITSU YASUDA HASHIBA, 48 years old and a Japanese National to
undisclosed place for the purpose of extorting ransoms, wherein the latter was
detained and deprived of his liberty for the period of more than five (5) days to the
damage and prejudice of said victim.4
Accused-appellants and their identified co-accused, except for Tandan, were
arraigned. They pleaded not guilty to the criminal charges against them.5 After the
pre-trial proceedings, trial ensued.6
The prosecution called to the witness stand private complainant Emelie Lopio
Hashiba7 (Emelie) and her brother Crisologo Pamad Lopio (Crisologo),8 who testified
as follows:
Witness, Emelie Hashiba testified that on January 23, 2003 at 7:30 o’clock in the
evening, she and her maid were cooking supper at their house at Bgy. Bunga,
Lanuza, Surigao del Sur. At the sala were her husband, her three (3) children
Hashiba Yuri, Hashiba Yu and Hashiba Hisayu, her mother and the son of their
housemaid Loloy, five (5) men entered their house with gun pointed to her younger
brother, Crisologo Lopio. One of them announced and said; "Don’t worry, we are
NPA" (New Peoples Army) and continued to say; "Huwag kayo matakot, pera lang
ang kailangan namin", which means, (Do not be afraid, we only need money.) "Hindi
kayo maano." (You will not be harmed.) All of them were terrified seeing the armed
men with their guns and a hand grenade. She identified the armed men, with their
height, built, complexion and the faces, except one who was wearing bonnet mask.
Although she does not know their names at the time of the incident on January 23,
2003, she recognized them during the trial and identified each one of them, Jovel
Apole, Renato Apole and Rolando Apole except the two (2), whom she failed to
recognize as she forgot them.
Joven Apole and his companion brought Emelie Hashiba upstair at the second floor
at their bedroom, which was lighted and there she was divested of money and
jewelries, 2 necklace 18 k, 4 rings 14 k, opal, rubi, emerald and sapphire and 2
wedding rings, worth a total of ₱ 30,000.00; cash money from the wallet of ₱
20,000.00 and another ₱ 28,000.00 from the collection of their passenger jeep,
samurai sword ₱ 4,000.00 and icom radio, ₱ 5,000.00. She was asked if that was her
only money and she told them "yes". She was also asked about the gun of her
husband, which she denied that her husband does not possess firearm. Then Jovel
Apole asked her if that was the only money they had and she answered in the
affirmative.
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Dissatisfied with the value of their loot, Jovel Apole and companion demanded three
(3) million pesos from her with the threat that if she will not give the amount
demanded they would bring with them her son.
Shortly thereafter, they went down and back to the sala where YASUMITSU
HASHIBA and companions were gathered. EMELIE HASHIBA informed the accused
that they could not bring her son because he was sick, so she offered herself as the
hostage, but brought YASUMITSU YASUDA HASHIBA instead. Yasumitsu Hashiba
vehemently objected and offered to give them the money as soon as he goes back to
Japan, but the group did not agree and insisted on the three (3) million pesos.
Helpless, they brought YASUMITSU HASHIBA with them after hog-tying the
occupants of the house. Before they left, they again threatened EMELIE HASHIBA
that if she failed to produce the three (3) million pesos, YASUMITSU HASHIBA will be
killed.
Thereafter, they left riding on the Yasumitsu Hashiba’s automobile towards the
National Highway. Regaining composures she immediately called Yasumitsu
Hashiba’s father in Japan thru SMART LINK. She told him that his son was kidnapped
and the kidnappers are demanding three (3) million pesos. She informed him further
that if she cannot produce the money, his son will be killed to which threat the father
assured her that he will be sending two (2) million pesos thru the PNB, Tandag,
Surigao del Sur.
On or about 7:00 o’clock in the morning of January 24, 2003 the Barangay Captain of
Bunga, Lanuza, Surigao del Sur who learned of the incident visited her house. The
latter confronted her why she did not report the incident to the Police Station to which
query she answered that she was apprehensive her husband would be killed if she
reports the incident to the police.
At about 10:00 o’clock of the same day she went to the PNB Tandag to verify if the
money was already deposited in the bank, but none was deposited so she went home
empty handed. When she arrived home, policemen from Lanuza and Tandag,
Surigao del Sur were already waiting for her. She was advised to go to Tandag for the
execution of her affidavit, which she agreed.
On the 25th day the kidnappers called her but she was not around. On the 26th day
of January the kidnappers again called her and instructed her to buy a cellular phone,
which she obliged. With a cellular phone she was able to talk with the kidnappers
while in Tandag, Surigao del Sur.
They asked if the money has arrived, and she was advised not to withdraw the money
in the bank and wait for further instructions. On January 27th and 28th, 2003 they
again called but after these dates did not receive any call from them.
On January 29, 2003, a policeman from Dinagat Island informed her that her husband
was released by the kidnappers. Probably thinking that it was a ploy of the kidnappers
she did not go to Dinagat Island, San Jose and instead waited for her husband in a
hotel in Tandag, Surigao del Sur.
Emelie Hashiba’s version of the incident was corroborated by Crisologo Lopio, a
younger brother of the former. He declared that he is the driver of Yasumitsu Hashiba
of a passenger jitney. At six (6) P.M. on January 23, 2003, he was at the house of his
parents which is only 15 meters away from his house at Bunga, Lanuza, Surigao del
Sur. He watched T.V. for five (5) to ten (10) minutes and left proceeding to the house
of his sister Emelie about 30 meters from the house of his parents.Reaching the gate
of the house of Emelie, which was lighted, he was met by two (2) armed men with .45
cal. pistols pointed their guns to him and told him to enter the house so that they will
talk. Entering the sala, they were ordered to sit on the sala, his mother, Yasumitsu
Hashiba, the 3 children of Yasumitsu Hashiba, a child of their maid, his nephew,
Emelie and Mercedita were all fetched from the kitchen and brought to the sala. Then
another two (2) armed men with .38 cal. revolver entered. The latter armed men
guarded them at the sala, while the other two (2) brought Emelie upstairs to their
bedroom. Returning to the sala with Emelie, the two men told them that they will bring
the son of Yasumitsu Hashiba and to be redeemed for two (2) million. Emelie told
them that the child is sick and offered herself instead but the armed men said, "We
will just kidnap Yasumitsu Hashiba." Hashiba objected, and asked, he will give the
money if he will be allowed to return to Japan but of no use. The armed men did not
agree and after hog-tying them, they brought out of the house leaving a threat not to
report to the Police otherwise, they will kill Hashiba. They left, carnapping the car
owned by Yasumitsu Hashiba.
Witness Crisologo Lopio identified in Court Jovel Apole, Rolando Apole and Renato
Apole and accordingly, one is at-large. After they left, Emelie told them that all her
jewelries and money from her collections of their passenger jitney were taken.9
Both Emelie and Crisologo positively identified the three accused-appellants in court.
Private complainant Yasumitsu Yasuda Hashiba (Yasumitsu) was also supposed to
take the witness stand for the prosecution and identify the other accused in the case,
but Yasumitsu was unable to give his testimony for lack of competent Japanese
interpreters. Thus, for lack of evidence, the prosecution moved for the provisional
dismissal of the charges against accused Alberto Basao, Melquiades L. Apole,
Estrelita G. Apole, Lorenzo L. Apole, Vicente Salon, and Rolando Ochivillo, which the
RTC granted in its Orders10 dated May 26, 2004 and January 13, 2005.
During their turn, the defense presented the testimonies of accused-appellants
Rolando Apole11 and Jovel Apole;12 and dispensed with the testimony of accused-
appellant Renato Apole as he would be merely corroborating those of the first
two.13 Accused-appellants denied the charges against them and proffered the
following version of events:
That on January 23, 2003, Rolando Apole was brought by his cousins Jovel Apole
and Renato Apole to the house of Allan Ochivillo in Lanuza, Surigao del Sur. They
came from Tubajon, Dinagat Island, Surigao del Norte to Surigao City. From Surigao
2 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
City, they boarded the Bachelor bus in going to Lanuza, Surigao del Sur. Arriving at
three (3) o’clock in the afternoon, they went directly to the house of Allan Ochivillo.
They saw Ochivillo for the first time and they were told by Ochivillo to stay, as he will
go to the house of his friend married to a Japanese national. When Ochivillo returned
home at 6:30 P.M., same day, they were informed that they will proceed there
because the Japanese will see their map.
The four of them, Rolando, Jovel, Renato and Allan Ochivillo went to the house of the
Japanese arriving there at 7:00 o’clock P.M. Allan Ochivillo went inside first followed
by Jovel, while Rolando and Renato stayed outside. They were met by the Japanese
wife and shook hands. Allan Ochivillo talked to the wife of the Japanese at the sala
and after the Japanese signal to go up because there were children viewing T.V.,
Jovel brought with him the map. The Japanese, his wife, Allan and Jovel went up the
second floor. They stayed there for 10 minutes, more or less, then they went down.
Then Allan Ochivillo said, "let’s go". The Japanese wife said; "Take care of my
husband because we can still make money". She further said; "You just use my car
and here is the key", given to Allan Ochivillo. The car was driven by the Japanese
with Allan Ochivillo in the front seat.
On the way, the Japanese looked at the map for a while and talked to Allan Ochivillo
in Tagalog, "this map have signs, and there is treasure in there, a tree, fish, starfish
and a mountain."
Arriving at Surigao City, they alighted at Sabang and they took a pumpboat and
proceeded to the area where the treasure was to be found at Tambongan, Tubajon,
while Ochivillo remained at Surigao City.
They arrived at Tambungan, Tubajon, Surigao del Norte on the 24th of January 2003.
They were housed in the house of their uncle. In the afternoon, they verified and
found that the treasure was already dug up, as there were signs of digging already.
On January 25, 2003, Jovel Apole arrived and informed Rolando and Renato that
according to Allan Ochivillo, the wife of the Japanese will file a case against them and
was told that each of them will receive ₱ 100,000.00 to kill the Japanese.
They did not kill the Japanese but released him in San Jose, Dinagat Island, Surigao
del Norte.
Their uncle Lorenzo Apole, Estrelita Apole and Melquiades were arrested in
connection with the kidnapping of the Japanese. Rolando and Renato went to the
house of the brother of Police Director Gonzales at Surigao City to ask why Lorenzo,
Melquiades and Estrelita Apole were arrested. Jovel Apole followed and the 3 of them
went to the house of Gonzales guided by Nay Nita. They saw Melquiades, Lorenzo
and Estrelita Apole in the house of Gonzales and after that they were brought to the
barracks at Tandag. Then, they were charged of two cases. They denied the truth of
the testimonies of Emelie Hashiba and Crisologo Lopio. They denied having robbed
and kidnapped Yasumitsu Hashiba.14
For rebuttal, the prosecution recalled Emelie15 and presented Ochivillo16 as witnesses.
Both prosecution witnesses refuted accused-appellants’ version of events. Emelie
denied seeing Ochivillo at their house or any treasure map. She added that accused-
appellants carried short firearms; that when accused-appellants left with Yasumitsu,
Renato C. Apole drove the car; and that the ₱ 3,000,000.00 would be paid within four
days and would be taken from the parked car. Ochivillo, for his part, avowed that he
did not know accused-appellants personally; that he had not seen a treasure map;
that at the time of the incident, he was having a drinking spree with his neighbor; and
that he only met accused-appellants for the first time in Tandag when he was
arrested.
The cases were submitted for decision without any documentary evidence for the
prosecution and the defense.17
On April 20, 2006, the RTC promulgated its Joint Decision, with a dispositive portion
that reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused JOVEL APOLE y SALVADOR, ROLANDO
APOLE y ARANA, and RENATO APOLE y CANTORNE, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes:
A. For the crime of Robbery in Band in Criminal Case No. C-368, each of the accused
JovelApole y Salvador, Rolando Apole y Arana and Renato Apole y Cantorne, is
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS
and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS, TEN (10)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor medium as maximum; to pay the private
complainants the sum of ₱ 78,000.00; ₱ 50,000.00 as moral damages and ₱
25,000.00 as exemplary damages and to pay the cost.
B. For the crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention in Criminal
Case No. C-369, each of the accused Jovel Apole y Salvador, Rolando Apole y
Arana, and Renato Apole y Cantorne, is sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of
death; to pay the private complainants the sum of ₱ 50,000.00 as moral damages and
₱ 25,000.00 as exemplary damages and to pay the cost.
In line with the decision of the Supreme Court in People vs. Mateo, G.R. Nos.
147678-87, dated July 7, 2004, let this decision be forwarded to the Court of Appeals,
YMCA Building, Cagayan de Oro City for automatic review within twenty (20) days but
not earlier than fifteen (15) days after the promulgation of judgment. Let the living
body of the convicted prisoners, Jovel Apole y Salvador, Rolando Apole y Arana and
Renato Apole y Cantorne, be brought to the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City, on
maximum security.18
Pursuant to the Commitment of Final Sentence 19 issued by the RTC on May 12, 2006,
accused-appellants were received and imprisoned at the New Bilibid Prison,
Muntinlupa City, on even date.20
3 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
In the meantime, the cases were forwarded to the Court of Appeals on automatic
review. Accused-appellants, represented by the Public Attorney’s Office, filed their
Brief21 on January 17, 2008 while plaintiff-appellee, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General, filed its Brief22 on May 12, 2008.
The Court of Appeals rendered its Decision on May 29, 2009, agreeing with the
findings of fact and judgments of conviction of the RTC, but modifying the penalties
imposed and amount of damages awarded, to wit:
Anent the penalty imposed in Criminal Case No. C-369, the court a quo convicted
accused-appellants with the supreme penalty of death as provided under Article 267
of the Revised Penal Code. However, with the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346
which proscribed the death penalty, the appropriate penalty for the crime of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention with ransom is now reclusion perpetua.
Furthermore, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally
liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
In the case of kidnapping for ransom, the amount of ₱ 50,000.00 as civil indemnity is
awarded in favor of complainant Emelie Hashiba in conformity with jurisprudence.
Likewise, another amount of ₱ 50,000.00 as civil indemnity is awarded for the crime
of robbery in band.23
Ultimately, the appellate court decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises foregoing, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the
assailed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with modification insofar as the penalty
imposed and the award of damages are concerned. Consequently, accused-
appellants are hereby SENTENCED to the following:
1. For the crime of Robbery in Band in Criminal Case No. C-368, each of the
accused-appellant Jovel Apole y Salvador, Rolando Apole y Arana and Renato Apole
y Cantorne, is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS, FOUR
(4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS,
TEN (10) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor medium as maximum; to pay
the private complainants the sum of ₱ 78,000.00 as actual damages; ₱ 50,000.00 as
civil indemnity; ₱ 50,000.00 as moral damages; and ₱ 25,000.00 as exemplary
damages and to pay the cost.
2. For the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious Illegal Detention in Criminal
Case No. C-369, each of the accused Jovel Apole y Salvador, Rolando Apole y
Arana, and Renato Apole y Cantorne, is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua; to pay the private complainants the sum of ₱ 50,000.00 as civil indemnity; ₱
50,000.00 as moral damages; and ₱ 25,000.00 as exemplary damages and to pay
the cost.24
Accused-appellants now seek recourse from this Court through the instant appeal.
The Court required the parties to file their respective supplemental briefs, if they so
desire, in a Resolution25 dated December 2, 2009. However, all the parties manifested
that they have exhausted their arguments before the Court of Appeals, thus, they
would no longer file any supplemental brief.26
In their Brief, accused-appellants assigned the following errors allegedly committed by
the RTC:
I.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES DESPITE THEIR INHERENT
INCREDIBILITIES AND IRRECONCILABLE INCONSISTENCIES.
II.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS
DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THEIR GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.27
Plaintiff-appellee contends that accused-appellants were correctly convicted and even
prays that the civil indemnity awarded in Criminal Case No. C-369 be increased.
The appeal is bereft of merit.
In this case, accused-appellants’ appeal is chiefly grounded on their challenge of the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses and veracity of the latter’s testimonies, to
which both the RTC and the Court of Appeals gave more credence and weight.
As consistently adhered to by this Court, the matter of assigning values to
declarations on the witness stand is best and most competently performed by the trial
judge, who had the unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses and to assess
their credibility by the various indicia available but not reflected on the record. The
demeanor of the person on the stand can draw the line between fact and fancy. The
forthright answer or the hesitant pause, the quivering voice or the angry tone, the
flustered look or the sincere gaze, the modest blush or the guilty blanch – these can
reveal if the witness is telling the truth or lying through his teeth.28
Consequently, the settled rule is that when the credibility of a witness is in issue, the
findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and
its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on
said findings are accorded high respect if not conclusive effect. This is more true if
such findings were affirmed by the appellate court, since it is settled that when the
4 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
trial court’s findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are
generally binding upon this Court.29 Without any clear showing that the trial court and
the appellate court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance, the rule should not be disturbed.30
The Court finds no cogent reason to disturb, and is, therefore, conclusively bound by
the findings of fact and judgments of conviction rendered by the RTC, subsequently
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
The testimonies of Emelie and Crisologo established beyond reasonable doubt the
commission by accused-appellants of the crimes of robbery by a band and
kidnapping for ransom.
The crime of robbery under Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code has the following
elements: (a) intent to gain, (b) unlawful taking, (c) personal property belonging to
another, and (d) violence against or intimidation of person or force upon things. Under
Article 296 of the same Code, "when more than three armed malefactors take part in
the commission of robbery, it shall be deemed to have been committed by a band." It
further provides that "any member of a band who is present at the commission of a
robbery by the band, shall be punished as principal of any of the assaults committed
by the band, unless it be shown that he attempted to prevent the same."31
All of the foregoing elements had been satisfactorily established herein. At least five
(5) people, including accused-appellants, carrying guns and a hand grenade, barged
into the home of, and forcibly took pieces of jewelry and other personal properties
belonging to, spouses Yatsumitsu and Emelie Hashiba. Accused-appellants
themselves made their intent to gain clear when they assured their victims that they
were only after the money.
As for the crime of kidnapping, the following elements, as provided in Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code, must be proven: (a) a person has been deprived of his
liberty, (b) the offender is a private individual, and (c) the detention is unlawful. 32 The
deprivation required by Article 267 means not only the imprisonment of a person, but
also the deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of time. It
involves a situation where the victim cannot go out of the place of confinement or
detention or is restricted or impeded in his liberty to move. In other words, the
essence of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty, coupled with
indubitable proof of the intent of the accused to effect such deprivation.33
In the present case, Yasumitsu was evidently deprived by accused-appellants of his
liberty for seven days. Armed with guns and a grenade, accused-appellants and their
cohorts took Yasumitsu from the latter’s home in Lanuza, Surigao del Sur, to Surigao
City, by car; and then all the way to Tubajon, Surigao del Norte, by boat. Accused-
appellants held Yasumitsu from January 23 to January 29, 2003. During said period,
Yasumitsu was unable to communicate with his family or to go home. Also during the
same period, accused-appellants called Emelie several times to ask whether the ₱
3,000,000.00 ransom payment was already available.
The Court rejects accused-appellants’ claim that Yasumitsu went with them
voluntarily. As the RTC acutely observed:
The claim of the defense that the victim Hashiba was not kidnapped but on his volition
to go with them by reason of the treasure map implying that the Japanese would join
them in the treasure hunt, is a ridiculous attempt of the accused to extricate
themselves from the offense they are in. This Court is not convinced. Having
observed all the demeanors of the witnesses, the Prosecution’s evidence is more in
accord with reason and logic. The accused protestations that they sought the services
of the Japanese to interpret the treasure map and finally went with them freely to
Tubajon, taxes credulity. Simple imagination militates against such pretended
defenses. Firstly, if the intention of the accused was only for the purpose of
requesting the Japanese to interpret the treasure map, why would the reading and
interpretation be brought to the second floor and right at the bedroom of the victim,
whom it could have been done at the living room? Secondly, why only the Japanese
was brought to the alleged location in Tubajon? This Court takes notice that the
Japanese cannot speak Filipino language or dialect. It was even the reason why the
Japanese was not able to testify because of the lack of interpreter due to the
objection of the accused for the wife to interpret the supposed testimony of the
Japanese. Bringing along with them the Japanese to read the treasure map is not in
keeping with reason because the Japanese could not be understood. Certainly, the
Japanese needs interpreter.
Again, the claim of the accused that they freely released the Japanese at San Jose
after finding that the area was already dug up did not convince the Court. They
released the Japanese after they knew that the authorities were looking for them and
that Melquiades, Lorenzo and Estrelita Apole were already arrested.34
Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning a felony and decide to commit it. It may
be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during or after the commission of the
crime which, when taken together, would be enough to reveal a community of criminal
design, as the proof of conspiracy is frequently made by evidence of a chain of
circumstances. To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of the
execution; he need not even take part in every act or need not even know the exact
part to be performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. Each
conspirator may be assigned separate and different tasks which may appear
unrelated to one another but, in fact, constitute a whole collective effort to achieve
their common criminal objective. Once conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act
of all the conspirators. The precise extent or modality of participation of each of them
becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.35
There is conspiracy among accused-appellants and their cohorts when they
kidnapped Yasumitsu. Their community of criminal design could be inferred from their
arrival at the Hashiba’s home already armed with weapons, as well as from their
clearly designated roles upon entry into the house (i.e., some served as lookouts;
some accompanied Emelie to the second floor to look for jewelry, cash, and other
property to take; and some guarded and hogtied the other people in the house) and in
5 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
the abduction of Yasumitsu (i.e., Jovel S. Apole went back to Surigao City to secure
the release of the ransom money while Renato C. Apole and Rolando A. Apole
stayed in Tubajon to guard Yasumitsu). The Court concurs with the RTC that "all
these acts were complimentary to one another and geared toward the attainment of a
common ultimate objective to extort a ransom of three (3) million in exchange for the
Japanese’s freedom."
The alleged inconsistencies or conflict in the prosecution witnesses’ testimonies were
already rejected by the Court of Appeals for the same only pertain to minor details
which have inconsequential significance. The appellate court elaborated thus:
Accused-appellants now insist that the conflicting testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses are inconsistent thereby creating reasonable doubt as to their culpability.
One such inconsistency is when Emelie allegedly testified that her husband
vehemently objected to go with the assailants contrary to her statements in her
affidavit that her husband voluntarily went with the malefactors in lieu of their son.
Accused-appellants also allege that Emelie’s testimony that there were five (5) armed
men contradicted with Crisologo Lopio’s testimony that there were only four (4) armed
men. Accused-appellants further allege that it is rather unusual in a kidnapping
situation that the kidnappers failed to give instructions as to how the ransom money
would be delivered and how the victim would then be released. Likewise, it was
allegedly disturbing that during the incident it was Emelie herself who gave her
telephone number to the armed men and told them to call her and even offered the
car instead of the jeepney. Accused-appellants also point out that after Emelie
withdrew the ransom money from the bank, she seemed to have just lost contact with
the alleged kidnappers and records allegedly failed to show that she exerted efforts to
ascertain the whereabouts of her husband. x x x.
We disagree.
The above alleged inconsistencies are of minor and inconsequential importance. Both
witnesses agreed and identified the three accused-appellants to have been the armed
malefactors. The testimonies of the victims were straightforward and there was no
showing of any ill motive on their part to falsely testify against accused-appellants.
Clearly, positive identification of the accused where categorical and consistent and
without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the
matter prevails over his defense. When there is no evidence to show any dubious
reasons or improper motive why a prosecution witness would testify falsely against
the accused or falsely implicate them in a heinous crime, the testimony is worthy of
full faith and credit. Furthermore, issues of sufficiency of evidence are resolved by
reference to findings of the trial court that are entitled to the highest respect on appeal
in the absence of any clear and overwhelming showing that the trial court neglected,
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance
affecting the result of the case.36
In People v. Delim,37 the Court further pronounced that a truth-telling witness is not
always expected to give an error-free testimony considering the lapse of time and the
treachery of human memory. What is primordial is that the mass of testimony jibes on
material points, the slight clashing of statements dilute neither the witnesses’
credibility nor the veracity of his testimony. Variations on the testimony of witnesses
on the same side with respect to minor, collateral, or incidental matters do not impair
the weight of their united testimony to the prominent facts. Inconsistencies on minor
and trivial matters only serve to strengthen rather than weaken the credibility of
witnesses for they erase the suspicion of rehearsed testimony.
Despite affirming the judgments of conviction against accused-appellants, the Court
still modifies the penalties imposed and amounts of damages awarded by the Court of
Appeals.
In Criminal Case No. C-368, accused-appellants are convicted of the crime of
Robbery with Violence Against or Intimidation of Persons Committed by a Band. The
penalty prescribed for said crime under Article 294(5), in relation to Article 295 of the
Revised Penal Code, is the maximum period of the penalty prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period.38 The Indeterminate Sentence
Law additionally provides that the maximum of the sentence shall be that which could
be properly imposed in view of the attending circumstances, and the minimum shall
be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal
Code.
In accused-appellants’ case, the maximum of the sentence should be within the range
of the maximum period of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor
in its medium period, which shall be from eight (8) years and twenty-one (21) days to
ten (10) years; while the minimum of the sentence should be within the range of
arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period,
which has a duration of four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2)
months. As a result, the Court imposes upon accused-appellants the penalty of
imprisonment for Four (4) years and Two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to Ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum.1awp++i1
The Court sustains the award of actual or compensatory, moral, and exemplary
damages in favor of private complainants. Actual damages are awarded as the
compensation for such pecuniary loss suffered by the complainant as he has duly
proved while moral damages may be recovered if the complainant suffered, among
others, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, and similar injuries.39 Exemplary
damages, on the other hand, are imposed by way of example or correction for the
public good and may be adjudicated in criminal cases if the crime was committed with
one or more aggravating circumstances and the complainant has shown that he is
entitled to moral, temperate, or compensatory damages.40 In this case, private
complainants have duly proven that they were robbed of their cash and jewelries, and
that they felt terrified during such time, thus, entitling them to be paid actual and moral
damages. Considering also that the robbery was committed with the inherent
aggravating circumstance of a band, and to set an example for the public good, the
award of exemplary damages is in order. The award of additional civil indemnity,
however, should be deleted for lack of legal basis.
6 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
In Criminal Case No. C-369, where accused-appellants are convicted of the crime of
Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious Illegal Detention, the Court of Appeals correctly
reduced their sentence from death to reclusion perpetua considering the passage of
Republic Act No. 9346, prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty. The Court
likewise emphasizes that accused-appellants shall not be eligible for parole. Under
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346, "persons convicted of offenses punished with
reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by
reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise
known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended."41
There is also need to modify the damages awarded in Criminal Case No. C-369 in
line with prevailing jurisprudence.42 Accused-appellants are to pay Yasumitsu the
amounts of ₱ 75,000.00 as civil indemnity, which is awarded if the crime warrants the
imposition of the death penalty; ₱ 75,000.00 as moral damages, because the victim is
assumed to have suffered moral injuries without need of proof; and ₱ 30,000.00 as
exemplary damages, to set an example for the public good.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the Decision dated May
29, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00428-MIN, which affirmed
with modification the Joint Decision dated April 20, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 41 of Cantilan, Surigao del Sur, to read as follows:
1) In Criminal Case No. C-368, the Court finds accused-appellants Jovel S.
Apole, Renato C. Apole and Rolando A. Apole GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Robbery with Violence Against or Intimidation of
Persons by a Band and sentences accused-appellants to suffer the penalty
of imprisonment for Four ( 4) years and Two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to Ten ( 1 0) years of prision mayor, as maximum,
and to pay private complainants the amounts of 1!78,000.00 as actual
damages; 1!50,000.00 as moral damages; and ₱ 25,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
2) In Criminal Case No. C-369, the Court finds accused-appellants Jove] S.
Apole, Renato C. Apole and Rolando A. Apole GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious Illegal Detention
and sentences accused-appellants to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, without the possibility of parole, and to pay private complainants
the amounts of ₱ 75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱ 75,000.00 as moral
damages, and ₱ 30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 175926               July 6, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RESTITUTO CARANDANG, HENRY MILAN AND JACKMAN CHUA, Accused-
Appellants.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal by Henry Milan and Jackman Chua from the Decision 1 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01934 dated May 10, 2006. Said Decision
affirmed that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicting them and one Restituto
Carandang for two counts of murder and one count of frustrated murder in Criminal
Cases No. Q-01-100061, Q-01-100062 and Q-01-100063, the Informations for which
read:
Criminal Case No. Q-01-100061
That on or about the 5th day of April 2001, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-
named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one
another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill,
taking advantage of superior strength and with treachery and evident premeditation,
attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of PO2 DIONISIO
ALONZO Y SALGO, by then and there shooting the latter several times with the use
of a firearm of unknown caliber hitting him on the different parts of the body, thereby
inflicting upon him serious and mortal gunshot wounds which were the direct and
immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the immediate heirs of
said PO2 DIONISIO ALONZO Y SALGO.
That the crime was committed in contempt of or with insult to the public authorities.2
Criminal Case No. Q-01-100062
That on or about the 5th day of April, 2001, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-
named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one
another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill,
taking advantage of superior strength and with treachery and evident premeditation,
attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of SPO2 WILFREDO
RED Y PILAR, by then and there shooting the latter several times with the use of a
firearm of unknown caliber, hitting him on the different parts of the body and as soon
as the said victim fell on the ground, by placing a hand grenade (sic) underneath the
body which directly caused an explosion and mutilated the body which directly
caused the death of SPO2 WILFREDO RED Y PILAR, to the damage and prejudice
of the heirs of the victim in such amount as may be awarded to them under the
provisions of the Civil Code.
That the crime was committed in contempt of or with insult to the public authorities.3
7 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
Criminal Case No. Q-01-100063
That on or about the 5th day of April, 2001, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-
named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one
another, with intent to kill with evident premeditation and with treachery, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack and employ personal
violence upon the person of SPO1 WILFREDO MONTECALVO Y DALIDA, by then
and there shooting the latter with the use of a firearm of unknown caliber, hitting him
on his neck, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal injuries, the offender thus
performing all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of murder
as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reasons or causes
independent of the will of the perpetrators, that is the timely and able medical
assistance rendered to said SPO1 WILFREDO MONTECALVO Y DALIDA, to the
damage and prejudice of the said offended party.
That the crime was committed in contempt of or with insult to the public authorities.4
On May 15, 2001, accused-appellants Carandang, Milan and Chua pleaded not guilty
to the crimes charged.
The prosecution evidence, culled from the testimonies of Senior Police Officer (SPO)
1 Wilfredo Montecalvo, SPO1 Rodolfo Estores, Police Senior Inspector (P/Sr. Insp.)
Virgilio Calaro, P/Supt. Manuel Roxas and Dr. Wilson Tan, yielded the following
version of the facts:
In the afternoon of April 5, 2001, the drug enforcement unit of the La Loma Police
Station 1 received a request for assistance from the sister of accused Milan regarding
a drug deal that would allegedly take place in her house at Calavite St., Brgy.
Salvacion, Quezon City. The station commander called SPO2 Wilfredo Pilar Red and
instructed him to talk to Milan’s sister, who was in their office. SPO2 Red,
accompanied by Police Officer (PO) 2 Dionisio Alonzo, SPO1 Estores and SPO1
Montecalvo, talked to Milan’s sister. Thereafter, SPO2 Red formed a team composed
of the officers who accompanied him during the interrogation, with him as team
leader. The team received further instructions from the station commander then
proceeded to Calavite Street aboard two vehicles, a mobile patrol car and an
unmarked car.5
6
When the team reached the place at around 4:00 p.m.,  they alighted from their
vehicles and surrounded Milan’s house. SPO1 Montecalvo’s group went to the left
side of the house, while SPO2 Red’s group proceeded to the right. The two groups
eventually met at the back of the house near Milan’s room. The door to Milan’s room
was open, enabling the police officers to see Carandang, Milan and Chua inside.
SPO2 Red told the group that the persons inside the room would not put up a fight,
making them confident that nothing violent would erupt. However, when the group
introduced themselves as police officers, Milan immediately shut the door.7
PO2 Alonzo and SPO2 Red pushed the door open, causing it to fall and propelling
them inside the room. PO2 Alonzo shouted "Walang gagalaw!" Suddenly, gunshots
rang, hitting PO2 Alonzo and SPO2 Red who dropped to the floor one after the other.
Due to the suddenness of the attack, PO2 Alonzo and SPO2 Red were not able to
return fire and were instantly killed by the barrage of gunshots. SPO1 Montecalvo,
who was right behind SPO2 Red, was still aiming his firearm at the assailants when
Carandang shot and hit him. SPO1 Montecalvo fell to the ground. SPO1 Estores
heard Chua say to Milan, "Sugurin mo na!" Milan lunged towards SPO1 Montecalvo,
but the latter was able to fire his gun and hit Milan. SPO1 Estores went inside the
house and pulled SPO1 Montecalvo out.8
Reinforcements came at around 4:30 p.m. upon the arrival of P/Sr. Insp. Calaro, Chief
Operations Officer of the La Loma Police Station 1, and P/Supt. Roxas, the Deputy
Station Commander of Police Station 1 at the time of the incident.9 SPO1 Montecalvo
was brought to the Chinese General Hospital. Milan stepped out of the house and
was also brought to a hospital,10 but Carandang and Chua remained holed up inside
the house for several hours. There was a lengthy negotiation for the surrender of
Carandang and Chua, during which they requested for the presence of a certain
Colonel Reyes and media man Ramon Tulfo.11 It was around 11:00 p.m. to 12:00
midnight when Carandang and Chua surrendered.12 SPO2 Red and PO2 Alonzo were
found dead inside the house, their bodies slumped on the floor with broken legs and
gunshot and grenade shrapnel wounds.13
Dr. Winston Tan, Medico-Legal Officer of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime
Laboratory, conducted the post-mortem examination of the bodies of SPO2 Red and
PO2 Alonzo. He found that the gunshot wounds of Red and Alonzo were the cause of
their deaths.14
According to SPO1 Montecalvo’s account, Dr. Bu Castro of the Chinese General
Hospital operated on him, removing a bullet from the right portion of his nape. SPO1
Montecalvo’s hospitalization expenses amounted to ₱14,324.48. He testified that it
was a nightmarish experience for him as he feared that he might be paralyzed later
on.15
The defense presented the three accused as witnesses, testifying as follows:
Carandang claims that he had no firearm during the incident, and that it was the
police officers who fired all the shots. He was in Milan’s house during the incident in
order to ask Milan to accompany him to convert his cellular phone’s SIM card. When
he arrived at Milan’s place, he found Milan and Chua playing a card game. A short
time later, there was banging on the door. The door of the house was destroyed and
gunfire suddenly erupted, prompting him to take cover under a bed. Chua cried out to
him that he was hit and that he might lose blood. Milan ran outside and sustained
injuries as well. There was an explosion near the door, causing burns on Carandang’s
left arm. Gunfire continued coming from different directions for two to three minutes.
Suddenly, the place became dark as the lights went out.16
8 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
Since gunshots were still heard every now and then, Carandang stayed in the house
and did not come out. Col. Tor, the new Chief of the Criminal Investigation Division
(CID) Sikatuna, negotiated for Carandang to come out. Carandang requested for the
presence of his wife, Col. Doroteo Reyes and media man Ramon Tulfo. He went out
of the house at around midnight when the three arrived.17
Milan testified that he was at home in Calavite St. at the time of the incident. He knew
Carandang for seven months. Chua was their neighbor. While playing a card game
inside his room, they heard someone pounding at the door. He stood and approached
the door to check. The door was destroyed, and two unidentified men barged in.
Gunshots erupted. He was hit on the left side of his body. He ran out of the room,
leaving Chua and Carandang behind. As he was doing so, he saw his mother lying
down and shouting "Itigil niyo ang putukan; maraming matatanda dito!" Milan was
then hit on his left leg by another gunshot.18
Chua testified that he went to the house of Milan at around noontime of April 4, 2001
to play a card game. They played inside Milan’s ground floor room. Five to ten
minutes later, Carandang arrived and laid down on the bed. Chua did not pay much
attention as Milan and Carandang discussed about cellular phones. Later, they heard
a loud banging in the door as if it was being forced open. Milan stood up to see what
was happening. Chua remained seated and Carandang was still on the bed. The door
was forcibly opened. Chua heard successive gunshots and was hit on his left big toe.
He ducked on the floor near the bed to avoid being hit further. He remained in that
position for several hours until he lost consciousness. He was already being treated
at the Chinese General Hospital when he regained consciousness. In said hospital, a
paraffin test was conducted upon him.19
P/Sr. Insp. Grace Eustaquio, Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory, later
testified that the paraffin test on Chua yielded a negative result for gunpowder
nitrates, but that performed on Carandang produced a positive result. She was not
able to conduct a paraffin test on Milan, who just came from the operating room when
she saw him. Milan seemed to be in pain and refused to be examined.20
On April 22, 2003, the trial court rendered its Decision 21 finding Carandang, Milan and
Chua guilty of two counts of murder and one count of frustrated murder:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused RESTITUTO CARANDANG, HENRY MILAN
AND JACKMAN CHUA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder
described and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to
Article 63 of the same Code, for the killing of SPO2 Wilfredo Pilar Red and PO2
Dionisio Alonzo qualified by treachery and acting in conspiracy with each other, they
are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of
murder and to indemnify the heirs of the victims, jointly and severally, as follows:
To the heirs of SPO2 Wilfredo Red:
1. ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
2. ₱50,000.00 as moral damages;
3. ₱149,734.00 as actual damages; and
4. ₱752,580.00 as compensatory damages
To the heirs of PO2 Dionisio Alonzo:
1. ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
2. ₱50,000.00 as moral damages;
3. ₱139,910.00 as actual damages; and
4. ₱522,960.00 as compensatory damages.
Likewise, finding the accused Restituto Carandang, Henry Milan and Jackman Chua
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated murder, described and
penalized under Article 249 in relation to Article 6, paragraph 2, having acted in
conspiracy with each other and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, they are
hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of six (6) years of prision mayor to twelve
(12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, and to indemnify the victim Wilfredo
Montecalvo as follows:
1. ₱14,000.00 as actual damages;
2. ₱20,000.00 as moral damages;
3. ₱20,000.00 as reasonable attorney’s fees; and
4. To pay the costs.22
Carandang, Milan and Chua appealed to this Court.23 The appeals were separately
docketed as G.R. Nos. 160510-12.24 Pursuant, however, to the decision of this Court
in People v. Mateo,25 the appeals were transferred26 to the Court of Appeals, where
they were assigned a single docket number, CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01934.
On May 10, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision modifying the
Decision of the trial court:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 76, in Criminal Case Nos. Q-01-100061-63 finding accused-
appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of Murder and one (1)
count of Frustrated Murder is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as follows:
9 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
 1) In Criminal Case Nos. Q-01-100061 and Q-01-100062, accused-
appellants are hereby ordered to pay the heirs of PO2 Dionisio S. Alonzo
and SPO2 Wilfredo P. Red an indemnity for loss of earning capacity in the
amount of ₱2,140,980.69 and ₱2,269,243.62, respectively; and
2) In Criminal Case No. Q-01-100063, accused-appellants are hereby
instead sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of six (6) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
With costs against the accused-appellants.27
Milan and Chua appealed to this Court anew. 28 Carandang did not appeal, and
instead presented a letter informing this Court that he is no longer interested in
pursuing an appeal.29 On April 9, 2008, Milan and Chua filed a Supplemental
Appellant’s Brief to further discuss the Assignment of Errors they presented in their
September 28, 2004 Appellant’s Brief:
I.
The court a quo erred in holding that there was conspiracy among the
appellants in the case at bar.
II.
Assuming arguendo that conspiracy exists, the court a quo gravely erred in
convicting them of the crime of murder and frustrated murder instead of
homicide and frustrated homicide only, the qualifying circumstance of
treachery not having been duly proven to have attended the commission of
the crimes charged.30
The trial court had ruled that Carandang, Milan and Chua acted in conspiracy in the
commission of the crimes charged. Thus, despite the established fact that it was
Carandang who fired the gun which hit SPO2 Red, PO2 Alonzo and SPO1
Montecalvo, all three accused were held equally criminally responsible therefor. The
trial court explained that Carandang, Milan and Chua’s actuations showed that they
acted in concert against the police officers. The pertinent portion of the RTC Decision
reads:
Milan, Carandang and Chua were all inside the room of Milan. Upon arrival of police
officers Red, Alonzo and the others and having identified themselves as police
officers, the door was closed and after Alonzo and Red pushed it open and as Alonzo
shouted, "walang gagalaw," immediately shots rang out from inside the room, felling
Alonzo, then Red, then Montecalvo. Chua was heard by Estores to shout to Milan:
"Sugurin mo na" (tsn, October 16, 2001, page 8). And as Milan lunged at Montecalvo,
the latter shot him.
That the three acted in concert can be gleaned from their actuations. First, when they
learned of the presence of the police officers, they closed the door. Not one of them
came out to talk peacefully with the police officers. Instead, Carandang opened fire,
Alonzo and Red did not even have the chance to touch their firearms at that instant.31
In affirming this ruling, the Court of Appeals further expounded on the acts of Milan
and Chua showing that they acted in concert with Carandang, to wit:
In the present case, when appellants were alerted of the presence of the police
officers, Milan immediately closed the door. Thereafter, when the police officers were
finally able to break open said door, Carandang peppered them with bullets. PO2
Alonzo and SPO2 Red died instantly as a result while SPO1 Montecalvo was mortally
wounded. Then, upon seeing their victims helplessly lying on the floor and seriously
wounded, Chua ordered Milan to attack the police officers. Following the order, Milan
rushed towards Montecalvo but the latter, however, was able to shoot him.
At first glance, Milan’s act of closing the door may seem a trivial contribution in the
furtherance of the crime. On second look, however, that act actually facilitated the
commission of the crime. The brief moment during which the police officers were
trying to open the door paved the way for the appellants to take strategic positions
which gave them a vantage point in staging their assault. Thus, when SPO2 Red and
PO2 Alonzo were finally able to get inside, they were instantly killed by the sudden
barrage of gunfire. In fact, because of the suddenness of the attack, said police
officers were not able to return fire.
Insofar as Chua is concerned, his participation in the conspiracy consisted of lending
encouragement and moral ascendancy to his co-conspirators as evidenced by the
fact that he ordered Milan to attack the already fallen police officers with the obvious
intention to finish them off. Moreover, he did not immediately surrender even when he
had the opportunity to do so but instead chose to stay with Carandang inside the
room until their arrest.32
Milan and Chua object to the conclusion that they were in conspiracy with Carandang
due to their acts of closing the door and not peaceably talking to the police officers.
According to them, those acts were caused by their being frightened by the police
officers who were allegedly in full battle gear. 33 Milan and Chua further assert that the
fortuitous and unexpected character of the encounter and the rapid turn of events
should have ruled out a finding of conspiracy.34 They claim that the incident happened
so fast, giving them no opportunity to stop Carandang.35
Appellants contest the factual finding that Chua directed Milan to go after SPO1
Montecalvo, alleging that they were both unarmed and that there was no way for
Milan to attack an armed person. What really happened, according to them, was that
Milan ran out of the room for safety and not to attack SPO1 Montecalvo. 36 Milan
claims that he was already injured in the stomach when he ran out, and it was natural
for him to seek safety.
10 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
Assuming arguendo that Chua uttered "Sugurin mo na!" to Milan, appellants argue
that no crime was committed due to the same as all the victims had already been shot
when said words were shouted.37 Furthermore, it appears to have been uttered as a
result of indiscretion or lack of reflection and did not inherently carry with it
inducement or temptation.38
In the Supplemental Brief, Milan and Chua point out that the assault on the victims
was the result of the impulsive act of Carandang and was not a result of any
agreement or a concerted action of all the accused. 39 They claim that when the
shootout ensued, Chua immediately dove down near the bed while Milan ran out of
the room out of fear.40 It is allegedly hard to imagine that SPO1 Montecalvo with
certainty heard Chua utter the phrase "Sugurin mo na," considering that the incident
happened so fast, there were lots of gunshots.41
To summarize, Milan’s and Chua’s arguments focus on the lack of direct evidence
showing that they conspired with Carandang during the latter’s act of shooting the
three victims. However, as we have held in People v. Sumalpong, 42 conspiracy may
also be proven by other means:
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Evidence need not establish the
actual agreement among the conspirators showing a preconceived plan or motive for
the commission of the crime. Proof of concerted action before, during and after the
crime, which demonstrates their unity of design and objective, is sufficient. When
conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all regardless of the degree of
participation of each.43
In the case at bar, the conclusion that Milan and Chua conspired with Carandang was
established by their acts (1) before Carandang shot the victims (Milan’s closing the
door when the police officers introduced themselves, allowing Carandang to wait in
ambush), and (2) after the shooting (Chua’s directive to Milan to attack SPO1
Montecalvo and Milan’s following such instruction). Contrary to the suppositions of
appellants, these facts are not meant to prove that Chua is a principal by inducement,
or that Milan’s act of attacking SPO1 Montecalvo was what made him a principal by
direct participation. Instead, these facts are convincing circumstantial evidence of the
unity of purpose in the minds of the three. As co-conspirators, all three are considered
principals by direct participation.
Appellants’ attempt to instill doubts in our minds that Chua shouted "sugurin mo na" to
Milan, who then ran towards SPO1 Montecalvo, must fail. SPO1 Estores’s positive
testimony44 on this matter prevails over the plain denials of Milan and Chua. SPO1
Estores has no reason to lie about the events he witnessed on April 5, 2001. As part
of the team that was attacked on that day, it could even be expected that he is
interested in having only the real perpetrators punished.
Furthermore, we have time and again ruled that factual findings of the trial court,
especially those affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive on this Court when
supported by the evidence on record.45 It was the trial court that was able to observe
the demeanors of the witnesses, and is consequently in a better position to determine
which of the witnesses are telling the truth. Thus, this Court, as a general rule, would
not review the factual findings of the courts a quo, except in certain instances such as
when: (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2)
the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings
of fact are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual
findings are based; (7) the finding of absence of facts is contradicted by the presence
of evidence on record; (8) the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to the
findings of the trial court; (9) the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain
relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion; (10) the findings of the Court of Appeals are beyond the issues of the
case; and (11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties.46
Neither can the rapid turn of events be considered to negate a finding of conspiracy.
Unlike evident premeditation, there is no requirement for conspiracy to exist that there
be a sufficient period of time to elapse to afford full opportunity for meditation and
reflection. Instead, conspiracy arises on the very moment the plotters agree,
expressly or impliedly, to commit the subject felony.47
As held by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, Milan’s act of closing the door
facilitated the commission of the crime, allowing Carandang to wait in ambush. The
sudden gunshots when the police officers pushed the door open illustrate the
intention of appellants and Carandang to prevent any chance for the police officers to
defend themselves. Treachery is thus present in the case at bar, as what is decisive
for this qualifying circumstance is that the execution of the attack made it impossible
for the victims to defend themselves or to retaliate.48
The trial court correctly sentenced appellants to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua in Criminal Case Nos. Q-01-100061 and Q-01-100062. The penalty for
murder under Article 24849 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death.
Applying Article 6350 of the same Code, since there was no other modifying
circumstance other than the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the penalty that
should be imposed is reclusion perpetua.
In Criminal Case No. Q-01-100063, the Court of Appeals correctly modified the
penalty for the frustrated murder of SPO1 Montecalvo. Under Article 50 51 in
connection with Article 61, paragraph 252 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for
frustrated murder is one degree lower than reclusion perpetua to death, which is
reclusion temporal. Reclusion temporal has a range of 12 years and 1 day to 20
years. Its medium period, which should be applied in this case considering that there
is no modifying circumstance other than the qualifying circumstance of treachery, is
14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months – the range of the maximum
term of the indeterminate penalty under Section 153 of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law. The minimum term of the indeterminate penalty should then be within the range
of the penalty next lower to reclusion temporal, and thus may be any term within
prision mayor, the range of which is 6 years and 1 day to 12 years. The modified term
11 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
of 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum, to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day
of reclusion temporal as maximum, is within these ranges.
The civil liabilities of appellants should, however, be modified in accordance with
current jurisprudence. Thus, in Criminal Case Nos. Q-01-100061 and Q-01-100062,
the award of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity for each victim must be increased to
₱75,000.00.54 In cases of murder and homicide, civil indemnity of ₱75,000.00 and
moral damages of ₱50,000.00 are awarded automatically, without need of allegation
and proof other than the death of the victim.55 Appellants are furthermore solidarily
liable to each victim for ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, which is awarded when
the crime was committed with an aggravating circumstance, be it generic or
qualifying.56 However, since Carandang did not appeal, he is only solidarily liable with
Milan and Chua with respect to the amounts awarded by the Court of Appeals, since
the Court of Appeals’ Decision has become final and executory with respect to him.
The additional amounts (₱25,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary
damages) shall be borne only by Milan and Chua, who are hereby held liable therefor
solidarily.
In Criminal Case No. Q-01-100063, the solidary liability of Milan and Chua for moral
damages to SPO1 Wilfredo Montecalvo is likewise increased to ₱40,000.00, in
accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.57 An award of ₱20,000.00 as exemplary
damages is also warranted.58 The additional amounts (₱20,000.00 as moral damages
and ₱20,000.00 as exemplary damages) are likewise to be solidarily borne only by
Milan and Chua.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01934
dated May 10, 2006 is hereby AFFIRMED, with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1. In Criminal Case Nos. Q-01-100061 and Q-01-100062, appellants Henry
Milan and Jackman Chua are held solidarily liable for the amount of
₱25,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages to the
heirs of each of the victims, PO2 Dionisio S. Alonzo and SPO2 Wilfredo P.
Red, in addition to the amounts to which they are solidarily liable with
Restituto Carandang as held in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01934. Thus, to
summarize the rulings of the lower courts and this Court:
a. The heirs of SPO2 Wilfredo Red are entitled to the following
amounts:
i. ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 of which shall
be solidarily borne by Carandang, Milan and Chua, while
₱25,000.00 shall be the solidary liability of Milan and Chua
only;
ii. ₱50,000.00 as moral damages to be solidarily borne by
Carandang, Milan and Chua;
12 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
iii. ₱149,734.00 as actual damages to be soldarily borne
by Carandang, Milan and Chua;
iv. ₱2,140,980.00 as indemnity for loss of earning capacity
to be solidarily borne by Carandang, Milan and Chua; and
v. ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages to be solidarily
borne by Milan and Chua only;
b. The heirs of PO2 Dionisio Alonzo are entitled to the following
amounts:
i. ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 of which shall
be solidarily borne by Carandang, Milan and Chua, while
₱25,000.00 shall be the solidary liability of Milan and Chua
only;
ii. ₱50,000.00 as moral damages to be solidarily borne by
Carandang, Milan and Chua;
iii. ₱139,910.00 as actual damages to be solidarily borne
by Carandang, Milan and Chua;
iv. ₱2,269,243.62 as indemnity for loss of earning capacity
to be solidarily borne by Carandang, Milan and Chua;
v. ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages to be solidarily
borne by Milan and Chua only;
2. In Criminal Case No. Q-01-100063, appellants Henry Milan and Jackman
Chua are held solidarily liable for the amount of ₱20,000.00 as moral
damages and ₱20,000.00 as exemplary damages to SPO1 Wilfredo
Montecalvo, in addition to the amounts to which they are solidarily liable with
Restituto Carandang as held in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01934. Thus, to
summarize the rulings of the lower courts and this Court, SPO1 Wilfredo
Montecalvo is entitled to the following amounts:
i. ₱14,000.00 as actual damages to be solidarily borne by
Carandang, Milan and Chua;
ii. ₱40,000.00 as moral damages, ₱20,000.00 of which shall be
solidarily borne by Carandang, Milan and Chua, while ₱20,000.00
shall be the solidary liability of Milan and Chua only;
 iii. ₱20,000.00 as exemplary damages to be solidarily borne by
Milan and Chua only; and
iv. ₱20,000.00 as reasonable attorney’s fees, to be solidarily borne
by Carandang, Milan and Chua.
3. Appellants are further ordered to pay interest on all damages awarded at
the legal rate of Six Percent (6%) per annum from date of finality of this
judgment.1avvphi1
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 177751               December 14, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
FLORENCIO AGACER, EDDIE AGACER, ELYNOR AGACER, FRANKLIN
AGACER and ERIC* AGACER, Appellants.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This case involves a man who was killed by his own relatives. Convicted for the crime
of murder by the lower courts, the indicted relatives are now before us assailing their
guilty verdict.
Factual Antecedents
This is an appeal from the November 17, 2006 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01543, affirming with modification the August 7, 2001
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Aparri, Cagayan which found
appellants Florencio Agacer (Florencio), Franklin Agacer (Franklin), Elynor Agacer
(Elynor), Eric Agacer (Eric) and Eddie Agacer (Eddie), guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder for the killing of Cesario Agacer (Cesario).
As mentioned, all the appellants were related to Cesario. Florencio was Cesario’s
nephew and is the father of Franklin while the brothers Elynor, Eric and Eddie are his
nephews.
On March 2, 1999, an Information3 for Murder was filed against the five appellants,
the accusatory portion of which reads as follows:
That on or about April 2, 1998, in the municipality of Sta. Ana, Province of Cagayan,
and within the jurisdiction [of] this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
armed with a long firearm, a bow and arrow, a bolo and stones, with intent to kill, with
evident premeditation and with treachery, conspiring together and helping one
another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack, stone
and shoot one Cesario Agacer, inflicting upon the latter [bruises] and multiple gunshot
wounds in his body which caused his death.
That the killing was aggravated by the use of an unlicensed firearm.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On October 14, 1999, Florencio, Elynor, Franklin and Eric entered separate pleas of
"not guilty" during their arraignment.5 On January 11, 2000, Eddie likewise pleaded
"not guilty".6 Thereafter, trial ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution’s version of the events is as follows:
Cesario was a 55-year old farmer and owner of a ricefield situated in Dungeg, Santa
Ana, Cagayan. On April 2, 1998, at around 9:00 a.m., he was clearing a section of his
farm and preparing the beddings for the rice seedlings intended for the coming
planting season. Farm laborers Genesis Delantar (Genesis), his brother Andy, Rafael
Morgado and brothers Roden (Roden) and Ric (Ric) Vallejo were nearby in a
separate section of the same ricefield harvesting Cesario’s palay.
According to prosecution witnesses Genesis and Roden, it was at that moment while
Cesario was tending to his farm when appellants suddenly emerged from a nearby
banana plantation and surrounded Cesario. Visibly intimidated, Cesario moved
backwards and retreated to where the other farm laborers were working. However,
Franklin set afire the rice straws that covered Cesario’s rice seedlings. This prompted
Cesario to return to put out the fire and save his rice seedlings. At this point, Franklin
and Eric started throwing stones at Cesario which forced the latter to retreat again.
Thereafter, Florencio, while standing side by side with Eric, signaled Cesario to come
closer. Cesario obliged but when he was just around five meters away from the group,
Eddie suddenly pulled out a gun concealed inside a sack and, without warning, shot
Cesario hitting him in the left portion of his chest. Almost simultaneously, Elynor took
aim at Cesario with his bow and arrow but missed his mark. As Cesario fell,
appellants fled towards the irrigation canal, where another gunshot rang. Thereafter,
a short firearm was thrown from where the appellants ran towards the direction of
Cesario’s fallen body. Appellants then immediately left the scene of the crime
onboard a hand tractor and a tricycle.
After these events unfolded, Genesis and the other farm laborers scampered away in
different directions. Genesis then reached Barangay Capanikian and informed
Cesario’s son, Neldison Agacer (Neldison), of the death of his father. At around 3:00
p.m., Cesario’s friends in said barangay went to the scene of the crime and retrieved
13 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
his corpse. During the autopsy, a total of eight entrance wounds were found, mostly
on the chest of Cesario’s cadaver. According to the Medico-Legal Officer, the fatal
gunshot wounds were inflicted by the use of a firearm capable of discharging several
slugs simultaneously.
Version of the Defense
The appellants denied the accusations against them and claimed that Florencio only
acted in self-defense and in defense of relatives. As proof, appellants presented
Florencio who testified that on April 2, 1998, he proceeded to Dungeg, Sta. Ana,
Cagayan, from his residence in Merde, also in Sta. Ana, Cagayan, to prepare seed
beddings in the ricefield over which he and his uncle Cesario had an existing dispute.
At around 8:00 a.m., he claimed that Cesario attempted to prevent him from preparing
the seed beds. When Florencio persisted and argued that he inherited the land from
his father, Cesario departed through a cogonal area. Moments later, Cesario returned
and shouted at him not to continue working on the land. At that time, Florencio
noticed that Cesario was holding an object. Suspecting that Cesario may be armed,
he shouted to Eric, Franklin, Eddie and Elynor, who had just arrived, to run away. The
four heeded his warning and scampered in different directions. Cesario then chased
Florencio who ran and jumped into the irrigation canal to hide in the tall cogon
grasses. However, Cesario was not deterred and continued to search for him. When
Florencio saw that Cesario was already close, he suddenly grabbed Cesario’s
buckshot gun and successfully disarmed him. Thereupon, Cesario drew another
firearm and shot Florencio several times. As Cesario was shooting him, Florencio also
fired the gun he earlier grabbed from Cesario and hit the latter. Finding out that he too
was hit in the arm, he shouted to his nephews for help. They responded by taking him
to a hospital for treatment. On April 16, 1998, he went to the police to surrender.
Elynor and Eddie corroborated this version in their respective testimonies.7
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court found the prosecution’s evidence sufficient to prove
appellants’ guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It held that appellants acted in conspiracy
in inflicting upon Cesario, in a treacherous manner, multiple gunshot wounds.
However, the trial court did not appreciate evident premeditation as a qualifying
aggravating circumstance for failure to establish its elements as clearly as the criminal
act itself. It also did not consider as aggravating circumstance the use of an
unlicensed firearm since the firearm used in the killing was not presented in evidence.
8
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s Decision  of August 7, 2001, reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds all the accused FLORENCIO AGACER, EDDIE
AGACER, ELYNOR AGACER, FRANKLIN AGACER and ERIC AGACER GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER qualified [by] treachery and
hereby sentence[s] them to:
1. suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties;
2. indemnify the heirs of the victim, the amount of ₱75,000.00 as death
indemnity; the amount of ₱40,000.00 as actual damages and the amount of
₱30,000.00 as and by way of Attorney’s fees.
3. pay the costs of litigation.
SO ORDERED.9
Appellants filed a Notice of Appeal, 10 which was approved by the trial court in its
Order11 of August 17, 2001. Pursuant thereto, the records of the case were elevated
to this Court. However, in view of the Court’s ruling in People v. Mateo12 allowing an
intermediate review by the CA where the penalty involved is death, reclusion
perpetua as in this case, or life imprisonment, the case was transferred to said court
for appropriate action and disposition.13
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court in all respects. It also awarded moral
damages pursuant to the rule laid down in People v. Dela Cruz14 and People v.
Panela.15 The dispositive portion of the November 17, 2006 Decision 16 of the CA
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered DENYING the
instant appeal, and accordingly AFFIRMING in toto the herein impugned August 7,
2001 Decision of the RTC, Branch 08, of Aparri, Cagayan. Additionally, the amount of
P50,000.00 is hereby awarded in favor of Cesario Agacer’s surviving heirs as and by
way of moral damages pursuant to the doctrine in the cases of Dela Cruz and Panela,
as heretofore stated.
SO ORDERED.17
Hence, the present appeal.
Assignment of Errors
In their Brief,18 appellants assigned the following errors:
I
14 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT CONSPIRACY EXISTED
[AMONG] THE HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANTS IN THE KILLING OF CESARIO
AGACER.
II
THE LOWER COURT LIKEWISE ERRED IN FINDING THAT
TREACHERY AS A QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE ATTENDED THE
COMMISSION OF THE CRIME.
III
THE LOWER COURT FINALLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS’ GUILT HAS BEEN PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.19
Appellants contend that both lower courts erred in finding that they conspired to kill
Cesario. They argue that there was no evidence sufficient to establish their intentional
participation in the crime to achieve a common purpose. Thus, they claim that the
criminal culpability arising from their acts, even if the same were all directed solely
against one victim, is individual and not collective. Put differently, each of them is
liable only for his own acts.
Appellants also contend that treachery did not attend the commission of the crime.
They assert that treachery cannot be appreciated when an altercation precedes the
killing. Here, Cesario already had a previous heated altercation with Florencio.
Appellants aver that Cesario had only himself to blame for obliging when Florencio
summoned him to come near considering that they just had a heated argument.
According to them, Cesario literally courted danger by approaching Florencio instead
of running away from him.
Lastly, appellants posit that they cannot be held guilty of murder since the qualifying
circumstance of treachery was not alleged with clarity nor specified in the Information
as required by Sections 8 and 9, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.
In its Brief,20 the People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) maintains that there was conspiracy among the appellants as shown by their
collective acts before, during, and after the perpetration of the crime. Their specific
acts are in fact indicative of a common design and intent to ensure the commission of
the crime.21 The OSG also belies the assertion of the appellants that treachery does
not exist in this case. It insists that their attack on Cesario was sudden and
unexpected, thereby depriving him of a chance to defend himself and ensuring its
commission without risk to the appellants and without the slightest provocation on the
part of the victim.22
Our Ruling
The appeal is unmeritorious.
Conspiracy was sufficiently established
"Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it."23 In conspiracy, it is not necessary to
adduce direct evidence of a previous agreement to commit a crime. 24 It "may be
shown through circumstantial evidence, deduced from the mode and manner in which
the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves
when such lead to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of
interest."25 Proof of a previous agreement and decision to commit the crime is not
essential but the fact that the malefactors acted in unison pursuant to the same
objective suffices.26
Here, while there is no proof of any previous agreement among appellants to commit
the crime and while it was established during trial that Eddie alone shot Cesario, the
acts of all appellants before, during and after the incident establish the existence of
conspiracy to kill Cesario beyond reasonable doubt. First, all of them emerged at the
same time from a banana plantation beside the ricefield. Second, they surprised
Cesario by immediately surrounding him. Third, all of them were armed at the time of
the incident. Eddie had a shotgun concealed in a sack, Florencio was armed with a
bolo, Elynor had a bow and arrow, while Eric and Franklin had stones in their hands.
Fourth, Eric and Franklin struck Cesario with stones moments before the shooting.
Fifth, Eddie immediately shot Cesario at close range while the latter was approaching
the group of appellants upon being summoned by Florencio. Sixth, Florencio,
Franklin, Eric and Elynor stood just a meter away from Eddie when he shot Cesario,
but did not do anything to stop or dissuade Eddie from the assault. Seventh, after
Cesario was shot, all appellants departed from the scene of the crime together.
Undoubtedly, the acts of the assailants constitute proof of their unanimity in design,
intent and execution.27 They "performed specific acts with closeness and coordination
as to unmistakably indicate a common purpose and design"28 to ensure the death of
Cesario. We thus uphold the lower courts’ finding that appellants conspired to commit
the crime of murder against Cesario.
Having established conspiracy, appellants’ assertion that each of them can only be
made liable for his own acts deserves no merit. Evidence as to who among the
appellants delivered the fatal blow is therefore no longer indispensable since in
conspiracy, a person may be convicted for the criminal act of another. 29 In a
conspiracy, the act of one is deemed the act of all.30
Essence of Treachery; Elements
We are also unimpressed with appellants’ contention that both the trial and appellate
courts erred in ruling that treachery qualified the killing of Cesario to murder. They
maintain that since the attack on Cesario was frontal, there was therefore no element
of surprise on the victim or suddenness of the assault that characterizes treachery.
15 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
"There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which
the offended party might make."31 Two conditions must concur for treachery to be
appreciated. First, is the employment of means of execution that gives the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate. Second, the means of
execution was deliberate or consciously adopted.32 "The essence of treachery is the
sudden attack by an aggressor without the slightest provocation on the part of the
victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring the
commission of the crime without risk to the aggressor." 33
In this case, treachery is evident from the same circumstances we have already
discussed above. From the facts, Cesario could not have been aware that he would
be surrounded, attacked and killed by the appellants who were all related to him. He
could not have also been aware that Eddie had a shotgun concealed in a sack
because if he was, he would not have casually approached Florencio when the latter
summoned him. Unfortunately, while Cesario was advancing towards Florencio,
Eddie shot him at close range without any warning whatsoever. Evidently, the crime
was committed in a manner that there was no opportunity for Cesario to defend
himself. Also, the mode of attack did not spring from the unexpected turn of events
but was clearly thought of by the appellants. Hence, it no longer matters that the
assault was frontal since its swiftness and unexpectedness deprived Cesario of a
chance to repel it or offer any resistance in defense of his person.34
Appellants’ contention that treachery was not alleged with certainty in the Information
is also devoid of merit. In People v. Villacorta 35 the Court appreciated treachery as an
aggravating circumstance, it having been alleged in the Information and proved
during trial that the "x x x accused, armed with a sharpened bamboo stick, with intent
to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully and feloniously
attack, assault and stab with the said weapon one DANILO SALVADOR CRUZ x x x."
Similarly, we hold that treachery was sufficiently alleged in the Information when it
reads, viz:
x x x the above-name[d] accused, armed with a long firearm, a bow and arrow, a bolo
and stones, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and with treachery,
conspiring together and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously assault, attack, stone and shoot one Cesario Agacer, inflicting upon
the latter [bruises] and multiple gunshot wounds in his body which caused his
death.36 (Emphasis supplied.)
"Well-settled is the rule that when x x x treachery x x x is present and alleged in the
Information, it qualifies the killing and raises it to the category of murder."37
Appellants failed to discharge their burden to prove Florencio’s claim that he acted in
self-defense and in defense of relatives.
Florencio admits that he shot Cesario but invokes defense of himself and of his
relatives to escape criminal liability.
The Court is not convinced.
While it is the burden of the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, this burden shifts when the accused admits the killing and pleads
self-defense by way of justification. It therefore becomes vital for the accused to show
clear and convincing evidence that he acted in self-defense. In so doing, he must rely
on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution’s
evidence.38
The accused must also prove the following elements of self-defense: (1) there was
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) there was reasonable necessity of
the means employed to prevent or repel the attack; and (3) the lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself. 39 In the justifying
circumstance of self-defense, unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non. 40 Self-
defense, complete or incomplete, cannot be considered a justification, unless the
victim commits an unlawful aggression against the person defending himself.41
Here, Florencio failed to prove that he defended himself against the unlawful
aggression of Cesario. He failed to present any evidence to substantiate his claim
that there was an actual or imminent peril to his life or limb. Aside from his unreliable
and self-serving claim, there is no proof that Cesario assaulted and shot him with a
firearm during their struggle or, if at all, that there was indeed a struggle between
them. On the other hand, the separate testimonies of prosecution witnesses Genesis
and Roden negate Florencio’s claim of unlawful aggression. The testimonies of these
witnesses established that it was the appellants who emerged from a nearby banana
plantation; that they surrounded Cesario and set to fire the rice straws covering his
rice seedlings; that appellants were armed with different kinds of weapons, while
Cesario was not; that Franklin and Elynor cast stones upon Cesario; and, that the one
who pulled a gun from a sack and shot Cesario was Eddie, not Florencio. We thus
hold that if there was unlawful aggression here, it came from appellants’ end and not
from Cesario. Hence, there being no unlawful aggression on the part of Cesario,
Florencio’s claim of self-defense must fail.
Another basis for appellants’ conviction is the finding of the medico-legal expert that
the cause of Cesario’s death was multiple gunshot wounds found mostly at the
"infero-lateral portion of the anterior chest, right side." This corroborates the
testimonies of Genesis and Roden that Cesario was shot in his chest. These
dovetailing findings of the medico-legal expert and the eyewitness accounts of
Genesis and Roden also deserve more credence than the unsubstantiated claim of
self-defense of Florencio, who, interestingly, gave contradictory testimony. Florencio
claimed that he could not see the gun used by Cesario in shooting him as tall cogonal
grass obstructed his view, yet he could clearly recall that he saw the bullet-riddled
Cesario fall.42 These contradictory statements of Florencio all the more convince us to
believe the testimonies of prosecution witnesses that no exchange of gunfire actually
16 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
transpired between Cesario and Florencio. Rather, it was only Eddie who wielded a
gun and shot Cesario.1avvphi1
Florencio also invokes the justifying circumstance of defense of relatives, which has
three elements, to wit, (1) there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2)
there was reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3)
in case of provocation given by the person being attacked, the person making
defense had no part therein.43 Like in the case of self-defense, unlawful aggression is
also an indispensable element in defense of relative. As discussed, there is no
unlawful aggression on the part of Cesario. Hence, Florencio’s reliance on this
justifying circumstance is likewise unavailing.
Similarly, Florencio’s subsequent presentation of himself at the police station cannot
be considered as a "voluntary surrender" which would mitigate the penalty imposed.
"A surrender to be voluntary must be spontaneous, showing the intent of the accused
to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities either because (a) he
acknowledges his guilt or (b) he wishes to save them the trouble and expense
necessarily incurred in his search and capture."44 Here, Florencio cannot be
considered to have surrendered voluntarily since his act did not emanate from a
natural impulse to admit the killing of Cesario or to save the police officers the effort
and expense that would be incurred in his search and incarceration. Although he
submitted a medico-legal certificate purportedly to show that his injuries prevented
him from immediately surrendering to the authorities, same, however, does not certify
as to the period of his incapacity or the period during which he required medical
attendance. Thus, there can be no explanation why he surrendered only on April 16,
1998 or 14 days after the commission of the crime. To us, Florencio’s surrender was
a mere afterthought undeserving of any consideration. Indeed, the failure of Florencio
to immediately surrender militates against his claim that he killed Cesario in self-
defense and in defense of relatives since an innocent person will not hesitate to take
the prompt and necessary action to exonerate himself of the crime imputed to him.
All told, we find no reason to disturb the conclusion of the trial court, as affirmed by
the CA. The testimonies of the eyewitnesses presented by the prosecution were given
in a clear, natural and spontaneous manner. Their positive identification of the
appellants as the persons responsible for the death of Cesario has been clearly,
categorically and consistently established on record. Moreover, we note that no
evidence was presented to establish that these eyewitnesses harbored any ill-will
against the appellants or that they have reasons to fabricate their
testimonies.45 These kinds of testimonies are accepted as true for being consistent
with the natural order of events, human nature and the presumption of good faith.46
The Proper Penalty
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the crime of murder is
reclusion perpetua to death. As correctly imposed by the trial court and as affirmed by
the CA, appellants must suffer the prison term of reclusion perpetua, the lower of the
said two indivisible penalties, due to the absence of an aggravating circumstance
attending the commission of the crime.
The Civil Liability
For the victim’s death resulting from the crime, the heirs are entitled to the following
awards: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or
compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5)
temperate damages.47
Civil indemnity in the amount of ₱75,000.00 is mandatory and is granted without need
of evidence other than the commission of the crime.48 Moral damages in the sum of
₱50,000.00 shall be awarded despite the absence of proof of mental and emotional
suffering of the victim’s heirs.49 "As borne out by human nature and experience, a
violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on
the part of the victim’s family."50 Also under Article 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary
damages may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more
aggravating circumstances, like treachery,51 as in this case. Thus, the award of
₱30,000.00 for exemplary damages is in order.52
As regards actual damages, the son of Cesario, Neldison, testified that the sum of
₱40,000.00 was spent for the coffin of his father but was unable to present receipts to
substantiate such claim. Where the amount of actual damages for funeral expenses
cannot be ascertained due to the absence of receipts to prove them, temperate
damages in the sum of ₱25,000.00 may be granted, as it is hereby granted, in lieu
thereof.53 "Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be
recovered as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victim suffered pecuniary loss
although the exact amount was not proved."54
The heirs of Cesario are also entitled to an interest on all the amounts of damages we
have awarded at the legal rate of 6% from the date of finality of this Decision until fully
paid.55
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the November 17, 2006 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01543 which affirmed the August 7, 2001 Decision
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Aparri, Cagayan, finding appellants Florencio,
Franklin, Elynor, Eddie and Eric, all surnamed Agacer, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder, with the following modifications:
(1) actual damages is DELETED;
(2) the appellants are ORDERED to pay the heirs of Cesario Agacer
₱25,000.00 as temperate damages; and
(3) the appellants are ORDERED to pay the heirs of Cesario Agacer interest
at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum on all the amounts of
17 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
 damages awarded, commencing from the date of finality of this Decision until
fully paid.
Costs against the appellants.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 176061               July 4, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
BINGKY CAMPOS and DANNY "BOY" ACABO, Appellants.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
We reiterate in this case the time-honored doctrine that although it is a cardinal
principle in criminal law that the prosecution has the burden of proving the guilt of the
accused, the rule is reversed where the accused admits the commission of the crime
and invokes self-defense.
This is an appeal from the September 25, 2006 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-CR H.C. No. 00241. The CA affirmed in toto the April 2, 2004
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Oriental, Branch 37,
Dumaguete City finding appellants Bingky Campos (Bingky) and Danny "Boy" Acabo
(Danny) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.
In an Information filed by the Assistant Prosecutor of Dumaguete City, Bingky and
Danny were charged with the crime of murder committed as follows:
That on August 19, 2001 at about 8:00 o’clock in the evening at Arellano Street,
Poblacion Zamboanguita, Negros Oriental, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping each other, with deliberate intent to kill, armed with a
"plamingco" - a bladed weapon of which said accused were armed and provided, and
[by] means of treachery, and disregard of the respect due the offended party on
account of his age, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, stab
and wound ROMEO F. ABAD, 64 years of age, thereby inflicting upon the latter "stab
[sic] wound with injury to the liver, gallbladder thru/thru; duodenum thru/thru;
pancreas", which cause[d] his death on the following day while undergoing medical
treatment at the Holy Child Hospital.
3
Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Arraigned on September 25, 2001, appellants, assisted by counsel, pleaded not
guilty. The pre-trial was deemed terminated on March 25, 2002. Trial on the merits
thereafter proceeded.
Version of the Prosecution
A brief summary of the pertinent facts constituting the prosecution’s version of the
incident was unveiled by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in this manner:
[A]t around [8:00] o’clock in the evening of August 19, 2001, prosecution eyewitness
Lester Huck Baldivino (Lester) was tending his sari-sari store near his house located
at Arellano St., Brgy. Calango, Zamboanguita, Negros Oriental when [the victim]
Romeo Abad (Romeo), his maternal uncle, came to buy cigarettes and candies.
Lester was about to call it a night and was already preparing to close his store, but
Romeo lit up a cigarette and started to converse with him.
Romeo was jesting about Lester’s skin rashes, as the latter was applying medicine on
his irritated skin.1avvphi1 They were in this bantering mood, when Lester, who was
facing the highway, suddenly heard footsteps and immediately saw Danny Boy Acabo
(Acabo) running towards his uncle’s direction, closely followed by Bingky Campos
(Campos). Before Lester can utter a word of warning, Danny swiftly stab[bed] Romeo
at the lower right side of the latter’s abdomen with a "plamingko" while Bingky stood
nearby. Immediately after stabbing Romeo, Danny and Bingky fled.
Lester was shocked but darted out of his store to apply pressure on Romeo’s wound
when he heard the latter cry out for help. Lester told Romeo to hang on and ran inside
his house to call his mother and Romeo’s son and told them to prepare the car.
Romeo was brought to the Holy Child Hospital where he died.
The medical examination conducted by Dr. Johnny B. Yee (Dr. Yee), the attending
physician at the Holy Child Hospital who prepared the Certificate of Death, revealed
that Romeo sustained a stab[bed] wound that could have been inflicted by a sharp
and pointed long instrument. The weapon hit him at the right upper quadrant of the
abdomen, penetrating and causing injury to the liver, with through and through
laceration of the gall bladder and the duodenum, and transecting the whole length of
the pancreas. Dr. Yee further testified that the injury to the pancreas caused the
massive blood loss which [made] Romeo to suffer hypovolemic shock [resulting to]
cardio-pulmonary arrest [and, eventually, his] death.4
Version of the Defense
For the defense, the following is their own version of the incident as narrated in their
Brief:
18 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
On August 19, 2001 while on their way to the house of their uncle, Danny and Bingky
met four men who mauled Bingky. When Bingky was able to run away, they
approached Danny and kicked his buttocks. Danny pulled out a knife and thrust it
towards one of the men. Danny then ran away to escape.5
Bingky corroborated the testimony of Danny that four men approached him (Bingky)
and mauled him. He does not know who these persons were.6
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On April 2, 2004, after evaluating the conflicting evidence before it, the RTC meted
out a judgment of conviction and sentenced both Bingky and Danny to reclusion
perpetua and ordered them to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of Romeo the
sum of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages plus cost.7
Appellants appealed to this Court in view of the penalty imposed on them. On
September 15, 2004, this Court accepted the appeal and notified the parties to file
briefs.8 On March 7, 2005,9 the Court transferred the case to the CA in conformity with
the Decision in People v. Mateo.10
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA found no error in the appreciation of the evidence and applicable law by the
trial court. On September 25, 2006, the appellate court, in rendering its assailed
Decision, dispositively ruled:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judgment is hereby rendered affirming the
Decision of the trial court in toto.
SO ORDERED.11
Hence, this appeal.
12 13
On May 3, 2007  and May 7, 2007,  appellants and appellee People of the
Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), respectively, filed
similar manifestation that they are no longer filing their supplemental briefs.
Appellants pray for the reversal of their conviction alleging that the prosecution failed
to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They claim that the stabbing of the
victim was done in self-defense. They take exception to the finding of the trial court
regarding the presence of conspiracy asserting that the mere presence of Bingky at
the scene of the crime does not prove the existence of conspiracy.
For the appellee, the OSG argues that Danny failed to prove his plea of self-defense;
that conspiracy attended the killing of the victim and that appellants’ guilt was proven
beyond reasonable doubt. Appellee thus prays for the affirmance of the judgment of
conviction with modification as to the award of civil indemnities.
Our Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
Well-settled is the rule in criminal cases that the prosecution has the burden of proof
to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.14 However, once the
accused admits the commission of the offense charged but raises a justifying
circumstance as a defense, the burden of proof is shifted to him. He cannot rely on
the weakness of the evidence for the prosecution for even if it is weak, it cannot be
doubted especially after he himself has admitted the killing.15 This is because a
judicial confession constitutes evidence of a high order.
Danny categorically admits that he stabbed Romeo. However, he boldly claims that
he did it in self defense. He avers that on that fateful night of August 19, 2001, he and
Bingky were attacked along the way home by four unknown persons for no apparent
reason. He observed that one of the men was pulling an object from his waistband
which he thought was a bladed weapon so he drew his own knife and thrust it at the
man rushing at him, hitting the latter on the right side of his body. His reaction, he
asserts, was defensive arising from a prior act of aggression and provocation by the
victim and his companions.
The essential elements of the justifying circumstance of self-defense, which the
accused must prove by clear and convincing evidence are: (a) unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed by the
accused to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (c) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the accused defending himself.16 The first element of
unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non. There can be no self-defense unless
there was unlawful aggression from the person injured or killed by the accused; for
otherwise, there is nothing to prevent or repel.
In the present case, Danny’s claim of self-defense is belied by his own testimony:
Q Now after they attacked Bingky Campos what did they do?
A They were not able to hit again Bingky because Bingky ran away.
Q How about you? What did they do to you?
A I was held by the other person when he approached me because Bingky was no
longer there.
Q And who was that person who held you?
19 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
A I do not know him. The witness is touching his lower right side.

Q How about now, do you know his name? Atty. Vailoces:

A What I know only was Jaime and Iko. Q And what were the other companions doing at that time?

Q Who [between] the two, Jaime and Iko [took] hold of you? Witness:

A Jaime and Iko were not able to hold me. A After thrusting the knife to the person, I ran away and the three (3) ran after me.17

Q Was there an attempt by Jaime and Iko to maul you also? As can be gleaned from the foregoing narration, there is no mention at all that Romeo
was among the four persons who allegedly attacked Danny and Bingky. Likewise,
A Yes. there is nothing in the narration which evinces unlawful aggression from Romeo.
Danny’s testimony shows that there was only an attempt, not by Romeo but by Jaime
and Iko, to attack him. Following his version, Danny then became the aggressor and
Q What did they do? not the victim. Even if the version of Danny is given a semblance of truth, that there
was an attempt to hurt him, though intimidating, the same cannot be said to pose
A They kicked my left butt and the other person held me. danger to his life and limb. This conclusion was drawn from the fact that no bladed
weapon was found at the alleged scene of the crime and nobody testified about it. For
Q Then what did you do? unlawful aggression to be appreciated, there must be an "actual, sudden and
unexpected attack, or imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or
intimidating attitude"18 and the accused must present proof of positively strong act of
A I pulled a knife from my waist. real aggression. For this reason, Danny’s observation that one of the men was pulling
an object from his waist is not a convincing proof of unlawful aggression. "[A] threat,
Q Who [between] the two kicked you at your butt and who was the person who took even if made with a weapon or the belief that a person was about to be attacked, is
hold of you? not sufficient."19 An intimidating or threatening attitude is by no means enough. In this
case, other than the self-serving allegation of Danny, there is no evidence sufficiently
clear and convincing that the victim indeed attacked him. The prosecution’s rebuttal
A It was Iko who kicked my buttocks but the other person who held me, I do not know
witnesses Jaime Maquiling and Francisco Austero20 who admittedly were among
his name.
those whom Danny and Bingky had an encounter with on the night of August 19,
2001, never said in their testimonies that Romeo attacked Danny and a bladed
Q Now what happened when you drew you[r] knife? weapon was used. These witnesses were categorical that Romeo was not with them
during the incident. This testimonial evidence was not refuted by the defense. Even
A The two persons who attempted to attack me, when I pulled a knife, I thrust the Bingky who claimed to be a friend of Romeo21 was not able to identify the latter as
knife to the person who rushed at me. one of those present at the time. Candid enough, Bingky declared that it was only a
certain Ago and Jaime who confronted Danny.22 Resultantly, Danny failed to
discharge his burden of proving unlawful aggression, the most indispensable element
Q Did you hit that person?
of self-defense. Where "no unlawful aggression is proved, no self-defense may be
successfully pleaded."23
A Yes, he was hit.
Moreover, as testified to by the attending physician Dr. Yee, Romeo sustained a stab
Q Where was he hit? wound causing injuries on his liver, gall bladder, duodenum and the pancreas which
resulted to massive blood loss.24 He eventually died of multiple vital organ failure.
A At the side. Clearly the wound inflicted by Danny on Romeo indicate a determined effort to kill and
not merely to defend.25 As has been repeatedly ruled, the nature, number and location
of the wounds sustained by the victim disprove a plea of self-defense.26
Court Interpreter:

20 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL

Furthermore, Danny’s actuation in not reporting the incident immediately to the
authorities cannot take out his case within the ambit of the Court’s jurisprudential
doctrine that the flight of an accused discloses a guilty conscience. The justifying
circumstance of self-defense may not survive in the face of appellant’s flight from the
scene of the crime coupled with his failure to promptly inform the authorities about the
incident.27
Indeed, appellants’ conviction was principally anchored on the testimony of Lester as
an eyewitness. Like the courts below, we too find Lester’s testimony consistent,
credible and trustworthy. We have reviewed his declaration in court as contained in
the pertinent transcript of stenographic notes and we discern nothing therein that
casts doubt on his credibility. His testimony is clear, positive in its vital points and full
of details substantiating the circumstances of how, where and when the offense
charged happened including the identity of the knife wielder, Danny. It is most unlikely
that he could narrate all the details of the crime with clarity and lucidity unless he was
personally present at the situs criminis before and during the incident. The testimony
of a witness, giving details of a startling incident that cannot easily be fabricated,
deserves credence and full probative weight for it indicates sincerity and truthfulness
in the narration of events.28 Findings of fact of the trial court, particularly when
affirmed by the CA, are binding upon this Court.29 Though there are recognized
exceptions to this rule, none is present in this case. We are bound by the trial court’s
assessment, as affirmed by the appellate court, that the stabbing of Romeo took
place in the manner proven by the prosecution, that is, in front of the store of Lester
and not elsewhere, at the time the victim was buying cigarette and candies.
Treachery attended the killing of the victim
The trial court, in convicting appellants of murder, ruled that the killing was qualified
by treachery.
We agree.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specifically to ensure the execution of the crime without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make.30 To establish treachery, two elements
must concur: (a) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to
defend himself; and, (b) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means of
attack employed.31
In this case, it is at once evident that Danny’s attack on the victim was sudden and
deliberate as testified by eyewitness Lester. The attack was unexpected and without
the slightest provocation on the part of the unarmed Romeo considering that he was
casually talking to Lester after buying something from the store with no inkling that an
attack was forthcoming. The attack was executed in a manner that Romeo was
rendered defenseless and unable to retaliate. The severity of the lone stab wound
forestalled any possibility of resisting the attack. Danny without doubt took advantage
of this situation. As correctly held by the trial court, the act of Danny in positioning
himself in a place where Romeo could not see him and then suddenly and
deliberately inflicting a fatal wound are clear indications that he employed means and
methods which tended directly and specifically to ensure the successful execution of
the offense.32
Conspiracy adequately established
Notably, a relevant portion of the appellants’ brief was focused on the discussion of
the conspiracy angle in the commission of the crime. The defense challenges the trial
court’s finding of conspiracy, arguing that Bingky’s mere presence at the scene of the
crime does not prove the existence of conspiracy.
Appellants’ argument is untenable.
Conspiracy is said to exist where two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. 33 "Direct proof is not
essential to prove conspiracy [for] it may be deduced [from] the acts of the accused
before, during and after the commission of the crime charged, from which it may be
indicated that there is a common purpose to commit the crime."34
Indeed, mere presence at the scene of the incident, by itself, is not a sufficient ground
to hold a person liable as a conspirator. However, conspiracy may be inferred from
proof of facts and circumstances which when taken together indicate that they are
parts of the scheme to commit the crime. In the present case, Bingky’s presence at
the scene of the crime at the time of its commission as testified to by prosecution
eyewitness Lester was never rebutted. According to Lester, Danny arrived first at the
scene of the crime followed by Bingky. During the stabbing incident, Bingky was
around three meters away from Danny. Immediately after the incident, both
appellants scampered away.35 To the mind of the Court, Bingky’s presence at the
scene of the crime at the time of its commission was not just a chance encounter with
Danny. His overt act of keeping himself around served no other purpose than to lend
moral support by ensuring that no one could give succor to the victim. His presence at
the scene has no doubt, encouraged Danny and increased the odds against the
victim. One who participates in the material execution of the crime by standing guard
or lending moral support to the actual perpetration thereof is criminally responsible to
the same extent as the actual perpetrator.36 Moreover, the record is bereft of any hint
that Bingky endeavored to avert the stabbing of the victim despite the particular
distance between them. Under the circumstances, we can hardly accept that Bingky
has nothing to do with the killing. No conclusion can be drawn from the acts of Bingky
except that he consented and approved the acts of his co-accused in stabbing the
victim. Once conspiracy is established, the act of one is deemed the act of all. It
matters not who among the accused actually killed the victim. Thus, the trial court did
not err in its ruling that conspiracy existed between appellants in the commission of
the crime charged.
The Proper Penalty
21 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
Treachery qualifies the killing to murder.37 Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. The two penalties
being both indivisible and there being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstance to
consider, the lesser of the two penalties which is reclusion perpetua should be
imposed pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 6338 of the RPC. Hence the
penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate
court is proper.
As to Damages
The trial court likewise correctly awarded civil indemnity and moral damages to the
heirs of the victim. However, in line with prevailing jurisprudence the award of civil
indemnity shall be increased from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00. This amount is granted
to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the commission of the crime.
We retain the award of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages. Moral damages are awarded
despite the absence of proof of mental and emotional suffering of the victim’s heirs.
Significantly, both lower courts failed to award exemplary and actual damages to the
heirs of the victim. Exemplary damages should be awarded in accordance with Article
223039 of the Civil Code given the presence of treachery which qualified the killing to
murder. We therefore award the amount of ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages to the
heirs of the victim.40
Settled is the rule that only duly receipted expenses can be the basis of actual
damages.lawphi1 Dominic Abad, son of the victim testified that the family spent
₱65,000.00 for the hospitalization of the victim, ₱45,000.00 for the coffin and
₱35,000.00 for the wake but failed to present receipts to prove these
expenses.41 However, notwithstanding the absence of receipts to prove actual
damages, we find it imperative to award the amount of ₱25,000.00 as temperate
damages in lieu of actual damages. Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate
damages may be recovered as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victim
suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved.42
In addition, and in conformity with current policy, we also impose on all the monetary
awards for damages an interest at the legal rate of 6% from date of finality of this
Decision until fully paid.
wherefore, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that
appellants Bingky Campos and Danny "Boy" Acabo are ordered to jointly and
severally pay the heirs of the victim Romeo Abad, the amount of ₱75,000.00 as civil
indemnity; ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages; ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages,
all in addition to the ₱50,000.00 moral damages which is retained, as well as interest
on all these damages assessed at the legal rate of 6% from date of finality of this
Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 178771               June 8, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
ALBERTO ANTICAMARA y CABILLO and FERNANDO CALAGUAS FERNANDEZ
a.k.a. LANDO CALAGUAS,
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 00556, affirming the trial court's judgment finding appellants Fernando Calaguas
Fernandez (Lando) and Alberto Cabillo Anticamara (Al) guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Murder in Criminal Case No. 4498-R and of the crime of
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention in Criminal Case No. 4481-R.
Lando, Al, Dick Tañedo (Dick), Roberto Tañedo (Bet), Marvin Lim (Marvin), Necitas
Ordeñiza-Tañedo (Cita), and Fred Doe are charged with the crimes of Murder and of
Kidnapping/Serious Illegal Detention in two separate Informations, which read:
For Murder (Criminal Case No. 4498-R)
That on or about the early morning of May 7, 2002, in Sitio Rosalia, Brgy. San
Bartolome, Municipality of Rosales, Province of Pangasinan, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then armed
with a hand gun, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with
intent to kill, with treachery, evident premeditation and superior strength, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take Sulpacio Abad, driver of the Estrellas,
hog tied (sic) him, brought (sic) to a secluded place, shoot and bury in a shallow
grave, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim.
Contrary to Article 248, Revised Penal Code.
For Kidnapping/Serious Illegal Detention (Criminal Case No. 4481-R)
That on or about the 7th day of May 2002, more or less 3:00 o'clock in the early
morning, at the Estrella Compound, Brgy. Carmen East, Municipality of Rosales,
Province of Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, who are private persons, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, armed with firearms, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously kidnap Sulpacio Abad and AAA,2 both employees of the
Estrellas, thereby depriving them of their liberty, all against their will for a period of
twenty-seven (27) days.
22 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
That in the course of the kidnapping, Sulpacio Abad was killed and buried in Brgy.
Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan and AAA was raped for several times by her
abductors.
Contrary to Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to RA 7659.
When arraigned of the aforementioned crimes, Lando, Al and Cita all pleaded not
guilty, while Dick, Bet, Marvin and Fred Doe remained at-large. Thereafter, a joint trial
ensued.
As summarized in the People's brief, the facts as established by the evidence of the
prosecution are as follows:
About 3 o'clock in the early morning of May 7, 2002, househelper AAA and driver
Abad Sulpacio were sleeping in their employers' house located in Barangay Carmen
East, Rosales, Pangasinan. Their employers, Conrado Estrella and his wife, were out
of the house at that time (TSN, December 4, 2002, pp. 4-7). Momentarily, AAA was
jolted from sleep when she heard voices saying, "We will kill her, kill her now" and
another voice saying, "Not yet!" Hiding under her blanket, AAA later heard someone
saying, "We only need money, we only need money." Thereafter, she heard someone
talking in Ilocano which she could not understand. Then she heard somebody say,
"Cebuana yan, Cebuana yan, kararating lang galing Cebu." AAA heard the persons
conversing which she estimated about four to five meters away (TSN, ibid., pp. 11-
12).
Thereafter, AAA observed about six (6) persons enter the house, who she later
identified as accused Dick Tañedo, Marvin Lim, Bert Tañedo, a certain Fred and
appellants Alberto Anticamara alias "Al Camara," and Fernando Fernandez alias
"Lando Calaguas." One of the intruders approached her and told her not to move
(TSN, ibid., p. 8).
Later, when AAA thought that the intruders were already gone, she attempted to run
but to her surprise, someone wearing a bonnet was watching her. Someone, whom
she later recognized as Dick Tañedo, tapped her shoulder. AAA asked Tañedo, "Why
Kuya?" Tañedo replied, "Somebody will die." After a brief commotion, appellant alias
"Lando Calaguas" asked the group saying, "What shall we do now?" They then
decided to tie AAA. Later, AAA was untied and led her outside the house. Outside,
AAA saw Abad, who was also tied and blindfolded, seated inside a vehicle (TSN, April
26, 2004, pp. 6-10).
The group later brought AAA and Abad to the fishpond owned by their employers.
AAA saw Cita Tañedo there. The group brought Abad outside the vehicle and led him
away (TSN, December 2, 2002, pp. 13-18; TSN, February 17, 2003, pp. 5-8).
Later, alias "Fred" returned telling the group, "Make the decision now, Abad has
already four bullets in his body, and the one left is for this girl." When Cita Tañedo
made a motion of cutting her neck, appellant alias "Lando Calaguas" and "Fred"
boarded the vehicle taking along with them AAA. They later proceeded towards San
Miguel Tarlac, where Lando Calaguas resided. They stayed in Lando's house where
they kept AAA from May 7 to May 9, 2002 (TSN, December 4, 2002, pp. 18-22; TSN,
February 17, 2003, pp. 7-9).
On May 9, 2002, appellant Lando Calaguas told AAA that Fred and Bert Tañedo
would kill her. Lando then brought AAA to a hotel in Tarlac, telling AAA that he would
leave her there as soon as Fred and Bert Tañedo leave the place. However, once
inside the hotel room, appellant Lando Calaguas sexually molested AAA. Lando told
AAA to follow what he wanted, threatening her that he would turn her over to Fred
and Bert Tañedo. After Lando raped AAA, he brought her back to his house. Later,
Fred, Bert Tañedo and Lando Calaguas transferred AAA to Riles, Tarlac (TSN, ibid.,
pp. 9-13).
AAA was brought to the residence of Fred's niece, a certain Minda, where Fred kept
AAA as his wife. At nighttime, Fred would repeatedly ravish AAA, threatening her that
he would give her back to appellant Lando Calaguas who, AAA knew, killed Abad
Sulpacio. She was afraid Lando might also kill her (TSN, ibid., pp. 14-16).
On May 22, 2002, Fred brought AAA to Carnaga (should be Kananga), Leyte,
together with his wife Marsha and their children. AAA stayed in the house of Marsha's
brother Sito, where she was made as a house helper (TSN, ibid., p. 17).
On June 4, 2002, AAA escaped from the house of Sito. She proceeded to Isabel,
Leyte and sought the help of her friend Susana Ilagan. After hearing AAA's plight,
Susana called AAA's brother in Cebu, who later fetched AAA in Isabel, Leyte and
brought her to Mandaue City. When they arrived in Mandaue City, they immediately
reported the incident to the police authorities. On June 23, 2002, AAA executed a
Sworn Statement (Exh. "D," TSN, ibid., pp. 18-20).
Meanwhile, Dr. Ronald Bandonil, Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), conducted an autopsy on the cadaver of Sulpacio Abad. Dr.
Bandonil prepared Autopsy Report No. N-T2-23-P (Exh. "A") which contains the
following findings, to wit:
x Remains placed in a sealed metal coffin, wrapped in two (2) layers of black, plastic
garbage bags, and covered in (sic) a red-stripped cotton blanker. A thick layer of lime
embeds the whole torso.
x Remains in a far advanced state of decomposition, with the head completely devoid
of soft tissue. A cloth is wrapped around the eyesockets and tied to the back of the
skull. The skull does not show any signs of dents, chips nor fractures. The other
recognizable body part is the chest area which retained a few soft tissues and skin,
but generally far advanced in decomposition. The whole gamut of internal organs
have undergone liquefaction necrosis and have been turned into grayish-black
pultaceous masses. Worn on top of the remaining chest is a sando shirt with
23 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
observable holes at the left side, both front and back. A large hole is seen at the area
of the left nipple, with traces of burning at its edges and inward in direction. A tied
cloth is also observable at the remnants of the left wrist.
x At the upper chest, which is the most recognizable, remaining and intact part of the
torso, a hole, 1.0 cm. x 2.0 cms., with signs of burning, edges inverted, is seen at the
left anterior axillary line just below the left nipple. Another hole is seen 1.5 cms. x 2.5
cms. in diameter, edged averted (sic) at the right chest, along the right anterior
axillary line, 5.0 cms. below the right nipple. A 3rd hole, almost unrecognizable is
seen at the left groin area.
x The other parts of the cadaver are too far advanced in decomposition to have
remarkable findings.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
GUNSHOT WOUNDS, TRUNK3
In his defense, Lando denied having committed the crimes charged and interposed
alibi as a defense. He claims that at the time of the incident on May 7, 2002, he was
in Barangay Maligaya, San Miguel, Tarlac, with his family. He denied ever going to
the Estrella farm in Sitio Rosalia, Barangay San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan.
Al claimed that he acted as a lookout and was tasked to report to his companions if
any person or vehicle would approach the house of the Estrellas. He said that he was
forced to follow what was ordered of him and did not report the matter to the police
because he was threatened to be killed, including the members of his family who
were in Cebu.
On August 23, 2004, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Rosales, Pangasinan, Branch
53, rendered its Decision,4 the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
I. In Criminal Case No. 4498-R for Murder:
A. Accused Nicetas "Cita" Tañedo is hereby acquitted of the crime charged
for insufficiency of evidence;
B. Accused Fernando Calaguas Fernandez (alyas Lando Calaguas) and
Alberto Anticamara (alyas Al Camara) are hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, as principal, of the crime of Murder qualified by treachery,
defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
Considering the presence of aggravating circumstance of pre-meditation,
with no mitigating circumstance to offset the same, the penalty of DEATH is
hereby imposed upon the two (2) accused Fernando Calaguas Fernandez
(Lando Calaguas) and Alberto Anticamara (Al Camara). They are also
ordered jointly and severally [to] pay the heirs of the victim Abad Sulpacio
the following:
1) Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) as moral damages;
2) Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00) as indemnity for the
death of the victim;
3) Fifty-Seven Thousand One Hundred Twenty-Two Pesos and
Thirty Centavos (₱57,122.30) as actual damages; and
4) The cost of suit.
II. Criminal Case No. 4481-R for Kidnapping/Serious Illegal Detention:
A) Accused Nicetas "Cita" Tañedo is hereby acquitted of the crime charged
for insufficiency of evidence;
B) Accused Fernando Calaguas Fernandez (alyas Lando Calaguas) and
Alberto Anticamara (alyas Al Camara) are hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, as principal, of the crime of Kidnapping/Serious Illegal
Detention of the victim AAA as charged, defined and penalized under Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659. Considering that
the victim AAA was raped during her detention, the maximum penalty of
DEATH is hereby imposed upon the two accused, Fernando Calaguas
Fernandez (Lando Calaguas) and Alberto Anticamara (Al Camara). The two
accused are also ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the victim AAA the
amount of:
1) One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱100,000.00) as moral
damages;
2) Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) as exemplary damages; and
3) Cost of suit.
As to the rest of the accused who are still at-large, let this case be set to the archives
until they are apprehended.
SO ORDERED.5
In light of the Court’s ruling in People v. Mateo,6 the records of the cases were
forwarded by the RTC to the CA for its review. The CA rendered a Decision dated
24 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
December 15, 2006, affirming the decision of the RTC in Criminal Case Nos. 4498-R
and 4481-R. However, in view of the abolition of the death penalty pursuant to
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346, which was approved on June 24, 2006, the appellants
were sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
On January 9, 2007, Lando, through the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), appealed the
Decision of the CA to this Court. Lando had assigned the following errors in his
appeal initially passed upon by the CA, to wit:
I SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH FOR THE SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME OF
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CONSPIRACY
EXISTED BETWEEN AND AMONG THE ALLEGED PERPETRATORS OF THE
CRIME.
II
ASSUMING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS GUILTY, THE LOWER COURT
GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING HIM OF THE CRIME OF MURDER INSTEAD
OF HOMICIDE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING UPON THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH FOR THE CRIME OF
KIDNAPPING/SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION, AGGRAVATED BY RAPE, IN
SPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE CRIME OF RAPE WAS NOT DULY PROVEN
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING SCANT CONSIDERATION TO
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WHICH IS MORE
CREDIBLE THAN THAT OF THE PROSECUTION
V common experience .9 Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction if: (a)
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RENDERING A VERDICT OF
CONVICTION DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.7
On January 9, 2007, Al, through the PAO, appealed the Decision of the CA to this
Court. Al had assigned the following errors, to wit:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF
THE CRIME OF KIDNAPPING/SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION IN SPITE OF THE
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
THAT HE CONSPIRED WITH HIS CO-ACCUSED TO COMMIT THE CRIME
CHARGED.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING UPON THE ACCUSED THE
KIDNAPPING/SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION WITH RAPE, IN SPITE OF THE
FACT THAT HE HAD NO PARTICIPATION IN THE COMMISSION OF [TWO]
SEXUAL ABUSES AGAINST THE VICTIM.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF MURDER IN SPITE OF THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT HE
CONSPIRED WITH HIS CO-ACCUSED TO COMMIT THE SAME.8
In capsule, the main issue is whether the appellants are guilty of the crimes charged.
In Criminal Case No. 4498-R for Murder:
Circumstantial Evidence
The trial court found that although there was no direct eyewitness in the killing of
Sulpacio in the early morning of May 7, 2002 at Sitio Rosalia, Barangay San
Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan, the prosecution adduced sufficient circumstantial
evidence to establish with moral certainty the identities and guilt of the perpetrators of
the crime.
Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from
which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and
there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; (c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.10 A judgment of conviction based on
circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the circumstances proved form an
unbroken chain that results in a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the
accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator.11
In this case, the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution, when
analyzed and taken together, lead to the inescapable conclusion that the appellants
25 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
are responsible for the death of Sulpacio. The Court quotes with approval the lower
court's enumeration of those circumstantial evidence:
The testimony of AAA had clearly established the following facts:
1. At about 3:00 in the early morning of May 7, 2002, while she and the
victim Abad Sulpacio were sleeping inside the house of the Estrella family in
Barangay Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan several persons entered to rob the
place;
2. Inside the house, she saw and recognized the accused Lando Calaguas
and Dick Tañedo, and heard the latter uttering "somebody will die";
3. Bringing her outside the house, Lando pushed her into the Revo where
she saw inside Abad Sulpacio who was blindfolded and with his hands tied;
4. Inside the Revo, she recognized the accused Dick Tañedo, Lando
Calaguas, Marvin Lim, Roberto Tañedo, Alberto Anticamara and Fred;
5. The Revo then proceeded towards the fishpond owned by the Estrellas in
Sitio Rosalia, Brgy. San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan;
6. The last time that she saw Abad Sulpacio was when he was dragged out
from the vehicle by Lando, Fred, Marvin and Al upon reaching Sitio Rosalia.
At that, time Dick Tañedo stayed with her in the vehicle;
7. Thereafter, when Fred returned to the vehicle, she heard him uttered (sic):
"Make a decision now. Abad has already four (4) bullets in his body, and the
one left is for this girl."12
In addition to these circumstances, the trial court further found that AAA heard Fred
utter "Usapan natin pare, kung sino ang masagasaan, sagasaan." (Our agreement is
that whoever comes our way should be eliminated). Moreover, NBI Agent Gerald V.
Geralde testified that on June 23, 2002, appellant Al admitted his participation as
lookout and naming his companions Dick, Lando, Fred, Marvin and Bet as the ones
who took AAA and Sulpacio from the house of the Estrellas and brought them to the
fishpond. Al also pointed and led the authorities to a shallow grave in Sitio Rosalia,
Barangay San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan, where the remains of Sulpacio were
buried. The autopsy conducted on the body, prepared by the Medico Legal Officer Dr.
Bandonil, shows that several holes were found on various parts of the body of the
victim and Dr. Bandonil concluded that the cause of the victim's death was the
gunshot wounds. The report also indicates that a piece of cloth was found wrapped
around the eye sockets and tied at the back of the skull, and another cloth was also
found tied at the remnants of the left wrist.
In the case at bar, although no one directly saw the actual killing of Sulpacio, the
prosecution was able to paint a clear picture that the appellants took Sulpacio away
from the house of the Estrellas, tied and blindfolded him, and brought him to another
place where he was repeatedly shot and buried.
Conspiracy
Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning a felony and decide to commit it. It may
be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during or after the commission of the
crime which, when taken together, would be enough to reveal a community of criminal
design, as the proof of conspiracy is frequently made by evidence of a chain of
circumstances.13 To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of the
execution; he need not even take part in every act or need not even know the exact
part to be performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. Each
conspirator may be assigned separate and different tasks which may appear
unrelated to one another but, in fact, constitute a whole collective effort to achieve
their common criminal objective. Once conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act
of all the conspirators. The precise extent or modality of participation of each of them
becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.14
In the present case, prior to the commission of the crime, the group met at the landing
field in Carmen, Pangasinan and discussed their plan to rob the house of the
Estrellas with the agreement that whoever comes their way will be
eliminated.15 Appellant Al served as a lookout by posting himself across the house of
the Estrellas with the task of reporting any movements outside. Fred then climbed the
old unserviceable gate of the Estrella compound and then opened the small door and
the rest of the group entered the house of the Estrellas through that opening. 16 After
almost an hour inside the house, they left on board a vehicle with AAA and Sulpacio.
AAA and Sulpacio were brought to Sitio Rosalia, Brgy. San Bartolome, Rosales,
Pangasinan. In that place, Sulpacio was killed and AAA was brought to another place
and deprived of her liberty. These circumstances establish a community of criminal
design between the malefactors in committing the crime. Clearly, the group conspired
to rob the house of the Estrellas and kill any person who comes their way. The killing
of Sulpacio was part of their conspiracy. Further, Dick's act of arming himself with a
gun constitutes direct evidence of a deliberate plan to kill should the need arise.
Appellant Al attempts to evade criminal liability by alleging that he was only forced to
participate in the commission of the crime because he and his family were threatened
to be killed. Al's defense fails to impress us. Under Article 1217 of the Revised Penal
Code, a person is exempt from criminal liability if he acts under the compulsion of an
irresistible force, or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater
injury, because such person does not act with freedom.18 To avail of this exempting
circumstance, the evidence must establish: (1) the existence of an uncontrollable fear;
(2) that the fear must be real and imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is greater
than, or at least equal to, that committed.19 For such defense to prosper, the duress,
force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such
26 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if
the act be done. A threat of future injury is not enough.20
There is nothing in the records to substantiate appellant Al's insistence that he was
under duress from his co-accused while participating in the crime that would suffice to
exempt him from incurring criminal liability. The evidence shows that Al was tasked to
act as a lookout and directed to station himself across the house of the Estrellas. Al
was there from 7:30 p.m. to 1:00 a.m.21 of the following day, while the rest of the
group was waiting in the landing field. Thus, while all alone, Al had every opportunity
to escape since he was no longer subjected to a real, imminent or reasonable fear.
However, he opted to stay across the house of the Estrellas for almost six (6)
hours,22 and thereafter returned to the landing field where the group was waiting for
his report. Subsequently, the group proceeded to the Estrellas’ house. When the
group entered the house, Al stayed for almost one (1) hour outside to wait for his
companions. Later, when the group left the house aboard a vehicle, Al rode with them
in going to Sitio Rosalia, Brgy. San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan, bringing with
them Sulpacio and AAA.23 Clearly, appellant Al had ample opportunity to escape if he
wished to, but he never did. Neither did he request for assistance from the authorities
or any person passing by the house of the Estrellas during the period he was
stationed there. Clearly, Al did not make any effort to perform an overt act to
dissociate or detach himself from the conspiracy to commit the felony and prevent the
commission thereof that would exempt himself from criminal liability.24 Therefore, it is
obvious that he willingly agreed to be a part of the conspiracy.
Alibi and Denial
Appellant Lando denied having committed the crime charged and interposed alibi as
a defense. He claims that at the time of the incident he was in his house at Tarlac,
together with his family. On the other hand, the appellants were positively identified
by AAA, as two (2) of the six (6) malefactors who forcibly took her and Sulpacio from
the Estrella house in the early morning of May 7, 2002. Both the trial court and the CA
found the testimony of AAA credible. The Court gives great weight to the trial court’s
evaluation of the testimony of a witness because it had the opportunity to observe the
facial expression, gesture, and tone of voice of a witness while testifying; thus,
making it in a better position to determine whether a witness is lying or telling the
truth.251avvphi1
Between the categorical statements of the prosecution witness, on one hand, and the
bare denial of the appellant, on the other, the former must perforce prevail. An
affirmative testimony is far stronger than a negative testimony especially when it
comes from the mouth of a credible witness. Alibi and denial, if not substantiated by
clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of
weight in law. They are considered with suspicion and always received with caution,
not only because they are inherently weak and unreliable but also because they are
easily fabricated and concocted.26 Denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of
prosecution witnesses who were not shown to have any ill-motive to testify against
the appellants.27
As to the defense of alibi. Aside from the testimony of appellant Lando that he was in
Tarlac at the time of the incident, the defense was unable to show that it was
physically impossible for Lando to be at the scene of the crime. Basic is the rule that
for alibi to prosper, the accused must prove that he was somewhere else when the
crime was committed and that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the
scene of the crime.Physical impossibility refers to the distance between the place
where the appellant was when the crime transpired and the place where it was
committed, as well as the facility of access between the two places.28 Where there is
the least chance for the accused to be present at the crime scene, the defense of alibi
must fail.29 During the trial of the case, Lando testified that the distance between his
house in Brgy. Maligaya, San Miguel, Tarlac to the town of Rosales, Pangasinan is
only around forty (40) kilometers. Such distance can be traversed in less than 30
minutes using a private car and when the travel is continuous.30 Thus, it was not
physically impossible for the appellant Lando to be at the locus criminis at the time of
the incident. In addition, positive identification destroys the defense of alibi and
renders it impotent, especially where such identification is credible and categorical.31
Qualifying and Aggravating Circumstances
In convicting the appellants, the courts a quo appreciated treachery in qualifying the
killing to murder and evident premeditation in imposing the penalty of death. There is
treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to
ensure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense that the offended
party might make.32 Two conditions must concur for treachery to exist, namely, (a) the
employment of means of execution gave the person attacked no opportunity to
defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the means or method of execution was
deliberately and consciously adopted.33
In the case at bar, it was proven that when AAA boarded the vehicle, she saw
Sulpacio tied and blindfolded. Later, when they reached the fishpond, Sulpacio, still
tied and blindfolded, was led out of the vehicle by the group. When the remains of
Sulpacio was thereafter found by the authorities, the autopsy report indicated that a
piece of cloth was found wrapped around the eye sockets and tied at the back of the
skull and another cloth was also found tied at the left wrist of the victim. There is no
question therefore, that the victim's body, when found, still had his hands tied and
blindfolded. This situation of the victim when found shows without doubt that he was
killed while tied and blindfolded; hence, the qualifying aggravating circumstance of
treachery was present in the commission of the crime. In People v. Osianas,34 the
Court held that:
x x x In the case at bar, the means used by the accused-appellants to insure the
execution of the killing of the victims, so as to afford the victims no opportunity to
defend themselves, was the act of tying the hands of the victims. Teresita saw the
accused-appellants hog-tie the victims and take them away with them. Later that
night, Dionisio Palmero saw the victims, still hog-tied, walking with the accused-
appellants. The following day, the victims were found dead, still hog-tied. Thus, no
matter how the stab and hack wounds had been inflicted on the victims in the case at
27 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
bar, we are sure beyond a reasonable doubt that Jose, Ronilo and Reymundo Cuizon
had no opportunity to defend themselves because the accused-appellants had earlier
tied their hands. The fact that there were twelve persons who took and killed the
Cuizons further assured the attainment of accused-appellants' plans without risk to
themselves.35
The aggravating circumstance of superior strength cannot be separately appreciated
because it is absorbed by treachery.36
The circumstance of evident premeditation requires proof showing: (1) the time when
the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the
accused has clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between such
determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his
act.37 The essence of premeditation is that the execution of the act was preceded by
cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a
space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. 38 From the time the group met at
the landing field at around 6:30 p.m. of May 6, 2002, and discussed the possibility of
killing anyone who stands on their way, up to the time they took Sulpacio away from
the Estrellas’ house and eventually killed him thereafter at around past 3:00 a.m.,
more than eight hours had elapsed – sufficient for the appellants to reflect on the
consequences of their actions and desist from carrying out their evil scheme, if they
wished to. Instead, appellants evidently clung to their determination and went ahead
with their nefarious plan.
In Criminal Case No. 4481-R for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention.
The Court finds appellant Lando guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention with rape, defined in and penalized under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code. The elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code39 are: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2)
he kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty;
(3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the commission of the
offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention
lasts for more than 3 days; or (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; or (c)
any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or
threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor,
female, or a public officer.40
The crime of kidnapping was proven beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution.
Appellants Lando and Al, both private individuals, forcibly took AAA, a female, away
from the house of the Estrellas and held her captive against her will. Thereafter,
appellant Lando brought AAA to his house in San Miguel Tarlac, whereby she was
deprived of her liberty for almost one month. It is settled that the crime of serious
illegal detention consists not only of placing a person in an enclosure, but also in
detaining him or depriving him in any manner of his liberty.41 For there to be
kidnapping, it is enough that the victim is restrained from going home.42 Its essence is
the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of the
intent of the accused to effect such deprivation.43 Although AAA was not confined in
an enclosure, she was restrained and deprived of her liberty, because every time
appellant Lando and his wife went out of the house, they brought AAA with them. The
foregoing only shows that AAA was constantly guarded by appellant Lando and his
family.
The crime of rape was also established by the prosecution. Appellant Lando
succeeded in having carnal knowledge of AAA through the use of threat and
intimidation. AAA testified that on May 9, 2002, appellant Lando brought her to a hotel
to hide her from Fred and Bert, who intended to kill her. Appellant Lando told her to
follow his orders, otherwise, he will give her to Fred and Bert. While in the hotel,
appellant Lando raped her.44 Clearly, for fear of being delivered to Fred and Bert and
of losing her life, AAA had no choice but to give in to appellant Lando's lustful assault.
In rape cases, the credibility of the victim's testimony is almost always the single most
important factor. When the victim's testimony is credible, it may be the sole basis for
the accused's conviction.45 This is so because owing to the nature of the offense, in
many cases, the only evidence that can be given regarding the matter is the
testimony of the offended party.46
The last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code provides that if the victim
is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped or subjected to torture
or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. In People v.
Larrañaga,47 this provision gives rise to a special complex crime. Thus, We hold that
appellant Lando is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape in Criminal Case No. 4481-R.
However, the Court does not agree with the CA and trial court's judgment finding
appellant Al liable for Rape in Criminal Case No. 4481-R. In People v. Suyu,48 We
ruled that once conspiracy is established between several accused in the commission
of the crime of robbery, they would all be equally culpable for the rape committed by
anyone of them on the occasion of the robbery, unless anyone of them proves that he
endeavored to prevent the others from committing rape.49 Also, in People v.
Canturia,50 the Court held that:
x x x For while the evidence does convincingly show a conspiracy among the
accused, it also as convincingly suggests that the agreement was to commit robbery
only; and there is no evidence that the other members of the band of robbers were
aware of Canturia's lustful intent and his consummation thereof so that they could
have attempted to prevent the same. x x x
The foregoing principle is applicable in the present case because the crime of robbery
with rape is a special complex crime defined in and penalized under Article 294,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, and the crime of kidnapping with rape in this
case is likewise a special complex crime as held in the case of People v.
Larrañaga.51 There is no evidence to prove that appellant Al was aware of the
subsequent events that transpired after the killing of Sulpacio and the kidnapping of
AAA. Appellant Al could not have prevented appellant Lando from raping AAA,
28 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
because at the time of rape, he was no longer associated with appellant Lando. AAA
even testified that only Fred and appellant Lando brought her to Tarlac,52 and she
never saw appellant Al again after May 7, 2002, the day she was held captive. She
only saw appellant Al once more during the trial of the case. 53 Thus, appellant Al
cannot be held liable for the subsequent rape of AAA.
The Penalties
In Criminal Case No. 4498-R, the attendant circumstance of treachery qualified the
killing to murder. The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
is reclusion perpetua to death. Since the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation was alleged and proven, the imposable penalty upon the appellants is
death, pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code. 54 In view,
however, of the passage of R.A. No. 9346, 55 prohibiting the imposition of the death
penalty, the penalty of death is reduced to reclusion perpetua, 56 without eligibility for
parole.57
In Criminal Case No. 4481-R, the penalty for the special complex crime of kidnapping
and serious illegal detention with rape is death. In view of R.A. No. 9346, the penalty
of death is reduced to reclusion perpetua,58 without eligibility for parole.59 Accordingly,
the imposable penalty for appellant Lando is reclusion perpetua.
As to appellant Al, the prescribed penalty for serious illegal detention under Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no
aggravating or mitigating circumstance in the commission of the offense, the proper
penalty to be imposed is reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Article 6360 of the Revised
Penal Code.
The Damages
In Criminal Case No. 4498-R, the award of civil indemnity is mandatory and granted
to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the commission of the
crime.61 In People v. Quiachon,62 even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed
because of the prohibition in R.A. 9346, the civil indemnity of ₱75,000.00 is proper,
because it is not dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on the
fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty
attended the commission of the offense. As explained in People v. Salome,63 while
R.A. No. 9346 prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the fact remains that the
penalty provided for by law for a heinous offense is still death, and the offense is still
heinous. Accordingly, the award of civil indemnity in the amount of ₱75,000.00 is
proper.
Anent moral damages, the same are mandatory in cases of murder, without need of
allegation and proof other than the death of the victim.64 However, consistent with
recent jurisprudence on heinous crimes where the imposable penalty is death but
reduced to reclusion perpetua pursuant to R.A. No. 9346, the award of moral
damages should be increased from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00.65
The award of exemplary damages is in order, because of the presence of the
aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation in the commission
of the crime.66 The Court awards the amount of ₱30,000.00, as exemplary damages,
in line with current jurisprudence on the matter.67
Actual damages is also warranted. Modesta Abad, the spouse of victim Sulpacio,
incurred expenses in the amount of ₱57,122.30, which was duly supported by
receipts.68lawphil
In Criminal Case No. 4481-R, AAA is entitled to civil indemnity in line with prevailing
jurisprudence that civil indemnification is mandatory upon the finding of
rape.69 Applying prevailing jurisprudence, AAA is entitled to ₱75,000.00 as civil
indemnity.70
In addition, AAA is entitled to moral damages pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil
Code,71 without the necessity of additional pleadings or proof other than the fact of
rape.72 Moral damages is granted in recognition of the victim's injury necessarily
resulting from the odious crime of rape.73 Such award is separate and distinct from the
civil indemnity.74 However, the amount of ₱100,000.00 awarded as moral damages is
reduced to ₱75,000.00, in line with current jurisprudence.75
The award of exemplary damages to AAA in the amount of ₱50,000 is hereby
reduced to ₱30,000.00 in accordance with recent jurisprudence.76
As to appellant Al. In the absence of conspiracy, the liability of the accused is
individual and not collective.77 Since appellant Al is liable only for the crime of serious
illegal detention, he is jointly and severally liable only to pay the amount of
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity. For serious illegal detention, the award of civil
indemnity is in the amount of ₱50,000.00, in line with prevailing jurisprudence.78
Along that line, appellant Al's liability for moral damages is limited only to the amount
of ₱50,000.00.79 Pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be
recovered in cases of illegal detention. This is predicated on AAA's having suffered
serious anxiety and fright when she was detained for almost one (1) month.80
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00556
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as follows:
(a) In Criminal Case No. 4498-R, appellants Fernando Calaguas Fernandez
alias "Lando" and Alberto Cabillo Anticamara alias "Al" are found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and are sentenced to suffer
the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, without eligibility of parole, and to pay,
jointly and severally, the heirs of Sulpacio Abad the amounts of ₱75,000.00
as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, ₱30,000.00 as exemplary
damages, and ₱57,122.30 as actual damages.
29 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
 (b) In Criminal Case No. 4481-R, appellant Fernando Calaguas Fernandez
alias "Lando" is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the special
complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, without eligibility of
parole, and to pay the offended party AAA, the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as
civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary
damages. Appellant Alberto Cabillo Anticamara alias "Al" is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. He is
also directed to pay, jointly and severally, with appellant Fernando Calaguas
Fernandez alias "Lando," the victim AAA the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 173791               April 7, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
PABLO AMODIA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We review in this appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals1 (CA) affirming with
modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 38, Makati City in
Criminal Case No. 97-289. The RTC found the accused-appellant Pablo Amodia
(Pablo) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the corresponding civil liabilities to
the heirs of the victim.
Pablo was indicted, together with three other accused, under the following
Information:2
That on or about the 26th day of November 1996, in the City of Makati, Philippines, a
place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one another,
while armed with a piece of wood and bladed weapon, taking advantage of their
superior strength [sic] and employing means to weaken the defense, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal
violence upon one FELIX OLANDRIA y BERGAÑO, by beating him on the head with
a piece of wood and stabbing him repeatedly on the different parts of his body,
thereby inflicting upon him mortal/fatal stab wounds which directly caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The Information, dated February 21, 1997, was filed with the court on February 28,
1997.
Pablo was arrested on June 5, 1998 and was thereafter prosecuted. The other
accused remained at large.4 Pablo moved to quash the Information on the ground of
mistaken identity and the staleness of the warrant of arrest issued on March 4, 1997.
The RTC denied his motion.5
Pablo entered a plea of "not guilty" to the charge when arraigned on August 3, 1998.6
The Prosecution’s Version
The prosecution presented evidence, both documentary7 and testimonial,8 to establish
that Pablo was one of the four assailants who, by their concerted efforts, killed Felix
Olandria y Bergaño (victim).9 Acting together, they hit him on the head and stabbed
him.
The records show that Romildo Ceno (Romildo) was a resident of Zone 17, Pembo,
Makati City and lived in the house of Freda Elnar (Freda).10 At around 12:05 a.m. of
November 26, 1996, he, Mario Bitco (Mario),11 and Freda were talking and watching
television at their house12 when he heard a noise coming somewhere below the C-5
bridge, located some forty (40) to fifty (50) meters away from their house; he also
heard somebody shout "may away doon."13 Curious, he and Mario went to the
bridge14 and saw five persons whom he identified as the victim, Pablo, Arnold Partosa
(Arnold), George Palacio (George),15 and Damaso Amodia (Damaso). He knew these
men; the victim was his neighbor, while Pablo, Arnold, George and Damaso were
residents of Scorpion Street, Zone 17 Pembo, Makati City.16
When Romildo was about three arms-length away from the place of the commotion,
then illuminated by light coming from a Meralco post located some five (5) to six (6)
meters from the scene, he saw the victim being held on his right hand by Pablo, while
the other hand was held by Arnold.17 George was positioned at the victim’s back and
clubbed the victim on the head; Damaso was in front of the victim and stabbed him
three times.18
Luther Caberte (Luther), who happened to be passing by the C-5 Bridge at the time,
also saw what happened. He testified that he saw men fighting under the C-5 Bridge
which was illuminated by a light coming from a lamppost located some ten (10)
meters away.19 From his vantage point (about 15 meters away from the fight), he saw
Pablo, Damaso, George and Arnold ganging up (pinagtulung-tulungan) on the
victim.20 He saw Pablo holding the victim’s hand while Damaso was stabbing him. He
also confirmed that George was positioned behind the victim.21 He personally knew
both Pablo and the victim; they have been neighbors since 1986.22
30 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
Both eyewitnesses left the scene after the stabbing; Romildo was chased away by
George and Damaso, while Luther went home immediately. Both were shaken and
shocked with what they had seen.23
At 3:00 a.m. of the same day, the CID Homicide received a report of an unidentified
body found in a road along Comembo Bridge, Barangay Pembo.24 SPO2 Romeo
Ubana (SPO2 Ubana), a police investigator assigned to the CID Homicide, and a
police photographer went to the place and saw the body of a dead male person with
three stab wounds whom they subsequently identified as the victim.25 He prepared a
Final Investigation Report of the incident.26
After the spot investigation, the victim’s body was taken to the Veronica Memorial
Chapel where Dr. Antonio Bertido (Dr. Bertido), a National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) Medico Legal Officer, subjected it to a post-mortem examination. 27 The autopsy
yielded the following findings:
Pallor, intergument and nailbeds.
Stab wounds.
1. Elongated 4.5. cms. Edges are clean cut, medial border is sharp, lateral
border is blunt. Located at the chest, anterior, left side, 6.0 cms. From the
anterior median line. Directed backwards, upwards and medially involving
the skin and underlying soft tissues, into the thoracic cavity, perforating the
pericardial sac, into the pericardial cavity, penetrating the heart with an
approximate depth of 10.0 cms.
2. Elongated, 3.5 cms edges are clean cut, medial border is blunt, lateral
border is sharp. Located at the anterior abdominal wall, left side, 6.5 cms.
From the anterior median line. Directed backwards, upwards and medially
involving the skin and underlying soft tissues, perforating the stomach with
an approximate depth of 14.0 cms.
3. Elongated, 3.0 cms, edges are clean-cut, medial border is blunt, lateral
border is sharp. Located at the anterior abdominal wall, right side. 2.0 cms.
From the anterior median line. Directed backwards, upwards and laterally
involving the skin and underlying soft tissues, penetrating the head of the
pancreas with an approximate depth of 12.0 cms.28
Dr. Bertido stated that the victim was stabbed three times on the body by a single-
bladed sharp-pointed instrument.29 Through the use of an anatomic diagram, Dr.
Bertido showed that the victim was stabbed on his left chest and over his right and left
abdominals.30 He also stated that of the three stab wounds, the wound on the victim’s
chest was the most fatal because it was near his heart, while the other wounds
involved the victim’s stomach and pancreas.31 Dr. Bertido declared that no other
wound, aside from the three stab wounds, was found on the victim’s body. 32 He later
on executed a Certificate of Post-Mortem Examination showing the cause of death as
hemorrhage, secondary to stab wounds.33
Dr. Bertido admitted that while he could not specifically determine the position of the
victim at the time he was stabbed, he was certain that the stab wounds were inflicted
when the victim and his assailant were facing each other.34 He also disclosed that the
sizes of the wounds were different from each other.35
The prosecution also presented Claudio Olandria,36 the victim’s father, who took the
witness stand and testified on the expenses that he and his family incurred by reason
of his son’s death.
The Defense’s Version
The defense relied on the defense of alibi, submitting testimonial and documentary
evidence37 to support Pablo’s claim that he was in another place at the time of the
stabbing.
Pablo averred that his name is Pablito Amodia and stated that at the time of the
incident, he lived in the house of Elma Amodia Romero (Elma), his sister, located at
Zone 13, Ilocos Street, Barangay  Rizal, Makati City.38 He has lived there since 1994.
He claimed that he was at home in the evening of November 25, 1996, until the early
morning of the next day.39 At around 10:00 of that evening, his brother – Elias Amodia
(Elias) – who lived next door, awakened him40 and told him that his (Elias’) wife, then
pregnant, had started having labor pains.41 He went back to sleep only to be
awakened by Elias at past 12:00 midnight. Elias then requested him to take care of
his house.42
Pablo related that it was at this time that Damaso (another brother), George, Arnold,
and another person he did not know, came to Elma’s house.43 He noticed that
Damaso was in a hurry and was packing his clothes; the latter told him that they
(Damaso and his companions) encountered trouble.44 Damaso and his companions
left past midnight; on the other hand, he went to Elias’ house to take care of the
latter’s children, while Elias and his wife went to a lying-in clinic.45 While at Elias’
house, Elma visited him to check on him and the children. 46 He stayed there until 9:00
a.m. of November 26, 1996 when he went back to Elma’s house; he went to school
later in the day.47
Pablo also alleged that it was only after returning from school that he came to know of
the victim’s death; he only knew the victim by name and even went to the victim’s
wake the first night.48
He further alleged that he stopped schooling for lack of funds and went to
Zamboanga del Norte in January 1997.49 He went back to Manila on May 22, 1998 to
continue his education, but was arrested on June 5, 1998.50
31 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
Elma and Elias corroborated Pablo’s story.51 Elma stated that Pablo lived with her in
their brother’s house together with her husband, their children, and Damaso. 52 She
added that Damaso told her that they were in trouble (atraso) because of a fight, and
that he and his companions were on their way to Cebu.53 Elma declared that Pablo
was with her when Damaso came to the house to pack his clothes. 54 Pablo and
Damaso left at 12:30, but for different destinations.55 She knew that Pablo went to
Elias’ house because she went to check on him and the children around 1 a.m. and
then again at 2 a.m.56 Elias’ wife gave birth to a baby girl at 2:50 p.m. of November
26, 1996.57
After some prodding, Elma admitted that she knew that cases have been filed against
Pablo and Damaso as early as December 1996.58 The defense thereafter rested its
case.
Prosecution’s Rebuttal Evidence
The prosecution presented Amelita Sagarino, a resident of Scorpion Street, Zone 17
since 1989, as a rebuttal witness.59 She testified that she knew the victim and the
accused who were all her neighbors.60 She stated that she served food at the victim’s
wake from seven in the evening up to six in the morning and that she never saw
Pablo there.61 She also heard from her neighbors that the people responsible for the
victim’s death were George, Arnold, Damaso, Pabling and Pablito Amodia.62 She
clarified that Pabling and Pablito Amodia are one and the same person.63
Subsequently, she stated that Pablito Amodia also attended the wake of the victim.64
Ruling of the RTC
The RTC convicted Pablo of murder after finding sufficient evidence of his identity,
role in the crime as principal by direct participation, and conspiracy between him and
the other accused who used their superior strength to weaken the victim. The RTC
relied on the testimonies of eyewitnesses Romildo and Luther, the autopsy results
conducted on the body of the victim, and the lack of physical impossibility on the part
of Pablo to be at the crime scene. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Pablo guilty of having committed the crime of
murder as principal by conspiracy. Considering that there are no aggravating or
mitigating circumstances attendant to the commission of the crime, pursuant to Article
64 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, accused is sentenced to suffer imprisonment of
reclusion perpetua. He is further sentence to pay the heirs of the deceased Felix
Olandria the amount of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and to reimburse said heirs of
the amount of ₱23,568.00 for expenses incurred for the funeral service, burial and
incidental expenses.
SO ORDERED.65
Ruling of the CA
On appeal, the CA agreed with the RTC’s findings and affirmed Pablo’s
conviction.66 The CA, however, corrected the RTC’s ruling on the applicable provision
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended (Code), and modified the award of actual
damages, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed
Decision dated July 19, 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in accordance with Rule
63(2) of the Revised Penal Code. He is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of the victim,
₱23,268.00, as actual damages, ₱50,000 as civil indemnity and P25,000.00, as
exemplary damages, in addition to the award of P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
The Issues
In his Brief before this Court,67 Pablo assigns the following errors committed by both
the RTC and CA:
(1) In finding that his guilt for the crime charged has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
(2) In finding the existence of conspiracy.
Pablo argues that the lower courts erred in failing to give evidentiary weight to his
alibi, thus disregarding the constitutional presumption of innocence in his favor. 68 He
emphasizes that his alibi was corroborated by defense witness Elma who confirmed
that he was at Elias’s house at the time of the stabbing.69
He alternatively argues that granting that he was a part of Damaso’s group and that
this group killed the victim, the prosecution failed to prove the conspiracy among
them; there was no evidence adduced to establish how the incident that led to the
stabbing began. Any doubt that he acted as a principal should have been resolved in
his favor.70
In their Brief,71 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) representing the People,
maintain that no reversible error was committed by the lower courts. The OSG avers
that the prosecution’s evidence has satisfactorily proven all the elements of the crime.
Similarly, the conspiracy between Pablo and the three accused was proven by the
autopsy report which corroborated the categorical testimonies of Romildo and Luther
on how the accused and the others acted, clearly showing a unity of purpose in the
accomplishment of their criminal objective.72 The testimonies of these two
eyewitnesses also reveal that the killing was attended by the aggravating
32 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
circumstance of abuse of superior strength, and the employment of means to weaken
the defense of the victim. These circumstances qualify the killing to murder.
The Court’s Ruling
We affirm Pablo’s conviction.
The appeal essentially attacks the soundness of the factual findings of the RTC and
CA that, according to Pablo, are not in accord with the totality of the evidence in the
case. He emphasizes that the RTC and CA disregarded his alibi and the lack of
evidence establishing a conspiracy to kill the victim.
A review of the records fails to persuade us to overturn Pablo’s judgment of
conviction. We have emphasized often enough that the factual findings of the trial
court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses, and its assessment of their
probative weight are given high respect, if not conclusive effect, unless cogent facts
and circumstances of substance were ignored, misconstrued or misinterpreted, which,
if considered, would alter the outcome of the case.73 Under the circumstances, we find
no exceptional reason to warrant a deviation from this rule.
The records show that both the RTC and CA convicted Pablo of murder based on the
positive identification by Romildo and Luther and their eyewitness accounts of the
actual killing, showing the existence of a conspiracy among Pablo’s group to kill the
victim. The CA decision clearly reflects these findings and reasoning:
The evidence on record gives the picture of the incident at the time when Felix
Olandria was already being held on both hands by accused Pablo Amodia and Arnold
Pantosa. It was while in this position that accused Damaso Amodia delivered three (3)
stab blows which proved to be fatal . . .74
Both courts gathered, too, from these testimonies that the killing was qualified by the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, demonstrated by the
concerted efforts of Pablo’s group to overpower the victim’s strength with their own in
carrying out their criminal plan:
… the nature of the evidence presented, there are sufficient reasons to conclude and
consider as having been established beyond reasonable doubt, the existence of
conspiracy and the qualifying aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior
strength and employment of means to weaken the defense. These are: first, the
convergence of four (4) accused; x x x second, the time when the four (4) accused
were seen together which is about 12:05 in the early morning of November 26, 1997;
x x x third, the place where they were seen together which is below the bridge of C-5;
fourth, possession by accused Damaso Amodia of a knife his occupation being that of
a painter; fifth, absence of any other injuries in other parts of the body of the victim
Felix Olandria x x x; sixth, the location of the three stab wounds all of which were
directed against delicate parts of the body indicating intent to kill… The foregoing
circumstances clearly proven by the prosecution evidence, when taken together with
the fact that death ensued indicate that there was conspiracy on the part of the
accused that they abused their superior strength and employed means to weaken the
defense. The act of one is to be considered therefore the act of the other.75
The Eyewitnesses Testimonies.
The RTC and CA found the identification made by Romildo and Luther to be clear,
categorical, and consistent.76 We observed that in accepting the truth of the
identification and the account of how the stabbing took place, the RTC and CA
considered the witnesses’ proximity to the victim and his assailants at the time of the
stabbing – they were about three arms length away and 15 meters away,
respectively; the well-lighted condition of the crime scene; and the familiarity of these
eyewitnesses with the victim and his assailants – they were all residents of the same
area. Similarly, we also note that no evidence was presented to establish that these
eyewitnesses harbored any ill-will against Pablo and had no reason to fabricate their
testimonies. The weight of jurisprudence is to accept these kinds of testimonies as
true for being consistent with the natural order of events, human nature and the
presumption of good faith.77
Aside from these, we additionally note that Romildo and Luther never wavered,
despite the contrary efforts of the defense, in their positive identification of Pablo as
one of the assailants of the victim. The records glaringly show the defense counsel’s
vain efforts to prove that these eyewitnesses committed a mistake in identifying Pablo
as one of the assailants since his name was allegedly Pablito Amadio, and not Pablo.
We state in this regard that positive identification pertains essentially to proof of
identity and not necessarily to the name of the assailant. A mistake in the name of the
accused is not equivalent, and does not necessarily amount to, a mistake in the
identity of the accused especially when sufficient evidence is adduced to show that
the accused is pointed to as one of the perpetrators of the crime. In this case, the
defense’s line of argument is negated by the undisputed fact that the accused’s
identity was known to both the eyewitnesses. On the one hand, we have Romildo’s
testimony stating that Pablo lived across Scorpion Street from where he lived.78 He
also stated that he had known Pablo for more than a year. 79 On the other hand,
Luther testified that he had known Pablo since 1986 because they were neighbors
and that he even played basketball with him.80 We stress that Pablo never denied
these allegations.
In People v. Ducabo, we took notice of the human trait that once a person knows
another through association, identification becomes an easy task even from a
considerable distance; most often, the face and body movements of the person
identified has created a lasting impression on the identifier’s mind that cannot easily
be erased.81
The association the eyewitnesses cited – specifically, being neighbors and even
basketball game mates – rendered them familiar with Pablo, making it highly unlikely
33 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
that they could have committed a mistake in identifying him as one of the assailants.
Their identification came at the first opportunity (i.e., when they revealed) what they
knew of the killing, and culminated with their courtroom identification of Pablo as
among those who assaulted the victim.82
Two reasons settle the argument about Pablo’s name against his favor. It strikes us
that this argument is a line of defense that came only as the defense’s turn to present
evidence neared. We have on record that prior to the defense’s presentation of
evidence, Pablo referred to himself as Pablo Amodia when the court asked him his
name.83 We likewise find no competent evidence, other than his assertion and those
of his siblings, showing that his true name is really Pablito Amodia. We therefore
conclude that any uncertainty on the name by which the accused is or should be
known is an extraneous matter that in no way renders his identification as a
participant in the stabbing uncertain.
We find nothing irregular, unusual, or inherently unbelievable, in the eyewitnesses’
testimonies that would affect their credibility. Their narratives are remarkably
compatible with the physical evidence on hand; likewise, their accounts are also
consistent with each other. More importantly, the narration of these eyewitnesses are
in full accord with the human experience of individuals who are exposed to a startling
event and their initial reluctance to involve themselves in the criminal matters
especially those involving violent crimes committed by individuals known to them.
The Defense of Alibi
Pablo argues that his alibi should have been given greater evidentiary weight
because it was corroborated by his sister, Elma. As reproduced by Pablo in his Brief,
the substance of Elma’s testimony is as follows:
Q: Mrs. Witness while you were sleeping which you said you start sleeping
at 10:00 o’clock in the evening of November 25, 1996, while you were
sleeping, what transpired, if any, was there any unusual incident that
transpired? [sic]
A: Pumunta po ang isang kapatid ko, si Elias Amodia dahil naglalabor daw
and hipag ko at manganganak at dadalhin niya sa lying-in, eh malayo po at
siya ang pinagbabantay sa mga pamangking kong maliliit, sir.
Q: Could you tell the Honorable Court what time did your brother Elias
Amodia wake up Pablo Amodia?
A: 12:00 midnight, sir.
xxx
Q: When Pablo woke up, what if any did Pablo Amodia do?
A: Pumunta po siya sa bahay ng kapatid ko, sir?
Q: And where was that house of your brother Elias located?
A: Malapit lang po sa amin.
Q: How far is your house to his house?
A: Tatlong (3) dipa po ang layo, sir.84
Alibi is a defense that comes with various jurisprudentially-established limitations. A
first limitation fully applicable to this case is that alibi cannot overcome positive
identification.85 For the defense of alibi to prosper, evidence other than the testimony
of the accused must be adduced. Evidence referred to in this respect does not merely
relate to any piece of evidence that would support the alibi; rather, there must be
sufficient evidence to show the physical impossibility (as to time and place) that the
accused could have committed or participated in the commission of the crime. For
alibi to be given evidentiary value, there must be clear and convincing evidence
showing that at the time of the commission of the crime, it was physically impossible
for the accused to have been at the situs criminis.86
As we have discussed at length, Pablo was positively identified by Romildo and
Luther as one of the victim’s assailants. We find no reason to doubt the accuracy of
the identification made.
Pablo’s alibi does not also meet the requirements of physical impossibility of time and
place. A scrutiny of the entire testimony of Elma failed to show that it was physically
impossible for Pablo to be at the crime scene when the stabbing took place. We note
that although Elma testified that Pablo was at Elias’ house at the time of the stabbing,
she nonetheless admitted that her house (which was located beside Elias’ house) and
the bridge where the crime was committed is a 10-minute walking distance away from
each other.87 She further testified that after Pablo left for Elias’ house, she only saw
him again at around 1:00 a.m. and at 2:00 a.m at their brother’s house. 88 Hence, it
was possible that Pablo could have gone out of Elias’ house to join Damaso, George,
and Arnold in assaulting the victim, and afterwards returned to his brother’s house
without Elma knowing that he was ever gone.
We scrutinize Elma’s version of the events with utmost care considering that she is
Pablo’s sister. This is not the first time that this Court has encountered a case
where alibi is provided by a close kin; we have recognized that in these situations, it
may come naturally to some to give more weight to blood ties and close relationship
than to the objective truth;89 thus, our strict scrutiny.
We find that the time frame in Elma’s version of events shows a pattern of
inconsistency that renders its truthfulness suspect. The testimony is inconsistent on
34 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
the time Pablo slept and was awakened by Elias – details that, to our mind, are
material to show his whereabouts on that fateful night.90
Elma initially stated that Pablo slept at 9:00 p.m. and was awakened by Elias at 12:00
midnight.91 Thereafter, she claimed that Pablo was also awakened by Elias at 9:00
p.m. (the same time that Pablo slept) that evening, and that Pablo went to Elias’s
house around 12:30 p.m.92 Subsequently, she averred that Pablo was awakened at
10:00 p.m. but went back to sleep then awakened again at 12:00 p.m.93
These conflicting statements are not rendered any more believable by their conflict
with the time frames claimed in Pablo’s version of events.94 Similarly, Elma’s version
of what occurred when is likewise inconsistent with Elias’ version of events.95
Finally, even granting that a semblance of truth exists in the defense’s narration of
events, the inconsistencies and contradictions in its witnesses’ testimonies render
their evidence uncertain. In the final analysis, even their version does not preclude
Pablo from being physically present at the crime scene when the killing took place.
Thus, the defense and prosecution’s evidence taken together, render Pablo guilty of
the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.
Conspiracy
As an alternative argument, Pablo puts into issue the failure of the prosecution’s
evidence to establish the conspiracy between him and his other co-accused to make
him liable for murder. He emphasizes that the evidence, as testified to by the
eyewitnesses, only relate to events during, and not prior to, the assault and the
stabbing of the victim. He argues that no evidence was adduced to show that the
accused all agreed to kill the victim.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. 96 It arises on the very instant the
plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith decide to
pursue it.97 It may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence.98
Direct proof of conspiracy is rarely found; circumstantial evidence is often resorted to
in order to prove its existence.99 Absent of any direct proof, as in the present case,
conspiracy may be deduced from the mode, method, and manner the offense was
perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves, when such acts
point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest.100 An
accused participates as a conspirator if he or she has performed some overt act as a
direct or indirect contribution in the execution of the crime planned to be
committed.101 The overt act may consist of active participation in the actual
commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to his co-
conspirators by being present at the commission of the crime, or by exerting moral
ascendancy over the other co-conspirators.102 Stated otherwise, it is not essential that
there be proof of the previous agreement and decision to commit the crime; it is
sufficient that the malefactors acted in concert pursuant to the same objective.103
Although there was no evidence in the present case showing a prior agreement
among Pablo, Arnold, George, and Damaso, the following chain of events however
show their commonality of purpose in killing the victim: first, the accused surrounded
the victim on all sides: Damaso at the front, George at the victim’s rear, while Pablo
and Arnold flanked the victim on each side; second, Pablo then wrested the right arm
of the victim and restrained his movement, while Arnold did the same to the left arm of
the victim; third, George then hit the victim’s head with a piece of wood; and fourth,
Damaso stabbed the victim three times.
In People v. Elijorde,104 we said: Me-sm
The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly or intentionally
rendered which cannot exist without previous cognizance of the criminal act intended
to be executed. It is therefore required in order to be liable either as a principal by
indispensable cooperation or as an accomplice that the accused must unite with the
criminal design of the principal by direct participation. S
In People v. Manalo,105 we declared that the act of the appellant in holding the victim’s
right hand while the latter was being stabbed constituted sufficient proof of
conspiracy:
Indeed, the act of the appellant of holding the victim’s right hand while the victim was
being stabbed by Dennis shows that he concurred in the criminal design of the actual
killer. If such act were separate from the stabbing, appellant’s natural reaction should
have been to immediately let go of the victim and flee as soon as the first stab was
inflicted. But appellant continued to restrain the deceased until Dennis completed his
attack.
Tested against these, the existence of conspiracy among the four accused is clear;
their acts were aimed at the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing
their respective parts in the series of acts that, although appearing independent from
one another, indicated a concurrence of sentiment and intent to kill the victim.
Following the reasoning in Manalo, if there was in fact no unity of purpose among
Pablo and the three other accused, Pablo’s reaction would have been to let go of the
victim and flee after the first stabbing by Damaso. The evidence reveals, however,
that after the first stabbing, Pablo still continued to hold the right arm of the victim,
rendering him immobile and exposed to further attack.1avvphi1
Where there is conspiracy, a person may be convicted  for the criminal act of
another.106 Where there is conspiracy, the act of one is deemed the act of all.107
The Crime
Murder is committed by killing a person under any of the qualifying circumstances
enumerated by Article 248 of the Code not falling within the provisions of Article 246
35 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
(on parricide), Article 249 (on homicide), and Article 255 (on infanticide) of the said
Code.
With Pablo’s participation in the killing duly established beyond reasonable doubt,
what is left to examine is whether or not the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength, which qualifies the crime to murder, is present under the
circumstances.
To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out
of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. 108 Taking
advantage of superior strength does not mean that the victim was completely
defenseless.109
In People v. Ventura, we opined that there are no fixed and invariable rules in
considering abuse of superior strength or employing means to weaken the defense of
the victim.110 Superiority does not always mean numerical superiority. Abuse of
superiority depends upon the relative strength of the aggressor vis-à-vis the
victim.111 Abuse of superiority is determined by the excess of the aggressor’s natural
strength over that of the victim, considering the position of both, and the employment
of the means to weaken the defense, although not annulling it.112 The aggressor must
have advantage of his natural strength to ensure the commission of the crime.113
In the present case, we find that there was abuse of superior strength employed by
Pablo, Arnold, George and Damaso in committing the killing. The evidence shows
that the victim was unarmed when he was attacked. In the attack, two assailants held
his arms on either side, while the other two, on the victim’s front and back, each
armed with a knife and a piece of wood that they later used on the victim. Against this
onslaught, the victim’s reaction was graphically described by the prosecution
eyewitness, Luther, when he testified:
Q: Which came first, by the way, was the victim or what was the victim doing
then when the fight took place?
A: Wala siyang nagawa kase hinawakan siya, gusto niyang makawala pero
wala siyang magawa hinawakan siya sa leeg, sir.114 [Emphasis supplied]
Under these circumstances, no doubt exists that there was gross inequality of forces
between the victim and the four accused and that the victim was overwhelmed by
forces he could not match. The RTC and CA therefore correctly appreciated the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength which qualified the killing to
the crime of murder.
The Penalty
The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Code is reclusion perpetua to death.
Article 63 (2)of the same Code states that when the law prescribes a penalty
consisting of two indivisible penalties and there are neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances in the commission of the crime, the lesser penalty shall be imposed.
Since the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength already qualified
the killing to murder, it can no longer be used to increase the imposable penalty. We
note that while another aggravating circumstance, i.e., employing means to weaken
the defense of the victim, was alleged in the Information, the prosecution failed to
adduce evidence to support the presence of this circumstance. Hence, the RTC and
CA correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Likewise, the CA correctly awarded ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000 as
exemplary to the heirs of the victim consistent with prevailing
jurisprudence.115 However, in line with recent jurisprudence, the award of civil
indemnity shall be increased from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00.116
Further, the CA erred in awarding actual damages in the amount of ₱23,268.00. In
People v. Villanueva, we held that when actual damages proven by receipts during
the trial amount to less than ₱25,000.00, the award of temperate damages for
₱25,000.00 is justified in lieu of actual damages of a lesser amount.117 We reiterated
this ruling in the recent cases of People v. Casta118 and People v. Ballesteros119 where
we awarded temperate damages, in lieu of actual damages, in the amount of
₱25,000.00.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court AFFIRMS the Court of Appeals
decision dated May 4, 2006 in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01764 finding accused-
appellant Pablo Amodia GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder,
with the MODIFICATION that:
(1) The award of civil indemnity shall be increased from P50,000.00 to
P75,000.00;
(2) The award of actual damages in the amount of ₱23,268.00 is
hereby DELETED; and
(3) In lieu thereof, accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay ₱25,000.00 as
temperate damages.
The other portions of the appealed decision are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 168539               March 25, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
HENRY T. GO, Respondent.
36 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
 DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
1
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolution  of the
Third Division2 of the Sandiganbayan (SB) dated June 2, 2005 which quashed the
Information filed against herein respondent for alleged violation of Section 3 (g) of
Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A. 3019), otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
The Information filed against respondent is an offshoot of this Court's Decision 3 in
Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. which nullified the various
contracts awarded by the Government, through the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC), to Philippine Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO) for the
construction, operation and maintenance of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III). Subsequent to the above
Decision, a certain Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman against several individuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019. Among
those charged was herein respondent, who was then the Chairman and President of
PIATCO, for having supposedly conspired with then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile
(Secretary Enrile) in entering into a contract which is grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government.
On September 16, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found
probable cause to indict, among others, herein respondent for violation of Section
3(g) of R.A. 3019. While there was likewise a finding of probable cause against
Secretary Enrile, he was no longer indicted because he died prior to the issuance of
the resolution finding probable cause.
Thus, in an Information dated January 13, 2005, respondent was charged before the
SB as follows:
On or about July 12, 1997, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Pasay City,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the late
ARTURO ENRILE, then Secretary of the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC), committing the offense in relation to his office and taking
advantage of the same, in conspiracy with accused, HENRY T. GO, Chairman and
President of the Philippine International Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO), did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into a Concession Agreement, after
the project for the construction of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport International
Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) was awarded to Paircargo Consortium/PIATCO,
which Concession Agreement substantially amended the draft Concession
Agreement covering the construction of the NAIA IPT III under Republic Act 6957, as
amended by Republic Act 7718 (BOT law), specifically the provision on Public Utility
Revenues, as well as the assumption by the government of the liabilities of PIATCO
in the event of the latter's default under Article IV, Section 4.04 (b) and (c) in relation
to Article 1.06 of the Concession Agreement, which terms are more beneficial to
PIATCO while manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government of the
Republic of the Philippines.4
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28090.
On March 10, 2005, the SB issued an Order, to wit:
The prosecution is given a period of ten (10) days from today within which to show
cause why this case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person of
the accused considering that the accused is a private person and the public official
Arturo Enrile, his alleged co-conspirator, is already deceased, and not an accused in
this case.5
The prosecution complied with the above Order contending that the SB has already
acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent by reason of his voluntary
appearance, when he filed a motion for consolidation and when he posted bail. The
prosecution also argued that the SB has exclusive jurisdiction over respondent's
case, even if he is a private person, because he was alleged to have conspired with a
public officer.6
On April 28, 2005, respondent filed a Motion to Quash 7 the Information filed against
him on the ground that the operative facts adduced therein do not constitute an
offense under Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. Respondent, citing the show cause order of
the SB, also contended that, independently of the deceased Secretary Enrile, the
public officer with whom he was alleged to have conspired, respondent, who is not a
public officer nor was capacitated by any official authority as a government agent,
may not be prosecuted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.
The prosecution filed its Opposition.8
On June 2, 2005, the SB issued its assailed Resolution, pertinent portions of which
read thus:
Acting on the Motion to Quash filed by accused Henry T. Go dated April 22, 2005,
and it appearing that Henry T. Go, the lone accused in this case is a private person
and his alleged co-conspirator-public official was already deceased long before this
case was filed in court, for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused, the
Court grants the Motion to Quash and the Information filed in this case is hereby
ordered quashed and dismissed.9
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues, to wit:
I
37 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED AND DECIDED A
QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR
APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE IN GRANTING THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
AND IN DISMISSING CRIMINAL CASE NO. 28090 ON THE GROUND THAT IT HAS
NO JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT GO.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED AND DECIDED A
QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR
APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE, IN RULING THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION
OVER THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT GO DESPITE THE IRREFUTABLE FACT
THAT HE HAS ALREADY POSTED BAIL FOR HIS PROVISIONAL LIBERTY
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED WHEN, IN
COMPLETE DISREGARD OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION, IT QUASHED THE INFORMATION AND DISMISSED CRIMINAL
CASE NO. 2809010
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 provides:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly
and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or
will profit thereby.
The elements of the above provision are:
(1) that the accused is a public officer;
(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the
government; and
(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government.11
At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that private persons, when acting in
conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the
pertinent offenses under Section 3 of R.A. 3019, in consonance with the avowed
policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons
alike constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead thereto. 12 This is the
controlling doctrine as enunciated by this Court in previous cases, among which is a
case involving herein private respondent.13
The only question that needs to be settled in the present petition is whether herein
respondent, a private person, may be indicted for conspiracy in violating Section 3(g)
of R.A. 3019 even if the public officer, with whom he was alleged to have conspired,
has died prior to the filing of the Information.
Respondent contends that by reason of the death of Secretary Enrile, there is no
public officer who was charged in the Information and, as such, prosecution against
respondent may not prosper.
The Court is not persuaded.
It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any public
officer with whom respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not
mean, however, that the allegation of conspiracy between them can no longer be
proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already expunged. The only thing
extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability. His death did not
extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge of conspiracy between
him and private respondent. Stated differently, the death of Secretary Enrile does not
mean that there was no public officer who allegedly violated Section 3 (g) of R.A.
3019. In fact, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause
to indict Secretary Enrile for infringement of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A.
3019.14 Were it not for his death, he should have been charged.
The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g)
of R.A. 3019, among others, is that such private person must be alleged to have
acted in conspiracy with a public officer. The law, however, does not require that such
person must, in all instances, be indicted together with the public officer. If
circumstances exist where the public officer may no longer be charged in court, as in
the present case where the public officer has already died, the private person may be
indicted alone.
Indeed, it is not necessary to join all alleged co-conspirators in an indictment for
conspiracy.15 If two or more persons enter into a conspiracy, any act done by any of
them pursuant to the agreement is, in contemplation of law, the act of each of them
and they are jointly responsible therefor.16 This means that everything said, written or
done by any of the conspirators in execution or furtherance of the common purpose is
deemed to have been said, done, or written by each of them and it makes no
difference whether the actual actor is alive or dead, sane or insane at the time of
38 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
trial.17 The death of one of two or more conspirators does not prevent the conviction of
the survivor or survivors.18 Thus, this Court held that:
x x x [a] conspiracy is in its nature a joint offense. One person cannot conspire alone.
The crime depends upon the joint act or intent of two or more persons. Yet, it does
not follow that one person cannot be convicted of conspiracy. So long as the acquittal
or death of a co-conspirator does not remove the bases of a charge for conspiracy,
one defendant may be found guilty of the offense.19
The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that, as alleged in the Information filed
against respondent, which is deemed hypothetically admitted in the latter's Motion to
Quash, he (respondent) conspired with Secretary Enrile in violating Section 3 (g) of
R.A. 3019 and that in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Hence, the criminal
liability incurred by a co-conspirator is also incurred by the other co-conspirators.
Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that the avowed policy of the State and the
legislative intent to repress "acts of public officers and private persons alike, which
constitute graft or corrupt practices,"20 would be frustrated if the death of a public
officer would bar the prosecution of a private person who conspired with such public
officer in violating the Anti-Graft Law.
In this regard, this Court's disquisition in the early case of People v. Peralta 21 as to the
nature of and the principles governing conspiracy, as construed under Philippine
jurisdiction, is instructive, to wit:
x x x A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Generally, conspiracy
is not a crime except when the law specifically provides a penalty therefor as in
treason, rebellion and sedition. The crime of conspiracy known to the common law is
not an indictable offense in the Philippines. An agreement to commit a crime is a
reprehensible act from the view-point of morality, but as long as the conspirators do
not perform overt acts in furtherance of their malevolent design, the sovereignty of the
State is not outraged and the tranquility of the public remains undisturbed.
However, when in resolute execution of a common scheme, a felony is committed by
two or more malefactors, the existence of a conspiracy assumes pivotal importance in
the determination of the liability of the perpetrators. In stressing the significance of
conspiracy in criminal law, this Court in U.S. vs. Infante and Barreto opined that
While it is true that the penalties cannot be imposed for the mere act of conspiring to
commit a crime unless the statute specifically prescribes a penalty therefor,
nevertheless the existence of a conspiracy to commit a crime is in many cases a fact
of vital importance, when considered together with the other evidence of record, in
establishing the existence, of the consummated crime and its commission by the
conspirators.
Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as
co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their respective active
participation in the commission of the crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of
the conspiracy because in contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all. The
foregoing rule is anchored on the sound principle that "when two or more persons
unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether through the physical volition of one, or
all, proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose evil will actively
contributes to the wrong-doing is in law responsible for the whole, the same as
though performed by himself alone." Although it is axiomatic that no one is liable for
acts other than his own, "when two or more persons agree or conspire to commit a
crime, each is responsible for all the acts of the others, done in furtherance of the
agreement or conspiracy." The imposition of collective liability upon the conspirators
is clearly explained in one case where this Court held that x x x it is impossible to
graduate the separate liability of each (conspirator) without taking into consideration
the close and inseparable relation of each of them with the criminal act, for the
commission of which they all acted by common agreement x x x. The crime must
therefore in view of the solidarity of the act and intent which existed between the x x x
accused, be regarded as the act of the band or party created by them, and they are
all equally responsible x x x
Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and confederated
in the commission of the felony proved, collective liability of the accused conspirators
attaches by reason of the conspiracy, and the court shall not speculate nor even
investigate as to the actual degree of participation of each of the perpetrators present
at the scene of the crime. Of course, as to any conspirator who was remote from the
situs of aggression, he could be drawn within the enveloping ambit of the conspiracy
if it be proved that through his moral ascendancy over the rest of the conspirators the
latter were moved or impelled to carry out the conspiracy.
In fine, the convergence of the wills of the conspirators in the scheming and execution
of the crime amply justifies the imputation to all of them the act of any one of them. It
is in this light that conspiracy is generally viewed not as a separate indictable offense,
but a rule for collectivizing criminal liability.
xxxx
x x x A time-honored rule in the corpus of our jurisprudence is that once conspiracy is
proved, all of the conspirators who acted in furtherance of the common design are
liable as co-principals. This rule of collective criminal liability emanates from the
ensnaring nature of conspiracy. The concerted action of the conspirators in
consummating their common purpose is a patent display of their evil partnership, and
for the consequences of such criminal enterprise they must be held solidarily liable.22
This is not to say, however, that private respondent should be found guilty of
conspiring with Secretary Enrile. It is settled that the absence or presence of
conspiracy is factual in nature and involves evidentiary matters.23 Hence, the
allegation of conspiracy against respondent is better left ventilated before the trial
39 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
court during trial, where respondent can adduce evidence to prove or disprove its
presence.
Respondent claims in his Manifestation and Motion24 as well as in his Urgent Motion
to Resolve25 that in a different case, he was likewise indicted before the SB for
conspiracy with the late Secretary Enrile in violating the same Section 3 (g) of R.A.
3019 by allegedly entering into another agreement (Side Agreement) which is
separate from the Concession Agreement subject of the present case. The case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 28091. Here, the SB, through a Resolution, granted
respondent's motion to quash the Information on the ground that the SB has no
jurisdiction over the person of respondent. The prosecution questioned the said SB
Resolution before this Court via a petition for review on certiorari. The petition was
docketed as G.R. No. 168919. In a minute resolution dated August 31, 2005, this
Court denied the petition finding no reversible error on the part of the SB. This
Resolution became final and executory on January 11, 2006. Respondent now
argues that this Court's resolution in G.R. No. 168919 should be applied in the instant
case.
The Court does not agree. Respondent should be reminded that prior to this Court's
ruling in G.R. No. 168919, he already posted bail for his provisional liberty. In fact, he
even filed a Motion for Consolidation26 in Criminal Case No. 28091. The Court agrees
with petitioner's contention that private respondent's act of posting bail and filing his
Motion for Consolidation vests the SB with jurisdiction over his person. The rule is
well settled that the act of an accused in posting bail or in filing motions seeking
affirmative relief is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the
court.27
Thus, it has been held that:
When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a competent court by virtue of
a warrant of arrest or otherwise, in order to avoid the submission of his body to the
jurisdiction of the court he must raise the question of the court’s jurisdiction over his
person at the very earliest opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the complaint or
files any dilatory plea or pleads to the merits, he thereby gives the court jurisdiction
over his person. (State ex rel. John Brown vs. Fitzgerald, 51 Minn., 534)
xxxx
As ruled in La Naval Drug vs. CA [236 SCRA 78, 86]:
"[L]ack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either
expressly or impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. If he so wishes not to waive this
defense, he must do so seasonably by motion for the purpose of objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court; otherwise, he shall be deemed to have submitted himself to
that jurisdiction."
Moreover, "[w]here the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court over the person, it must be for the sole and separate purpose
of objecting to said jurisdiction. If the appearance is for any other purpose, the
defendant is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Such
an appearance gives the court jurisdiction over the person."
Verily, petitioner’s participation in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan was not
confined to his opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest but also covered other
matters which called for respondent court’s exercise of its jurisdiction. Petitioner may
not be heard now to deny said court’s jurisdiction over him. x x x.28
In the instant case, respondent did not make any special appearance to question the
jurisdiction of the SB over his person prior to his posting of bail and filing his Motion
for Consolidation. In fact, his Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal Case No.
28090 only came after the SB issued an Order requiring the prosecution to show
cause why the case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over his person.
As a recapitulation, it would not be amiss to point out that the instant case involves a
contract entered into by public officers representing the government. More
importantly, the SB is a special criminal court which has exclusive original jurisdiction
in all cases involving violations of R.A. 3019 committed by certain public officers, as
enumerated in P.D. 1606 as amended by R.A. 8249. This includes private individuals
who are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the said public
officers. In the instant case, respondent is being charged for violation of Section 3(g)
of R.A. 3019, in conspiracy with then Secretary Enrile. Ideally, under the law, both
respondent and Secretary Enrile should have been charged before and tried jointly by
the Sandiganbayan. However, by reason of the death of the latter, this can no longer
be done. Nonetheless, for reasons already discussed, it does not follow that the SB is
already divested of its jurisdiction over the person of and the case involving herein
respondent. To rule otherwise would mean that the power of a court to decide a case
would no longer be based on the law defining its jurisdiction but on other factors, such
as the death of one of the alleged offenders.
Lastly, the issues raised in the present petition involve matters which are mere
incidents in the main case and the main case has already been pending for over nine
(9) years. Thus, a referral of the case to the Regional Trial Court would further delay
the resolution of the main case and it would, by no means, promote respondent's right
to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of his case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Sandiganbayan
dated June 2, 2005, granting respondent's Motion to Quash, is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is forthwith DIRECTED to proceed with
deliberate dispatch in the disposition of Criminal Case No. 28090.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 196735               May 5, 2014
40 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DANILO FELICIANO, JR., JULIUS VICTOR MEDALLA, CHRISTOPHER SOLIVA,
WARREN L. ZINGAPAN, and ROBERT MICHAEL BELTRAN ALVIR, Accused-
appellants.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
It is in the hallowed grounds of a university where students, faculty, and research
personnel should feel safest. After all, this is where ideas that could probably solve
the sordid realities in this world are peacefully nurtured and debated. Universities
produce hope. They incubate all our youthful dreams.
Yet, there are elements within this academic milieu that trade misplaced concepts of
perverse brotherhood for these hopes. Fraternity rumbles exist because of past
impunity. This has resulted in a senseless death whose justice is now the subject
matter of this case. It is rare that these cases are prosecuted. It is even more
extraordinary that there are credible witnesses who present themselves courageously
before an able and experienced trial court judge.
This culture of impunity must stop. There is no space in this society for hooliganism
disguised as fraternity rumbles. The perpetrators must stand and suffer the legal
consequences of their actions. They must do so for there is an individual who now lies
dead, robbed of his dreams and the dreams of his family. Excruciating grief for them
will never be enough.
It is undisputed that on December 8, 1994, at around 12:30 to 1:00 in the afternoon,
seven (7) members of the Sigma Rho fraternity were eating lunch at the Beach House
Canteen, near the Main Library of the University of the Philippines, Diliman, when
they were attacked by several masked men carrying baseball bats and lead pipes.
Some of them sustained injuries that required hospitalization. One of them, Dennis
Venturina, died from his injuries.
An information1 for murder, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q95-6113 3, was filed
against several members of the Scintilla Juris fraternity, namely, Danilo Feliciano, Jr.,
Julius Victor L. Medalla, Warren L. Zingapan, Robert Michael Beltran Alvir,
Christopher L. Soliva, Reynaldo G. Ablanida, Carlo Jolette Fajardo, George Morano,
Raymund E. Narag, Gilbert Merle Magpantay, Benedict Guerrero, and Rodolfo
Penalosa, Jr. with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 219. The
information reads:
That on or about the 8th day of December 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
above-named accused, wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise, conspiring,
confederating with other persons whose true names, identities and whereabouts have
not as yet been ascertained, and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill,
qualified with treachery, and with evident premeditation, taking advantage of superior
strength, armed with baseball bats, lead pipes, and cutters, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon
the person of DENNIS F. VENTURINA, by then and there hitting him on the head and
clubbing him on different parts of his body thereby inflicting upon him serious and
mortal injuries which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of said DENNIS F. VENTURINA. (Emphasis
supplied)
Separate informations were also filed against them for the attempted murder of Sigma
Rho fraternity members Cesar Mangrobang, Jr.,2 Cristobal Gaston, Jr.,3 and Leandro
Lachica,4 and the frustrated murder of Sigma Rho fraternity members Mervin
Natalicio5 and Amel Fortes.6 Only 11 of the accused stood trial since one of the
accused, Benedict Guerrero, remained at large.
A trial on the merits ensued.
The facts, according to the prosecution, are as follows:
Leandro Lachica, Amel Fortes, Derinis Venturina, Mervin Natalicio, Cristobal Gaston,
Jr., Felix Tumaneng,7 and Cesar Magrobang, Jr. are all members of the Sigma Rho
Fraternity. On December 8, 1994, at around 12:30 to 1 :00 p.m., they were having
lunch at Beach House Canteen, located at the back of the Main Library of the
University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City.8 Suddenly, Dennis Venturina
shouted, "Brads, brods!"9
According to Leandro Lachica, Grand Archon of Sigma Rho Fraternity, he looked
around when Venturina shouted, and he saw about ten (10) men charging toward
them.10 The men were armed with baseball bats and lead pipes, and their heads were
covered with either handkerchiefs or shirts.11 Within a few seconds, five (5) of the men
started attacking him, hitting him with their lead pipes. 12 During the attack, he
recognized one of the attackers as Robert Michael Beltran Alvir because his mask fell
off.13
Lachica tried to parry the blows of.his attackers, suffering scratches and contusions.14
He was, however, able to run to the nearby College of Education. 15 Just before
reaching it, he looked back and saw Warren Zingapan and Julius Victor L. Medalla
holding lead pipes and standing where the commotion was.16 Both of them did not
have their masks on.17 He was familiar with Alvir, Zingapan, and Medalla because he
often saw them in the College of Social Sciences and Philosophy (CSSP) and
Zingapan used to be his friend.18 The attack lasted about thirty (30) to forty-five (45)
seconds.19
41 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
According to Mervin Natalicio, the Vice Grand Archon of Sigma Rho, he looked to his
left when Venturina shouted.20 He saw about fifteen (15) to twenty (20) men, most of
who were wearing masks, running toward them.21 He was stunned, and he started
running.22 He stumbled over the protruding roots of a tree.23 He got up, but the
attackers came after him and beat him up with lead pipes and baseball bats until he
fell down.24 While he was parrying the blows, he recognized two (2) of the attackers
as Warren Zingapan and Christopher L. Soliva since they were not wearing any
masks.25 After about thirty (30) seconds, they stopped hitting him.26
He was lying on his back and when he looked up, he saw another group of four (4) to
five (5) men coming toward him, led by Benedict Guerrero. 27 This group also beat him
up.28 He did not move until another group of masked men beat him up for about five
(5) to eight (8) seconds.29
When the attacks ceased, he was found lying on the ground. 30 Several bystanders
brought him to the U.P. Infirmary where he stayed for more than a week for the
treatment of his wounds and fractures.31
According to Cesar Mangrobang, Jr., member of Sigma Rho, he also looked back
when Venturina shouted and saw a group of men with baseball bats and lead pipes.
Some of them wore pieces of cloth around their heads. 32 He ran when they attacked,
but two (2) men, whose faces were covered with pieces of cloth, blocked his way and
hit him with lead pipes.33 While running and parrying the blows, he recognized them
as Gilbert Merle Magpantay and Carlo Jolette Fajardo because their masks fell
off.34 He successfully evaded his attackers and ran to the Main Library.35 He then
decided that he needed to help his fraternity brothers and turned back toward Beach
House.36 There, he saw Venturina lying on the ground. 37 Danilo Feliciano, Jr. was
beating Venturina up with a lead pipe while Raymund E. Narag was aiming to hit
Venturina.38 When they saw him, they went toward his direction.39 They were about to
hit him when somebody shouted that policemen were coming. Feliciano and Narag
then ran away.40
Cesar Mangrobang, Jr. then saw Amel Fortes. Fortes accompanied him to his car so
they could bring Venturina to the U.P. Infirmary.41 When they brought the car over,
other people, presumably bystanders, were already loading Venturina into another
vehicle.42 They followed that vehicle to the U.P. Infirmary where they saw
Natalicio.43 He stayed at the infirmary until the following morning.44
According to Cristobal Gaston, Jr., member of Sigma Rho, he immediately stood up
when he heard someone shout, "Brods!"45 He saw a group of men charging toward
them carrying lead pipes and baseball bats.46 Most of them had pieces of cloth
covering their faces.47 He was about to run when two (2) of the attackers approached
him.48 One struck him with a heavy pipe while the other stabbed him with a bladed
instrument.49 He was able to parry most of the blows from the lead pipe, but he
sustained stab wounds on the chest and on his left forearm.50
He was able to run away.51 When he sensed that no one was chasing him, he looked
back to Beach House Canteen and saw Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Warren Zingapan, and
George Morano.52 He decided to go back to the canteen to help his fraternity
brothers.53 When he arrived, he did not see any of his fraternity brothers but only saw
the ones who attacked them.54 He ended up going to their hang-out instead to meet
with his other fraternity brothers.55 They then proceeded to the College of Law where
the rest of the fraternity was already discussing the incident.56
According to Amel Fortes, member of Sigma Rho, he also ran when he saw the group
of attackers coming toward them.57 When he looked back, he saw Danilo Feliciano,
Jr. hitting Venturina.58 He was also able to see Warren Zingapan and George Morano
at the scene.59
Leandro Lachica, in the meantime, upon reaching the College of Education, boarded
a jeepney to the College of Law to wait for their other fraternity brothers.60 One of his
fraternity brothers, Peter Corvera, told him that he received information that members
of Scintilla Juris were seen in the west wing of the Main Library and were regrouping
in SM North.61 Lachica and his group then set off for SM North to confront Scintilla
Juris and identify their attackers.62
When they arrived in SM North, pillboxes and stones were thrown at them.63 Lachica
saw Robert Michael Beltran Alvir and Warren Zingapan and a certain Carlo
Taparan.64 They had no choice but to get away from the mall and proceed instead to
U.P. where the Sigma Rho Fraternity members held a meeting.65
On the night of December 8, 1994, the officers of Sigma Rho advised the victims to
lodge their complaints with the National Bureau of Investigation. 66 Their counsel, Atty.
Frank Chavez, told the U.P. Police that the victims would be giving their statements
before the National Bureau of Investigation, promising to give the U.P. Police copies
of their statements. In the meantime, Venturina was transferred from the U.P.
Infirmary to St. Luke's Hospital on December 8, 1994. He died on December 10,
1994.67 On December 11, 1994, an autopsy was conducted on the cadaver of Dennis
Venturina.68 Dr. Rolando Victoria, a medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of
Investigation, found that Venturina had "several contusions located at the back of the
upper left arm and hematoma on the back of both hands," 69 "two (2) lacerated wounds
at the back of the head,70 generalized hematoma on the skull,"71 "several fractures on
the head,"72 and "inter-cranial hemorrhage."73 The injuries, according to Dr. Victoria,
could have been caused by a hard blunt object.74 Dr. Victoria concluded that
Venturina died of traumatic head injuries.75
On December 12, 1994, Lachica, Natalicio, Mangrobang, Fortes, and Gaston
executed their respective affidavits76 before the National Bureau of Investigation and
underwent medico-legal examinations77 with their medicolegal officer, Dr. Aurelio
Villena. According to Dr. Villena, he found that Mervin Natalicio had "lacerated
wounds on the top of the head, above the left ear, and on the fingers; contused
abrasions on both knees; contusion on the left leg and thigh," 78 all of which could
42 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
have been caused by any hard, blunt object. These injuries required medical
attendance for a period of ten (10) days to thirty (30) days from the date of infliction.79
Dr. Villena found on Amel Fortes "lacerated wounds on the head and on the right leg
which could have been caused by a blunt instrument."80 These injuries required
hospitalization for a period of ten (10) days to thirty (30) days from date of
infliction.81 He also found on Cesar Mangrobang, Jr. a "healed abrasion on the left
forearm which could possibly be caused by contact with [a] rough hard surface and
would require one (1) to nine (9) days of medical attention." 82 He found on Leandro
Lachica "contusions on the mid auxiliary left side, left forearm and lacerated wound
on the infra scapular area, left side." 83 On Christopher Gaston, Jr. he found "lacerated
wounds on the anterior chest, left side, left forearm; swollen knuckles of both hands;
contusions on the mid auxiliary left side, left forearm and lacerated wound on the infra
scapular area, left side."84
On September 18, 1997, after the prosecution presented its evidence-in-chief, the
court granted the demurrer to evidence filed by Rodolfo Penalosa, Jr. on the ground
that he was not identified by the prosecution's witnesses and that he was not
mentioned in any of the documentary evidence of the prosecution.85
Upon the presentation of their evidence, the defense introduced their own statement
of the facts, as follows:
According to Romeo Cabrera,86 a member of the U.P. Police, he was on foot patrol
with another member of the U.P. Police, Oscar Salvador, at the time of the incident.
They were near the College of Arts and Sciences (Palma Hall) when he vaguely
heard somebody shouting, "Rumble!" They went to the place where the alleged
rumble was happening and saw injured men being helped by bystanders. They
helped an injured person board the service vehicle of the Beach House Canteen.
They asked what his name was, and he replied that he was Mervin Natalicio. When
he asked Natalicio who hit him, the latter was not able to reply but instead told him
that his attackers were wearing masks. Oscar Salvador87 corroborated his testimony.
Benjamin Lato,88 a utility worker of the Beach House Canteen, likewise testified that
the identities of the attackers were unrecognizable because of their masks. He,
however, admitted that he did not see the attack; he just saw a man sprawled on the
ground at the time of the incident.
Frisco Capilo,89 a utility worker of U.P. assigned to the Main Library, was buying a
cigarette at a vendor located nearby. From there, he allegedly saw the whole incident.
He testified that ten (10) men, wearing either masks of red and black bonnets or with
shirts covering their faces, came from a red car parked nearby. He also saw three (3)
men being hit with lead pipes by the masked men. Two (2) of the men fell after being
hit. One of the victims was lifting the other to help him, but the attackers overtook him.
Afterwards, the attackers ran away. He then saw students helping those who were
injured. He likewise helped in carrying one of the injured victims, which he later found
out to be Amel Fortes.
A U.P. student and member of the Sigma Alpha Nu Sorority, Eda
Panganiban,90 testified that she and her friends were in line to order lunch at the
Beach House Canteen when a commotion happened. She saw around fifteen (15) to
eighteen (18) masked men attack a group of Sigma Rhoans. She did not see any
mask fall off. Her sorority sister and another U.P. student, Luz Perez,91 corroborated
her story that the masked men were unrecognizable because of their masks. Perez,
however, admitted that a member of Scintilla Juris approached her to make a
statement.
Another sorority sister, Bathalani Tiamzon,92 testified on substantially the same
matters as Panganiban and Perez. She also stated that she saw a person lying on
the ground who was being beaten up by about three (3) to five (5) masked men. She
also stated that some of the men were wearing black masks while some were wearing
white t-shirts as masks. She did not see any mask fall off the faces of the attackers.
According to Feliciana Feliciano,93 accused-appellant Danilo Feliciano, Jr.'s motlier,
her son was in Pampanga to visit his sick grandfather at the time of the incident. She
alleged that her son went to Pampanga before lunch that day and visited the school
where she teaches to get their house key from her.
According to Robert Michael Beltran Alvir,94 he had not been feeling well since
December 5, 1994. He said that he could not have possibly been in U.P. on
December 8, 1994 since he was absent even from work. He also testified that he
wore glasses and, thus, could not have possibly been the person identified by
Leandro Lachica. He also stated that he was not enrolled in U.P. at the time since he
was working to support himself.
According to Julius Victor Medalla,95 he and another classmate, Michael Vibas, were
working on a school project on December 8, 1994. He also claimed that he could not
have participated in the rumble as he had an injury affecting his balance. The injury
was caused by an incident in August 1994 when he was struck in the head by an
unknown assailant. His testimony was corroborated by Jose Victor Santos 96 who
stated that after lunch that day, Medalla played darts with him and, afterwards, they
went to Jollibee.
Christopher Soliva,97 on the other hand, testified that he was eating lunch with his
girlfriend and another friend in Jollibee, Philcoa, on December 8, 1994. They went
back to U.P. before 1:00 p.m. and went straight to their fraternity hang-out where he
was told that there had been a rumble at the Main Library. He also met several Sigma
Rhoans acting suspiciously as they passed by the hang-out. They were also told by
their head, Carlo Taparan, not to react to the Sigma Rhoans and just go home. Anna
Cabahug,98 his girlfriend, corroborated his story.
Warren Zingapan99 also testified that he was not in U.P. at the time of the incident. He
claimed to have gone to SM North to buy a gift for a friend's wedding but ran into a
fraternity brother. He also alleged that some Sigma Rhoans attacked them in SM
North that day.
43 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
On February 28, 2002, the trial court rendered its decision100 with the finding that
Robert Michael Alvir, Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Christopher Soliva, Julius Victor Medalla,
and Warren Zingapan were guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and attempted
murder and were sentenced to, among other penalties, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.101 The trial court, however, acquitted Reynaldo Ablanida, Carlo Jolette
Fajardo, Gilbert Magpantay, George Morano, and Raymund Narag. 102 The case
against Benedict Guerrero was ordered archived by the court until his
apprehension.103 The trial court, m evaluating the voluminous evidence at hand,
concluded that:
After a judicious evaluation of the matter, the Court is of the considered view that of
the ten accused, some were sufficiently identified and some were not. The Court
believes that out of the amorphous images during the pandemonium, the beleaguered
victims were able to espy and identify some of the attackers etching an indelible
impression in their memory. In this regard, the prosecution eyewitnesses were
emphatic that they saw the attackers rush towards them wielding deadly weapons like
baseball bats, lead pipes, pieces of wood and bladed ones, and pounce on their
hapless victims, run after them, and being present with one another at the scene of
the crime during the assault. Although each victim had a very strong motive to place
his fraternity rivals permanently behind bars, not one .of them testified against all of
them. If the prosecution eyewitnesses, who were all Sigma Rhoans, were simply bent
on convicting Scintilla Juris members for that matter, they could have easily tagged
each and every single accused as a participant in the atrocious and barbaric assault
to make sure that no one else would escape conviction. Instead, each eyewitness
named only one or two and some were candid enough to say that they did not see
who delivered the blows against them.104
Because one of the penalties meted out was reclusion perpetua, the case was
brought to this court on automatic appeal. However, due to the amendment of the
Rules on Appeal,105 the case was remanded to the Court of Appeals.106 In the Court of
Appeals, the case had to be re-raffled several Times107 before it was eventually
assigned to Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. for the writing of the decision.
On December 26, 2010, the Court of Appeals, in a Special First Division of Five,
affirmed108 the decision of the Regional Trial Court, with three (3) members
concurring109 an one (1) dissenting.110
The decision of the Court of Appeals was then brought to this court for review.
The issue before this court is whether the prosecution was able to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that accused-appellants attacked private complainants and caused
the death of Dennis Venturina.
On the basis, however, of the arguments presented to this court by both parties, the
issue may be further refined, thus:
1. Whether accused-appellants' constitutional rights were violated when the
information against them contained the aggravating circumstance of the use
of masks despite the prosecution presenting witnesses to prove that the
masks fell off; and
2. Whether the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals correctly ruled,
on the basis of the evidence, that accused-appellants were sufficiently
identified.
I
An information is sufficient
when the accused is fully
apprised of the charge against
him to enable him to prepare
his defense
It is the argument of appellants that the information filed against them violates their
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
them. They argue that the prosecution should not have included the phrase "wearing
masks and/or other forms of disguise" in the information since they were presenting
testimonial evidence that not all the accused were wearing masks or that their masks
fell off.
It is enshrined in our Bill of Rights that "[n]o person shall be held to answer for a
criminal offense without due process of law."111 This includes the right of the accused
to be presumed innocent until proven guilty and "to be informed of the nature and
accusation against him."112
Upon a finding of probable cause, an information is filed by the prosecutor against the
accused, in compliance with the due process of the law. Rule 110, Section 1,
paragraph 1 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that:
A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of
as constituting the offense; the name of the offended pary; the approximate date of
the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
In People v. Wilson Lab-ea,113 this court has stated that:
The test of sufficiency of Information is whether it enables a person of common
understanding to know the charge against him, and the court to render judgment
properly. x x x The purpose is to allow the accused to fully prepare for his defense,
precluding surprises during the trial.114
44 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
Contrary to the arguments of the appellants, the inclusion of the phrase "wearing
masks and/or other forms of disguise" in the information does not violate their
constitutional rights.
It should be remembered that every aggravating circumstance being alleged must be
stated in the information. Failure to state an aggravating circumstance, even if duly
proven at trial, will not be appreciated as such.115 It was, therefore, incumbent on the
prosecution to state the aggravating circumstance of "wearing masks and/or other
forms of disguise" in the information in order for all the evidence, introduced to that
effect, to be admissible by the trial court.
In criminal cases, disguise is an aggravating circumstance because, like nighttime, it
allows the accused to remain anonymous and unidentifiable as he carries out his
crimes.
The introduction of the prosecution of testimonial evidence that tends to prove that
the accused were masked but the masks fell off does not prevent them from including
disguise as an aggravating circumstance.116 What is important in alleging disguise as
an aggravating circumstance is that there was a concealment of identity by the
accused. The inclusion of disguise in the information was, therefore, enough to
sufficiently apprise the accused that in the commission of the offense they were being
charged with, they tried to conceal their identity.
The introduction of evidence which shows that some of the accused were not wearing
masks is also not violative of their right to be informed of their offenses.
The information charges conspiracy among the accused. Conspiracy presupposes
that "the act of one is the act of all."117 This would mean all the accused had been one
in their plan to conceal their identity even if there was evidence later on to prove that
some of them might not have done so.
In any case, the accused were being charged with the crime of murder, frustrated
murder, and attempted murder. All that is needed for the information to be sufficient is
that the elements of the crime have been alleged and that there are sufficient details
as to the time, place, and persons involved in the offense.
II
Findings of the trial court,
when affirmed by the
appellate court, are entitled
to great weight and credence
As a general rule, the findings of fact by the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate
court, are given great weight and credence on review. The rationale for this was
explained in People v. Daniel Quijada,118 as follows:
Settled is the rule that the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility
of witnesses, are accorded great weight and respect. For, the trial court has the
advantage of observing the witnesses through the different indicators of truthfulness
or falsehood, such as the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a
discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a
ready reply;
or the furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the sincere or the
flippant or sneering tone, the heat, the calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or
lack of it, the scant or full realization of the solemnity of an oath, the carriage and
mien.119
There are, of course, recognized exceptions to this rule. In People v. Leticia
Labarias,120 this court stated that:
It is the policy of this Court to sustain the factual findings of the trial court on the
reasonable assumption that it is in a better position to assess the evidence before it,
particularly the testimonies of the witnesses, who reveal much of themselves by their
deportment on the stand. The exception that makes the rule is where such findings
arc clearly arbitrary or erroneous as when they are tainted with bias or hostility or are
so lacking in basis as to suggest that they were reached without the careful study and
perceptiveness that should characterize a judicial decision.121 (Emphasis supplied)
In criminal cases, the exception gains even more importance since the presumption is
always in favor of innocence. It is only upon proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt
that a conviction is sustained.
In this case, a total of eleven (11) witnesses for the prosecution and forty-two (42)
witnesses for the defense were put on the stand from 1995 to 2001. In an eighty-three
(83)-page decision, the trial court acquitted six (6) and convicted five (5) of the
accused. On the basis of these numbers alone, it cannot be said that the trial court
acted arbitrarily or that its decision was "so lacking in basis" that it was arrived at
without a judicious and exhaustive study of all the evidence presented.
Inasmuch, however, as the trial court's findings hold great persuasive value, there is
also nothing that precludes this court from coming to its own conclusions based on an
independent review of the facts and the evidence on record.
The accused were sufficiently
identified by the witnesses for
the prosecution
The trial court, in weighing all the evidence on hand, found the testimonies of the
witnesses for the prosecution to be credible. In its decision, the trial court stated that:
45 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
x x x. Although each victim had a very strong motive to place his fraternity rivals
permanently behind bars, not one testified against all of them. If the prosecution
eyewitnesses, who were all Sigma Rhoans, were simply bent on convicting Scintilla
Juris members for that matter, they could have easily tagged each and every accused
as a participant in the atrocious and barbaric assault to make sure no one would
escape conviction. Instead, each eyewitness named only one or two and some were
candid enough to say that they did not see who delivered the blows against them.
Thus, the prosecution witnesses, Ernest Paulo Tan, Dennis Gaio and Darwin
Asuncion, testified to have seen it all but they could not, and did not, disclose any
name. Lachica, on the other hand, said that he did not have the opportunity to see
and identify the person who hit him in the back and inflicted a two-inch cut. His
forearm was also hit by a lead pipe but he did not see who did it. Natalicio, one of the
other three who were hospitalized, was severely beaten by three waves of attackers
totalling more than 15 but he could only name 3 of them. He added, however, that he
would be able to recognize those he saw if he would see them again. Of them,
Mangrobang pointed to at least 5 but he stressed that he did not see Zingapan,
Soliva, Guerrero, Del Rosario, Daraoay, Denoista, and Penalosa during the
onslaught. Gaston could have named any of the accused as the one who repeatedly
hit him with a heavy pipe and stabbed him but he frankly said their faces were
covered. Like Natalicio, Fortes was repeatedly beaten by several groups but did not
name any of the accused as one of those who attacked him. The persons he
identified were those leading the pack with one of them as the assailant of Venturina,
and the two others who he saw standing while he was running away. He added that
he saw some of the accused during the attack but did not know then their
names.122 (Emphasis supplied)
We agree.
The trial court correctly held that "considering the swiftness of the incident," 123 there
would be slight inconsistencies in their statements. In People v. Adriano Cabrillas,124 it
was previously observed that:
It is perfectly natural for different witnesses testifying on the occurrence of a crime to
give varying details as there may be some details which one witness may notice while
the other may not observe or remember. In fact, jurisprudence even warns against a
perfect dovetailing of narration by different witnesses as it could mean that their
testimonies were prefabricated and rehearsed.125 (Emphasis supplied)
According to their testimonies, Lachica was able to identify Alvir, Zingapan, and
Medalla;126
Natalicio was able to identify Medalla, Zingapan, and Soliva;127 and Fortes was able to
identify Feliciano, Medalla, and Zingapan.128 Their positive identification was due to
the fact that they either wore no masks or that their masks fell off.
It would be in line with human experience that a victim or an eyewitness of a crime
would endeavor to find ways to identify the assailant so that in the event that he or
she survives, the criminal could be apprehended. It has also been previously held
that:
It is the most natural reaction for victims of criminal violence to strive to see the looks
and faces of their assailants and observe the manner in which the crime was
committed. Most often the face of the assailant and body movements thereof, creates
a lasting impression which cannot be easily erased from their memory.129
In the commotion, it was more than likely that the masked assailants could have lost
their masks. It had been testified by the victims that some of the assailants were
wearing masks of either a piece of cloth or a handkerchief and that
Alvir,130 Zingapan,131 Soliva,132 and Feliciano133 had masks on at first but their masks
fell off and hung around their necks.
Equally telling was the testimony of defense witness Frisco Capilo during cross-
examination who observed that some of the attackers were wearing masks and some
were not, thus:
Q Mr. Capilo, do you know this Scintilla Juris Fraternity?
A No, sir.
Q During the incident of December 8, 1994, there were a lot of people eating in the
Beach House Canteen, and then running towards different directions, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q And some people were wearing masks and some were not?
A Yes, sir.134
While the attack was swift and sudden, the victims would have had the presence of
mind to take a look at their assailants if they were identifiable. Their positive
identification, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, must be upheld to be
credible.
It has been argued that the trial court did not give Mangrobang's testimony credence
while Gaston's testimony was found to be "hazy." This argument is unmeritorious.
It should be noted that it was the trial court itself that stated that the acquittal of the
Scintilla Juris members identified by Mangrobang "should not be. misinterpreted to
mean that the tt:'.stimony of Mangrobang was an absolute fabrication." 135 The court
went on to state that they "were exonerated merely because they were accorded the
46 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
benefit of the doubt as their identification by Mangrobang, under tumultuous and
chaotic circumstances were [sic] not corroborated and their alibis, not
refuted."136 There was, therefore, no basis to say that Mangrobang was not credible; it
was only that the evidence presented was not strong enough to overcome the
presumption of innocence.
Gaston's testimony, on the other hand, was considered "hazy"137 by the trial court only
with regard to his identification of Zingapan's companion. Gaston testified that he saw
Zingapan with Morano, with Zingapan moving and Morano staying in place. Fortes,
however, testified that both Zingapan and Morano were running after him. Lachica
also testified that it was Medalla, not Morano, who was with Zingapan. Because of
this confusion, the trial court found that there was doubt as to who was really beside
Zingapan. The uncertainty resulted into an acquittal for Morano. Despite this, the
court still did not" impute doubt in their testimonies that Zingapan was present at the
scene.
Be that as it may, the acquittals made by the trial court further prove that its decision
was brought about only upon a thorough examination of the evidence presented: It
accepted that there were inconsistencies in the testimonies of the victims but that
these were minor and did not affect their credibility. It ruled that "[s]uch
inconsistencies, and even probabilities, are not unusual 'for there is no person with
perfect faculties or senses."'138
Evidence as part of the res
gestae may be admissible but
have little persuasive value in
this case
According to the testimony of U.P. Police Officer Salvador, 139 when he arrived at the
scene, he interviewed the bystanders who all told him that they could not recognize
the attackers since they were all masked. This, it is argued, could be evidence that
could be given as part of the res gestae.
As a general rule, "[a] witness can testify only to the facts he knows of his personal
knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, x x x." 140 All other
kinds of testimony are hearsay and are inadmissible as evidence. The Rules of Court,
however, provide several exceptions to the general rule, and one of which is when the
evidence is part of res gestae, thus:
Section 42. Part of res gestae. - Statements made by a person while a starting
occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to
the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of res gestae. So, also,
statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal
significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.141
In People v. Rodrigo Salafranca,142 this court has previously discussed the
admissibility of testimony taken as part of res gestae, stating that:
A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus admissible
in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur,
to wit: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements
are made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements
must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances.
xxxx
The term res gestae has been defined as "those circumstances which are the
undersigned incidents of a particular litigated act and which are admissible when
illustrative of such act." In a general way, res gestae refers to the circumstances,
facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its
character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to
exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The rule on res gestae encompasses
the exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or
spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission
of the crime when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a
spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and
there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false
statement. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is,
therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or
connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a
part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation
or purpose to manufacture testimony.143
There is no doubt that a sudden attack on a group peacefully eating lunch on a school
campus is a startling occurrence. Considering that the statements of the bystanders
were made immediately after the startling occurrence, they are, in fact, admissible as
evidence given in res gestae.
In People v. Albarido,144 however, this court has stated that "in accord to ordinary
human experience:"
x x x persons who witness an event perceive the same from their respective points of
reference. Therefore, almost always, they have different accounts of how it
happened. Certainly, we cannot expect the testimony of witnesses to a crime to be
consistent in all aspects because different persons have different impressions and
recollections of the same incident. x x x145
(Emphasis supplied)
The statements made by the bystanders, although admissible, have little persuasive
value since the bystanders could have seen the events transpiring at different
vantage points and at different points in time. Even Frisco Capilo, one of the
bystanders at the time of the attack, testified that the attackers had their masks on at
first, but later on, some remained masked and some were unmasked.
47 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
When the bystanders' testimonies are weighed against those of the victims who
witnessed the entirety of the incident from beginning to end at close range, the former
become merely corroborative of the fact that an attack occurred. Their account of the
incident, therefore, must be given considerably less weight than that of the victims.
The belated identification by
the victims do not detract from
their positive identification of
the appellants
It is argued that the fact that the victims stayed silent about the incident to the U.P.
Police or the Quezon City Police but instead executed affidavits with the National
Bureau of Investigation four (4) days after the incident gives doubt as to the credibility
of their testimonies.
U.P. Police Officer Romeo Cabrera146 testified that on their way to the U.P. Infirmary,
he interviewed the victims who all told him they could not recognize the attackers
because they were all wearing masks. Meanwhile, Dr. Mislang147 testified to the effect
that when she asked Natalicio who attacked them, Natalicio answered that he did not
know because they were masked.
It must be remembered that the parties involved in this case belong to rival
fraternities. While this court does not condone their archaic and oftentimes barbaric
traditions, it is conceded that there are certain practices that are unique to fraternal
organizations.
It is quite possible that at this point in time, they knew the identities of their attackers
but chose not to disclose it without first conferring with their other fraternity brothers.
This probability is bolstered by the actions of Sigma Rho after the incident, which
showed that they confronted the members of Scintilla Juris in SM North. Because of
the tenuous relationship of rival fraternities, it would not have been prudent for Sigma
Rho to retaliate against the wrong fraternity.
Their act of not disclosing the correct information to the U.P. Police or to Dr. Mislang
does not make the police officer or the doctor's testimonies more credible than that of
the victims. It should not be forgotten that the victims actually witnessed the entire
incident, while Officer Salvador, Officer Cabrera, and Dr. Mislang were merely
relaying secondhand information.
The fact that they went to the National Bureau of Investigation four (4) days after the
incident also does not affect their credibility since most of them had been hospitalized
from their injuries and needed to recover first.
Since a fraternity moves as one unit, it would be understandable that they decided to
wait until all of them were well enough to go to the National Bureau of Investigation
headquarters in order to give their statements.
Seniority is also often the norm in fraternities. It was upon the advice of their senior
"brads" and their legal counsel that they executed their sworn statements before the
National Bureau of Investigation four (4) days after the incident.
The decision to report the incident to the National Bureau of Investigation instead of
to the U.P. Police was the call of their legal counsel who might have deemed the
National Bureau of Investigation more equipped to handle the investigation. This does
not, however, affect the credibility of the witnesses since they were merely following
the legal advice of their counsel.
Indeed, there is reason to believe that the National Bureau of Investigation is better
equipped than the U.P. Police to handle the investigation of the case. As stated in the
U.P. College of Economics website:
The UP Diliman Police (UPDP) is tasked with maintaining campus security. Their
station is located in front of the College of Architecture.
The primary missions of the UPDP are to maintain peace and order, secure and
protect lives and property, enforce basic laws, applicable Quezon City Ordinances,
and University Rules and Regulations including policies and standards; and to
perform such other functions relative to the general safety and security of the
students, employees, and residents in the U.P. Diliman Campus. x x x.148 (Emphasis
supplied)
It can be seen that the U.P. Police is employed by U.P. primarily for campus security.
They are by no means an actual police force that is equipped to handle a full-blown
murder investigation. Fraternity-related violence in U.P. has also increasingly become
more frequent, which might possibly have desensitized the U.P. Police in such a way
that would prevent their objectivity in the conduct of their investigations. The victims'
reliance on the National Bureau of Investigation, therefore, is understandable.
III
Alibi cannot prevail over the
positive identification of the
victim
It is settled that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of
the victim.149 In People v. Benjamin Peteluna,150 this court stated that:
It is a time-honored principle that the positive identification of the appellant by a
witness destroys the defense of alibi and denial. Thus:
x x x. It is well-entrenched that alibi and denial are inherently weak and have always
been viewed with disfavor by the courts due to the facility with which they can be
concocted. They warrant the least credibility or none at all and cannot prevail over the
48 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
positive identification of the appellant by the prosecution witnesses. For alibi to
prosper, it is not enough to prove that appellant was somewhere else when the crime
was committed; he must also demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to
have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Unless
substantiated by clear and convincing proof, such defense is negative, self-serving,
and undeserving of any weight in law. Denial, like alibi, as an exonerating
justification[,] is inherently weak and if uncorroborated regresses to blatant
impotence. Like alibi, it also constitutes self-serving negative evidence which cannot
be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who
testify on affirmative matters.151
In this case, the victims were able to positively identify their attackers while the
accused-appellants merely offered alibis and denials as their defense. The credibility
of the victims was upheld by both the trial court and the appellate court while giving
little credence to the accused-appellants' alibis. There is, thus, no reason to disturb
their findings.
Accused-appellants were
correctly charged with
murder, and there was
treachery in the commission
of the crime
According to the provisions of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the accused-
appellants were correctly charged with murder. Article 248 states:
ART. 248. Murder.-Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246,
shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua, to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men,
or employing means to weaken the defense, or of means or persons to insure or
afford impunity;
xxxx
It is undisputed that on December 8, 1994, a group of men armed with lead pipes and
baseball bats attacked Dennis Venturina and his companions, which resulted in
Venturina's death.
As correctly found by the trial court and the appellate court, the offense committed
against Dennis Venturina was committed by a group that took advantage of its
superior strength and with the aid of armed men. The appellate court, however,
incorrectly ruled out the presence of treachery in the commission of the offense.
It has been stated previously by this court that:
[T]reachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense
which the offended party might make.152
Similarly, in People v. Leozar Dela Cruz,153 this court stated that:
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense
which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is that the attack
comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording
the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. For
treachery to be considered, two elements must concur: (1) the employment of means
of execution that gives the persons attacked no opportunity to defend themselves or
retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously
adopted.154 (Emphasis supplied)
The appellate court, in affirming the conviction of the accused-appellants, ruled that
contrary to the findings of the trial court, there was no treachery involved. In particular,
they ruled that although the attack was sudden and unexpected, "[i]t was done in
broad daylight with a lot of people who could see them" 155 and that "there was a
possibility for the victims to have fought back or that the people in the canteen could
have helped the victims."156
This reasoning is clearly erroneous. The victims in this case were eating lunch on
campus. They were not at a place where they would be reasonably expected to be on
guard for any sudden attack by rival fraternity men.
The victims, who were unarmed, were also attacked with lead pipes and baseball
bats. The only way they could parry the blows was with their arms. In a situation
where they were unnamed and outnumbered, it would be impossible for them to fight
back against the attackers. The attack also happened in less than a minute, which
would preclude any possibility of the bystanders being able to help them until after the
incident.
The swiftness and the suddenness of the attack gave no opportunity for the victims to
retaliate or even to defend themselves. Treachery, therefore, was present in this
case.
The presence of conspiracy
makes all of the accused-
appellants liable for murder
and attempted murder
49 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
In the decision of the trial court, all of the accused-appellants were found guilty of the
murder of Dennis Venturina and the attempted murder of Mervin Natalicio, Cesar
Mangrobang, Jr. Leandro Lachica, Arnel Fortes, and Cristobal Gaston, Jr. The
appellate court, however, modified their liabilities and found that the accused-
appellants were guilty of attempted murder only against Natalicio and Fortes, and not
against Mangrobang, Lachica, and Gaston.
It is the appellate court's reasoning that because Lachica and Mangrobang "were no
longer chased by the attackers,"157 it concluded that accused-appellants "voluntary
desisted from pursuing them and from inflicting harm to them, which shows that they
did not have the intent to do more than to make them suffer pain by slightly injuring
them."158 It also pointed out that the wound inflicted on Gaston "was too shallow to
have been done with an intent to kill."159
Thus, it concluded that the accused-appellants would have been guilty only of slight
physical injuries.
This is erroneous.
It should be remembered that the trial court found that there was conspiracy among
the accused-appellants160 and the appellate court sustainedthis finding.161
Conspiracy, once proven, has the effect of attaching liability to all of the accused,
regardless of their degree of participation, thus: Once an express or implied
conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of
the extent and character of their respective active participation in the commission of
the crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy because in
contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all. The foregoing rule is anchored on
the sound principle that "when two or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal
object, whether through the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding severally or
collectively, each individual whose evil will actively contributes to the wrong-doing is in
law responsible for the whole, the same as though performed by himself alone."
Although it is axiomatic that no one is liable for acts other than his own, "when two or
more persons agree or conspire to commit a crime, each is responsible for all the acts
of the others, done in furtherance of the agreement or conspiracy." The imposition of
collective liability upon the conspirators is clearly explained in one case where this
Court held that
... it is impossible to graduate the separate liability of each (conspirator) without taking
into consideration the close and inseparable relation of each of them with the criminal
act, for the commission of which they all acted by common agreement ... The crime
must therefore in view of the solidarity of the act and intent which existed between the
... accused, be regarded as the act of the band or party created by them, and they are
all equally responsible
Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and confederated
in the commission of the felony proved, collective liability of the accused conspirators
attaches by reason of the conspiracy, and the court shall not speculate nor even
investigate as to the actual degree of participation of each of the perpetrators present
at the scene of the crime. x x x.162 (Emphasis supplied)
The liabilities of the accused-appellants m this case arose from a single incident
wherein the accused-appellants were armed with baseball bats and lead pipes, all in
agreement to do the highest amount of damage possible to the victims. Some were
able to run away and take cover, but the others would fall prey at the hands of their
attackers. The intent to kill was already present at the moment of attack and that
intent was shared by all of the accused-appellants alike when the presence of
conspiracy was proven. It is, therefore, immaterial to distinguish between the
seriousness of the injuries suffered by the victims to determine the respective
liabilities of their attackers. What is relevant is only as to whether the death occurs as
a result of that intent to kill and whether there are qualifying, aggravating or mitigating
circumstances that can be appreciated.
The appellate court, therefore, erred in finding the accused-appellants guilty only of
slight physical injuries. It would be illogical to presume that despite the swiftness and
suddenness of the attack, the attackers intended to kill only Venturina, Natalicio, and
Fortes, and only intended to injure Lachica, Mangrobang, and Gaston. Since the
intent to kill was evident from the moment the accused-appellants took their first
swing, all of them were liable for that intent to kill.1âwphi1
For this reason, the accused-appellants should be liable for the murder of Dennis
Venturina and the attempted murder of Mervin Natalicio, Cesar Mangrobang, Jr.,
Leandro Lachica, Arnel Fortes, and Cristobal Gaston, Jr.
A Final Note
It is not only the loss of one promising young life; rather, it is also the effect on the five
other lives whose once bright futures are now put in jeopardy because of one
senseless act of bravado. There is now more honor for them to accept their
responsibility and serve the consequences of their actions. There is, however, nothing
that they can do to bring back Dennis Venturina or fully compensate for his senseless
and painful loss.
This is not the first fraternity-related case to come to this court; neither will it be the
last. Perhaps this case and many cases like it can empower those who have a better
view of masculinity: one which valorizes courage, sacrifice and honor in more life-
saving pursuits.
"Giting at dangal" are words of the anthem of the University of the Philippines. It
colors the stories of many who choose to expend their energy in order that our people
will have better lives. Fraternity rumbles are an anathema, an immature and useless
expenditure of testosterone. It fosters a culture that retards manhood. It is devoid of
"giting at dangal."
50 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
This_ kind of shameful violence must stop.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR N). 01158 dated
November 26, 2010 is AFFIRMED insofar as the accused-appellants Danilo Feliciano,
Jr., Julius Victor Medalla, Christopher Soliva, Warren L. Zingapan, and Robert
Michael Beltran Alvir are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder in.
Criminal Case No. Q95-61133 with the MODIFICATION that they be fouhd GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of Attempted Murder in Criminal Case Nos. Q95-61136,
Q95-61135, Q95-61134, Q95-61138, and Q95-61137.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 195196               July 13, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ESTANLY OCTA y BAS, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
Before us is a Notice of Appeal 1 dated 30 July 2010 from the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision2 dated 19 July 2010 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03490, affirming the
Decision3 dated 15 May 2008 in Criminal Case No. 04-224073 issued by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) Branch 48, Manila, convicting accused-appellant Estanly Octa y
Bas, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for ransom.
As culled from the records, the prosecution's version is herein quoted:
In the morning of September 25, 2003, around 6:40 A.M., Johnny Corpuz (Johnny)
and Mike Adrian Batuigas (Mike Adrian) were on board a Honda Civic Car colored
silver with Plate No. UPT 697 travelling on Buenos Aires St., Sampaloc, Manila when
their way was blocked by a Mitsubishi box type Lancer car colored red-orange. The
four (4) armed occupants of the Lancer car alighted. Johnny did not open the door of
the Honda Civic car but one of the armed men fired his pistol at the left window of the
civic car, thus compelling Johnny to open the locked door of the car. The armed men
went inside the car and Johnny was ordered to transfer at the back seat at that time.
Inside the car, Johnny was handcuffed, blindfolded and was even boxed. The armed
men asked for the names and telephone numbers of his mother-in-law. The armed
men called his mother-in-law giving the information that Johnny was in their custody
and they would just meet each other at a certain place. They travelled for a while and
then they stopped and Johnny was brought to a safehouse.
After Johnny and Mike were kidnapped, the kidnappers communicated with Johnny’s
wife Ana Marie Corpuz (Ana Marie) giving the information that they have intheir
custody her husband Johnny and her brother Mike Adrian. Ana Marie tried to confirm
the kidnapping incident by talking to her husband, who confirmed to his wife that he
and Mike Adrian were indeed kidnapped and they were in the custody of their
abductors. Ana Marie sought the assistance of the PACER [Police AntiCrime and
Emergency Response] and stayed in a PACER safehouse located at P. Tuazon,
Cubao, Quezon City. During her stay, she had several communications with her
husband’s kidnappers. The latter started demanding the amount of ₱20 million for the
release of her husband and her brother but the amount was considerably reduced up
to the time that Ana Marie was able to raise the amount of ₱538,000.00 which was
accepted by the kidnappers.
Finally, on September 30, 2003 at 10PM, the kidnappers set up the manner on how
the ransom money would be delivered. Ana Marie travelled to Quiapo Church, then to
Quezon City circle up to SM Fairview and to Robinsons Fairview. She was made to
stop at Red Lips Beer House and go to the nearby Caltex Auto Supply where she
would see a man wearing a red cap and who would ask her "saan yong padala ni
boss". She was instructed to deliver the wrapped bundled ransom money to the man
wearing red cap. When she saw the man with red cap, she was asked for the money.
At first, she did not give the money because she wanted to be sure that she was
giving the money to the right man. Using her own cellphone, she called up the man
who had been instructing her all along and asked him to confirm if the man in front of
her is the right man to give the ransom money to, saying "kausapin mo muna ito kung
siya ba." The man in the phone and the man in the red cap talked for a while in
another dialect which Ana Marie did not understand. When she asked the man to give
back her cellphone to her, he refused and, instead instructed her to give the money to
him. She described the man wearing red cap to be goodlooking, lightly built, in his
early 20s, around 5’4" in height and with dimples, which she later identified in court as
accused Estanly Octa.
On October 1, 2003, Johnny was released by his captors after the payment of ransom
money. He was detained for the duration of six (6) days. After his release, he
removed his blindfold and handcuffs but he could hardly regain his sight and see
things. He flagged down a private pick-up and learned that he was in Camarin,
Caloocan City. He asked a favor that he be driven to Meycauayan, Bulacan where he
took a jeepney to Monumento, and from there, he took a taxi bound home. When he
was released, his brother-in-law Mike Adrian was also released.4
The defense recounted a different set of facts, to wit:
x x x [O]n September 25, 2003, he was still in Daet, Camarines Norte working as a
welder in the welding shop of his uncle Edwin delos Reyes. He went to Daet on the
second week of August 2003 and returned to Manila when he was called by his father
sometime in November 2003. In addition to his defense of denial and alibi, he clings
to the theory that he himself was a victim of abduction. He testified that, on December
1, 2003, while crossing the street, his way was blocked by a van and thereafter, two
(2) persons alighted and a gun was poked at him then he was boarded inside the van.
His hands were tied and eyes covered. The incident happened at Susano Road,
Camarin, Caloocan City. He was eventually brought to the PACER Office, Camp
51 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
Crame, Quezon City. He claims that he was tortured to admit the charge filed against
him. At the PACER’s office, he was presented to a State Prosecutor of the DOJ but
he claimed he was not assisted by counsel. He said that he did not submit himself for
medical examination. He categorically stated that, when he was inquested by a State
Prosecutor, he did not tell of the alleged torture that he suffered because he was
afraid.5
On 4 December 2003, accused-appellant was arrested by the operatives of the Police
Anti-Crime and Emergency Response (PACER) on S[u]sano Road, Camarin,
Caloocan City, in connection with another kidnap for ransom incident. He was
identified by prosecution witness Ana Marie Corpuz from a police line-up as the
person who had received the ransom money from her.6 Consequently, on 26
February 2004, an Information7 was filed against accused-appellant charging him with
the crime of kidnapping for ransom as follows:
That on or about 6:40 a.m. of September 25, 2003, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating, and mutually helping one another, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously kidnap and deprive JOHNNY L.CORPUZ and
MIKE ADRIAN BATUIGAS, a minor, of their liberty and against their will by means of
threats and intimation with the use of firearms, and then bring them through the use of
a motor vehicle to a house, wherein they were detained for a period of six (6) days,
and that the abduction of the said victims was for the purpose of extorting
Php538,000.00 was actually delivered to the above-mentioned accused in exchange
for the release of the victims.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
When arraigned on 5 July 2004,accused-appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not
guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits then ensued.9
On 15 May 2008, the RTC rendered a Decision,10 the dispositive portion of which is
herein quoted:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Estanly Octa y Bas guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for the felony charge [sic] and pursuant to law, he is hereby sentenced to suffer
maximum prison term of reclusion perpetua and to pay the private aggrieved party of
the following:
1. The amount of 538,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages;
2. The amount of 100,000.00 as moral damages; and
3. The amount of 50,000.00 as exemplary damages and cost.
In view of the conviction of the accused, the Manila City Jail is ordered to commit his
person to the National Penitentiary immediately without necessary [sic] delay.
SO ORDERED.11
In so ruling, the RTC ruled that prosecution witness Ana Marie Corpuz, wife of victim
Johnny Corpuz, steadfastly testified that she gave the ransom money in the amount
of 538,000 to accused-appellant. She did not waiver in identifying and describing him
as good-looking, wearing red cap, light in built, in his early 20’s, 5’4" and with dimples.
The assertion of Ana Marie Corpuz that accused-appellant was sporting dimples was
squarely corroborated by the court’s observation when he took the witness stand.12
The trial court also viewed the act of receiving ransom money as sufficient evidence
to establish accused-appellant’s conspiratorial act in the kidnapping for ransom of the
victims in this case.13
With respect to the defense of denial and alibi, the RTC found them to be inherently
weak as opposed to the straightforward testimony of Corpuz. The claim of accused-
appellant that he was abducted did not convince the court either, inasmuch as it was
not supported by evidence, nor was it the subject of an investigation.14
Upon intermediate appellate review, the CA rendered a Decision15 promulgated on 19
July 2010, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the appeal in this case is DENIED
and the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 48, in Manila in Criminal
Case No. 04-224073 finding Estanly Octa y Bas guilty of the crime of kidnapping for
ransom and imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered him to pay
538,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages, 100,000.00 as moral damages
and 50,000.00 as exemplary damages and cost, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.16
The CA found the positive identification of accused-appellant by prosecution witness
Ana Marie Corpuz to be unwavering and steadfast. It stressed that his positive
identification, when categorical, consistent, straightforward, and without any showing
of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, would prevail over
mere alibi and denial.17 Such positive identification constituted direct evidence, and
not merely circumstantial evidence.18
Moreover, the CA ruled that accused-appellant had been rightly found to be a co-
conspirator in this case. At the time he received the ransom money, the crime of
kidnapping was still continuing, since both victims were still illegally detained by the
kidnappers. Accused-appellant’s act of taking the ransom money was an overt act
made in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.19
52 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
Hence, the instant appeal.20
ISSUES
In seeking a reversal of the decisions of the CA and the RTC, accused-appellant Octa
argues that:
1. The trial court gravely erred in convicting him despite the prosecutions’
failure to positively identify him as the ransom taker;21
2. The trial court gravely erred in finding him to be a conspirator to the crime
charged;22 and
3. The trial court gravely erred in convicting him of the crime charged based
on circumstantial evidence.23
THE COURT’S RULING
We deny accused-appellant’s appeal.
When the credibility of a witness is at
issue, the findings of fact of the trial
court are accorded high respect if
not conclusive effect, more so if
those findings have been affirmed by
the appellate court.
In his Brief, accused-appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that he was the one who received the ransom money. He primarily
argues that prosecution witness Ana Marie Corpuz could not have positively
ascertained the identity of the ransom taker, because the area where the transaction
took place was dark, and the man was wearing a cap. Neither did Corpuz declare in
her Sinumpaang Salaysay that the person who received the ransom money was
sporting a dimple, a fact that she mentioned on direct examination. 24 Accused-
appellant further insinuates that the police might have influenced his out-of-court
identification in the line-up when they informed Corpuz that they had apprehended
some people who were suspects in other kidnap for ransom cases, and that
information might have conditioned her mind that the ransom taker had already been
apprehended.25
We disagree.
In People v. Basao,26 the Court held that:
[T]the matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and
most competently performed by the trial judge, who had the unmatched opportunity to
observe the witnesses and to assess their credibility by the various indicia available
but not reflected on the record. The demeanor of the person on the stand can draw
the line between fact and fancy. The forthright answer or the hesitant pause, the
quivering voice or the angry tone, the flustered look or the sincere gaze, the modest
blush or the guilty blanch – these can reveal if the witness is telling the truth or lying
through his teeth.27
xxxx
[Thus], when the credibility of a witness is in issue, the findings of fact of the trial
court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the
probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are
accorded high respect if not conclusive effect. This is more true if such findings were
affirmed by the appellate court, since it is settled that when the trial court’s findings
have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally binding upon
this Court. Without any clear showing that the trial court and the appellate court
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance, the rule should not be disturbed."28
In this case, both the RTC and the CA found Corpuz to be a credible witness who had
categorically testified that she saw the face of the ransom taker, and that he was
actually the accused-appellant.
The fact that Corpuz failed to declare in her Sinumpaang Salaysay that the ransom
taker was sporting a dimple was not fatal to her testimony because she was able to
positively and categorically identify accused-appellant during the police line-up and in
open court.
Even accused-appellant’s insinuation that Corpuz could have been influenced by the
police during the line-up cannot be given weight in the face of his positive
identification as the ransom taker. On this point, we agree with the observation of the
CA that "assuming arguendo that the accused-appellant’s out of court identification
was defective, her subsequent identification in court cured any flaw that may have
initially attended it. We emphasize that the ‘inadmissibility of a police line-up
identification x x x should not necessarily foreclose the admissibility of an
independent in-court identification.’"29
To hold an accused guilty as a co-
principal by reason of conspiracy, he
must be shown to have performed an
overt act in pursuance or
furtherance of the complicity.
Accused-appellant also claims that he cannot be considered as a conspirator to the
kidnapping in the absence of concrete proof that he actually participated in the
53 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
execution of the essential elements of the crime by overt acts indispensable to its
accomplishment. His receipt of the ransom money transpired only after the
kidnapping had been consummated and was not an essential element of the crime.30
We disagree.
On point is our dissertation in People v. Bautista,31 to wit:
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it.1awp++i1 Where all the accused
acted in concert at the time of the commission of the offense, and it is shown by such
acts that they had the same purpose or common design and were united in its
execution, conspiracy is sufficiently established. It must be shown that all participants
performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to indicate a
common purpose or design to commit the felony.
xxxx
Evidently, to hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he
must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the
complicity. There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the
furtherance of the common design and purpose. x x x.
xxxx
Taking these facts in conjunction with the testimony of Dexter, who testified that
accused-appellant was the one who received the ransom money x x x then the
commonality of purpose of the acts of accused-appellant together with the other
accused can no longer be denied. Such acts have the common design or purpose to
commit the felony of kidnapping for ransom.
Thus, accused-appellants’ argument that he is a mere accomplice must fail. He is
liable as a principal for being a co-conspirator in the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom
under Art. 267 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. 7659 x x x.32 (Emphasis ours)
Moreover, the CA is correct in its observation that at the time accused-appellant
received the ransom money, the crime of kidnapping was still continuing, since both
victims were still being illegally detained by the kidnappers. 33 While his receipt of the
ransom money was not a material element of the crime, it was nevertheless part of
the grand plan and was in fact the main reason for kidnapping the victims.34 Ransom
is money, price or consideration paid or demanded for the redemption of a captured
person or persons; or payment that releases from captivity.35 Without ransom money,
the freedom of the detained victims cannot be achieved. The positive identification of
accused-appellant constitutes direct, and not merely circumstantial, evidence.
Accused-appellant's contention that he was convicted based only on circumstantial
evidence deserves scant consideration. We agree with the conclusion of the CA that
"[Corpuz] testified that she gave the ransom money to accused-appellant, and as the
trial court declared, his act of receiving the ransom money is sufficient conspiratorial
act in the commission of the kidnapping for ransom. The positive identification of the
accused-appellant then constitutes direct evidence, and not merely circumstantial
evidence."36
With respect to the penalty imposed, we agree with the imposition by the RTC and the
CA on accused-appellant of the penalty of reclusion perpetua, considering the
prohibition on the death penalty.37 To conform to recent jurisprudence,38 we hereby
modify the exemplary damages awarded by increasing the amount from ₱50,000 to
₱100,000.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-HC No. 03490 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION.
Accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and ordered to pay ₱538,000 as actual damages, ₱100,000 as moral damages, and
₱100,000 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
July 19, 2016
G.R. No. 220598
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, Petitioner,
vs
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN (First
Division), Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 220953
BENIGNO B. AGUAS, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
We resolve the consolidated petitions for certiorari separately brought to assail and
annul the resolutions issued on April 6, 20151 and September 10, 2015,2 whereby
54 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
the Sandiganbayan  respectively denied their demurrer to evidence, and their motions
for reconsideration, asserting such denials to be tainted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Antecedents
On July 10, 2012, the Ombudsman charged in the Sandiganbayan  former President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA); Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO)
Budget and Accounts Officer Benigno Aguas; PCSO General Manager and Vice
Chairman Rosario C. Uriarte; PCSO Chairman of the Board of Directors Sergio 0.
Valencia; Members of the PCSO Board of Directors, namely: Manuel L. Morato, Jose
R. Taruc V, Raymundo T. Roquero, and Ma. Fatima A.S. Valdes; Commission on
Audit (COA) Chairman Reynaldo A. Villar; and COA Head of Intelligence/Confidential
Fund Fraud Audit Unit Nilda B. Plaras with plunder. The case was docketed as
Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-O 174 and assigned to the First Division of
the Sandiganbayan.
The information3 reads:
The undersigned Assistant Ombudsman and Gratl Investigation and Prosecution
Officer III, Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuse GLORIA MACAPAGAL-
ARROYO, ROSARIO C. URIARTE, SERGIO O. VALENCIA, MANUEL L. MORA TO,
JOSE R. TARUC V, RAYMUNDO T. ROQUERO, MA. FATIMA A.S. V ALOES,
BENIGNO B. AGUAS, REYNALDO A. VILLAR and NILDA B. PLARAS, of the crime
of PLUNDER, as defined by, and penalized under Section 2 of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 7080, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, committed, as follows:
That during the period from January 2008 to June 2010 or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused GLORIA MA CAP A GAL-ARROYO, then the President of
the Philippines, ROSARIO C. URIARTE, then General Manager and Vice Chairman,
SERGIO O. VALENCIA, then Chairman of the Board of Directors, MANUEL L. MORA
TO, JOSE R. TARUC V, RAYMUNDO T. ROQUERO, MA. FATIMA A.S. V ALOES,
then members of the Board of Directors, BENIGNO B. AGUAS, then Budget and
Accounts Manager, all of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO),
REYNALDO A. VILLAR, then Chairman, and NILDA B. PLARAS, then Head of
Intelligence/Confidential Fund Fraud Audit Unit, both of the Commission on Audit, all
public officers committing the offense in relation to their respective offices and taking
undue advantage of their respective official positions, authority, relationships,
connections or influence, conniving, conspiring and confederating with one another,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and/or
acquire. Directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value
of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE MILLION NINE HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN
THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FIFTEEN PESOS (PHP365,997,915.00), more or less,
through any or a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts, or similar schemes
or means, described as follows:
(a) diverting in several instances, funds from the operating budget of PCSO
to its Confidential/Intelligence Fund that could be accessed and withdrawn at
any time with minimal restrictions, and converting, misusing, and/or illegally
conveying or transferring the proceeds drawn from said fund in the
aforementioned sum, also in several instances, to themselves, in the guise
of fictitious expenditures, for their personal gain and benefit;
(b) raiding the public treasury by withdrawing and receiving, in several
instances, the above-mentioned amount from the Confidential/Intelligence
Fund from PCSO's accounts, and or unlawfully transferring or conveying the
same into their possession and control through irregularly issued
disbursement vouchers and fictitious expenditures; and
(c) taking advantage of their respective official positions, authority,
relationships, connections or influence, in several instances, to unjustly
enrich themselves in the aforementioned sum, at the expense of, and the
damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the
Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
By the end of October 2012, the Sandiganbayan already acquired jurisdiction over
GMA, Valencia, Morato and Aguas. Plaras, on the other hand, was able to secure a
temporary restraining order (TRO) from this Court in Plaras v.
Sandiganbayan  docketed as G.R. Nos. 203693-94. Insofar as Roquero is concerned,
the Sandiganbayan  acquired jurisdiction as to him by the early part of 2013. Uriarte
and Valdes remained at large.
Thereafter, several of the accused separately filed their respective petitions for bail.
On June 6, 2013, the Sandiganbayan granted the petitions for bail of Valencia,
Morato and Roquero upon finding that the evidence of guilt against them was not
strong.4 In the case of petitioners GMA and Aguas, the Sandiganbayan, through the
resolution dated November 5, 2013, denied their petitions for bail on the ground that
the evidence of guilt against them was strong. 5 The motions for reconsideration filed
by GMA and Aguas were denied by the Sandiganbayan  on February 19,
2014.6 Accordingly, GMA assailed the denial of her petition for bail in this Court, but
her challenge has remained pending and unresolved todate.
Personal jurisdiction over Taruc and Villar was acquired by the Sandiganbayan in
2014. Thereafter, said accused sought to be granted bail, and their motions were
granted on different dates, specifically on March 31, 20147 and May 9,
2014,8 respectively.
The case proceeded to trial, at which the State presented Atty. Aleta Tolentino as its
main witness against all the accused. The Sandiganbayan  rendered the following
summary of her testimony and evidence in its resolution dated November 5, 2013
denying the petitions for bail of GMA and Aguas, to wit:
55 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
She is a certified public accountant and a lawyer. She is a member of the Philippine
Institute of Certified Public Accountants and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. She
has been a CPA for 30 years and a lawyer for 20 years. She has practiced
accountancy and law. She became accounting manager of several companies. She
has also taught subjects in University of Santo Tomas, Manuel L. Quezon University,
Adamson University and the Ateneo de Manila Graduate School. She currently
teaches Economics, Taxation and Land Reform.
Presently, she is a Member of the Board of Directors of the PCSO. The Board
appointed her as Chairman of an Audit Committee. The audit review proceeded when
she reviewed the COA Annual Reports of the PCSO for 2006 2007 2008 and 2009
(Exhibits "D" "E" "F" and "G" respectively), and the annual financial statements
contained therein for the years 2005 to 2009. The reports were given to them by the
COA. These are transmitted to the PCSO annually after the subject year of audit.
One of her major findings was that the former management of the PCSO was
commingling the charity fund, the prize fund and the operating fund. By commingling
she means that the funds were maintained in only one main account. This violates
Section 6 of Republic Act 1169 (PCSO Charter) and generally accepted accounting
principles.
The Audit Committee also found out that there was excessive disbursement of the
Confidential and Intelligence Fund (CIF). There were also excessive disbursements
for advertising expenses. The internal audit department was also merged with the
budget and accounting department, which is a violation of internal audit rules.
There was excessive disbursement of the CIF because the PCSO was given only P10
million in 2002, i.e. P5 million for the Office of the Chairman and P5 million for the
Office of the General Manager. Such allocation was based on the letters of then
Chairman Lopez (Exh. "I") and then General Manager Golpeo (Exh. "J"), asking for
P5 million intelligence fund each. Both were dated February 21, 2000, and sent to
then President Estrada, who approved them. This allocation should have been the
basis for the original allocation of the CIF in the PCSO, but there were several
subsequent requests made by the General Manager during the time of, and which
were approved by, former President Arroyo.
The allocation in excess of P10 million was in violation of the PCSO Charter. PCSO
did not have a budget for this. They were working on a deficit from 2004 to 2009. The
charter allows only 15% of the revenue as operating fund, which was already
exceeded. The financial statements indicate that they were operating on a deficit in
the years 2006 to 2009.
It is within the power of the General Manager to ask for additional funds from the
President, but there should be a budget for it. The CIF should come from the
operating fund, such that, when there is no more operating fund, the other funds
cannot be used.
The funds were maintained in a commingled main account and PCSO did not have a
registry of budget utilization. The excess was not taken from the operating fund, but
from the prize fund and the charity fund.
In 2005, the deficit was P916 million; in 2006, Pl,000,078,683.23. One of the causes
of the deficit for 2006 was the CIF expense of P215 million, which was in excess of
the approved allocation of P10 million. The net cash provided by operating expenses
in 2006 is negative, which means that there were more expenses than what was
received.
In the 2007 COA report, it was found that there was still no deposit to the prize and
charity funds. The COA made a recommendation regarding the deposits in one main
account. There were also excessive disbursements of CIF amounting to P77,478,705.
She received a copy of the PCSO corporate operating budget (COB) for the year
2008 in 2010 because she was already a member of its Board of Directors. The 2008
approved COB has a comparative analysis of the actual budget for 2007 (Exh. "K"). It
is stated there that the budget for CTF in 2007 is only P25,480,550. But the financial
statements reflect P77 million. The budget was prepared and signed by then PCSO
General Manager Rosario Uriarte. It had accompanying Board Resolution No. 305,
Series of 2008, which was approved by then Chairperson Valencia, and board
members Valdes, Morato, Domingo, and attested to by Board Secretary Atty. Ronald
T. Reyes.
In the 2008 COA report, it was noted that there was still no deposit to the prize and
charity funds, adverted in the 2007 COA report. There was already a
recommendation by the COA to separate the deposits or funds in 2007. But the COA
noted that this was not followed. The financial statements show the Confidential and
the Extra-Ordinary Miscellaneous Expenses account is P38,293,137, which is more
than the P10 million that was approved.
In the Comparative Income Statement (Exh. "K"), the 2008 Confidential/Intelligence
Expense budget was approved for P28 million. The Confidential and Extra-Ordinary
Miscellaneous Expenses is the account being used for confidential and intelligence
expenses. The amount in the financial statements is over the budgeted amount of
P28 million. Further, the real disbursement is more than that, based on a summary of
expenditures she had asked the treasurer to prepare.
In the Comparative Income Statement for 2009 Budget against the 2008 Actual
Budget (Exh. "L"), the budget for CIF and expenses was P60 million.
In the 2009 COA report, it was noted that there was still no deposit to the prize and
charity funds, despite the instruction or recommendation of COA. The funds were still
deposited in one account. The COA observation in 2007 states that there is juggling
or commingling of funds.
56 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
After she had concluded the audit review, she reported her findings to the Board of
Directors in one of their executive meetings. The Board instructed her to go in-depth
in the investigation of the disbursements of CIF.
The Audit Committee also asked Aguas why there were disbursements in excess of
P10 million. He explained that there were board resolutions confirming additional CIF
which were approved by former President Arroyo. Aguas mentioned this in one of
their meetings with the directors and corporate secretary. The board secretary, Atty.
Ed Araullo, gave them the records of those resolutions.
In the records that Araullo submitted to her, it appears that Uriarte would ask for
additional CIF, by letter and President Arroyo approves it by affixing her signature on
that same letter-request. There were seven letters or memoranda to then President
Arroyo, with the subject "Request for Intelligence Fund."
She then asked their Treasurer, Mercy Hinayon, to give her a summary of all the
disbursements from CIF from 2007 to 2010. The total of all the amounts in the
summaries for three years is P365,997,915.
After receiving the summaries of the disbursed checks, she asked Hinayon to give her
the checks or copies thereof. She also asked Dorothy Robles, Budget and Accounting
Manager, to give her the corresponding vouchers. Only two original checks were
given to her, as the rest were with the bank. She asked her to request certified true
copies of the checks.
They were then called to the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, which was then
investigating the operation of PCSO, including the CIF. She was invited as a resource
speaker in an invitation from Chairman Teofisto Guingona III (Exh. "DD"). Before the
hearing, the Committee Chairman went to the PCSO and got some documents
regarding the subject matter being investigated. Araullo was tasked to prepare all the
documents needed by the Committee. These documents included the CIF summary
of disbursements, letters of Uriarte and the approval of the former president.
She attended whenever there were committee hearings. Among those who also
attended were the incoming members if the PCSO Board Directors and the directors.
Accused Valencia and Aguas were also present in some hearings as resources
speakers. They were invited in connection with the past disbursements of PCSO
related to advertising expenses, CIF, vehicles for the bishops, and the commingling of
funds.
The proceedings in the Committee were recorded and she secured a copy of the
transcript of stenographic notes from the Office of the Blue Ribbon Committee. In the
proceeding on June 7, 2011 (Exh. ''EE"), Uriarte testified. The witness was about two
to three meters away from Uriarte when the latter testified, and using a microphone.
According to the witness, Uriarte testified that all the confidential intelligence projects
she had proposed were approved by President Arroyo; all the requests she gave to
the President were approved and signed by the latter personally in her (Uriarte's)
presence; and all the documents pertaining to the CIF were submitted to President
Arroyo. On the other hand, Valencia and Taruc said they did not know about the
projects. Statements before the Committee are under oath.
After the Committee hearings, she then referred to the laws and regulations involved
to check whether the disbursements were in accordance with law. One of the duties
and responsibilities of the audit committee was to verify compliance with the laws.
She considered the following laws: R.A. 1169, as amended (PCSO Charter); P.D.
1445 (COA Code); LOI 1282; COA Circular 92-385, as amended by Circular 2003-
002, which provides the procedure for approval of disbursements and liquidation of
confidential intelligence funds. She made a handwritten flowchart (Exh. "II") of the
allocations/disbursements/liquidation and audit of the CIF, based on LOI 1282 and
the COA Circulars. A digital presentation of this flowchart was made available.
The first step is the provision or allotment of a budget because no CIF fund can be
disbursed without the allocation. This is provided in the second whereas clause of
Circular 92-385. For GOCCs, applying Circular 2003-002, there must be allocation or
budget for the CIF and it should be specifically in the corporate operating budget or
would be taken from savings authorized by special provisions.
This was not followed in the PCSO CIF disbursement in 2008. The disbursement for
that year was P86,555,060. The CIF budget for that year was only P28 million, and
there were no savings because they were on deficit. This was also not followed for
the year 2009. The CIF disbursement for that year was P139,420,875. But the CIF
budget was only P60 million, and there was also no savings, as they were in deficit.
For the year 2010, the total disbursement, as of June 2010, was P141,021,980. The
budget was only P60 million.
The requirements in the disbursement of the CIF are the budget and the approval of
the President. If the budget is correct, the President will approve the disbursement or
release of the CIF. In this case, the President approved the release of the fund
without a budget and savings. Also, the President approved the same in violation of
LOI 1282, because there were no detailed specific project proposals and
specifications accompanying the request for additional CIF. The requests for the year
2008, 2009 and 2010 were uniform and just enumerated the purposes, not projects.
They did not contain what was required in the LOI.
The purpose of this requirement is stated in the LOI itself. The request for allocations
must contain full details and specific purposes for which the fund will be used. A
detailed presentation is made to avoid duplication of expenditures, as what had
happened in the past, because of a lack of centralized planning and organization or
intelligence fund.
57 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
There was no reason for each additional intelligence fund that was approved by then
President Arroyo.
The third step is the designation of the disbursing officer. In this case, the Board of
Directors designated Uriarte as Special Disbursing Officer (SDO) for the portion of the
CIF that she withdrew. For the portion withdrawn by Valencia, there was no special
disbursing officer designated on record.
The designation of Uriarte was in violation of internal control which is the
responsibility of the department head, as required by Section 3 of Circular 2003-002.
When she went through copies of the checks and disbursement vouchers submitted
to her, she found out that Uriarte was both the SDO and the authorized officer to sign
the vouchers and checks. She was also the payee of the checks. All the checks
withdrawn by Uriarte were paid to her and she was also the signatory of the checks.
Aside from Uriarte, Valencia also disbursed funds in the CIF. For the funds withdrawn
by Valencia, he was also the authorized officer to sign the vouchers and checks. He
was also the payee of the checks.
The confidential funds were withdrawn through cash advance. She identified the
vouchers and checks pertaining to the disbursements made by Uriarte and Valencia
in 2008, 2009 and 2010.
The checks of Uriarte and Valencia had the treasurer as cosignatory. The treasurer
who signed depends on when the checks were issued
She knows the signatures of Uriarte, Valencia and Aguas because they have their
signatures on the records.
Uriarte and Valencia signed the vouchers to certify to the necessity and legality of the
vouchers; they also signed to approve the same, signify they are "okay" for payment
and claim the amount certified and approved as payee. Gloria P. Araullo signed as
releasing officer, giving the checks to the claimants.
Accused Aguas signed the vouchers to certify that there are adequate funds and
budgetary allotment, that the expenditures were properly certified and supported by
documents, and that the previous cash advances were liquidated and accounted for.
This certification means that the cash advance voucher can be released. This is
because the COA rule on cash advance is that before any subsequent cash advance
is released, the previous cash advance must be liquidated first. This certification
allowed the requesting party and payee to get the cash advance from the voucher.
Without this certification, Uriarte and Valencia could not have been able to get the
cash advance. Otherwise, it was a violation of P.D. 1445 (Government Auditing
Code).
The third box in the flowchart is the designation of the SDO. Board Resolutions No.
217, Series of2009 (Exh."M"), No. 2356, Series of 2009 (Exh."N"), and No. 029,
Series of 2010 (Exh. "O"), resolved to designate Uriarte as SDO for the CIF. These
resolutions were signed and approved by Valencia, Taruc, Valdes, Uriarte, Roquero
and Morato. The witness is familiar with these persons' signature because their
signatures appear on PCSO official records.
Valencia designated himself as SDO upon the recommendation of COA Auditor
Plaras. There was no board resolution for this designation. There was just a
certification dated February 2, 2009 (Exh. "Z4"). This certification was signed by
Valencia himself and designates himself as the SDO since he is personally taking
care of the funds which are to be handled with utmost confidentiality. The witness is
familiar with Valencia's signature because it appears on PCSO official documents.
Under COA rules, the Board of Directors has authority to designate the SDO. The
chairman could not do this by himself.
Plaras wrote a letter dated December 15, 2008 to Valencia. It appears in the letter
that to substantiate the liquidation report, Plaras told Valencia to designate himself as
SDO because there was no disbursing officer. It was the suggestion of Plaras. Plaras
is the head of the CIF Unit under then COA Chairman Villar. Liquidation vouchers and
supporting papers were submitted to them, with corresponding fidelity bond.
COA Circulars 92-385 and 2003-002 indicate that to disburse CIF, one must be a
special disbursing officer or SDO. All disbursing officers of the government must have
fidelity bonds. The bond is to protect the government from and answer for
misappropriation that the disbursing officer may do. The bond amount required is the
same as the amount that may be disbursed by the officer. It is based on total
accountability and not determined by the head of the agency as a matter of discretion.
The head determines the accountability which will be the basis of the bond amount.
The Charter states that the head of the agency is the Board of Directors, headed by
the Chairman. But now, under the Governance of Government Corporation law, it is
the general manager.
Plaras should have disallowed or suspended the cash advances because there was
no fidelity bond and the disbursing officer was not authorized. There was no bond put
up for Valencia. The records show that the bond for Uriarte was only for the amount of
Pl.5 million. This is shown in a letter dated August 23, 2010, to COA Chairman Villar
through Plaras from Aguas (Exh. "B5"), with an attachment from the Bureau of
Treasury, dated March 2, 2009. It appears there that the bond for Uriarte for the CIF
covering the period February 2009 to February 2010 was only Pl.5 million.
Aguas submitted this fidelity bond certification, which was received on August 24,
2010, late, because under the COA Circulars, it should have been submitted when
the disbursing officer was designated. It should have been submitted to COA because
a disbursing officer cannot get cash advances if they do not have a fidelity bond.
58 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
Once an SDO is designated, the specimen signature must be submitted to COA,
together with the fidelity bond and the signatories for the cash advances.
The approval of the President pertains to the release of the budget, not its allocation.
She thinks the action of the Board was done because there was no budget. The
Board's confirmation was needed because it was in excess of the budget that was
approved. They were trying to give a color of legality to them approval of the CIF in
excess of the approved corporate operating budget. The Board approval was required
for the amount to be released, which amount was approved in excess of the allotted
budget for the year. The President cannot approve an additional amount, unless there
is an appropriation or a provision saying a particular savings will be used for the CIF.
The approvals here were all in excess of the approved budget.
Cash advances can be given on a per project basis for CIF. For one to get a cash
advance, one must state what the project is as to that cash advance. No subsequent
cash advance should be given, until previous cash advances have been liquidated
and accounted for. If it is a continuing project, monthly liquidation reports must be
given. The difference in liquidation process between CIF and regular cash advances
is that for CIF, the liquidation goes to the Chair and not to the resident auditor of the
agency or the GOCC. All of the liquidation papers should go to the COA Chair, given
on a monthly basis.
In this case, the vouchers themselves are couched generally and just say cash
advance from CIF of the Chairman or from the GM's office in accordance with her
duties. There is no particular project indicated for the cash advance. Also, the
requirement that prior advances be liquidated first for subsequent advances to be
given was not followed. The witness prepared a summary of the cash advances
withdrawn by the two disbursing officers covering the years 2008, 2009 and 2010
(Exh. "D5"). The basis for this summary is the record submitted to them by Aguas,
which were supposedly submitted to COA. It shows that there were subsequent cash
advances, even if a prior advance has not yet been liquidated. Valencia submitted
liquidation reports to Villar, which consists of a letter, certification and schedule of
cash advances, and liquidation reports. One is dated July 24, 2008 (Exh. "G5") and
another is dated February 13, 2009 (Exh. "H5").
When she secured Exhibit "G5", together with the attached documents, she did not
find any supporting documents despite the statement in Exhibit "G5" that the
supporting details of the expenses that were incurred from the fund can be made
available, if required. Aguas, the person who processed the cash advances said he
did not have the details or suppmiing details of documents of the expenditures.
Normally, when liquidating CIF, the certification of the head of the agency is
necessary. If there were vouchers or receipts involved, then all these should be
attached to the liquidation report. There should also be an accomplishment report
which should be done on a monthly basis. All of these should be enclosed in a sealed
envelope and sent to the Chairman of the COA, although the agency concerned must
retain a photocopy of the documents. The report should have a cover/transmittal letter
itemizing the documents, as well as liquidation vouchers and other supporting papers.
If the liquidation voucher and the supporting papers are in order, then the COA
Chairman or his representative shall issue a credit memorandum. Supporting papers
consist of receipts and sales invoices. The head of the agency would have to certify
that those were all actually incurred and are legal. In this case, there were no
supporting documents submitted with respect to Valencia's cash advances in 2008.
Only the certifications by the SDO were submitted. These certifications stated that he
has the documents in his custody and they can be made available, if and when
necessary.
When she reviewed the CIF, she asked Aguas to produce the supporting documents
which were indicated in Valencia's certification and Aguas's own certification in the
cash advance vouchers, where he also certified that the documents supporting the
cash advance were in their possession and that there was proper liquidation. Aguas
replied that he did not have them.
She identified the letter of Uriarte to Villar dated July 24, 2008 as well as a transmittal
letter by Uriarte for August 1, 2008, a certification and schedule of cash advances and
an undetailed liquidation report. Among the attachments is Board Resolution 305, a
copy of the COB for 2008, a document for the second half of 2008, a document dated
April 2, 2009, and a document for liquidation of P2,295,000. She also identified
another letter for P50 million, dated February 13, 2009, attached to the transmittal
letter. There is a certification attached to those two letters amounting to P2,295,000.
Also attached is the schedule of cash advances by Aguas and a liquidation report
where Aguas certified that the supporting documents are complete and proper
although the supporting documents and papers are not attached to the liquidation
report, only the general statement. These documents were submitted to them by
Aguas.
She was shown the four liquidation reports (Exhibits "M5", "N5", "05" and "P5") attached
to the transmittal letter and was asked whether they were properly and legally
accomplished. She replied that they were couched in general terms and the voucher
for which the cash advance was liquidated is not indicated and only the voucher
number is specified. She adds that the form of the liquidation is correct, but the details
are not there and neither are the supporting papers.
The liquidation report was dated July 24, 2008, but it was submitted only on August 1,
2008 to COA, and it supposedly covered the cash advances of Uriarte from January
to May 2008. This is stated in her summary of liquidation that was earlier marked.
There were no supporting papers stated on or attached to the liquidation report.
She identified a set of documents to liquidate the cash advances from the CIF for the
second semester of 2008 by Uriarte. The transmittal letter of Uriarte was received by
the COA on April 2, 2009. Upon inquiry with Aguas, he said that he did not have any
of the supporting papers that he supposedly had according to the certification.
According to him, they are with Uriarte. Uriarte, on the other hand, said, during the
Senate hearing, that she gave them to President Arroyo.
59 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
When Plaras wrote Valencia on December 15, 2008, Aguas wrote back on behalf of
Valencia, who had designated himself as SDO. However, their designations, or in
what capacity they signed the voucher are not stated. Among the attachments is also
a memorandum dated April 2, 2008 (Exhibit "P5"), containing the signature of Arroyo,
indicating her approval to the utilization of funds. Another memorandum, dated
August 13, 2008, indicating the approval of Arroyo was also attached to the
transmittal letter of Aguas on April 4, 2009. These two memoranda bear the reasons
for the cash advances, couched in general terms. The reasons were donated
medicines that were sold and authorized expenditures on endowment fund. The
reasons stated in the memoranda are practically the same. Uriarte did not submit any
accomplishment reports regarding the intelligence fund. Aguas submitted an
accomplishment report, but the accomplishments were not indicated in definite
fashion or with specificity.
The witness narrated, based on her Summary of Liquidation Reports in 2009, that the
total cash advance made by Uriarte was P132,760,096. Arroyo approved P90 million
for release. P10 million in January 2009 and April 27, 2009, and then P50 million in
May 6, 2009.In July 2, 2009, P10 million or a total of P70 million. In October 2009,
P20 million or a total of P90 million. The amount that was cash advanced by Valencia
was P5,660,779. Therefore, the total cash advances by these two officials were
P138,420,875, but all of these were never liquidated in 2009. Uriarte and Valencia
only submitted a liquidation voucher and a report to COA on April I2, 2010. For the
January 22, 2009 disbursements, the date of the liquidation voucher was June 30,
2009, but it was submitted to COA on April 12, 2010. Witness identified the transmittal
letter for P28 million by Uriarte, dated October 19, 2009, which was received by the
COA only on April 12, 2010, with an accompanying certification from Uriarte as to
some of the documents from which the witness's Summary of Liquidation was based.
The cash advances made by Uriarte and Valencia violated par. I, Sec. 4 and Sec. 84
of P.D. I445 and par. 2, III, COA Circular No. 92-385.
Since these cash advances were in excess of the appropriation, in effect, they were
disbursed without any appropriation. These cash advances were also made without
any specific project, in violation of par. 2 of COA Circular No. 92-385. In this case, the
cash advances were not for a specific project. The vouchers only indicate the source
of the fund. The vouchers did not specify specific projects.
The total cash advances for the years 2008, 2009 and 2010 to accused Uriarte and
Valencia is more than P366,000,000. Valencia cash advanced PI 3.3 million. The rest
was made by Uriarte.
The memoranda to President Arroyo stated only the problems encountered by the
PCSO. These problems, as stated in each memorandum, included donated
medicines sometimes ending up in store for sale, unofficial use of ambulances, rise of
expenditures of endowment fund, lotto sweepstakes scams, fixers for programs of the
PCSO, and other fraudulent schemes. No projects were mentioned.
As regards the sixth step - the credit notice, the same was not validly issued by the
COA. The credit notice is a settlement or an action made by the COA Auditors and is
given once the Chairman, in the case of CIF Fund, finds that the liquidation report and
all the supporting papers are in order. In this case, the supporting papers and the
liquidation report were not in order, hence, the credit notice should not have been
issued. Further, the credit notice has to follow a specific form. The COA Chairman or
his representative can: 1) settle the cash advance when everything is in order; 2)
suspend the settlement if there are deficiencies and then ask for submission of the
deficiencies; or 3) out rightly disallow it in case said cash advances are illegal,
irregular or unconscionable, extravagant or excessive. Instead of following this form,
the COA issued a document dated January 10, 2011, which stated that there is an
irregular use of the price fund and the charity fund for CIF Fund. The document bears
an annotation which says, "wait for transmittal, draft" among others. The document
was not signed by Plaras, who was the Head of the Confidential and Intelligence
Fund Unit under COA Chairman Villar. Instead, she instructed her staff to "please ask
Aguas to submit the supplemental budget." This document was not delivered to
PCSO General Manager J.M. Roxas. They instead received another letter dated
January 13, 2011 which was almost identical to the first document, except it was
signed by Plaras, and the finding of the irregular use of the prize fund and the charity
fund was omitted. Instead, the work "various" was substituted and then the amount of
P137,5000,000. Therefore, instead of the earlier finding of irregularity, suddenly, the
COA issued a credit notice as regards the total of P140,000,000. The credit notice
also did not specify that the transaction had been audited, indicating that no audit was
made.
A letter dated May 11, 2009 from the COA and signed by Plaras, states that the credit
notice is hereby issued. Thus, it is equivalent to the credit notice, although it did not
come in the required form. It merely stated that the credit notice is issued for
P29,700,000, without specifying for which vouchers and for which project the credit
notice was being given. It merely says "First Semester of 2008". In other words, it is a
"global" credit notice that she issued and it did not state that she made an audit.
Another letter, dated July 14, 2010 and signed by Plaras, supposedly covers all the
cash advances in 2009, but only up to the amount of P116,386,800. It also did not
state that an audit was made.
There were no supporting papers attached to the voucher, and the certification issued
is not in conformity with the required certification by COA Circular 2003-002. The
certification dated July 24, 2008 by Valencia was not in conformity with the
certification required by COA. The required form should specify the project for which
the certification was being issued, and file code of the specific project. The
certification dated July 24, 2008, however, just specified that it was to certify that the
P2 million from the 2008 CIF Fund was incurred by the undersigned, in the exercise
of his functions as PCSO Chairman for the various projects, projects and activities
related to the operation of the office, and there was no specific project or program or
file code of the intelligence fund, as required by COA. Furthermore, the certification
also did not contain the last paragraph as required by COA. Instead, the following
was stated in the certification: "He further certifies that the details and supporting
60 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
documents and papers on these highly confidential missions and assignments are in
our custody and kept in our confidential file which can be made available if
circumstances so demand." No details or supporting documents were reviewed by the
witness, and though she personally asked Aguas, the latter said that he did not have
the supporting papers, and they were not in the official files of the PCSO. Two people
should have custody of the papers, namely, The Chairman of COA and the PCSO or
its Special Disbursing Officer. The witness asked Aguas because Valencia was not
there, and also because Aguas was the one who made the certification and was in-
charge of accounting. The vouchers, supposedly certified by Aguas, as Budget and
Accounting Department Manager, each time cash advances were issued, stated that
the supporting documents are complete, so the witness went to him to procure the
documents.
A certification dated February 13, 2009, stating that P2,857,000 was incurred by
Valencia in the exercise of his function as PCSO Chairman, related to the operations
of his office without the specific intelligence project. In the same document, there is a
certification similar to one in the earlier voucher. No details of this certification were
submitted by Aguas.
Another certification dated July 24, 2008 was presented, and it also did not specify
the intelligence and confidential project, and it did not contain any certification that the
amount was disbursed legally or that no benefits was given to any person. Similarly,
the fourth paragraph of the same document states that Uriarte certified that details
and supporting papers of the cash advance that she made of P27,700,000 are "kept
in their confidential" (sic). The same were not in the PCSO official records.
The certification dated October 19, 2009 for the amount of P2,498,300, was
submitted to the witness by Aguas. It also did not conform to the COA requirements,
as it also did not specify the use of the cash advance, did not contain any certification
that the cash advance was incurred for legal purposes, or that no benefits to other
people were paid out of it. Again, no supporting documents were found and none
were given by Aguas. Similarly, a certification dated February 8, 2010 for the amount
of P2,394,654 was presented, and it also does not conform with the COA circular, as
it only stated that the amount was spent or incurred by Valencia for projects covering
the period of July 1 to December 31, 2009 to exercise his function as PCSO
Chairman, thus no particular intelligence fund or project was stated. As in the other
certifications, though it was stated that the details were in the confidential file, it
appeared that these were not in the possession of PCSO. Another certification dated
October 19, 2009 submitted by Uriarte was examined by the witness in the course of
her audit, and found that it also did not conform to the requirements, as it only stated
that the P25 million and P10 million intelligence and confidential fund dated January
29, 2009 and April 27, 2009 were used in the exercise of her function as PCSO Vice
Chairman and General Manager.
All the documents were furnished by Aguas during the course of the audit of the
financial transactions of PCSO. Other documents given by Aguas include a letter by
Valencia to COA Chairman Villar, which was attached to the letter dated July 24,
2008. For the Certification issued by Valencia for P2,857,000, there was also a
certification attached dated February 13, 2009. As to Exhibit "J5", together with the
certification, there was a letter but no other documents were submitted. Similarly, as
to Exhibit "M6", it was attached to a letter dated October 19, 2009 and was submitted
to the witness by Aguas. Exhibit "N6" was attached to the letter of Valencia dated
February 8, 2010, the October 19, 2009 certification was attached to the October 19,
2009 letter to Chairman Villar.
The certification dated June 29, 2010, signed by Valencia in the amount of
P2,075,000, also does not conform with the COA requirement as it only specifies that
the fund was disbursed by Valencia under his office for various programs in the
exercise of his function as Chairman. Though there was a certification that the
supporting papers were kept in the office, these papers were not found in the records
of the PCSO and Aguas did not have any of the records. The certification was
attached to the letter of Valencia to Villar dated June 29, 2010.
In the certification dated June 29, 2010 signed by Uriarte in the amount of P137 ,
500,000, the witness also said that the certification did not conform to the COA
Circular because it only stated that the amount was disbursed from a special
intelligence fund, authorized and approved by the President under the disposition of
the Office of the Vice Chairman. Despite the statement certifying that there were
documents for the audit, no documents were provided and the same were not in the
official files of PCSO . The certification was attached to a letter by Uriarte dated July
1, 2010 addressed to Villar.
In the certification dated October 19, 2009 signed by Uriarte in the amount of
P2,500,000, the witness made the same finding that it also did not conform to the
COA Circular, as it did not specify the project for which the cash advance was
obtained and there were also no records in the PCSO. It was attached to the letter
dated October 19, 2009.
Finally, in the certification dated February 9, 2010 signed by Uriarte in the amount of
P73,993,846, the witness likewise found that it did not conform with the requirements
of the COA, as all it said was the amount was used for the exercise of the functions of
the PCSO Chairman and General Manager. The documents related to this were also
not in the PCSO records and Aguas did not submit the same. It was attached to a
letter dated February 8, 2010 from Uriarte to Villar.
There are two kinds of audit on disbursements of government funds: pre-audit and
post-audit. Both are defined in COA Circular 2009-002. Pre-audit is the examination
of documents supporting the transaction, before these are paid for and recorded. The
auditor determines whether: (1) the proposed expenditure was in compliance with the
appropriate law, specific statutory authority or regulations; (2) sufficient funds are
available to enable payment of the claim; (3) the proposed expenditure is not illegal,
irregular, extravagant, unconscionable or unnecessary, and (4) the transaction is
approved by the proper authority and duly supported by authentic underlying
evidence. On the other hand, the post-audit requirement is the process where the
COA or the auditor will have to do exactly what was done in the pre-audit, and in
61 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
addition, the auditor must supplement what she did by tracing the transaction under
audit to the books of accounts, and that the transaction is all recorded in the books of
accounts. The auditor, in post-audit, also makes the final determination of whether the
transaction was not illegal, irregular, extravagant, excessive, unconscionable or
unnecessary.
In this case, no audit was conducted. In a letter dated May 11, 2009 signed by Plaras,
it was stated that a credit advice was given. However, the letter did not conform to the
requirements or form of a credit notice. Such form was in COA Circular 2003-002, and
should specify the liquidation report number, the amount, check numbers, and the
action taken by the auditor. The auditor should also include a certification that these
have been audited. In this instance, no certification that the transaction was audited
was given by Plaras. Other similar letters did not conform with the COA Circular. All
transactions of the government must be subject to audit in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution. Nevertheless, the requirements for audit are the same.
The effect of the issuance of the credit notice by the COA was that the agency will
take it up in the books and credit the cash advance. This is the seventh step in the
flowchart. Once there is a cash advance, the liability of the officers who obtained the
cash advance would be recorded in the books. The credit notice, when received,
would indicate that the account was settled. The agency will credit the receivable or
the cash advance, and remove from the books as a liability of the person liable for the
cash advance. The effect of this was that the financial liabilities of Uriarte and
Valencia were removed from the books, but they could still be subject to criminal
liability based on Sec. 10 of COA Circular 91-368 (Government Accounting and
Auditing Manuals, Vol. 1, implementing P.O. 1445), which states: "The settlement of
an account whether or not on appeal has been made within the statutory period is no
bar to criminal prosecution against persons liable." From the 2008 COA Annual
Audited Financial Statements of PCSO, it was seen that the procedure was not
followed because the liability of the officers was already credited even before the
credit notice was received. In the financial statements, it was stated that the amount
due from officers and employees, which should include the cash advances obtained
by Uriarte and Valencia, were not included because the amount stated therein was
P35 million, while the total vouchers of Uriarte and Valencia was P86 million.
The witness also related that she traced the records of the CIF fund (since such was
no longer stated as a receivable), and reviewed whether it was recorded as an
expense in 2008. She found out that the recorded CIF fund expense, as recorded in
the corporate operating budget as actually disbursed, was only P21,102,000. As
such, she confronted her accountants and asked them "Saan tinago itong amount na
to?" The personnel in the accounting office said that the balance of the P86 million or
the additional P21 million was not recorded in the operating fund budget because
they used the prize fund and charity fund as instructed by Aguas. Journal Entry
Voucher No. 8121443 dated December 31, 2008, signed by Elmer Camba, Aguas
(Head of the Accounting Department), and Hutch Balleras (one of the staff in the
Accounting Department), showed that this procedure was done.
The contents of the Journal Entry Voucher are as follows:
(a) Accounts and Explanation: Due to other funds. This means that the amount of
P63,750,000 was credited as confidential expense from the operating fund. The
amount was then removed from the operating fund, and it was passed on to other
funds.
(b) PF Miscellaneous, Account No. 424-1-L P41,250,000 and CF Miscellaneous for
424-2-G for P22,500,000. PF Miscellaneous means Prize Fund Miscellaneous and
CF stands for Charity Fund Miscellaneous. This means that funds used to release the
cash advances to Uriarte and Valencia were from the prize fund and charity.
Attached to the Journal Entry Voucher was a document which reads "Allocation of
Confidential and Intelligence Fund Expenses", and was the basis of Camba in doing
the Journal Entry Voucher. In the same document, there was a written annotation
dated 12-31-2008 which reads that the adjustment of CIF, CF and IF, beneficiary of
the fund is CF and PF and signed by Aguas.
The year 2009 was a similar case, as the witness traced the recording of the credit
notice at the end of 2009, and despite the absence of the credit notice, the
Accounting Department removed from the books of PCSO the liability of Uriarte and
Valencia, corresponding to the cash advances obtained in 2009. She based this
finding on the COA Annual Audit Report on the PCSO for the year ended December
31, 2009. It was stated in the Audit Report that the total liability due from officers and
employees was only P87,747,280 and it was less than the total cash advances of
Uriarte and Valencia, which was P138 million. As a result, the witness checked the
corresponding entry for the expenses in the corporate operating budget and found out
that the same was understated. The CIF expenses were only P24,968,300, as
against the actual amount per vouchers, which was P138,420,875. Upon checking
with the Accounting Department, the department showed her another Journal Entry
Voucher No. 9121157, dated December 29, 2009, where the personnel removed
immediately the expense and recorded it as expense for the prize fund and charity
fund by the end of December 31.
The contents of the Journal Entry Voucher, especially the notation "due from'', means
the accountability of those who had cash advance was instead credited. It was
removed, and the amount was P106 million. The entry was confidential expense for
P15,958,020 and then the due to other funds was P90,428,780. The explanation for
"424" was found in the middle part, stating: "424-1-L" of miscellaneous prize fund was
used in the amount of P58,502,740 and the charity fund was used in the amount of
P31, 916,040. The total amount of the receivables from Uriarte and Valencia that was
removed was P106,386,800 and P90,428,780 respectively which came from the prize
fund and charity fund.
The witness reported the discrepancy because there were violations of R.A. 1169,
Sec. 6, which provides for the different funds of PCSO namely: prize fund (55% of the
net receipts), charity fund (30% of the net receipts), and operating fund (15% ). The
proceeds of the lotto and sweepstakes ticket sales provide the money for these
different funds, removing first the printing cost and the net proceeds (98%) is divided
62 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
among the three funds mentioned. The prize fund is the fund set aside to be used to
pay the prizes for the winnings in the lotto or sweepstakes draws, whether they are
jackpot or consolation prizes. Incentives to the lotto operators or horse owners are
also drawn from this fund, as all of the expenses connected to the winnings of the
draw. On the other hand, the charity fund is reserved for charity programs approved
by the board of PCSO, and constitutes hospital and medical assistance to individuals,
or to help facilities and other charities of national character. Operating expenses are
charged to the expenses to operate, personnel services, and MOOE. One kind of
fund cannot be used for another kind, as they become a trust fund which should only
be used for the purpose for which it was authorized, not even with the approval of the
board.
The amounts obtained from the charity fund and prize fund for 2008 was
P63,750,000, and in 2009 P90,428,780. The Board of Directors was given a copy of
the COA Audit Reports for years 2008 and 2009. The Board of Directors for both
years was composed of: Chairman Valencia, and Board Members Morato, Roquero,
Taruc and Valdez. Uriarte was the Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors. The
witness did not know whether the Board checked the COA reports, but there was no
action on their part, and neither did they question the correctness of the statements.
They also had the Audit Committee (which was composed of members of the board)
at that time, and one of the duties of the Audit Committee was to verify the balances.
The witness identified the documents referring to the confirmation by the Board of
Directors of PCSO of the CIF. Board Resolution No. 217, approved on February 18,
2009, confirms the CIF approved by the President. It did not state which CIF they
were approving. They also assigned Uriarte as the Special Disbursing Officer of the
CIF, but it did say for what year. The signatories to the same Board Resolution were
Valencia, Taruc, Valdes, Uriarte, Roquero and Morato. The same were the witness's
findings for Board Resolution No. 2356 S. 2009, approved on December 9, 2009. As
for Board Resolution No. 29, S. 2010, approved on January 6, 2010, the Board
confirmed the fund approved by the President for 2010, though the approval of the
President was only received on August 13, 2010 as shown in the Memorandum dated
January 4. In effect, the Board was aware of the requests, and because they ratified
the cash advances, they agreed to the act of obtaining the same.
Apart from the President violating LOI 1282, the witness also observed that the
President directly dealt with the PCSO, although the President, by Executive Order
No. 383 dated November 14, 2004, and Executive Order No. 455 dated August 22,
2005, transferred the direct control and supervision of the PCSO to the Department of
Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), and later to the Department of Health
(DOH). A project should first be approved by the Supervising and Controlling
Secretary of the Secretary of Health; that the President had transferred her direct
control and supervision, and lost the same. The witness said her basis was
administrative procedure. In this regard, President Aquino now has transferred the
control and supervision of the PCSO back to the Office of the President through
Executive Order No. 14, S. 2010, dated November 19, 2010.
Uriarte should not have gone directly to the President to ask for the latter's approval
for allocation. Nonetheless, the release of the CIF must still be approved by the
President.9
The State also presented evidence consisting in the testimonies of officers coming
from different law enforcement agencies10 to corroborate Tolentino's testimony to the
effect that the PCSO had not requested from their respective offices any intelligence
operations contrary to the liquidation report submitted by Uriarte and Aguas.
To complete the evidence for the Prosecution, Atty. Anamarie Villaluz Gonzales,
Office-in-Charge and Department Manager of the Human Resources of PCSO;
Flerida Africa Jimenez, Head of the Intelligence and Confidential Fund Audit Unit of
the COA; and Noel Clemente, Director of COA were presented as additional
witnesses.
After the Prosecution rested its case, GMA, Aguas, Valencia, Morato, Taruc V,
Roquero and Villar separately filed their demurrers to evidence asserting that the
Prosecution did not establish a case for plunder against them.
On April 6, 2015, the Sandiganbayan  granted the demurrers to evidence of Morato,
Roquero, Taruc and Villar, and dismissed the charge against them. It held that said
accused who were members of the PCSO Board of Directors were not shown to have
diverted any PCSO funds to themselves, or to have raided the public treasury by
conveying and transferring into their possession and control any money or funds from
PCSO account; that as to Villar, there had been no clear showing that his designation
of Plaras had been tainted with any criminal design; and that the fact that Plaras had
signed "by authority" of Villar as the COA Chairman could not criminally bind him in
the absence of any showing of conspiracy.
However, the Sandiganbayan denied the demurrers of GMA, Aguas and Valencia,
holding that there was sufficient evidence showing that they had conspired to commit
plunder; and that the Prosecution had sufficiently established a case of malversation
against Valencia, pertinently saying:
Demurrer to evidence is an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect
that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether
true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. The party demurring
challenges the sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a verdict. The court
then ascertains whether there is a competent or sufficient evidence to sustain
the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt.
xxxx
Sufficient evidence for purposes of frustrating a demurrer thereto is such evidence in
character, weight or amount as will legally justify the judicial or official action
demanded to accord to circumstances. To be considered sufficient therefore, the
63 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
evidence must prove (a) the commission of the crime, and (b) the precise degree of
paiiicipation therein by the accused (Gutib v. CA, 110 SCAD 743, 312 SCRA 365
[1999]).
x x x           x x x          x x x
A. Demurrer filed by Arroyo and Aguas:
It must be remembered that in Our November 5, 2013 Resolution, We found strong
evidence of guilt against Arroyo and Aguas, only as to the second predicate act
charged in the Information, which reads:
(b) raiding the public treasury by withdrawing and receiving, in several instances, the
above-mentioned amount from the Confidential/Intelligence Fund from PCSO's
accounts, and/or unlawfully transferring or conveying the same into their possession
and control through irregularly issued disbursement vouchers and fictitious
expenditures.
In the November 5, 2013 Resolution, We said:
It should be noted that in both R.A. No. 7080 and the PCGG rules, the enumeration of
the possible predicate acts in the commission of plunder did not associate or require
the concept of personal gain/benefit or unjust enrichment with respect to raids on the
public treasury, as a means to commit plunder. It would, therefore, appear that a "raid
on the public treasury" is consummated where all the acts necessary for its execution
and accomplishment are present. Thus a "raid on the public treasury" can be said to
have been achieved thru the pillaging or looting of public coffers either through
misuse, misappropriation or conversion, without need of establishing gain or profit
to the raider. Otherwise stated, once a "raider" gets material possession of a
government asset through improper means and has free disposal of the same,
the raid or pillage is completed. x x x
xxxx
Clearly, the improper acquisition and illegal use of CIF funds, which is obviously a
government asset, will amount to a raid on the public treasury, and therefore fall into
the category of ill-gotten wealth.
xxxx
xxx It is not disputed that Uriarte asked for and was granted authority by Arroyo to use
additional CIF funds during the period 2008-2010. Uriarte was able [to] accumulate
during that period CIF funds in the total amount of P.352,681,646. This was
through a series of withdrawals as cash advances of the CIF funds from the PCSO
coffers, as evidenced by the disbursement vouchers and checks issued and
encashed by her, through her authorized representative.
These flagrant violations of the rules on the use of CIF funds evidently characterize
the series of withdrawals by and releases to Uriarte as "raids" on the PCSO
coffers, which is part of the public treasury. These were, in every sense, "pillage,"
as Uriarte looted government funds and appears to have not been able to
account for it. The monies came into her possession and, admittedly, she disbursed
it for purposes other than what these were intended for, thus, amounting to "misuse"
of the same. Therefore, the additional CIF funds are ill-gotten, as defined by R.A.
7080, the PCGG rules, and Republic v. Sandiganbayan. The encashment of the
checks, which named her as the "payee," gave Uriarte material possession of
the CIF funds which she disposed of at will.
As to the determination whether the threshold amount of P50million was met by the
prosecution's evidence, the Court believes this to have been established. Even if the
computation is limited only to the cash advances/releases made by accused Uriarte
alone AFTER Arroyo had approved her requests and the PCSO Board approved CIF
budget and the "regular" P5million CIF budget accorded to the PCSO Chairman and
Vice Chairman are NOT taken into account, still the total cash advances through
accused Uriarte's series of withdrawals will total P189,681,646. This amount
surpasses the P50million threshold.
The evidence shows that for the year 2010 alone, Uriarte asked for P150 million
additional CIF funds, and Arroyo granted such request and authorized its use. From
January 8, 2010 up to June 18, 2010, Uriarte made a series of eleven (11) cash
advances in the total amount of P138,223,490. According to Uriarte's testimony
before the Senate, the main purpose for these cash advances was for the "roll-out"
of the small town lottery program. However, the accomplishment report submitted by
Aguas shows that P137,500,000 was spent on non-related PCSO activities, such as
"bomb threat, kidnapping, terrorism and bilateral and security relations." All the cash
advances made by Uriarte in 2010 were made in violation of LOI 1282, and COA
Circulars 2003-002 and 92-385. These were thus improper use of the additional Cff
funds amounting to raids on the PCSO coffers and were ill-gotten because Uriarte
had encashed the checks and came into possession of the monies, which she had
complete freedom to dispose of but was not able to properly account for.
These findings of the Court clearly point out the commission by Uriarte of the crime
of Plunder under the second predicate act charged in the Information. As to
Arroyo's participation, the Court stated in its November 5, 2013 Resolution that:
The evidence shows that Arroyo approved not only Uriarte's request for additional CIF
funds in 2008-2010, but also authorized the latter to use such funds. Arroyo's "OK"
notation and signature on Uriartc's letter-requests signified unqualified
approval of Uriarte's request to use the additional CIF funds because the last
paragraph of Uriarte's requests uniformly ended with this phrase: "With the use
of intelligence fund, PCSO can protect its image and integrity of its operations.
The letter-request of Uriarte in 2010 was more explicit because it categorically asked
for: "The approval on the use of the fifty percent of the PR Fund as PCSO Intelligence
64 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
Fund will greatly help PCSO in the disbursement of funds to immediately address
urgent issues."
Arroyo cannot, therefore, successfully argue that what she approved were only the
request for the grant or allocation of additional CIF funds, because Arroyo's "OK"
notation was unqualified and, therefore, covered also the request to use such
funds, through releases of the same in favor of Uriarte. 11
The Sandiganbayan  later also denied the respective Motions for Reconsideration of
GMA and Aguas, observing that:
In this case, to require proof that monies went to a plunderer's bank account or
was used to acquire real or personal properties or used for any other purpose
to personally benefit the plunderer, is absurd. Suppose a plunderer had already
illegally amassed, acquired or accumulated P50 Million or more of government funds
and just decided to keep it in his vault and never used such funds for any purpose to
benefit him, would that not be plunder? Or, if immediately right after such amassing,
the monies went up in flames or recovered by the police, negating any opportunity for
the person to actually benefit, would that not still be plunder? Surely, in such cases, a
plunder charge could still prosper and the argument that the fact of personal benefit
should still be evidence-based must fail.
Also, accused Arroyo insists that there was no proof of the fact of amassing the ill-
gotten wealth, and that the "overt act" of approving the disbursement is not the "overt
act" contemplated by law. She further stresses that there was no proof of conspiracy
between accused Arroyo and her co-accused and that the Prosecution was unable to
prove their case against accused Arroyo. What accused Arroyo forgets is that
although she did not actually commit any "overt act" of illegally amassing CIF
funds, her act of approving not only the additional CIF funds but also their
releases, aided and abetted accused Uriarte's successful raids on the public
treasury. Accused Arroyo is therefore rightly charged as a coconspirator of Uriarte
who accumulated the CIF funds. Moreover, the performance of an overt act is not
indispensable when a conspirator is the mastermind. 12
Considering that the Sandiganbayan  denied the demurrers to evidence of GMA and
Aguas, they have come to the Court on certiorari to assail and set aside said denial,
claiming that the denial was with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
Issues
GMA pleads that the denial of her demurrer to evidence was in patent and flagrant
violation of Republic Act No. 7080, the law on plunder, and was consequently
arbitrary and oppressive, not only in grave abuse of discretion but rendered without
jurisdiction because:
First Ground
On the basis of the above Resolutions, the Sandiganbayan has denied
petitioner Arroyo's Demurrer to Evidence and considering the reasons for
doing so, would find petitioner Arroyo guilty of the offense of plunder under
Republic Act No. 7080 as charged in the Information notwithstanding the
following:
a. While the gravamen, indeed corpus delicti of the offense of plunder under
R.A. No. 7080, and as charged in the Information, is that the public officer ...
"amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or
series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section l(d) hereof, in the
aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00)",
the Sandiganbayan Resolutions extirpate this vital element of the offense of
plunder;
b. In point of fact, not a single exhibit of the 637 exhibits offered by the
prosecution nor a single testimony of the 21 witnesses of the prosecution was
offered by the prosecution to prove that petitioner amassed, accumulated or
acquired even a single peso of the alleged ill-gotten wealth amounting to
P365,997,915.00 or any part of that amount alleged in the Information;
c. Implicitly confirming the above, and aggravating its error, on the basis solely
of petitioner Arroyo's authorization of the release of the
Confidential/Intelligence Fund from PCSO's accounts, the Sandiganbayan ruled
that she has committed the offense of plunder under R.A. No. 7080 for the
reason that her release of CIF funds to the PCSO amount to a violation of Sec.
l(d) [11 of R.A. No. 7080 which reads, as follows:
1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public
funds or raids on the public treasury;
which, "did not associate or require the concept of personal gain/benefit or
un.just enrichment with respect to raids on the public treasury", thereby
disregarding the gravamen or the corpus delicti  of the offense of plunder under
R.A. No. 7080.
Second Ground
Worsening the above error of the Sandiganbayan, the Resolutions, with
absolutely no justification in law or in the evidence, purportedly as the
"mastermind" of a conspiracy, and without performing any overt act, would
impute to petitioner Arroyo the "series of withdrawals as cash advances of the
CIF funds from the PCSO coffers" by Uriarte as "raids on the PCSO coffers,
which is part of the public treasury" and "in every sense, 'pillage' as Uriarte
looted government funds and appears to have not been able to account for it".
65 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
Parenthetically, Uriarte has not been arrested, was not arraigned and did not
participate in the trial of the case.
Third Ground
That as an obvious consequence of the above, denial of petitioner Arroyo's
Demurrer To Evidence for the reasons stated in the Sandiganbayan
Resolutions, amounting no less to convicting her on the basis of a disjointed
reading of the crime of plunder as defined in R.A. No. 7080, aggravated by the
extirpation in the process of its "corpus delicti"  - the amassing, accumulation
or acquisition of ill-gotten wealth, hence, of a crime that docs not exist in law
and consequently a blatant deprivation of liberty without due process of law.
Fourth Ground
The Information alleges that the ten (10) persons accused in Crim. Case No. SB-
12-CRM-0174, namely: Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Rosario C. Uriarte, Sergio 0.
Valencia, Manuel L. Morato, Jose R. Taruc V, Raymundo T. Roquero, [M]a.
Fatima A.S. Valdes, Benigno B. Aguas, Reynaldo A. Villar and Nilda B.
Plaras" ... all public officers committing the offense in relation to their
respective offices and taking undue advantage of their respective official
positions, authority, relationships, connections or influence, conniving,
conspiring and confederating with one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and/or acquire, directly or
indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of THREE
HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE MILLION NINE HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN THOUSAND
NINE HUNDRED FIFTEEN PESOS (PHP365,997,915.00), more or less, through
any or a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts, or similar schemes or
means, described as follows ... " or each of them, P36,599,791.50 which would
not qualify the offense charged as "plunder" under R.A. No. 7080 against all ten
(10) accused together, for which reason the Information docs not charge the
offense of plunder and, as a consequence, all proceedings thereafter held
under the Information arc void.13
On his part, Aguas contends that:
A. In light of the factual setting described above and the evidence offered and
admitted, docs proof beyond reasonable doubt exist to warrant a holding that
Prosecution proved the guilt of the accused such that there is legal reason to
deny Petitioner's Demurrer'?
B. Did the Prosecution's offered evidence squarely and properly support the
allegations in the Information'?
PETITIONER STRONGLY SUBMITS THAT PROSECUTION FAILED TO
ESTABLISH BY PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THE EXISTENCE OF
THE CORE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF PLUNDER.14
On the other hand, the Prosecution insists that the petitions for certiorari should be
dismissed upon the following grounds, namely:
A. CERTIORARI IS NOT THE PROPER REMEDY FROM AN ORDER OR
RESOLUTION DENYING DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE.
B. THERE IS NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION BECAUSE THE
SANDIGANBAYAN MERELY INTERPRETED WHAT CONSTITUTES PLUNDER
UNDER LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN LIGHT OF FACTS OF THE CASE. IT DID
NOT JUDICIALLY LEGISLATE A "NEW" OFFENSE.
1. ACTUAL PERSONAL GAIN, BENEFIT OR ENRICHMENT IS NOT AN ELEMENT
OF PLUNDER UNDER R.A. No. 7080.
2. EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT ARROYO, BY INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION,
CONSPIRED WITH HER CO-ACCUSED AND PARTICIPATED IN THE COMPLEX,
ILLEGAL SCHEME WHICH DEFRAUDED PCSO IN HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF
PESOS, WHICH CONSTITUTES PLUNDER.
3. ARROYO IS NOT SIMILARLY SITUATED WITH ACCUSED PCSO BOARD
MEMBERS AND CANNOT THUS DEMAND THAT THE SANDIGANBA YAN
DISMISS THE PLUNDER CASE AGAINST HER.
C. ARROYO'S BELATED, COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE INFORMATION
CHARGING HER AND CO-ACCUSED FOR PLUNDER IS HIGHLY IMPROPER,
ESPECIALLY AT THIS LA TE STAGE OF THE PROCEEDING.
1. THE FACTS CONSTITUTING THE OFFENSE ARE CLEARLY ALLEGED IN THE
INFORMATION.
2. ARROYO'S ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE PROCEEDINGS ARISING FROM
OR RELATING TO SB-12-CRM-0174 PROVES THAT SHE HAS ALWAYS KNOWN
AND UNDERSTOOD THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE ACCUSATIONS
AGAINST HER.
D. ARROYO IS NOT ENTITLED TO A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
BECAUSE THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN SB-12-CRM-0174 CANNOT BE
ENJOINED.15
Based on the submissions of the parties, the Court synthesizes the decisive issues to
be considered and resolved, as follows:
66 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
Procedural Issue: however, that the denial of the demurrers to evidence of the petitioners was an
interlocutory order that did not terminate the proceedings, and the proper recourse of
1. Whether or not the special civil action for certiorari  is proper to assail the denial of the demurring accused was to go to trial, and that in case of their conviction they may
the demurrers to evidence. then appeal the conviction, and assign the denial as among the errors to be
reviewed.18 Indeed, it is doctrinal that the situations in which the writ of certiorari may
issue should not be limited,19 because to do so –
Substantive Issues:
x x x would be to destroy its comprehensiveness and usefulness. So wide is the
1. Whether or not the State sufficiently established the existence of conspiracy among discretion of the court that authority is not wanting to show that certiorari  is more
GMA, Aguas, and Uriarte; discretionary than either prohibition or mandamus.  In the exercise of our
superintending control over other courts, we are to be guided by all the
2. Whether or not the State sufficiently established all the elements of the crime of circumstances of each particular case 'as the ends of justice may require.' So it
plunder: is that the writ will be granted where necessary to prevent a substantial wrong
or to do substantial justice.20
a. Was there evidence of amassing, accumulating or acquiring ill-gotten wealth in the
total amount of not less than P50,000,000.00? The Constitution itself has imposed upon the Court and the other courts of justice the
duty to correct errors of jurisdiction as a result of capricious, arbitrary, whimsical and
b. Was the predicate act of raiding the public treasury alleged in the information despotic exercise of discretion by expressly incorporating in Section 1 of Article VIII
proved by the Prosecution? the following provision:

Ruling of the Court Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.

The consolidated petitions for certiorari are meritorious.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
I. whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
The Court cannot be deprived of its jurisdiction excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
to correct grave abuse of discretion
The exercise of this power to correct grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
The Prosecution insists that the petition for certiorari of GMA was improper to excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government
challenge the denial of her demurrer to evidence; that she also thereby failed to show cannot be thwarted by rules of procedure to the contrary or for the sake of the
that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan  in denying convenience of one side. This is because the Court has the bounden constitutional
her demurrer to evidence; and that, on the contrary, the Sandiganbayan only duty to strike down grave abuse of discretion whenever  and wherever it is committed.
interpreted what constituted plunder under the law and jurisprudence in light of the Thus, notwithstanding the interlocutory character and effect of the denial of the
established facts, and did not legislate a new offense, by extensively discussing how demurrers to evidence, the petitioners as the accused could avail themselves of the
she had connived with her co-accused to commit plunder.16 remedy of certiorari  when the denial was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. 21 As
we shall soon show, the Sandiganbayan  as the trial court was guilty of grave abuse of
The Court holds that it should take cognizance of the petitions for certiorari  because discretion when it capriciously denied the demurrers to evidence despite the absence
the Sandiganbayan,  as shall shortly be demonstrated, gravely abused its discretion of competent and sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment for plunder, and
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. despite the absence of the factual bases to expect a guilty verdict.22

The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper to assail such an II.
interlocutory order issued by the trial court because of the availability of another The Prosecution did not properly allege and prove
remedy in the ordinary course of law.17 Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules the existence of conspiracy among GMA, Aguas and Uriarte
of Court  expressly provides that "the order denying the motion for leave of court to file
demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or
by certiorari before judgment." It is not an insuperable obstacle to this action,
67 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony, and decide to commit it.23 In this jurisdiction, conspiracy is
either a crime in itself or a mere means to commit a crime.
As a rule, conspiracy is not a crime unless the law considers it a crime, and
prescribes a penalty for it.24 The exception is exemplified in Article 115 (conspiracy
and proposal to commit treason),  Article 136 (conspiracy and proposal to commit
coup d'etat, rebellion or insurrection)  and Article 141 (conspiracy to commit
sedition) of the Revised Penal Code. When conspiracy is a means to commit a crime,
it is indispensable that the agreement to commit the crime among all the conspirators,
or their community of criminal design must be alleged and competently shown.
We also stress that the community of design to commit an offense must be a
conscious one.25 Conspiracy transcends mere companionship, and mere presence at
the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge of, or
acquiescence in, or agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute one a party to
a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime with a
view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.26 Hence, conspiracy must
be established, not by conjecture, but by positive and conclusive evidence.
In terms of proving its existence, conspiracy takes two forms. The first is the express
form, which requires proof of an actual agreement among all the co-conspirators to
commit the crime. However, conspiracies are not always shown to have been
expressly agreed upon. Thus, we have the second form, the implied conspiracy. An
implied conspiracy exists when two or more persons are shown to have aimed by
their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part
so that their combined acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected
and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association and a concurrence of
sentiment.27 Implied conspiracy is proved through the mode and manner of the
commission of the offense, or from the acts of the accused before, during and after
the commission of the crime indubitably pointing to a joint purpose, a concert of action
and a community of interest.28
But to be considered a part of the conspiracy, each of the accused must be shown to
have performed at least an overt act in pursuance or in furtherance of the conspiracy,
for without being shown to do so none of them will be liable as a co-conspirator, and
each may only be held responsible for the results of his own acts. In this connection,
the character of the overt act has been explained in People v. Lizada:29
An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the
intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation,
which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural course, without
being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the spontaneous desistance of the
perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. The raison
d'etre for the law requiring a direct overt act is that, in a majority of cases, the
conduct of the accused consisting merely of acts of preparation has never
ceased to be equivocal; and this is necessarily so, irrespective of his declared
intent. It is that quality of being equivocal that must be lacking before the act
becomes one which may be said to be a commencement of the commission of
the crime, or an overt act or before any fragment of the crime itself has been
committed, and this is so for the reason that so long as the equivocal quality
remains, no one can say with certainty what the intent of the accused is.  It is
necessary that the overt act should have been the ultimate step towards the
consummation of the design. It is sufficient if it was the "first or some subsequent step
in a direct movement towards the commission of the offense after the preparations
are made." The act done need not constitute the last proximate one for
completion. It is necessary, however, that the attempt must have a causal
relation to the intended crime. In the words of Viada, the overt acts must have
an immediate and necessary relation to the offense. (Bold underscoring supplied
for emphasis)
In her case, GMA points out that all that the State showed was her having affixed her
unqualified "OK" on the requests for the additional CIFs by Uriarte. She argues that
such act was not even an overt act of plunder because it had no immediate and
necessary relation to plunder by virtue of her approval not being per se illegal or
irregular. However, the Sandiganbayan, in denying the Motions for Reconsideration
of GMA and Aguas vis-a-vis the denial of the demurrers, observed that:
xxxx accused Arroyo insists that there was no proof of the fact of amassing the ill-
gotten wealth, and that the "overt act" of approving the disbursement is not the "overt
act" contemplated by Jaw. She further stresses that there was no proof of conspiracy
between accused Arroyo and her co-accused and that the Prosecution was unable to
prove their case against accused Arroyo. What accused Arroyo forgets is that
although she did not actually commit any "overt act" of illegally amassing CIF funds,
her act of approving not only the additional CIF funds but also their releases, aided
and abetted accused Uriarte's successful raids on the public treasury. Accused
Arroyo is therefore rightly charged as a co-conspirator of Uriarte who accumulated the
CIF funds. Moreover, the performance of an overt act is not indispensable when a
conspirator is the mastermind.30
It is in this regard that the Sandigabayan gravely abused its discretion amounting to
lack or excess of its jurisdiction. To start with, its conclusion that GMA had been the
mastermind of plunder was plainly conjectural and outrightly unfounded considering
that the information did not aver at all that she had been the mastermind; hence,
the Sandigabayan  thereby acted capriciously and arbitrarily. In the second place, the
treatment by the Sandiganbayan  of her handwritten unqualified "OK" as an overt act
of plunder was absolutely unwarranted considering that such act was a common legal
and valid practice of signifying approval of a fund release by the President. Indeed,
pursuant to People v. Lizada, supra, an act or conduct becomes an overt act of a
crime only when it evinces a causal relation to the intended crime because the act or
conduct will not be an overt act of the crime if it does not have an immediate and
necessary relation to the offense.
68 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,31the Court recognized two nuances of appreciating
conspiracy as a means to commit a crime, the wheel conspiracy and the chain
conspiracy.
The wheel conspiracy occurs when there is a single person or group (the hub) dealing
individually with two or more other persons or groups (the spokes). The spoke
typically interacts with the hub rather than with another spoke. In the event that the
spoke shares a common purpose to succeed, there is a single conspiracy. However,
in the instances when each spoke is unconcerned with the success of the other
spokes, there are multiple conspiracies.32
An illustration of wheel conspiracy wherein there is only one conspiracy involved was
the conspiracy alleged in the information for plunder filed against former President
Estrada and his co-conspirators. Former President Estrada was the hub while the
spokes were all the other accused individuals. The rim that enclosed the spokes was
the common goal in the overall conspiracy, i.e.,  the amassing, accumulation and
acquisition of ill-gotten wealth.
On the other hand, the American case of Kotteakos v. United States33 illustrates a
wheel conspiracy where multiple conspiracies were established instead of one single
conspiracy. There, Simon Brown, the hub, assisted 31 independent individuals to
obtain separate fraudulent loans from the US Government. Although all the
defendants were engaged in the same type of illegal activity, there was no common
purpose or overall plan among them, and they were not liable for involvement in a
single conspiracy. Each loan was an end in itself, separate from all others, although
all were alike in having similar illegal objects. Except for Brown, the common figure,
no conspirator was interested in whether any loan except his own went through.
Thus, the US Supreme Court concluded that there existed 32 separate conspiracies
involving Brown rather than one common conspiracy.34
The chain conspiracy recognized in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan exists when there is
successive communication and cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate
business operations between manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and
retailer, and then retailer and consumer.35
This involves individuals linked together in a vertical chain to achieve a criminal
objective.36 Illustrative of chain conspiracy was that involved in United States v.
Bruno,37of the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. There, 88 defendants were
indicted for a conspiracy to import, sell, and possess narcotics. This case involved
several smugglers who had brought narcotics to retailers who, in turn, had sold the
narcotics to operatives in Texas and Louisiana for distribution to addicts. The US
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that what transpired was a single chain
conspiracy in which the smugglers knew that the middlemen must sell to retailers for
distribution to addicts, and the retailers knew that the middle men must purchase
drugs from smugglers. As reasoned by the court, "the conspirators at one end of the
chain knew that the unlawful business would not and could not, stop with their buyers;
and those at the other end knew that it had not begun with their sellers." Each
conspirator knew that "the success of that part with which he was immediately
concerned was dependent upon success of the whole." This means, therefore, that
"every member of the conspiracy was liable for every illegal transaction carried out by
other members of the conspiracy in Texas and in Louisiana."38
Once the State proved the conspiracy as a means to commit a crime, each co-
conspirator is as criminally liable as the others, for the act of one is the act of all. A co-
conspirator does not have to participate in every detail of the execution; neither does
he have to know the exact part performed by the co-conspirator in the execution of
the criminal act.39 Otherwise, the criminal liability of each accused is individual and
independent.
The Prosecution insisted that a conspiracy existed among GMA, Uriarte, Valencia and
the Members of the PCSO Board of Directors, Aguas, Villar and Plaras.
The Sandiganbayan  agreed with the Prosecution as to the conspirators involved,
declaring that GMA, Aguas, and Uriarte had conspired and committed plunder.
A review of the records of the case compels us to reject
the Sandiganbayan's  declaration in light of the information filed against the
petitioners, and the foregoing exposition on the nature, forms and extent of
conspiracy. On the contrary, the Prosecution did not sufficiently allege the existence
of a conspiracy among GMA, Aguas and Uriarte.
A perusal of the information suggests that what the Prosecution sought to show was
an implied conspiracy to commit plunder among all of the accused on the basis of
their collective actions prior to, during and after the implied agreement. It is notable
that the Prosecution did not allege that the conspiracy among all of the accused was
by express agreement, or was a wheel conspiracy or a chain conspiracy.
This was another fatal flaw of the Prosecution.
In its present version, under which the petitioners were charged, Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 7080 (Plunder Law) states:
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties.  – Any public officer who, by
himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses,
accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt
criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total
value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of
plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua  to death. Any person who
participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to
the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of
penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be
considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their
interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stocks
69 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State. [As
Amended by Section 12, Republic Act No. 7659 (The Death Penalty Law)]
Section l(d) of Republic Act No. 7080 provides:
Section 1. Definition of terms.  - As used in this Act, the term:
xxxx
d. "Ill-gotten wealth"  means any asset, property, business enterprise or material
possession of any person within the purview of Section two (2) hereof, acquired by
him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or
business associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar
schemes:
1. Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or
raids on the public treasury;
2. By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage,
kickbacks or any/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by
reason of the office or position of the public officer concerned;
3. By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the
National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities or
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
4. By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity
or any other form of interest or participation including the promise of future
employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;
5. By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other
combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit
particular persons or special interests; or
6. By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or
influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage
and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
The law on plunder requires that a particular public officer must be identified as the
one who amassed, acquired or accumulated ill-gotten wealth because it plainly states
that plunder is committed by any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with
members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth in
the aggregate amount or total value of at least P50,000,000.00 through
a combination or series  of overt criminal acts as described in Section l(d) hereof.
Surely, the law requires in the criminal charge for plunder against several individuals
that there must be a main plunderer and her co-conspirators, who may be members
of her family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates
or other persons. In other words, the allegation of the wheel conspiracy or express
conspiracy in the information was appropriate because the main plunderer would then
be identified in either manner. Of course, implied conspiracy could also identify the
main plunderer, but that fact must be properly alleged and duly proven by the
Prosecution.
This interpretation is supported by Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,40where the Court
explained the nature of the conspiracy charge and the necessity for the main
plunderer for whose benefit the amassment, accumulation and acquisition was made,
thus:
There is no denying the fact that the "plunder of an entire nation resulting in material
damage to the national economy" is made up of a complex and manifold network of
crimes. In the crime of plunder, therefore, different parties may be united by a
common purpose. In the case at bar, the different accused and their different criminal
acts have a commonality - to help the former President amass, accumulate or acquire
ill-gotten wealth. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) in the Amended Information alleged the
different participation of each accused in the conspiracy. The gravamen of the
conspiracy charge, therefore, is not that each accused agreed to receive protection
money from illegal gambling, that each misappropriated a portion of the tobacco
excise tax, that each accused ordered the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares of Belle
Corporation and receive commissions from such sale, nor that each unjustly enriched
himself from commissions, gifts and kickbacks; rather, it is that each of them, by
their individual acts, agreed to participate, directly or indirectly, in the
amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of and/or for former
President Estrada. [bold underscoring supplied for emphasis]
Here, considering that 10 persons have been accused of amassing, accumulating
and/or acquiring ill-gotten wealth aggregating P365,997,915.00, it would be
improbable that the crime charged was plunder if none of them was alleged to be the
main plunderer. As such, each of the 10 accused would account for the aliquot
amount of only P36,599,791.50, or exactly 1/10 of the alleged aggregate ill-gotten
wealth, which is far below the threshold value of ill-gotten wealth required for plunder.
We are not unmindful of the holding in Estrada v. Sandiganabayan41 to the effect that
an information alleging conspiracy is sufficient if the information alleges conspiracy
either: (1) with the use of the word conspire,  or its derivatives or synonyms, such
as confederate, connive, collude, etc;  or (2) by allegations of the basic facts
constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a person of common understanding
would know what is being conveyed, and with such precision as would enable the
accused to competently enter a plea to a subsequent indictment based on the same
facts. We are not talking about the sufficiency of the information as to the allegation of
conspiracy, however, but rather the identification of the main plunderer sought to be
prosecuted under R.A. No. 7080 as an element of the crime of plunder. Such
identification of the main plunderer was not only necessary because the law required
70 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
such identification, but also because it was essential in safeguarding the rights of all
of the accused to be properly informed of the charges they were being made
answerable for. The main purpose of requiring the various elements of the crime
charged to be set out in the information is to enable all the accused to suitably
prepare their defense because they are presumed to have no independent knowledge
of the facts that constituted the offense charged.42
For sure, even the Sandiganbayan was at a loss in this respect. Despite the silence
of the information on who the main plunderer or the mastermind was,
the Sandiganbayan  readily condemned GMA in its resolution dated September 10,
2015 as the mastermind despite the absence of the specific allegation in the
information to that effect. Even worse, there was no evidence that substantiated such
sweeping generalization.
In fine, the Prosecution's failure to properly allege the main plunderer should be fatal
to the cause of the State against the petitioners for violating the rights of each
accused to be informed of the charges against each of them.
Nevertheless, the Prosecution insists that GMA, Uriarte and Aguas committed acts
showing the existence of an implied conspiracy among themselves, thereby making
all of them the main plunderers. On this score, the Prosecution points out that the sole
overt act of GMA to become a part of the conspiracy was her approval via the
marginal note of "OK" of all the requests made by Uriarte for the use of additional
intelligence fund. The Prosecution stresses that by approving Uriaiie's requests in that
manner, GMA violated the following:
a. Letter of Instruction 1282, which required requests for additional confidential and
intelligence funds (CIFs) to be accompanied with detailed, specific project proposals
and specifications; and
b.  COA Circular No. 92-385, which allowed the President to approve the release of
additional CIFs only if there was an existing budget to cover the request.
The insistence of the Prosecution is unwarranted. GMA's approval of Uriarte's
requests for additional CIFs did not make her part of any design to raid the public
treasury as the means to amass, accumulate and acquire ill-gotten wealth. Absent the
specific allegation in the information to that effect, and competent proof thereon,
GMA' s approval of Uriarte' s requests, even if unqualified, could not make her part of
any criminal conspiracy to commit plunder or any other crime considering that her
approval was not by any means  irregular or illegal.
The Prosecution takes GMA to task for approving Uriarte's request despite the
requests failing to provide "the full detail [ ofJ the specific purposes for which said
funds shall be spent and shall explain the circumstances giving rise to the necessity
for the expenditure and the particular aims to be accomplished." It posits that the
requests were not specific enough, contrary to what is required by LOI 1282.
LOI 1282 reads:
LETTER OF INSTRUCTION No. 1282
To: All Ministries and Offices Concerned
In recent years intelligence funds appropriated for the various ministries and certain
offices have been, as reports reaching me indicate, spent with less than full regard for
secrecy and prudence. On the one hand, there have been far too many leakages of
information on expenditures of said funds; and on the other hand, where secrecy has
been observed, the President himself was often left unaware of how these funds had
been utilized.
Effective immediately, all requests for the allocation or release of intelligence funds
shall indicate in full detail the specific purposes for which said funds shall be spent
and shall explain the circumstances giving rise to the necessity for the expenditure
and the particular aims to be accomplished.
The requests and the detailed explanations shall be submitted to the President
personally.
It is imperative that such detailed presentations be made to the President in order to
avoid such duplication of expenditures as has taken place in the past because of the
lack of centralized planning and organized disposition of intelligence funds.
Full compliance herewith is desired.
Manila, January 12, 1983.
(Sgd.) FERDINANDE. MARCOS
President of the Philippines
However, an examination of Uriarte' s several requests indicates their compliance
with LOI No. 1282. The requests, similarly worded, furnished: (a) the full details of the
specific purposes for which the funds would be spent; (b) the explanations of the
circumstances giving rise to the necessity of the expenditure; and (c) the particular
aims to be accomplished.
The specific purposes and circumstances for the necessity of the expenditures were
laid down as follows:
In dispensing its mandate, PCSO has been constantly encountering a number of
fraudulent schemes and nefarious activities on a continuing basis which affect the
integrity of our operations, to wit:
71 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
1. Donated medicines sometimes end up in drug stores for sale even if they were
labeled "Donated by PCSO- Not for Sale";
2. Unwarranted or unofficial use of ambulances by beneficiarydonees;
3. Unauthorized expenditures of endowment fund for charity patients and
organizations;
4. Lotto and sweepstakes scams victimizing innocent people of winning the jackpot
and selling tampered tickets as winning tickets;
5. Fixers for the different programs of PCSO such as Ambulance Donation Project,
Endowment Fund Program and Individual Medical Assistance Program;
6. Other fraudulent schemes and activities which put the PCSO in bad light.43
A reading of the requests also reveals that the additional CIFs requested were to be
used to protect PCSO's image and the integrity of its operations. The Court thus
cannot share the Prosecution's dismissiveness of the requests for not being compliant
with LOI No. 1282. According to its terms, LOI No. 1282 did not detail any
qualification as to how specific the requests should be made. Hence, we should not
make any other pronouncement than to rule that Uriarte's requests were compliant
with LOI No. 1282.
COA Circular No. 92-385 required that additional request for CIFs would be approved
only when there was available budget. In this regard, the Prosecution suggests that
there was no longer any budget when GMA approved Uriarte's requests because the
budget had earmarked intelligence funds that had already been maxed out and
used. The suggestion is not acceptable, however, considering that the funds of the
PCSO were comingled into one account as early as 2007. Consequently, although
only 15% of PCSO's revenues was appropriated to an operation fund from which the
CIF could be sourced, the remaining 85% of PCSO's revenues, already co-mingled
with the operating fund, could still sustain the additional requests. In short, there was
available budget from which to draw the additional requests for CIFs.
It is notable that the COA, although frowning upon PCSO's co-mingling of funds, did
not rule such co-mingling as illegal. As such, sourcing the requested additional CIFs
from one account was far from illegal.
Lastly, the Prosecution's effort to show irregularities as badges of bad faith has led it
to claim that GMA had known that Uriarte would raid the public treasury, and would
misuse the amounts disbursed. This knowledge was imputed to GMA by virtue of her
power of control over PCSO.
The Prosecution seems to be relying on the doctrine of command responsibility to
impute the actions of subordinate officers to GMA as the superior officer. The reliance
is misplaced, for incriminating GMA under those terms was legally unacceptable and
incomprehensible. The application of the doctrine of command responsibility is
limited, and cannot be true for all litigations. The Court ruled in Rodriguez v.
Macapagal-Arroyo44that command responsibility pertains to the responsibility of
commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or
other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict. The
doctrine has also found application in civil actions for human rights abuses. But this
case involves neither a probe of GMA' s actions as the Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, nor of a human rights issue. As such, it is legally
improper to impute the actions of Uriarte to GMA in the absence of any conspiracy
between them.
On the part of Aguas, the Sandiganbayan pronounced him to be as much a member
of the implied conspiracy as GMA was, and detailed his participation in this manner:
In all of the disbursement vouchers covering the cash advances/releases to Uriarte of
the CIF funds, Aguas certified that:
CERTIFIED: Adequate available funds/budgetary allotment in the amount of
P___________ ; expenditure properly certified; supported by documents marked (X)
per checklist and back hereof; account codes proper; previous cash advance
liquidated/accounted for.
These certifications, after close scrutiny, were not true because: 1.) there were no
documents which lent support to the cash advances on a per project basis. The
particulars of payment simply read: "To draw cash advance form the CIF Fund of the
Office of the Vice-Chairman and General Manager". No particular purpose or project
was specified contrary to the requirement under COA Circular 2003-002 that cash
advances must be on a per project basis. Without specifics on the project covered by
each cash advance. Aguas could not certify that supporting documents existed simply
because he would not know what project was being funded by the cash advances;
and 2.) There were no previous liquidations made of prior cash advances when
Aguas made the certifications. COA circular 2003-002 required that cash advances
be liquidated within one (1) month from the date the purpose of the cash advance
was accomplished. If the completion of the projects mentioned were for more than
one month, a monthly progress liquidation report was necessary. In the case of
Uriarte' s cash advances certified to by Aguas, the liquidation made was wholesale,
i.e. these were done on a semi-annual basis without a monthly liquidation or at least a
monthly liquidation progress report. How then could Aguas correctly certify that
previous liquidations were accounted for? Aguas's certification also violated Sec. 89
of P.D. 1445 which states:
Limitations on cash advance. No cash advance shall be given unless for a legally
authorized specific purpose. A cash advance shall be reported on and liquidated as
soon as the purpose for which it was given has been served. No additional cash
advance shall be allowed to any official or employee unless the previous cash
advance given to him is first settled or a proper accounting thereof is made.
72 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
There is a great presumption of guilt against Aguas, as his action aided and abetted
Uriarte's being able to draw these irregular CIF funds in contravention of the rules on
CIF funds. Without Aguas's certification, the disbursement vouchers could not have
been processed for payment. Accordingly, the certification that there were supporting
documents and prior liquidation paved the way for Uriarte to acquire ill-gotten wealth
by raiding the public coffers of the PCSO.
By just taking cognizance of the series and number of cash advances and the
staggering amounts involved, Aguas should have been alerted that something was
greatly amiss and that Uriarte was up to something. If Aguas was not into the
scheme, it would have been easy for him to refuse to sign the certification, but he did
not. The conspiracy "gravamen" is therefore present in the case of Aguas. Moreover,
Aguas's attempt to cover-up Uriarte's misuse of these CIF funds in his
accomplishment report only contributed to unmasking the actual activities for which
these funds were utilized. Aguas' s accomplishment report, which was conformed to
by Uriarte, made it self-evidence that the bulk of the CIF funds in 2009 and 2010 were
allegedly spend for non-PCSO related activities, e.g. bomb threats, kidnapping,
terrorism, and others.45
Thus, the Sandiganbayan concluded that Aguas became a part of the implied
conspiracy when he signed the disbursement vouchers despite the absence of certain
legal requirements, and issued certain certifications to the effect that the budgetary
allotment/funds for cash advance to be withdrawn were available; that the
expenditures were supported by documents; and that the previous cash advances
had been liquidated or accounted for.
We opine and declare, however, that Aguas' certifications and signatures on the
disbursement vouchers were insufficient bases to conclude that he was into any
conspiracy to commit plunder or any other crime. Without GMA's participation, he
could not release any money because there was then no budget available for the
additional CIFs. Whatever irregularities he might have committed did not amount to
plunder, or to any implied conspiracy to commit plunder.
Under the circumstances, the Sandiganbayan's  finding on the existence of the
conspiracy to commit plunder was unsustainable. It then becomes unavoidable for the
Court to rule that because the Prosecution failed to properly allege the elements of
the crime, as well as to prove that any implied conspiracy to commit plunder or any
other crime existed among GMA, Aguas and Uriarte there was no conspiracy to
commit plunder among them. As a result, GMA and Aguas could be criminally
responsible only for their own respective actions, if any.
III.
No proof of amassing, or accumulating, or acquiring
ill-gotten wealth of at least P50 Million
was adduced against GMA and Aguas
The Sandiganbayan  sustained the sufficiency of the evidence to convict the
petitioners for plunder on the basis that the Prosecution established all the elements
of plunder.
After a review of the records, we find and rule that the Prosecution had no case for
plunder against the petitioners.
To successfully mount a criminal prosecution for plunder, the State must allege and
establish the following elements, namely:
1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by herself or in connivance with
members of her family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons;
2. That the offender amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a
combination or series of the following overt or criminal acts: (a) through
misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the
public treasury; (b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share,
percentage, kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits from any person and/or
entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office
or position of the public officer; (c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or
disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions,
agencies or instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries; (d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares
of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including the promise of
future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking; (e) by establishing
agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or
implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or
special interests; or (f) by taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship,
connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to
the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines;
and,
3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed,
accumulated or acquired is at least P50,000,000.00.46
The corpus delicti of plunder is the amassment, accumulation or acquisition of ill-
gotten wealth valued at not less than P50,000,000.00. The failure to establish
the corpus delicti should lead to the dismissal of the criminal prosecution.
As regards the element that the public officer must have amassed, accumulated or
acquired ill-gotten wealth worth at least P50,000,000.00, the Prosecution adduced no
evidence showing that either GMA or Aguas or even Uriarte, for that matter, had
amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth of any amount. There was also
no evidence, testimonial or otherwise, presented by the Prosecution showing even
the remotest possibility that the CIFs of the PCSO had been diverted to either GMA or
Aguas, or Uriarte.
73 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
The absolute lack of evidence on this material but defining and decisive aspect of the
criminal prosecution was explicitly noted in the concurring and partial dissenting
opinion of Justice Rodolfo A. Ponferrada of the Sandiganbayan,  to wit:
Here the evidence of the prosecution failed to show the existence of the crime of
plunder as no evidence was presented that any of the accused, accumulated and/or
acquired ill-gotten wealth. In fact, the principal witness of the prosecution when
asked, said that she does not know the existence or whereabouts of the alleged ill-
gotten wealth, to wit:
Q: Of course, you don't know where is this ill-gotten wealth are (sic) now?
A: Yes, Your Honors. We don't know whether they saved it, squandered it or
what? We don't know, Your Honor.47 [bold emphasis supplied]
After Atty. Tolentino, as the Prosecution's main witness, conceded lack of any
knowledge of the amassing, accumulating or acquiring of ill-gotten wealth of at least
P50,000,000.00, nothing more remained of the criminal prosecution for plunder.
Hence, the Sandiganbayan should have granted the demurrers of GMA and Aguas,
and dismissed the criminal action against them.
IV.
The Prosecution failed to prove the
predicate act of raiding the public treasury
The Sandiganbayan  observed that the Prosecution established the predicate act of
raiding the public treasury, to wit:
Secondly, the terms "unjust enrichment," "benefit," and "pecuniary benefit" are only
mentioned in the predicate acts mentioned in par. 2, 5 and 6 of Section 1 (d) of the
Plunder Law. Paragraph 1 of the same section where "raids on the public treasury" is
mentioned did not mention "unjust enrichment" or "personal benefit". Lastly, the
predicate act covering "raids on the public treasury" is lumped up with the phrases
misappropriation, conversion, misuse and malversation of public funds. Thus, once
public funds, as in the case of CIF funds, are illegally accumulated, amassed or
acquired. To the tune of PSO Million or more, there will be no need to establish any
motive to gain, or much more establish where the money eventually ended up. As
stated in Our Resolution dated November 5, 2013:
It should be noted that in both R.A. No. 7080 and the PCGG rules, the enumeration of
the possible predicate acts in the commission of plunder did not associate or require
the concept of personal gain/benefit or unjust enrichment with respect to raids on the
public treasury, as a means to commit plunder. It would, therefore, appear that a "raid
on the public treasury" is consummated where all the acts necessary for its execution
and accomplishment are present. Thus a "raid on the public treasury" can be said to
have been achieved thru the pillaging or looting of public coffers either through
misuse, misappropriation or conversion, without need of establishing gain or profit to
the "raider" gets material possession of a government asset through improper means
and has free disposal of the same, the raid or pillage is completed.
xxxx
Clearly, the improper acquisition and illegal use of CIF funds, which is obviously a
government asset, will amount to a raid on the public treasury, and therefore fall into
the category of ill-gotten wealth.
xxxx
x x x It is not disputed that Uriarte asked for and was granted authority by Arroyo to
use additional CIF funds during the period 2008 - 2010. Uriarte was able to
accumulate during that period CIF funds in the total amount of P352,681,646. This
was through a series of withdrawals as cash advances of the CIF funds from the
PCSO coffers, as evidenced by the disbursement vouchers and checks issued and
encashed by her, through her authorized representatives.
These flagrant violations of the rules on the use of CIF funds evidently characterize
the series of withdrawals by and releases to Uriarte as "raids" on the PCSO coffers,
which is part of the public treasury. These were, in every sense, "pillage," as Uriarte
looted government funds and appears to have not been able to account for it. The
monies came into her possession and, admittedly, she disbursed it for purposes other
than what these were intended for, thus amounting to "misuse" of the same. xxx
In this case, to require proof that monies went to a plunderer's bank account or was
used to acquire real or personal properties or used for any other purpose to
personally benefit the plunderer, is absurd. Suppose a plunderer had already
amassed, acquired or accumulated P50 Million or more of government funds and just
decide to keep it in his vault and never used such funds for any purpose to benefit
him, would that not be plunder? Or, if immediately right after such amassing, the
monies went up in flames or recovered by the police, negating any opportunity for the
purpose to actually benefit, would that not still be plunder? Surely, in such cases, a
plunder charge could still prosper and the argument that the fact of personal benefit
should still be evidence-based must fail.48
The Sandiganbayan  contended that in order to prove the predicate act of raids of the
public treasury,  the Prosecution need not establish that the public officer had
benefited from such act; and that what was necessary was proving that the public
officer had raided the public coffers. In support of this, it referred to the records of the
deliberations of Congress to buttress its observation.
We do not share the Sandiganbayan'  s contention.
74 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
The phrase raids on the public treasury is found in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080,
which provides:
Section I .Definition of Terms.  - x x x
xxxx
d) Ill-gotten wealth means any asset, property, business enterprise or material
possession of any person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by
him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or
business associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar
schemes:
1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or
raids on the public treasury;
xxxx
To discern the proper import of the phrase raids on the public treasury,  the key is to
look at the accompanying words: misappropriation, conversion,
misuse  or malversation of public funds. This process is conformable with the maxim
of statutory construction noscitur a sociis, by which the correct construction of a
particular word or phrase that is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of
various meanings may be made by considering the company of the words in which
the word or phrase is found or with which it is associated. Verily, a word or phrase in a
statute is always used in association with other words or phrases, and its meaning
may, therefore, be modified or restricted by the latter.49
To convert  connotes the act of using or disposing of another's property as if it were
one's own; to misappropriate  means to own, to take something for one's own
benefit;50 misuse means "a good, substance, privilege, or right used improperly,
unforeseeably, or not as intended;"51 and malversation occurs when "any public
officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or
property, shall appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent,
through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such
public funds, or property, wholly or partially."52 The common thread that binds all the
four terms together is that the public officer used the property taken. Considering
that raids on the public treasury  is in the company of the four other terms that require
the use of the property taken, the phrase raids on the public treasury similarly
requires such use of the property taken. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan  gravely
erred in contending that the mere accumulation and gathering constituted the
forbidden act of raids on the public treasury. Pursuant to the maxim of noscitur a
sociis, raids on the public treasury requires the raider to use the property taken
impliedly for his personal benefit.
The Prosecution asserts that the Senate deliberations removed personal benefit as a
requirement for plunder. In not requiring personal benefit, the Sandiganbayan quoted
the following exchanges between Senator Enrile and Senator Tañada, viz.:
Senator Emile. The word here, Mr. President, "such public officer or person who
conspired or knowingly benefited". One does not have to conspire or
rescheme. The only element needed is that he "knowingly benefited". A candidate for
the Senate for instance, who received a political contribution from a plunderer,
knowing that the contributor is a plunderer and therefore, he knowingly benefited from
the plunder, would he also suffer the penalty, Mr. President, for life imprisonment?
Senator Tañada. In the committee amendments, Mr. President, we have deleted
these lines 1 to 4 and part ofline 5, on page 3. But, in a way, Mr. President, it is good
that the Gentleman is bringing out these questions, I believe that under the examples
he has given, the Court will have to ...
Senator Emile. How about the wife, Mr. President, he may not agree with the
plunderer to plunder the country but because she is a dutiful wife or a faithful
husband, she has to keep her or his vow of fidelity to the spouse. And, of course, she
enjoys the benefits out of the plunder. Would the Gentleman now impute to her or him
the crime of plunder simply because she or he knowingly benefited out of the fruits of
the plunder and, therefore, he must suffer or he must suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment?
The President. That was stricken out already in the Committee amendment.
Senator Tañada. Yes, Mr. President. Lines l to 4 and part of line 5 were stricken out in
the Committee amendment. But, as I said, the eamples of the Minority Floor Leader
are still worth spreading the Record. And, I believe that in those examples, the Court
will have just to take into consideration all the other circumstances prevailing in the
case and the evidence that will be submitted.
The President. In any event, 'knowingly benefited' has already been stricken off."53
The exchanges between Senator Enrile and Senator Tañada reveal, therefore, that
what was removed from the coverage of the bill and the final version that eventually
became the law was a person who was not the main plunderer or a co-conspirator,
but one who personally benefited from the plunderers' action. The requirement of
personal benefit on the part of the main plunderer or his co-conspirators by virtue of
their plunder was not removed.
As a result, not only did the Prosecution fail to show where the money went but, more
importantly, that GMA and Aguas had personally benefited from the same. Hence, the
Prosecution did not prove the predicate act of raids on the public treasury  beyond
reasonable doubt.
75 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
V.
Summation
In view of the foregoing, the Court inevitably concludes that
the Sandiganbayan  completely ignored the failure of the information to sufficiently
charge conspiracy to commit plunder against the petitioners; and ignored the lack of
evidence establishing the corpus delicti  of amassing, accumulation and acquisition of
ill-gotten wealth in the total amount of at least P50,000,000.00 through any or all of
the predicate crimes. The Sandiganbayan thereby acted capriciously, thus gravely
abusing its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment
which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.54 To justify the issuance of the writ
of certiorari, the abuse of discretion must be grave, as when the power is exercised in
an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and the
abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to
a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all, in contemplation of law,
as to be equivalent to having acted without jurisdiction.55
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petitions for certiorari; ANNULS and SETS
ASIDE the resolutions issued in Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 by
the Sandiganbayan  on April 6, 2015 and September 10, 2015; GRANTS the
petitioners' respective demurrers to evidence; DISMISSES Criminal Case No. SB-12-
CRM-0174 as to the petitioners GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO and BENIGNO
AGUAS for insufficiency of evidence; ORDERS the immediate release from detention
of said petitioners; and MAKES no pronouncements on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 141066             February 17, 2005
EVANGELINE LADONGA, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga seeks a review of the Decision,1 dated May 17, 1999,
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20443, affirming the Decision dated
August 24, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3 of Bohol, in Criminal
Case Nos. 7068, 7069 and 7070 convicting her of violation of B.P. Blg. 22, otherwise
known as The Bouncing Checks Law.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On March 27, 1991, three Informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 were filed with the
RTC, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 7068 - 7070. The Information in Criminal Case
No. 7068 alleges as follows:
That, sometime in May or June 1990, in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating, and mutually helping with one another, knowing fully well that they did
not have sufficient funds deposited with the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB),
Tagbilaran Branch, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, draw and
issue UCPB Check No. 284743 postdated July 7, 1990 in the amount of NINE
THOUSAND SEVENTY-FIVE PESOS AND FIFTY-FIVE CENTAVOS (₱9,075.55),
payable to Alfredo Oculam, and thereafter, without informing the latter that they did
not have sufficient funds deposited with the bank to cover up the amount of the
check, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously pass on, indorse, give
and deliver the said check to Alfredo Oculam by way of rediscounting of the
aforementioned checks; however, upon presentation of the check to the drawee bank
for encashment, the same was dishonored for the reason that the account of the
accused with the United Coconut Planters Bank, Tagbilaran Branch, had already
been closed, to the damage and prejudice of the said Alfredo Oculam in the
aforestated amount.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.2
The accusatory portions of the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 7069 and 7070 are
similarly worded, except for the allegations concerning the number, date and amount
of each check, that is:
(a) Criminal Case No. 7069 - UCPB Check No. 284744 dated July 22, 1990 in the
amount of ₱12,730.00;3
(b) Criminal Case No. 7070 – UCPB Check No. 106136 dated July 22, 1990 in the
amount of ₱8,496.55.4
The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. When arraigned on June 26, 1991, the
two accused pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged.5
The prosecution presented as its lone witness complainant Alfredo Oculam. He
testified that: in 1989, spouses Adronico6 and Evangeline Ladonga became his
regular customers in his pawnshop business in Tagbilaran City, Bohol;7 sometime in
May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a ₱9,075.55 loan from him, guaranteed by
United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Check No. 284743, post dated to dated July 7,
1990 issued by Adronico;8 sometime in the last week of April 1990 and during the first
week of May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained an additional loan of ₱12,730.00,
guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 284744, post dated to dated July 26, 1990 issued by
Adronico;9 between May and June 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a third loan
in the amount of ₱8,496.55, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 106136, post dated to
July 22, 1990 issued by Adronico; 10 the three checks bounced upon presentment for
76 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
the reason "CLOSED ACCOUNT";11 when the Ladonga spouses failed to redeem the
check, despite repeated demands, he filed a criminal complaint against them.12
While admitting that the checks issued by Adronico bounced because there was no
sufficient deposit or the account was closed, the Ladonga spouses claimed that the
checks were issued only to guarantee the obligation, with an agreement that Oculam
should not encash the checks when they mature;13 and, that petitioner is not a
signatory of the checks and had no participation in the issuance thereof.14
On August 24, 1996, the RTC rendered a joint decision finding the Ladonga spouses
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
Premises considered, this Court hereby renders judgment finding accused Adronico
Ladonga, alias Ronie, and Evangeline Ladonga guilty beyond reasonable doubt in the
aforesaid three (3) criminal cases, for which they stand charged before this Court, and
accordingly, sentences them to imprisonment and fine, as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 7068, for (sic) an imprisonment of one (1) year for
each of them, and a fine in the amount of ₱9,075.55, equivalent to the
amount of UCPB Check No. 284743;
2. In Criminal Case No. 7069, for (sic) an imprisonment for each of them to
one (1) year and a fine of ₱12, 730.00, equivalent to the amount of UCPB
Check No. 284744; and,
3. In Criminal Case No. 7070, with (sic) an imprisonment of one year for
each of them and a fine of ₱8,496.55 equivalent to the amount of UCPB
Check No. 106136;
4. That both accused are further ordered to jointly and solidarily pay and
reimburse the complainant, Mr. Alfredo Oculam, the sum of ₱15,000.00
representing actual expenses incurred in prosecuting the instant cases;
₱10,000.00 as attorney’s fee; and the amount of ₱30,302.10 which is the
total value of the three (3) subject checks which bounced; but without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
With Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED. 15
Adronico applied for probation which was granted.16 On the other hand, petitioner
brought the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the RTC erred in finding her
criminally liable for conspiring with her husband as the principle of conspiracy is
inapplicable to B.P. Blg. 22 which is a special law; moreover, she is not a signatory of
the checks and had no participation in the issuance thereof.17
On May 17, 1999, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner.18 It held
that the provisions of the penal code were made applicable to special penal laws in
the decisions of this Court in People vs. Parel, 19 U.S. vs. Ponte, 20 and U.S. vs.
Bruhez.21 It noted that Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code itself provides that its
provisions shall be supplementary to special laws unless the latter provide the
contrary. The Court of Appeals stressed that since B.P. Blg. 22 does not prohibit the
applicability in a suppletory character of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), the principle of conspiracy may be applied to cases involving violations of B.P.
Blg. 22. Lastly, it ruled that the fact that petitioner did not make and issue or sign the
checks did not exculpate her from criminal liability as it is not indispensable that a co-
conspirator takes a direct part in every act and knows the part which everyone
performed. The Court of Appeals underscored that in conspiracy the act of one
conspirator could be held to be the act of the other.
Petitioner sought reconsideration of the decision but the Court of Appeals denied the
same in a Resolution dated November 16, 1999.22
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner presents to the Court the following issues for resolution:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER WHO WAS NOT THE DRAWER
OR ISSUER OF THE THREE CHECKS THAT BOUNCED BUT HER CO-
ACCUSED HUSBAND UNDER THE LATTER’S ACCOUNT COULD BE
HELD LIABLE FOR VIOLATIONS OF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22 AS
CONSPIRATOR.
2. ANCILLARY TO THE MAIN ISSUE ARE THE FOLLOWING ISSUES:
A. WHETHER OR NOT CONSPIRACY IS APPLICABLE IN VIOLATIONS OF BATAS
PAMBANSA BILANG 22 BY INVOKING THE LAST SENTENCE OF ARTICLE 10 OF
THE REVISED PENAL CODE WHICH STATES:
Art. 10. Offenses not subject of the provisions of this Code. – Offenses which are or in
the future may be punished under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this
Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should
specially provide the contrary.
B. WHETHER OR NOT THE CASES CITED BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS IN AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER AS
CONSPIRATOR APPLYING THE SUPPLETORY CHARACTER OF THE REVISED
PENAL CODE TO SPECIAL LAWS LIKE B.P. BLG. 22 IS APPLICABLE.23
Petitioner staunchly insists that she cannot be held criminally liable for violation
of B.P. Blg. 22 because she had no participation in the drawing and issuance of the
three checks subject of the three criminal cases, a fact proven by the checks
77 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
themselves. She contends that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in applying the
principle of conspiracy, as defined under the RPC, to violations of B.P. Blg. 22. She
posits that the application of the principle of conspiracy would enlarge the scope of
the statute and include situations not provided for or intended by the lawmakers, such
as penalizing a person, like petitioner, who had no participation in the drawing or
issuance of checks.
The Office of the Solicitor General disagrees with petitioner and echoes the
declaration of the Court of Appeals that some provisions of the Revised Penal Code,
especially with the addition of the second sentence in Article 10, are applicable to
special laws. It submits that B.P. Blg. 22 does not provide any prohibition regarding
the applicability in a suppletory character of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code
to it.
Article 10 of the RPC reads as follows:
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. – Offenses which are or
in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of
this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should
specially provide the contrary.
The article is composed of two clauses. The first provides that offenses which in the
future are made punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of the
RPC, while the second makes the RPC supplementary to such laws. While it seems
that the two clauses are contradictory, a sensible interpretation will show that they can
perfectly be reconciled.
The first clause should be understood to mean only that the special penal laws are
controlling with regard to offenses therein specifically punished. Said clause only
restates the elemental rule of statutory construction that special legal provisions
prevail over general ones.24 Lex specialis derogant generali. In fact, the clause can be
considered as a superfluity, and could have been eliminated altogether. The second
clause contains the soul of the article. The main idea and purpose of the article is
embodied in the provision that the "code shall be supplementary" to special laws,
unless the latter should specifically provide the contrary.
The appellate court’s reliance on the cases of People vs. Parel,25 U.S. vs.
Ponte,26 and U.S. vs. Bruhez27 rests on a firm basis. These cases involved the
suppletory application of principles under the then Penal Code to special
laws. People vs. Parel is concerned with the application of Article 2228 of the Code to
violations of Act No. 3030, the Election Law, with reference to the retroactive effect of
penal laws if they favor the accused. U.S. vs. Ponte involved the application of Article
1729 of the same Penal Code, with reference to the participation of principals in the
commission of the crime of misappropriation of public funds as defined and penalized
by Act No. 1740. U.S. vs. Bruhez covered Article 4530 of the same Code, with
reference to the confiscation of the instruments used in violation of Act No. 1461, the
Opium Law.
B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the suppletory application of the provisions
of the RPC. Thus, in the absence of contrary provision in B.P. Blg. 22, the general
provisions of the RPC which, by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be
applied suppletorily. Indeed, in the recent case of Yu vs. People,31 the Court applied
suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary imprisonment under Article 3932 of the RPC
to B.P. Blg. 22.
The suppletory application of the principle of conspiracy in this case is analogous to
the application of the provision on principals under Article 17 in U.S. vs. Ponte. For
once conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of
one is the act of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of
participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are
principals.33
All these notwithstanding, the conviction of the petitioner must be set aside.
Article 8 of the RPC provides that "a conspiracy exists when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit
it." To be held guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, the accused must be
shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the
complicity.34 The overt act or acts of the accused may consist of active participation in
the actual commission of the crime itself or may consist of moral assistance to his co-
conspirators by moving them to execute or implement the criminal plan.35
In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove that petitioner performed any
overt act in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. As testified to by the lone
prosecution witness, complainant Alfredo Oculam, petitioner was merely present
when her husband, Adronico, signed the check subject of Criminal Case No.
7068.36 With respect to Criminal Case Nos. 7069-7070, Oculam also did not describe
the details of petitioner’s participation. He did not specify the nature of petitioner’s
involvement in the commission of the crime, either by a direct act of participation, a
direct inducement of her co-conspirator, or cooperating in the commission of the
offense by another act without which it would not have been accomplished.
Apparently, the only semblance of overt act that may be attributed to petitioner is that
she was present when the first check was issued. However, this inference cannot be
stretched to mean concurrence with the criminal design.
Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive
evidence.37 Conspiracy transcends mere companionship and mere presence at the
scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy.38 Even knowledge,
acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a
party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime
with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.39
As the Court eloquently pronounced in a case of recent vintage, People vs. Mandao:40
78 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
To be sure, conspiracy is not a harmless innuendo to be taken lightly or accepted at SO ORDERED.
every turn. It is a legal concept that imputes culpability under specific circumstances;
as such, it must be established as clearly as any element of the crime. Evidence to G.R. No. 93028 July 29, 1994
prove it must be positive and convincing, considering that it is a convenient and
simplistic device by which the accused may be ensnared and kept within the penal
fold. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARTIN SIMON y SUNGA, respondent.
Criminal liability cannot be based on a general allegation of conspiracy, and a
judgment of conviction must always be founded on the strength of the prosecution’s
evidence. The Court ruled thus in People v. Legaspi, from which we quote: The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

At most, the prosecution, realizing the weakness of its evidence against accused-
appellant Franco, merely relied and pegged the latter’s criminal liability on its
sweeping theory of conspiracy, which to us, was not attendant in the commission of
the crime.
The rule is firmly entrenched that a judgment of conviction must be predicated on the
strength of the evidence for the prosecution and not on the weakness of the evidence
for the defense. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest
suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied
that on the defense could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged; that not
only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. What is required then is
moral certainty.
Verily, it is the role of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond
reasonable doubt in order to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.
In sum, conviction must rest on hard evidence showing that the accused is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. In criminal cases, moral certainty --
not mere possibility -- determines the guilt or the innocence of the accused. Even
when the evidence for the defense is weak, the accused must be acquitted when the
prosecution has not proven guilt with the requisite quantum of proof required in all
criminal cases. (Citations omitted)41
All told, the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the petitioner with moral
certainty. Its evidence falls short of the quantum of proof required for conviction.
Accordingly, the constitutional presumption of the petitioner’s innocence must be
upheld and she must be acquitted.1a\^/phi1.net
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision, dated May
17, 1999, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20443 affirming the Decision,
dated August 24, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 3), Bohol, in Criminal
Case Nos. 7068, 7069 and 7070 convicting the petitioner of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga is ACQUITTED
of the charges against her under B.P. Blg. 22 for failure of the prosecution to prove
her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. No pronouncement as to costs.
Ricardo M.Sampang for accused-appellant.
REGALADO, J.:
Herein accused-appellant Martin Simon y Sunga was charged on November 10, 1988
with a violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, under
an indictment alleging that on or about October 22, 1988, at Barangay Sto. Cristo,
Guagua, Pampanga, he sold four tea bags of marijuana to a Narcotics Command
(NARCOM) poseur-buyer in consideration of the sum of P40.00, which tea bags,
when subjected to laboratory examination, were found positive for marijuana.1
Eventually arraigned with the assistance of counsel on March 2, 1989, after his
rearrest following his escape from Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga where he
was temporarily detained,2 he pleaded not guilty. He voluntarily waived his right to a
pre-trial conference,3 after which trial on the merits ensued and was duly concluded.
I
The evidence on record shows that a confidential informant, later identified as a
NARCOM operative, informed the police unit at Camp Olivas, San Fernando,
Pampanga, of the illegal drug activities of a certain "Alyas Pusa" at Sto. Cristo,
Guagua, Pampanga. Capt. Francisco Bustamante, Commanding Officer of the 3rd
Narcotics Regional Unit in the camp, then formed a buy-bust team composed of Sgt.
Buenaventura Lopez, Pfc. Virgilio Villaruz and
Sgt. Domingo Pejoro, all members of the same unit. After securing marked money
from Bustamante, the team, together with their informant, proceeded to Sto. Cristo
after they had coordinated with the police authorities and barangay officers thereof.
When they reached the place, the confidential informer pointed out appellant to Lopez
who consequently approached appellant and asked him if he had marijuana.
Appellant answered in the affirmative and Lopez offered to buy two tea bags.
Appellant then left and, upon returning shortly thereafter, handed to Lopez two
marijuana tea bags and Lopez gave him the marked money amounting to P40.00 as
payment. Lopez then scratched his head as a
pre-arranged signal to his companions who were stationed around ten to fifteen
meters away, and the team closed in on them. Thereupon, Villaruz, who was the
79 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
head of the back-up team, arrested appellant. The latter was then brought by the
team to the 3rd Narcotics Regional Unit at Camp Olivas on board a jeep and he was
placed under custodial investigation, with Sgt. Pejoro as the investigator.4
Pfc. Villaruz corroborated Lopez' testimony, claiming that he saw the deal that
transpired between Lopez and the appellant. He also averred that he was the one
who confiscated the marijuana and took the marked money from appellant.5
Sgt. Domingo Pejoro, for his part, declared that although he was part of the buy-bust
team, he was stationed farthest from the rest of the other members, that is, around
two hundred meters away from his companions. He did not actually see the sale that
transpired between Lopez and appellant but he saw his teammates accosting
appellant after the latter's arrest. He was likewise the one who conducted the
custodial investigation of appellant wherein the latter was apprised of his rights to
remain silent, to information and to counsel. Appellant, however, orally waived his
right to counsel.6
Pejoro also claimed having prepared Exhibit "G", the "Receipt of Property
Seized/Confiscated" which appellant signed, admitting therein the confiscation of four
tea bags of marijuana dried leaves in his possession. Pejoro likewise informed the
court below that, originally, what he placed on the receipt was that only one marijuana
leaf was confiscated in exchange for P20.00. However, Lopez and Villaruz corrected
his entry by telling him to put "two", instead of "one" and "40", instead of "20". He
agreed to the correction since they were the ones who were personally and directly
involved in the purchase of the marijuana and the arrest of appellant.7
Dr. Pedro S. Calara, a medical officer at Camp Olivas, examined appellant at 5:30
p.m. of the day after the latter's apprehension, and the results were practically normal
except for his relatively high blood pressure. The doctor also did not find any trace of
physical injury on the person of appellant. The next day, he again examined appellant
due to the latter's complaint of
gastro-intestinal pain. In the course of the examination, Dr. Calara discovered that
appellant has a history of peptic ulcer, which causes him to experience abdominal
pain and consequently vomit blood. In the afternoon, appellant came back with the
same complaint but, except for the gastro-intestinal pain, his physical condition
remained normal.8
As expected, appellant tendered an antipodal version of the attendant facts, claiming
that on the day in question, at around 4:30 p.m., he was watching television with the
members of his family in their house when three persons, whom he had never met
before suddenly arrived. Relying on the assurance that they would just inquire about
something from him at their detachment, appellant boarded a jeep with them. He was
told that they were going to Camp Olivas, but he later noticed that they were taking a
different route. While on board, he was told that he was a pusher so he attempted to
alight from the jeep but he was handcuffed instead. When they finally reached the
camp, he was ordered to sign some papers and, when he refused, he was boxed in
the stomach eight or nine times by Sgt. Pejoro. He was then compelled to affix his
signature and fingerprints on the documents presented to him. He denied knowledge
of the P20.00 or the dried marijuana leaves, and insisted that the twenty-peso bill
came from the pocket of Pejoro. Moreover, the reason why he vomited blood was
because of the blows he suffered at the hands of Pejoro. He admitted having escaped
from the NARCOM office but claimed that he did so since he could no longer endure
the maltreatment to which he was being subjected. After escaping, he proceeded to
the house of his uncle, Bienvenido Sunga, at San Matias, Guagua, reaching the place
at around 6:30 or 7:30 p.m. There, he consulted a quack doctor and, later, he was
accompanied by his sister to the Romana Pangan District Hospital at Floridablanca,
Pampanga where he was confined for three days.9
Appellant's brother, Norberto Simon, testified to the fact that appellant was
hospitalized at Floridablanca, Pampanga after undergoing abdominal pain and
vomiting of blood. He likewise confirmed that appellant had been suffering from peptic
ulcer even before the latter's arrest.10 Also, Dr. Evelyn Gomez-Aguas, a resident
physician of Romana Pangan District Hospital, declared that she treated appellant for
three days due to abdominal pain, but her examination revealed that the cause for
this ailment was appellant's peptic ulcer. She did not see any sign of slight or serious
external injury, abrasion or contusion on his body.11
On December 4, 1989, after weighing the evidence presented, the trial court rendered
judgment convicting appellant for a violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No.
6425, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, to
pay a fine of twenty thousand pesos and to pay the costs. The four tea bags of
marijuana dried leaves were likewise ordered confiscated in favor of the
Government.12
Appellant now prays the Court to reverse the aforementioned judgment of the lower
court, contending in his assignment of errors that the latter erred in (1) not upholding
his defense of "frame-up", (2) not declaring Exhibit "G" (Receipt of Property
Seized/Confiscated) inadmissible in evidence, and (3) convicting him of a violation of
the Dangerous Drugs Act.13
At the outset, it should be noted that while the People's real theory and evidence is to
the effect the appellant actually sold only two tea bags of marijuana dried leaves,
while the other two tea bags were merely confiscated subsequently from his
possession,14 the latter not being in any way connected with the sale, the information
alleges that he sold and delivered four tea bags of marijuana dried leaves.15 In view
thereof, the issue presented for resolution in this appeal is merely the act of selling
the two tea bags  allegedly committed by appellant, and does not include the
disparate and distinct issue of illegal possession of the other two tea bags which
separate offense is not charged herein.16
To sustain a conviction for selling prohibited drugs, the sale must be clearly and
unmistakably established.17 To sell means to give, whether for money or any other
material consideration.18 It must, therefore, be established beyond doubt that
80 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
appellant actually sold and delivered two tea bags of marijuana dried leaves to Sgt.
Lopez, who acted as the poseur-buyer, in exchange for two twenty-peso bills.
After an assiduous review and calibration of the evidence adduced by both parties,
we are morally certain that appellant was caught in  flagrante delicto engaging in the
illegal sale of prohibited drugs. The prosecution was able to prove beyond a scintilla
of doubt that appellant, on October 22, 1988, did sell two tea bags of marijuana dried
leaves to Sgt. Lopez. The latter himself creditably testified as to how the sale took
place and his testimony was amply corroborated by his teammates. As between the
straightforward, positive and corroborated testimony of Lopez and the bare denials
and negative testimony of appellant, the former undeniably deserves greater weight
and is more entitled to credence.
We are aware that the practice of entrapping drug traffickers through the utilization of
poseur-buyers is susceptible to mistake, harassment, extortion and
abuse.19 Nonetheless, such causes for judicial apprehension and doubt do not obtain
in the case at bar. Appellant's entrapment and arrest were not effected in a
haphazard way, for a surveillance was conducted by the team before the
buy-bust operation was effected.20 No ill motive was or could be attributed to them,
aside from the fact that they are presumed to have regularly performed their official
duty.21 Such lack of dubious motive coupled with the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty, as well as the findings of the trial court on the credibility
of witnesses, should prevail over the self-serving and uncorroborated claim of
appellant of having been framed,22 erected as it is upon the mere shifting sands of an
alibi. To top it all, appellant was caught
red-handed delivering prohibited drugs, and while there was a delimited chance for
him to controvert the charge, he does not appear to have plausibly done so.
When the drug seized was submitted to the Crime Laboratory Service of the then
Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PC-INP) at Camp Olivas for
examination, P/Cpl. Marlyn Salangad, a forensic chemist therein,23 confirmed in her
Technical Report No. NB-448-88 that the contents of the four tea bags confiscated
from appellant were positive for and had a total weight of 3.8 grams of
marijuana.24 Thus, the corpus delicti of the crime had been fully proved with certainty
and conclusiveness.25
Appellant would want to make capital of the alleged inconsistencies and
improbabilities in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Foremost, according
to him, is the matter of who really confiscated the marijuana tea bags from him since,
in open court, Pejoro asserted that he had nothing to do with the confiscation of the
marijuana, but in the aforementioned "Receipt of Property Seized/Confiscated," he
signed it as the one who seized the same.26
Suffice it to say that whether it was Villaruz or Pejoro who confiscated the marijuana
will not really matter since such is not an element of the offense with which appellant
is charged. What is unmistakably clear is that the marijuana was confiscated from the
possession of appellant. Even, assuming arguendo that the prosecution committed an
error on who actually seized the marijuana from appellant, such an error or
discrepancy refers only to a minor matter and, as such, neither impairs the essential
integrity of the prosecution evidence as a whole nor reflects on the witnesses'
honesty.27 Besides, there was clearly a mere imprecision of language since Pejoro
obviously meant that he did not take part in the physical taking of the drug from the
person of appellant, but he participated in the legal seizure or confiscation thereof as
the investigator of their unit.
Next, appellant adduces the argument that the twenty-peso bills allegedly confiscated
from him were not powdered for finger-printing purposes contrary to the normal
procedure in buy-bust operations.28 This omission has been satisfactorily explained by
Pfc. Virgilio Villaruz in his testimony, as follows:
Q: Is it the standard operating procedure of your unit that in conducting
such operation you do not anymore provide a powder (sic) on the
object so as to determine the thumbmark or identity of the persons
taking hold of the object?
A: We were not able to put powder on these denominations because
we are lacking that kind of material in our office since that item can be
purchased only in Manila and only few are producing that, sir.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q: Is it not a fact that your office is within (the) P.C. Crime Laboratory,
CIS, as well as the office of NICA?
A: Our office is only adjacent to those offices but we cannot make a
request for that powder because they, themselves, are using that in
their own work, sir.29
The foregoing explanation aside, we agree that the failure to mark the money bills
used for entrapment purposes can under no mode of rationalization be fatal to the
case of the prosecution because the Dangerous Drugs Act punishes "any person
who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another,
distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker
in any of such transactions."30 The dusting of said bills with phosphorescent powder is
only an evidentiary technique for identification purposes, which identification can be
supplied by other species of evidence.
Again, appellant contends that there was neither a relative of his nor
any barangay official or civilian to witness the seizure. He decries the lack of pictures
taken before, during and after his arrest. Moreover, he was not reported to or booked
in the custody of any barangay official or police authorities.31 These are absurd
disputations. No law or jurisprudence requires that an arrest or seizure, to be valid, be
witnessed by a relative, a barangay official or any other civilian, or be accompanied
81 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
by the taking of pictures. On the contrary, the police enforcers having caught
appellant in flagrante delicto, they were not only authorized but were also under the
obligation to effect a warrantless arrest and seizure.
Likewise, contrary to appellant's contention, there was an arrest report prepared by
the police in connection with his apprehension. Said Booking Sheet and Arrest
Report32 states, inter alia, that "suspect was arrested for selling two tea bags of
suspected marijuana dried leaves and the confiscation of another two tea bags of
suspected marijuana dried leaves." Below these remarks was affixed appellant's
signature. In the same manner, the receipt for the seized property, hereinbefore
mentioned, was signed by appellant wherein he acknowledged the confiscation of the
marked bills from him.33
However, we find and hereby declare the aforementioned exhibits inadmissible in
evidence. Appellant's conformance to these documents are declarations against
interest and tacit admissions of the crime charged. They were obtained in violation of
his right as a person under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense,
there being nothing in the records to show that he was assisted by
counsel.34 Although appellant manifested during the custodial investigation that he
waived his right to counsel, the waiver was not made in writing and in the presence of
counsel,35 hence whatever incriminatory admission or confession may be extracted
from him, either verbally or in writing, is not allowable in evidence.36 Besides, the
arrest report is self-serving and hearsay and can easily be concocted to implicate a
suspect.
Notwithstanding the objectionability of the aforesaid exhibits, appellant cannot thereby
be extricated from his predicament since his criminal participation in the illegal sale of
marijuana has been sufficiently proven. The commission of the offense of illegal sale
of prohibited drugs requires merely the consummation of the selling
transaction37 which happens the moment the buyer receives the drug from the
seller.38 In the present case, and in light of the preceding discussion, this sale has
been ascertained beyond any peradventure of doubt.
Appellant then asseverates that it is improbable that he would sell marijuana to a total
stranger.39 We take this opportunity to once again reiterate the doctrinal rule that
drug-pushing, when done on a small scale as in this case, belongs to that class of
crimes that may be committed at any time and in any place.40 It is not contrary to
human experience for a drug pusher to sell to a total stranger,41 for what matters is
not an existing familiarity between the buyer and seller but their agreement and the
acts constituting the sale and delivery of the marijuana leaves. 42 While there may be
instances where such sale could be improbable, taking into consideration the diverse
circumstances of person, time and place, as well as the incredibility of how the
accused supposedly acted on that occasion, we can safely say that those exceptional
particulars are not present in this case.
Finally, appellant contends that he was subjected to physical and mental torture by
the arresting officers which caused him to escape from Camp Olivas the night he was
placed under custody.43 This he asserts to support his explanation as to how his
signatures on the documents earlier discussed were supposedly obtained by force
and coercion.
The doctrine is now too well embedded in our jurisprudence that for evidence to be
believed, it must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be
credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can
approve as probable under the circumstances.44 The evidence on record is bereft of
any support for appellant's allegation of maltreatment. Two doctors, one for the
prosecution45 and the other for the defense,46 testified on the absence of any tell-tale
sign or indication of bodily injury, abrasions or contusions on the person of appellant.
What is evident is that the cause of his abdominal pain was his peptic ulcer from
which he had been suffering even before his arrest.47 His own brother even
corroborated that fact, saying that appellant has had a history of bleeding peptic
ulcer.48
Furthermore, if it is true that appellant was maltreated at Camp Olivas, he had no
reason whatsoever for not divulging the same to his brother who went to see him at
the camp after his arrest and during his detention there. 49 Significantly, he also did not
even report the matter to the authorities nor file appropriate charges against the
alleged malefactors despite the opportunity to do so50 and with the legal services of
counsel being available to him. Such omissions funnel down to the conclusion that
appellant's story is a pure fabrication.
These, and the events earlier discussed, soundly refute his allegations that his arrest
was baseless and premeditated for the NARCOM agents were determined to arrest
him at all costs.51 Premeditated or not, appellant's arrest was only the culmination, the
final act needed for his isolation from society and it was providential that it came
about after he was caught in the very act of illicit trade of prohibited drugs.
Accordingly, this opinion could have concluded on a note of affirmance of the
judgment of the trial court. However, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, was further
amended by Republic Act No. 7659 effective December 31, 1993,52 which
supervenience necessarily affects the original disposition of this case and entails
additional questions of law which we shall now resolve.
II
The provisions of the aforesaid amendatory law, pertinent to the adjudication of the
case at bar, are to this effect:
Sec. 13. Sections 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 of Art. II of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, are hereby amended
to read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
82 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
 Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and
Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. — The penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand
pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person
who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give
away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such
transactions.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Sec. 17. Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of
the Proceeds or Instrument of the Crime. — The penalties for
offenses under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections
14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the
dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following quantities:
x x x           x x x          x x x
5. 750 grams or more of indian hemp or marijuana
x x x           x x x          x x x
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing
quantities, the penalty shall range from  prision
correccional to reclusion perpetua  depending upon the quantity.
1. Considering that herein appellant is being prosecuted for the sale of four tea bags
of marijuana with a total weight of only 3.8 grams and, in fact, stands to be convicted
for the sale of only two of those tea bags, the initial inquiry would be whether the
patently favorable provisions of Republic Act
No. 7659 should be given retroactive effect to entitle him to the lesser penalty
provided thereunder, pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code.
Although Republic Act No. 6425 was enacted as a special law, albeit originally
amendatory and in substitution of the previous Articles 190 to 194 of the Revised
Penal Code,53 it has long been settled that by force of Article 10 of said Code the
beneficient provisions of Article 22 thereof applies to and shall be given retrospective
effect to crimes punished by special laws.54 The execution in said article would not
apply to those convicted of drug offenses since habitual delinquency refers to
convictions for the third time or more of the crimes of serious or less serious
physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa or falsification.55
Since, obviously, the favorable provisions of Republic Act No. 7659 could neither
have then been involved nor invoked in the present case, a corollary question would
be whether this court, at the present stage, can
sua sponte apply the provisions of said Article 22 to reduce the penalty to be imposed
on appellant. That issue has likewise been resolved in the cited case of People
vs.  Moran, et al., ante., thus:
. . . . The plain precept contained in article 22 of the Penal Code,
declaring the retroactivity of penal laws in so far as they are
favorable to persons accused of a felony, would be useless and
nugatory if the courts of justice were not under obligation to fulfill
such duty, irrespective of whether or not the accused has applied
for it, just as would also all provisions relating to the prescription of
the crime and the penalty.
If the judgment which could be affected and modified by the reduced penalties
provided in Republic Act No. 7659 has already become final and executory or the
accused is serving sentence thereunder, then practice, procedure and pragmatic
considerations would warrant and necessitate the matter being brought to the judicial
authorities for relief under a writ of habeas corpus.56
2. Probably through oversight, an error on the matter of imposable penalties appears
to have been committed in the drafting of the aforesaid law; thereby calling for and
necessitating judicial reconciliation and craftsmanship.
As applied to the present case, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as now further
amended, imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from
P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00 upon any person who shall unlawfully sell,
administer, deliver, give away, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited
drug. That penalty, according to the amendment to Section 20 of the law, shall be
applied if what is involved is 750 grams or more of indian hemp or marijuana;
otherwise, if the quantity involved is less, the penalty shall range from prision
correccional to reclusion perpetua  depending upon the quantity.
In other words, there is here an overlapping error in the provisions on the penalty
of reclusion perpetua by reason of its dual imposition, that is, as the maximum of the
penalty where the marijuana is less than 750 grams, and also as the minimum of the
penalty where the marijuana involved is 750 grams or more. The same error has
been committed with respect to the other prohibited and regulated drugs provided in
said Section 20. To harmonize such conflicting provisions in order to give effect to the
whole law,57 we hereby hold that the penalty to be imposed where the quantity of the
drugs involved is less than the quantities stated in the first paragraph shall range
from  prision correccional to reclusion temporal, and not reclusion perpetua. This is
also concordant with the fundamental rule in criminal law that all doubts should be
construed in a manner favorable to the accused.
83 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
3. Where, as in this case, the quantity of the dangerous drug is only 3.8 grams, hence
covered by the imposable range of penalties under the second paragraph of Section
20, as now modified, the law provides that the penalty shall be taken from said range
"depending upon the quantity"  of the drug involved in the case. The penalty in said
second paragraph constitutes a complex one composed of three distinct penalties,
that is,  prision correccional, prision mayor, and reclusion temporal. In such a
situation, the Code provides that each one shall form a period, with the lightest of
them being the minimum, the next as the medium, and the most severe as the
maximum period.58
Ordinarily, and pursuant to Article 64 of the Code, the mitigating and aggravating
circumstances determine which period of such complex penalty
shall be imposed on the accused. The peculiarity of the second paragraph of Section
20, however, is its specific mandate, above quoted, that the penalty shall
instead depend upon the quantity of the drug subject of the criminal
transaction.59 Accordingly, by way of exception to Article 77 of the Code and to
subserve the purpose of Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7659, each of the aforesaid
component penalties shall be considered as a principal imposable penalty depending
on the quantity of the drug involved. Thereby, the modifying circumstances will not
altogether be disregarded. Since each component penalty of the total complex
penalty will have to be imposed separately as determined by the quantity of the drug
involved, then the modifying circumstances can be used to fix the proper period of
that component penalty, as shall hereafter be explained.
It would, therefore, be in line with the provisions of Section 20 in the context of our
aforesaid disposition thereon that, unless there are compelling reasons for a
deviation, the quantities of the drugs enumerated in its second paragraph be divided
into three, with the resulting quotient, and double or treble the same, to be
respectively the bases for allocating the penalty proportionately among the three
aforesaid periods according to the severity thereof. Thus, if the marijuana involved is
below 250 grams, the penalty to be imposed shall be prision correccional; from 250 to
499 grams,  prision mayor; and 500 to
749 grams, reclusion temporal. Parenthetically, fine is imposed as a conjunctive
penalty only if the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death.60
Now, considering the minimal quantity of the marijuana subject of the case at bar, the
penalty of prision correccional is consequently indicated but, again, another
preliminary and cognate issue has first to be resolved.
4. Prision correccional has a duration of 6 months and 1 day to 6 years and, as a
divisible penalty, it consists of three periods as provided in the text of and illustrated in
the table provided by Article 76 of the Code. The question is whether or not in
determining the penalty to be imposed, which is here to be taken from the penalty
of  prision correccional, the presence or absence of mitigating, aggravating or other
circumstances modifying criminal liability should be taken into account.
We are not unaware of cases in the past wherein it was held that, in imposing the
penalty for offenses under special laws, the rules on mitigating or aggravating
circumstances under the Revised Penal Code cannot and should not be applied. A
review of such doctrines as applied in said cases, however, reveals that the reason
therefor was because the special laws involved provided their own specific penalties
for the offenses punished thereunder, and which penalties were not taken from or
with reference to those in the Revised Penal Code. Since the penalties then provided
by the special laws concerned did not provide for the minimum, medium or maximum
periods, it would consequently be impossible to consider the aforestated modifying
circumstances whose main function is to determine the period of the penalty in
accordance with the rules in Article 64 of the Code.
This is also the rationale for the holding in previous cases that the provisions of the
Code on the graduation of penalties by degrees could not be given supplementary
application to special laws, since the penalties in the latter were not components of or
contemplated in the scale of penalties provided by Article 71 of the former. The
suppletory effect of the Revised Penal Code to special laws, as provided in Article 10
of the former, cannot be invoked where there is a legal or physical impossibility of, or
a prohibition in the special law against, such supplementary application.
The situation, however, is different where although the offense is defined in and
ostensibly punished under a special law, the penalty therefor is actually taken from
the Revised Penal Code in its technical nomenclature and, necessarily, with its
duration, correlation and legal effects under the system of penalties native to said
Code. When, as in this case, the law involved speaks of prision correccional, in its
technical sense under the Code, it would consequently be both illogical and absurd to
posit otherwise. More on this later.
For the nonce, we hold that in the instant case the imposable penalty under Republic
Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, is prision correccional, to be
taken from the medium period thereof pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised Penal
Code, there being no attendant mitigating or aggravating circumstance.
5. At this juncture, a clarificatory discussion of the developmental changes in the
penalties imposed for offenses under special laws would be necessary.
Originally, those special laws, just as was the conventional practice in the United
States but differently from the penalties provided in our Revised Penal Code and its
Spanish origins, provided for one specific penalty or a range of penalties with
definitive durations, such as imprisonment for one year or for one to five years but
without division into periods or any technical statutory cognomen. This is the special
law contemplated in and referred to at the time laws like the Indeterminate Sentence
Law61 were passed during the American regime.
Subsequently, a different pattern emerged whereby a special law would direct that an
offense thereunder shall be punished under the Revised Penal Code and in the same
manner provided therein. Inceptively, for instance, Commonwealth Act No.
84 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
30362 penalizing non-payment of salaries and wages with the periodicity prescribed On the other hand, the rules for the application of penalties and the correlative effects
therein, provided: thereof under the Revised Penal Code, as well as other statutory enactments founded
upon and applicable to such provisions of the Code, have suppletory effect to the
Sec. 4. Failure of the employer to pay his employee or laborer as penalties under the former Republic Act
required by section one of this Act, shall  prima facie be considered No. 1700 and those now provided under Presidential Decrees Nos. 1612 and 1866.
a fraud committed by such employer against his employee or While these are special laws, the fact that the penalties for offenses thereunder are
laborer by means of false pretenses similar to those mentioned in those provided for in the Revised Penal code lucidly reveals the statutory intent to
article three hundred and fifteen, paragraph four, sub-paragraph give the related provisions on penalties for felonies under the Code the corresponding
two (a) of the Revised Penal Code and shall be punished in the application to said special laws, in the absence of any express or implicit proscription
same manner as therein provided.63 in these special laws. To hold otherwise would be to sanction an indefensible judicial
truncation of an integrated system of penalties under the Code and its allied
legislation, which could never have been the intendment of Congress.
Thereafter, special laws were enacted where the offenses defined therein were
specifically punished by the penalties as technically named and understood in the
Revised Penal Code. These are exemplified by Republic Act No. 1700 (Anti- In People vs. Macatanda,65 a prosecution under a special law (Presidential Decree
Subversion Act) where the penalties ranged from arresto mayor to No. 533, otherwise known as the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974), it was contended
death;64 Presidential Decree No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Decree) where the penalties run by the prosecution that Article 64, paragraph 5, of the Revised Penal Code should not
from arresto mayor  to prision mayor; and Presidential Decree apply to said special law. We said therein that —
No. 1866 (illegal possession and other prohibited acts involving firearms), the
penalties wherefor may involve  prision mayor, reclusion temporal, reclusion We do not agree with the Solicitor General that P.D. 533 is a special
perpetua or death. law entirely distinct from and unrelated to the Revised Penal Code. From
the nature of the penalty imposed which is in terms of the classification and
Another variant worth mentioning is Republic Act No. 6539 duration of penalties as prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, which is not
(Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972) where the penalty is imprisonment for not less than 14 for penalties as are ordinarily imposed in special laws, the intent seems
years and 8 months and not more than 17 years and 4 months, when committed clear that P.D. 533 shall be deemed as an amendment of the Revised
without violence or intimidation of persons or force upon things; not less than 17 Penal Code, with respect to the offense of theft of large cattle (Art. 310) or
years and 4 months and not more than 30 years, when committed with violence otherwise to be subject to applicable provisions thereof such  as Article 104
against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and life imprisonment to of the Revised Penal Code . . . . Article 64 of the same Code should,
death, when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed. likewise, be applicable, . . . . (Emphasis supplied.)

With respect to the first example, where the penalties under the special law are
different from and are without reference or relation to those under the Revised Penal
Code, there can be no suppletory effect of the rules for the application of penalties
under said Code or by other relevant statutory provisions based on or applicable only
to said rules for felonies under the Code. In this type of special law, the legislative
intendment is clear.
The same exclusionary rule would apply to the last given example, Republic Act No.
6539. While it is true that the penalty of 14 years and
8 months to 17 years and 4 months is virtually equivalent to the duration of the
medium period of reclusion temporal, such technical term under the Revised Penal
Code is not given to that penalty for carnapping. Besides, the other penalties for
carnapping attended by the qualifying circumstances stated in the law do not
correspond to those in the Code. The rules on penalties in the Code, therefore,
cannot suppletorily apply to Republic Act No. 6539 and special laws of the same
formulation.
More particularly with regard to the suppletory effect of the rules on penalties in the
Revised Penal Code to Republic Act No. 6425, in this case involving Article 63(2) of
the Code, we have this more recent pronouncement:
. . . Pointing out that as provided in Article 10 the provisions of the Revised
Penal Code shall be "supplementary" to special laws, this Court held that
where the special law expressly grants to the court discretion in applying
the penalty prescribed for the offense, there is no room for the application
of the provisions of the Code . . . .
The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by P.D. No. 1623,
contains no explicit grant of discretion to the Court in the application of the
penalty prescribed by the law. In such case, the court must be guided by
the rules prescribed by the Revised Penal Code concerning the application
of penalties  which distill the "deep legal thought and centuries of
experience in the administration of criminal laws." (Emphasis ours.)66

85 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL

Under the aforestated considerations, in the case of the Dangerous Drugs Act as now
amended by Republic Act No. 7659 by the incorporation and prescription therein of
the technical penalties defined in and constituting integral parts of the three scales of
penalties in the Code, 67 with much more reason should the provisions of said Code
on the appreciation and effects of all attendant modifying circumstances apply in
fixing the penalty. Likewise, the different kinds or classifications of penalties and the
rules for graduating
such penalties by degrees should have supplementary effect on Republic Act No.
6425, except if they would result in absurdities as will now be explained.
While not squarely in issue in this case, but because this aspect is involved in the
discussion on the role of modifying circumstances, we have perforce to lay down the
caveat that mitigating circumstances should be considered and applied only if they
affect the periods and the degrees of the penalties within rational limits.
Prefatorily, what ordinarily are involved in the graduation and consequently determine
the degree of the penalty, in accordance with the rules in Article 61 of the Code as
applied to the scale of penalties in Article 71, are the stage of execution of the crime
and the nature of the participation of the accused. However, under paragraph 5 of
Article 64, when there are two or more ordinary mitigating circumstances and no
aggravating circumstance, the penalty shall be reduced by one degree. Also, the
presence of privileged mitigating circumstances, as provided in Articles 67 and 68,
can reduce the penalty by one or two degrees, or even more. These provisions of
Articles 64(5), 67 and 68 should not apply in toto in the determination of the proper
penalty under the aforestated second paragraph of section 20 of Republic Act No.
6425, to avoid anomalous results which could not have been contemplated by the
legislature.
Thus, paragraph 5 of Article 61 provides that when the law prescribes a penalty in
some manner not specially provided for in the four preceding paragraphs thereof, the
courts shall proceed by analogy therewith. Hence, when the penalty prescribed for
the crime consists of one or two penalties to be imposed in their full extent, the
penalty next lower in degree shall likewise consist of as many penalties which follow
the former in the scale in Article 71. If this rule were to be applied, and since the
complex penalty in this
case consists of three discrete penalties in their full extent, that is,
prision correccional, prision mayor and reclusion temporal, then one degree lower
would be arresto menor, destierro and arresto mayor. There could, however, be no
further reduction by still one or two degrees, which must each likewise consist of three
penalties, since only the penalties of fine and public censure remain in the scale.
The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying circumstances may be appreciated to
determine the  periods of the corresponding penalties, or even reduce the penalty
by degrees, in no case should such graduation of penalties reduce the imposable
penalty beyond or lower than prision correccional. It is for this reason that the three
component penalties in the second paragraph of Section 20 shall each be considered
as an independent principal penalty, and that the lowest penalty should in any event
be  prision correccional in order not to depreciate the seriousness of drug
offenses. Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat. Such interpretation
is to be adopted so that the law may continue to have efficacy rather than fail. A
perfect judicial solution cannot be forged from an imperfect law, which impasse
should now be the concern of and is accordingly addressed to Congress.
6. The final query is whether or not the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable to
the case now before us. Apparently it does, since drug offenses are not included in
nor has appellant committed any act which would put him within the exceptions to
said law and the penalty to be imposed does not involve reclusion perpetua or death,
provided, of course, that the penalty as ultimately resolved will exceed one year of
imprisonment.68 The more important aspect, however, is how the indeterminate
sentence shall be ascertained.
It is true that Section 1 of said law, after providing for indeterminate sentence for an
offense under the Revised Penal Code, states that "if the offense is punished by any
other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the
maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the
minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same." We hold
that this quoted portion of the section indubitably refers to an offense under a special
law wherein the penalty imposed was not taken from and is without reference to the
Revised Penal Code, as discussed in the preceding illustrations, such that it may be
said that the "offense is punished" under that law.
There can be no sensible debate that the aforequoted rule on indeterminate sentence
for offenses under special laws was necessary because of the nature of the former
type of penalties under said laws which were not included or contemplated in the
scale of penalties in Article 71 of the Code, hence there could be no minimum "within
the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense," as
is the rule for felonies therein. In the illustrative examples of penalties in special laws
hereinbefore provided, this rule applied, and would still apply, only to the first and last
examples. Furthermore, considering the vintage of Act No. 4103 as earlier noted, this
holding is but an application and is justified under the rule of contemporanea
expositio.69
We repeat, Republic Act No. 6425, as now amended by Republic Act No. 7659, has
unqualifiedly adopted the penalties under the Revised Penal Code in their technical
terms, hence with their technical signification and effects. In fact, for purposes of
determining the maximum of said sentence, we
have applied the provisions of the amended Section 20 of said law to arrive at prision
correccional and Article 64 of the Code to impose the same in the medium period.
Such offense, although provided for in a special law, is now in effect punished by and
under the Revised Penal Code. Correlatively, to determine the minimum, we must
apply the first part of the aforesaid Section 1 which directs that "in imposing a prison
sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the
court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of
which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the rules of said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the
86 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense."
(Emphasis ours.)
A divergent pedantic application would not only be out of context but also an
admission of the hornbook maxim that qui haeret in litera haeret in cortice.
Fortunately, this Court has never gone only skin-deep in its construction of Act. No.
4103 by a mere literal appreciation of its provisions. Thus, with regard to the phrase in
Section 2 thereof excepting from its coverage "persons convicted of
offenses punished with death penalty or life imprisonment," we have held that what is
considered is the penalty actually imposed and not the penalty imposable under the
law,70 and that reclusion perpetua is likewise embraced therein although what the law
states is "life imprisonment".
What irresistibly emerges from the preceding disquisition, therefore, is that under the
concurrence of the principles of literal interpretation, which have been rationalized by
comparative decisions of this Court; of historical interpretation, as explicated by the
antecedents of the law and related contemporaneous legislation; and of structural
interpretation, considering the interrelation of the penalties in the Code as
supplemented by Act No. 4103 in an integrated scheme of penalties, it follows that
the minimum of the indeterminate sentence in this case shall be the penalty next
lower to that prescribed for the offense. Thereby we shall have interpreted the
seeming ambiguity in Section 1 of Act No. 4103 in such a way as to harmonize laws
with laws, which is the best mode of interpretation.71
The indeterminate Sentence Law is a legal and social measure of compassion, and
should be liberally interpreted in favor of the accused. 72 The "minimum" sentence is
merely a period at which, and not before, as a matter of grace and not of right, the
prisoner may merely be allowed to serve the balance of his sentence outside of his
confinement.73 It does not constitute the totality of the penalty since thereafter he still
has to continue serving the rest of his sentence under set conditions. That minimum is
only the period when the convict's eligibility for parole may be considered. In fact, his
release on parole may readily be denied if he is found unworthy thereof, or his
reincarceration may be ordered on legal grounds, even if he has served the minimum
sentence.
It is thus both amusing and bemusing if, in the case at bar, appellant should be
begrudged the benefit of a minimum sentence within the range of arresto mayor, the
penalty next lower to prision correccional which is the maximum range we have fixed
through the application of Articles 61 and 71 of the Revised Penal Code. For, with
fealty to the law, the court may set the minimum sentence at 6 months of arresto
mayor, instead of 6 months and 1 day of  prision correccional. The difference, which
could thereby even involve only one day, is hardly worth the creation of an overrated
tempest in the judicial teapot.
ACCORDINGLY, under all the foregoing premises, the judgment of conviction
rendered by the court a quo against accused-appellant Martin Simon y Sunga is
AFFIRMED, but with the MODIFICATION that he should be, as he hereby is,
sentenced to serve an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as
the minimum, to six (6) years of  prision correccional, as the maximum thereof.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 177357               October 17, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
VAL DELOS REYES, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
For final review is the December 19, 2006 Decision1 of the Court or Appeals and its
February 22, 2007 Resolution,2 in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 01642, affirming with
modification the June 28, 2005 Joint Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 15, Tabaco City, Albay, which convicted accused Val Delos Reyes (Delos
Reyes) of three (3) counts of rape against AAA.4 The case bears intimate relation with
the proceedings in G.R. Nos. 139331, 140845-46, 130714, and 139634, as will be
shown hereunder.
The Facts:
On March 30, 1995, Delos Reyes and Donel Go (Go) were charged with three (3)
counts and two (2) counts of rape, respectively, in three (3) separate Informations.
The accusatory portions of the Informations read:
Crim. Case No. T-2639
That on or about the 22nd day of December, 1994 at more or less between the hours
of 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon and 10:00 o'clock in the evening at Barangay San
Roque, Tabaco, Albay, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused by means of force and intimidation and rendering AAA
almost unconscious by forcing private complainant to drink two (2) bottles of beer,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously did lie and succeeded in having carnal knowledge
of AAA, against her will, to her damage and prejudice.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.5
Crim. Case No. T-2640
87 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
That on or about the 22nd day of December, 1994 at more or less between the hours
of 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon and 10:00 o'clock in the evening at Barangay San
Roque, Tabaco, Albay,
DONEL GO, with the indispensable cooperation and help of VAL DE LOS REYES, by
means of force and intimidation and rendering AAA almost unconscious by forcing
private complainant to drink two (2) bottles of beer, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
did lie and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of AAA, against her will, to her
damage and prejudice.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.6
Crim Case No. T-2641
That on or about the 22nd day of December, 1994 at more or less between the hours
of 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon and 10:00 o'clock in the evening at Barangay San
Roque, Tabaco, Albay,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, VAL DE LOS REYES,
with the indispensable cooperation and help of DONEL GO, by means of force and
intimidation and rendering AAA almost unconscious by forcing private complainant to
drink two (2) bottles of beer, VAL DE LOS REYES, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
did lie and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of AAA, against her will, to her
damage and prejudice.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.7
Criminal Case No. T-2640 was raffled to Branch 15, RTC, Albay (RTC-Br. 15) while
Criminal Case Nos. T-2639 and T-2641 were raffled to Branch 16 of the same court
(RTC-Br. 16). On motion of the prosecution,8 T-2640 was consolidated with the two
other cases in RTC-Br. 16.
Considering that Delos Reyes was at large at that time, only Go was arraigned.
Before the prosecution could finish presenting evidence, Go jumped bail and was
tried in absentia.
In its June 25, 1997 Decision,9 RTC-Br. 16 found Go guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of two (2) counts of rape in Criminal Case Nos. T-2640 and T-2641, sentencing him to
suffer the death penalty for each count. An alias warrant of arrest against Delos
Reyes was issued and the cases against him were ordered archived. The cases
against Go were brought to the Court on automatic review and were docketed as G.R.
Nos. 130714 and 139634.
After Delos Reyes was finally apprehended by the police, on August 17, 1997, RTC-
Br. 16 ordered the revival of the cases against him. During his arraignment on August
26, 1997, Delos Reyes pleaded "Not Guilty" to all three charges of rape. 10 On
December 3, 1997, the cases against him were transferred to RTC-Br. 15, which was
designated by this Court as a special court to try cases involving heinous crimes.
The prosecution then adopted and marked in evidence the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses given in Criminal Case Nos. T-2640 and T-2641, particularly,
those of the victim, AAA; her mother, BBB; her sister, CCC; and Dr. Marissa S.
Saguinsin (Dr. Saguinsin), the City Health Physician of Tabaco City. Also presented in
evidence were the panty worn by AAA on that fateful day, her broken wristwatch, the
Certificate of Entry in the Police Blotter, the Medico-Legal Certificate issued by Dr.
Marissa S. Saguinsin, the Referral Form of ABS-CBN, and the Decision rendered in
Criminal Case Nos. T-2640 and T-2641.
In its February 22, 1999 Joint Judgment, 11 the RTC-Br. 15 found Delos Reyes guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of rape and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua in each case. He sought reconsideration 12 of his
conviction but his motion was denied by the RTC-Br. 15 in its March 29, 1999
Resolution. His appeal, elevated to the CA, was accepted by the Court in its
Resolution, dated January 17, 2000.13 His appeal, docketed as G. R. Nos. 139331
and 140845-46, and that of Go as G.R. Nos. 130714 and 139634, were
consolidated.14
Considering that the prosecution witnesses in the trial of Delos Reyes merely affirmed
their testimonies given on direct examination in the trial of Go, the Court found that
there was a violation of his constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the
witnesses against him. Thus, in its Resolution, 15 dated December 27, 2002, the Court
resolved:
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to VACATE the judgment of Branch 15 of the
Regional Trial Court of Tabaco, Albay in Criminal Case Nos. T-2639-41, "People v.
Val de los Reyes," and to SET ASIDE Exhibits "A," "B," "C," "D," "E-2," "E-2-A" to "E-
2-I," "F," "G" and "H." Said criminal cases are REMANDED to Branch 15 of the
Regional Trial Court of Tabaco, Albay for the immediate rehearing of the testimonies
of witnesses BBB, AAA, CCC and Dr. Marissa Saguinsin, in accordance with this
Court’s above disquisition. The trial court is further directed to conduct said
proceedings and render a decision thereon within 90 days from receipt of this
Resolution. Following Section 6 (a), Rule 121 of the Revised Rules of Court, the trial
court may, in the interest of justice, allow the introduction of additional evidence.
Pending these rehearing proceedings in the trial court, the automatic review of the
cases against Donel Go in G. R. Nos. 130714 and 139634 is held in abeyance.
In the rehearing of the case, the evidence of the prosecution established that on
December 22, 1994, at around 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon, AAA was requested by
CCC to deliver the pictures taken during the christening of her niece to Go, one of the
godfathers. AAA and CCC then left the house on board a tricycle. AAA dropped off
CCC at the Philtranco bus terminal and proceeded to the house of Go in San Roque,
Tabaco City, to deliver the pictures.
88 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
Arriving at the place, AAA saw Go standing by the roadside talking to a man, who was
later introduced to her as Delos Reyes. According to AAA, there was a sudden
downpour before she could leave. Upon invitation of Go, she took shelter in his
house. She noticed that there was nobody in the house. Alarmed and fearful, she
tried to leave despite the pouring rain but Go stopped her by forcibly pulling her.
Delos Reyes then joined the two, bringing with him two (2) bottles of beer. He
proceeded to the kitchen, took two (2) drinking glasses and poured the beer. He and
Go urged AAA to drink. Not being used to drinking beer, she refused. Delos Reyes
then forced her to drink by pinching her nose while Go was forcibly opening her
mouth. Despite her resistance, the two succeeded in pouring beer into her mouth.
Shortly, thereafter, she felt weak, dizzy and her stomach began aching. She
suspected that the beer was laced with some substance.
Delos Reyes then brought AAA to a construction site near Go's house. He made her
lie down on some lumber and removed her pants and underwear. He then undressed
himself. She shouted for help but he started squeezing her neck. He then raised her
blouse, bit her breast, neck and other parts of her body, and then forcefully inserted
his penis into her vagina. Still not satisfied, he forced his organ into her mouth. She
almost vomitted because of its bad smell.
Go arrived and helped Delos Reyes in dressing up AAA. They then returned to Go's
house and she was brought inside the bedroom. While Delos Reyes restrained her
hands, Go started taking off her clothes. She again tried to shout for help but Delos
Reyes pressed her neck. Go seized the moment to raise her blouse and bite her
breasts, neck and other parts of her body. He then forced his organ into her vagina
and, thereafter, into her mouth, making it difficult for her to breathe.
After Go was done with her, Delos Reyes again satisfied his lust for the second time.
While Delos Reyes was doing it, Go was holding her hands and neck. Delos Reyes
inserted his penis inside her vagina and then into her mouth. Delos Reyes again bit
her breasts, neck and other parts of her body. Feeling tired and weak, she fell
unconscious.
When she regained consciousness, AAA noticed that she was already dressed up.
Delos Reyes and Go then accompanied her in going home on board a tricycle, but
warned her not to tell anyone what happened, otherwise, they would kill her. After
dropping her off at her house, the two hurriedly left. Scared and confused, she did not
inform her mother about what befell her. Instead, she went straight to her bedroom.
Feeling pain all over her body, she covered herself with a blanket and slept without
eating.
The next day, AAA could not stand up and could not eat breakfast. She only drank
Milo and then went back to bed. The following day, December 24, 1994, she forced
herself to stand up. She was only able to eat lunch. Feeling dirty and uncomfortable,
she went to the bathroom and washed herself. There she noticed her neck, breast
and feet with hematoma, contusions and bruises. She also found out that her panty
was bloodied with garter detached and her wristwatch broken. Then, she went back
to bed.
Apprehensive of AAA's strange behavior, BBB confronted her. Right then and there,
AAA bared her horrifying ordeal to her mother and CCC. Immediately, they brought
her to the Tabaco Police Station where she gave her statement on her suffering in the
hands of Delos Reyes and Go. Upon the advice of the Chief of Police, they also had
the incident entered in the blotter of Barangay San Roque where Delos Reyes
resided. They then went to the hospital for medical examination.
On January 26, 1995, AAA felt pain in her vagina. After an examination, she was
found positive for urinary tract infection.
In support of the prosecution, BBB recounted that on that day, CCC requested AAA to
deliver the baptismal pictures to Go. Late in the afternoon, BBB got worried because
AAA had not returned. So, she went to Go’s place to fetch her. Upon reaching Go’s
place, she noticed that Go appeared uneasy and shaking. When she inquired about
her daughter, he replied that she had already left. She, thus, went home but AAA was
not yet there. Later that night, however, she saw her being accompanied by Go and
Delos Reyes, who immediately left. AAA went straight to bed without eating and she
remained in bed the following day. Upon her urging, AAA disclosed what the two had
done to her and their threats to kill her.
Dr. Marissa Saguinsin, the City Health Physician, testified that she received a letter-
request from the Tabaco Police Station to conduct a physical and medical
examination on AAA. Upon examination, she issued the corresponding Medical
Certificate16 stating the following findings:
External: Fairly developed and fairly nourished female adult.
Internal:
1.) Pubic hair fully grown.
2.) Labia majora and menora are coaptated.
3.) No tear on sharp angle base on the fourchette.
4.) Healed superficial hymenal laceration corresponding to 4.6 & 8 o'clock
positions in the face of the clock.
5.) Hymenal orifice admits 2 fingers with moderate resistance.
Conclusion:
89 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
Physical virginity lost.
On the other hand, the defense presented five (5) witnesses, namely: Delos Reyes
himself; his sister, Maribel Delos Reyes (Maribel); a co-worker of CCC, Zenaida Borjal
(Zenaida); Arlene Nonato (Arlene); and Hernando Pantojo, Jr. (Pantojo) of PAGASA.
Maribel and Arlene both testified that they resided near the house of Go and Delos
Reyes; that Go and AAA were sweethearts; and that AAA used to frequent the house
of Go.
Zenaida testified that she was the co-worker of CCC at the Dr. Cabredo Hospital; that
on December 25, 1994, CCC was absent; that CCC informed her that she did not go
to work on that day because she had beaten up AAA and that out fear of what she
had done, she brought her to the hospital.
When it was his turn at the witness stand, Delos Reyes stated that on December 22,
1994, he, Jose Bolber and Jun de los Santos were in the house of Go drinking a few
bottles of beer. At around 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon, AAA arrived carrying pictures
taken at a baptism. When Go invited her inside the house, he and his other
companions went home. At around 8:30 o’clock in the evening, he went out of his
house and saw AAA, Go, Jose Bolber, and Jun de los Santos talking to each other
along a nearby alley. He then approached the group and joined the conversation.
Later, upon the invitation of Go, they all rode on a pedicab and brought her home.
They stayed in her house for ten (10) minutes and then left. Two days later, on
December 24, 1994, he saw AAA waiting for him in his house. When he asked what
was wrong, she told him that she had a problem. He noticed that she had bruises and
contusions all over her body. She then told him that she was beaten up by CCC.
Afraid to go home, she asked him if he could marry her. Shocked by the proposal, he
accompanied her to the house of Go and informed him of her problem. It was the last
time he saw her. Sometime thereafter, he received a letter from her asking for his
forgiveness.
Pantojo, Region 5 PAGASA Chief Meteorological Officer, stated that on December
22, 1994, the area of Legaspi City and an area spanning fifty (50) kilometers,
including Tabaco City, experienced intermittent rains.
On rebuttal, AAA was again presented. She denied having a relationship with Go and
also disowned the letter addressed to Delos Reyes. 17 She then offered in evidence a
specimen of her own handwriting.18
On June 28, 2005, the RTC rendered judgment19 finding Delos Reyes guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for three (3) counts of rape. Thus, the RTC disposed:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding the accused VAL DEL LOS
REYES guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE as defined and
penalized under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, and hereby sentences him as follows:
In Criminal Case No. T-2639, as principal by direct participation, to suffer the penalty
of DEATH and additionally to indemnify the victim AAA the sum of Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) Pesos as damages, together with interest at the rate of six (6%) percent
per annum computed from the time of the filing of the complaint;
In Criminal Case No. T-2640, as principal by indispensable cooperation, to suffer the
penalty of DEATH and to indemnify the private offended party AAA, the sum of Fifty
Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as damages, together with interest at the rate of six
(6%) percent per annum computed from the time of the filing of the complaint; and,
In Criminal Case No. T-2641, as principal by direct participation, to suffer the penalty
of DEATH and additionally to indemnify AAA the sum of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00)
Pesos as damages, together with interest at the rate of six (6%) percent per annum
computed from the time of the filing of the complaint.
SO ORDERED.20
Undaunted, Delos Reyes interposed his appeal before the CA, which, on December
19, 2006, promulgated the assailed decision affirming his conviction. The CA,
however, reduced the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9346.21 Despite the reduction of the penalty, the CA was of the view
that the award of civil indemnity should be maintained at P50,000.00.22 The CA also
found the award of moral damages warranted, but similarly limited the amount to
P50,000.00.23
The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED and the assailed
joint decision dated June 28, 2005 of the RTC, Branch 15, Tabaco City in Criminal
Cases Nos. T-2639 to T-2641 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS:
1. the death penalty is reduced to reclusion perpetua; and
2. moral damages of ₱50,000.00 is granted to victim AAA.
The rest of the decision stands.
SO ORDERED.
In its March 22, 2007 Resolution,24 the Court gave due course to Delos Reyes’
appeal. In its Resolution,25 dated June 27, 2007, the Court required the parties to file
their respective supplemental briefs within thirty (30) days from notice, if they so
desired.
90 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
In its Manifestation,26 dated September 7, 2007, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) opted to stand by its brief filed before the CA. On September 24, 2007, the
counsel for Delos Reyes filed his Supplemental Brief27 presenting the following
arguments:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO APPRECIATE THAT THE
PROSECUTION EVIDENCE IS ON THE WHOLE IMPROBABLE AND
INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE
ACCUSED-PETITIONER IS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE
CRIME OF RAPE.
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE
INCONSISTENCIES ON MATERIAL POINTS OF THE STATEMENT AND
TESTIMONY OF THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE AND THE PROSECUTION
WITNESSES
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE
IMPROBABILITIES OF THE STATEMENT AND TESTIMONY OF THE
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, WHICH IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED ARE
MANIFESTLY CONTRARY TO HUMAN NATURE AND EXPERIENCE
C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE
INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE PLAINTIFF-
APPELLEE TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT SUSTAINED THE
TRIAL COURT CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF AN OFFENSE NOT
CHARGED IN THE COMPLAINT.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT SUSTAINED THE
ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT AND DID NOT GIVE WEIGHT TO THE EVIDENCE
OF THE DEFENSE.28
In the main, Delos Reyes argues that there were inconsistencies and improbabilities
in the prosecution’s evidence which vitiate its integrity. On the inconsistencies, he
points out that AAA’s testimony in court is inconsistent with her sworn statement on a)
how she was forced to drink beer; b) where she was when she was forced to stay in
the house of Go; and c) what Delos Reyes was doing when Go was raping her. He
also asked the Court to consider that BBB’s testimony on the circumstances when
she was brought home by the two accused was not corroborated by AAA herself.
Also, AAA’s claim that there was a heavy downpour was belied by the meteorologist
of PAGASA who testified that there were merely intermittent rains on that day.
On how she was forced to drink beer, AAA testified that Delos Reyes pressed her
nose and Go forcibly opened her mouth. In her sworn statement, however, she stated
that because of her fear, she drank the beer. Regarding where she was when Go
forced her to stay, she testified that she was already inside the house of Go but her
sworn statement stated that she was still outside. With respect to what Delos Reyes
was doing when Go was raping her, she testified that Delos Reyes was holding her
while her sworn statement stated that he was just watching them.
Aside from the inconsistencies, Delos Reyes claims there are improbabilities in her
story that render it hard to believe as they are contrary to human experience. These
are, among others: 1) that she did not cry out when she could have, while she was
being forced to drink beer or threatened with rape; 2) that she did not run when she
could have, when Delos Reyes was taking off his clothes with his two hands; 3) that
the two accused still inserted their penises in her mouth after they had satisfied their
lust; 4) that she did not bite their penises when she could have and should have done
it; 5) that she was still brought to a place under construction when she could be
defiled right then and there in the house of Go; and 6) that the two still brought her
home even after they had molested her.
After due consideration of the evidence on record, the Court affirms the conviction of
Delos Reyes.
The rule is well-settled that when the decision hinges on the credibility of witnesses
and their respective testimonies, the trial court’s observations and conclusions
deserve great respect and are accorded finality, unless the records show facts or
circumstances of material weight and substance that the lower court overlooked,
misunderstood or misappreciated, and which, if properly considered, would alter the
result of the case.29 The Court finds no reason to deviate from the general rule under
the proven circumstances of this case.
The testimony of AAA on the elements constituting the crime of rape, as committed
on three separate occasions through force and intimidation after she was rendered
almost unconscious after being forced to drink two (2) bottles of beer, was clear,
categorical and positive. In the absence of corroboration, the insinuation of Delos
Reyes that he was only included in the complaint because he refused to marry her
deserves scant consideration. A candid narration by a rape victim deserves credence
particularly where no ill motive is attributed to the rape victim that would make her
testify falsely against the accused. For no woman in her right mind will admit to having
been raped, allow an examination of her most private parts and subject herself as
well as her family to the humiliation and shame concomitant with a rape prosecution,
unless the charges are true. Where an alleged rape victim says she was sexually
abused, she says almost all that is necessary to show that rape had been inflicted on
her person, provided her testimony meets the test of credibility.30
91 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
The Court finds it hard to reconcile the allegation of Delos Reyes that Go and AAA
were sweethearts and his contention that the only reason why he was being
implicated in the charges of rape was because of his refusal to accept her demand for
marriage. In this regard, the Court quotes, with affirmation, the disquisition of the
RTC. Thus:
x x x If it is true that Donel Go and AAA are lovers as the accused Delos Reyes now
claims, the Court could hardly imagine why the victim should demand that accused
Delos Reyes should marry her with the defense ostensibly arguing that because
Delos Reyes refused to such proposal, these three (3) cases for rape were filed
against him. It is highly imaginable that a woman single and of good repute would
ambivalently be linked in so swift a time to two male persons whom she is not fully
acquainted with. The records clearly showed that accused Donel Go was only known
to AAA five (5) days prior to the rape incident on the occasion of him standing as
sponsor in the christening of her niece, and accused Val Delos Reyes having just
been introduced to her that fateful day of December 22, 1994.31
On the inconsistencies between her oral testimony and her sworn statement, raised
by the accused, the Court sees them as minor and cannot be categorized as
prevarication, sufficient to render the case doubtful. On the contrary, these alleged
inconsistencies are signs that AAA was not rehearsed and that she was telling the
truth. Inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses, when referring only to minor
details and collateral matters, do not affect the substance of their declaration, their
veracity or the weight of their testimony. They do not impair the credibility of the
witnesses where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive
identification of the assailants.32 Such inconsistency is insignificant and cannot have
any bearing on the essential fact testified to.33
On this point, it should be borne in mind that more than ten (10) years had elapsed
from the time of the incident to the time AAA gave her last testimony. Surely, one
cannot expect that she could vividly remember every minor detail that transpired on
that fateful day of December 22, 1994.
At any rate, these alleged inconsistencies do not militate against her credibility as the
Court has repeatedly held that sworn statements are almost always incomplete and
inaccurate and do not disclose the complete facts for want of inquiries or
suggestions.34 It is a matter of judicial experience that an affidavit, being taken ex
parte, is almost always incomplete and often inaccurate and is generally considered
to be inferior to a testimony given in open court as the latter is subject to the test of
cross-examination.35
The forensic evidence showing old lacerations of AAA’s hymen corroborates her
claim that she had been sexually assaulted. When a woman states that she had been
raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was
committed.36 When such testimony corresponds with medical findings, there is
sufficient basis to conclude that the essential requisites of carnal knowledge have
been established.37 Contrary to what Delos Reyes would like the Court to believe, the
bite marks on her neck, breasts and thighs are not indicative of sexual foreplay.
Rather, these marks are badges of bestiality which are a testament to his depravity.
The Court also looks into the so-called improbabilities claimed by the accused and
finds them as not totally contrary to human experience. Rape is not commonly
experienced by a woman. Thus, there is no common reaction to it. The failure of AAA
to run away when Delos Reyes was taking his pants off using both his hands can be
explained by the fear already instilled in her as well as the effect of having been
forced to imbibe two (2) bottles of beer, a beverage she was not used to drink.
The same can be said of the failure of AAA to shout for help, kick the accused or bite
their penises during the assault. It has been said that though a man lays no hand on a
woman, yet if by an array of physical forces, he so overpowers her mind that she
does not resist, or she ceases resistance through fear of greater harm, the
consummation of the sexual act is recognized in jurisprudence as rape. 38 Physical
resistance need not be established in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the
victim and the latter submits herself against her will to the rapist’s embrace because
of fear for life and personal safety.39 Threats, intimidation, violence, fear, and terror all
combined to suppress the will to resist, kick, shout, or struggle against the rapist. AAA
added that she could not shout because Delos Reyes was squeezing her neck.
The close physical proximity of other residents and passersby at the construction site
or the neighbors of Go does not render impossible the commission of the crime. It has
been repeatedly emphasized that rape can be committed even in places where
people congregate, in parks, along the roadside, within school premises, inside a
house where there are other occupants, and even in the same room where other
members of the family are also sleeping. Lust is not a respecter of time and
place.40 The fact that it could have been more convenient for Delos Reyes to rape
AAA in the house of Go instead of bringing her to the construction site and back again
does not affect her credibility. The choice was that of her ravisher, not hers.
Neither does the Court find strange the testimony of AAA that after she was raped,
Delos Reyes and Go had the guts to bring her home in a pedicab. Again, it was the
choice of her assailants, not hers. The records, moreover, reveal that while bringing
her home, he and Go warned her not to tell anyone of what they did to her, otherwise,
they would kill her. Coming from persons who just forcibly imposed their bestiality on
her, they were not empty threats.
AAA cannot be faulted either if she failed to corroborate her mother’s testimony that
she saw the two accompany her daughter. Her failure has no controlling significance.
It should not be taken against her or the prosecution.
The failure to immediately report the dastardly acts to her family or to the authorities
at the soonest possible time or her failure to immediately change her clothes is not
enough reason to cast reasonable doubt on the guilt of Delos Reyes. This Court has
repeatedly held that delay in reporting rape incidents, in the face of threats of physical
violence, cannot be taken against the victim.41 Further, it has been written that a rape
92 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
victim’s actions are oftentimes overwhelmed by fear rather than by reason. It is this
fear, springing from the initial rape, that the perpetrator hopes to build a climate of
extreme psychological terror, which would, he hopes, numb his victim into silence and
submissiveness.42
Contrary to the assertions of the accused, the trial court took into consideration the
evidence presented by the defense. The undated letter, allegedly written by AAA to
him seeking his forgiveness, was vehemently denied by her. Comparing the copied
portion of the letter by AAA and the letter presented by him,43 one could readily see
that there are marked differences in the strokes of the handwriting. Delos Reyes could
have helped his case had he presented the person who handed to him the said letter
to prove that it was AAA who wrote the letter, but he never did.
The testimony of PAGASA meteorologist Pantojo that there was only intermittent
rainfall on the night of December 22, 1994, was properly considered by the lower
court. The trial court, however, also took into consideration his statements during
cross-examination that weather conditions were not the same in all places, and that
while some places might have heavy rains, other places within the 50-kilometer radius
could have no rainfall at all.44
The argument of Delos Reyes that he was convicted for an offense not charged in the
sworn complaint simply lacks merit. As aptly explained by the CA:
A close scrutiny of the sworn complaint reveals that accused-appellant De los Reyes
was charged with the crime of rape. Similarly, the Informations filed against him
(Crim. Cases Nos. T-2639, T-2640 and T-2641) charged him of the same crime of
rape, penalized under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, now found under Art. 266-
A. Surely accused-appellant De los Reyes has been afforded his fundamental right to
be apprised of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
The Information alleged that accused-appellant De los Reyes, by means of force and
intimidation and rendering the victim AAA almost unconscious by forcing her to drink
two (2) bottles of beer, succeeded in having carnal knowledge against her will. If
accused-appellant De los Reyes found the Information to be insufficient or defective,
he should have filed a motion to quash the information or a bill of particulars before
he was arraigned, but he never did. He was assisted by counsel during his
arraignment and he pleaded not guilty. The Information was read to him but he did
not complain that the charge against him was defective or insufficient. Whatever
objections he had as to the form and substance of the information is thus, deemed to
have been waived by him. Accused-appellant De los Reyes, ergo, has no right to
object to whatever evidence which could be lawfully introduced and admitted under
said information which sufficiently charged him of the crime of rape.
Accused-appellant De los Reyes actively participated in the trial of this case. He
presented evidence for his defense and cross-examined the prosecution witnesses. It
is now too late in the day for him to declare that his right to be informed of the nature
and cause
of the accusation against him was violated. Accused-appellant De los Reyes could
not raise this issue for the first time on appeal.
It is not the designation of the offense in the Information that governs, rather it is the
allegations that must be considered in determining what crime is charged. 45 (Citations
omitted.)
The contention of Delos Reyes that the RTC erred in denying his motion to have an
ocular inspection of the construction site also deserves scant consideration. It has
been said that ocular inspection rests within the sound discretion of the court.
Inspection may be granted only where it is reasonably certain that it will be of
substantial aid to the court in reaching a correct verdict. The trial court in this case
correctly refused to make the inspection where testimonial evidence adequately
pictured the condition of the place.1âwphi1 Thus, a view of the place would serve no
useful purpose.46 As correctly noted by the CA, considering the long lapse of time
since the rape, the construction site would have been finished and many houses
erected within the vicinity.
The CA, however, in reducing the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua, failed to
state in the dispositive portion that the reduction should be without eligibility for parole
as held in the case of People v. Antonio Ortiz.47 This should be rectified.
The CA also limited the amount of civil indemnity to P50,000.00. On this score, the
discussion of the Court in People of the Philippines v. Rodolfo Lopez 48 is worth noting.
Thus:
On pecuniary liability, this Court ruled in People of the Philippines v. Sarcia that:
The principal consideration for the award of damages, under the ruling in People v.
Salome and
People v. Quiachon is the penalty provided by law or imposable for the offense
because of its heinousness, not the public penalty actually imposed on the offender.
Regarding the civil indemnity and moral damages,
People v. Salome explained the basis for increasing the amount of said civil damages
as follows:
The Court, likewise, affirms the civil indemnity awarded by the Court of Appeals to
Sally in accordance with the ruling in People v. Sambrano which states:
As to damages, we have held that if the rape is perpetrated with any of the attending
qualifying circumstances that require the imposition of the death penalty, the civil
indemnity for the victim shall be Php75,000.00 . . . Also, in rape cases, moral
damages are awarded without the need of proof other than the fact of rape because it
is assumed that the victim has suffered moral injuries entitling her to such an award.
93 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
However, the trial court's award of Php50,000.00 as moral damages should also be
increased to Php75,000.00 pursuant to current jurisprudence on qualified rape."
It should be noted that while the new law prohibits the imposition of the death penalty,
the penalty provided for by law for a heinous offense is still death and the offense is
still heinous. Consequently, the civil indemnity for the victim is still Php75,000.00.
People v. Quiachon also ratiocinates as follows:
eligibility for parole; and to pay AAA civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00,
moral damages in the amount of P75,000.00, and exemplary damages in the amount
of P30,000.00, plus interest at the legal rate of 6% reckoned from the filing of the
complaint up to the finality of this judgment, after which the rate should be 12% per
annum.
SO ORDERED.

With respect to the award of damages, the appellate court, following prevailing
jurisprudence, correctly awarded the following amounts; Php75,000.00 as civil
indemnity which is awarded if the crime is qualified by circumstances warranting the
imposition of the death penalty; Php75,000.00 as moral damages because the victim
is assumed to have suffered moral injuries, hence, entitling her to an award of moral
damages even without proof thereof,

x x x.

Even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed on the appellant because of the
prohibition in R. A. No. 9346, the civil indemnity of Php75,000.00 is still proper
because, following the ratiocination in People v. Victor, the said award is not
dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying
circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the
commission of the offense. The Court declared that the award of P75,000.00 shows
"not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the
financial fluctuations over time but also the expression of the displeasure of the court
of the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity."

The litmus test therefore, in the determination of the civil indemnity is the heinous
character of the crime committed, which would have warranted the imposition of the
death penalty, regardless of whether the penalty actually is reduced to reclusion
perpetua. [Citations omitted. Emphases included]

Finally, an award of exemplary damages of P30,000.00 for each count of rape is also
warranted. In People v. Rayos,49 it was said that "Article 2229 of the Civil Code
sanctions the grant of exemplary or correction damages in order to deter the
commission of similar acts in the future and to allow the courts to mould behaviour
that can have grave and deleterious consequences to society." It goes without saying
that the civil liabilities imposed and modified herein should bear interest at the legal
rate of 6% reckoned from the filing of the complaint up to the finality of this judgment,
after which the rate should be 12% per annum.

WHEREFORE, the December 19, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR H.C. No. 001642, finding accused Val Delos Reyes guilty of three (3) counts of
rape Is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. For each count of rape, accused Val
delos Reyes is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without

94 ARTICLE 8-10 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW| JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL