This personal journey also symbolizes a transformation of pro-Islamist political parties in

Turkey.

In the 1980s, Erdoğan became the Istanbul provincial head of Erbakan’s Refah Partisi (RP,
Welfare Party), which was another Islamic-oriented political party that rose from the ashes of the
MSP, which had been shut down after the military coup on 12 September 1980.

In the 1990s, Erdoğan turned himself into a ‘wonder kid’ in the eyes of the pro-Islamist
political tradition. First, in 1994, he was elected as the mayor of Istanbul, a city that has a symbolic
value for pro-Islamists as the capital of the Ottoman Empire.

Then, when Erdoğan was given a ten-month prison sentence because of a poem that he read
during a speech in Siirt (a small province located in the southeast of the country) in 1997, followers of
the RP and others in the pro-Islamist political continuum perceived him as a holy martyr representing
the victimization of religious people in a secular Turkey. Without any doubt, this sentence increased
his popularity among the public.

The shutdown of the party triggered a brand-new process and in 2001, the traditionalists
established the Saadet Partisi (SP, Felicity Party) whereas Erdoğan and his friends formed the Adalet
ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP, Justice and Development Party).

Erdoğan won impressive victories during the general elections in 2007 and 2011, and local
elections in 2004, 2009 and 2014. In 2014, he became the first directly elected president of the
Republic of Turkey.

Erdoğan has stamped his mark on Turkish politics over the last 14 years. This offers us an
opportunity to explore the art of politics and leadership in action. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan uses
populism as a medium of mass mobilization in times of crisis.

The first section briefly discusses the concept of populism. The second section describes
political crises in Turkish politics during the AKP era. The third section of the paper explains the case
of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan with a particular emphasis on the relationship between politics and
populism.

POPULISM AND MASS MOBILIZATION

As a matter of fact, the ambiguity surrounding the concept is a byproduct of the

multidimensional nature of populism. The concept of populism might simultaneously refer to ‘a
movement, an ideology, a political practice’ (Laclau, 2005b: 32).

Populism as all three ‘is best seen as an appeal to “the people” against both the established
structure of power and the dominant ideas and values of the society’ (Canovan, 1999: 3). As Howarth
(2005: 204) has pointed out, populism is ‘grounded on the construction of an
underdog/establishment frontier’. Following Stanley’s (2008: 102) approach, this study will employ
the term populism as the intertwinement of four major concepts: ‘The existence of two
homogeneous units of analysis: “the people” and “the Elite”, the antagonistic relationship between
the people and the elite, the idea of popular sovereignty, and the positive valorization of “the
people” and denigration of “the elite”’. In so doing, the study will also rest on Molyneux and
Osborne’s (2017: 2) definition of populism as an ‘effect, a style, a syndrome, a device – or series of
devices – involving, to varying degrees and intensities, the myth of direct popular power – a
component of politics of different shades’. Populism is a powerful discursive instrument in times of
crisis. Political, social or economic crises provide an opportunity for populist leaders to reformulate
their arguments through the rhetoric of war. Lowndes (2005: 146) has pointed out, populist
discourse ‘has greatest purchase as an active political force in moments of crisis, when popular
sovereignty, and national identity itself, are open to new interpretations.’

On the one hand, it articulates a potential reaction to political opponents or enemies. On the
other hand, it encourages the masses to express their views, concerns and emotions through
demonstrations and protests. It imbues the people with the idea of mobilization. Ultimately, it
reaffirms the legitimacy and rightfulness of the populist political actor who claims to act in the name
of the people.

Accordingly, in moments of crisis, mass mobilization becomes the ultimate aim of populism.
First, through mass mobilization, the mutual ties between the leader and the mass are reaffirmed.
Second, mass mobilization is an instrument of crisis management. Populist leaders tend to conceive
of populism as a way to deal with the unexpected political dangers, social events or economic crises
that are likely to threaten their legitimacy and power. Third, mass mobilization is a concrete
extension of populist leaders’ inclination for creating political enemies. This dimension of populist
strategy is compatible with the fact that ‘politics always entails an us/them distinction’ (Mouffe,
2005: 56).

Through these strategies, populist political leaders inform ‘the people’ of the burning
necessity of being alert to potential dangers that are posed by ‘the elite’, or ‘the enemy’.

In this context, with the aid of the medium of mass mobilization, populism always attempts
to create a terrain in which people can react to economic and political elites or ‘enemies’. For
populist leaders, organizing demonstrations, rallies, marches and managing social media campaigns
are part of such an attempt. This political strategy enables populist leaders to energize the mass for
political aims and helps the leaders draw public attention to a certain issue or sometimes to divert
the attention from socio-political problems.

Against the first strike (2007)

In the AKP’s fifth year in power, the major source for a possible politicalcrisis was the
approaching elections of the presidency. In Turkish political culture, the presidency was mostly seen
as a titular and symbolic position that represented the values and codes of the modern and secular
republic. That the AKP held the majority in the parliament normally meant that it could elect its
candidate Abdullah Gül as the new president. But ‘normally’ is a word that one should use very
cautiously in Turkish politics.

The third wave (2016)

On 15 July 2016, Turkey witnessed another coup attempt which failed this time amid much
bloodshed. A faction within the army that operated outside of the regular chain of command directly
targeted Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and attempted to assassinate him.

Simultaneously, in Istanbul and Ankara, tanks stopped traffic and F-16s bombed the
Parliament, the Presidential Palace and the police headquarters. More than 200 people lost their
lives and more than 2000 people were injured.

Through the lenses of the AKP, other political parties and most of the ordinary citizens, the
coup attempt was planned and staged by a group strongly affiliated with the Gülen Movement.

The breaking point during the coup attempt was Erdoğan’s message, which he delivered on a
live TV programme via I-phone’s FaceTime app. Erdoğan addressed the people and urged them to go
out onto the streets and resist the coup plotters. It was not only a reply to the coup plotters who
created a WhatsApp group named Yurtta Sulh Biziz (We are the Peace at Home) – a supposed
reference to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s motto, ‘Peace at home, peace in the world’ – in order to
communicate with each other, but also a very efficient way to challenge the plotters. By the following
day, it was obvious to everyone that the coup attempt failed.

Following the failure of the coup attempt, people were invited to participate in nationwide
rallies (Demokrasi Nöbeti (Democracy Watch)) against the failed coup attempt. Once again, a
powerful populist discourse entered circulation and immediately turned into a medium of mass
mobilization. Erdoğan said:

I am requesting my heroic nation, which thwarted the armed coup attempt with its foresight
and courage, to continue the democracy watch on the streets until our country gets out of
this difficult situation for good. This incident has shown that the most effective and strongest
antidote to coup is the national will and the public.

Populism and Erdoğan’s style of leadership

First of all, Erdoğan is a leader concerned with maintaining an organic relationship between himself
and his voters, (i.e. in his words, ‘his people’). From the early stages of his political career, he has
developed a very particular sensitivity about how people in Turkey act and react.

At the end of many speeches, Erdoğan reads the lyrics of a famous song called ‘Bana her şey
seni hatırlatıyor’ (‘Everything reminds me of you’), and this song, therefore, is transformed from an
ordinary love song into a political hymn, which tells the story of the togetherness of the leader and
his people. From the perspective of Erdoğan and his supporters, this song is thought to present the
ordeals that Erdoğan and his people have faced. Erdoğan usually changes a word of the song and
instead of ‘seni’ (‘of you’ in singular form), he uses ‘sizi’ (‘of you’ in plural form). Erdoğan never quits
mentioning the genuine nature of this relationship. He communicates with the people in a common
manner as ‘one of them’, which is one of the major characteristics of populist rhetoric.

Erdoğan’s ultimate populist political strategy is always constructed in accordance with

existing cultural conflicts between AKP voters and non-AKP voters. Erdoğan is a man of political
arithmetic. He is aware of the fact that it is impossible to get the support of all social strata and
classes. He tends, therefore, to reinforce the socio-cultural base on which his own support rests (i.e.
in his words, ‘the fifty per cent’).