G.R. No.

L-38773         December 19, 1933
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GINES ALBURQUERQUE Y SANCHEZ, defendant-appellant.
Gibbs and McDonough and Roman Ozaeta, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
AVANCEÑA, C.J.:
Osma. They both went downstairs. What happened later, nobody witnessed. But the
undisputed fact is that on that occasion the appellant inflicted a wound at the base of
the neck of the deceased, causing his death.
After excluding the improbable portions thereof, the court infers from the testimony of
the appellant that he proposed to said deceased to marry his daughter and that, upon
hearing that the latter refused to do so, he whipped out his penknife. Upon seeing the
appellant's attitude, the deceased tried to seize him by the neck whereupon the said
appellant stabbed him on the face with the said penknife. Due to his lack of control of
the movement of his arm, the weapon landed on the base of the neck of the
deceased.

The judgment appealed from finds the appellants Gines Alburquerque guilty of the
crime of homicide committed on the person of Manuel Osma and sentences him to
eight years and one day of prision mayor, and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
in the sum of P1,000, with costs.
The appellant herein, who is a widower of fifty-five years of age and father of nine
living children, has been suffering from partial paralysis for some time, walks dragging
one leg and has lost control of the movement of his right arm. He has been unable to
work since he suffered the stroke of paralysis. One of his daughters was named Maria
and another, are married, while still another one is a nun. With the exemption of the
other married daughter and the nun, of all of them, including the appellant, live with
Maria upon whom they depend for support.
The trial court found that the appellant did not intend to cause so grave an injury as
the death of the deceased. We find that his conclusion is supported by the evidence.
In his testimony the appellant emphatically affirmed that he only wanted to inflict a
wound that would leave a permanent scar on the face of the deceased, or one that
would compel him to remain in the hospital for a week or two but never intended to kill
him, because then it would frustrate his plan of compelling him to marry or, at least,
support his daughter. The appellant had stated this intention in some of his letters to
the deceased by way of a threat to induce him to accept his proposal for the benefit of
his daughter. That the act of the appellant in stabbing the deceased resulted in the
fatal wound at the base of his neck, was due solely to the fact hereinbefore
mentioned that appellant did not have control of his right arm on account of paralysis
and the blow, although intended for the face, landed at the base of the neck.

Among the daughters living with Maria, one named Pilar became acquainted and had
intimate relations later with the deceased Manuel Osma about the end of the year
1928. It was then that the appellant became acquainted with the deceased who
frequently visited Pilar in his house. The relations between Pilar and the deceased
culminated in Pilar's giving birth to a child. The appellant did not know that his
daughter's relations with the deceased had gone to such extremes, that he had to be
deceived with the information that she had gone to her godfather's house in
Singalong, when in fact she had been taken to the Chinese Hospital for delivery. The
appellant learned the truth only when Pilar returned home with her child.
Naturally the appellant was deeply affected by this incident, since which time he has
appeared sad and worried not only because of the dishonor it brought upon his family
but also because the child meant an added burden to Maria upon whom they all
depended for support. For some time the appellant wrote letters, that at times were
hostile and threatening and at other times entreating the deceased to legitimize his
union with Pilar by marrying her, or at least, to support her and his child. Although the
deceased agreed to give the child a monthly allowance by way of support, he never
complied with his promise.
The appellant was in such a mood when he presented himself one day at the office
where the deceased worked and asked leave of the manager thereof to speak to
Therefore, the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to cause so grave an injury
as the death of the deceased as well as those of his having voluntarily surrendered
himself to the authorities, and acted under the influence of passion and obfuscation,
should be taken into consideration in favor of the appellant.
Under the facts above stated, we cannot entertain the appellant's contention that he
acted in legitimate self-defense inasmuch as he provoked and commenced the
aggression by whipping out and brandishing his penknife.
The defense likewise claims that, at all events, article 49 of the Revised Penal Code,
which refers to cases where the crime committed is different from that intended by the
accused, should be applied herein. This article is a reproduction of article 64 of the
old Code and has been interpreted as applicable only in cases where the crime
befalls a different person (decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain of October 20,
1897, and June 28,1899), which is not the case herein.
The facts as herein proven constitute the crime of homicide defined and penalized in
article 249 of the Revised Penal Code with reclusion temporal. In view of the
concurrence therein of three mitigating circumstances without any aggravating
circumstance, the penalty next lower in degree, that is prision mayor, should be
imposed.
1 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
Wherefore, pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 4103, the appellant is hereby
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year of prision
correccional to eight (8) years and (1) day of prision mayor, affirming the judgment
appealed from in all other respects, with the costs. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-1477             January 18, 1950
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JULIO GUILLEN, defendant-appellant.
Mariano A. Albert for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Solicitor Francisco A.
Carreon for appellee.
PER CURIAM, J.:
This case is before us for review of, and by virtue of appeal from, the judgment
rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila in case No. 2746, whereby Julio
Guillen y Corpus, or Julio C. Guillen, is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder and multiple frustrated murder, as charged in the information, and is
sentenced to the penalty of death, to indemnify the of the deceased Simeon Valera
(or Barrela) in the sum of P2,000 and to pay the costs.
Upon arraignment the accused entered a plea of not guilty to the charges contained
in the information.
Then the case was tried in one of the branches of the Court of First Instance of Manila
presided over by the honorable Buenaventura Ocampo who, after the submission of
the evidence of the prosecution and the defense, rendered judgment as above stated.
In this connection it should be stated that, at the beginning of the trial and before
arraignment, counsel de oficio for the accused moved that the mental condition of
Guillen be examined. The court, notwithstanding that it had found out from the
answers of the accused to questions propounded to him in order to test the
soundness of his mind, that he was not suffering from any mental derangement,
ordered that Julio Guillen be confined for Hospital, there to be examined by medical
experts who should report their findings accordingly. This was done, and, according
to the report of the board of medical experts, presided over by Dr. Fernandez of the
National Psychopathic Hospital, Julio Guillen was not insane. Said report (Exhibit L),
under the heading "Formulation and Diagnosis," at pages 13 and 14, reads:
Final Diagnosis
FORMULATION AND DIAGNOSIS
Not insane: Constitutional Psychopathic Inferiority, without psychosis.
Julio C. Guillen was placed under constant observation since admission.
There was not a single moment during his whole 24 hours daily, that he was
not under observation.
The motive behind the commission of the crime is stated above. The veracity
of this motivation was determined in the Narcosynthesis. That the narco-
synthesis was successful was checked up the day after the test. The narco-
synthesis proved not only reveal any conflict or complex that may explain a
delusional or hallucinatory motive behind the act.
Our observation and examination failed to elicit any sign or symptom of
insanity in Mr. Julio C. Guillen. He was found to be intelligent, always able to
differentiate right from wrong, fully aware of the nature of the crime he
committed and is equally decided to suffer for it in any manner or form.
His version of the circumstances of the crime, his conduct and conversation
relative thereto, the motives, temptations and provocations that preceded the
act, were all those of an individual with a sound mind.
On the other hand he is an man of strong will and conviction and once
arriving at a decision he executes, irrespective of consequences and as in
this case, the commission of the act at Plaza Miranda.
What is of some interest in the personality of Julio C. Guillen is his
commission of some overt acts. This is seen not only in the present instance,
but sometime when an employee in la Clementina Cigar Factory he engaged
in a boxing bout Mr. Manzano, a Span-wanted to abuse the women cigar
makers, and felt it his duty to defend them. One time he ran after a
policeman with a knife in hand after being provoked to a fight several times.
He even challenged Congressman Nueno to a fight sometime before when
Mr. Nueno was running for a seat in the Municipal Board of the City of
Manila, after hearing him deliver one of his apparently outspoken speeches.
All these mean a defect in his personality characterized by a weakness of
censorship especially in relation to rationalization about the consequences of
his acts.
In view of the above findings it is our considered opinion that Julio C. Guillen
is not insane but is an individual with a personality defect which in Psychiatry
is termed, Constitutional Psychopathic Inferiority.
2 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
In view of the above-quoted findings of the medical board, and notwithstanding the
contrary opinion of one Dr. Alvarez, who was asked by the defense to give his opinion
on the matter, the court ruled that Guillen, not being insane, could be tired, as he was
tired, for the offenses he committed on the date in question.
THE FACTS
Upon careful perusal of the evidence and the briefs submitted by counsel for the
accused, the Solicitor General and their respective memoranda, we find that there is
no disagreement between the prosecution and the defense, as to the essential facts
which caused the filing of the present criminal case against this accused. Those facts
may be stated as follows:
On the dates mentioned in this decision, Julio Guillen y Corpus, although not affirmed
with any particular political group, has voted for the defeated candidate in the
presidential elections held in 1946. Manuel A. Roxas, the successful candidate,
assumed the office of President of the Commonwealth and subsequently President of
the President of the Philippine Republic. According to Guillen, he became
disappointed in President Roxas for his alleged failure to redeem the pledges and
fulfill the promises made by him during the presidential election campaign; and his
disappointment was aggravated when, according to him, President Roxas, instead of
looking after the interest of his country, sponsored and campaigned for the approval
of the so-called "parity" measure. Hence he determined to assassinate the President.
After he had pondered for some time over the ways and means of assassinating
President Roxas, the opportunity presented itself on the night of March 10, 1947,
when at a popular meeting held by the Liberal Party at Plaza de Miranda, Quiapo,
Manila attended by a big crowd, President Roxas, accompanied by his wife and
daughter and surrounded by a number of ladies and gentlemen prominent in
government and politics, stood on a platform erected for that purpose and delivered
his speech expounding and trying to convince his thousand of listeners of the
advantages to be gained by the Philippines, should the constitutional amendment
granting American citizens the same rights granted to Filipino nationals be adopted.
Guillen had first intended to use a revolver for the accomplishment of his purpose, but
having lost said firearm, which was duly licensed, he thought of two hand grenades
which were given him by an American soldier in the early days of the liberation of
Manila in exchange for two bottles of whisky. He had likewise been weighing the
chances of killing President Roxas, either by going to Malacañan, or following his
intended victim in the latter's trips to provinces, for instance, to Tayabas (now
Quezon) where the President was scheduled to speak, but having encountered many
difficulties, he decided to carry out his plan at the pro-parity meeting held at Plaza de
Miranda on the night of March 10, 1947.
On the morning of that he went to the house of Amando Hernandez whom he
requested to prepare for him a document (Exhibit B), in accordance with their
pervious understanding in the preceding afternoon, when they met at the premises of
the Manila Jockey Club on the occasion of an "anti-parity" meeting held there. On
account of its materially in this case, we deem it proper to quote hereunder the
contents of said document. An English translation (Exhibit B-2) from its original
Tagalog reads:
FOR THE SAKE OF A FREE PHILIPPINES
I am the only one responsible for what happened. I conceived it, I planned it,
and I carried it out all by myself alone. It took me many days and nights
pondering over this act, talking to my own conscience, to my God, until I
reached my conclusion. It was my duty.
I did not expected to live long; I only had on life to spare. And had I expected
to lives to spare, I would not have hesitated either ton sacrifice it for the sake
of a principle which was the welfare of the people.
Thousands have died in Bataan; many more have mourned the loss of their
husbands, of their sons, and there are millions now suffering. Their deeds
bore no fruits; their hopes were frustrated.
I was told by my conscience and by my God that there was a man to be
blamed for all this: he had deceived the people, he had astounded them with
no other purpose than to entice them; he even went to the extent of risking
the heritage of our future generations. For these reasons he should not
continue any longer. His life would mean nothing as compared with the
welfare of eighteen million souls. And why should I not give up my life too if
only the good of those eighteen million souls.
These are the reasons which impelled me to do what I did and I am willing to
bear up the consequences of my act. I t matters not if others will curse me.
Time and history will show, I am sure, that I have only displayed a high
degree of patriotism in my performance of my said act.
Hurrah for a free Philippines.
Cheers for the happiness of every Filipino home.
May God pity on me.
Amen.
JULIO C. GUILLEN
3 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
A copy (Exhibit B-1) of the original in Tagalog (Exhibit B), made at the request of
Guillen by his nephew, was handed to him only at about 6 o'clock in the afternoon of
March 10, 1947, for which reason said Exhibit B-1 appears unsigned, because he
was in a hurry for that meeting at Plaza de Miranda.
When he reached Plaza de Miranda, Guillen was carrying two hand grenades
concealed in a paper bag which also contained peanuts. He buried one of the hand
grenades (Exhibit D), in a plant pot located close to the platform, and when he
decided to carry out his evil purpose he stood on the chair on which he had been
sitting and, from a distance of about seven meters, he hurled the grenade at the
President when the latter had just closed his speech, was being congratulated by
Ambassador Romulo and was about to leave the platform.
General Castañeda, who was on the platform, saw the smoking, hissing, grenade and
without losing his presence of mind, kicked it away from the platform, along the
stairway, and towards an open space where the general thought the grenade was
likely to do the least harm; and, covering the President with his body, shouted to the
crowd that everybody should lie down. The grenade fell to the ground and exploded in
the middle of a group of persons who were standing close to the platform. Confusion
ensued, and the crowd dispersed in a panic. It was found that the fragments of the
grenade had seriously injured Simeon Varela (or Barrela ) — who died on the
following day as the result of mortal wounds caused by the fragments of the grenade
(Exhibits F and F-1) — Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang.
Guillen was arrested by members of the Police Department about two hours after the
occurrence. It appears that one Angel Garcia, who was one spectators at that
meeting, saw how a person who was standing next to him hurled an object at the
platform and, after the explosion, ran away towards a barber shop located near the
platform at Plaza de Miranda. Suspecting that person was the thrower of the object
that exploded, Garcia went after him and had almost succeeded in holding him, but
Guillen offered stiff resistance, got loose from Garcia and managed to escape. Garcia
pursued him, but some detectives, mistaking the former for the real criminal and the
author of the explosion, placed him under arrest. In the meantime, while the City
Mayor and some agents of the Manila Police Department were investigating the affair,
one Manuel Robles volunteered the information that the person with whom Angel
Garcia was wrestling was Julio Guillen; that he (Manuel Robles) was acquainted with
Julio Guillen for the previous ten years and had seen each other in the plaza a few
moments previous to the explosion.
The police operatives interrogated Garcia and Robles, and Julio Guillen was, within
two hours after the occurrence, found in his home at 1724 Juan Luna Street, Manila,
brought to the police headquarters and identified by Angel Garcia, as the same
person who hurled towards the platform the object which exploded and whom Garcia
tried to hold when he was running away.
During the investigation conducted by the police he readily admitted his responsibility,
although at the same time he tried to justify his action in throwing the bomb at
President Roxas. He also indicated to his captors the place where he had hidden his
so called last will quoted above and marked Exhibit B, which was then unsigned by
him and subsequently signed at the police headquarters.
Re-enacting the crime (Exhibit C), he pointed out to the police where he had buried
(Exhibit C-1) the other hand grenade (Exhibit D), and, in the presence of witnesses he
signed a statement which contained his answers to question propounded to him by
Major A. Quintos of the Manila Police, who investigated him soon after his arrest
(Exhibit E). From a perusal of his voluntary statement, we are satisfied that it tallies
exactly with the declarations and made by him on the witness stand during the trial of
this case.
THE ISSUES
In the brief submitted by counsel de oficio for this appellant, several errors are
assigned allegedly committed by the trial court, namely: first, "in finding the appellant
guilty of murder for the death of Simeon Varela"; second, "in declaring the appellant
guilty of the complex crime of murder and multiple frustrated murder"; third, "in
applying sub-section 1 of article 49 of the Revised Penal Code in determining the
penalty to be imposed upon the accused"; and fourth, "in considering the concurrence
of the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and of contempt of public authorities in
the commission of crime."
The evidence for the prosecution, supported by the brazen statements made by the
accused, shows beyond any shadow of doubt that, when Guillen attended that
meeting, carrying with him two hand grenades, to put into execution his preconceived
plan to assassinate President Roxas, he knew fully well that, by throwing one of those
two hand grenades in his possession at President Roxas, and causing it to explode,
he could not prevent the persons who were around his main and intended victim from
being killed or at least injured, due to the highly explosive nature of the bomb
employed by him to carry out his evil purpose.
Guillen, testifying in his own behalf, in answer to questions propounded by the trial
judge (page 96 of transcript) supports our conclusion. He stated that he performed
the act voluntarily; that his purpose was to kill the President, but that it did not make
any difference to him if there were some people around the President when he hurled
that bomb, because the killing of those who surrounded the President was
tantamount to killing the President, in view of the fact that those persons, being loyal
to the President being loyal to the President, were identified with the latter. In other
word, although it was not his main intention to kill the persons surrounding the
President, he felt no conjunction in killing them also in order to attain his main
purpose of killing the President.
4 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
The facts do not support the contention of counsel for appellant that the latter is guilty
only of homicide through reckless imprudence in regard to the death of Simeon
Varela and of less serious physical injuries in regard to Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio,
Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang, and that he should be sentenced to the
corresponding penalties for the different felonies committed, the sum total of which
shall not exceed three times the penalty to be imposed for the most serious crime in
accordance with article 70 in relation to article 74 of the Revised Penal Code.
In throwing hand grenade at the President with the intention of killing him, the
appellant acted with malice. He is therefore liable for all the consequences of his
wrongful act; for in accordance with article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal
liability is incurred by any person committing felony (delito) although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intended. In criminal negligence, the injury
caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act
performed without malice. (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939.) In the words of Viada, "in
order that an act may be qualified as imprudence it is necessary that either malice nor
intention to cause injury should intervene; where such intention exists, the act should
qualified by the felony it has produced even though it may not have been the intention
of the actor to cause an evil of such gravity as that produced.' (Viada's Comments on
the Penal Code, vol. 7, 5th ed., p.7.) And, as held by this Court, a deliberate intent to
do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence.
(People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232.) Where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a
mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless
imprudence. (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605)
Squarely on the point by counsel is the following decision of the Supreme Court of
Spain:
Cuestion 62. Se presenta A, a las ocho de la noche, en el estanco de B a
comprar tabaco, y habiendose negado este a darselo al fiado, se retira a
quel sin mediar entre ambos disputa alguna; pero; trnscurrido un cuarto de
hora, hallandose el estanquero despachando a C, se oye la detonacion de
un arma de fuego disparada por A desde la calle, quedando muertos en el
acto C y el estanquero; supuesta la no intencion en A de matar a C y si solo
al estanquero, cabe calificar la muerte de este de homicidio y la de c de
imprudencia temeraria? — La Sala de lo Criminal de la Auudiencia de
Granada lo estimo asi, y condeno al procesado a catorse anos de reclusion
por el homivcidio y a un año de prision correctional por la imprudencia.
Aparte de que la muerte del estanquero debio calificarse de assesinato y no
de homicidio, por haberse ejecutado con aleviosa. es evidente que la
muerte de C, suponiendo que no se propusiera ejecutaria el procesado, no
pudo calificarse de imprudencia teme raria, sino que tambien debio
declararsele responsable de la misma, a tenor de lo puesto en este
apartado ultimo del articulo; y que siendo ambas muertes producidas por un
solo hecho, o sea por un solo disparo, debio imponerse al reo la pena del
delito de asesinato en el grado maximo, a tenor de lo dispuesto en el art. 90
del Codigo, o sea la pena de muerte. Se ve, pues, claramente que en el
antedicha sentencia, aparte de otros articulos del Codigo, se infringio por la
Sala la disposicion de este apartado ultimo del articulo muy principalmente,
y asi lo declaro el Tribunal Supremo en S. de 18 junio de 1872. (Gaceta de
1,0 de agosto.) (I Viada, 5th Ed., p. 42.)
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows:
Art. 48. Penalty for Complex Crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means
for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be
imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
We think it is the above-quoted article and not paragraph 1 of article 49 that is
applicable. The case before us is clearly governed by the first clause of article 48
because by a single act, that a throwing highly explosive hand grenade at President
Roxas, the accused committed two grave felonies, namely: (1) murder, of which
Simeon Varela was the victim; and (2) multiple attempted murder, of which President
Roxas, Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang were the injured
parties.
The killing of Simeon Varela was attended by the qualifying circumstance of
treachery. In the case of People vs. Mabug-at, supra, this court held that the
qualifying circumstance of treachery may be properly considered, even when the
victim of the attack was not the one whom the defendant intended to kill, if it appears
from the evidence that neither of the two persons could in any manner put up defense
against the attack, or become aware of it. In the same case it was held that the
qualifying circumstance of premeditation may not be properly taken into the account
when the person whom the defendant proposed to kill was different from the one who
became his victim.
There can be no question that the accused attempted to kill President Roxas by
throwing a hand grenade at him with the intention to kill him, thereby commencing the
commission of a felony by over acts, but he did not succeed in assassinating him "by
reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance." For
the same reason we qualify the injuries caused on the four other persons already
named as merely attempted and not frustrated murder.
In this connection, it should be stated that , although there is abundant proof that , in
violation of the provisions of article 148 of the Revised Penal Code, the accused
Guillen has committed among others the offense of assault upon a person in
authority, for in fact his efforts were directed towards the execution of his main
purpose of eliminating President Roxas for his failure to redeem his electoral
campaign promises, by throwing at him in his official capacity as the Chief Executive
of the nation the hand grenade in question, yet, in view of the appropriate allegation
charging Guillen with the commission of said offense, we shall refrain making a
finding to that effect.
5 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
The complex crimes of murder and multiple attempted murder committed by the
accused with the single act of throwing a hand grenade at the President, was
attended by the various aggravating circumstances alleged in the information, without
any mitigating circumstance. But we do not deem it necessary to consider said
aggravating circumstances because in any event article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code above-quoted requires that the penalty for the most serious of said crimes be
applied in its maximum period. The penalty for murder is reclusion temporal  in its
maximum period to death. (Art. 248.)
It is our painful duty to apply the law and mete out to the accused the extreme penalty
provided by it upon the facts and circumstances hereinabove narrated.
The sentence of the trial court being correct, we have no alternative but to affirm it,
and we hereby do so by a unanimous vote. The death sentence shall be executed in
accordance with article 81 of the Revised Penal Code, under authority of the Director
of Prisons, on such working day as the trial court may fix within 30 days from the date
the record shall have been remanded. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. 171951               August 28, 2009
AMADO ALVARADO GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
1
For review on certiorari is the Decision  dated December 20, 2005 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R.-CR No. 27544 affirming the Decision 2 dated July 2, 2003 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 9, Aparri, Cagayan, which found petitioner Amado
Garcia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide. Contested as well is the appellate
court’s Resolution3 dated March 13, 2006 denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration.4
On February 10, 2000, petitioner was charged with murder in an Information that
alleges as follows:
The undersigned, Provincial Prosecutor accuses AMADO GARCIA @ Manding of the
crime of Murder, defined and penalized under Article [248] of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, committed as follows:
That on or about September 29, 1999, in the municipality of Aparri, province of
Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, armed with a bottle, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and with
treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack, box,
club and maul one Manuel K. Chy, inflicting upon the latter fatal injuries which caused
his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a not guilty plea. Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
At approximately 11:00 a.m. on September 26, 1999, petitioner, Fidel Foz, Jr. and
Armando Foz had a drinking spree at the apartment unit of Bogie Tacuboy, which
was adjacent to the house of Manuel K. Chy. At around 7:00 p.m., Chy appealed for
the group to quiet down as the noise from the videoke machine was blaring. It was
not until Chy requested a second time that the group acceded. Unknown to Chy, this
left petitioner irate and petitioner was heard to have said in the Ilocano vernacular,
"Dayta a Manny napangas makaala caniac dayta." (This Manny is arrogant, I will lay a
hand on him.)6
On September 28, 1999, the group met again to celebrate the marriage of Ador
Tacuboy not far from Chy’s apartment. Maya Mabbun advised the group to stop
singing lest they be told off again. This further infuriated petitioner who remarked,
"Talaga a napangas ni Manny saan ko a pagbayagen daytoy," meaning, "This Manny
is really arrogant, I will not let him live long."7
Yet again, at around 12:00 p.m. on September 29, 1999, the group convened at the
house of Foz and Garcia. There, petitioner, Foz, Jr. and Fred Rillon mused over the
drinking session on the 26th and 28th of September and the confrontation with Chy.
Enraged at the memory, petitioner blurted out "Talaga a napangas dayta a day[t]oy a
Manny ikabbut ko ita." (This Manny is really arrogant, I will finish him off today.)8 Later
that afternoon, the group headed to the store of Adela dela Cruz where they drank
until petitioner proposed that they move to Punta. On their way to Punta, the group
passed by the store of Aurelia Esquibel, Chy’s sister, and there, decided to have
some drinks.
At this juncture, petitioner ordered Esquibel to call on Chy who, incidentally, was
coming out of his house at the time. Upon being summoned, the latter approached
petitioner who suddenly punched him in the face. Chy cried out, "Bakit mo ako
sinuntok hindi ka naman [inaano]?" (Why did you box me[?] I’m not doing anything to
you.)9 But petitioner kept on assaulting him. Foz attempted to pacify petitioner but was
himself hit on the nose while Chy continued to parry the blows. Petitioner reached for
a bottle of beer, and with it, struck the lower back portion of Chy’s head. Then, Foz
shoved Chy causing the latter to fall.
6 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
When Chy found an opportunity to escape, he ran towards his house and phoned his
wife Josefina to call the police. Chy told Josefina about the mauling and complained
of difficulty in breathing. Upon reaching Chy’s house, the policemen knocked five
times but nobody answered. Josefina arrived minutes later, unlocked the door and
found Chy lying unconscious on the kitchen floor, salivating. He was pronounced
dead on arrival at the hospital. The autopsy confirmed that Chy died of myocardial
infarction.
After trial in due course, the RTC of Aparri, Cagayan (Branch 9) found petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of homicide. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment:
1) Finding AMADO GARCIA guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
HOMICIDE defined and penalized by Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code
and after applying in his favor the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate prison term of TEN
(10) YEARS OF PRISION MAYOR, as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14)
YEARS and EIGHT (8) MONTHS of RECLUSION TEMPORAL as maximum;
2) Ordering him to pay the heirs of Manuel Chy the amount of FIFTY
THOUSAND (₱50,000.00) PESOS, as death indemnity; TWO HUNDRED
THOUSAND (₱200,000.00) PESOS, representing expenses for the wake
and burial; THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND (₱300,000.00) PESOS, as
moral damages; and THREE HUNDRED THIRTY[-]TWO THOUSAND
(₱332,000.00] PESOS, as loss of earning, plus the cost of this suit.
SO ORDERED.10
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction in a Decision dated
December 20, 2005, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, appeal is hereby [DENIED] and the July 2,
2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch [9], in Criminal
Case No. 08-1185, is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.11
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied in a Resolution dated
March 13, 2006.
Hence, the instant appeal of petitioner on the following grounds:
I.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL
COURT THAT PETITIONER IS THE ONE RESPONSIBLE FOR INFLICTING THE
SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES SUSTAINED BY THE DECEASED MANUEL CHY.
II.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL
COURT FINDING PETITIONER LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF MANUEL CHY
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE CAUSE OF DEATH IS MYOCARDIAL
INFARCTION, A NON-VIOLENT RELATED CAUSE OF DEATH.
III.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL
COURT WHICH CONCLUDED THAT THE HEART FAILURE OF MANUEL CHY
WAS DUE TO "FRIGHT OR SHOCK CAUSED BY THE MALTREATMENT."
IV.
BOTH THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT
ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER ON THE GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT.12
In essence, the issue is whether or not petitioner is liable for the death of Manuel Chy.
In his undated Memorandum,13 petitioner insists on a review of the factual findings of
the trial court because the judge who penned the decision was not the same judge
who heard the prosecution evidence. He adds that the Court of Appeals had wrongly
inferred from, misread and overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts, which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.14
At the onset, petitioner denies laying a hand on Manuel Chy. Instead, he implicates
Armando Foz as the author of the victim’s injuries. Corollarily, he challenges the
credibility of Armando’s brother, Fidel, who testified concerning his sole culpability.
Basically, petitioner disowns responsibility for Chy’s demise since the latter was found
to have died of myocardial infarction. In support, he amplifies the testimony of Dr.
Cleofas C. Antonio15 that Chy’s medical condition could have resulted in his death
anytime. Petitioner asserts that, at most, he could be held liable for slight physical
injuries because none of the blows he inflicted on Chy was fatal.
The Office of the Solicitor General reiterates the trial court’s assessment of the
witnesses and its conclusion that the beating of Chy was the proximate cause of his
death.
7 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
Upon careful consideration of the evidence presented by the prosecution as well as
the defense in this case, we are unable to consider the petitioner’s appeal with favor.
The present petition was brought under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, yet, petitioner
raises questions of fact. Indeed, it is opportune to reiterate that this Court is not the
proper forum from which to secure a re-evaluation of factual issues, save where the
factual findings of the trial court do not find support in the evidence on record or
where the judgment appealed from was based on a misapprehension of
facts.16 Neither exception applies in the instant case as would justify a departure from
the established rule.
Further, petitioner invokes a recognized exception to the rule on non-interference with
the determination of the credibility of witnesses. He points out that the judge who
penned the decision is not the judge who received the evidence and heard the
witnesses. But while the situation obtains in this case, the exception does not. The
records reveal that Judge Conrado F. Manauis inhibited from the proceedings upon
motion of no less than the petitioner himself. Consequently, petitioner cannot seek
protection from the alleged adverse consequence his own doing might have caused.
For us to allow petitioner relief based on this argument would be to sanction a
travesty of the Rules which was designed to further, rather than subdue, the ends of
justice.
We reiterate, the efficacy of a decision is not necessarily impaired by the fact that
the ponente only took over from a colleague who had earlier presided over the trial. It
does not follow that the judge who was not present during the trial, or a fraction
thereof, cannot render a valid and just decision.17 Here, Judge Andres Q. Cipriano
took over the case after Judge Manauis recused himself from the proceedings. Even
so, Judge Cipriano not only heard the evidence for the defense, he also had an
opportunity to observe Dr. Cleofas Antonio who was recalled to clarify certain points
in his testimony. Worth mentioning, too, is the fact that Judge Cipriano presided
during the taking of the testimonies of Fidel Foz, Jr. and Alvin Pascua on rebuttal.
In any case, it is not unusual for a judge who did not try a case in its entirety to decide
it on the basis of the records on hand.18 He can rely on the transcripts of stenographic
notes and calibrate the testimonies of witnesses in accordance with their conformity to
common experience, knowledge and observation of ordinary men. Such reliance
does not violate substantive and procedural due process of law.19
The Autopsy Report on the body of Manuel Chy disclosed the following injuries:
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
Body embalmed, well preserved.
Cyanotic lips and nailbeds.
Contusions, dark bluish red: 4.5 x 3.0 cms., lower portion of the left ear; 4.0 x 2.8
cms., left inferior mastoid region; 2.5 x 1.1 cms., upper lip; 2.7 x 1.0 cms., lower lip;
5.8 x 5.5 cms., dorsum of left hand.
Lacerated wound, 0.8 cm., involving mucosal surface of the upper lip on the right
side.
No fractures noted.
Brain with tortuous vessels. Cut sections show congestion. No hemorrhage noted.
Heart, with abundant fat adherent on its epicardial surface. Cut sections show a
reddish brown myocardium with an area of hyperemia on the whole posterior wall, the
lower portion of the anterior wall and the inferior portion of the septum. Coronary
arteries, gritty, with the caliber of the lumen reduced by approximately thirty (30%)
percent. Histopathological findings show mild fibrosis of the myocardium.
Lungs, pleural surfaces, shiny; with color ranging from dark red to dark purple. Cut
sections show a gray periphery with reddish brown central portion with fluid oozing on
pressure with some reddish frothy materials noted. Histopathological examinations
show pulmonary edema and hemorrhages.
Kidneys, purplish with glistening capsule. Cut sections show congestion.
Histopathological examinations show mild lymphocytic infiltration.1avvphi1
Stomach, one-half (1/2) full with brownish and whitish materials and other partially
digested food particles.
CAUSE OF DEATH: - Myocardial Infarction. (Emphasis supplied.)20
At first, petitioner denied employing violence against Chy. In his undated
Memorandum, however, he admitted inflicting injuries on the deceased, albeit, limited
his liability to slight physical injuries. He argues that the superficial wounds sustained
by Chy did not cause his death.21 Quite the opposite, however, a conscientious
analysis of the records would acquaint us with the causal connection between the
death of the victim and the mauling that preceded it. In open court, Dr. Antonio
identified the immediate cause of Chy’s myocardial infarction:
ATTY. TUMARU:
Q: You diagnose[d] the cause of death to be myocardial infarction that is because
there was an occlusion in the artery that prevented the flowing of blood into the heart?
8 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
A: That was not exactly seen at the autopsy table but it changes, the hyperemic
changes [in] the heart muscle were the one[s] that made us [think] or gave strong
conclusion that it was myocardial infarction, and most likely the cause is occlusion of
the blood vessels itself. (Emphasis supplied.)22
By definition, coronary occlusion23 is the complete obstruction of an artery of the
heart, usually from progressive arteriosclerosis24 or the thickening and loss of
elasticity of the arterial walls. This can result from sudden emotion in a person with an
existing arteriosclerosis; otherwise, a heart attack will not occur.25 Dr. Jessica Romero
testified on direct examination relative to this point:
ATTY. CALASAN:
Q: Could an excitement trigger a myocardial infarction?
A: Excitement, I cannot say that if the patient is normal[;] that is[,] considering that the
patient [does] not have any previous [illness] of hypertension, no previous history of
myocardial [ischemia], no previous [arteriosis] or hardening of the arteries, then
excitement [cannot] cause myocardial infarction. (Emphasis supplied.)26
The Autopsy Report bears out that Chy has a mild fibrosis of the
myocardium27 caused by a previous heart attack. Said fibrosis 28 or formation of fibrous
tissue or scar tissue rendered the middle and thickest layer of the victim’s heart less
elastic and vulnerable to coronary occlusion from sudden emotion. This causation is
elucidated by the testimony of Dr. Antonio:
ATTY. CALASAN:
Q: You said that the physical injuries will cause no crisis on the part of the victim,
Doctor?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And [these] physical injuries [were] caused by the [boxing] on the mouth and[/]or
hitting on the nape by a bottle?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: On the part of the deceased, that [was] caused definitely by emotional crisis,
Doctor?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And because of this emotional crisis the heart palpitated so fast, so much so, that
there was less oxygen being pumped by the heart?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And definitely that caused his death, Doctor?
A: Yes, sir, it could be.29
In concurrence, Dr. Antonio A. Paguirigan also testified as follows:
ATTY. CALASAN:
Q: I will repeat the question… Dr. Antonio testified that the deceased died because of
the blow that was inflicted, it triggered the death of the deceased, do you agree with
his findings, Doctor?
A: Not probably the blow but the reaction sir.
Q: So you agree with him, Doctor?
A: It could be, sir.
Q: You agree with him on that point, Doctor?
A: Yes, sir.30
It can be reasonably inferred from the foregoing statements that the emotional strain
from the beating aggravated Chy’s delicate constitution and led to his death. The
inevitable conclusion then surfaces that the myocardial infarction suffered by the
victim was the direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony that petitioner had
intended to commit.
Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code states that criminal liability shall be incurred
"by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended." The essential requisites for the application of
this provision are: (a) the intended act is felonious; (b) the resulting act is likewise a
felony; and (c) the unintended albeit graver wrong was primarily caused by the actor’s
wrongful acts.31lawph!l
In this case, petitioner was committing a felony when he boxed the victim and hit him
with a bottle. Hence, the fact that Chy was previously afflicted with a heart ailment
9 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
does not alter petitioner’s liability for his death. Ingrained in our jurisprudence is the
doctrine laid down in the case of United States v. Brobst32 that:
x x x where death results as a direct consequence of the use of illegal violence, the
mere fact that the diseased or weakened condition of the injured person contributed
to his death, does not relieve the illegal aggressor of criminal responsibility.33
In the same vein, United States v. Rodriguez34 enunciates that:
x x x although the assaulted party was previously affected by some internal malady, if,
because of a blow given with the hand or the foot, his death was hastened, beyond
peradventure he is responsible therefor who produced the cause for such
acceleration as the result of a voluntary and unlawfully inflicted injury. (Emphasis
supplied.)35
In this jurisdiction, a person committing a felony is responsible for all the natural and
logical consequences resulting from it although the unlawful act performed is different
from the one he intended;36 "el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal
causado" (he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused). 37 Thus,
the circumstance that petitioner did not intend so grave an evil as the death of the
victim does not exempt him from criminal liability. Since he deliberately committed an
act prohibited by law, said condition simply mitigates his guilt in accordance with
Article 13(3)38 of the Revised Penal Code.39 Nevertheless, we must appreciate as
mitigating circumstance in favor of petitioner the fact that the physical injuries he
inflicted on the victim, could not have resulted naturally and logically, in the actual
death of the victim, if the latter’s heart was in good condition.
Considering that the petitioner has in his favor the mitigating circumstance of lack of
intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed without any aggravating
circumstance to offset it, the imposable penalty should be in the minimum period, that
is, reclusion temporal in its minimum period,40or anywhere from twelve (12) years and
one (1) day to fourteen years (14) years and eight (8) months. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law,41 the trial court properly imposed upon petitioner an
indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prisión mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14)
years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as maximum.
We shall, however, modify the award of damages to the heirs of Manuel Chy for his
loss of earning capacity in the amount of ₱332,000. In fixing the indemnity, the
victim’s actual income at the time of death and probable life expectancy are taken into
account. For this purpose, the Court adopts the formula used in People v. Malinao:42
Net earning capacity = 2/3 x (80-age of x a reasonable portion of the the victim at the
annual net income which time of this death) would have been received
by the heirs for support.43
Branch 9 of the Aparri, Cagayan RTC took judicial notice of the salary which Manuel
Chy was receiving as a sheriff of the court. At the time of his death, Chy was 51 years
old and was earning a gross monthly income of ₱10,600 or a gross annual income of
₱127,200. But, in view of the victim’s delicate condition, the trial court reduced his life
expectancy to 10 years. It also deducted ₱7,000 from Chy’s salary as reasonable
living expense. However, the records are bereft of showing that the heirs of Chy
submitted evidence to substantiate actual living expenses. And in the absence of
proof of living expenses, jurisprudence44 approximates net income to be 50% of the
gross income. Accordingly, by reason of his death, the heirs of Manuel Chy should be
awarded ₱1,229,600 as loss of earning capacity, computed as follows:
Net earning capacity = 2/3 x (80-51) x [₱127,200 - 1/2 (₱127,200)]
= 2/3 x (29) x ₱63,600
= 19 1/3 x ₱63,600
= ₱1,229,600
We sustain the trial court’s grant of funerary expense of ₱200,000 as stipulated by the
parties45 and civil indemnity of ₱50,000.46 Anent moral damages, the same is
mandatory in cases of murder and homicide, without need of allegation and proof
other than the death of the victim.47 However, in obedience to the controlling case law,
the amount of moral damages should be reduced to ₱50,000.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated December 20, 2005 and the Resolution dated
March 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.-CR No. 27544 are AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION in that the award of moral damages is reduced to ₱50,000.
Petitioner is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of Manuel K. Chy ₱50,000 as civil
indemnity; ₱200,000, representing expenses for the wake and burial; and ₱1,229,600
as loss of earning capacity.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 198400               October 7, 2013
FE ABELLA y PERPETUA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
10 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
 DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 from the Decision2 and Resolution3 dated
October 26, 2010 and August 11, 2011, respectively, of the Court of Appeals CA) in
CA-G.R. CR No. 00336-MIN affirming with modifications the conviction4 by the
Regional Trial Court RTC) of Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 39 of Fe
Abella y Perpetua petitioner) for the crime of frustrated homicide committed against
his younger brother, Benigno Abella Benigno). The RTC sentenced the petitioner to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of six 6) years and one 1) day to eight 8) years of
prision mayor as minimum, to ten 10) years and one 1) day to twelve 12) years of
prision mayor as maximum, and to pay Benigno ₱100,000.00 as consequential
damages, ₱10,000.00 for the medical expenses he incurred, plus the costs of
suit.5 The CA concurred with the RTC’s factual findings. However, the CA modified
the penalty imposed to six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years of prision
correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its
medium period as maximum. The CA also deleted the RTC’s award in favor of
Benigno of (a) ₱10,000.00 as actual damages corresponding to the medical
expenses allegedly incurred; and (b) ₱100,000.00 as consequential damages. In lieu
of the preceding, the CA ordered the petitioner to pay Benigno ₱30,000.00 as moral
damages and ₱10,000.00 as temperate damages.6
Antecedent Facts
On October 7, 1998, the petitioner, who at times worked as a farmer, baker and
trisicad driver, was charged with frustrated homicide in an Information7 which reads:
That on or about September 6, 1998, at 11:00 o’clock in the evening, more or less, at
Sitio Puli, Canitoan, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any justifiable cause, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with intent to kill, attack,
assault, harm and hack one, BENIGNO ABELLA y PERPETUA, with the use of a
scythe, hitting the latter’s neck, thereby inflicting the injury described below, to wit:
• hacking wound left lateral aspect neck; and
• incised wound left hand dorsal aspect thus performing all the acts of
execution which would produce the crime of homicide as a consequence, but
nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of some cause or causes
independent of the will of the accused, that is the timely and able
intervention of the medical attendance rendered to the said victim.
Contrary to Article 249 in relation to 250 of the RPC.8
After the Information was filed, the petitioner remained at large and was only arrested
by agents of the National Bureau of Investigation on October 7, 2002.9
During the arraignment, the petitioner pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Pre-
trial and trial thus proceeded.
The Prosecution offered the testimonies of: (a) Benigno;10 (b) Amelita
Abella11 (Amelita), Benigno’s wife; (c) Alejandro Tayrus12 (Alejandro), with whom the
petitioner had a quarrel; and (d) Dr. Roberto Ardiente13 (Dr. Ardiente), a surgeon from
J.R. Borja Memorial Hospital, Cagayan de Oro City, who rendered medical assistance
to Benigno after the latter was hacked by the petitioner.
The Prosecution evidence established that on September 6, 1998, at around 11:00
p.m., Benigno was watching television in his house. A certain Roger Laranjo arrived
and asked Benigno to pacify the petitioner, who was stirring trouble in a nearby store.
Benigno and Amelita found the petitioner fighting with Alejandro and a certain
Dionisio Ybañes (Dionisio). Benigno was able to convince the petitioner to go home.
Benigno and Amelita followed suit and along the way, they dropped by the houses of
Alejandro and Dionisio to apologize for the petitioner’s conduct.
Benigno and Amelita were in Alejandro’s house when the petitioner arrived bringing
with him two scythes, one in each of his hands. Benigno instructed Alejandro and
Dionisio to run away and the latter two complied. The petitioner wanted to enter
Alejandro’s house, but Benigno blocked his way and asked him not to proceed. The
petitioner then pointed the scythe, which he held in his left hand, in the direction of
Benigno’s stomach, while the scythe in the right hand was used to hack the latter’s
neck once.14 Benigno fell to the ground and was immediately taken to the
hospital15 while the petitioner ran to chase Alejandro.16 Benigno incurred an expense
of more than ₱10,000.00 for hospitalization, but lost the receipts of his bills. 17 He
further claimed that after the hacking incident, he could no longer move his left hand
and was thus deprived of his capacity to earn a living as a carpenter.18
Dr. Ardiente testified that Benigno sustained: (a) a "hacking wound left lateral aspect
neck 11 cm"; and (b) an "incised wound left hand dorsal aspect 4 cm".19 Benigno was
initially confined in the hospital on September 6, 1998 and was discharged on
September 23, 1998.20 From Dr. Ardiente’s recollection, since the scythe used in the
hacking was not sterile, complications and infections could have developed from the
big and open wounds sustained by Benigno, but fortunately did not.21
The defense offered the testimonies of: (a) the petitioner; 22 (b) Fernando
Fernandez23 (Fernando), a friend of the petitioner; and (c) Urbano Cabag24 (Urbano).
The petitioner relied on denial and alibi as defenses. He claimed that from September
2, 1998 to October 2002, he and his family resided in Buenavista, Agusan del Norte.
Sitio Puli, Canitoan, Cagayan de Oro City, where the hacking incident occurred, is
11 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
about four (4) hours drive away. Fernando testified that on September 6, 1998, he
saw the petitioner gathering woods to make a hut.25 Later in the evening, at around
5:00 p.m., Urbano spotted the petitioner drinking tuba in the store of Clarita
Perpetua.26
The RTC Ruling
On July 13, 2006, the RTC convicted the petitioner of the crime charged. The fallo of
the Judgment27 reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing and finding the evidence presented by the
prosecution sufficient to prove the guilt of the [petitioner] beyond reasonable doubt,
judgment is rendered finding petitioner Fe Abella GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Frustrated Homicide as defined and penalized by Article 249 in relation
to Article 50 and Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, petitioner Fe Abella is
hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of Six (6) years and One (1) day
to Eight (8) years of prision mayor as minimum to Ten (10) years and One (1) day to
Twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum; to indemnify offended-party
complainant Benigno Abella the sum of Ten Thousand ([P]10,000.00) Pesos for the
medical expenses incurred; to pay the sum of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
([P]100,000.00) PESOS as consequential damages and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.28
The RTC found the petitioner’s defenses of alibi and denial as weak. No disinterested
witnesses were presented to corroborate the petitioner’s claim that he was nowhere
at the scene of the hacking incident on September 6, 1998. Fernando and Urbano’s
testimonies were riddled with inconsistencies. The RTC accorded more credence to
the averments of the prosecution witnesses, who, without any ill motives to testify
against the petitioner, positively, categorically and consistently pointed at the latter as
the perpetrator of the crime. Besides, medical records show that Benigno sustained a
wound in his neck and his scar was visible when he testified during the trial.
The RTC awarded ₱10,000.00 as actual damages to Benigno for the medical
expenses he incurred despite the prosecution’s failure to offer receipts as evidence.
The petitioner was likewise ordered to pay ₱100,000.00 as consequential damages,
but the RTC did not explicitly lay down the basis for the award.
The petitioner then filed an appeal29 before the CA primarily anchored on the claim
that the prosecution failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the existence of
intent to kill which accompanied the single hacking blow made on Benigno’s neck.
The petitioner argued that the hacking was merely accidental especially since he had
no motive whatsoever which could have impelled him to hurt Benigno, and that the
infliction of merely one wound negates intent to kill.
The CA Ruling
On October 26, 2010, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision 30 affirming the
petitioner’s conviction for the crime of frustrated homicide ratiocinating that:
Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of: (a) motive; (b) the nature or number of
weapons used in the commission of the crime; (c) the nature and number of wounds
inflicted on the victim; (d) the manner the crime was committed; and (e) the words
uttered by the offender at the time the injuries are inflicted by him on the victim.
Here, the intent to kill was sufficiently proven by the Prosecution. The petitioner
attacked Benigno with deadly weapons, two scythes. The petitioner’s blow was
directed to the neck of Benigno. The attack on the unarmed and unsuspecting
Benigno was swift and sudden. The latter had no means, and no time, to defend
himself.
Dr. Roberto Ardiente, Jr., who attended and issued the Medical Certificate, testified
that Benigno suffered from a hack wound on the left neck, and an incised wound on
the left hand palm. He said that the wounds might have been caused by a sharp,
pointed and sharp-edged instrument, and may have resulted to death without proper
medical attendance. Benigno was hospitalized for about a month because of the
injuries. The location of the wound (on the neck) shows the nature and seriousness of
the wound suffered by Benigno. It would have caused his death, had it not been for
the timely intervention of medical science.31 (Citations omitted and emphasis
supplied)
However, the CA modified the sentence to "imprisonment of six (6) months and one
(1) day to six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor in its medium period, as maximum."32 The CA explained that:
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty for the crime of
consummated homicide is reclusion temporal , or twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
twenty (20) years. Under Article 50 of the same Code, the penalty for a frustrated
crime is one degree lower than that prescribed by law. Thus, frustrated homicide is
punishable by prision mayor , or six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, absent any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty should be taken from the
medium period of prision mayor . To determine the minimum of the indeterminate
penalty, prision mayor should be reduced by one degree, which is prision correccional
, with a range of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. The minimum of the
indeterminate penalty may be taken from the full range of prision
correccional.33 (Citation omitted)
The CA also deleted the RTC’s order for the payment of actual and consequential
damages as there were no competent proofs to justify the awards. The CA instead
12 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
ruled that Benigno is entitled to ₱30,000.00 as moral damages and ₱10,000.00 as
temperate damages,34 the latter being awarded when some pecuniary loss has been
incurred, but the amount cannot be proven with certainty.35
Issue
Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari36 anchored on the issue of
whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in rendering judgments which are not in
accordance with law and applicable jurisprudence and which if not corrected, will
cause grave injustice and irreparable damage to the petitioner.37
In support thereof, the petitioner avers that the courts a quo failed to appreciate
relevant facts, which if considered, would justify either his acquittal or the
downgrading of his conviction to less serious physical injuries. The petitioner points
out that after the single hacking blow was delivered, he ran after Alejandro and
Dionisio leaving Benigno behind. Had there been an intent to kill on his part, the
petitioner could have inflicted more wounds since at that time, he had two scythes in
his hands. Further, the CA erred in finding that the hacking blow was sudden and
unexpected, providing Benigno with no opportunity to defend himself. Benigno saw
the petitioner arriving with weapons on hand. Benigno could not have been unaware
of the danger facing him, but he knew that the petitioner had no intent to hurt him.
Benigno thus approached the petitioner, but in the process, the former was
accidentally hit with the latter’s scythe.
The petitioner also cites Pentecostes, Jr. v. People 38 where this Court found the
downgrading of a conviction from attempted murder to physical injuries as proper
considering that homicidal intent was absent when the accused shot the victim once
and did not hit a vital part of the latter’s body.39
Further, as per Dr. Ardiente’s testimony, no complications resulted from Benigno’s
hacking wound in the neck and incised wound in the hand. Such being the case,
death could not have resulted. The neck wound was not "so extensive because it did
not involve a big blood vessel on its vital structure" while the incised wound in the
hand, which only required cleansing and suturing, merely left a slight
scarring.40 Besides, Benigno was only confined for seventeen (17) days at the
hospital and the injuries he sustained were in the nature of less serious ones.
In its Comment,41 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeks the dismissal of the
instant petition. The OSG stresses that the petitioner raises factual issues, which call
for a re-calibration of evidence, hence, outside the ambit of a petition filed under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the petitioner’s argument that the development of
infections or complications on the wounds is a necessary factor to determine the
crime committed is specious. The petitioner’s intent to kill Benigno can be clearly
inferred from the nature of the weapon used, the extent of injuries inflicted and the
circumstances of the aggression. Benigno could have died had there been no timely
medical assistance rendered to him.
If it were the petitioner’s wish to merely get Benigno out of the way to be able to
chase Alejandro and Dionisio, a kick, fist blow, push, or the use of a less lethal
weapon directed against a non-vital part of the body would have been sufficient.
However, the petitioner hacked Benigno’s neck with an unsterile scythe, leaving
behind a big, open and gaping wound.
This Court’s Ruling
The instant petition raises factual issues which are beyond the scope of a petition
filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Century Iron Works, Inc. and Benito Chua v. Eleto B. Bañas42 is instructive anent
what is the subject of review in a petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
viz:
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is an appeal from a ruling of a lower
tribunal on pure questions of law. It is only in exceptional circumstances that we admit
and review questions of fact.
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of
facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of
the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the question must not involve an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of
them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the
given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the
evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact.43 (Citations omitted)
In the case at bar, the challenge is essentially posed against the findings of the courts
a quo that the petitioner had a homicidal intent when he hacked Benigno’s neck with
a scythe and that the wounds the latter sustained could have caused his death had
there been no prompt medical intervention. These questions are patently factual in
nature requiring no less than a re-calibration of the contending parties’ evidence.
It is settled that the general rule enunciated in Century Iron Works, Inc. and Benito
Chua admits of exceptions, among which is, "when the judgment of the CA is
premised on a misapprehension of facts or a failure to notice certain relevant facts
that would otherwise justify a different conclusion x x x." 44 However, the factual
backdrop and circumstances surrounding the instant petition do not add up to qualify
the case as falling within the exceptions.
Even if this Court were to be exceptionally liberal and allow a review of factual issues,
still, the instant petition is susceptible to denial.
To successfully prosecute the crime of homicide, the following elements must be
proved beyond reasonable doubt: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused
13 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
killed that person without any justifying circumstance; (3) that the accused had the
intention to kill, which is presumed; and (4) that the killing was not attended by any of
the qualifying circumstances of murder, or by that of parricide or infanticide.
Moreover, the offender is said to have performed all the acts of execution if the
wound inflicted on the victim is mortal and could cause the death of the victim without
medical intervention or attendance.45
In cases of frustrated homicide, the main element is the accused’s intent to take his
victim’s life. The prosecution has to prove this clearly and convincingly to exclude
every possible doubt regarding homicidal intent. And the intent to kill is often inferred
from, among other things, the means the offender used and the nature, location, and
number of wounds he inflicted on his victim.46
The petitioner now wants to impress upon this Court that he had no motive to attack,
much less kill Benigno. The petitioner likewise invokes the doctrine in Pentecostes,
Jr.47 to argue that homicidal intent is absent in a case where the accused shot the
victim only once when there was an opportunity to do otherwise. The petitioner
belabors his claim that had he intended to kill Benigno, he could have repeatedly
hacked him to ensure the latter’s death, and not leave right after the blow to chase
Alejandro instead.
The analogy is flawed.
In Pentecostes, Jr., the victim was shot only once in the arm, a non vital part of the
body. The attending physician certified that the injury would require medical
attendance for ten days, but the victim was in fact promptly discharged from the
hospital the following day.
In Benigno’s case, he sustained an 11-centimeter long hacking wound in the neck
and a 4-cm long incised wound in his left hand caused by the unsterile scythe used
by the petitioner. Dr. Ardiente testified that "it is possible to have complications
resulting from these injuries because the wounds were extensive and they were big
and they were open wounds, so there is a possibility of infections resulting from these
kinds of wounds, and the instrument used was not a sterile instrument contaminated
with other things."48 No complications developed from Benigno’s wounds which could
have caused his death, but he was confined in the hospital for a period of 17 days
from September 6, 1998 to September 23, 1998.
From the foregoing, this Court concludes and thus agrees with the CA that the use of
a scythe against Benigno’s neck was determinative of the petitioner’s homicidal intent
when the hacking blow was delivered. It does not require imagination to figure out
that a single hacking blow in the neck with the use of a scythe could be enough to
decapitate a person and leave him dead. While no complications actually developed
from the gaping wounds in Benigno’s neck and left hand, it perplexes logic to
conclude that the injuries he sustained were potentially not fatal considering the
period of his confinement in the hospital. A mere grazing injury would have
necessitated a lesser degree of medical attention.
This Court likewise finds wanting in merit the petitioner’s claim that an intent to kill is
negated by the fact that he pursued Alejandro instead and refrained from further
hacking Benigno. What could have been a fatal blow was already delivered and there
was no more desistance to speak of. Benigno did not die from the hacking incident by
reason of a timely medical intervention provided to him, which is a cause independent
of the petitioner’s will.1âwphi1
All told, this Court finds no reversible error committed by the CA in affirming the
RTC’s conviction of the petitioner of the crime charged.
The Court modifies the award of damages.
As to the civil liability of the petitioner, the CA was correct in deleting the payment of
the consequential damages awarded by the trial court in the absence of proof thereof.
Where the amount of actual damages cannot be determined because of the absence
of supporting receipts but entitlement is shown by the facts of the case, temperate
damages may be awarded.49 In the instant case, Benigno certainly suffered injuries,
was actually hospitalized and underwent medical treatment. Considering the nature of
his injuries, it is prudent to award temperate damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00, in
lieu of actual damages.50
Furthermore, we find that Benigno is entitled to moral damages in the amount of
₱25,000.00.51 There is sufficient basis to award moral damages as ordinary human
experience and common sense dictate that such wounds inflicted on Benigno would
naturally cause physical suffering, fright, serious anxiety, moral shock, and similar
injury.52
WHEREFORE the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution, dated
October 26, 2010 and August 11 2011, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 00336-MIN are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. The petitioner, Fe
Abella y Perpetua is ORDERED TO PAY the offended party moral damages in the
amount of ₱25,000.00 and temperate damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00. Further,
the monetary awards for damages shall be subject to interest at the legal rate of six
percent ( 6%) p r annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.53
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 72964 January 7, 1988
FILOMENO URBANO, petitioner,
vs.
14 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court which
affirmed the decision of the then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City finding
petitioner Filomeno Urban guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide.
The records disclose the following facts of the case.
At about 8:00 o'clock in the morning of October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano
went to his ricefield at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan located at about
100 meters from the tobacco seedbed of Marcelo Javier. He found the place where
he stored his palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal nearby which
had overflowed. Urbano went to the elevated portion of the canal to see what
happened and there he saw Marcelo Javier and Emilio Erfe cutting grass. He asked
them who was responsible for the opening of the irrigation canal and Javier admitted
that he was the one. Urbano then got angry and demanded that Javier pay for his
soaked palay. A quarrel between them ensued. Urbano unsheathed his bolo (about 2
feet long, including the handle, by 2 inches wide) and hacked Javier hitting him on the
right palm of his hand, which was used in parrying the bolo hack. Javier who was then
unarmed ran away from Urbano but was overtaken by Urbano who hacked him again
hitting Javier on the left leg with the back portion of said bolo, causing a swelling on
said leg. When Urbano tried to hack and inflict further injury, his daughter embraced
and prevented him from hacking Javier.
Immediately thereafter, Antonio Erfe, Emilio Erfe, and Felipe Erfe brought Javier to his
house about 50 meters away from where the incident happened. Emilio then went to
the house of Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven but not finding him there, Emilio
looked for barrio councilman Felipe Solis instead. Upon the advice of Solis, the Erfes
together with Javier went to the police station of San Fabian to report the incident. As
suggested by Corporal Torio, Javier was brought to a physician. The group went to
Dr. Guillermo Padilla, rural health physician of San Fabian, who did not attend to
Javier but instead suggested that they go to Dr. Mario Meneses because Padilla had
no available medicine.
After Javier was treated by Dr. Meneses, he and his companions returned to Dr.
Guillermo Padilla who conducted a medico-legal examination. Dr. Padilla issued a
medico-legal certificate (Exhibit "C" dated September 28, 1981) which reads:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that I have examined the wound of Marcelo Javier,
20 years of age, married, residing at Barangay Anonang, San
Fabian, Pangasinan on October 23, 1980 and found the following:
1 -Incised wound 2 inches in length at the upper portion of the
lesser palmar prominence, right.
As to my observation the incapacitation is from (7-9) days period.
This wound was presented to me only for medico-legal
examination, as it was already treated by the other doctor. (p. 88,
Original Records)
Upon the intercession of Councilman Solis, Urbano and Javier agreed to settle their
differences. Urbano promised to pay P700.00 for the medical expenses of Javier.
Hence, on October 27, 1980, the two accompanied by Solis appeared before the San
Fabian Police to formalize their amicable settlement. Patrolman Torio recorded the
event in the police blotter (Exhibit A), to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Entry Nr 599/27 Oct '80/103OH/ Re entry Nr 592 on page 257 both
parties appeared before this Station accompanied by brgy.
councilman Felipe Solis and settled their case amicably, for they
are neighbors and close relatives to each other. Marcelo Javier
accepted and granted forgiveness to Filomeno Urbano who
shoulder (sic) all the expenses in his medical treatment, and
promising to him and to this Office that this will never be repeated
anymore and not to harbour any grudge against each other. (p. 87,
Original Records.)
Urbano advanced P400.00 to Javier at the police station. On November 3, 1980, the
additional P300.00 was given to Javier at Urbano's house in the presence of
barangay captain Soliven.
At about 1:30 a.m. on November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the Nazareth
General Hospital in a very serious condition. When admitted to the hospital, Javier
had lockjaw and was having convulsions. Dr. Edmundo Exconde who personally
attended to Javier found that the latter's serious condition was caused by tetanus
toxin. He noticed the presence of a healing wound in Javier's palm which could have
been infected by tetanus.
On November 15, 1980 at exactly 4:18 p.m., Javier died in the hospital. The medical
findings of Dr. Exconde are as follows:
Date Diagnosis
15 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
 11-14-80 ADMITTED due to trismus
adm. at DX TETANUS
1:30 AM Still having frequent muscle spasm. With diffi-
#35, 421 culty opening his mouth. Restless at times. Febrile
11-15-80 Referred. Novaldin 1 amp. inj. IM. Sudden cessa-
tion of respiration and HR after muscular spasm.
02 inhalation administered. Ambo bag resuscita-
tion and cardiac massage done but to no avail.
Pronounced dead by Dra. Cabugao at 4:18
P.M.
P
MC done and cadaver brought home by
rela-
t
ives. (p. 100, Original Records)
In an information dated April 10, 1981, Filomeno Urbano was charged with the crime
of homicide before the then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City, Third Judicial
District.
Upon arraignment, Urbano pleaded "not guilty." After trial, the trial court found Urbano
guilty as charged. He was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of from
TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision mayor, as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) years,
FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of  reclusion temporal, as maximum, together
with the accessories of the law, to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Marcelo Javier, in
the amount of P12,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and
to pay the costs. He was ordered confined at the New Bilibid Prison, in Muntinlupa,
Rizal upon finality of the decision, in view of the nature of his penalty.
The then Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the conviction of Urbano on appeal
but raised the award of indemnity to the heirs of the deceased to P30,000.00 with
costs against the appellant.
The appellant filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial. The motion for new
trial was based on an affidavit of Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven (Annex "A")
which states:
That in 1980, I was the barrio captain of Barrio Anonang, San
Fabian, Pangasinan, and up to the present having been re-elected
to such position in the last barangay elections on May 17, 1982;
That sometime in the first week of November, 1980, there was a
typhoon that swept Pangasinan and other places of Central Luzon
including San Fabian, a town of said province;
That during the typhoon, the sluice or control gates of the Bued
irrigation dam which irrigates the ricefields of San Fabian were
closed and/or controlled so much so that water and its flow to the
canals and ditches were regulated and reduced;
That due to the locking of the sluice or control gates of the dam
leading to the canals and ditches which will bring water to the
ricefields, the water in said canals and ditches became shallow
which was suitable for catching mudfishes;
That after the storm, I conducted a personal survey in the area
affected, with my secretary Perfecto Jaravata;
That on November 5, 1980, while I was conducting survey, I saw
the late Marcelo Javier catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals
with some companions;
That few days there after,or on November l5, l980, I came to know
that said Marcelo Javier died of tetanus. (p. 33, Rollo)
The motion was denied. Hence, this petition.
In a resolution dated July 16, 1986, we gave due course to the petition.
The case involves the application of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code which
provides that "Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1) By any person committing a
felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended
..." Pursuant to this provision "an accused is criminally responsible for acts committed
by him in violation of law and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting
therefrom." (People v. Cardenas, 56 SCRA 631).
16 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
The record is clear that Marcelo Javier was hacked by the petitioner who used a bolo
as a result of which Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm; that on
November 14, 1981 which was the 22nd day after the incident, Javier was rushed to
the hospital in a very serious condition and that on the following day, November 15,
1981, he died from tetanus.
Under these circumstances, the lower courts ruled that Javier's death was the natural
and logical consequence of Urbano's unlawful act. Hence, he was declared
responsible for Javier's death. Thus, the appellate court said:
The claim of appellant that there was an efficient cause which
supervened from the time the deceased was wounded to the time
of his death, which covers a period of 23 days does not deserve
serious consideration. True, that the deceased did not die right
away from his wound, but the cause of his death was due to said
wound which was inflicted by the appellant. Said wound which was
in the process of healing got infected with tetanus which ultimately
caused his death.
Dr. Edmundo Exconde of the Nazareth General Hospital testified
that the victim suffered lockjaw because of the infection of the
wound with tetanus. And there is no other way by which he could
be infected with tetanus except through the wound in his palm (tsn.,
p. 78, Oct. 5, 1981). Consequently, the proximate cause of the
victim's death was the wound which got infected with tetanus. And
the settled rule in this jurisdiction is that an accused is liable for all
the consequences of his unlawful act. (Article 4, par. 1, R.P.C.
People v. Red, CA 43 O.G. 5072; People v. Cornel 78 Phil. 418).
Appellant's allegation that the proximate cause of the victim's death
was due to his own negligence in going back to work without his
wound being properly healed, and lately, that he went to catch fish
in dirty irrigation canals in the first week of November, 1980, is an
afterthought, and a desperate attempt by appellant to wiggle out of
the predicament he found himself in. If the wound had not yet
healed, it is impossible to conceive that the deceased would be
reckless enough to work with a disabled hand. (pp. 20-21, Rollo)
The petitioner reiterates his position that the proximate cause of the death of Marcelo
Javier was due to his own negligence, that Dr. Mario Meneses found no tetanus in the
injury, and that Javier got infected with tetanus when after two weeks he returned to
his farm and tended his tobacco plants with his bare hands exposing the wound to
harmful elements like tetanus germs.
The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by Urbano was
infected with tetanus at the time of the infliction of the wound. The evidence merely
confirms that the wound, which was already healing at the time Javier suffered the
symptoms of the fatal ailment, somehow got infected with tetanus However, as to
when the wound was infected is not clear from the record.
In Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina (102 Phil. 1181), we adopted the following
definition of proximate cause:
xxx xxx xxx
... A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume
38, pages 695-696 of American Jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-
appellants in their brief. It is as follows:
... "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not have occurred."And more
comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in
motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events,
each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the
injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first
acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for
the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent
person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act
or default that an injury to some person might probably result
therefrom." (at pp. 185-186)
The issue, therefore, hinges on whether or not there was an efficient intervening
cause from the time Javier was wounded until his death which would exculpate
Urbano from any liability for Javier's death.
We look into the nature of tetanus-
The  incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time between injury and
the appearance of unmistakable symptoms, ranges from 2 to 56
days. However, over 80 percent of patients become symptomatic
within 14 days. A short incubation period indicates severe disease,
and when symptoms occur within 2 or 3 days of injury the mortality
rate approaches 100 percent.
Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as restlessness,
irritability, and headache are encountered occasionally, but the
commonest presenting complaints are pain and stiffness in the jaw,
abdomen, or back and difficulty swallowing. As the progresses,
17 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
 stiffness gives way to rigidity, and patients often complain of
difficulty opening their mouths. In fact, trismus in the commonest
manifestation of tetanus and is responsible for the familiar
descriptive name of lockjaw. As more muscles are involved, rigidity
becomes generalized, and sustained contractions called risus
sardonicus. The intensity and sequence of muscle involvement is
quite variable. In a small proportion of patients, only local signs and
symptoms develop in the region of the injury. In the vast majority,
however, most muscles are involved to some degree, and the signs
and symptoms encountered depend upon the major muscle groups
affected.
Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first
symptom, an interval referred to as the onset time. As in the case of
the incubation period, a short onset time is associated with a poor
prognosis. Spasms are caused by sudden intensification of afferent
stimuli arising in the periphery, which increases rigidity and causes
simultaneous and excessive contraction of muscles and their
antagonists. Spasms may be both painful and dangerous. As the
disease progresses, minimal or inapparent stimuli produce more
intense and longer lasting spasms with increasing frequency.
Respiration may be impaired by laryngospasm or tonic contraction
of respiratory muscles which prevent adequate ventilation. Hypoxia
may then lead to irreversible central nervous system damage and
death.
Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least 14
days and an onset time of more than 6 days.  Trismus is usually
present, but dysphagia is absent and generalized spasms are brief
and mild. Moderately severe tetanus has a somewhat shorter
incubation period and onset time; trismus is marked, dysphagia and
generalized rigidity are present, but ventilation remains adequate
even during spasms. The criteria for severe tetanus include a short
incubation time, and an onset time of 72 hrs., or less, severe
trismus, dysphagia and rigidity and frequent prolonged, generalized
convulsive spasms. (Harrison's Principle of Internal Medicine, 1983
Edition, pp. 1004-1005; Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body
depends on the incubation period of the disease.
In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he
parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. This incident took place on
October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or on November 14, 1980, he suffered the
symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The following day, November
15, 1980, he died.
If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by
tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been
infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared
on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days  after the infliction of
the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been more than six days. Javier,
however, died on the second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion
is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of
tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have
been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance
surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a
few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical
consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. (People v. Cardenas,
supra) And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused
caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt.
The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the
wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier
was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and
foreign to the crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038).
Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote  cause
and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus
may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had
nothing to do. As we ruled in Manila Electric Co. v. Remoquillo, et al. (99 Phil. 118).
"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if
such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or
give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if
there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury
a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury,
even though such injury would not have happened but for such
condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except
because of the independent cause, such condition was not the
proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective
condition sets into operation the instances which result in injury
because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or
condition is the proximate cause." (45 C.J. pp. 931-932). (at p. 125)
It strains the judicial mind to allow a clear aggressor to go scot free of criminal liability.
At the very least, the records show he is guilty of inflicting slight physical injuries.
However, the petitioner's criminal liability in this respect was wiped out by the victim's
own act. After the hacking incident, Urbano and Javier used the facilities of barangay
mediators to effect a compromise agreement where Javier forgave Urbano while
Urbano defrayed the medical expenses of Javier. This settlement of minor offenses is
18 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
allowed under the express provisions of Presidential Decree G.R. No. 1508, Section
2(3). (See also People v. Caruncho, 127 SCRA 16).
We must stress, however, that our discussion of proximate cause and remote cause
is limited to the criminal aspects of this rather unusual case. It does not necessarily
follow that the petitioner is also free of civil liability. The well-settled doctrine is that a
person, while not criminally liable, may still be civilly liable. Thus, in the recent case
of People v. Rogelio Ligon y Tria, et al. (G.R. No. 74041, July 29, 1987), we said:
xxx xxx xxx
... While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be
established beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of
evidence is required in a civil action for damages. (Article 29, Civil
Code). The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the
accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from
which the civil liability might arise did not exist. (Padilla v. Court of
Appeals, 129 SCRA 559).
The reason for the provisions of article 29 of the Civil Code, which
provides that the acquittal of the accused on the ground that his
guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt does not
necessarily exempt him from civil liability for the same act or
omission, has been explained by the Code Commission as follows:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a
criminal case also releases him from civil liability
is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine
legal system. It has given use to numberless
instances of miscarriage of justice, where the
acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the
mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused.
The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the
civil responsibility is derived from the criminal
offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability
cannot be demanded.
This is one of those causes where confused
thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable
consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a
clear line of demarcation between criminal liability
and civil responsibility, and to determine the
logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities
are separate and distinct from each other. One
affects the social order and the other, private
rights. One is for the punishment or correction of
the offender while the other is for reparation of
damages suffered by the aggrieved party. The
two responsibilities are so different from each
other that article 1813 of the present (Spanish)
Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a
compromise upon the civil action arising from a
crime; but the public action for the imposition of
the legal penalty shall not thereby be
extinguished." It is just and proper that, for the
purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the
accused, the offense should be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of
indemnity the complaining party, why should the
offense also be proved beyond reasonable
doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every
private right to be proved only by a
preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the
aggrieved person any less private because the
wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal
law?
"For these reasons, the Commission
recommends the adoption of the reform under
discussion. It will correct a serious defect in our
law. It will close up an inexhaustible source of
injustice-a cause for disillusionment on the part of
the innumerable persons injured or wronged."
The respondent court increased the P12,000.00 indemnification imposed by the trial
court to P30,000.00. However, since the indemnification was based solely on the
finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt in the homicide case, the civil liability of the
petitioner was not thoroughly examined. This aspect of the case calls for fuller
development if the heirs of the victim are so minded.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned decision of
the then Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of homicide. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 186412               September 7, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ORLITO VILLACORTA, Accused-Appellant.
19 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
 DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
On appeal is the Decision1 dated July 30, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 02550, which affirmed the Decision2 dated September 22, 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 170, of Malabon, in Criminal Case No. 27039-MN,
finding accused-appellant Orlito Villacorta (Villacorta) guilty of murder, and sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of Danilo Cruz
(Cruz) the sum of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, plus the costs of suit.
On June 21, 2002, an Information3 was filed against Villacorta charging him with the
crime of murder, as follows:
That on or about 23rd day of January 2002, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a
sharpened bamboo stick, with intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the
said weapon one DANILO SALVADOR CRUZ, thereby inflicting upon the victim
serious wounds which caused his immediate death.
When arraigned on September 9, 2002, Villacorta pleaded not guilty.4
During trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses Cristina Mendeja (Mendeja) and
Dr. Domingo Belandres, Jr. (Dr. Belandres).
Mendeja narrated that on January 23, 2002, she was tending her sari-sari store
located at C-4 Road, Bagumbayan, Navotas. Both Cruz and Villacorta were regular
customers at Mendeja’s store. At around two o’clock in the morning, while Cruz was
ordering bread at Mendeja’s store, Villacorta suddenly appeared and, without uttering
a word, stabbed Cruz on the left side of Cruz’s body using a sharpened bamboo stick.
The bamboo stick broke and was left in Cruz’s body. Immediately after the stabbing
incident, Villacorta fled. Mendeja gave chase but failed to catch Villacorta. When
Mendeja returned to her store, she saw her neighbor Aron removing the broken
bamboo stick from Cruz’s body.5 Mendeja and Aron then brought Cruz to Tondo
Medical Center.6
Dr. Belandres was Head of the Tetanus Department at the San Lazaro Hospital.
When Cruz sustained the stab wound on January 23, 2002, he was taken to the
Tondo Medical Center, where he was treated as an out-patient. Cruz was only
brought to the San Lazaro Hospital on February 14, 2002, where he died the following
day, on February 15, 2002. While admitting that he did not personally treat Cruz, Dr.
Belandres was able to determine, using Cruz’s medical chart and diagnosis, that Cruz
died of tetanus infection secondary to stab wound.7 Dr. Belandres specifically
described the cause of Cruz’s death in the following manner:
The wound was exposed x x – spurs concerted, the patient developed difficulty of
opening the mouth, spastivity of the body and abdominal pain and the cause of death
is hypoxic encephalopathy – neuro transmitted – due to upper G.I. bleeding x x x.
Diagnosed of Tetanus, Stage III.8
The prosecution also intended to present Dr. Deverni Matias (Dr. Matias), who
attended to Cruz at the San Lazaro Hospital, but the prosecution and defense agreed
to dispense with Dr. Matias’ testimony based on the stipulation that it would only
corroborate Dr. Belandres’ testimony on Cruz dying of tetanus.
For its part, the defense presented Villacorta himself, who denied stabbing Cruz.
Villacorta recounted that he was on his way home from work at around two o’clock in
the morning of January 21, 2002. Upon arriving home, Villacorta drank coffee then
went outside to buy cigarettes at a nearby store. When Villacorta was about to leave
the store, Cruz put his arm around Villacorta’s shoulder. This prompted Villacorta to
box Cruz, after which, Villacorta went home. Villacorta did not notice that Cruz got
hurt. Villacorta only found out about Cruz’s death upon his arrest on July 31, 2002.9
On September 22, 2006, the RTC rendered a Decision finding Villacorta guilty of
murder, qualified by treachery. The dispositive portion of said Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Orlito Villacorta
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of Danilo Cruz the sum of
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of said victim plus the costs of suit.10
Villacorta, through his counsel from the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO), filed a notice
of appeal to assail his conviction by the RTC.11 The Court of Appeals directed the
PAO to file Villacorta’s brief, within thirty days from receipt of notice.
Villacorta filed his Appellant’s Brief12 on May 30, 2007; while the People, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed its Appellee's Brief13 on October 2, 2007.
On July 30, 2008, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming in toto the
RTC judgment of conviction against Villacorta.
Hence, Villacorta comes before this Court via the instant appeal.
Villacorta manifested that he would no longer file a supplemental brief, as he was
adopting the Appellant's Brief he filed before the Court of Appeals. 14 The OSG,
likewise, manifested that it was no longer filing a supplemental brief. 15
In his Appellant’s Brief, Villacorta raised the following assignment of errors:
20 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
 I In this case, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals gave full faith and credence to
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE
OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY.
III
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED COMMITTED A CRIME,
HE COULD ONLY BE HELD LIABLE FOR SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES.16
Villacorta assails the credibility of Mendeja, an eyewitness to the stabbing incident. It
was Mendeja who positively identified Villacorta as the one who stabbed Cruz in the
early morning of January 23, 2002. Villacorta asserts that Mendeja’s account of the
stabbing incident is replete with inconsistencies and incredulities, and is contrary to
normal human experience, such as: (1) instead of shouting or calling for help when
Villacorta allegedly stabbed Cruz, Mendeja attempted to run after and catch
Villacorta; (2) while, by Mendeja’s own account, there were other people who
witnessed the stabbing and could have chased after Villacorta, yet, oddly, only
Mendeja did; (3) if Cruz was stabbed so swiftly and suddenly as Mendeja described,
then it would have been physically improbable for Mendeja to have vividly recognized
the perpetrator, who immediately ran away after the stabbing; (4) after the stabbing,
both Villacorta and Cruz ran in opposite directions; and (5) Mendeja had said that the
bamboo stick, the alleged murder weapon, was left at her store, although she had
also stated that the said bamboo stick was left embedded in Cruz’s body. Villacorta
maintains that the aforementioned inconsistencies are neither trivial nor
inconsequential, and should engender some doubt as to his guilt.
We are not persuaded.
To begin with, it is fundamental that the determination by the trial court of the
credibility of witnesses, when affirmed by the appellate court, is accorded full weight
and credit as well as great respect, if not conclusive effect. Such determination made
by the trial court proceeds from its first-hand opportunity to observe the demeanor of
the witnesses, their conduct and attitude under grilling examination, thereby placing
the trial court in the unique position to assess the witnesses' credibility and to
appreciate their truthfulness, honesty and candor.17
the testimony of prosecution witness Mendeja. The Court of Appeals rejected
Villacorta’s attempts to impugn Mendeja’s testimony, thus:
Appellant’s reason for concluding that witness Mendeja’s testimony is incredible
because she did not shout or call for help and instead run after the appellant, fails to
impress the Court because persons who witness crimes react in different ways.
"x x x the makings of a human mind are unpredictable; people react differently and
there is no standard form of behavior when one is confronted by a shocking incident.
Equally lacking in merit is appellant’s second reason which is, other persons could
have run after the appellant after the stabbing incident. As explained by witness
Mendeja, the other person whom she identified as Aron was left to assist the
appellant who was wounded. Further, the stabbing occurred at 2:00 o’clock in the
morning, a time when persons are expected to be asleep in their house, not roaming
the streets.
His [Villacorta’s] other argument that the swiftness of the stabbing incident rendered
impossible or incredible the identification of the assailant cannot likewise prosper in
view of his admission that he was in the store of witness Mendeja on January 23,
2002 at 2:00 o’clock in the morning and that he assaulted the victim by boxing him.
Even if his admission is disregarded still the evidence of record cannot support
appellant’s argument. Appellant and the victim were known to witness Mendeja, both
being her friends and regular customers. There was light in front of the store. An
opening in the store measuring 1 and ¼ meters enables the person inside to see
persons outside, particularly those buying articles from the store. The victim was in
front of the store buying bread when attacked. Further, immediately after the
stabbing, witness Mendeja ran after the appellant giving her additional opportunity to
identify the malefactor. Thus, authorship of the attack can be credibly ascertained.18
Moreover, Villacorta was unable to present any reason or motivation for Mendeja to
fabricate such a lie and falsely accuse Villacorta of stabbing Cruz on January 23,
2002. We have ruled time and again that where the prosecution eyewitness was
familiar with both the victim and accused, and where the locus criminis afforded good
visibility, and where no improper motive can be attributed to the witness for testifying
against the accused, then her version of the story deserves much weight.19
The purported inconsistencies in Mendeja’s testimony pointed out by Villacorta are on
matters that have no bearing on the fundamental fact which Mendeja testified on: that
Villacorta stabbed Cruz in the early morning of January 23, 2002, right in front of
Mendeja’s store.
21 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
In the face of Mendeja’s positive identification of Villacorta as Cruz’s stabber,
Villacorta could only muster an uncorroborated denial. Denial, like alibi, as an
exonerating justification, is inherently weak and if uncorroborated, regresses to
blatant impotence. Like alibi, it also constitutes self-serving negative evidence which
cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible
witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.20
Hence, we do not deviate from the foregoing factual findings of the RTC, as affirmed
by the Court of Appeals.
Nevertheless, there is merit in the argument proffered by Villacorta that in the event
he is found to have indeed stabbed Cruz, he should only be held liable for slight
physical injuries for the stab wound he inflicted upon Cruz. The proximate cause of
Cruz’s death is the tetanus infection, and not the stab wound.
Proximate cause has been defined as "that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred."21
In this case, immediately after he was stabbed by Villacorta in the early morning of
January 23, 2002, Cruz was rushed to and treated as an out-patient at the Tondo
Medical Center. On February 14, 2002, Cruz was admitted to the San Lazaro Hospital
for symptoms of severe tetanus infection, where he died the following day, on
February 15, 2002. The prosecution did not present evidence of the emergency
medical treatment Cruz received at the Tondo Medical Center, subsequent visits by
Cruz to Tondo Medical Center or any other hospital for follow-up medical treatment of
his stab wound, or Cruz’s activities between January 23 to February 14, 2002.
In Urbano v. Intermediate Appellate Court,22 the Court was confronted with a case of
very similar factual background as the one at bar. During an altercation on October
23, 1980, Urbano hacked Javier with a bolo, inflicting an incised wound on Javier’s
hand. Javier was treated by Dr. Meneses. On November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed
to the hospital with lockjaw and convulsions. Dr. Exconde, who attended to Javier,
found that Javier’s serious condition was caused by tetanus infection. The next day,
on November 15, 1980, Javier died. An Information was filed against Urbano for
homicide. Both the Circuit Criminal Court and the Intermediate Appellate Court found
Urbano guilty of homicide, because Javier's death was the natural and logical
consequence of Urbano's unlawful act. Urbano appealed before this Court, arguing
that Javier’s own negligence was the proximate cause of his death. Urbano alleged
that when Dr. Meneses examined Javier’s wound, he did not find any tetanus
infection and that Javier could have acquired the tetanus germs when he returned to
work on his farm only two (2) weeks after sustaining his injury. The Court granted
Urbano’s appeal.
We quote extensively from the ratiocination of the Court in Urbano:
The issue, therefore, hinges on whether or not there was an efficient intervening
cause from the time Javier was wounded until his death which would exculpate
Urbano from any liability for Javier's death.
We look into the nature of tetanus-
"The  incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time between injury and the appearance of
unmistakable symptoms, ranges from 2 to 56 days. However, over 80 percent of
patients become symptomatic within 14 days. A short incubation period indicates
severe disease, and when symptoms occur within 2 or 3 days of injury the mortality
rate approaches 100 percent.
"Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as restlessness, irritability, and headache
are encountered occasionally, but the commonest presenting complaints are pain and
stiffness in the jaw, abdomen, or back and difficulty swallowing. As the disease
progresses, stiffness gives way to rigidity, and patients often complain of difficulty
opening their mouths. In fact, trismus is the commonest manifestation of tetanus and
is responsible for the familiar descriptive name of lockjaw. As more muscles are
involved, rigidity becomes generalized, and sustained contractions called risus
sardonicus. The intensity and sequence of muscle involvement is quite variable. In a
small proportion of patients, only local signs and symptoms develop in the region of
the injury. In the vast majority, however, most muscles are involved to some degree,
and the signs and symptoms encountered depend upon the major muscle groups
affected.
"Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first symptoms, an interval
referred to as the onset time. As in the case of the incubation period, a short onset
time is associated with a poor prognosis. Spasms are caused by sudden
intensification of afferent stimuli arising in the periphery, which increases rigidity and
causes simultaneous and excessive contraction of muscles and their antagonists.
Spasms may be both painful and dangerous. As the disease progresses, minimal or
inapparent stimuli produce more intense and longer lasting spasms with increasing
frequency. Respiration may be impaired by laryngospasm or tonic contraction of
respiratory muscles which prevent adequate ventilation. Hypoxia may then lead to
irreversible central nervous system damage and death.
"Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least 14 days and an
onset time of more than 6 days. Trismus is usually present, but dysphagia is absent
and generalized spasms are brief and mild. Moderately severe tetanus has a
somewhat shorter incubation period and onset time; trismus is marked, dysphagia
and generalized rigidity are present, but ventilation remains adequate even during
spasms. The criteria for severe tetanus include a short incubation time, and an onset
time of 72 hrs., or less, severe trismus, dysphagia and rigidity and frequent
prolonged, generalized convulsive spasms. (Harrison's Principle of Internal Medicine,
1983 Edition, pp. 1004-1005; Emphasis supplied)
22 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body
depends on the incubation period of the disease.
In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he
parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. This incident took place on
October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or on November 14, 1980, he suffered the
symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The following day, November
15, 1980, he died.
If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by
tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been
infected with only a mild case of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared
on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days  after the infliction of
the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been more than six days. Javier,
however, died on the second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion
is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of
tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have
been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance
surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a
few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.23
The incubation period for tetanus infection and the length of time between the hacking
incident and the manifestation of severe tetanus infection created doubts in the mind
of the Court that Javier acquired the severe tetanus infection from the hacking
incident. We explained in Urbano that:
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical
consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. (People v. Cardenas,
supra) And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused
caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt.
The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the
wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier
was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and
foreign to the crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038).
Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote  cause
and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus
may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had
nothing to do. As we ruled in Manila Electric Co. v. Remoquillo, et al. (99 Phil. 118).
"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote
cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by
which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote
cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury,
even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion.
If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such
condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or
defective condition sets into operation the instances, which result in injury because of
the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate
cause." (45 C.J. pp. 931-932). (at p. 125)24
We face the very same doubts in the instant case that compel us to set aside the
conviction of Villacorta for murder. There had been an interval of 22 days between the
date of the stabbing and the date when Cruz was rushed to San Lazaro Hospital,
exhibiting symptoms of severe tetanus infection. If Cruz acquired severe tetanus
infection from the stabbing, then the symptoms would have appeared a lot sooner
than 22 days later. As the Court noted in Urbano, severe tetanus infection has a short
incubation period, less than 14 days; and those that exhibit symptoms with two to
three days from the injury, have one hundred percent (100%) mortality. Ultimately, we
can only deduce that Cruz’s stab wound was merely the remote cause, and its
subsequent infection with tetanus might have been the proximate cause of Cruz's
death. The infection of Cruz’s stab wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening
cause later or between the time Cruz was stabbed to the time of his death.
However, Villacorta is not totally without criminal liability.1âwphi1 Villacorta is guilty of
slight physical injuries under Article 266(1) of the Revised Penal Code for the stab
wound he inflicted upon Cruz. Although the charge in the instant case is for murder, a
finding of guilt for the lesser offense of slight physical injuries may be made
considering that the latter offense is necessarily included in the former since the
essential ingredients of slight physical injuries constitute and form part of those
constituting the offense of murder.25
We cannot hold Villacorta criminally liable for attempted or frustrated murder because
the prosecution was not able to establish Villacorta’s intent to kill. In fact, the Court of
Appeals expressly observed the lack of evidence to prove such an intent beyond
reasonable doubt, to wit:
Appellant stabbed the victim only once using a sharpened bamboo stick, hitting him
on the left side of the body and then immediately fled. The instrument used is not as
lethal as those made of metallic material. The part of the body hit is not delicate in the
sense that instant death can ensue by reason of a single stab wound. The assault
was done only once. Thus, there is doubt as to whether appellant had an intent to kill
the victim, which should be resolved in favor of the appellant. x x x.26
The intent must be proved in a clear and evident manner to exclude every possible
doubt as to the homicidal (or murderous) intent of the aggressor. The onus probandi
lies not on accused-appellant but on the prosecution. The inference that the intent to
kill existed should not be drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove
this fact beyond reasonable doubt. When such intent is lacking but wounds were
inflicted, the crime is not frustrated murder but physical injuries only.27
23 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
Evidence on record shows that Cruz was brought to Tondo Medical Center for
medical treatment immediately after the stabbing incident.1avvphi1 Right after
receiving medical treatment, Cruz was then released by the Tondo Medical Center as
an out-patient. There was no other evidence to establish that Cruz was incapacitated
for labor and/or required medical attendance for more than nine days. Without such
evidence, the offense is only slight physical injuries.28
We still appreciate treachery as an aggravating circumstance, it being sufficiently
alleged in the Information and proved during trial.
The Information specified that "accused, armed with a sharpened bamboo stick, with
intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said weapon one DANILO
SALVADOR CRUZ x x x."
Treachery exists when an offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods or forms which tend directly or especially to ensure its
execution, without risk to the offender, arising from the defense that the offended
party might make. This definition sets out what must be shown by evidence to
conclude that treachery existed, namely: (1) the employment of such means of
execution as would give the person attacked no opportunity for self-defense or
retaliation; and (2) the deliberate and conscious adoption of the means of execution.
To reiterate, the essence of qualifying circumstance is the suddenness, surprise and
the lack of expectation that the attack will take place, thus, depriving the victim of any
real opportunity for self-defense while ensuring the commission of the crime without
risk to the aggressor.29 Likewise, even when the victim was forewarned of the danger
to his person, treachery may still be appreciated since what is decisive is that the
execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to
retaliate.30
Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that treachery was duly proven in this
case, and we sustain such finding. Cruz, the victim, was attacked so suddenly,
unexpectedly, and without provocation. It was two o’clock in the morning of January
23, 2002, and Cruz, who was out buying bread at Mendeja’s store, was unarmed.
Cruz had his guard down and was totally unprepared for an attack on his person.
Villacorta suddenly appeared from nowhere, armed with a sharpened bamboo stick,
and without uttering a word, stabbed Cruz at the left side of his body, then swiftly ran
away. Villacorta’s treacherous mode of attack left Cruz with no opportunity at all to
defend himself or retaliate.
Article 266(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. – The crime of slight physical
injuries shall be punished:
1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall
incapacitate the offended party from labor from one to nine days, or shall require
medical attendance during the same period.
The penalty of arresto menor spans from one (1) day to thirty (30) days.31 The
Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply since said law excludes from its
coverage cases where the penalty imposed does not exceed one (1) year. 32 With the
aggravating circumstance of treachery, we can sentence Villacorta with imprisonment
anywhere within arresto menor in the maximum period, i.e., twenty-one (21) to thirty
(30) days. Consequently, we impose upon Villacorta a straight sentence of thirty (30)
days of arresto menor; but given that Villacorta has been in jail since July 31, 2002
until present time, already way beyond his imposed sentence, we order his immediate
release.
Under paragraph (1), Article 2219 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be
recovered in a criminal offense resulting in physical injuries. Moral damages
compensate for the mental anguish, serious anxiety, and moral shock suffered by the
victim and his family as being a proximate result of the wrongful act. An award
requires no proof of pecuniary loss. Pursuant to previous jurisprudence, an award of
Five Thousand Pesos (₱5,000.00) moral damages is appropriate for less serious, as
well as slight physical injuries.33
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 30, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 02550, affirming the Decision dated September 22, 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 170, of Malabon, in Criminal Case No. 27039-MN, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is entered finding Villacorta GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of slight physical injuries, as defined and
punished by Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentenced to suffer the
penalty of thirty (30) days arresto menor. Considering that Villacorta has been
incarcerated well beyond the period of the penalty herein imposed, the Director of the
Bureau of Prisons is ordered to cause Villacorta’s immediate release, unless
Villacorta is being lawfully held for another cause, and to inform this Court, within five
(5) days from receipt of this Decision, of the compliance with such order. Villacorta is
ordered to pay the heirs of the late Danilo Cruz moral damages in the sum of Five
Thousand Pesos (₱5,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 125909               June 23, 2000
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HERMOGENES FLORA AND EDWIN FLORA, accused-appellants.
QUISUMBING, J.
24 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
Accused-appellants seek the reversal of the decision 1 dated November 7, 1995, of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, Santa Cruz, Laguna, in Criminal Case Nos. SC-
4810, 4811 and 4812, finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of
double murder and attempted murder, and sentencing them to reclusion perpetua,
payment of P50,000.00 for indemnity, P14,000.00 for burial expenses and
P619,800.00 for loss of earning capacity in Crim. Case SC-4810  for the death of
Emerita Roma; reclusion perpetua, payment of P50,000.00 as indemnity, P14,000.00
for burial expenses and P470,232.00 for loss of earning capacity for the death of
Ireneo Gallarte in Crim. Case SC-4811; and imprisonment from 2 years, 4 months
and 1 day of prision correccional as minimum to 10 years of prision mayor and
payment of P15,000.00 to Flor Espinas for injuries sustained  in Crim. Case SC-4812.
On February 26, 1993, Prosecution Attorney Joselito D.R. Obejas filed three separate
informations charging appellants as follows:
Criminal Case No. 4810
That on or about January 10, 1993, at around 1:30 o'clock in the morning
thereof, in Sitio Silab, Barangay Longos, municipality of Kalayaan, province
of Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
Hermogenes Flora @ Bodoy, conspiring and confederating with accused
Edwin Flora @ Boboy, and mutually helping one another, while conveniently
armed then with a caliber .38 handgun, with intent to kill, by means of
treachery and with evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the said firearm one
EMERITA ROMA y DELOS REYES, thereby inflicting upon the latter
gunshot wounds on her chest which caused her immediate death, to the
damage and prejudice of her surviving heirs.
That in the commission of the crime, the aggravating circumstances of
treachery and evident premeditation are present. 2
Criminal Case No. 4811.
That on or about January 10, 1993, at around 1:30 o'clock in the morning
thereof, in Sitio Silab, Barangay Longos, municipality of Kalayaan, province
of Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
HERMOGENES FLORA @ Bodoy, conspiring and confederating with
accused Erwin [Edwin] Flora @ Boboy, and mutually helping one another,
while conveniently armed then with a caliber .38 handgun, with intent to kill,
by means of treachery and with evident premeditation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the said
firearm one IRENEO GALLARTE y VALERA, thereby inflicting upon the
latter gunshot wounds on his chest which caused his immediate death, to the
damage and prejudice of his surviving heirs.1âwphi1.nêt
That in the commission of the crime, the aggravating circumstances of
treachery and evident premeditation are present. 3
Criminal Case No. 4812
That on or about January 10, 1993, at around 1:30 o'clock in the morning
thereof, in Sitio Silab, Barangay Longos, municipality of Kalayaan, province
of Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
Hermogenes Flora @ Bodoy, conspiring and confederating with accused
Erwin [Edwin] Flora @ Boboy, and mutually helping one another, while
conveniently armed then with a caliber .38 handgun, with intent to kill, by
means of treachery and with evident premeditation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the said
firearm one FLOR ESPINAS y ROMA, hitting the latter on her shoulder, and
inflicting upon her injuries which, ordinarily, would have caused her death,
thus, accused performed all the acts of execution which could have
produced the crime of Murder as a consequence but which, nevertheless did
not produce it by reason of a cause independent of their will, that is, by the
timely and able medical attendance given the said Flor Espinas y Roma,
which prevented her death, to her damage and prejudice. 4
During arraignment, both appellants pleaded not guilty. Trial thereafter ensued.
Resolving jointly Criminal Cases Nos. SC-4810, SC-4811 and SC-4812, the trial court
convicted both appellants for the murder of Emerita Roma and Ireneo Gallarte, and
the attempted murder of Flor Espinas. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, this Court finds as follows:
In CRIMINAL CASE NO. SC-4810, for the death of Emerita Roma, the Court
finds both accused Hermogenes Flora and Edwin Flora guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder qualified by treachery and
sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all
the accessory penalties of the law, and to indemnify the heirs of the victim
the sums of (a) P50,000.00 as death indemnity; (b) P14,000.00 as expenses
for wake and burial; and (c) P619,800 for lost (sic) of earning capacity,
without any subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the
costs.
In CRIMINAL CASE NO. SC-4811, for the death of Ireneo Gallarte, the Court
finds both accused Hermogenes Flora and Edwin Flora guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, qualified by treachery and with the
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation and sentences each of
them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory
penalties of the law, and to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sums of (a)
P50,000.00 as death indemnity; (b) P14,000.00 as expenses for wake and
25 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
 burial; and (c) P470,232.00 for lost (sic) of earning capacity, without any
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
In CRIMINAL CASE NO. SC-4812, for the injuries sustained by Flor Espinas,
the Court finds both accused Hermogenes Flora and Edwin Flora guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Attempted Murder and sentences
each of them to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of  prision correccional, as minimum,
to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay P15,000.00 to
Flor Espinas as indemnity for her injuries and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. 5
The facts of the case, borne out by the records, are as follows:
Days before the incident, appellant Hermogenes Flora alias "Bodoy," had a violent
altercation with a certain Oscar Villanueva. Oscar's uncle, Ireneo Gallarte, pacified
the two.
On the evening of January 9, 1993, a dance party was held to celebrate the birthday
of Jeng-jeng Malubago in Sitio Silab, Barangay Longos, Kalayaan, Laguna. Appellant
Hermogenes Flora, allegedly a suitor of Jeng-jeng Malubago, attended the party with
his brother and co-appellant Edwin Flora, alias  "Boboy". Also in attendance were
Rosalie Roma, then a high school student; her mother, Emerita Roma, and her aunt,
Flor Espinas. Ireneo Gallarte, a neighbor of the Romas, was there too.
The dancing went on past midnight but at about 1:30, violence erupted. On signal by
Edwin Flora, Hermogenes Flora fired his .38 caliber revolver twice. The first shot
grazed the right shoulder of Flor Espinas, then hit Emerita Roma, below her shoulder.
The second shot hit Ireneo Gallarte who slumped onto the floor. Rosalie, was
shocked and could only utter, "si Bodoy, si Bodoy", referring to Hermogenes Flora.
Edwin Flora approached her and, poking a knife at her neck, threatened to kill her
before he and his brother, Hermogenes, fled the scene.
The victims of the gunfire were transported to the Rural Health Unit in Longos,
Kalayaan, Laguna, where Emerita and Ireneo died. 6
Early that same morning of January 10, 1993, the police arrested Edwin Flora at his
rented house in Barangay Bagumbayan, Paete, Laguna. Hermogenes Flora, after
learning of the arrest of his brother, proceeded first to the house of his aunt, Erlinda
Pangan, in Pangil, Laguna but later that day, he fled to his hometown in Pipian, San
Fernando, Camarines Sur.
The autopsy conducted by the medico-legal officer, Dr. Ricardo R. Yambot, Jr.,
revealed the following fatal wounds sustained by the deceased:
EMERITA ROMA
a) Gunshot of entrance at the posterior chest wall near the angle of the
axillary region measuring 1 cm. in diameter with clean cut inverted edges
involving deep muscles, and subcutaneous tissues and travel through both
lobes of the lungs, including the great blood vessels.
About 400 cc of clotted blood was extracted from the cadaver. The bullet
caliver 38 was extracted from the lungs.
The cause of her death was attributed to "Hypovolemic" shock secondary to
massive blood loss secondary to gunshot wound of the posterior chest wall.7
IRENEO GALLARTE
Gunshot wound of entrance at the left arm, measuring 1 cm. in diameter with
clean cut inverted edges involving the deep muscles, subcutaneous tissues
traveling through the anterior chest wall hitting both lobes of the lungs and
each great blood vessels obtaining the bullet fragments.
About 500 cc. of clotted blood was obtained from the cadaver.
His cause of death was attributed to "Hypovelemic" shock secondary to
massive blood loss secondary to gunshot wound of the left arm. 8
Flor Espinas submitted herself to a medical examination by Dr. Dennis Coronado. Her
medical certificate 9 disclosed that she sustained a gunshot wound, point of entry, 2 x
1 cm. right supra scapular area mid scapular line (+) contusion collar; and another
gunshot wound with point of exit 1 x 1 cm. right deltoid area.
Three criminal charges were filed against the Flora brothers, Hermogenes and Edwin,
before Branch 26 of the Regional Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. During the trial,
the prosecution presented two eyewitnesses, namely, (1) Rosalie Roma, daughter of
one of the victims, Emerita Roma, and (2) Flor Espinas, the injured victim. Rosalie
narrated the treacherous and injurious attack by Hermogenes Flora against the
victims. Flor detailed how she was shot by him.
Felipe Roma, the husband of Emerita, testified that his wife was forty-nine (49) years
old at the time of her death and was a paper mache maker, earning an average of
one thousand (P1,000.00) pesos a week. He claimed that his family incurred fourteen
thousand (P14,000.00) pesos as expenses for her wake and burial.
Ireneo Gallarte's widow, Matiniana, testified that her husband was fifty-two (52) years
old, a carpenter and a substitute farmer earning one hundred (P100.00) to two
26 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
hundred (P200.00) pesos a day. Her family spent fourteen thousand (P14,000.00)
pesos for his wake and burial.
The defense presented appellants Hermogenes and Edwin Flora, and Imelda
Madera, the common-law wife of Edwin. Appellants interposed alibi as their defense,
summarized as follows:
Version of Edwin Flora:
Edwin Flora, 28 years old, testified that accused Hermogenes Flora is his
brother. On January 10, 1993, around 1:30 in the morning, he was at
Barangay Bagumbayan, Paete, Laguna in the house of Johnny Balticanto,
sleeping with his wife. Policemen came at said house looking for his brother
Hermogenes. Replying to them that his brother was not living there,
policemen took him instead to the Municipal building of Paete and thereafter
transferred and detained him to (sic) the Municipal building of Kalayaan.
He recalled that on January 9, 1993, after coming from the cockpit at about
3:00 p.m. he and his accused brother passed by the house of Julito
Malubago. His brother Hermogenes was courting the daughter of Julito
Malubago. At about 6:00 p.m. he went home but his brother stayed behind
since there would be a dance party that night. 10
Version of Hermogenes Flora:
Hermogenes Flora, 21 years old, testified that he did not kill Ireneo Gallarte
and Emerita Roma and shot Flor Espina on January 10, 1993 at about 1:30
in the morning of Silab, Longos Kalayaan Laguna.
On said date, he was very much aslept (sic) in the house of his sister Shirley
at Sitio Bagumbayan, Longos, Kalayaan. From the time he slept at about
8:00 in the evening to the time he woke up at 6:00 in the morning, he had
not gone out of her sister's house. He knew the victims even before the
incident and he had no severe relation with them.
x x x           x x x          x x x
He also testified that in the morning of January 10, 1993, Imelda Madera
came to their house and told him that his brother Edwin was picked-up by
the policemen the night before. Taken aback, his sister told him to stay in the
house while she would go to the municipal hall to see their brother Edwin.
Thereafter, his aunt and sister agreed that he should go to Bicol to inform
their parents of what happened to Edwin. 11
Madera corroborated the testimony of her husband. 12
As earlier stated, the trial court convicted accused-appellants of the crime of double
murder and attempted murder. Appellants now raise this sole assigned error:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE TWO ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO
MORALLY ASCERTAIN THEIR IDENTITIES AND GUILT FOR THE
CRIMES CHARGED.
At the outset, it may be noted that the trial court found both appellants have been
positively identified. However, they challenge the court's finding that they failed to
prove their alibi because they did not establish that it was physically impossible for
them to be present at the crime scene. According to the trial court, by Hermogenes'
own admission, the house of his sister Shirley, where appellants were allegedly
sleeping, was only one (1) kilometer away from Sitio Silab, where the offenses
allegedly took place. The sole issue here, in our view, concerns only the plausibility of
the appellants' alibi and the credibility of the witnesses who identified them as the
perpetrators of the crimes charged.
For the defense of alibi to prosper, it is imperative that the accused establish two
elements: (1) he was not at the locus delicti  at the time the offense was committed,
and (2) it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene at the time of its
commission. 13 The defense of alibi and the usual corroboration thereof are disfavored
in law since both could be very easily contrived. 14 In the present case, appellants' alibi
is patently self-serving. Although Edwin's testimony was corroborated by his common-
law wife, it is ineffectual against the positive testimonies of eyewitnesses and
surviving victims who contradicted his alibi. Moreover, an alibi becomes less plausible
as a defense when it is invoked and sought to be crafted mainly by the accused
himself and his immediate relative or relatives. 15 Appellants' defense of alibi should
have been corroborated by a disinterested but credible witness. 16 Said
uncorroborated alibi crumbles in the face of positive identification made by
eyewitnesses. 17
In their bid for acquittal, appellants contend that they were not categorically and
clearly identified by the witnesses of the prosecution. They claim that the testimonies
of the said witnesses were not entitled to credence. They assail the credibility of two
eyewitnesses, namely Rosalie Roma and Flor Espinas, because of the alleged
inconsistencies in their testimonies. For instance, according to appellants, Rosalie
Roma testified she was in the dance hall when the gunshots were heard, and that she
was dancing in the middle of the dance hall when Hermogenes shot Emerita Roma,
Ireneo Gallarte and Flor Espinas,
Q Where were you when Hermogenes Roma shot these Ireneo Gallarte,
Emerita Roma and Flor Espinas?
27 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
 A I was dancing, sir. (Emphasis ours.)
Q And how far were you from Hermogenes Flora when he shot these
persons while you were dancing?
A Two armslength from me only, sir. 18
However, to a similar question, later in her testimony, she replied,
Q And where were these Emerita Roma, Your mother, Ireneo Gallarte and
Flor Espinas when Hermogenes Flora shot at them?
A They were beside each other.
Q And how far were you from these 3 persons?
A Because they were standing beside the fence and I was only seated near
them, sir. 19 (Emphasis ours.)
On this issue, we do not find any inconsistency that impairs her credibility or renders
her entire testimony worthless. Nothing here erodes the effectiveness of the
prosecution evidence. What counts is the witnesses' admitted proximity to the
appellants. Was she close enough to see clearly what the assailant was doing? If so,
is there room for doubt concerning the accuracy of her identification of appellant as
one of the malefactors?
Appellants argue that since the attention of witness Flor Espinas was focused on the
dance floor, it was improbable for her to have seen the assailant commit the crimes.
On cross-examination, said witness testified that while it was true she was watching
the people on the dance floor, nonetheless, she also looked around (gumagala) and
occasionally looked behind her and she saw both appellants who were known to
her. 20 Contrary to appellants' contention that Flor did not have a sufficient view to
identify the assailants, the trial court concluded that Flor was in a position to say who
were in the party and to observe what was going on. On this point, we concur with the
trial court.
Well-settled is the rule that findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses
deserve respect, for it had the opportunity to observe first-hand the deportment of
witnesses during trial. 21 Furthermore, minor inconsistencies do not affect the
credibility of witnesses, as they may even tend to strengthen rather than weaken their
credibility. 22 Inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution witnesses with respect to
minor details and collateral matters do not affect either the substance of their
declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony. 23 Such minor flaws may
even enhance the worth of a testimony, for they guard against memorized
falsities.1avvphi1
Appellants assert that Flor Espinas and Rosalie Roma were biased because they are
relatives of the victim Emerita Roma. However, unless there is a showing of improper
motive on the part of the witnesses for testifying against the accused, the fact that
they are related to the victim does not render their clear and positive testimony less
worthy of credit. On the contrary, their natural interest in securing the conviction of the
guilty would deter them from implicating other persons other than the culprits, for
otherwise, the latter would thereby gain immunity. 24
Here, appellants did not present any proof of improper motive on the part of the
eyewitnesses in pointing to the Flora brothers as the perpetrators of the crime. There
is no history of animosity between them. Emerita Roma and Flor Espinas were merely
innocent bystanders when hit by gunfire. Where eyewitnesses had no grudge against
the accused, their testimony is credible. 25 In the absence of ulterior motive, mere
relationship of witnesses to the victim does not discredit their testimony. 26
Coming now to the criminal responsibility of appellants. In the present case, when
Hermogenes Flora first fired his gun at Ireneo, but missed, and hit Emerita Roma and
Flor Espinas instead, he became liable for Emerita's death and Flor's injuries.
Hermogenes cannot escape culpability on the basis of aberratio ictus  principle.
Criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony, although the wrongful
act be different from that which he intended. 27
We find that the death of Emerita and of Ireneo were attended by treachery. In order
for treachery to exist, two conditions must concur namely: (1) the employment of
means, methods or manner of execution which would ensure the offender's safety
from any defense or retaliatory act on the part of the offended party; and (2) such
means, method or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously chosen by the
offender. 28 When Hermogenes Flora suddenly shot Emerita and Ireneo, both were
helpless to defend themselves. Their deaths were murders, not simply homicides
since the acts were qualified by treachery. Thus, we are compelled to conclude that
appellant Hermogenes Flora is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of double murder for
the deaths of Emerita Roma and Ireneo Gallarte, and guilty of attempted murder of
Flor Espinas.1âwphi1.nêt
Is the other appellant, Edwin Flora, equally guilty as his brother, Hermogenes? For
the murder of Ireneo Gallarte, was there conspiracy between appellants? For
conspiracy to exist, it is not required that there be an agreement for an appreciable
period prior to the occurrence. It is sufficient that at the time of the commission of the
offense, the accused and co-accused had the same purpose and were united in
execution. 29 Even if an accused did not fire a single shot but his conduct indicated
cooperation with his co-accused, as when his armed presence unquestionably gave
encouragement and a sense of security to the latter, his liability is that of a co-
conspirator. 30 To hold an accused guilty as a co-conspirator by reason of conspiracy,
28 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
it must be shown that he had performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of
the conspiracy. 31 Edwin's participation as the co-conspirator of Hermogenes was
correctly appreciated by the trial court, viz.:
Edwin Flora demonstrated not mere passive presence at the scene of the
crime. He stayed beside his brother Hermogenes, right behind the victims
while the dance party drifted late into the night till the early hours of the
morning the following day. All the while, he and his brother gazed ominously
at Ireneo Gallarte, like hawks waiting for their prey. And then Edwin's flick of
that lighted cigarette to the ground signaled Hermogenes to commence
shooting at the hapless victims. If ever Edwin appeared acquiescent during
the carnage, it was because no similar weapon was available for him. And
he fled from the crime scene together with his brother but not after violently
neutralizing any obstacle on their way. While getting away, Edwin grabbed
Rosalie Roma and poked a knife at her neck when the latter hysterically
shouted "si Bodoy, Si Bodoy," in allusion to Hermogenes Flora, whom she
saw as the gunwielder. All told, Edwin, by his conduct, demonstrated unity of
purpose and design with his brother Hermogenes in committing the crimes
charged. He is thus liable as co-conspirator. 32
However, we cannot find Edwin Flora similarly responsible for the death of Emerita
Roma and the injury of Flor Espinas. The evidence only shows conspiracy to kill
Ireneo Gallarte and no one else. For acts done outside the contemplation of the
conspirators only the actual perpetrators are liable. In People v. De la Cerna, 21
SCRA 569, 570 (1967), we held:
. . . And the rule has always been that co-conspirators are liable only for acts
done pursuant to the conspiracy. For other acts done outside the
contemplation of the co-conspirators or which are not the necessary and
logical consequence of the intended crime, only the actual perpetrators are
liable. Here, only Serapio killed (sic) Casiano Cabizares. The latter was not
even going to the aid of his father Rafael but was fleeing away when shot.
To conclude, appellant Edwin Flora is guilty beyond reasonable doubt only of the
murder of Ireneo Gallarte. He has no liability for the death of Emerita Roma nor for
the injuries of Flor Espinas caused by his co-accused Hermogenes Flora.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
(1) Appellants Hermogenes Flora and Edwin Flora are found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the MURDER of Ireneo Gallarte and sentenced
to each suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua  and to pay jointly and
severally the heirs of Ireneo Gallarte in the sum of P50,000.00 as death
indemnity; P14,000.00 compensatory damages for the wake and burial; and
P470,232.00 representing loss of income without any subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
(2) Hermogenes Flora is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
MURDER of Emerita Roma and the ATTEMPTED MURDER of Flor Espinas.
For the MURDER of EMERITA ROMA, Hermogenes Flora is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of Emerita
Roma in the sum of P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P14,000.00 as
expenses for wake and burial, and P619,800.00 for loss of earning capacity,
without any subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. For the
ATTEMPTED MURDER of Flor Espinas, Hermogenes Flora is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment from two (2) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day of  prision correccional  as minimum to ten (10) years of prision
mayor, as maximum, and to pay P15,000.00 to Flor Espinas as indemnity for
her injuries.
(3) Appellant Edwin Flora is ACQUITTED of the murder of Emerita Roma
and the attempted murder of Flor Espinas.
Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 205228               July 15, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff and Appellee,
vs.
ROLLY ADRIANO y SAMSON, LEAN ADRIANO @ DENDEN, ABBA SANTIAGO y
ADRIANO, JOHN DOE AND PETER DOE, Accused,
ROLLY ADRIANO y SAMSON, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is an appeal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 30 May 2011 in CA-
G.R. CR-HC No. 04028, which affirmed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court
dated 7 April 2009, convicting accused-appellant Rolly Adriano y Santos (Adriano) for
the crime of Homicide (Crim. Case No. 13159-07) for the killing of Ofelia Bulanan
(Bulanan) and for the crime of Murder (Crim. Case No. 13160-07) for the killing of
Danilo Cabiedes (Cabiedes) in "People of the Philippines v. Rolly Adriano y Sales."
29 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
Adriano was charged with two (2) counts of Murder. The two (2) sets of Information
read:
Crim. Case No. 13159-07
On or about March 13, 2007, around 8:00 o'clock (sic) in the morning, in Malapit, San
Isidro, Nueva Ecija, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conniving together, with intent to kill, treachery and abuse of superior
strength, willfully shot several times with assorted firearms Ofelia Bulanan, hitting her
on the different parts of her body, resulting in her death to the damage of her heirs.3
Crim. Case No. 13160-07
On or about March 13, 2007, around 8:00 o'clock (sic) in the morning, in Malapit, San
Isidro, Nueva Ecija, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conniving together, with intent to kill, treachery and abuse of superior
strength, willfully shot several times with assorted firearms Danilo Cabiedes, hitting
him on the different parts of his body, resulting in his death to the damage of his
heirs.4
Version of the Prosecution:
On 13 March 2007, at around 8:00 a.m., Police Officer 1 Matthew Garabiles (POI
Garabiles) and P02 Alejandro Santos (P02 Santos), in civilian clothes, were on their
way to Camp Olivas, Pampanga, riding a motorcycle along Olongapo-Gapan National
Road.5
While they were at Barangay Malapit San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, a speeding blue Toyota
Corolla (Corolla) with plate no. WHK 635, heading towards the same direction,
overtook them and the car in front of them, a maroon Honda CRV (CRY) with plate
no. CTL 957.6
When the Corolla reached alongside the CRV, the passenger on the front seat of the
Corolla shot the CRV and caused the CRV to swerve and fall in the canal in the road
embankment. Four (4) armed men then suddenly alighted the Corolla and started
shooting at the driver of the CRV, who was later identified as Cabiedes. During the
shooting, a bystander, Bulanan, who was standing near the road embankment, was
hit by a stray bullet. The four armed men hurried back to the Corolla and immediately
left the crime scene. PO 1 Garabiles and P02 Santos followed the Corolla but lost
track of the latter.7
Later, both Cabiedes and Bulanan died from fatal gunshot wounds: Cabiedes was
pronounced dead on arrival (DOA) at the Good Samaritan General Hospital due to
three (3) gunshot wounds on the left side of his chest while Bulanan died on the spot
after being shot in the head.
During the investigation, the police learned that the Corolla was registered under the
name of Antonio V. Rivera (Rivera). Upon inquiry, Rivera admitted that he is the
owner of the Corolla but clarified that the Corolla is one of the several cars he owns in
his car rental business, which he leased to Adriano. Later that day, Adriano arrived at
Rivera's shop with the Corolla, where he was identified by P02 Santos and PO 1
Garabiles as one of the four assailants who alighted from the passenger's seat beside
the driver of the Corolla and shot Cabiedes. He was immediately arrested and
brought to the Provincial Special Operations Group (PSOG) headquarters in
Cabanatuan City.8
In examining the crime scene, the Nueva Ecija Provincial Crime Laboratory Office
recovered one (1) deformed fired bullet from a .45 caliber firearm and five (5)
cartridges from a .45 caliber firearm.9
Version of the Defense
Adriano testified that on 13 March 2007, at about 6:00 a.m., at the time of the
incident, he was at his house in Dolores, Magalang, Pampanga, washing the clothes
of his child. After doing the laundry, he took his motorcycle to a repair shop and left it
there.10
At about 8:00 a.m., Adriano went to the house of his friend, Ruben Mallari (Mallari), to
ask for a lighter spring needed to repair his motorcycle. After having coffee in Mallari'
s house, Adriano went home and brought his child to his mother. On his way to his
mother's house, he met his brother-in-law, Felix Aguilar Sunga (Sunga). After leaving
his child at his mother's house, Adriano went to the cockpit arena to watch cockfights,
where he saw his friend, Danilo Dizon (Dizon). After the fights, he left the cockpit at
about 2:00 p.m. and went home and took a rest.11
After resting, Adriano picked-up his motorcycle and proceeded to a store and stayed
there. At around 5 :00 p.m., he went back home. After a while, he received a call from
a certain Boyet Garcia (Garcia), who borrowed the Corolla from him, which he rented
from Rivera.12
At 8:00 p.m., he met with Garcia to get the Corolla back. After dropping Garcia off,
Adriano went to Rivera to return the Corolla, where he was arrested by police officers,
thrown inside the Corolla's trunk, and brought to a place where he was tortured.13
The other defense's witnesses, Lucita Tapnio (Tapnio), Mallari, Sunga, and Dizon
corroborated Adriano's testimony.14
When arraigned, Adriano pleaded not guilty. The other accused, Lean Adriano alias
"Denden," Abba Santiago y Adriano, John Doe, and Peter Doe remained at large.
30 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
During trial, the prosecution presented eight (8) witnesses: (1) PO1 Garabiles, (2) P02
Santos, (3) Police Senior Inspector Roger V. Sebastian, (4) SP02 Alejandro Eduardo,
(5) P02 Jay Cabrera, (6) P03 Antonio dela Cruz, (7) Adelaida Cabiedes, widow of
Cabiedes, and (8) Ricky Flores.
On the other hand, the defense presented Adriano, Tapnio, Sunga, Mallari, and Dizon
as witnesses.
Ruling of the Lower Courts
After trial, the RTC convicted Adriano. The RTC rejected Adriano's defense of alibi on
the ground that it was not supported by clear and convincing evidence. According to
the RTC, Adriano's alibi cannot prevail over the testimonies of credible witnesses,
who positively identified Adriano as one of the perpetrators of the crime. Also,
contrary to the allegations of the defense, the RTC gave full credence to the
testimony of prosecution witnesses, POI Garabiles and P02 Santos. The RTC
determined that the defense failed to show proof that will show or indicate that PO1
Garabiles and P02 Santos were impelled by improper motives to testify against
Adriano. The RTC found as proven the assessment of damages against the accused.
Thus did the RTC order Adriano to pay the heirs of Cabiedes the amount of
₱222,482.00 based on the following: (1) One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(Pl00,000.00) as funeral expenses; (2) Sixty Thousand Pesos (₱60,000.00) as
expenses for the food served during the burial; (3) Twelve Thousand Four Hundred
Eighty Two Pesos (1!12,482.00) as groceries used and served during the wake; and
Sixty Thousand Pesos (₱60,000.00) for the parts and service repair of the CRV.15
The dispositive portion of the R TC Decision dated 7 April 2009 reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accused ROLLY ADRIANO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Murder, as charged, for the death of Danilo Cabiedes, there being no aggravating or
mitigating circumstance that attended the commission of the crime, he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused Rolly Adriano is also
ordered to indemnify the heirs of Danilo Cabiedes in the amount of Php 50,000.00
and to pay the sum of Php 222,482.00 as actual damages.
And finding ROLLY ADRIANO also guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide, as
charged, for the death of Ofelia Bulanan, likewise, there being no aggravating or
mitigating circumstance that attended the commission of the offense, he is further
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Eight (8) years
and One (1) day of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) years and
Four (4) months of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum, and to indemnify the
heirs of Ofelia Bulanan in the amount of Php 50,000.00.16
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Adriano alleged that the R TC erred when it failed
to appreciate his defense of alibi, as well as the testimonies of the other defense's
witnesses. Adriano contended that the RTC erred when it gave credence to the
testimony of the prosecution witnesses which are inconsistent and contradictory. In
detail, Adriano referred to the following particulars: 1) whether the culprits started
shooting when the victim's vehicle was still in motion; 2) which side of the vehicle did
the shooters alight from; 3) the identity of the culprit who triggered the fatal shot; 4)
whether the trip of PO1 Garabiles and P02 Santos going to Camp Olivas, Pampanga
was official business; 5) the precise distance of the assailants' vehicle from that of the
two (2) eyewitnesses; and 6) the precise minutes of the shooting incident.
The Court of Appeals rejected Adriano's attempt to becloud the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses. According to the Court of Appeals, the prosecution witnesses'
positive identification of Adriano as one of the perpetrators of the crime cannot be
overcome by minor inconsistencies in their testimony. The Court of Appeals ruled that
these trivial differences in fact constitute signs of veracity.
On the defense of alibi, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the R TC that
Adriano's claim that he was in Dolores, Magalang, Pampanga at the time of the
incident does not convince because it was not impossible for Adriano to be physically
present at the crime scene, in Barangay Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, which can
be reached by car in less than an hour.17 The dispositive portion of the Court of
Appeals Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Gapan City, Nueva Ecija, Br. 36, in Crim. Case Nos. 13159-07 and 13160-07 is
AFFIRMED subject to the Modification that the award of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(Php50,000.00) as civil indemnity to the heirs of Danilo Cabiedes is INCREASED to
Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (Php75,000.00). In addition, the Accused-Appellant is
ORDERED to pay the heirs of Danilo Cabiedes the amount of Seventy-Five
Thousand Pesos (Php75,000.00) as moral damages; and the heirs of Ofelia Bulanan
the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00) as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.18
Our Ruling
In cases of murder, the prosecution must establish the presence of the following
elements:
1. That a person was killed.
2. That the accused killed him.
3. That the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances
mentioned in Art. 248.
31 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
 4. The killing is not parricide or infanticide.
In the case at bar, the prosecution has established the concurrence of the elements
of murder: (1) the fact of death of Cabiedes and Bulanan; (2) the positive identification
of Adriano as one of perpetrators of the crime; and (3) the attendance of treachery as
a qualifying aggravating circumstance and use of firearms and abuse of superior
strength as generic aggravating circumstances.
Death of Cabiedes
The present case is a case of murder by ambush. In ambush, the crime is carried out
to ensure that the victim is killed and at the same time, to eliminate any risk from any
possible defenses or retaliation from the victim—19 ambush exemplifies the nature of
treachery.
Paragraph 16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) defines treachery as the
direct employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime against
persons which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the
offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. In order for
treachery to be properly appreciated, two elements must be present: (1) at the time of
the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the accused
consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods or forms of
attack employed by him.20 The "essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected
attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance
to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission without risk of himself."21
Clearly, treachery is present in the case at bar as the victims were indeed
defenseless at the time of the attack. Adriano, together with the other accused,
ambushed Cabiedes by following the unsuspecting victim along the national highway
and by surprise, fired multiple shots at Cabiedes and then immediately fled the crime
scene, causing Cabiedes to die of multiple gunshot wounds. When the Corolla
swerved into the CRV's lane, Cabiedes was forced to swiftly turn to the right and on to
the road embankment, finally falling into the canal where his CRY was trapped,
precluding all possible means of defense. There is no other logical conclusion, but
that the orchestrated ambush committed by Adriano, together with his co-accused,
who are still on the loose, was in conspiracy with each other to ensure the death of
Cabiedes and their safety. The means of execution employed was deliberately and
consciously adopted by Adriano so as to give Cabiedes no opportunity to defend
himself or to retaliate.22
All these circumstances indicate that the orchestrated crime was committed with the
presence of the aggravating circumstances of treachery, which absorbs the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, and use of firearms. Indeed,
Cabiedes had no way of escaping or defending himself.
Death of Bulanan
We refer back to the settled facts of the case. Bulanan, who was merely a bystander,
was killed by a stray bullet. He was at the wrong place at the wrong time.
Stray bullets, obviously, kill indiscriminately and often without warning, precluding the
unknowing victim from repelling the attack or defending himself. At the outset, Adriano
had no intention to kill Bulanan, much less, employ any particular means of attack.
Logically, Bulanan's death was random and unintentional and the method used to kill
her, as she was killed by a stray a bullet, was, by no means, deliberate. Nonetheless,
Adriano is guilty of the death of Bulanan under Article 4 of the Revised Penal
Code,23 pursuant to the doctrine of aberratio ictus, which imposes criminal liability for
the acts committed in violation of law and for all the natural and logical consequences
resulting therefrom. While it may not have been Adriano's intention to shoot Bulanan,
this fact will not exculpate him. Bulanan' s death caused by the bullet fired by Adriano
was the natural and direct consequence of Adriano's felonious deadly assault against
Cabiedes.
As we already held in People v. Herrera 24 citing People v. Hilario,25 "[t]he fact that
accused killed a person other than their intended victim is of no moment." Evidently,
Adriano's original intent was to kill Cabiedes. However, during the commission of the
crime of murder, a stray bullet hit and killed Bulanan. Adriano is responsible for the
consequences of his act of shooting Cabiedes. This is the import of Article 4 of the
Revised Penal Code. As held in People v. Herrera citing People v. Ural:
Criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful
act be different from that which is intended. One who commits an intentional felony is
responsible for all the consequences which may naturally or logically result therefrom,
whether foreseen or intended or not. The rationale of the rule is found in the doctrine,
'el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado ', or he who is the cause of
the cause is the cause of the evil caused.26
As regards the crime(s) committed, we reiterate our ruling in People v. Nelmida. 27 In
the aforesaid case, we ruled that accused-appellants should be convicted not of a
complex crime but of separate crimes of two counts of murder and seven counts of
attempted murder as the killing and wounding of the victims were not the result of a
single act but of several acts.28 The doctrine in Nelmida here is apt and applicable.
In Nelmida, we distinguished the two kinds of complex crime: compound crime, when
a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, and complex crime
proper, when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. Moreover,
we also made a distinction that "when various victims expire from separate shots,
such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes,"29 not a complex crime.
32 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
As borne by the records, the Nueva Ecija Provincial Crime Laboratory Office
recovered six (6) cartridges of bullets from a .45 caliber firearm. This does not
indicate discharge by a single burst. Rather, separate shots are evidenced. One or
more of which, though fired to kill Cabiedes, killed Bulanan instead. There is thus no
complex crime. The felonious acts resulted in two separate and distinct crimes.
Finally, we ask, may treachery be appreciated in aberratio ictus?
Although Bulanan's death was by no means deliberate, we shall adhere to the
prevailing jurisprudence pronounced in People v. Flora,30 where the Court ruled that
treachery may be appreciated in aberratio ictus. In Flora, the accused was convicted
of two separate counts of murder: for the killing of two victims, Emerita, the intended
victim, and Ireneo, the victim killed by a stray bullet. The Court, due to the presence of
the aggravating circumstance of treachery, qualified both killings to murder. The
material facts in Flora are similar in the case at bar. Thus, we follow the Flora
doctrine.
Also, contrary to the defense's allegation that Bulanan' s death was not established, a
perusal of the records would reveal that Bulanan's fact of death was duly established
as the prosecution offered in evidence Bulanan's death certificate.31
On the alibi as defense, time and again, we have ruled alibis like denials, are
inherently weak and unreliable because they can easily be fabricated. 32 For alibi to
prosper, the accused must convincingly prove that he was somewhere else at the
time when the crime was committed and that it was physically impossible for him to
be at the crime scene.33 In the case at bar, Adriano claimed he was in Dolores,
Magalang, Pampanga at the time of incident. Adriano's claim failed to persuade. As
admitted, Dolores, Magalang, Pampanga was only less than an hour away from the
crime scene, Barangay Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija. Hence, it was not physically
impossible for Adriano to be at the crime scene at the time of the incident.
It is likewise uniform holding that denial and alibi will not prevail when corroborated
not by credible witnesses but by the accused's relatives and
friends.1âwphi1 Therefore, the defense's evidence which is composed of Adriano's
relatives and friends cannot prevail over the prosecution's positive identification of
Adriano as one of the perpetrators of the crime.
The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion
perpetua to death. In the case at bar, as the circumstance of abuse of superior
strength concurs with treachery, the former is absorbed in the latter. There being no
aggravating or mitigating circumstance present, the lower penalty should be imposed,
which is reclusion perpetua, in accordance with Article 63, paragraph 2 of the Revised
Penal Code.
To recover actual or compensatory damages, basic is the rule that the claimant must
establish with a reasonable degree of certainty, the actual amount of loss by means
of competent proof or the best evidence obtainable.34 Documentary evidence support
the award of actual damages in this case. The RTC computed the amount of actual
damages as ₱222,482.00. However, a perusal of the records reveals that the amount
of award of actual damages should be ₱232,482.00 as duly supported by official
receipts.35 Therefore, we hereby increase the award of actual damages from
₱222,482.00 to ₱232,482.00.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04028 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
Appellant-appellant ROLL Y ADRIANO y SAMSON is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of MURDER (Criminal Case No. 13160-07) for the killing of
DANILO CABIEDES and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Accused-appellant ROLLY ADRIANO y SAMSON is ordered to pay the
heirs of DANILO CABIEDES the amount of Seventy Five Thousand Pesos
(₱75,000.00) as civil indemnity, Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00) as moral
damages, Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00) as exemplary damages, and Two
Hundred Thirty Two Thousand Four Hundred Eighty Two Pesos {₱232,482.00) as
actual damages.
Accused-appellant ROLLY ADRIANO y SAMSON is also found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER (Criminal Case No. 13159-07) for the
killing of OFELIA BULANAN and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant ROLLY ADRIANO y SAMSON is ordered to
pay the heirs of OFELIA BULANAN in the amount of the amount of Seventy Five
Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00) as civil indemnity, Seventy Five Thousand Pesos
(₱75,000.00) as moral damages, Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00) as exemplary
damages, and Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (₱25,000.00) as temperate damages in
lieu of actual damages.
All monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of 6o/o per annum from the date of
finality until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 177218               October 3, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
NOEL T. SALES, Appellant.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
33 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
A father ought to discipline his children for committing a misdeed. However, he may
not employ sadistic beatings and inflict fatal injuries under the guise of disciplining
them.
This appeal seeks the reversal of the December 4, 2006 Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01627 that affirmed the August 3, 2005 Joint
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 63 of Calabanga, Camarines Sur
in Criminal Case Nos. RTC’03-782 and RTC’03-789, convicting appellant Noel T.
Sales (appellant) of the crimes of parricide and slight physical injuries, respectively.
The Information3 for parricide contained the following allegations:
That on or about the 20th day of September, 2002, at around or past 8:00 o’clock in
the evening at Brgy. San Vicente, Tinambac, Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with evident
premeditation and [in] a fit of anger, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously hit [several] times, the different parts of the body of his legitimate eldest
son, Noemar Sales, a 9-year old minor, with a [piece of] wood, measuring more or
less one meter in length and one [and] a half inches in diameter, [thereby] inflicting
upon the latter mortal wounds, which cause[d] the death of the said victim, to the
damage and prejudice of the latter’s heirs in such amount as may be proven in court.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On the other hand, the Information5 in Criminal Case No. RTC’03-789 alleges that
appellant inflicted slight physical injuries in the following manner:
That on or about the 20th day of September, 2002, at around or past 8:00 o’clock in
the evening, at Brgy. San Vicente, Tinambac, Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named [accused] assault[ed] and
hit with a piece of wood, one Noel Sales, Jr., an 8-year old minor, his second
legitimate son, thereby inflicting upon him physical injuries which have required
medical attendance for a period of five (5) days to the damage and prejudice of the
victim’s heirs in such amount as may be proven in court.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.6
When arraigned on April 11, 2003 and July 1, 2003, appellant pleaded not guilty for
the charges of parricide7 and slight physical injuries8 respectively. The cases were
then consolidated upon manifestation of the prosecution which was not objected to by
the defense.9 During the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed to stipulate that
appellant is the father of the victims, Noemar Sales (Noemar) and Noel Sales, Jr.
(Junior); that at the time of the incident, appellant’s family was living in the conjugal
home located in Barangay San Vicente, Tinambac, Camarines Sur; and, that
appellant voluntarily surrendered to the police.10
Thereafter, trial ensued.
The Version of the Prosecution
On September 19, 2002, brothers Noemar and Junior, then nine and eight years old,
respectively, left their home to attend the fluvial procession of Our Lady of
Peñafrancia without the permission of their parents. They did not return home that
night. When their mother, Maria Litan Sales (Maria), looked for them the next day, she
found them in the nearby Barangay of Magsaysay. Afraid of their father’s rage,
Noemar and Junior initially refused to return home but their mother prevailed upon
them. When the two kids reached home at around 8 o’clock in the evening of
September 20, 2002, a furious appellant confronted them. Appellant then whipped
them with a stick which was later broken so that he brought his kids outside their
house. With Noemar’s and Junior’s hands and feet tied to a coconut tree, appellant
continued beating them with a thick piece of wood. During the beating Maria stayed
inside the house and did not do anything as she feared for her life.
When the beating finally stopped, the three walked back to the house with appellant
assisting Noemar as the latter was staggering, while Junior fearfully followed. Maria
noticed a crack in Noemar’s head and injuries in his legs. She also saw injuries in the
right portion of the head, the left cheek, and legs of Junior. Shortly thereafter, Noemar
collapsed and lost consciousness. Maria tried to revive him and when Noemar
remained motionless despite her efforts, she told appellant that their son was already
dead. However, appellant refused to believe her. Maria then told appellant to call a
quack doctor. He left and returned with one, who told them that they have to bring
Noemar to a hospital. Appellant thus proceeded to take the unconscious Noemar to
the junction and waited for a vehicle to take them to a hospital. As there was no
vehicle and because another quack doctor they met at the junction told them that
Noemar is already dead, appellant brought his son back to their house.
Noemar’s wake lasted only for a night and he was immediately buried the following
day. His body was never examined by a doctor.
The Version of the Defense
Prior to the incident, Noemar and Junior had already left their residence on three
separate occasions without the permission of their parents. Each time, appellant
merely scolded them and told them not to repeat the misdeed since something
untoward might happen to them. During those times, Noemar and Junior were never
physically harmed by their father.
However, Noemar and Junior again left their home without their parents’ permission
on September 16, 2002 and failed to return for several days. Worse, appellant
received information that his sons stole a pedicab. As they are broke, appellant had to
borrow money so that his wife could search for Noemar and Junior. When his sons
34 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
finally arrived home at 8 o’clock in the evening of September 20, 2002, appellant
scolded and hit them with a piece of wood as thick as his index finger. He hit Noemar
and Junior simultaneously since they were side by side. After whipping his sons in
their buttocks three times, he noticed that Noemar was chilling and frothing. When
Noemar lost consciousness, appellant decided to bring him to a hospital in Naga City
by waiting for a vehicle at the crossroad which was seven kilometers away from their
house.
Appellant held Noemar while on their way to the crossroad and observed his difficulty
in breathing. The pupils of Noemar’s eyes were also moving up and down. Appellant
heard him say that he wanted to sleep and saw him pointing to his chest in pain.
However, they waited in vain since a vehicle never came. It was then that Noemar
died. Appellant thus decided to just bring Noemar back to their house.
Appellant denied that his son died from his beating since no parent could kill his or
her child. He claimed that Noemar died as a result of difficulty in breathing. In fact, he
never complained of the whipping done to him. Besides, appellant recalled that
Noemar was brought to a hospital more than a year before September 2002 and
diagnosed with having a weak heart.
On the other hand, Maria testified that Noemar suffered from epilepsy. Whenever he
suffers from epileptic seizures, Noemar froths and passes out. But he would regain
consciousness after 15 minutes. His seizures normally occur whenever he gets
hungry or when scolded.
The death of Noemar was reported to the police by the barangay
captain.11 Thereafter, appellant surrendered voluntarily.12
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
13
In a Joint Decision,  the trial court held that the evidence presented by the
prosecution was sufficient to prove that appellant was guilty of committing the crimes
of parricide and slight physical injuries in the manner described in the Informations. In
the crime of parricide, the trial court did not consider the aggravating circumstance of
evident premeditation against appellant since there is no proof that he planned to kill
Noemar. But the trial court appreciated in his favor the mitigating circumstances of
voluntary surrender and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong. The dispositive
portion of said Joint Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the prosecution having proven the guilt of
Noel Sales, beyond reasonable doubt, he is found guilty of parricide in Crim. Case
No. RTC’03-782 and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is
likewise ordered to pay the heirs of Noemar Sales, the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil
indemnity; ₱50,000.00 as moral damages; ₱25,000,00 as exemplary damages and to
pay the costs.
Furthermore, accused Noel Sales is also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of slight physical injuries in Crim. Case No. RTC’03-789 and sentenced to
suffer the penalty of twenty (20) days of Arresto Menor in its medium period.
Accused Noel Sales is likewise meted the accessory penalties as provided under the
Revised Penal Code. Considering that herein accused has undergone preventive
imprisonment, he shall be credited in the service of his sentence with the time he has
undergone preventive imprisonment in accordance with and subject to the conditions
provided for in Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.14
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal15 which was given due course in an Order16 dated
September 21, 2005.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
However, the appellate court denied the appeal and affirmed the ruling of the trial
court. The dispositive portion of its Decision17 reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed decision
dated August 3, 2005 in Criminal Case Nos. RTC’03-782 and RTC’03-789 for
Parricide and Slight Physical Injuries, respectively, is AFFIRMED.
Pursuant to Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
appellant may appeal this case to the Supreme Court via a Notice of Appeal filed
before this Court.
SO ORDERED.18
Issues
Hence, appellant is now before this Court with the following two-fold issues:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT TO THE
TESTIMONIES OF THE DEFENSE WITNESSES.19
35 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
Our Ruling
The appeal is without merit.
The Charge of Parricide
Appellant admits beating his sons on September 20, 2002 as a disciplinary measure,
but denies battering Noemar to death. He believes that no father could kill his own
son. According to him, Noemar had a weak heart that resulted in attacks consisting of
loss of consciousness and froth in his mouth. He claims that Noemar was conscious
as they traveled to the junction where they would take a vehicle in going to a hospital.
However, Noemar had difficulty in breathing and complained of chest pain. He
contends that it was at this moment that Noemar died, not during his whipping. To
substantiate his claim, appellant presented his wife, Maria, who testified that Noemar
indeed suffered seizures, but this was due to epilepsy.
The contentions of appellant fail to persuade. The imposition of parental discipline on
children of tender years must always be with the view of correcting their erroneous
behavior. A parent or guardian must exercise restraint and caution in administering
the proper punishment. They must not exceed the parameters of their parental duty to
discipline their minor children. It is incumbent upon them to remain rational and refrain
from being motivated by anger in enforcing the intended punishment. A deviation will
undoubtedly result in sadism.
Prior to whipping his sons, appellant was already furious with them because they left
the family dwelling without permission and that was already preceded by three other
similar incidents. This was further aggravated by a report that his sons stole a pedicab
thereby putting him in disgrace. Moreover, they have no money so much so that he
still had to borrow so that his wife could look for the children and bring them home.
From these, it is therefore clear that appellant was motivated not by an honest desire
to discipline the children for their misdeeds but by an evil intent of venting his anger.
This can reasonably be concluded from the injuries of Noemar in his head, face and
legs. It was only when Noemar’s body slipped from the coconut tree to which he was
tied and lost consciousness that appellant stopped the beating. Had not Noemar lost
consciousness, appellant would most likely not have ceased from his sadistic act. His
subsequent attempt to seek medical attention for Noemar as an act of repentance
was nevertheless too late to save the child’s life. It bears stressing that a decent and
responsible parent would never subject a minor child to sadistic punishment in the
guise of discipline.
Appellant attempts to evade criminal culpability by arguing that he merely intended to
discipline Noemar and not to kill him. However, the relevant portion of Article 4 of the
Revised Penal Code states:
Art. 4. Criminal liability. – Criminal liability shall be incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended.
xxxx
In order that a person may be criminally liable for a felony different from that which he
intended to commit, it is indispensible (a) that a felony was committed and (b) that the
wrong done to the aggrieved person be the direct consequence of the crime
committed by the perpetrator.20 Here, there is no doubt appellant in beating his son
Noemar and inflicting upon him physical injuries, committed a felony. As a direct
consequence of the beating suffered by the child, he expired. Appellant’s criminal
liability for the death of his son, Noemar, is thus clear.
Appellant’s claim that it was Noemar’s heart ailment that caused his death deserves
no merit. This declaration is self-serving and uncorroborated since it is not
substantiated by evidence. While Dr. Salvador Betito, a Municipal Health Officer of
Tinambac, Camarines Sur issued a death certificate indicating that Noemar died due
to cardio-pulmonary arrest, the same is not sufficient to prove that his death was due
mainly to his poor health. It is worth emphasizing that Noemar’s cadaver was never
examined. Also, even if appellant presented his wife, Maria, to lend credence to his
contention, the latter’s testimony did not help as same was even in conflict with his
testimony. Appellant testified that Noemar suffered from a weak heart which resulted
in his death while Maria declared that Noemar was suffering from epilepsy.
Interestingly, Maria’s testimony was also unsubstantiated by evidence.
Moreover, as will be discussed below, all the elements of the crime of parricide are
present in this case.
All the Elements of Parricide are present in the case at bench.
We find no error in the ruling of the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court, that
appellant committed the crime of parricide.
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code defines parricide as follows:
Art. 246. Parricide. – Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse,
shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death.
"Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the
accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate
spouse of accused."21
36 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
In the case at bench, there is overwhelming evidence to prove the first element, that
is, a person was killed. Maria testified that her son Noemar did not regain
consciousness after the severe beating he suffered from the hands of his father.
Thereafter, a quack doctor declared Noemar dead. Afterwards, as testified to by
Maria, they held a wake for Noemar the next day and then buried him the day after.
Noemar’s Death Certificate22 was also presented in evidence.
There is likewise no doubt as to the existence of the second element that the
appellant killed the deceased. Same is sufficiently established by the positive
testimonies of Maria and Junior. Maria testified that on September 20, 2002, Noemar
and his younger brother, Junior, were whipped by appellant, their father, inside their
house. The whipping continued even outside the house but this time, the brothers
were tied side by side to a coconut tree while appellant delivered the lashes
indiscriminately. For his part, Junior testified that Noemar, while tied to a tree, was
beaten by their father in the head. Because the savagery of the attack was too much
for Noemar’s frail body to endure, he lost consciousness and died from his injuries
immediately after the incident.
As to the third element, appellant himself admitted that the deceased is his child.
While Noemar’s birth certificate was not presented, oral evidence of filial relationship
may be considered.23 As earlier stated, appellant stipulated to the fact that he is the
father of Noemar during the pre-trial conference and likewise made the same
declaration while under oath.24 Maria also testified that Noemar and Junior are her
sons with appellant, her husband. These testimonies are sufficient to establish the
relationship between appellant and Noemar.
Clearly, all the elements of the crime of parricide are obtaining in this case.
There is Mitigating Circumstance of Voluntary Surrender but not Lack of Intention to
Commit so Grave a Wrong
The trial court correctly appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender in favor of appellant since the evidence shows that he went to the police
station a day after the barangay captain reported the death of Noemar. The
presentation by appellant of himself to the police officer on duty in a spontaneous
manner is a manifestation of his intent "to save the authorities the trouble and
expense that may be incurred for his search and capture"25 which is the essence of
voluntary surrender.
However, there was error in appreciating the mitigating circumstance of lack of
intention to commit so grave a wrong. Appellant adopted means to ensure the
success of the savage battering of his sons. He tied their wrists to a coconut tree to
prevent their escape while they were battered with a stick to inflict as much pain as
possible. Noemar suffered injuries in his face, head and legs that immediately caused
his death. "The mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong
as that actually perpetrated cannot be appreciated where the acts employed by the
accused were reasonably sufficient to produce and did actually produce the death of
the victim."26
The Award of Damages and Penalty for Parricide
We find proper the trial court’s award to the heirs of Noemar of the sums of
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages. However, the
award of exemplary damages of ₱25,000.00 should be increased to ₱30,000.00 in
accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.27 "In addition, and in conformity with current
policy, we also impose on all the monetary awards for damages an interest at the
legal rate of 6% from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid."28
As regards the penalty, parricide is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The
trial court imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua when it considered the presence
of the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and lack of intent to commit so
grave a wrong. However, even if we earlier ruled that the trial court erred in
considering the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong,
we maintain the penalty imposed. This is because the exclusion of said mitigating
circumstance does not result to a different penalty since the presence of only one
mitigating circumstance, which is, voluntary surrender, with no aggravating
circumstance, is sufficient for the imposition of reclusion perpetua as the proper
prison term. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides in part as follows:
Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. - x x x
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible
penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
xxxx
3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and
there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
xxxx
The crime of parricide is punishable by the indivisible penalties of reclusion
perpetua to death. With one mitigating circumstance, which is voluntary surrender,
and no aggravating circumstance, the imposition of the lesser penalty of reclusion
perpetua and not the penalty of death on appellant was thus proper.29
The Charge of Slight Physical Injuries
The victim himself, Junior testified that he, together with his brother Noemar, were
beaten by their father, herein appellant, while they were tied to a coconut tree. He
37 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
recalled to have been hit on his right eye and right leg and to have been examined by
a physician thereafter.30 Maria corroborated her son’s testimony.31
Junior’s testimony was likewise supported by Dr. Ursolino Primavera, Jr. (Dr.
Primavera) of Tinambac Community Hospital who examined him for physical injuries.
He issued a Medical Certificate for his findings and testified on the same. His findings
were (1) muscular contusions with hematoma on the right side of Junior’s face just
below the eye and on both legs, which could have been caused by hitting said area
with a hard object such as a wooden stick and, (2) abrasions of brownish color circling
both wrist with crust formation which could have been sustained by the patient due to
struggling while his hands were tied. When asked how long does he think the injuries
would heal, Dr. Primavera answered one to two weeks. 32 But if applied with
medication, the injuries would heal in a week.33
We give full faith and credence to the categorical and positive testimony of Junior that
he was beaten by his father and that by reason thereof he sustained injuries. His
testimony deserves credence especially since the same is corroborated by the
testimony of his mother, Maria, and supported by medical examination. We thus find
that the RTC correctly held appellant guilty of the crime of slight physical
injuries.1awphil
Penalty for Slight Physical Injuries
We likewise affirm the penalty imposed by the RTC. Dr. Primavera testified that the
injuries sustained by Junior should heal in one week upon medication. Hence, the trial
court correctly meted upon appellant the penalty under paragraph 1, Article 266 of the
Revised Penal Code which provides:
ART. 266. Slight Physical Injuries and maltreatment. –  The crime of slight physical
injuries shall be punished:
1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall
incapacitate the offended party for labor from one to nine days or shall require
medical attendance during the same period.
xxxx
There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance present in the commission of
the crime, the penalty shall be in its medium period. The RTC was thus correct in
imposing upon appellant the penalty of twenty (20) days of arresto menor  in its
medium period.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01627 that affirmed the Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 63 of Calabanga, Camarines Sur in Criminal Case Nos. RTC’03-782 and
RTC’03-789, convicting Noel T. Sales of the crimes of parricide and slight physical
injuries is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that the award of exemplary damages is
increased to ₱30,000.00. In addition, an interest of 6% is imposed on all monetary
awards from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992
SULPICIO INTOD, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
CAMPOS, JR., J.:
Petitioner, Sulpicio Intod, filed this petition for review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals 1 affirming in toto the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIV,
Oroquieta City, finding him guilty of the crime of attempted murder.
From the records, we gathered the following facts.
In the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio
and Avelino Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena,
Misamis Occidental and asked him to go with them to the house of Bernardina
Palangpangan. Thereafter, Mandaya and Intod, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig had a
meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan. He told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to
be killed because of a land dispute between them and that Mandaya should
accompany the four (4) men, otherwise, he would also be killed.
At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Petitioner, Mandaya,
Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig, all armed with firearms, arrived at Palangpangan's
house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental. At the instance of his
companions, Mandaya pointed the location of Palangpangan's bedroom. Thereafter,
Petitioner, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired at said room. It turned out, however,
that Palangpangan was in another City and her home was then occupied by her son-
in-law and his family. No one was in the room when the accused fired the shots. No
one was hit by the gun fire.
Petitioner and his companions were positively identified by witnesses. One witness
testified that before the five men left the premises, they shouted: "We will kill you (the
witness) and especially Bernardina Palangpangan and we will come back if (sic) you
were not injured". 2
38 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of attempted murder. The court
(RTC), as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, holding that Petitioner was guilty of
attempted murder. Petitioner seeks from this Court a modification of the judgment by
holding him liable only for an impossible crime, citing Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal
Code which provides:
Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. — Criminal Responsibility
shall be incurred:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense
against persons or property, were it not for the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the
employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.
Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the
night he and his companions riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently
impossible.
On the other hand, Respondent People of the Philippines argues that the crime was
not impossible. Instead, the facts were sufficient to constitute an attempt and to
convict Intod for attempted murder. Respondent alleged that there was intent.
Further, in its Comment to the Petition, respondent pointed out that:
. . . The crime of murder was not consummated, not because of the
inherent impossibility of its accomplishment (Art. 4(2), Revised
Penal Code), but due to a cause or accident other than petitioner's
and his accused's own spontaneous desistance (Art. 3., Ibid.)
Palangpangan did not sleep at her house at that time. Had it not
been for this fact, the crime is possible, not impossible. 3
Article 4, paragraph 2 is an innovation 4 of the Revised Penal Code. This seeks to
remedy the void in the Old Penal Code where:
. . . it was necessary that the execution of the act has been
commenced, that the person conceiving the idea should have set
about doing the deed, employing appropriate means in order that
his intent might become a reality, and finally, that the result or end
contemplated shall have been physically possible. So long as these
conditions were not present, the law and the courts did not hold him
criminally liable. 5
This legal doctrine left social interests entirely unprotected. 6 The Revised Penal
Code, inspired by the Positivist School, recognizes in the offender his
formidability, 7 and now penalizes an act which were it not aimed at something quite
impossible or carried out with means which prove inadequate, would constitute a
felony against person or against property. 8 The rationale of Article 4(2) is to punish
such criminal tendencies. 9
Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense
against person or property because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently
impossible of accomplishment: or (2) the means employed is either (a) inadequate or
(b) ineffectual. 10
That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is
inherently impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be impossible
under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one
impossible of accomplishment. 11 There must be either impossibility of accomplishing
the intended act 12 in order to qualify the act an impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not
amount to a crime. 13 Thus:
Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1)
the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation
of the law; (2) there is intention to perform the physical act; (3) there
is a performance of the intended physical act; and (4) the
consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a
crime. 14
The impossibility of killing a person already dead 15 falls in this category.
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances
unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended
crime. 16 One example is the man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another
with the intention to steal the latter's wallet and finds the pocket empty. 17
The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he
thought his victim would be, although in reality, the victim was not present in said
place and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his end.
One American case had facts almost exactly the same as this one. In People vs. Lee
Kong, 18 the accused, with intent to kill, aimed and fired at the spot where he thought
the police officer would be. It turned out, however, that the latter was in a different
place. The accused failed to hit him and to achieve his intent. The Court convicted the
accused of an attempt to kill. It held that:
The fact that the officer was not at the spot where the attacking
party imagined where he was, and where the bullet pierced the
39 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
 roof, renders it no less an attempt to kill. It is well settled principle of
criminal law in this country that where the criminal result of an
attempt is not accomplished simply because of an obstruction in the
way of the thing to be operated upon, and these facts are unknown
to the aggressor at the time, the criminal attempt is committed.
In the case of Strokes vs. State, 19 where the accused failed to accomplish his intent
to kill the victim because the latter did not pass by the place where he was lying-in
wait, the court held him liable for attempted murder. The court explained that:
It was no fault of Strokes that the crime was not committed. . . . It
only became impossible by reason of the extraneous circumstance
that Lane did not go that way; and further, that he was arrested and
prevented from committing the murder. This rule of the law has
application only where it is inherently impossible to commit the
crime. It has no application to a case where it becomes impossible
for the crime to be committed, either by outside interference or
because of miscalculation as to a supposed opportunity to commit
the crime which fails to materialize; in short it has no application to
the case when the impossibility grows out of extraneous acts not
within the control of the party.
In the case of Clark vs. State, 20 the court held defendant liable for attempted robbery
even if there was nothing to rob. In disposing of the case, the court quoted Mr. Justice
Bishop, to wit:
It being an accepted truth that defendant deserves punishment by
reason of his criminal intent, no one can seriously doubt that the
protection of the public requires the punishment to be administered,
equally whether in the unseen depths of the pocket, etc., what was
supposed to exist was really present or not. The community suffers
from the mere alarm of crime. Again: Where the thing intended
(attempted) as a crime and what is done is a sort to create alarm, in
other words, excite apprehension that the evil; intention will be
carried out, the incipient act which the law of attempt takes
cognizance of is in reason committed.
In State vs. Mitchell, 21 defendant, with intent to kill, fired at the window of victim's
room thinking that the latter was inside. However, at that moment, the victim was in
another part of the house. The court convicted the accused of attempted murder.
The aforecited cases are the same cases which have been relied upon by
Respondent to make this Court sustain the judgment of attempted murder against
Petitioner. However, we cannot rely upon these decisions to resolve the issue at
hand. There is a difference between the Philippine and the American laws regarding
the concept and appreciation of impossible crimes.
In the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, in Article 4(2), expressly provided for
impossible crimes and made the punishable. Whereas, in the United States, the Code
of Crimes and Criminal Procedure is silent regarding this matter. What it provided for
were attempts of the crimes enumerated in the said Code. Furthermore, in said
jurisdiction, the impossibility of committing the offense is merely a defense to an
attempt charge. In this regard, commentators and the cases generally divide the
impossibility defense into two categories: legal versus factual impossibility. 22 In U.S.
vs.  Wilson 23 the Court held that:
. . . factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a
defense. If the crime could have been committed had the
circumstances been as the defendant believed them to be, it is no
defense that in reality the crime was impossible of commission.
Legal impossibility, on the other hand, is a defense which can be invoked to avoid
criminal liability for an attempt. In U.S. vs. Berrigan, 24 the accused was indicated for
attempting to smuggle letters into and out of prison. The law governing the matter
made the act criminal if done without knowledge and consent of the warden. In this
case, the offender intended to send a letter without the latter's knowledge and
consent and the act was performed. However, unknown to him, the transmittal was
achieved with the warden's knowledge and consent. The lower court held the
accused liable for attempt but the appellate court reversed. It held unacceptable the
contention of the state that "elimination of impossibility as a defense to a charge of
criminal attempt, as suggested by the Model Penal Code and the proposed federal
legislation, is consistent with the overwhelming modern view". In disposing of this
contention, the Court held that the federal statutes did not contain such provision, and
thus, following the principle of legality, no person could be criminally liable for an act
which was not made criminal by law. Further, it said:
Congress has not yet enacted a law that provides that intent plus
act plus conduct constitutes the offense of attempt irrespective of
legal impossibility until such time as such legislative changes in the
law take place, this court will not fashion a new non-statutory law of
criminal attempt.
To restate, in the United States, where the offense sought to be committed is factually
impossible or accomplishment, the offender cannot escape criminal liability. He can
be convicted of an attempt to commit the substantive crime where the elements of
attempt are satisfied. It appears, therefore, that the act is penalized, not as an
impossible crime, but as an attempt to commit a crime. On the other hand, where the
offense is legally impossible of accomplishment, the actor cannot be held liable for
any crime — neither for an attempt not for an impossible crime. The only reason for
this is that in American law, there is no such thing as an impossible crime. Instead, it
only recognizes impossibility as a defense to a crime charge — that is, attempt.
40 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
This is not true in the Philippines. In our jurisdiction, impossible crimes are
recognized. The impossibility of accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely a
defense, but an act penalized by itself. Furthermore, the phrase "inherent
impossibility" that is found in Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code makes no
distinction between factual or physical impossibility and legal impossibility. Ubi lex
non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.
The factual situation in the case at bar present a physical impossibility which rendered
the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of
the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime.
To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense was Attempted Murder
because the absence of Palangpangan was a supervening cause independent of the
actor's will, will render useless the provision in Article 4, which makes a person
criminally liable for an act "which would be an offense against persons or property,
were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment . . ." In that case all
circumstances which prevented the consummation of the offense will be treated as an
accident independent of the actor's will which is an element of attempted and
frustrated felonies.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED. the petition is hereby GRANTED, the
decision of respondent Court of Appeals holding Petitioner guilty of Attempted Murder
is hereby MODIFIED. We hereby hold Petitioner guilty of an impossible crime as
defined and penalized in Articles 4, paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal Code,
respectively. Having in mind the social danger and degree of criminality shown by
Petitioner, this Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto
mayor, together with the accessory penalties provided by the law, and to pay the
costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 162540               July 13, 2009
GEMMA T. JACINTO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari  filed by petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto
seeking the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
23761 dated December 16, 2003, affirming petitioner's conviction of the crime of
Qualified Theft, and its Resolution2 dated March 5, 2004 denying petitioner's motion
for reconsideration.
Petitioner, along with two other women, namely, Anita Busog de Valencia y Rivera
and Jacqueline Capitle, was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Caloocan City, Branch 131, with the crime of Qualified Theft, allegedly committed as
follows:
That on or about and sometime in the month of July 1997, in Kalookan City, Metro
Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring together and mutually helping one another, being then all employees of
MEGA FOAM INTERNATIONAL INC., herein represented by JOSEPH DYHENGCO
Y CO, and as such had free access inside the aforesaid establishment, with grave
abuse of trust and confidence reposed upon them with intent to gain and without the
knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously take, steal and deposited in their own account, Banco De Oro Check
No. 0132649 dated July 14, 1997 in the sum of ₱10,000.00, representing payment
made by customer Baby Aquino to the Mega Foam Int'l. Inc. to the damage and
prejudice of the latter in the aforesaid stated amount of ₱10,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The prosecution's evidence, which both the RTC and the CA found to be more
credible, reveals the events that transpired to be as follows.
In the month of June 1997, Isabelita Aquino Milabo, also known as Baby Aquino,
handed petitioner Banco De Oro (BDO) Check Number 0132649 postdated July 14,
1997 in the amount of ₱10,000.00. The check was payment for Baby Aquino's
purchases from Mega Foam Int'l., Inc., and petitioner was then the collector of Mega
Foam. Somehow, the check was deposited in the Land Bank account of Generoso
Capitle, the husband of Jacqueline Capitle; the latter is the sister of petitioner and the
former pricing, merchandising and inventory clerk of Mega Foam.
Meanwhile, Rowena Ricablanca, another employee of Mega Foam, received a phone
call sometime in the middle of July from one of their customers, Jennifer Sanalila. The
customer wanted to know if she could issue checks payable to the account of Mega
Foam, instead of issuing the checks payable to CASH. Said customer had apparently
been instructed by Jacqueline Capitle to make check payments to Mega Foam
payable to CASH. Around that time, Ricablanca also received a phone call from an
employee of Land Bank, Valenzuela Branch, who was looking for Generoso Capitle.
The reason for the call was to inform Capitle that the subject BDO check deposited in
his account had been dishonored.
Ricablanca then phoned accused Anita Valencia, a former employee/collector of
Mega Foam, asking the latter to inform Jacqueline Capitle about the phone call from
41 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
Land Bank regarding the bounced check. Ricablanca explained that she had to call
and relay the message through Valencia, because the Capitles did not have a phone;
but they could be reached through Valencia, a neighbor and former co-employee of
Jacqueline Capitle at Mega Foam.
Valencia then told Ricablanca that the check came from Baby Aquino, and instructed
Ricablanca to ask Baby Aquino to replace the check with cash. Valencia also told
Ricablanca of a plan to take the cash and divide it equally into four: for herself,
Ricablanca, petitioner Jacinto and Jacqueline Capitle. Ricablanca, upon the advise of
Mega Foam's accountant, reported the matter to the owner of Mega Foam, Joseph
Dyhengco.
Thereafter, Joseph Dyhengco talked to Baby Aquino and was able to confirm that the
latter indeed handed petitioner a BDO check for ₱10,000.00 sometime in June 1997
as payment for her purchases from Mega Foam.4 Baby Aquino further testified that,
sometime in July 1997, petitioner also called her on the phone to tell her that the BDO
check bounced.5 Verification from company records showed that petitioner never
remitted the subject check to Mega Foam. However, Baby Aquino said that she had
already paid Mega Foam ₱10,000.00 cash in August 1997 as replacement for the
dishonored check.6
Generoso Capitle, presented as a hostile witness, admitted depositing the subject
BDO check in his bank account, but explained that the check came into his
possession when some unknown woman arrived at his house around the first week of
July 1997 to have the check rediscounted. He parted with his cash in exchange for
the check without even bothering to inquire into the identity of the woman or her
address. When he was informed by the bank that the check bounced, he merely
disregarded it as he didn’t know where to find the woman who rediscounted the
check.
Meanwhile, Dyhengco filed a Complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) and worked out an entrapment operation with its agents. Ten pieces of
₱1,000.00 bills provided by Dyhengco were marked and dusted with fluorescent
powder by the NBI. Thereafter, the bills were given to Ricablanca, who was tasked to
pretend that she was going along with Valencia's plan.
On August 15, 2007, Ricablanca and petitioner met at the latter's house. Petitioner,
who was then holding the bounced BDO check, handed over said check to
Ricablanca. They originally intended to proceed to Baby Aquino's place to have the
check replaced with cash, but the plan did not push through. However, they agreed to
meet again on August 21, 2007.
On the agreed date, Ricablanca again went to petitioner’s house, where she met
petitioner and Jacqueline Capitle. Petitioner, her husband, and Ricablanca went to
the house of Anita Valencia; Jacqueline Capitle decided not to go with the group
because she decided to go shopping. It was only petitioner, her husband, Ricablanca
and Valencia who then boarded petitioner's jeep and went on to Baby Aquino's
factory. Only Ricablanca alighted from the jeep and entered the premises of Baby
Aquino, pretending that she was getting cash from Baby Aquino. However, the cash
she actually brought out from the premises was the ₱10,000.00 marked money
previously given to her by Dyhengco. Ricablanca divided the money and upon
returning to the jeep, gave ₱5,000.00 each to Valencia and petitioner. Thereafter,
petitioner and Valencia were arrested by NBI agents, who had been watching the
whole time.
Petitioner and Valencia were brought to the NBI office where the Forensic Chemist
found fluorescent powder on the palmar and dorsal aspects of both of their hands.
This showed that petitioner and Valencia handled the marked money. The NBI filed a
criminal case for qualified theft against the two and one Jane Doe who was later
identified as Jacqueline Capitle, the wife of Generoso Capitle.
The defense, on the other hand, denied having taken the subject check and
presented the following scenario.
Petitioner admitted that she was a collector for Mega Foam until she resigned on
June 30, 1997, but claimed that she had stopped collecting payments from Baby
Aquino for quite some time before her resignation from the company. She further
testified that, on the day of the arrest, Ricablanca came to her mother’s house, where
she was staying at that time, and asked that she accompany her (Ricablanca) to Baby
Aquino's house. Since petitioner was going for a pre-natal check-up at the Chinese
General Hospital, Ricablanca decided to hitch a ride with the former and her husband
in their jeep going to Baby Aquino's place in Caloocan City. She allegedly had no idea
why Ricablanca asked them to wait in their jeep, which they parked outside the house
of Baby Aquino, and was very surprised when Ricablanca placed the money on her
lap and the NBI agents arrested them.
Anita Valencia also admitted that she was the cashier of Mega Foam until she
resigned on June 30, 1997. It was never part of her job to collect payments from
customers. According to her, on the morning of August 21, 1997, Ricablanca called
her up on the phone, asking if she (Valencia) could accompany her (Ricablanca) to
the house of Baby Aquino. Valencia claims that she agreed to do so, despite her
admission during cross-examination that she did not know where Baby Aquino
resided, as she had never been to said house. They then met at the house of
petitioner's mother, rode the jeep of petitioner and her husband, and proceeded to
Baby Aquino's place. When they arrived at said place, Ricablanca alighted, but
requested them to wait for her in the jeep. After ten minutes, Ricablanca came out
and, to her surprise, Ricablanca gave her money and so she even asked, "What is
this?" Then, the NBI agents arrested them.
The trial of the three accused went its usual course and, on October 4, 1999, the RTC
rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
42 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Gemma Tubale De
Jacinto y Latosa, Anita Busog De Valencia y Rivera and Jacqueline
Capitle GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of QUALIFIED THEFT and
each of them is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of FIVE (5) YEARS, FIVE
(5) MONTHS AND ELEVEN (11) DAYS, as minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS, EIGHT (8)
MONTHS AND TWENTY (20) DAYS, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.7
The three appealed to the CA and, on December 16, 2003, a Decision was
promulgated, the dispositive portion of which reads, thus:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the trial court is MODIFIED, in that:
(a) the sentence against accused Gemma Jacinto stands;
(b) the sentence against accused Anita Valencia is reduced to 4
months arresto mayor  medium.
(c) The accused Jacqueline Capitle is acquitted.
SO ORDERED.
A Partial Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing CA Decision was filed only for
petitioner Gemma Tubale Jacinto, but the same was denied per Resolution dated
March 5, 2004.
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner alone, assailing
the Decision and Resolution of the CA. The issues raised in the petition are as
follows:
1. Whether or not petitioner can be convicted of a crime not charged in the
information;
2. Whether or not a worthless check can be the object of theft; and
3. Whether or not the prosecution has proved petitioner's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.8
The petition deserves considerable thought.
The prosecution tried to establish the following pieces of evidence to constitute the
elements of the crime of qualified theft defined under Article 308, in relation to Article
310, both of the Revised Penal Code: (1) the taking of personal property - as shown
by the fact that petitioner, as collector for Mega Foam, did not remit the customer's
check payment to her employer and, instead, appropriated it for herself; (2) said
property belonged to another − the check belonged to Baby Aquino, as it was her
payment for purchases she made; (3) the taking was done with intent to gain – this is
presumed from the act of unlawful taking and further shown by the fact that the check
was deposited to the bank account of petitioner's brother-in-law; (4) it was done
without the owner’s consent – petitioner hid the fact that she had received the check
payment from her employer's customer by not remitting the check to the company; (5)
it was accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of
force upon things – the check was voluntarily handed to petitioner by the customer,
as she was known to be a collector for the company; and (6) it was done with grave
abuse of confidence – petitioner is admittedly entrusted with the collection of
payments from customers.
However, as may be gleaned from the aforementioned Articles of the Revised Penal
Code, the personal property subject of the theft must have some value, as the
intention of the accused is to gain  from the thing stolen. This is further bolstered
by Article 309, where the law provides that the penalty to be imposed on the accused
is dependent on the value of the thing stolen.
In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the postdated check belonging to Mega Foam,
but the same was apparently without value, as it was subsequently dishonored. Thus,
the question arises on whether the crime of qualified theft was actually produced.
The Court must resolve the issue in the negative.
Intod v. Court of Appeals9 is highly instructive and applicable to the present case.
In Intod, the accused, intending to kill a person, peppered the latter’s bedroom with
bullets, but since the intended victim was not home at the time, no harm came to him.
The trial court and the CA held Intod guilty of attempted murder. But upon review by
this Court, he was adjudged guilty only of an impossible crime as defined and
penalized in paragraph 2, Article 4, in relation to Article 59, both of the Revised Penal
Code, because of the factual impossibility of producing the crime. Pertinent portions
of said provisions read as follows:
Article 4(2). Criminal Responsibility. - Criminal responsibility shall be incurred:
xxxx
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or
property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on
account of the employment of inadequate to ineffectual means. (emphasis supplied)
43 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
Article 59. Penalty to be imposed in case of failure to commit the crime because the
means employed or the aims sought are impossible. - When the person intending to
commit an offense has already performed the acts for the execution of the same but
nevertheless the crime was not produced by reason of the fact that the act intended
was by its nature one of impossible accomplishment or because the means employed
by such person are essentially inadequate to produce the result desired by him, the
court, having in mind the social danger and the degree of criminality shown by the
offender, shall impose upon him the penalty of arresto mayor or a fine ranging from
200 to 500 pesos.
Thus, the requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be
an offense against persons or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent; and
(3) that its accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means employed was
either inadequate or ineffectual. The aspect of the inherent impossibility of
accomplishing the intended crime under Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code was
further explained by the Court in Intod10 in this wise:
Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense
against persons or property because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently
impossible of accomplishment; or (2) the means employed is either (a) inadequate or
(b) ineffectual.
That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is
inherently impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be impossible
under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one
impossible of accomplishment. There must be either (1) legal impossibility, or (2)
physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act as
an impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not
amount to a crime.
xxxx
The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category.
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances
unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended
crime. x x x 11
In Intod, the Court went on to give an example of an offense that involved factual
impossibility, i.e., a man puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention
to steal the latter's wallet, but gets nothing since the pocket is empty.
Herein petitioner's case is closely akin to the above example of factual impossibility
given in Intod. In this case, petitioner performed all the acts to consummate the crime
of qualified theft, which is a crime against property. Petitioner's evil intent cannot be
denied, as the mere act of unlawfully taking the check meant for Mega Foam showed
her intent to gain or be unjustly enriched. Were it not for the fact that the check
bounced, she would have received the face value thereof, which was not rightfully
hers. Therefore, it was only due to the extraneous circumstance of the check being
unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at the time, that prevented the crime from
being produced. The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out to be absolutely
worthless, because the check was eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam had
received the cash to replace the value of said dishonored check.1avvphi1
The fact that petitioner was later entrapped receiving the ₱5,000.00 marked money,
which she thought was the cash replacement for the dishonored check, is of no
moment. The Court held in Valenzuela v. People12 that under the definition of theft in
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, "there is only one operative act of execution
by the actor involved in theft ─ the taking of personal property of another." Elucidating
further, the Court held, thus:
x x x Parsing through the statutory definition of theft under Article 308, there is one
apparent answer provided in the language of the law — that theft is already
"produced" upon the "tak[ing of] personal property of another without the latter’s
consent."
xxxx
x x x when is the crime of theft produced? There would be all but certain unanimity in
the position that theft is produced when there is deprivation of personal property due
to its taking by one with intent to gain. Viewed from that perspective, it is immaterial to
the product of the felony that the offender, once having committed all the acts of
execution for theft, is able or unable to freely dispose of the property stolen since the
deprivation from the owner alone has already ensued from such acts of execution. x x
x
xxxx
x x x we have, after all, held that unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is deemed
complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has
no opportunity to dispose of the same. x x x
x x x Unlawful taking, which is the deprivation of one’s personal property, is the
element which produces the felony in its consummated stage. x x x 13
From the above discussion, there can be no question that as of the time that
petitioner took possession of the check meant for Mega Foam, she had
44 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
performed all the acts to consummate the crime of theft, had it not been
impossible of accomplishment in this case. The circumstance of petitioner
receiving the ₱5,000.00 cash as supposed replacement for the dishonored check was
no longer necessary for the consummation of the crime of qualified theft. Obviously,
the plan to convince Baby Aquino to give cash as replacement for the check was
hatched only after the check had been dishonored by the drawee bank. Since the
crime of theft is not a continuing offense, petitioner's act of receiving the cash
replacement should not be considered as a continuation of the theft. At most, the fact
that petitioner was caught receiving the marked money was merely corroborating
evidence to strengthen proof of her intent to gain.
Moreover, the fact that petitioner further planned to have the dishonored check
replaced with cash by its issuer is a different and separate fraudulent scheme.
Unfortunately, since said scheme was not included or covered by the allegations in
the Information, the Court cannot pronounce judgment on the accused; otherwise, it
would violate the due process clause of the Constitution. If at all, that fraudulent
scheme could have been another possible source of criminal liability.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals, dated December 16, 2003, and its Resolution dated March 5, 2004,
are MODIFIED. Petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto is found GUILTY of an IMPOSSIBLE
CRIME as defined and penalized in Articles 4, paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised
Penal Code, respectively. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6)
months of arrresto mayor, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 180016               April 29, 2014
LITO CORPUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is to resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, dated November 5, 2007, of petitioner Lito Corpuz (petitioner), seeking to
reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated March 22, 2007 and Resolution2 dated
September 5, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed with modification the
Decision3 dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 46, San
Fernando City, finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal
Code.
The antecedent facts follow.
Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner met at the Admiral Royale Casino
in Olongapo City sometime in 1990. Private complainant was then engaged in the
business of lending money to casino players and, upon hearing that the former had
some pieces of jewelry for sale, petitioner approached him on May 2, 1991 at the
same casino and offered to sell the said pieces of jewelry on commission basis.
Private complainant agreed, and as a consequence, he turned over to petitioner the
following items: an 18k diamond ring for men; a woman's bracelet; one (1) men's
necklace and another men's bracelet, with an aggregate value of ₱98,000.00, as
evidenced by a receipt of even date. They both agreed that petitioner shall remit the
proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold, to return the same items, within a period of 60
days. The period expired without petitioner remitting the proceeds of the sale or
returning the pieces of jewelry. When private complainant was able to meet petitioner,
the latter promised the former that he will pay the value of the said items entrusted to
him, but to no avail.
Thus, an Information was filed against petitioner for the crime of estafa, which reads
as follows:
That on or about the fifth (5th) day of July 1991, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, after
having received from one Danilo Tangcoy, one (1) men's diamond ring, 18k, worth
₱45,000.00; one (1) three-baht men's bracelet, 22k, worth ₱25,000.00; one (1) two-
baht ladies' bracelet, 22k, worth ₱12,000.00, or in the total amount of Ninety-Eight
Thousand Pesos (₱98,000.00), Philippine currency, under expressed obligation on
45 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
the part of said accused to remit the proceeds of the sale of the said items or to return
the same, if not sold, said accused, once in possession of the said items, with intent
to defraud, and with unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, and far from complying
with his aforestated obligation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own personal use and benefit the
aforesaid jewelries (sic) or the proceeds of the sale thereof, and despite repeated
demands, the accused failed and refused to return the said items or to remit the
amount of Ninety- Eight Thousand Pesos (₱98,000.00), Philippine currency, to the
damage and prejudice of said Danilo Tangcoy in the aforementioned amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On January 28, 1992, petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel, entered a plea of
not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution, to prove the above-stated facts, presented the lone testimony of
Danilo Tangcoy. On the other hand, the defense presented the lone testimony of
petitioner, which can be summarized, as follows:
Petitioner and private complainant were collecting agents of Antonio Balajadia, who is
engaged in the financing business of extending loans to Base employees. For every
collection made, they earn a commission. Petitioner denied having transacted any
business with private complainant.
However, he admitted obtaining a loan from Balajadia sometime in 1989 for which he
was made to sign a blank receipt. He claimed that the same receipt was then dated
May 2, 1991 and used as evidence against him for the supposed agreement to sell
the subject pieces of jewelry, which he did not even see.
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged in the Information. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, finding accused LITO CORPUZ GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the felony of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph one (1), subparagraph (b) of the
Revised Penal Code;
there being no offsetting generic aggravating nor ordinary mitigating circumstance/s
to vary the penalty imposable;
accordingly, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of deprivation of
liberty consisting of an imprisonment under the Indeterminate Sentence Law of FOUR
(4) YEARS AND TWO (2) MONTHS of Prision Correccional in its medium period AS
MINIMUM, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS AND EIGHT (8) MONTHS of Reclusion
Temporal in its minimum period AS MAXIMUM; to indemnify private complainant
Danilo Tangcoy the amount of ₱98,000.00 as actual damages, and to pay the costs
of suit.
SO ORDERED.
The case was elevated to the CA, however, the latter denied the appeal of petitioner
and affirmed the decision of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Judgment dated July 30,
2004 of the RTC of San Fernando City (P), Branch 46, is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION on the imposable prison term, such that accused-appellant shall
suffer the indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to 8 years of prision mayor, as maximum, plus 1 year for each additional
₱10,000.00, or a total of 7 years. The rest of the decision stands.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner, after the CA denied his motion for reconsideration, filed with this Court the
present petition stating the following grounds:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONFIRMING THE
ADMISSION AND APPRECIATION BY THE LOWER COURT OF PROSECUTION
EVIDENCE, INCLUDING ITS EXHIBITS, WHICH ARE MERE MACHINE COPIES,
AS THIS VIOLATES THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE;
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER
COURT'S FINDING THAT THE CRIMINAL INFORMATION FOR ESTAFA WAS NOT
FATALLY DEFECTIVE ALTHOUGH THE SAME DID NOT CHARGE THE OFFENSE
UNDER ARTICLE 315 (1) (B) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE IN THAT -
1. THE INFORMATION DID NOT FIX A PERIOD WITHIN WHICH THE
SUBJECT [PIECES OF] JEWELRY SHOULD BE RETURNED, IF UNSOLD,
OR THE MONEY TO BE REMITTED, IF SOLD;
2. THE DATE OF THE OCCURRENCE OF THE CRIME ALLEGED IN THE
INFORMATION AS OF 05 JULY 1991 WAS MATERIALLY DIFFERENT
FROM THE ONE TESTIFIED TO BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT
WHICH WAS 02 MAY 1991;
C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER
COURT'S FINDING THAT DEMAND TO RETURN THE SUBJECT [PIECES OF]
JEWELRY, IF UNSOLD, OR REMIT THE PROCEEDS, IF SOLD – AN ELEMENT OF
THE OFFENSE – WAS PROVED;
46 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
D. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER
COURT'S FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION'S CASE WAS PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT ALTHOUGH -
1. THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TESTIFIED ON TWO (2) VERSIONS OF
THE INCIDENT;
2. THE VERSION OF THE PETITIONER – ACCUSED IS MORE
STRAIGHTFORWARD AND LOGICAL, CONSISTENT WITH HUMAN
EXPERIENCE;
3. THE EQUIPOISE RULE WAS NOT APPRECIATED IN AND APPLIED TO
THIS CASE;
4. PENAL STATUTES ARE STRICTLY CONSTRUED AGAINST THE
STATE.
In its Comment dated May 5, 2008, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) stated
the following counter-arguments:
The exhibits were properly admitted inasmuch as petitioner failed to object to their
admissibility.
The information was not defective inasmuch as it sufficiently established the
designation of the offense and the acts complained of.
The prosecution sufficiently established all the elements of the crime charged.
This Court finds the present petition devoid of any merit.
The factual findings of the appellate court generally are conclusive, and carry even
more weight when said court affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any showing
that the findings are totally devoid of support in the records, or that they are so
glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of discretion. 4 Petitioner is of the
opinion that the CA erred in affirming the factual findings of the trial court. He now
comes to this Court raising both procedural and substantive issues.
According to petitioner, the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the trial court, admitting
in evidence a receipt dated May 2, 1991 marked as Exhibit "A" and its submarkings,
although the same was merely a photocopy, thus, violating the best evidence rule.
However, the records show that petitioner never objected to the admissibility of the
said evidence at the time it was identified, marked and testified upon in court by
private complainant. The CA also correctly pointed out that petitioner also failed to
raise an objection in his Comment to the prosecution's formal offer of evidence and
even admitted having signed the said receipt. The established doctrine is that when a
party failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they were offered in
evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived.5
Another procedural issue raised is, as claimed by petitioner, the formally defective
Information filed against him. He contends that the Information does not contain the
period when the pieces of jewelry were supposed to be returned and that the date
when the crime occurred was different from the one testified to by private
complainant. This argument is untenable. The CA did not err in finding that the
Information was substantially complete and in reiterating that objections as to the
matters of form and substance in the Information cannot be made for the first time on
appeal. It is true that the gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the appropriation or conversion of
money or property received to the prejudice of the owner6 and that the time of
occurrence is not a material ingredient of the crime, hence, the exclusion of the period
and the wrong date of the occurrence of the crime, as reflected in the Information, do
not make the latter fatally defective. The CA ruled:
x x x An information is legally viable as long as it distinctly states the statutory
designation of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. Then
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that a complaint or information is
sufficient if it states the name of the accused;
the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the
commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. In the
case at bar, a reading of the subject Information shows compliance with the foregoing
rule. That the time of the commission of the offense was stated as " on or about the
fifth (5th) day of July, 1991" is not likewise fatal to the prosecution's cause considering
that Section 11 of the same Rule requires a statement of the precise time only when
the same is a material ingredient of the offense. The gravamen of the crime of estafa
under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is the
appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the
offender. Thus, aside from the fact that the date of the commission thereof is not an
essential element of the crime herein charged, the failure of the prosecution to specify
the exact date does not render the Information ipso facto defective. Moreover, the
said date is also near the due date within which accused-appellant should have
delivered the proceeds or returned the said [pieces of jewelry] as testified upon by
Tangkoy, hence, there was sufficient compliance with the rules. Accused-appellant,
therefore, cannot now be allowed to claim that he was not properly apprised of the
charges proferred against him.7
It must be remembered that petitioner was convicted of the crime of Estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the RPC, which reads:
47 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any of the q Did you know his residence?
means mentioned hereinbelow.
a Yes, sir.
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
q Did you go there?
xxxx
a Yes, sir.
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or
any other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for q Did you find him?
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or
to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a
bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property; x x x a No, sir.

The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (a) that money, q Were you able to talk to him since 5 July 1991?
goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to a I talked to him, sir.
make delivery of, or to return the same; (b) that there be misappropriation or
conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such q How many times?
receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of
another; and (d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.8
a Two times, sir.
Petitioner argues that the last element, which is, that there is a demand by the
offended party on the offender, was not proved. This Court disagrees. In his q What did you talk (sic) to him?
testimony, private complainant narrated how he was able to locate petitioner after
almost two (2) months from the time he gave the pieces of jewelry and asked a About the items I gave to (sic) him, sir.
petitioner about the same items with the latter promising to pay them. Thus:
q Referring to Exhibit A-2?
PROS. MARTINEZ
a Yes, sir, and according to him he will take his obligation and I asked him where the
q Now, Mr. Witness, this was executed on 2 May 1991, and this transaction could items are and he promised me that he will pay these amount, sir.
have been finished on 5 July 1991, the question is what happens (sic) when the
deadline came?
q Up to this time that you were here, were you able to collect from him partially or full?

a I went looking for him, sir.

a No, sir.9

q For whom?
No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand. 10 Demand need
not even be formal; it may be verbal. 11 The specific word "demand" need not even be
a Lito Corpuz, sir. used to show that it has indeed been made upon the person charged, since even a
mere query as to the whereabouts of the money [in this case, property], would be
q Were you able to look (sic) for him? tantamount to a demand.12 As expounded in Asejo v. People:13

a I looked for him for a week, sir. With regard to the necessity of demand, we agree with the CA that demand under this
kind of estafa need not be formal or written. The appellate court observed that the law
is silent with regard to the form of demand in estafa under Art. 315 1(b), thus:
48 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
When the law does not qualify, We should not qualify. Should a written demand be
necessary, the law would have stated so. Otherwise, the word "demand" should be
interpreted in its general meaning as to include both written and oral demand. Thus,
the failure of the prosecution to present a written demand as evidence is not fatal.
In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired about the money
entrusted to the accused, we held that the query was tantamount to a demand, thus:
x x x [T]he law does not require a demand as a condition precedent to the existence
of the crime of embezzlement. It so happens only that failure to account, upon
demand for funds or property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of
misappropriation. The same way, however, be established by other proof, such as
that introduced in the case at bar.14
In view of the foregoing and based on the records, the prosecution was able to prove
the existence of all the elements of the crime. Private complainant gave petitioner the
pieces of jewelry in trust, or on commission basis, as shown in the receipt dated May
2, 1991 with an obligation to sell or return the same within sixty (60) days, if unsold.
There was misappropriation when petitioner failed to remit the proceeds of those
pieces of jewelry sold, or if no sale took place, failed to return the same pieces of
jewelry within or after the agreed period despite demand from the private
complainant, to the prejudice of the latter.
Anent the credibility of the prosecution's sole witness, which is questioned by
petitioner, the same is unmeritorious. Settled is the rule that in assessing the
credibility of witnesses, this Court gives great respect to the evaluation of the trial
court for it had the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and their
deportment on the witness stand, an opportunity denied the appellate courts, which
merely rely on the records of the case. 15 The assessment by the trial court is even
conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence, especially when such finding is affirmed by the
CA.16 Truth is established not by the number of witnesses, but by the quality of their
testimonies, for in determining the value and credibility of evidence, the witnesses are
to be weighed not numbered.17
As regards the penalty, while this Court's Third Division was deliberating on this case,
the question of the continued validity of imposing on persons convicted of crimes
involving property came up. The legislature apparently pegged these penalties to the
value of the money and property in 1930 when it enacted the Revised Penal Code.
Since the members of the division reached no unanimity on this question and since
the issues are of first impression, they decided to refer the case to the Court en banc
for consideration and resolution. Thus, several amici curiae were invited at the behest
of the Court to give their academic opinions on the matter. Among those that
graciously complied were Dean Jose Manuel Diokno, Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria,
Professor Alfredo F. Tadiar, the Senate President, and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives. The parties were later heard on oral arguments before the Court en
banc, with Atty. Mario L. Bautista appearing as counsel de oficio of the petitioner.
After a thorough consideration of the arguments presented on the matter, this Court
finds the following:
There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the range of penalties that
the courts continue to impose on crimes against property committed today, based on
the amount of damage measured by the value of money eighty years ago in 1932.
However, this Court cannot modify the said range of penalties because that would
constitute judicial legislation. What the legislature's perceived failure in amending the
penalties provided for in the said crimes cannot be remedied through this Court's
decisions, as that would be encroaching upon the power of another branch of the
government. This, however, does not render the whole situation without any remedy.
It can be appropriately presumed that the framers of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
had anticipated this matter by including Article 5, which reads:
ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which
are not covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. - Whenever a court
has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not
punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief
Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to
believe that said act should be made the subject of penal legislation.
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the
Department of Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without
suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the
provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty,
taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense.18
The first paragraph of the above provision clearly states that for acts bourne out of a
case which is not punishable by law and the court finds it proper to repress, the
remedy is to render the proper decision and thereafter, report to the Chief Executive,
through the Department of Justice, the reasons why the same act should be the
subject of penal legislation. The premise here is that a deplorable act is present but is
not the subject of any penal legislation, thus, the court is tasked to inform the Chief
Executive of the need to make that act punishable by law through legislation. The
second paragraph is similar to the first except for the situation wherein the act is
already punishable by law but the corresponding penalty is deemed by the court as
excessive. The remedy therefore, as in the first paragraph is not to suspend the
execution of the sentence but to submit to the Chief Executive the reasons why the
court considers the said penalty to be non-commensurate with the act committed.
Again, the court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive, this time, of the need for a
legislation to provide the proper penalty.
49 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
In his book, Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code,19 Guillermo B. Guevara
opined that in Article 5, the duty of the court is merely to report to the Chief Executive,
with a recommendation for an amendment or modification of the legal provisions
which it believes to be harsh. Thus:
This provision is based under the legal maxim "nullum crimen, nulla poena sige lege,"
that is, that there can exist no punishable act except those previously and specifically
provided for by penal statute.
No matter how reprehensible an act is, if the law-making body does not deem it
necessary to prohibit its perpetration with penal sanction, the Court of justice will be
entirely powerless to punish such act.
Under the provisions of this article the Court cannot suspend the execution of a
sentence on the ground that the strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code
would cause excessive or harsh penalty. All that the Court could do in such
eventuality is to report the matter to the Chief Executive with a recommendation for an
amendment or modification of the legal provisions which it believes to be harsh.20
Anent the non-suspension of the execution of the sentence, retired Chief Justice
Ramon C. Aquino and retired Associate Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino, in their
book, The Revised Penal Code,21 echoed the above-cited commentary, thus:
The second paragraph of Art. 5 is an application of the humanitarian principle that
justice must be tempered with mercy. Generally, the courts have nothing to do with
the wisdom or justness of the penalties fixed by law. "Whether or not the penalties
prescribed by law upon conviction of violations of particular statutes are too severe or
are not severe enough, are questions as to which commentators on the law may fairly
differ; but it is the duty of the courts to enforce the will of the legislator in all cases
unless it clearly appears that a given penalty falls within the prohibited class of
excessive fines or cruel and unusual punishment." A petition for clemency should be
addressed to the Chief Executive.22
There is an opinion that the penalties provided for in crimes against property be
based on the current inflation rate or at the ratio of ₱1.00 is equal to ₱100.00 .
However, it would be dangerous as this would result in uncertainties, as opposed to
the definite imposition of the penalties. It must be remembered that the economy
fluctuates and if the proposed imposition of the penalties in crimes against property
be adopted, the penalties will not cease to change, thus, making the RPC, a self-
amending law. Had the framers of the RPC intended that to be so, it should have
provided the same, instead, it included the earlier cited Article 5 as a remedy. It is
also improper to presume why the present legislature has not made any moves to
amend the subject penalties in order to conform with the present times. For all we
know, the legislature intends to retain the same penalties in order to deter the further
commission of those punishable acts which have increased tremendously through the
years. In fact, in recent moves of the legislature, it is apparent that it aims to broaden
the coverage of those who violate penal laws. In the crime of Plunder, from its original
minimum amount of ₱100,000,000.00 plundered, the legislature lowered it to
₱50,000,000.00. In the same way, the legislature lowered the threshold amount upon
which the Anti-Money Laundering Act may apply, from ₱1,000,000.00 to
₱500,000.00.
It is also worth noting that in the crimes of Theft and Estafa, the present penalties do
not seem to be excessive compared to the proposed imposition of their corresponding
penalties. In Theft, the provisions state that:
Art. 309. Penalties. — Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the
value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed
22,000 pesos, but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount
the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this
paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the
total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In
such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be
imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty
shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if
the value of the thing stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but does not exceed
12,000 pesos.
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if
the value of the property stolen is more than 200 pesos but does not exceed
6,000 pesos.
4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum
period, if the value of the property stolen is over 50 pesos but does not
exceed 200 pesos.
5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5 pesos but does not
exceed 50 pesos.
6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value does not
exceed 5 pesos.
7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the theft is committed
under the circumstances enumerated in paragraph 3 of the next preceding
article and the value of the thing stolen does not exceed 5 pesos. If such
value exceeds said amount, the provision of any of the five preceding
subdivisions shall be made applicable.
50 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
 8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos,
when the value of the thing stolen is not over 5 pesos, and the offender shall
have acted under the impulse of hunger, poverty, or the difficulty of earning a
livelihood for the support of himself or his family.
In a case wherein the value of the thing stolen is ₱6,000.00, the above-provision
states that the penalty is prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods (6
months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). Applying the proposal, if the value of the
thing stolen is ₱6,000.00, the penalty is imprisonment of arresto mayor in its medium
period to prision correccional minimum period (2 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4
months). It would seem that under the present law, the penalty imposed is almost the
same as the penalty proposed. In fact, after the application of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law under the existing law, the minimum penalty is still lowered by one
degree; hence, the minimum penalty is arresto mayor in its medium period to
maximum period (2 months and 1 day to 6 months), making the offender qualified for
pardon or parole after serving the said minimum period and may even apply for
probation. Moreover, under the proposal, the minimum penalty after applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law is arresto menor in its maximum period to arresto mayor
in its minimum period (21 days to 2 months) is not too far from the minimum period
under the existing law. Thus, it would seem that the present penalty imposed under
the law is not at all excessive. The same is also true in the crime of Estafa.23
Moreover, if we apply the ratio of 1:100, as suggested to the value of the thing stolen
in the crime of Theft and the damage caused in the crime of Estafa, the gap between
the minimum and the maximum amounts, which is the basis of determining the proper
penalty to be imposed, would be too wide and the penalty imposable would no longer
be commensurate to the act committed and the value of the thing stolen or the
damage caused:
I. Article 309, or the penalties for the crime of Theft, the value would be modified but
the penalties are not changed:
1. ₱12,000.00 to ₱22,000.00 will become ₱1,200,000.00 to ₱2,200,000.00,
punished by prision mayor minimum to prision mayor medium (6 years and 1
day to 10 years).
2. ₱6,000.00 to ₱12,000.00 will become ₱600,000.00 to ₱1,200,000.00,
punished by prision correccional medium and to prision correccional
maximum (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years).24
3. ₱200.00 to ₱6,000.00 will become ₱20,000.00 to ₱600,000.00,
punishable by prision correccional minimum to prision correccional medium
(6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months).
4. ₱50.00 to ₱200.00 will become ₱5,000.00 to ₱20,000.00, punishable by
arresto mayor medium to prision correccional minimum (2 months and 1 day
to 2 years and 4 months).
5. ₱5.00 to ₱50.00 will become ₱500.00 to ₱5,000.00, punishable by arresto
mayor (1 month and 1 day to 6 months).
6. ₱5.00 will become ₱500.00, punishable by arresto mayor minimum to
arresto mayor medium.
x x x x.
II. Article 315, or the penalties for the crime of Estafa, the value would also be
modified but the penalties are not changed, as follows:
1st. ₱12,000.00 to ₱22,000.00, will become ₱1,200,000.00 to
₱2,200,000.00, punishable by prision correccional maximum to prision
mayor minimum (4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 8 years).25
2nd. ₱6,000.00 to ₱12,000.00 will become ₱600,000.00 to ₱1,200,000.00,
punishable by prision correccional minimum to prision correccional medium
(6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months).26
3rd. ₱200.00 to ₱6,000.00 will become ₱20,000.00 to ₱600,000.00,
punishable by arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional minimum (4
months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months).
4th. ₱200.00 will become ₱20,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor
maximum (4 months and 1 day to 6 months).
An argument raised by Dean Jose Manuel I. Diokno, one of our esteemed amici
curiae, is that the incremental penalty provided under Article 315 of the RPC violates
the Equal Protection Clause.
The equal protection clause requires equality among equals, which is determined
according to a valid classification. The test developed by jurisprudence here and
yonder is that of reasonableness,27 which has four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
51 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
 (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.28 JUSTICE PERALTA:

According to Dean Diokno, the Incremental Penalty Rule (IPR) does not rest on But in your presentation, you were fixing the amount at One Hundred Thousand
substantial distinctions as ₱10,000.00 may have been substantial in the past, but it is (₱100,000.00) Pesos ...
not so today, which violates the first requisite; the IPR was devised so that those who
commit estafa involving higher amounts would receive heavier penalties; however, DEAN DIOKNO:
this is no longer achieved, because a person who steals ₱142,000.00 would receive
the same penalty as someone who steals hundreds of millions, which violates the
second requisite; and, the IPR violates requisite no. 3, considering that the IPR is Well, my presen ... (interrupted)
limited to existing conditions at the time the law was promulgated, conditions that no
longer exist today. JUSTICE PERALTA:

Assuming that the Court submits to the argument of Dean Diokno and declares the
incremental penalty in Article 315 unconstitutional for violating the equal protection
clause, what then is the penalty that should be applied in case the amount of the thing
subject matter of the crime exceeds ₱22,000.00? It seems that the proposition poses
more questions than answers, which leads us even more to conclude that the
appropriate remedy is to refer these matters to Congress for them to exercise their
inherent power to legislate laws.
Even Dean Diokno was of the opinion that if the Court declares the IPR
unconstitutional, the remedy is to go to Congress. Thus:
For every One Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos in excess of Twenty-Two
Thousand (₱22,000.00) Pesos you were suggesting an additional penalty of one (1)
year, did I get you right?
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor, that is, if the court will take the route of statutory interpretation.
JUSTICE PERALTA:

xxxx Ah ...

JUSTICE PERALTA: DEAN DIOKNO:

Now, your position is to declare that the incremental penalty should be struck down as If the Court will say that they can go beyond the literal wording of the law...
unconstitutional because it is absurd.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
DEAN DIOKNO:
But if we de ... (interrupted)
Absurd, it violates equal protection, Your Honor, and cruel and unusual punishment.
DEAN DIOKNO:
JUSTICE PERALTA:
....then....
Then what will be the penalty that we are going to impose if the amount is more than
Twenty-Two Thousand (₱22,000.00) Pesos. JUSTICE PERALTA:

DEAN DIOKNO: Ah, yeah. But if we declare the incremental penalty as unsconstitutional, the court
cannot fix the amount ...
Well, that would be for Congress to ... if this Court will declare the incremental penalty
rule unconstitutional, then that would ... the void should be filled by Congress. DEAN DIOKNO:

52 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL

No, Your Honor. Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PERALTA: JUSTICE PERALTA:

... as the equivalent of one, as an incremental penalty in excess of Twenty-Two The amount in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (₱22,000.00) Pesos.
Thousand (₱22,000.00) Pesos.
Thank you, Dean.
DEAN DIOKNO:
DEAN DIOKNO:
No, Your Honor.
Thank you.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
x x x x29
The Court cannot do that.
Dean Diokno also contends that Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes
DEAN DIOKNO: cruel and unusual punishment. Citing Solem v. Helm,30 Dean Diokno avers that the
United States Federal Supreme Court has expanded the application of a similar
Could not be. Constitutional provision prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment, to the duration of
the penalty, and not just its form. The court therein ruled that three things must be
done to decide whether a sentence is proportional to a specific crime, viz.; (1)
JUSTICE PERALTA: Compare the nature and gravity of the offense, and the harshness of the penalty; (2)
Compare the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, i.e.,
The only remedy is to go to Congress... whether more serious crimes are subject to the same penalty or to less serious
penalties; and (3) Compare the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime
DEAN DIOKNO: in other jurisdictions.

Yes, Your Honor. However, the case of Solem v. Helm cannot be applied in the present case, because
in Solem what respondent therein deemed cruel was the penalty imposed by the state
court of South Dakota after it took into account the latter’s recidivist statute and not
JUSTICE PERALTA: the original penalty for uttering a "no account" check. Normally, the maximum
punishment for the crime would have been five years imprisonment and a $5,000.00
... and determine the value or the amount. fine. Nonetheless, respondent was sentenced to life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole under South Dakota’s recidivist statute because of his six prior
felony convictions. Surely, the factual antecedents of Solem are different from the
DEAN DIOKNO:
present controversy.

Yes, Your Honor.

With respect to the crime of Qualified Theft, however, it is true that the imposable
penalty for the offense is high. Nevertheless, the rationale for the imposition of a
JUSTICE PERALTA: higher penalty against a domestic servant is the fact that in the commission of the
crime, the helper will essentially gravely abuse the trust and confidence reposed upon
That will be equivalent to the incremental penalty of one (1) year in excess of Twenty- her by her employer. After accepting and allowing the helper to be a member of the
Two Thousand (₱22,000.00) Pesos. household, thus entrusting upon such person the protection and safekeeping of the
employer’s loved ones and properties, a subsequent betrayal of that trust is so
repulsive as to warrant the necessity of imposing a higher penalty to deter the
DEAN DIOKNO:
commission of such wrongful acts.
53 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
There are other crimes where the penalty of fine and/or imprisonment are dependent
on the subject matter of the crime and which, by adopting the proposal, may create
serious implications. For example, in the crime of Malversation, the penalty imposed
depends on the amount of the money malversed by the public official, thus:
Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation. —
Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public
funds or property, shall appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall
consent, through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take
such public funds, or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the
misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if
the amount involved in the misappropriation or malversation does not
exceed two hundred pesos.
2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the
amount involved is more than two hundred pesos but does not exceed six
thousand pesos.
3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal
in its minimum period, if the amount involved is more than six thousand
pesos but is less than twelve thousand pesos.
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum periods, if
the amount involved is more than twelve thousand pesos but is less than
twenty-two thousand pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty
shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual
special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or
equal to the total value of the property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property
with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be
prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use.
The above-provisions contemplate a situation wherein the Government loses money
due to the unlawful acts of the offender. Thus, following the proposal, if the amount
malversed is ₱200.00 (under the existing law), the amount now becomes ₱20,000.00
and the penalty is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods (2 years 4
months and 1 day to 6 years). The penalty may not be commensurate to the act of
embezzlement of ₱20,000.00 compared to the acts committed by public officials
punishable by a special law, i.e., Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, specifically Section 3,31 wherein the injury caused to the government is
not generally defined by any monetary amount, the penalty (6 years and 1 month to
15 years)32 under the Anti-Graft Law will now become higher. This should not be the
case, because in the crime of malversation, the public official takes advantage of his
public position to embezzle the fund or property of the government entrusted to him.
The said inequity is also apparent in the crime of Robbery with force upon things
(inhabited or uninhabited) where the value of the thing unlawfully taken and the act of
unlawful entry are the bases of the penalty imposable, and also, in Malicious Mischief,
where the penalty of imprisonment or fine is dependent on the cost of the damage
caused.
In Robbery with force upon things (inhabited or uninhabited), if we increase the value
of the thing unlawfully taken, as proposed in the ponencia, the sole basis of the
penalty will now be the value of the thing unlawfully taken and no longer the element
of force employed in entering the premises. It may likewise cause an inequity
between the crime of Qualified Trespass to Dwelling under Article 280, and this kind
of robbery because the former is punishable by prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years) and a fine not exceeding
₱1,000.00 (₱100,000.00 now if the ratio is 1:100) where entrance to the premises is
with violence or intimidation, which is the main justification of the penalty. Whereas in
the crime of Robbery with force upon things, it is punished with a penalty of prision
mayor (6 years and 1 day to 12 years) if the intruder is unarmed without the penalty of
Fine despite the fact that it is not merely the illegal entry that is the basis of the
penalty but likewise the unlawful taking.
Furthermore, in the crime of Other Mischiefs under Article 329, the highest penalty
that can be imposed is arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods (2 months
and 1 day to 6 months) if the value of the damage caused exceeds ₱1,000.00, but
under the proposal, the value of the damage will now become ₱100,000.00 (1:100),
and still punishable by arresto mayor (1 month and 1 day to 6 months). And, if the
value of the damaged property does not exceed ₱200.00, the penalty is arresto
menor or a fine of not less than the value of the damage caused and not more than
₱200.00, if the amount involved does not exceed ₱200.00 or cannot be estimated.
Under the proposal, ₱200.00 will now become ₱20,000.00, which simply means that
the fine of ₱200.00 under the existing law will now become ₱20,000.00. The amount
of Fine under this situation will now become excessive and afflictive in nature despite
the fact that the offense is categorized as a light felony penalized with a light penalty
under Article 26 of the RPC.33 Unless we also amend Article 26 of the RPC, there will
be grave implications on the penalty of Fine, but changing the same through Court
decision, either expressly or impliedly, may not be legally and constitutionally feasible.
There are other crimes against property and swindling in the RPC that may also be
affected by the proposal, such as those that impose imprisonment and/or Fine as a
penalty based on the value of the damage caused, to wit: Article 311 (Theft of the
property of the National Library and National Museum), Article 312 (Occupation of
real property or usurpation of real rights in property), Article 313 (Altering boundaries
54 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
or landmarks), Article 316 (Other forms of swindling), Article 317 (Swindling a minor),
Article 318 (Other deceits), Article 328 (Special cases of malicious mischief) and
Article 331 (Destroying or damaging statues, public monuments or paintings). Other
crimes that impose Fine as a penalty will also be affected, such as: Article 213
(Frauds against the public treasury and similar offenses), Article 215 (Prohibited
Transactions),
Article 216 (Possession of prohibited interest by a public officer), Article 218 (Failure
of accountable officer to render accounts), Article 219 (Failure of a responsible public
officer to render accounts before leaving the country).
In addition, the proposal will not only affect crimes under the RPC. It will also affect
crimes which are punishable by special penal laws, such as Illegal Logging or
Violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended. 34 The law treats
cutting, gathering, collecting and possessing timber or other forest products without
license as an offense as grave as and equivalent to the felony of qualified
theft.35 Under the law, the offender shall be punished with the penalties imposed
under Articles 309 and 31036 of the Revised Penal Code, which means that the
penalty imposable for the offense is, again, based on the value of the timber or forest
products involved in the offense. Now, if we accept the said proposal in the crime of
Theft, will this particular crime of Illegal Logging be amended also in so far as the
penalty is concerned because the penalty is dependent on Articles 309 and 310 of the
RPC? The answer is in the negative because the soundness of this particular law is
not in question.
With the numerous crimes defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code and
Special Laws, and other related provisions of these laws affected by the proposal, a
thorough study is needed to determine its effectivity and necessity. There may be
some provisions of the law that should be amended; nevertheless, this Court is in no
position to conclude as to the intentions of the framers of the Revised Penal Code by
merely making a study of the applicability of the penalties imposable in the present
times. Such is not within the competence of the Court but of the Legislature which is
empowered to conduct public hearings on the matter, consult legal luminaries and
who, after due proceedings, can decide whether or not to amend or to revise the
questioned law or other laws, or even create a new legislation which will adopt to the
times.
Admittedly, Congress is aware that there is an urgent need to amend the Revised
Penal Code. During the oral arguments, counsel for the Senate informed the Court
that at present, fifty-six (56) bills are now pending in the Senate seeking to amend the
Revised Penal Code,37 each one proposing much needed change and updates to
archaic laws that were promulgated decades ago when the political, socio-economic,
and cultural settings were far different from today’s conditions.
Verily, the primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a way that it
shall not usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in the course of such
application or construction, it should not make or supervise legislation, or under the
guise of interpretation, modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or
give the law a construction which is repugnant to its terms. 38 The Court should apply
the law in a manner that would give effect to their letter and spirit, especially when the
law is clear as to its intent and purpose. Succinctly put, the Court should shy away
from encroaching upon the primary function of a co-equal branch of the Government;
otherwise, this would lead to an inexcusable breach of the doctrine of separation of
powers by means of judicial legislation.
Moreover, it is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a Fine;
hence, it can be increased by the Court when appropriate. Article 2206 of the Civil
Code provides:
Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall
be at least three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating
circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the
deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such
indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless
the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the
defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of
Article 291, the recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's
inheritance by the law of testate or intestate succession, may demand
support from the person causing the death, for a period not exceeding five
years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of
the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of
the death of the deceased.
In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind of
monetary restitution or compensation to the victim for the damage or infraction that
was done to the latter by the accused, which in a sense only covers the civil aspect.
Precisely, it is civil indemnity. Thus, in a crime where a person dies, in addition to the
penalty of imprisonment imposed to the offender, the accused is also ordered to pay
the victim a sum of money as restitution. Clearly, this award of civil indemnity due to
the death of the victim could not be contemplated as akin to the value of a thing that
is unlawfully taken which is the basis in the imposition of the proper penalty in certain
crimes. Thus, the reasoning in increasing the value of civil indemnity awarded in
some offense cannot be the same reasoning that would sustain the adoption of the
suggested ratio. Also, it is apparent from Article 2206 that the law only imposes a
minimum amount for awards of civil indemnity, which is ₱3,000.00. The law did not
provide for a ceiling. Thus, although the minimum amount for the award cannot be
55 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
changed, increasing the amount awarded as civil indemnity can be validly modified
and increased when the present circumstance warrants it. Corollarily, moral damages
under Article 222039 of the Civil Code also does not fix the amount of damages that
can be awarded. It is discretionary upon the court, depending on the mental anguish
or the suffering of the private offended party. The amount of moral damages can, in
relation to civil indemnity, be adjusted so long as it does not exceed the award of civil
indemnity.
In addition, some may view the penalty provided by law for the offense committed as
tantamount to cruel punishment. However, all penalties are generally harsh, being
punitive in nature. Whether or not they are excessive or amount to cruel punishment
is a matter that should be left to lawmakers. It is the prerogative of the courts to apply
the law, especially when they are clear and not subject to any other interpretation
than that which is plainly written.
Similar to the argument of Dean Diokno, one of Justice Antonio Carpio’s opinions is
that the incremental penalty provision should be declared unconstitutional and that
the courts should only impose the penalty corresponding to the amount of
₱22,000.00, regardless if the actual amount involved exceeds ₱22,000.00. As
suggested, however, from now until the law is properly amended by Congress, all
crimes of Estafa will no longer be punished by the appropriate penalty. A conundrum
in the regular course of criminal justice would occur when every accused convicted of
the crime of estafa will be meted penalties different from the proper penalty that
should be imposed. Such drastic twist in the application of the law has no legal basis
and directly runs counter to what the law provides.
It should be noted that the death penalty was reintroduced in the dispensation of
criminal justice by the Ramos Administration by virtue of Republic Act No. 7659 40 in
December 1993. The said law has been questioned before this Court. There is,
arguably, no punishment more cruel than that of death. Yet still, from the time the
death penalty was re-imposed until its lifting in June 2006 by Republic Act No.
9346,41 the Court did not impede the imposition of the death penalty on the ground
that it is a "cruel punishment" within the purview of Section 19 (1),42 Article III of the
Constitution. Ultimately, it was through an act of Congress suspending the imposition
of the death penalty that led to its non-imposition and not via the intervention of the
Court.
Even if the imposable penalty amounts to cruel punishment, the Court cannot declare
the provision of the law from which the proper penalty emanates unconstitutional in
the present action. Not only is it violative of due process, considering that the State
and the concerned parties were not given the opportunity to comment on the subject
matter, it is settled that the constitutionality of a statute cannot be attacked collaterally
because constitutionality issues must be pleaded directly and not collaterally,43 more
so in the present controversy wherein the issues never touched upon the
constitutionality of any of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
Besides, it has long been held that the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments
is generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity
in respect of duration or amount, and applies to punishments which public sentiment
has regarded as cruel or obsolete, for instance, those inflicted at the whipping post, or
in the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling, and the
like. Fine and imprisonment would not thus be within the prohibition.44
It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a
penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. The fact that the punishment authorized
by the statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual. Expressed in other terms,
it has been held that to come under the ban, the punishment must be "flagrantly and
plainly oppressive," "wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock
the moral sense of the community."45
Cruel as it may be, as discussed above, it is for the Congress to amend the law and
adapt it to our modern time.
The solution to the present controversy could not be solved by merely adjusting the
questioned monetary values to the present value of money based only on the current
inflation rate. There are other factors and variables that need to be taken into
consideration, researched, and deliberated upon before the said values could be
accurately and properly adjusted. The effects on the society, the injured party, the
accused, its socio-economic impact, and the likes must be painstakingly evaluated
and weighed upon in order to arrive at a wholistic change that all of us believe should
be made to our existing law. Dejectedly, the Court is ill-equipped, has no resources,
and lacks sufficient personnel to conduct public hearings and sponsor studies and
surveys to validly effect these changes in our Revised Penal Code. This function
clearly and appropriately belongs to Congress. Even Professor Tadiar concedes to
this conclusion, to wit:
xxxx
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah, Just one question. You are suggesting that in order to determine the value of
Peso you have to take into consideration several factors.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Yes.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Per capita income.
56 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
PROFESSOR TADIAR: PROFESSOR TADIAR:

Per capita income. ... One (₱1.00.00) Peso in 1930.

JUSTICE PERALTA: JUSTICE PERALTA:

Consumer price index. That is legislative in nature.

PROFESSOR TADIAR: PROFESSOR TADIAR:

Yeah. That is my position that the Supreme Court ...

JUSTICE PERALTA: JUSTICE PERALTA:

Inflation ... Yeah, okay.

PROFESSOR TADIAR: PROFESSOR TADIAR:

Yes. ... has no power to utilize the power of judicial review to in order to adjust, to make the
adjustment that is a power that belongs to the legislature.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
JUSTICE PERALTA:
... and so on. Is the Supreme Court equipped to determine those factors?
Thank you, Professor.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
There are many ways by which the value of the Philippine Peso can be determined
utilizing all of those economic terms. Thank you.46

JUSTICE PERALTA: Finally, the opinion advanced by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno echoes
the view that the role of the Court is not merely to dispense justice, but also the active
Yeah, but ... duty to prevent injustice. Thus, in order to prevent injustice in the present controversy,
the Court should not impose an obsolete penalty pegged eighty three years ago, but
consider the proposed ratio of 1:100 as simply compensating for inflation.
PROFESSOR TADIAR: Furthermore, the Court has in the past taken into consideration "changed conditions"
or "significant changes in circumstances" in its decisions.
And I don’t think it is within the power of the Supreme Court to pass upon and peg the
value to One Hundred (₱100.00) Pesos to ... Similarly, the Chief Justice is of the view that the Court is not delving into the validity
of the substance of a statute. The issue is no different from the Court’s adjustment of
JUSTICE PERALTA: indemnity in crimes against persons, which the Court had previously adjusted in light
of current times, like in the case of People v. Pantoja. 47 Besides, Article 10 of the Civil
Yeah. Code mandates a presumption that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to
prevail.
57 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
With due respect to the opinions and proposals advanced by the Chief Justice and
my Colleagues, all the proposals ultimately lead to prohibited judicial legislation. Short
of being repetitious and as extensively discussed above, it is truly beyond the powers
of the Court to legislate laws, such immense power belongs to Congress and the
Court should refrain from crossing this clear-cut divide. With regard to civil indemnity,
as elucidated before, this refers to civil liability which is awarded to the offended party
as a kind of monetary restitution. It is truly based on the value of money. The same
cannot be said on penalties because, as earlier stated, penalties are not only based
on the value of money, but on several other factors. Further, since the law is silent as
to the maximum amount that can be awarded and only pegged the minimum sum,
increasing the amount granted as civil indemnity is not proscribed. Thus, it can be
adjusted in light of current conditions.
Now, with regard to the penalty imposed in the present case, the CA modified the
ruling of the RTC. The RTC imposed the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional in its medium period, as minimum, to fourteen
(14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal in its minimum period, as
maximum. However, the CA imposed the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision
mayor, as maximum, plus one (1) year for each additional ₱10,000.00, or a total of
seven (7) years.
In computing the penalty for this type of estafa, this Court's ruling in Cosme, Jr. v.
People48 is highly instructive, thus:
With respect to the imposable penalty, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code
provides:
ART. 315 Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the
means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 but does not exceed 22,000
pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this
paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each
additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed
twenty years. In such case, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may
be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall
be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
The penalty prescribed by Article 315 is composed of only two, not three, periods, in
which case, Article 65 of the same Code requires the division of the time included in
the penalty into three equal portions of time included in the penalty prescribed,
forming one period of each of the three portions. Applying the latter provisions, the
maximum, medium and minimum periods of the penalty prescribed are:
Maximum - 6 years, 8 months, 21 days to 8 years
Medium - 5 years, 5 months, 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, 20 days
Minimum - 4 years, 2 months, 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, 10 days49
To compute the maximum period of the prescribed penalty, prisión correccional
maximum to prisión mayor minimum should be divided into three equal portions of
time each of which portion shall be deemed to form one period in accordance with
Article 6550 of the RPC.51 In the present case, the amount involved is ₱98,000.00,
which exceeds ₱22,000.00, thus, the maximum penalty imposable should be within
the maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years of prision mayor.
Article 315 also states that a period of one year shall be added to the penalty for
every additional ₱10,000.00 defrauded in excess of ₱22,000.00, but in no case shall
the total penalty which may be imposed exceed 20 years.
Considering that the amount of ₱98,000.00 is ₱76,000.00 more than the ₱22,000.00
ceiling set by law, then, adding one year for each additional ₱10,000.00, the
maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years of prision mayor
minimum would be increased by 7 years. Taking the maximum of the prescribed
penalty, which is 8 years, plus an additional 7 years, the maximum of the
indeterminate penalty is 15 years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, since the penalty prescribed by law for the
estafa charge against petitioner is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor
minimum, the penalty next lower would then be prision correccional in its minimum
and medium periods.
Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere from 6
months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months.
One final note, the Court should give Congress a chance to perform its primordial
duty of lawmaking. The Court should not pre-empt Congress and usurp its inherent
powers of making and enacting laws. While it may be the most expeditious approach,
a short cut by judicial fiat is a dangerous proposition, lest the Court dare trespass on
prohibited judicial legislation.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November 5, 2007 of
petitioner Lito Corpuz is hereby DENIED. Consequently, the Decision dated March
22, 2007 and Resolution dated September 5, 2007 of the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed with modification the Decision dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of
the Revised Penal Code, are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the
penalty imposed is the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from THREE
58 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL
(3) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ELEVEN DAYS of prision correccional, as
minimum, to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum.

Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, let a Copy of this Decision be
furnished the President of the Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of
Justice.

Also, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives.

SO ORDERED.

59 ARTICLE 4-5 |CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL