Am Soc (2017) 48:297–341

DOI 10.1007/s12108-017-9339-z

The French Tradition of Sociology of International

Relations: An Overview

Thomas Meszaros 1

Published online: 2 May 2017

# Springer Science+Business Media New York 2017

Abstract International Relations (IR) is an Anglo-American discipline. It was founded

in 1919 at Aberystwyth University. Immediately after the Second World War it found a
particularly fertile ground for its development in the United States. Even if the
discipline remained marked by its Anglo-American origins, a sociological school of
international relations emerged in France in the 1960s, with two main authors Raymond
Aron and Marcel Merle. This French sociology of international relations already dated
back to the eighteenth century with Montesquieu and Tocqueville. In the context of the
First and Second World Wars, Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss, produced an
embryonic sociology of international relations. After the Second World War, Aron’s
sociology of international relations marked a break with the French school. His
sociology was influenced by Max Weber and Carl von Clausewitz. He produced a
comprehensive and historical tradition of international relations sociology and his
analyses had a strong influence in IR specialists during the entire period of the Cold
War. Today, his thought continues to exert influence on French and foreign interna-
tionalists as an essential reference point of the discipline. Marcel Merle, for his part,
influenced by the work of Durkheim and Mauss, created an explanatory, positive
school studying transnational relations which exerted influence on French and foreign
internationalists as well. This contribution offers an historical overview of the devel-
opment of this French tradition of sociology of international relations from the eigh-
teenth century to the present time.

Keywords International relations . Sociology . IR theory . French tradition

* Thomas Meszaros
thomas.meszaros@univ-lyon3.fr

1
Department of Law, Jean Moulin Lyon 3 University (EA 4586 - CLESID), 15 Quai Claude
Bernard, 69007 Lyon, France
298 Am Soc (2017) 48:297–341

Sociology is a scientific study of social relations either at the elementary level of

interpersonal relations or the wider study of large groups, classes, nations and
civilizations, or to take a current expression global societies (Aron 1967a: 16)

In the first francophone Treatise on international relations ever to be edited, Frederic

Ramel finished the chapter which he devoted to Bsociology^ by the following:
BUndeniably, the questions concerning the existence and the relevance of these national
tendencies [in International Relations] – French Touch, English School, etc. – will
follow the path of sociology^ (Balzacq, Ramel 2013: 518). This statement is most true
for the French ‘Touch’, which one of the characteristic features is the development,
right after Second World War, of a sociological tradition of international relations.
The discipline of International Relations became academically recognized in Great
Britain after the First World War, with the development of liberal institutionalism and
the creation of the first chair of international politics at the University of Aberystwyth.
The discipline continued to develop after the Second World War in the United States
with the blossoming of realism, which has since become the dominant paradigm.
International Relations is originally therefore an Anglo-Saxon discipline which studies
the international milieu, which is anarchical, that is to say, a lack of State’s superior
authority (Bull 1977).
This structural insecurity has led the first Internationalists to give conflict a central
position in their reflections. Therefore, diplomacy, collective security, commerce, law
or even institutions per se are all seen in the light of anarchy and war. The increasing
institutionalization of international relations plus globalization and transnationalism
have led to the enlarging of the epistemological platform of the discipline to add
sociology besides of philosophy, law, history, economics and political science.
Studying international relations sociologically means considering them as Bsocial
facts^, which take place in a Bmilieu: the international society^, which is one particular
form of society (Vernant 1952: 299).
In the Anglo-Saxon tradition of International Relations, the sociological contribution
appears mostly from the 1970s, even though some precursors had already opened the
way. This American sociology of international relations studies, in the Behaviorist
tradition, the emergence of new actors, integration processes, transnational flows, and
then from the 1980s with the development of the Constructivist approach, representa-
tions, identities, social roles and, with its post-positivist variant, the place of theory in
International Relations.
In the history of the discipline in France, this interest for the study of
sociology of international relations appears earlier, maybe because of the
French origins of sociology.1 This sociological approach takes a different path
from that taken in diplomatic history by the analysis of Bdeep rooted forces^
produced by Jean Baptiste Duroselle and Pierre Renouvin or those followed in
law by Robert Reslob or Georges Scelle.

1
On the subject of the origins of sociology, Emile Durkheim writes: BDetermining the part that France has
played in the development of sociology during the nineteenth Century means making, mostly, the history of
this science; because it is at us and in this century that it was born and it remains for the most part a French
science^ (Durkheim 1970a: 111).
Am Soc (2017) 48:297–341 299

This French tradition of the sociology of international relations was founded by four
important figures in sociology: Emile Durkheim, whose ground-breaking work was
inspired by pre-sociologists, Marcel Mauss, himself inspired by Durkheim, Marcel
Merle, who is part of the positivist tradition of Durkheim, and Raymond Aron, who
introduced in this tradition the German sociology and notably Max Weber’s work.
Therefore, while in France international relations have been a subject which has
primarily been the concern of historians and lawyers, interested in the study of historic
facts and international norms, and while in the Anglo-American tradition it’s the
moment of the founders’ debates to the discipline, between Idealists and Realists,
and then between Ancients and the Moderns, these founding figures go on to produce
an original sociological analysis of international relations. This will terminate with the
emergence of two schools which, even if they have points in common, distinguish
themselves by the objects they study and the methods they use.
How this French tradition of sociology of international relations has been constituted
historically? Who are the precursors, who are founders and the continuators of this
tradition? What are their respective specificities and contributions? How has this
tradition been divided into two schools which study different objects, interstates and
transnational relations, each with their own methods?
Revisiting works of the pre-sociologists to find in their reflections traces of a
sociological thought on international relations may seem at first sight as a useless task
considering the secondary place that international relations take in their works.
However, such a study permits us to appreciate certain elements which bear witness
to the existence of an embryonic sociology of international relations. The First and the
Second World Wars will give a rise to this embryonic sociological thought regarding
international relations through the reflections of Durkheim and Mauss. Their precursors
work announced the foundation of a French tradition of the sociology of international
relations whose the two emblematic figures will later be Raymond Aron and Marcel
Merle. These two founders are the source of inspiration of two approaches: the first one
analyses the sociology of international relations exclusively from the interstates point of
view, the second one proposes a sociology of transnational relations. These two
schools, which will be presented separately in this article, will produce numerous
researchers whose work is of great interest for the discipline of International
Relations.2

Pre-Sociologists and the Object of International Relations

Pre-sociologists’ interest in questions of external affairs is evident with the rise of

industrialization which brought about major political, economic and social change.
These first sociological thoughts on relations between nations, go to make up the
foundation of the French tradition of the sociology of international relations. The
internationalists who later will follow the path of studying international relations from

2
We deal exclusively with French authors. The exercise of the tradition, school of thought, ideas and authors
overview is always delicate. It cannot contain authors and thoughts in rigid categories. It does not claim to be
exhaustive and to present in details complex thinking. Therefore, it is necessary to excuse sometimes the
summary nature of this presentation.
300 Am Soc (2017) 48:297–341

a sociological point of view Bare, the heirs and successors of the so called pre-
sociologists^ (Aron 1967a: 15).
Montesquieu is the first pre-sociologist where we observe sociologically biased
thoughts on international relations. His place as precursor is debated by certain sociol-
ogists such as Raymond Aron who sees him having the specific intention of being a
doctrinarian of sociology (Aron 1967a: 27). Durkheim also sees him as being the
founder who Bhas established the principles of a new science^ (Durkheim 1966: 28).
The sociological intentions of Montesquieu, in L’Esprit des lois, in accordance with
Aristotelian tradition, is as evident in his analysis of political regimes as in his analysis of
different causes which influence the organization of societies. His thought is a thought of
entirety, ambitious. It unites a theory of politics and political sociology which permit a
Bsetting out of the main problems of general sociology^ (Aron 1967a: 43; see also
Birnbaum 1970). This Bpolitological^ analysis integrates at the same time consider-
ations on the internal political system, the political regimes and their effects on the law;
Bnecessary relationships which originate from the very nature of things^, and also on
States external affairs.
In spite of his interest in foreign politics, Montesquieu does not differentiate between
internal milieu and international milieu. He considers there is a continuity between
men’s life of and that of nations. War, in itself, does not possess a particular character-
istic as with Hobbes, where contrary to the internal hierarchical order it becomes
anarchy between States. It is a social phenomenon which one finds just as easily
between individuals as between States. For Montesquieu, the first law of nature is
therefore not war, as the author of Leviathan thinks, but rather peace resulting from the
Bfeeling of weakness^ of the man in the state of nature. War, then, does not derive from
human nature. It finds its origins in society and in political regimes. It is useless,
therefore, to try to eliminate it definitively. It starts when men come together to form a
society, this is also what Rousseau thinks, when the feeling of weakness and equality of
the state of nature disappear.
Montesquieu admits that since violence is always possible in society, individuals
more often than not use tribunals to settle their disputes, and thus assure their own
preservation and their property, by the rule of law. He observes that outside society the
constraining force of the rule of law is not the same. The heterogeneous nature of nations
and political regimes limits its effects. In order to ensure their survival, States use
defensive wars (wars of conservation) in accordance to the natural law. Montesquieu
follows the line of thought already opened by Aristotle and considers that the cause of
foreign wars could be found in the nature of political regimes. Every regime, according
to the principle on which it is based and the size of its territory, possesses a particular
relationship with war. Despotic regimes, which have vast territories, are based on the
principle of fear and equality between of citizens in face of fear. These immoderate
regimes wage wars of conquest. Monarchies, which have territories of average size, are
based on a principle of honor and inequality between citizens. These moderate regimes
tend toward empire and lead wars of extension. Republics, which have small territories
are based on the principle of virtue and equality of its citizens before the law. These
regimes tend to be more pacific and moderate. Republics frequently lead wars of defense
to protect themselves from other States. Montesquieu uses this idea to say that Bsmall
societies have a greater right to make war than bigger ones because they more often
exposed to the fear of being destroyed^ (Montesquieu 1831: 263).
Am Soc (2017) 48:297–341 301

This Bright^ to go to war on the part of republican regimes is moderated by the

principle of separation of powers that govern them. In so far, as a republic is organized
in such a way as to enable Bpower to constrain power^, the power to make war cannot
be the decision of one man or a group of individuals who might, abusively, act with the
aim of satisfying their own interests regarding for prestige or power. The political
freedom at the basis of a republican regime cannot exist without a Bpeace of mind^ that
the government has to guarantee to all citizens. In a republic, the purpose of diplomacy
and war is to assure citizens’ security in order to allow their political freedom.
Montesquieu also explores the question of creating international institutions destined
to prevent or limit the effects of war.
The structural and functional analysis of Montesquieu, with its perspective of the
importance of political regimes to explain conflict (internal and external), emphasizes the
particular nature of republican regimes, the institutionalization of international relations as a
factor limiting and preventing wars as well as the benefits of cooperation. These analyses
bring to mind the ideas developed by liberal Institutionalists after the First World War.
Montesquieu’s thoughts on international relations and war were followed up by
Alexis de Tocqueville, also one of the founding figures of sociology (Aron 1967a: 223–
303; Elster 2009, see also Leca 2011). There is a central theme to his thesis: the end of
the Old regime implies the end of inequality and the rise of Bequalization of social
conditions of individuals. Tocqueville is not just an observer of social and international
reality, but also an acting magistrate and after 1849 Minister for Foreign Affairs. He
often touches on the subject of international affairs in his major work, De la démocratie
en Amérique, in his unfinished book, L’Ancien régime et la revolution, in his corre-
spondence and also political addresses and writings.
With Tocqueville, as with Montesquieu, foreign policy and war are explained by
internal factors of the society. These Bsubjects are national by nature, that is to say, they
are to do with the nation concerned and cannot be handled by one man or by the
assembly which represents the majority of the whole nation^ (Tocqueville 1848 vol. 2:
331). He also establishes a relationship between the political regime and the function of
war. BFeudal aristocracy was born from war and for war; power was to be found in
arms and maintained by arms; the most important thing therefore was military courage;
and it was natural to glorify it above all else^ (Tocqueville 1848 vol. 4: 146). In a
democracy things were quite the opposite.
In Chapter 22 of De la démocratie en Amérique, Tocqueville formulates a rule
according to which the more equal the conditions between individuals are, the rarer
warlike passions become. However, even if an increase in equality leads to a decrease
in warlike passions, which means there is a natural tendency for democratic peoples to
prefer peace, there are dangers overshadowing democratic regimes.3

3
These are of two kinds: the first is external and concerns the menace of warlike aristocratic regimes on
peaceful democratic regimes. The second is internal. It is about the individualism and democratic materialism
which can have a negative effect on the constitution of military elites. These dangers are the origin of a
paradox peculiar to democratic regimes: of all armies, it is those in democracies which are the most inclined to
make war, when of all peoples, it is democratic peoples, because of the equalization of conditions, who are the
most pacific. This paradox is explained by two reasons. First of all, by the fact that democratic regimes must
continually seek to renew the spirit of citizenship in restoring the unity of the group against an enemy and the
need to struggle against individualism and materialism withdrawal. Then, by the fact that democratic regimes
and their military elites must avoid long periods of peace which make them vulnerable.
302 Am Soc (2017) 48:297–341

Is war inevitable? For Tocqueville war is an Baccident to which all peoples are
prone^ (Tocqueville 1848 vol. 4: 206). With this argument he precedes Durkheim’s
thesis which presents war as an abnormal pathology of the international system. War is
also sometimes a necessary evil, a remedy to ills of democratic societies. It can have an
appeasing effect on the ambitions of armies and the risks of military revolutions, as also
on the individualistic withdrawal of its citizens. Tocqueville considers that the exten-
sion of the principle of equality to other States, in spite of a heterogeneity of languages,
behavior and laws, favors the emergence of the same fear of war. Equality, because this
pushes societies to develop commerce and industrialization and leads to a convergence
of interests between nations, produces interdependence so that no State can
Binflict on others the evils which are their own, and that everyone finishes by
considering war as a calamity almost greater for the vanquishers as for the
vanquished^ (Tocqueville 1848 vol.4: 242). He deduces that democracies have
less chance of making war between themselves because their interests, their
needs and their public beliefs are linked one to the other.4
Both Montesquieu and Tocqueville figures bear witness to a sociology, inspired by
English and American history which seeks to Bunderstand modernity^, that is to say the
logics of Bdecomposition^ and Bre-composition^ intern and international (Baechler
2004: 153). In France, two complementary movements explain the development of
sociology: the French Revolution and the industrial revolution, as well as the special-
ization of knowledge (see Nisbet 1984: 20).
The thinking of Saint Simon, and more extensively the socialist ideas which develop
in France in the nineteenth century, illustrate the interest of sociology for the study of
these political, social and economic transformations. This Bsocial physiology^ has
influenced French sociology (Comte, Durkheim and Mauss notably). For Marcel
Mauss, notes Frederic Ramel, Bthe emergence of a positive tradition of international
relations can be traced back to Saint Simon and his disciples, notably Enfantin and
Littré^ (Ramel 2006: 102). Saint Simon’s study of the industrialization of society sets
out the basis of a scientific law of history which foreshadows Comte’s law of three
states, and an antagonism between the classes which bring to mind the Marxism. For
him, industry is the motor of social progress. BAll by industry, all just for it^ one reads
at the beginning of L’Industrie ou Discussions politiques, morales et philosophiques,
dans l’intérêt de tous les hommes livrés à des travaux utiles et indépendants. Saint
Simon thus analyses Brevolutionary forces^ at work since the fifteenth century which
lead to the end of the theological and feudal system (Saint Simon 1965: 33–34). In the
eighteenth century, he observes the beginnings of the transition from the apparent
feudal-military system (the Bhornets nobles from the Old regime and the Revolution),
towards an industrial/scientific system not yet in evidence, but which was in the process
of developing (the Bbees^ which produce honey, that is to say money). According to
him the real power was no longer political and military, but industrial and intellectual.
In the industrial era, positive age, the temporal power of the nobility was replaced by
the industrialists, and the spiritual power of the priests by scientist. In his text De la
4
This affirmation of Tocqueville as to the rarity of war (foreign and civil) is inscribed in the tradition of the
liberal theory of democratic peace, his constructivist version and also more generally the thesis on the
obsolescence of war (see on democratic peace, Doyle 1983, 1986, 2011; Russett 1993; Russett and Oneal
2001; Weart 1998; see on the constructivist view of democratic peace, Risse-Kappen 1995a, b; Kahl 1998-
1999; Lindemann 2004; see on the thesis of the obsolescence of major wars, Mueller 1989).
Am Soc (2017) 48:297–341 303

réorganisation de la société européenne, a project of positive politics, Saint Simon

presents a social organization on a European scale, which allows this social change to
take place beyond the frontiers of the State. He proposes the creation of a European
confederation structured around institutions inspired by those of the English parliament.
This organization would be the model for a larger association, universal, based on
production, economic prosperity, circulation of goods and people and the development
of networks of communication which would enable to overcome all the conflicts.
Saint Simon, with Fourier, Proudhon and Marx share a global, unitary and holistic
conception of society which excludes all separation between the internal and external. It
is marked by the seal of historic progress, transcending the State and the inherent
conflict of the society by its reorganization (Catholic pattern of social organization,
phalanstery, federalism, etc.). These sociologies are sociologies of change, ranging
from society to international society or even global society. These sociologies approach
the international object from the point of view of globalism and are strongly marked by
ideologies which have a teleological purpose: the suppression of conflict and the
reconciliation of society with itself, Bthe culmination to a final end state of the human
spirit^ (Aron 1967a: 97).
So what about the founder of the term sociology? What attention has he pay to
international relations and to the issue of war? August Comte confirms the rise of
sociology in France, a science at the same time old and new, eventually becoming
independent of metaphysics and theology. The philosophy positive of August Comte, as
Raymond Aron points out, is thought of unity, Bhuman and social; of the unity of human
history^ which bring to mind the philosophy of Saint Simon or of Marx (Aron 1967a: 79;
see also Comte 1966, 1969). It is also a thought on order whose ambition is to classify
knowledge using laws, that is to say relationships we can observe between phenomena.5
As astonishing as it may seem, this positive science which targets the reorganization
of the social order does not take into consideration international relations or war.
However, in the tradition of Saint Simon, various aspects of these subjects are
highlighted at two different moments in the elaboration of the positive system.
Firstly, in the first two lessons of the Cours de philosophie positive, when Comte
presents the primitive theological and military state in his law of three states (Comte
1975). Wars of conquest which characterize the polytheistic Antiquity have led to the
formation of large societies. These wars of conquest, at the Middle Ages, became
defensive wars which explains, at the metaphysical age, the appearance of a relatively
homogeneous Christian Europe. According to Comte, this European monarchic system,
unable to form a Bgovernment of States^, depended on a precarious system of balance
which did not in fact prevent war but often was the cause. Even if war is an engine of
transformation of societies, work, which is a constructive activity, and industry will
progressively substitute for destructive military activities. Finally, with progress, war
itself will become a mean to stimulate and give importance to industry. As Saint Simon
already presents it, the reorganization of the social order will finish by replacing those

5
The objective is to produce a science of society’s organization (the social static which studies property, the
family, language and the division of work) and the stages of historic progress (the social dynamic, the law of
three states which focuses on the scientific spirit and its progress from the theological or military age, to the
age of metaphysical abstractions, a transitory stage, finishing in the positive age, that of the industrial society
where, as with Saint Simon, industrialists have replaced the military elites and scientists have taken the place
of priests).
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who hold spiritual power by scholars and those who hold temporal power by industri-
alists. August Comte also touches on these questions when he talks about the
positive science of politics or political science, the internal and international
pacification of the political orders, whose activities are completely turned towards
industrialization and production. The globalization, at the scale of humanity, of this
model would mean the disappearance of war and peace in international relations
thanks to a universal moral order (Comte 1978). This unity of humanity, the
BGreat Being^ (Grand Être), implies as with Saint Simon a reorganization of the
society, first of all the Western society, under a federal structure. The proximity of
Comte’s thinking to that of Saint Simon bears witness to a common platform of
positive and socialist thinking, which one also finds with Emile Durkheim, the
father of the French school of sociology.6
Durkheim, if he agrees with research into the evolution of societies, such as
that carried out by August Comte or Herbert Spencer, criticizes Comte’s
reduction of sociology to one program of research: that of the law of social
dynamics. On the contrary, he considers that Bthe very nature of positive
science is that it should never be completed. The subjects considered are much
too complex to ever be so. If sociology is a positive science, it is certain that it
cannot be contained in one issue, and on the contrary is made up of different
parts, separate sciences, corresponding to different aspects of social life^
(Durkheim 1970b: 147).
In spite of this affirmation, Durkheim does not include either political
sociology or the study of international relations in his classification of sciences.
However, international relations and war are B'social phenomena of which it
should be possible to make into a science′, but for him this science does not
exist even in an embryonic state^. (Durkheim cited in Favre 1982: 8). The
absence of any explicit reference to political sociology or to sociology of
international relations and war does not mean that Durkheim is not interested
in these questions, on the contrary. One finds in L’Année sociologique a
heading entitled BPolitical organization^, and in volume 5 another on BWar^
which wasn’t retained, but the contributions on Bthis social phenomenon,
wrongly identified as the same and unique phenomenon throughout the ages^
are presented later under the heading entitled Binternational morals^ (Favre
1982: 18). Finally, Durkheim is very interested in political geographic studies,
notably these pioneer of Friedrich Ratzel. They are classified under the heading
in L’Année devoted to Bpolitical morphologies^.7 For Durkheim, political ques-
tions are a Bconstant preoccupation^ (Lacroix 1990: 113; see also Lacroix
1981). Bernard Lacroix even considers that the whole of Durkheim’s work
should be seen as a preliminary study of the genesis of political phenomena.

6
Durkheim succeeded at the ‘Aggregation’ of philosophy in 1882. In 1887, he is given the Chair of education
and social science at the Faculté de Lettres in Bordeaux. In 1906, he is given the Chair of the science of
education at the Sorbonne which in 1913 will become the Chair of the science of education and sociology.
7
Even if Durkheim regrets that Friedrich Ratzel’s method and object of Anthropological-geography is too ill-
defined, he considers that: Bthese books are not only rich with interesting and ingenious insights, but he
[Ratzel] has the great merit of taking geography out of isolation where it languished, to bring it closer to
sociology, to make of it a truly social science, and he opened the way for what promised to be fruitful studies
(Durkheim 1900).
Am Soc (2017) 48:297–341 305

One can read the whole of Emile Durkheim’s work as the essay to realize
this preliminary initiative which ultimately allows a better understanding
of political phenomena, without it containing anything superfluous or
arbitrary. In this perspective, the fact that the sociologist considers phe-
nomena or mechanisms which we consider to be explicitly political, is of
minor importance (Lacroix 1990: 114).

Lacroix and other critics of Durkheim, such as Frederic Ramel, remind with
precision that the founder of French sociology and his work are inseparable from the
socio-historic context of the IIIe Republic when social and political crises are linked.
The Dreyfus Affair, the Commune, the defeat of 1870, make up the historical episodes
which have marked Durkheim and his sociology. His works such as, La division du
travail social or Le suicide are the fruit of his reflections on the impact of
industrialization on society and individuals. Socialism is seen as a consequence of
industrialization of society. In this context of uncertainty, Durkheim’s ambition is to
contribute to the moral reform of society and to its unity. His desire to create a scientific
moral - an inheritance of Charles Renouvier whose disciple he was - based on
solidarity, is embedded in a positive rationalism, the purpose of which is pragmatic
(Bwithout this, these researches would not be worth one hour of one’s time^).
The sources of Durkheim’s work are two-fold. On the one hand they are to be found
in his readings of the precursors of sociology, mainly Aristotle, Montesquieu and
Comte. 8 With the latter he shares the ambition of producing an autonomous field of
social science. The other source is that of German thinkers such as Schaeffle, Wundt,
Wagner, Ihering, Tönnies, and Simmel, which Durkheim had the opportunity of dis-
covering on a study trip to Germany in 1885 (Mucchielli 1993: 8).9 Durkheim, just as
Raymond Aron before the Second World War, had the opportunity, during his trips to
Germany, to perceive the mind-set which had developed the other side of the Rhine. The
First World War inspired him to write two books: L’Allemagne au dessus de tout. La
mentalité allemande et la guerre, published in 1915, and Qui a voulu la guerre? Les
origines de la guerre d’après les documents diplomatiques. Etudes et documents sur la
guerre, published in 1915 with Ernest Denis (Durkheim and Denis 1915). Frederic
Ramel draws attention to a third contribution to complete the two preceding ones. The
fifth lesson of L’Education morale (Ramel 2006: 13; Durkheim 1963). This publications
bear witness to the evolution of Durkheim’s stance, in that a few years previous, he
would have considered that even though diplomacy and war were subjects of sociology,
no such science of these social phenomena existed, not even in an embryonic state.
With these three works, Emile Durkheim changed his opinion and situated himself
as founder of sociology of international relations, a few years before the official birth of

8
His Latin thesis which is complementary to his principal thesis on La division du travail social, is related to
La contribution de Montesquieu à la constitution de la science sociale.
9
Laurent Mucchielli also presents the role that Celestin Bouglé played in importing to France the thinking of
George Simmel and that of Maurice Halbwachs in the reception of Max Weber’s work in France (Mucchielli
1993: 9–15). Therefore, the idea according to which Raymond Aron was the origin of the introduction of
German sociology to France, mainly with his work La sociologie allemande contemporaine, and that a radical
opposition between the French durkheimian school of sociology and the German weberian school would be an
Bhistoriographical myth , because Durkheim had no knowledge of the works of Weber and the durheimians
were not recalcitrant to Germans sociologies (Mucchielli 1993: 15–17).
306 Am Soc (2017) 48:297–341

the discipline of International Relations in 1919. Contrary to most of his predecessors

who tackled the questions of relations between socio-political units and the question of
peace and of war, Durkheim used a specific methodology, which he had developed in
Les Règles de la méthode sociologique, in order to highlight the causes of the First
World War.
In spite of his interest in political geography, Durkheim considers that the First
World War Bcannot be explained in geopolitical terms because the location of the State
at the heart of its strategic environment does not constitute a prime factor. The First
World War rather finds its origin in the ‘German soul’ which, despite its different
expressions is characterized by an inherent state or special mentality^ (Ramel 2006:
14). This soul, illustrated by the works of the German historian Heinrich von
Treitschke, is marked by a will to power (Wille zur Macht) and explains why the
State in international relations should continually be driven by its desire for power. This
is the reason for the violation of international law and a conception of international
relations which is universally (it is the essence of the State to seek power) and eternally
(State as a political entity cannot be transcended) violent. The behavior of Germany is
therefore explained by the all-powerful State, which is above the will of individuals and
groups and above the law and morality. War between great powers, from which small
States are excluded, is a normal activity because it is the expression simply of their will
to power. Durkheim contests this theory of the State and this conception of international
relations which for him are directly inspired by Machiavelli (Durkheim 1991: 36;
Machiavel 1952). For him Bthis morbid hypertrophy of the will, this mania of the
desire^ evident in Germany at the outbreak of the First World War is a Bsocial
pathology^ (Durkheim 1991:84, 85; Ramel 2006: 18–19). This behavior is abnormal
because it does not take into account of the international milieu which, like the internal
milieu, has judicial and moral constraints which impose on States a certain moderation
in their relations (Durkheim uses terms in his sociology of international relations such
as milieu, normal, pathological, which were developed initially in physiology by
Claude Bernard, see notably Ramel 2006).
Durkheim, therefore makes a distinction between two milieu on the basis of what is
normal and abnormal: the internal milieu, which is a place of organic solidarity and the
external milieu which is mechanical. 10 Internal conflicts (revolutions, civil wars,
homicides) can be considered as normal because they become legitimate as soon as
social inequality is too great (Ramel 2006: 26). On the other hand, foreign wars are
always the exception, an abnormal, pathological state.
Unlike his precursors, Durkheim does not see a remedy to this pathology of the
international milieu. He does not propose a world State or an international society ruled
by organic solidarity on humanity scale. He thus avoided the stumbling block which
tripped up Saint Simon and his new catechism, and August Comte and his religion of

10
Kenneth Waltz uses this lecture of Durkheim in his theory of international relations. Structural realism
originates with the principle that the permanence of the international system’s structural anarchy is the
consequence of the unforgiving character of solidarity between States (Waltz 1979). Other authors, however,
take the other foot and consider that on the contrary a process of integration supported by universal moral
principles has permitted the emergence of an organic solidarity in international relations reducing the risk of
anomy and manifestations of abnormality of the international system (Larkins 1994; Barkdull 1995; Badie
2002; for a synthesis of how Durkheim’s thought is used in Waltz’s, Larkins’ and Wendt’s works see especially
Ramel 2004a:497, b: 739).
Am Soc (2017) 48:297–341 307

humanity. If the solution is not to be found on an international scale, Durkheim

considers that it exists at the point in society where the action of the State will favor
individual development:

Formerly, the action of the State has been facing without, it is now destined to
turn more and more within. Because it is by the organization of the whole and by
that alone, that society will manage to arrive at the objective that it must follow
above all else […]. Organize social milieu in such a way that a person
can fulfill himself most completely, revise the collective machine so that it
does not weigh so heavily on individuals, assure the pacific exchange of
services and the competition of those idealistically inclined and of good
will, all carried out peacefully together. Isn’t that enough to keep the
public domain busy? (Durkheim 1950: 67)

The origins of change are not to be found outside society. They are in society and in
every man. These considerations bring to mind the importance that Aristotle,
Montesquieu and Tocqueville give to the State and to political regimes in the fulfill-
ment of its citizens. The condition for change in society is the fulfillment of human
individuals and this goes far wider than the international milieu. This Borganization of
the cult of man^ must be for him the only function of the State. Durkheim’s project is
far from being idealistic. On the contrary it appears to be objective and realistic. He
realizes that the organization of the cult of man by the State can only happen if:

Each society lives isolated from others, without having to fear hostilities. But we
know that international competition has not yet disappeared; that even civilized
States live partly in fear of war in their mutual relationships. They threaten one
another and since the most important duty of a State regarding its citizens is to
maintain intact the collective unity, it has to organize itself with this end in mind.
A State has to be ready to defend itself and also to attack if it feels menaced. But
for this type of organization there must be a moral discipline different from that
necessary for the cult of man. It is oriented in a different direction. It does not
have the needs of the individual in mind but the collective. It is the traditional
discipline which survives because the old conditions for the survival of the
collective have not yet disappeared (Durkheim 1950: 67).

Marcel Mauss was the nephew and disciple of Durkheim and he would perpetuate
the tradition of this French school of sociology. Obtaining a Doctorate in philosophy in
1895, he was named professor of sociology at the College of France in 1931. He was
one of the pioneers of ethnology and inspired, through certain of his texts, the structural
anthropology of Claude Lévi-Strauss. The two World Wars were to have a profound
effect on him (he had an active role as interpreter with the British troops at the time of
the First World War) and were to influence his thoughts notably on war and the life of
nations. As a journalist and militant socialist he would devote several newspaper
articles in La Vie socialiste and in Le Populaire to these questions. This interest in
international politics would also find an echo in his scientific work. In the tradition
inherited from Saint Simon, Comte and Durkheim, Marcel Mauss considers that the
study of human society, general sociology, must take into account both national social
308 Am Soc (2017) 48:297–341

phenomena and international. 11 Mauss considers that, contrary to other subjects of

sociology, international relations and war are the areas where work could still be done
by sociology, because these are subjects of recent knowledge the study of which dates
back to the jus gentium Middle Ages’. Mauss therefore Bintended to found a real
positive sociology of international relations because international relations are social
relations of a superior type that sociology must recognize (Ramel 2006: 31; see also
Mauss 1969: 455).
In his study on The nation, Mauss makes two observations.12 The first concerns the
process of forming larger and larger groups which themselves collect together both
small and large societies. This process can be established as an historical law. The
second bears witness to the importance that the increasing interdependence of nations
has in making the constitution of these groups larger.

International phenomena, as before with national phenomena, have become more

and more numerous and increasingly important. That is to say it is evident that if
they have always existed, as we have seen with regard to the notion of civiliza-
tion, they have, in the last thousand years of history, increased in strength and
frequency. Commerce which stretches over larger areas, wider and more com-
plete exchanges, ideas and fashions borrowed more swiftly, waves of religious
and moral movements, the conscious imitation of institutions and legal and
financial regimes; finally resulting in the increasing and deeper knowledge of
literatures and languages has led both big and small nations and even today some
of the most backward societies in the world to a state of permeation and
increasing dependence (Mauss 1969: 607).

The originality of Mauss’s sociology of international relations resides in his

reformulation of positivism, as a successor to Comte and Durkheim, whose objec-
tive was to study the Bmilieu des milieux that is to say Ball the international
conditions, or better, inter-social conditions, of life between societies^ (Mauss,
1969: 608). For the disciple of Durkheim, a society is a mileu composed of
individuals. International society is the milieu for societies which have already a
milieu. Marcel Mauss insists on the complexity of international relations. It is the
consequence of the increasing interdependence of nations at the heart of the milieu
des milieux and the processes which enlarge society. His sociology of international
facts or Binter-social^ (as opposed to Bintra-social^ facts or national facts), origi-
nates in the physiological order, that is to say the dynamics of social structures
which can be warlike, peaceful or supranational (civilizations). Frederic Ramel
rightly notes that the interdependence and intensification of international relations
11
Sociology can be divided into two areas of study: that of social morphologies that is the study of groups of
human beings from a demographic, anthropological-geographic or geographic point of view (initiated by
Friedrich Ratzel and which Durkheim found particularly interesting), and that of a social physiology concerned
with structures in movement, and the function of these structures (Mauss 1969: 205). The first studies the
group which forms society (to take the terminology of Comte, the static social). The second studies the
representations and movements of this group (with Comte the dynamic social).
12
Marcel Mauss initially intended to publish a major work on the Nation. This project remained incomplete.
He presented a communication on the same theme at the Philosophy Congress in Oxford in 1920 entitled Bthe
Problem of Nationality^. The publication entitled The Nation correspond with the fragments published in 1956
by Henri Lévy-Bruhl in the review L’Année Sociologique (Fournier 2004: 207).
Am Soc (2017) 48:297–341 309

in Mauss concerns different domains, which gives him an originality in the sociol-
ogy of international relations: Babsolute economic interdependence; considerably
increased moral interdependence (notably since Wilson’s fourteen points were
established); the desire by the people to no longer make war; the desire for peace;
the limitation of national sovereignty^ (Ramel 2006: 88; Fournier 2004: 210).
Marcel Mauss’s sociology of international relations, unquestionably demonstrates
his personal engagement with socialism in the context of his time.13 The post-World
War One period is marked by a wish to prevent another conflict. It is for this reason that
the first Chair of international politics was created at Aberystwyth in 1919. The
emblematic figures of pacifism and the institutions which were to be created in the
period between the two wars - such as Wilson and his fourteen points, presented before
Congress in 1918 which, after the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, lead to the establishment
of the League of Nations, platform for Aristide Briand and Gustave Stresemann to
present, in 1929, their project for the construction of a BEuropean Union^, and in 1928
Frank Kellogg’s and Aristide Briand’s signature to a pact declaring that war Billegal^ -
all this bears witness to an internationalism ideal to which Mauss adheres.
The originality of the times with the increasing interdependence of nations and the
creation of the League of Nations, led to the emergence of an international morality
which, henceforth, States were obliged to take into account when taking action. Even if
Mauss did not consider the League of Nations had sufficient means to carry out
sanctions in order to apply international law, nevertheless the result was a moral
constraint on States to limit resorting to violence in their relations.
In Mauss’s communication on Nations and internationalism published in 1920, he
applied the concept of organic solidarity coined by his uncle, to describe the interna-
tional milieu and thus further developed the embryonic sociology of international
relations initiated by Durkheim (Mauss 1969: 626–634). This so called organic soli-
darity was to allow the development of conditions for peace at an international level.
This process is inscribed in the continuity of the idea of progress after which the
movement for the intensification of international relations, notably thanks to increased
exchanges, networks and technological tools of communication, produced an increase
in membership and a transformation of the morphology of society. However, this
process, even if it led to a rapprochement between nations, did not lead to a world
society and a universal peace. Just as Emmanuel Kant, Marcel Mauss considers that this
universal peace was more a horizon towards which one should aim but which was still
far from being realized. Where he is optimistic, is concerning the progress being made
in bringing nations together which, like Saint Simon and August Comte, should go to
make up ever larger entities and take the form of confederations or federations. The
formation of a group of countries which have been pacified, that is to say an interna-
tional society, having the same traits as a national society, will happen little by little. For
Mauss, peace will ensue from these new forms of organization which were to be
developed as time passes using the League of Nations as model.
This step, sociologically speaking, is limited to highlighting the features of this
dynamic. He observes that this process of interdependence is paralleled by a dynamic
of penetration of the internal and external milieu and in this, notes the importance of

13
As a committed militant socialist he is close to Jean Jaurès. He is a founding figure in the newspaper
L’Humanité. Similar to Durkheim he takes a stance in the Dreyfus Affair.
310 Am Soc (2017) 48:297–341

political regimes (and bring to mind the observations of Aristotle, Montesquieu and
Tocqueville).14 He also mentions the risks of nationalistic tensions and regressions in
his analysis. Mauss is conscious of the risks that can stem from such changes at an
inter-social level and the traps that can be formed. His contribution to a new light being
cast on socialism is a response to this danger. Mauss does not see socialism and
nationalism in opposition to one another. Nationalization, he writes Bis the most recent
form of socialism and that which has the most future^. Neither does he see nationalism
and internationalism in opposition to one another. For him, the nation is the vector of
internationalization. This is the reason for which he does not immediately envisage
bypassing the nation in creating a world society, but rather sees a process of rapproche-
ment by nations which will eventually produce federations or confederations of States.
Mauss’ thinking is above all a though on modernity and questions the disruptions
taking place on an international scale. It is setting out the ground-work for a positive
sociology of international relations but nevertheless remains limited by his commitment
to his political ideals. In this sense, Marcel Mauss is more an author of transition.

With Mauss, there is, therefore, as with Frederic Ramel, a sociology of interna-
tional relations founded on a fact, the international character of modern society:
increasing interdependence of nations, whether economic, political or cultural,
and the growth of social belongings and political identities. This is a sociology, as
with the whole of Mauss’ work, that is backed up by epistemological and
methodological principles: empirical necessity and defense of positivism, rejec-
tion of a primary explanation whether it be economic, cultural or political, the
notion of total social fact and linkage of social facts. But Mauss’ analysis remains
embryonic and has its limits, one of which ideological: Mauss is a committed
intellectual and supports Wilson believing in the virtues of arbitration as a way of
solving conflict (Fournier, Marcel 2004: 12-13).

In spite of work which is unfinished, Marcel Mauss is not just a successor to Emile
Durkheim’s sociology of international relations. At a time when the discipline of
International Relations is being institutionalized in the Anglo-Saxon world with an
initial big philosophical debate between idealists and realists, he appears as the last
precursor or the primary founder of a positive sociology of international relations, the
aim of which is to explain the complexity of groups of international phenomena in
studying the international milieu and inter-social conditions.

Raymond Aron’s Comprehensive Sociology of Interstates Relations

The tradition of a positive sociology of international relations dates back to

Durkheim and Mauss. However, their contributions, even though important, still
remain the seeds of the discipline. Paradoxically, it is in breaking with this
positive and holistic influence that the sociology of international relations will

14
In his analysis of the Franco-German conflict, he established a link between democracy and peace and an
imperial regime and war. Also in his articles on the Boar War, he analyses the link between conflict and
capitalism (Mauss 1997: 208, 89; see Ramel 2006: 103)
Am Soc (2017) 48:297–341 311

take a new departure with the founding works of Raymond Aron.15 His thinking
is influenced by his precursors, notably Montesquieu and Tocqueville, also by
English and American thinkers (his empathy of the United States will eventually
bring him criticism) but mostly by German.

I would happily say that when I try to philosophize, my culture is German in

French, and when I reflect on politics, I’m in the Anglo-American world. In last
analysis, I do not think in German, neither do I in American, neither in French
(Aron 2006: 906).

Aron was one of the first (together with Maurice Halbwachs) to introduce in French,
in 1936 with his book La Sociologie allemande contemporaine, the works of German
sociologists, notably those of George Simmel, Leopold Von Wiese, Ferdinand Tönnies,
Alfred Vierkandt, Othmar Spann, Franz Oppenheimer, Alfred Weber, Max Scheler,
Karl Mannheim and especially Max Weber (to whom he devoted a complete chapter)
(Aron 1935). Raymond Aron chose not to follow the positivist thought of Saint Simon,
Comte and Durkheim. He also refused the methods used in the behaviorist revolution in
the United States, as the systemic analysis something that Marcel Merle was using at
this time. Raymond Aron opted for the comprehensive approach of Max Weber, which
was for him a stimulating sociological approach to international relations. As Frederic
Ramel emphasized regarding Weber:

His thought almost immediately penetrated the field of international rela-

tions. It represents one of the sources of realism which was making its
mark after the Second World War and constitutes today a necessary place
in the increasing importance of the history of the sociology of interna-
tional relations (Ramel 2006: 63; see also Guilhot 2017: 63).

The political sociology of Weber makes a break with the tradition of Durkheim. This
is one of the reasons which pushed Aron to find his motivation there, the political

15
The work of Raymond Aron is particularly dense and atypical. It covers nearly the whole of the twentieth
century. It comprises philosophy (1938a; 1938b; 1961; 1964; 1965a; 1965b), sociology (1935; 1963a; 1966;
1967a; 1971), International Relations (1962; 1973; 1984b), strategy (1948; 1951; 1959b; 1963b; 1976),
political science (1955a; 1955b; 1957; 1958; 1959a; 1968; 1972; 1977). As a journalist, his articles on war
have been published in three volumes: De l’armistice à l’insurrection nationale (1944), L’Age des empires et
l’avenir de la France (1945), L’Homme contre les tyrans (1946). These three volumes have been united in one
work: Chroniques de guerre. BLa France Libre^, 1940–45, published in 1990 (Aron 1990a). The articles
written for the Figaro (1947–77) have been united into three volumes by Georges-Henri Soutou: tome 1: la
guerre froide: 1947–1955, tome 2: la coexistence 1955–65, tome 3: Les crises 1965–77 (Aron 1990b; 1994;
1997). His editorials for L’Express have been all put into one work: De Giscard à Mitterrand: 1977–1983,
prefaced by Jean-Claude Casanova (Aron 2005a). He started to write mainly for the newspaper La France
libre, when he was engaged in the Free French Forces in London, then for Combat, Le Figaro and L’Express.
Once he had returned to France after the war, in 1944, he was offered the Chair of sociology at the University
of Bordeaux. He refused this to devote his time to journalism. After, he taught at the Ecole Nationale
d’Administration (ENA), then at the Political Studies Institute (IEP) of Paris. He became a Professor at the
Faculty of Lettres et sciences humaines at Paris University then later Directeur d’Etudes at the Ecole pratique
des hautes études and then, last of all, Professor at the Collège de France, holding the Chair of BSociology of
Modern Civilization until 1978. He founded a review Les temps modernes (with Sartre) in 1945, then the
review Commentaire in 1978 with Jean-Claude Cassanova.
312 Am Soc (2017) 48:297–341

sociology of Weber studies politics in its agonal dimension.16 Weber’s sociology is one
of the study of struggle, both inside and outside the State. BHe was not one of these
sociologists, such as Durkheim, who believed that the military functions of the State
belonged to the past and was fast disappearing. He believed that conflicts would always
exist between the big powers and he wanted Germany to unify in order to hold an important
place in the world’s arena^ (Aron 1967a: 562). In his political sociology, Weber studied the
allocation of power inside the State and outside the State. Within the State, the monopoly of
legitimate physical violence is in the hands of the State itself (Weber 1959, 1979). At an
international level, this monopoly did not exist. Relations between States are marked by
permanent struggle. Conflict is therefore a constant of social life, in spite of the shape of it
and origin changing from time to time. In international relations a system of law is
insufficient to limit the conflicts which States are prone to. Weber does not envisage a
superior structure to States such as a world society or world State, which would temper this
situation of permanent conflict. There are two reasons for this: first of all because conflict is
an essence of politics and then because the Nation-State represents an impassable horizon.
The specificity of international relations, the absence of a monopoly of legitimate violence
superior to the State, reminds us of Hobbes’s view of the state of nature. In spite of the
anarchy which is characteristic of the international system, Weber does not vindicate
Realpolitik. On the contrary, he criticizes it and considers that reason of State is the only
form of objective rationality which can serve to organize the priorities of the State, which
are mainly those of survival (see especially Ramel 2006: 71–76).
The reason for the interest which Raymond Aron has for Weber’s sociology of
international relations can be understood no doubt in view of his own personal
experience of the war. Man and his thoughts are the product of two separate contexts.
The first is intellectual, being that of the debates ensuing from existentialism and
communism, the second is political, that of war, first of the Second World War and
then the Cold War which was characterized by a balance of the reign of terror and a
series of major international crises with the impossibility of direct confrontation
between the two great powers (Bimpossible peace, improbable war^). These two things
will have a lasting effect on the thinking and work of Aron (Soutou 1991). The first
because it sets the foundation of the intellectual debate of the time, in which Raymond
Aron will take part as commentator of Marx, of Kojève, and of Sartre, as journalist and
analyst of the internal politics of the State. The second will lead him to consider
strategic questions and develop his thinking on foreign politics and also produce a
sociology of international relations, that is to say a sociology of the bipolarity of the
international arena, more precisely a sociology of bipolarity (Aron 1963b, c). Raymond
Aron is soon to write his first works on international relations, war and strategy, namely
Le Grand Schisme (1948), Les Guerres en chaîne (1951), La Coexistence pacifique,
Essai d’analyse (written using the pseudonym of François Houtisse and published in
1953), La Société industrielle et la Guerre (1959b). The numerous articles on Bthe
theory and method of international relations^, written in Etudes politiques and later Les
societies industrielles also date from this period (Aron 1983: 299, 1972, 2005b). His
16
The sociology of Max Weber is a sociology of conflict and domination. Some of his writings on the types of
power and the configurations of domination date to before the First World War. They bear witness to the
interest that Weber has for the questions which are of central importance in his study of the modern world and
which are sociological, historical and comparative (Weber 2015; see also the article by Hubert Treiber on the
sociology of domination in the recent works on Max Weber, Treiber 2005).
Am Soc (2017) 48:297–341 313

major work on international relations, Paix et guerre entre nations, and also the
publication of numerous newspaper articles written during and after the Second
World War are his crowning achievement.
After reading Marx and Weber, Aron then reflects on the subjects of conflict and
domination. According to the tradition of Weber and Clausewitz, he considers interna-
tional relations and war as sociological objects. The specificity of these subjects is found
in the difference which exists between the internal and external order: society is
characterized by the monopoly of legitimate physical violence, the international order
is characterized, on the contrary, by the absence of this monopoly of coercion, that is to
say by the legality and legitimacy of resorting to armed violence by the different actors
(Aron 1967b: 843–845; see also Launay 1995). This distinction is of fundamental
importance to the sociology of international relations because it defines the subject of
study. The internal, the space where the monopolization of violence has led to the
suppression of Bthe war all against all is the concern of political sociology. The external,
space where the absence of monopoly of violence implies maintaining permanent
conflict of States one against another, is a matter for the sociology of international
relations. War is the central subject of this sociology. It exists at an international level,
writes Kenneth Waltz, Bbecause nothing can prevent it^ (Waltz 1959: 188). Aron does
not consider it to be a pathology of the international system but a normal phenomenon. It
is an invariable which structures the history of the international system. War is undeni-
ably an historic fact and also a social reality, but of a particular type:

International relations are driven by the alternatives of war or peace; evidently,

war is an historic event of considerable importance, inherent to centuries’ history,
since there is no civilization which has not known war and even protracted wars
of varying frequency; but this historical phenomenon seems not to be a social
phenomenon at first sight or, if I can say, it has the unique character amongst the
subjects of sociology to be at the same time both social and asocial. It is sociality
because of a certain social relationship between those who fight, but simulta-
neously it is the very negation of the term social, because those who fight agree
upon their enmity and the breakdown of social relations. Sorokin puts civil wars
and foreign wars in the same category, calling the phenomenon breakdown of
social relations. In other words, in this quite classical perspective, war is more a
dissolving of social ties than a social phenomenon itself (Aron 1963c:308).

The sociology of international relations must therefore study this particular social
phenomenon: war. This specific sociology is all the more important in the nuclear age
when the political costs of a conflict have profoundly changed and require a rethinking
of the traditional scope of thought which has prevailed up to the present in the study of
international relations:

Why am I so interested in military affairs? This started during the last war. I felt
ashamed that no French intellectuals had reflected on war. And then, there is
another reason which seems to me to be more important, and that is nuclear arms.
Using nuclear arms is no longer warfare in the ordinary sense of the word.
Nuclear warfare has become a subject of philosophical consideration. In fact,
when using an arm so as not to deploy it effectively or where the arm becomes the
314 Am Soc (2017) 48:297–341

way of avoiding the war, we leave the competence of military specialists and
enter that of the political philosopher (Aron 2006: 906)

This philosophical reflection on the nature of war is complementary to a sociology

of war, and concerns different forms of war during the Cold War (guerilla warfare, war
of liberation, etc.) and the Bconcrete study of international relations^ which for Aron, is
both historical and sociological (Aron 1967b: 852; see also Launay 2007). A theory of
international relations must contain the three dimensions of philosophy, sociology and
history. The theory that Aron puts forward concerns the international system, that is to
say the entity constituted of political units having regular relations with each other and
which are susceptible to being implicated in a general war (Aron 1984a: 103). This
theory, the aim of which is praxeologic, puts the accent on three emblematic figures of
international relations: the diplomat, the soldier and the strategist (in Paix et guerre
Aron only makes reference to the diplomat and the soldier, but in the rest of his works
he shows the importance of the strategist). Through these key actors, it is possible to
separate, among general international phenomena, the specific diplomatico-strategic
relationships between independent political units, in order to study them.
From an ontological point of view, since war is not a relationship between one man
and another but a relationship between States (Aron 1984a: 113), the international
system which Raymond Aron studies is the interstate system, more precisely of a whole
composed of political units (the States) which have Bregular diplomatic relations^ and
which are susceptible to make war (Aron 1984a: II). Aron does not reject the idea of a
transnational society, such as that described by Marcel Merle, evidenced by
Bcommercial exchanges, migration of people, common beliefs, cross-border organiza-
tions and finally ceremonies or competitions open to members of all these units^ (Aron
1984a: 113). On the other hand he does not accept the idea of a world society or an
international society which would encompass Bthe interstate system, the economic
system, transnational movements, the different forms of exchange (of commerce in the
wider 18th century view) from civil societies to civil societies, supranational
institutions^ (Aron 1984a: VIII). In short, such a society would include all the
aspects of Binternational life^ and would no longer have the characteristics of a
society. Thus, Raymond Aron, contrary to Marcel Merle, uses the concept of a
system Bin a non-rigorous way^ (Aron, 1984a: VIII). He does not seek to produce a
systemic analysis of international relations, neither to produce an explicative global
theory of international phenomena. For Aron, it is a meaningless task to try and
produce a general theory of international relations (Aron 1962b, 1967b). Just like
Weber, he refuses all causal, deterministic and absolute explanations. His theory is part
of a comprehensive logic, that is to say one which permits the understanding or
interpretation of international facts. He seeks to establish sociological typologies (a
method using the ideal type inspired by Weber and Tocqueville) developed using
principles (in Montesquieu’s sense of the word) rather than determining laws (Aron
1984a: 179 et 180). His method, inspired by the hermeneutic tradition of Hans-Georg
Gadamer and also weberian tradition, has as aim to understand the behavior of actors
and make the meaning they give to their behavior more objective. This objectification
is made possible thanks to the construction of concepts useful to analysis.
Anarchy, that is to say absence of monopoly of legitimate violence, existing
at an international level, provides insights into why there is the quest for
Am Soc (2017) 48:297–341 315

permanent power on the part of States which seek to assure their security and
prestige on the international scene. The behavior of States is the result of the
material configuration of these power relationships expressed in terms of po-
larity (bipolarity or bi-monopolarity, oligopolarity, multipolarity or polypolarity)
and in terms of homogeneity and heterogeneity according to the degree of
legitimacy of the political regimes (these concepts were inspired by Panayis
Papaligouras, see Papaligouras 1941; Aron 1984a: 103, 1983: 302; see also
Piquemal 1978). Therefore, the behavior of States can be understood according
to the configuration of the structure of the system (polarity) and the nature of
the international system (homogenous, heterogeneous) (Aron 1984a: 103).
From the first the works of Raymond Aron had an important resonance on
the other side of the Atlantic. The ideas have been taken up or commented on
by influential internationalists such as Hans Morgenthau, Morton Kaplan,
Hedley Bull, Henry Kissinger, Robert Tucker, Oran Young, Kenneth Waltz
and of the Franco-American, Stanley Hoffmann, who would contribute widely
to the international diffusion of the works of Aron (Hoffmann 1965, 1983a, b).
As Dario Battistella points out:

An enquiry by APSA, in the 1970s, puts Aron amongst the six most important
theoreticians, and Paix et guerre entre les nations is considered to be the third
most influential work in the discipline, behind Politics among Nations by
Morgenthau and System and Process in International Politics by Morton A.
Kaplan, but placed in front of Twenty Years’ Crisis by Edward H. Carr, Political
Community and the North Atlantic Area by Karl Deutsch, Man, State and War by
Kenneth N. Waltz, and Strategy of Conflict by Thomas C. Schelling (Battistella
2013: 167).

Raymond Aron still occupies an important place in the discipline both in France and
abroad. Jean-Vincent Holeindre indicates that Aron is still today the most cited author
in the two most important manuals of the discipline in France (Dario Battistella and
Jean-Jacques Roche) and the most cited author in America (for this last point see
Brown and Ainley 2009 cited in Holeindre 2012; 322).
Was Aron a realist or a neorealist? Even today this question is the starting
point of interesting debates between mainly French internationalists. First of all,
because of the indefinable character of his work. Then, because Aron himself
mistrusted the categorization of schools or trends. During the second debate of
the discipline between Ancients and Moderns, he does not take part in the
quarrel between Morton Kaplan and Hedley Bull. Even if he is intellectually
drawn towards the traditional approach associated with history, philosophy and
law rather than the Bmodern^ approach inspired by the behaviorist revolution,
he nevertheless recognizes its value. Finally, because he was a complex man
with his contradictions and personal conflicts.
His political work and his work on international relations follows in the
wake of Tocqueville, Weber and Clausewitz with whom he had Bchosen
affinities^. BAll three have in common split or torn personalities. All three
are men who are fundamentally sad, because they see reality as ruthless such
as it is, and besides they are either romantics, or nostalgic of an order which
316 Am Soc (2017) 48:297–341

has disappeared, or just passionate^ (Aron 2006: 906). Raymond Aron shared
with them the same hurt and the same sadness in front of 20th century violence
which he would also study in an unpitying way. As a young Jewish student in
Germany between the wars and resistant during the war, he saw the end of one
and the birth of a new order divided ideologically where the balance of terror
ruled. He therefore understood the importance of producing a thought on the
question of the relationship between societies and politics without sacrificing
his objectivity towards a philosophical ideal, with realism.

I have discovered different people from myself in modern society, of the likes of
Hitler and those who followed him. From this time on, I have, so to speak, been
purified once and for all, of that I would call academic idealism. I have had the
feeling at one and the same time, that politics is tragic and that one could only
have reasonable opinions if one respected, as far as is possible, others and
accepted differences of opinion (Aron 2006: 904-905).

Raymond Aron was resolutely realistic, both with his attitude towards pol-
itics and in his own intellectual thought process (see Frost 1997; Hassner 2007;
Roche 2011a, 2011b; Battistella 2002, 2012a, b). Steadfastly anti-totalitarian, he
thought that a Bsincerely humanistic society^ such as inspired by Kant was
possible and he shared with Rickert, Dilthey and Weber a Bliberal conception of
the philosophy of history^ (Aron 1981: 315; Canguilhem 1985). His attachment
to the freedom of human action was totally incompatible with a teleological and
deterministic view of history (Aron 1984b; Bourricaud 1985; Holeindre 2012).
As an adept of reasonable and moderate thought, he believed in virtue and
prudence in politics and in the importance of having conduct which was
Breasonable^, especially in this nuclear age.
This agonizing of the Bcommitted spectator^, between realism and liberalism,
sometimes taking the form of a rift, produced with him the desire to overcome,
by criticism, the limitations of the two approaches (Châton 2012; Holeindre
2012: 331). This desire sometimes took him to be more skeptical than realist,
more relativistic than rational. His skepticism pushed him to discuss all the
hypotheses in order to develop his thoughts, his relativism taught him to
beware of ideas that were too rigid. His both realistic and rationalistic perspec-
tives, his Bliberal realism^ (Jangène Vilmer 2013), led him to consider the State
as the central player in international relations. His skepticism and his relativism
made him avoid considering the national interest in a rigid sense and power
seeking to be the essence of politics, as is presented by the classical realists
since Hans J. Morgenthau (Aron 1967b: 862; Montbrial de 1985). His interest
in the endogenous factors of political units, mainly his reflections on homo-
heterogeneity and the legitimacy of political regimes and on democracy and
totalitarianism, differentiates his thoughts from those of the neorealist, Kenneth
Waltz, whose area of study is the structure of the international system and
relations between the units of the system, excluding all the internal factors to
the State. In short, Aron’s sociology of international relations goes beyond the
two dominant paradigms of the discipline. Even more, with the place given to
Bideas and intersubjectivity^, this sociology could be envisaged as an Bopening^
Am Soc (2017) 48:297–341 317

to the constructivism perspective (Holeindre 2012: 330 and 331; for a construc-
tivist approach to the war see Lindemann 2008).
Aron’s historical sociology of international relations would suffer criticism
notably from Alain Touraine, François Châtelet, Marcel Merle and Bertand
Badie in France, and Ben Kerkvliet and Oran Young in America. 17 This
criticisms generally relate to the place that Aron gives to the State as central
actor in international relations, to the importance he gives to the war, to the
under estimated role of non-state actors, to the lack of space given to social and
economic movements, to international law, to the inequality between the North
and the South, and also to the rejection of the idea of a world society. Even if
criticism is valid regarding some of his arguments and hypotheses, Aron is
nevertheless recognized, by the majority of specialists, as having given
International Relations an important position in France, which in its turn has
given space to a fruitful debate between the Anglo-American approach to
sociology and the more comprehensive historical French approach of German
inspiration. His contribution to the sociology of international relations is funda-
mental (Friedrichs 2001). He has produced a theory of international relations
which is original because it is a mixture of philosophy, as a way of forming
concepts, sociology, which describes international life with a view to understand-
ing the dynamics, and history, which gives a view in time of the evolution of
political forms and societies.
In spite of the originality of his thought and his work, Aron did not wish to
create either a school or a place of worship (Riesman 1985). It happened
naturally. BMaster without a doctrine^ (Baechler 1985b: 64), passionate about
debating, he opened a door for researchers who wished to subscribe to this
intellectual and multidisciplinary tradition, generally during seminars which
brought his Bdisciples together (Jean Baechler, in his homage to Aron entitled
Maître and disciple, shows us the way in which these seminars unfolded, see
Beachler 1985a, b). His name has been given to a research center, Le Centre
d’Etudes Sociologiques et Politiques Raymond Aron (CESPRA) which unites
researchers from all horizons to work on political questions from a philosophic,
sociologic, historic or anthropological perspective.18
The diversity of work originating from the ideas of Raymond Aron is
enormous. This continues to be true both in France and abroad. Among the
successors to this tradition, it is important to note three of his Bdisciples^, who
each in their way, have given a new dynamic to Aron’s tradition: Jean
Baechler, Julien Freund, Jean-Pierre Derriennic.

17
On the different critics addressed to Raymond Aron, see especially the reminder that Jean-Vincent
Holeindre gives at the debate organized by the review Annales following the publication of Paix et guerres
entre les nations (Braudel et al. 1963). We also find there the response that Raymond Aron makes to his critics.
See also Marcel Merle’s text, written after the death of Raymond Aron, which go over the same differences
and similarities of their respective sociologies of international relations (Merle 1984). See also the text written
by Bertrand Badie who questions the specificities and limits of the theory of international relations proposed
by Raymond Aron (Badie 2005b). See finally the elements formulated by Dario Battistella concerning the
critics of Marcel Merle and Bertrand Badie (Battistella 2013: 164–173; Battistella 2012a). For the criticism of
Ben Kerkvliet and Oran young see Kerkvliet 1968 and Young 1969.
18
Initially it is a question of Institute Raymond Aron, where his archives are located and which was created in
1984 by François Furet who was then Director of the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS).
318 Am Soc (2017) 48:297–341

The work elaborated by Jean Baechler lies within the framework of this tradition of
an historical sociology of international relations and of war.19 This sociology is rooted
in a precise epistemology because Jean Baechler distinguishes between sociology as a
discipline and sociology as a science:

As a discipline, sociology, as for philosophy and history, does not have its own
study objective. The complete human adventure is its objective. But our com-
prehension is such that we can only understand segments of what goes to make
up humanity. Each segment is governed by a scientific subject such as demog-
raphy, politics, criminology, suicide studies, economic science and so on […]
There is one or more sciences of realities that one can call Bsocial^, just as others
are called economic, political or religious, but this or these social sciences must
for cognitive necessity resort to the philosophical, historical and sociological
point of view (Baechler 2004: 152)

According to Jean Baechler, the sociology of international relations is a science

because it studies a specific segment of reality. As a science it is indissociable from an
historic and philosophic approach, which Raymond Aron also puts forward in his
sociology of international relations. Philosophy has the function of defining the object.
The function of sociology is the method used to study this object. Historical situations
serve to verify the theories developed.
Jean Baechler’s sociology of international relations is inscribed in the tradition of
Simmel and Weber. Man, the political animal, is a conflictive being. This affirmation
requires to reflect philosophically on conflict as the essence of politics and on politics
as a means, both historical and material, of resolution of conflicts.
The concepts of politie and transpolitie, which are philosophical constructions, give
us a way of studying different social morphologies and their relations (band, tribe, city,
cast, feudal system, market center, capital city, nation). These polities are endowed with
Binstitutions for the resolution of conflicts and have the capacity to lead actions, notably
wars against other polities^ (Baechler 2005: 7). A politie is therefore a Bgroup with
pacific internal tendencies and virtual tendencies to war externally. War supposes and
results from the existence of at least two polities which make up a transpolitie^ (Baechler
2005: 113). Jean Baechler advances an historical sociology of relations between polities
or an historical sociology of transpolities. This comparative and historical sociology of
transpolities opens the way to an exploration Bof the fabrication of modernity in its
international dimension^ (Ramel 2013: 515; see also Baechler 2011b). At the base of this
sociology we find the weberian and aronian idea of a difference between the internal,
where the tendencies are to pacifism, and the external where conflict is always possible.
19
Jean Baechler was Professor of historical sociology in Paris IV – Sorbonne from 1988 to 2006. He was a
member of the European Centre for Historical Sociology of Raymond Aron (1969–1984). He submitted his
thesis for a Doctorate in 1975, entitled Les suicides, under the direction of Raymond Aron. He is an honorary
member of the Groupe d’Etudes des Méthodes de l’Analyse Sociologique de la Sorbonne (GEMASS), founded
by Raymond Boudon. He is a member of the Académie des sciences morales et politiques (Institute of France).
His work is particularly profound and rich, mainly about ideology (Baechler 1976), power (Baechler 1978),
capitalism (Baechler 1971, 1995), democracy (Baechler 1985a, 1994), international relations (Baechler 1993,
1996), and war (Baechler 2016; Baechler and Holeindre 2014). Lastly, Jean Baechler produced a major
anthropological work which tried to include all dimensions of humanity (see Baechler 2000; 2002; 2005;
2006; 2008; 2009a; b; 2010; 2011a; 2013; 2014).
Am Soc (2017) 48:297–341 319

The exercise of power, where the political aim, both inside the polities and outside,
consists in putting a term to opposition in society. At the heart of a politie pacification
has the objective of installing justice as a mean of settling differences. At the level of
the transpolitie, it is a question of assuring safety for each politie, by negotiation,
diplomacy, or by war.
In the logic of game theory and in the tradition of Aron, Jean Baechler,
considers that the number of polities influences the strategy of the rational
actors who try to maximize their power or reduce their vulnerability in order to
guarantee their security. He defines four ideal types of transpolitical configura-
tions: the monopolar, dipolar, oligopolar and polypolar systems. Each configu-
ration implies a particular strategy for war and peace. The oligopolar system is
reputed to be the most stable because it unites five to ten polities which
prevents one of them from being more powerful than the others. The strategy
is chiefly defensive, war is limited and peace as a synonym for Bnon-violence^
rests on balance (Baechler 2003: 7–10; Baechler 1994). The definition of the
ideal types of transpolities implies the consideration of the political regimes of
the polities, which go to make them up, which reminds us of Aron’s logic of
homo-heterogeneity.
In Baechler’s reflexions on globalization which is part of his work on
universal history, he considers the possibility of going beyond national State
and foreign war, and over and above war and peace, thus giving an unexpected
angle to the tradition of Aron. He considers that in order to guarantee individ-
ual sovereignty there has to be a world politie. BThe benefits would be
enormous, because war, which has existed from Neolithic times, will disappear
completely from the history of mankind^ (Baechler 2003:13). The monopolar,
dipolar or polypolar structures will not allow the transition towards this world
politie. Only the installation of a stable oligarchic structure, bringing together
the chief powers of the international system, will allow a gentle transition
towards the world politie (Baechler 2007; see also Baechler 2002). Finally,
with Beachler, war, which is of Neolithic origin and is inherent in the relations
between polities, could be overcome by putting in place a world politie (unitary
or federal). Even so, conflict will not disappear completely since it would
always be present in the heart of a politie in the form of civil war.
In parallel with Jean Baechler, another disciple of Raymond Aron, Julien Freund has
also produced a sociology of international relations concerned primarily with conflict.
This particular sociology of conflict is completely within Aron’s tradition.20 Together
with Gaston Bouthoul, he has developed a new French branch of sociology:
polemology or the science of conflicts. Even if there is a similarity between the two
men, their approaches are different. Julien Freund is influenced by the German

20
Like Jean Baechler, Julien Freund, also completed a Doctorate with Raymond Aron. Their paths have
points in common. Both were engaged in the resistance during the Second World War. At the end of the war
Freund became a teacher. He later obtained a doctorate in philosophy. He became Director of research at the
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) between 1960 and 1965. In 1965 he defended a thesis at
the Sorbonne on the essence of politics. He is named Professor of sociology at the University of Strasbourg
where he contributed to the development of the Faculty of Social Science and where he founded several
centers for research notably the Institut of Polemology.
320 Am Soc (2017) 48:297–341

sociology of Georg Simmel and Max Weber (whom he has translated) and by the
political theory of Carl Schmitt.21
His thought, marked by agonistics, is also at the heart of his reflections on
the essence of politics. Julien Freund considers that hostility is a constitutive
part of society. This proposition has both an existential and intellectual expla-
nation. Freund has an existential experience of war which has drawn him to the
subject of conflict. And, just as Aron reproached Bsecond generation of
Durkheimians^, Bthe serenity of their choices, their implacable optimism, their
indifference to Marx, their inclination to avoid conflict^, Freund wanted to
break free from a French sociology which he found to be too Bdull^ and full
of Bclear conscience^ (Aron 1971: 19; Freund 1983: 7). He chose a less
intellectual, more authentic and more existential sociology. The sources of his
thought, from an intellectual point of view: Aristotle, Machiavelli, Simmel,
Weber and Aron all have in common that they consider conflict to be a
characteristic of human nature and society. Aristotle, in opposition to Plato’s
idealism, to the separation of matter and form, to the search for principles
regarding a static and eternal supralunar world, developed a dynamic ontology
turned toward to an end (Τέλος), the order and stability of the city. The nature
of beings and things in the tangible reality, sublunar, is in the making. It is
marked by the corruption of time, that is to say by a process of inevitable
change of matter. Man, rational animal, sociable and political being has as his
aim the search for happiness. Making this objective reality, means using
politics, that is to say using the best possible regime. But Aristotle knows that
no political community is perfect, nor is any political system, each has within it
the deviant form of its own objective.
Julien Freund, inspired by the philosophy of Aristotle which for him was a revela-
tion, sought to establish a theory of the essences. The ‘social’ is the fruit of interactions
of activities such as politics, economics, judicial, artistic, religious, moral, etc. Freund,
like Aron through his praxeology, questions the patterns of political activity and seek its
essence. There are three antithetic couples or universal categories which make up
politics: commanding and obeying, the public and the private and the friend and the
enemy. The first, commanding and obeying, is the supposed basis of all political
relations. The second, of public and private, concerns internal politics and differentiates
between the two orders. Finally, the third, the friend-enemy, concerns external politics
and is characterized by peace and war.
For Freund, history is the product of this dialectic of the essence and that of
antithetic couples. Politics, just as with the legal system, has the function of creating
a space where violence is the exception. It manages this in opposing one collectivity to
another. If this tendency towards peace is possible within political units, it is not
completely possible outside. And wars, even if they are not common phenomena, bear
witness to the hostility which exists on the international stage. Even if Julien Freund
considers the unifying function of politics and the possibility of friendship in interna-
tional relations, he thinks that the creation of a world State or a world society is utopian.
It would, by definition, mean the end of politics.

21
The work of Julien Freund is, as is that of Gaston Bouthoul, very dense (see especially Freund 1965, 1966,
1968; 1970, 1983, 1996).
Am Soc (2017) 48:297–341 321

Jean-Pierre Derriennic is another Bdisciple^ of Raymond Aron. 22 His original

contribution to International Relations derives from the sociology of international
relations and also in the sociology of conflict. In his article on the actors and
strategies of international conflicts, Jean-Pierre Derriennic draws attention to the
tendency which consists in Bdenying this traditional distinction between internal
and international politics and substituting new conceptual frameworks^
(Derriennic 1971: 817):

Thus, one has attempted to apply systematic and functioning methods of analysis,
which first of all were used for the study of national societies with a minimum of
integration, to the study of international relations: the international system is itself
a social system where there are functional specializations working within and
where regulatory processes operate. It is not surprising that such an endeavor
would give weak results in analyzing conflicting aspects of international relations
but would be fruitful in the analysis of phenomena which relate more to internal
politics: the process of regional integration, the function of international organi-
zations, the appearance of a worldwide public opinion and of international
arbitration procedures (Derriennic 1971: 818).

If Jean-Pierre Derriennic recognizes the fundamental importance of the separa-

tion of internal and external, on which Aron has based his sociology of interna-
tional relations, he insists equally on the interdependence of internal and external,
that is to say the manner in which the external politics of a State are determined
by internal constraints and conversely the influence of international relations on
internal politics (Derriennic 1974: 817; see also Derriennic 1980). The internal
divisions of a country can have consequences on foreign policy and on war. At the
same time, decisions which are taken by policymakers of a country can be
motivated by internal politics without considering that there might be international
or military implications. As Tocqueville has already shown, public opinion can
mobilize in favor of extreme positions in an argument, and can also have a
negative effect on international negotiations or in conducting war (Derriennic
1974: 290). Conversely, the international environment can be a constraint on
internal politics, it can influence certain polls or the politics of certain actors,
political parties or unions or even public opinion (Derriennic 1974: 293).
In fact, this is a criticism directed at observers who consider that Bthe
distinctions between internal politics and international politics, or between civil
war and war between States, have lost their pertinence^ (Derriennic 2001: 16–
17). He recognizes that transformations which are currently taking place in the
international system (an increase in transnational exchanges, porous borders,
multiple allegiances, criminalization of violence, etc.) are important. But in the
face of these changes it is not appropriate to challenge the structures of
traditional analysis of international relations. On the contrary, he proposes using
22
Jean-Pierre Derriennic defended his thesis for a Doctorate in Political Science, entitled Esquisse de
problèmatique pour une sociologie des relations internationales in 1978 under the direction of Raymond
Aron. Agrégé of Philosophy, he was researcher at the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques (FNSP)
then Director of Research at the Centre d’études et de recherches internationales (CERI) and Professor at the
Political Studies Institute (IEP) of Paris, he is today Professor at the University of Laval in Canada.
322 Am Soc (2017) 48:297–341

sociology of international relations to elaborate his own sociology of conflict,

the main subject of which is civil war.
The aronian tradition is present in all of his work on civil war. The introduction,
prefaced by Pierre Hassner, admits that Bthis essay of Jean-Pierre Derriennic is certainly
the best book in French on civil war and probably the best on war, since Paix
et guerre entre les nations^ (Hassner 2001: 11). Besides mentioning Pierre
Hassner, Jean Baechler’s and Julien Freund’s ideas are used in the book to
present Derriennic’s arguments on political regimes, democracy, ideology
(Baechler), or on polemology (Freund).
Jean-Pierre Derriennic takes up the distinction between war and conflict
established by Raymond Aron, and also that between the international system,
marked by the absence of a monopoly on legitimate violence, and the national
society, marked by the monopolization of violence. The characteristic trait of
the international system does not only reside in the possibility of using vio-
lence, which exists in all societies, but in the legality and legitimacy of using
violence. On the contrary, in national societies use of private violence is illegal
and illegitimate. Paradoxically, civil war produces in the heart of a society more
anarchy than exists in international relations. This is explained notably by the
multiplicity of actors present (governments, organization or groups whether
subnational or transnational).
From a methodological point of view, Jean-Pierre Derriennic does not look
for one rule or law, but rather for tendencies. In his work on civil war, he uses
methodological individualism and, in the tradition of Weber, he elaborates three
ideal types of war: partisan wars (of religion or political party), socioeconomic
wars (of slavery, revolution, violent enterprises) and wars of identity (ethic and
nationalistic).
The question of the future of civil wars does not have as back-ground the
idea of Bthe progress of humanity^, nor even the negative idea that nothing will
change. Even if one observes a reduction in slavery and in wars between States
since the eighteenth century, the same does not go for civil war. However,
Jean-Pierre Derriennic is optimistic about the future. According to him, democ-
racies, which are the most powerful States of the international system, normally
cooperate and intervene Bbenevolently^ together in countries affected by civil
war (Derriennic 2001: 268–269). This hypothesis partly echoes the optimism
with which Aron regarded the rational conduct of politics in the nuclear age. In
the actual context, however, most people would hold to Pierre Hassner’s
formula of Bagnosticism or even Aron’s skepticism regarding the future of
civil wars.

The Rise of a Holistic and Positive Sociology of Transnational Relations

Aron’s sociology has played a fundamentally important role in the development

of International Relations in France. However, a challenge to this appeared very
quickly with a positive and holistic school of sociology following the lines set
out by Durkheim and Mauss (see notably the presentation of the history of the
discipline in France by Dario Battistella, Battistella 2013: 164–173; see also
Am Soc (2017) 48:297–341 323

Battistella 2012a). The internationalist who will continue this current of soci-
ology, of which transnational relations is the main subject, is Marcel Merle who
is a trained lawyer.23
Merle’s afiliation with Durkheim and Mauss, is explained partly by the legacy and
by the fertility of the work of the disciples who continued the spirit of L’Année
Sociologique. The main objective of this project was to present sociology as a new
discipline in France with the sociological contribution of these Bspecial sciences^. In
fact, the disciples of Durkheim will continue to explore numerous areas such as
ethnology (Marcel Mauss, Paul Fauconnet), economics (François Simiand, Maurice
Halbwachs, Georges and Hubert Bourgin), religion (Henri Hubert, Robert Hertz),
criminality (Paul Fauconnet, Jean Ray), psychology and the sociology of knowledge
(Célestin Bouglé, Dominique Parodi, Paul Lapie) or geography (Albert Demangeon
and Antoine Vacher). In these fields of study, law has an important place because of its
link to religion and morals. In fact, the contributors to this field are numerous (Gaston
Richard, Louis Gernet, Paul Fauconnet, Georges Davy, Emmanuel Lévy, Paul Huvelin
notably). However, political sociology is still not considered a science:

Political sociology appears to have a specific status, within the field as a subject
that is not clearly defined and even neglected. In teaching, is it not often engulfed
in an ill-defined general body of work: Bgeneral sociology and politics^? And the
area it covers, is it not less studied and consequently is less well defined than
other areas of sociology? Without doubt the reasons for this go back a long way:
let us not forget that political sociology was never classified in the plan of
L’Année Sociologique, plan which was a real category of knowledge for gener-
ations of sociologists. The existence of a Bpolitical science^, which has some-
times been used as a synonym for political sociology, but more often than not has
argued its specificity, has been institutionalized for the last thirty years not in the
Faculties of Human Science, but in the Faculties of Law and Political Studies
Institutes [IEP], where the teaching of other branches of sociology, has served to
make the status of political sociology more ambiguous and its area of study less
distinct (Chazel, Favre 1983: 365; see also Leca 2001).

There are three dates of fundamental importance to French political science: the creation
of the free school of political science by Emile Boutmy in 1871, the publication in 1913 of
the Tableau politique de la France de l’Ouest by Andre Siegfried and in 1951 the publication

23
Graduate from the Ecole libre des sciences politiques and agrégé in Public Law, Marcel Merle was director
of the Political Studies Institute (IEP) of Bordeaux, he also taught as Professor at Paris 1 University and at the
Political Studies Institute (IEP) of Paris (as underlined by Lyons, Marcel Merle was a colleague of the theorist
of "Third World strategies", Edmond Jouve, see Lyons 1982; Jouve 1979). The subject of his thesis for his
Doctorate, Le process de Nuremberg et le châtiment des criminels de guerre (1949), shows his interest in
international questions. Together with Raymond Aron, Marcel Merle, has given to the sociology of interna-
tional relations a place in the French academic domaine. Among his works, the most importants are La vie
internationale (1963), Pacifisme et internationalisme XVIIe et XXe siècles (1966), Sociologie des relations
internationales (1974), Force et enjeux dans les relations internationales (1981), La politique étrangère
(1984), with Christine de Montclos, L’Eglise catholique et les relations internationales (1988), Les acteurs
dans les relations internationales (1986). La crise du Golfe et le nouvel ordre international (1991) and Bilan
des relations internationales contemporaines (1995).
324 Am Soc (2017) 48:297–341

by Maurice Duverger of Les partis politiques. The refusal by the followers of Durkheim to
classify political sociology has for a long time limited political science to judicial analysis in
the domain of public law, before opening up to other areas such as sociology.
The study of international relations proposed by Marcel Merle follows the same
route. In Sociologie des relations internationales, of which he will publish three
versions (1974; 1976; 1982), he proposes a critical and methodological study of the
approaches which have developed in the discipline since the end of the Second World
War.24 Then he redefines the subject matter of the discipline apart from those already
existing. For him, international relations are to do with Ball the transactions or flows
across borders and even those that might cross^ (Merle 1976: 141).
For Marcel Merle, sociology which is a science with a global vocation, the role of
which is explicative but which goes beyond a viewpoint of simple description, is the best
adapted to understand these transnational flows. His thinking takes up some of the analyses
originating in the positive tradition of Saint Simon, Comte, Durkheim and Mauss. Merle
seeks to produce a sociology of international relations which proposes a systematic view of
all international phenomena. For him, the questions of society do not stop at the borders of
States but must be considered in their globality. 25 This global analysis has been made
possible by Bthe closing off of the international system^, that is to say Bthe progressive
occupation which today has been completed, of all space which is habitable by man [this]
has united the limits of the international system with those of the planet. It is because the
system has become global that it appears to have closed in on itself^ (Merle 1976: 440).
Merle’s objective is not to elaborate a general theory of international relations. He
agrees with Raymond Aron in that such an enterprise would be useless in the current
complexity of the international reality. His objective, similar to that of current Anglo-
Saxon sociologists who seek an explanation regarding the function of the international
system, is to establish a method of analysis for international facts. He is particularly
drawn to systemic analysis, pioneered by such people as David Easton. He studied the
international system, its milieu and its actors:

I intend to refer to the international system as the group of relations between the
principal actors which are the States, international organizations and transnational
forces. Consequently, the environment will be made up of a group of factors
(natural, economic, technologic, demographic, ideological) the combination of
which influences the structure and function of the system (Merle 1976: 146).

These factors, making up the environment, which influence the structure and
function of the system, are the constraints which weigh on the actors and influence
their behavior. Henceforth, the actors are many: States now share the international

24
The classical approaches: philosophy, inspired by Thomas Hobbes and Machiavelli, judiciary, inspired by
Jean Bodin as represented by Georges Scelle, and diplomatic history, see works of Pierre Renouvin and Jean-
Baptiste Duroselle.
25
This idea of Marcel Merle echoes the proposition of Gerges Scelle formulate in 1948 in his Manuel de droit
international public, who adopted a similar perspective to that of Marcel Mauss and Emile Durkheim in
considering that Binternational society does not result from the coexistence of States, but on the contrary from
the interpenetration of peoples by the international Community (in the largest sense of the word). It would be
very strange if the phenomenon of sociability stopped at the borders of a State^ (George Scelle cited in Ramel
2006: 89).
Am Soc (2017) 48:297–341 325

scene with intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations (religious

organizations such as Churches, unions and organizations of similar type), multina-
tional firms and international public opinion (Merle 1974, 1986, 1988). Just as did
Marcel Mauss, Merle observes an increasing interdependence between these different
actors which leads to, from the point of view of Binternational life^, a decline in the
central role of the State (even if the State remains a major actor) and also the political
and military factors to the advantage of the socio-economic. As a consequence, this
leads to the progressive erosion of the barrier between internal and external (Merle
1963).26 Foreign policy and war are an illustration of this blending of the internal milieu
and external milieu.
Modernity has moved foreign policy or Bthat part of the activity of the State turned
towards to exterior^ (Merle 1984: 4), into a new age, where international affairs are not
the concern only of the Prince, as was the case in Machiavelli’s time. Consecutive
social changes and the increase in technological progress, economic and political
changes linked to the weakening of the executive and legislative powers, and leading
to the increasing importance of both internal forces and transnational forces (political
parties, pressure groups and regional, national and international public opinion), have
brought about a change in attitudes which means rethinking foreign policy, not any
longer as a monolithic whole but as the result of decisions of an executive under
multiple influences (this is also the opinion of Jean-Pierre Derriennic) (Merle 1995).
Henceforth, foreign policy is subordinate to internal politics which explains the
Birrationality^ of certain diplomatico-strategic actions, as was the case in the decoloni-
zation of Algeria and the war in Vietnam. Marcel Merle is in agreement with
Montesquieu and especially Tocqueville as to the manner in which choices concerning
external policies are conditioned by the orientations of internal politics (Merle 1996). In
fact, decisions in foreign policy (except, he says, for matters concerning the nuclear) are
essentially the fruit of internal constraints. In pluralistic political systems, the political
parties, he thinks, do not appropriate international questions or if they do, give clearly
identifiable reference points to their citizens, with which they can feel comfortable.27
And so, in order to make politically coherent choices, he suggests approaching the
question of foreign politics in terms of Bcompénétration^ (in the sense of mutual
penetration) of internal and external milieu. His analysis offers an interesting

26
The thesis of Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye has the same logic as that of Marcel Merle. In their work
Transnational Relations and World Politics they show the importance of the emergence of transnational actors
who possess their own foreign policies and which the States cannot control (Keohane and Nye 1972). This
assessment questions the State-centered paradigm of the dominant realism, devoted to the appearance of a
Bpluralistic paradigm^ which confirms the ever more important role of the non-state actors in world politics.
The work of James Rosenau, Linkage politics, Essays on the Convergence of National and International
Systems is also complementary to the work of Marcel Merle who sought a convergence between national
societies and the international system (Rosenau 1969). In The Study of Global Interdependence (1980) and
Turbulence in World Politics (1990) the analysis reminds Marcel Merle’s reflections, notably on the interde-
pendence of actors in the international system (tourist and terrorist), or the emergence in parallel to the
interstate system of a Bmulti-centered^ system which is the result of: the decline of the capacity of the State, an
increase in the competences of citizens, changes in the role of authority and loyalty (new allegiances which
disperse loyalty), increasing influence of groups and public opinion (see Rosenau 1980, 1990). In short
changes which happen within the State and which impact on the international system.
27
For example, Marcel Merle shows that during the legislative elections in 1978 in France, foreign matters
were not of major political importance. They only became so when translated into choices to be made in
internal politics (see Merle 1978: 467–506).
326 Am Soc (2017) 48:297–341

point of view on the existence of competing foreign policies (multinational

firms, non-governmental organizations, international organizations and private
groups) to those of the State. The State does not control them because they are
initiated by private interests whose objective is to influence and structure their
own environment (see mainly Charillon 2002: 13–29).
In contrast to Aron and his followers, Marcel Merle does not devote the most part of
his work to the issues of peace and war. He concludes that these are particularly
complex phenomena. He refutes the dualism of internal/external and privileges a
pluralistic approach. He also refutes the classical distinction between peace and war
which according to him is no longer obvious. Guerilla warfare, international crises and
tensions which are characteristic of a period of decolonization and the ideological
conflict between East and West, have produced Bgrey zones^ and are the result of
disorder and instability created by important movements or groups. Even if the
international system achieved his closure his evolution is in the making and this is
evidenced though by movements or turbulences which are the consequences of the
crisis of the nation-State and implies the rethinking of his role at the dawn of the
interpenetration of the internal milieu and external milieu. This crisis coincides with the
development of transnational forces and networks which are in economic, political and
ideological competition with it (Merle 1981, 1983). This crisis also corresponds to the
rise of regionalism and federalism, as shown by the European project, which weakens
the sovereignty of States. Thus, the causes of the transformation of conflict are Bplaced
alongside other more important causes present simultaneously on three levels: the
closure of the Westphalian system, the transformation of the role of the State, the
subjectivation of violence at an individual level, which bring us back to the question of
the increasingly ill-defined limits between internal and external (Bigo 1998: 329).
Marcel Merle, contrary to Raymond Aron, has seen the end of the bipolar world and
witnessed the emergence of a new post-Cold War international world. In his Bilan des
relations internationales contemporaines he confirms that the State remains the actor
par excellence of the international milieu even if it is no longer possible for it to control
the activities of other actors of the international system. Is this the sign that there is a
tendency for the international system to move towards a global society, as described by
John Burton in 1972? Marcel Merle does not see a way open, in these transformations,
for the creation of a world society of this type. He does not believe in the creation of an
authority above States, utopia which would resolve all international conflicts. He
believes in the possibility of an international society based on law, but he considers
that it is up to States to bring this into being. Even more, he is particularly critical of the
idea that an international and stable order can be instituted in this post-Cold War era
(Merle 1995). Examples of this can be found in the Gulf War and the various conflicts
which have occurred in the ex-Soviet Union. They, in fact, show the limitations of
collective organizations of security such as the United Nations or other international
and regional organizations. The inefficacity of law and democracy, in pacifying the
international system, is also illustrated (Merle, 1991).
Looking at Marcel Merle’s work one can legitimately question two aspects: First,
why his sociology of international relations has not drawn on other sociology special-
izations, such as the sociology of organizations or the sociology of war and conflict,
which developed round about the same time? In fact, the birth of polemology after the
Second World War with Julien Freund and Gaston Bouthoul (in reaction to the irenic
Am Soc (2017) 48:297–341 327

spirit of conciliation which marked the beginnings of the discipline of International

Relations between the two wars) could well have been fed by the works of Marcel
Merle. Especially since the work of Gaston Bouthoul on the function of wars is marked
by a positive approach following the durkheimian sociology. 28 In the same way that
Durkheim sought to observe scientifically the phenomenon of suicide, Bouthoul
observed scientifically the phenomenon of war. His positive sociology of war could
be considered complementary to the positive sociology of international relations
developed by Marcel Merle.
Then, in the French context where the theories of international relations are
experiencing a boom notably with the contributions of Raymond Aron (1962) or even
Jean-Baptiste Duroselle (1981), why did Marcel Merle not produce a theory of the
international system, inspired by American internationalists (see Morton Kaplan 1957
or Kenneth Waltz 1979), which examine the actors and configurations which are
possible in the international system in terms of balance and polarity? Finally, rightly
or wrongly, Marcel Merle can be reproached for voluntarily limiting his development
of a method of analysis of the international system. Why? Because for him, it seems
that the international milieu is fundamentally dependent on the internal milieu and
socio-political factors. It is in using the tools developed by political sociology that it is
possible to comprehend these mechanisms. One could suggest that Marcel Merle, when
considering the interpenetration of the internal milieu with the external milieu (he
affirms that the international milieu has an impact in all areas of social, cultural,
economic and political life) and in giving in his explanation of the function of the
international system a major importance to internal phenomena on international phe-
nomena, removes all specificity to the international dimension. In sum, the sociology of
international relations should be seen as a method of understanding international
phenomena and explaining them by means of the convergence of national societies
with the international system.
Later, the works of Marcel Merle will inspire lawyers such as René-Jean Dupuy and
Alain Pellet (Dupuy 1989; Pellet 2014). Also inspired will be the numerous interna-
tionalists of Durkheim’s positive school of thought. One of their chief characteristics
being to form a global viewpoint of political phenomena and their dynamics. This
blurred line between the internal and external is confirmed by the absence of an
international environment. The characteristic trait of this is to imagine international
subjects from an internal point of view, using the classical tools of political science,
with the risk of denying all specificity to the international environment.29

28
Gaston Bouthoul has produced an important work on sociology in general (Bouthoul 1960, 1949b) and
especially on the positive sociology of war (see 1949a; 1962; 1970; 1976).
29
Guillaume Devin’s article on BThe international or comprehensive dimension in the teaching of political
science^, published in the Traité de Relations internationales by Frederic Ramel and Thierry Balzacq is part of
this tradition (Devin 2013). Guillaume Devin underlines in this contribution, citing in particular the article by
Aristide Zolberg BL’influence des facteurs externes sur l’ordre politique interne published in the Traité de
science politique of Leca and Gravitz (Zolberg 1985) and that of Peter A. Gourevitch BSquarring the Circle:
Domestic Sources of International Cooperation^ (Gourevitch 1996), that Bwe have to forget that international
studies are exclusively about international subjects. They cover a field which is much vaster, in which there are
varying dynamics - at the same time endogenous and exogenous-, which produce ‘great transformations’ […]
the discipline gains nothing by being prematurely divided between ‘internalists’ and ‘externalists’, but what is
most important is the overall viewpoint^ (Devin 2013: 1078, 1079).
328 Am Soc (2017) 48:297–341

The turbulence in the international system, for which the 1990s are known, led the
internationalists to revise their framework and their tools of analysis of international
relations. In France, Bertrand Badie and Marie-Claude Smouts developed a research
program in response to this agenda. Their work is part of the current of the sociology of
globalization which dates back to the 1960s.30 They will give a new élan to the French
school of international relations by proposing Ba new study of international relations,
on the basis of what they call Le retournement du monde^ (Leca 2003, Badie, Smouts,
1998, 2002). In their book on Les nouvelles relations internationales they assemble
researchers from different generations who share the same study point of view of
international relations, that is to say for which:

There has never been a distinction between international relations and cultural
areas (areas studies), domestic political systems and international sociology. […]
For the authors of this book the subject of international relations is the function of
the planet, or to be more precise, the structuring of world space by networks of
social interactions (Smouts 1998: 13-14).

In the course of this work, Marie-Claude Smouts and Bertrand Badie inaugurate in
1991 a course in the sociology of international relations at the Political Studies Institute
(IEP) which will form the basis for their work Le retournement du monde. This
publication is part of the tradition of Durkheim, Mauss and Merle and opens the way
to a current which, without being the dominant one, is certainly influential in the field
of French international relations.31 As Marie-Claude Smouts says:

One of the principal characteristics of International Relations (IR) in France can

be found without doubt in the existence of this current of thought [illustrated
notably by certain researchers of IEP of Paris, of the Centre d’Etudes en Relations
Internationales (CERI) and of the review Cultures et conflits directed by Didier
Bigo] originating from internal political science, of which the findings, the
methods and the questions have been very fruitfully transferred to the interna-
tional level (Smouts 2002: 84; see also Guilhot 2017: 50-52).

This school will not form part of the approach and debates of the mainstream of the
discipline, that is to say it is not part of neo-realism, or neo-institutionalism which are
the dominant currents of international relations in the years from 1990 to 2000. Their

30
BIn 1966, Wilbert Ellis Moore, then in 1980 Johan Vincent Galtung, in 1982 Niklas Luhmann and in 1991
Anthony Giddens all made an attempt at sketching the outline of a sociology of globalization, but the studies
which have been by far most methodical on the subject of globalization as a system without actors, is
Immanuel Wallerstein, the first works of whom date back to 1979 and also to Roland Robertson (his research
has been united in one volume in 1992)^ (Busino 2006: 35).
31
In France there are numerous approaches from different disciplines to International Relations. These show
the diversity of work carried out and perspectives used. These approaches are philosophical (Hassner, Giesen,
Ramel, Holeindre, Colonomos, Jeangène Vilmer), sociological (Lindemann, Dorronsoro, Grosjean), judicial
(Sur, Guilhaudis, Andréani, Delcourt), historical (Grosser, Soutou), geographical and geopolitical (Dussouy,
Lacoste, Thual, Foucher), strategic (Chaliand, Vennesson), also economic (Laroche, Chavagneux, Cohen) and
psychological (Baele, Grawitz), or from the point of view of the analysis of public policies (Smith, Joana,
Buchet de Neuilly, Balzacq, Petiteville) (on these approaches see mainly Ramel, Balzacq 2013: 269–522; see
also on the research subjects 525–1052).
Am Soc (2017) 48:297–341 329

approach is similar to that of Marcel Merle, proceeding with a critical look at existing
theories, outside of the inter-paradigmatic debates (chiefly influenced by
Bpreoccupations with the American superpower^ and also the most important
American authors) (Smouts 1998: 11). These two aspects, a distancing from the
major inter-paradigmatic debates, which are mainly American, and critical analysis,
taking distance also with regard to international relations theory, are the character-
istic traits which one finds with certain internationalists who belong to this French
school of the sociology of international relations.
Bertrand Badie is without doubt one of the most important successors to this French
school of the sociology of international relations inspired by Durkheim. He shares the
views of Marcel Merle and James Rosenau, who observe that the transnationalization of
the international system is tending towards a Bworld without sovereignty^ (Badie 1999).
The world has been subjected to great change with the end of bipolarity of power. It has
become in fact Ba-polar^ and is characterized by increasing complexity due to the
appearance on the world scene of new actors: the Bemerging^. The deterritoralization
of the flow of people and of their identities, the increase in networks (economic, of
merchandise, religious, and of the mafia) the increase in the flow of goods, of informa-
tion, of new allegiances, of new ways of mobilizing and claims (regionalism) make up
the principal characteristics of this world turnaround which is imposing new forms of
international relations because the traditional theories are no longer suited to the
changes that are happening (Badie, Smouts 1992; Badie 1995, 2004). Power is no
longer exclusively military, it is measured, according to the expression of Joseph Nye,
on the three-dimensional Binternational chessboard^ (Nye 2004:136–137). Henceforth,
the State has to confer with a multiplicity of contradictory actors, economic, social, non-
governmental organizations, all with different rationalities and a plurality of interests,
which escape its control. The study of these new interactions can only be undertaken
using a sociological analysis which is complementary to the traditional theoretic ap-
proaches (Badie and Smouts 1992; Badie and Pellet 1993; Badie 1995, 1999).
The post-Cold War, post-Westphalian world according to Bertrand Badie, defies
Weber’s conception of the State as the only possible entity to monopolize legitimate
physical violence within borders. It also defies the view of Hobbes that the State is
obliged to behave like a Bgladiator^ in a permanent struggle for survival (Badie 2005a).
Globalization which has produced Binterdependence, inclusivity and uniformity^, have
allowed numerous non-state actors, such as multinational firms and non-governmental
organizations, media and churches for example, to join the international scene. Progress
in the fields of technologies of information and communication (radio, television,
internet and today the social networks), and also the technics in the field mobility,
which have been highlighted by Marcel Merle and before him Marcel Mauss, have
contributed to underscore not only the autonomy of the actors but also their interde-
pendence, their integration and uniformity. These logics of integration and interdepen-
dence is however counterbalanced by logics of exclusion or as Rosenau calls it
Bfragmegration^ (Rosenau 1997). These exclusions and inequality which carry the
weight of humiliation result in insecurity.
This double movement, of exclusion and inclusion between heterogeneous actors,
produced by globalization, has created issues of transnational security such as terror-
ism, maritime piracy, organized cross-border criminality, etc. It bears witness to the
increasing privatization of violence by transnational non-state actors, who are always
330 Am Soc (2017) 48:297–341

increasing in number (terrorist groups, militias, private security companies, mafia

networks, etc.) and with an increasing interpenetration between the internal and
external milieu. Security is becoming a global problem and cannot be limited to a
strict politico-military approach (this idea is close to the work initiated in the 1980s by
Barry Buzan and the school of Copenhagen). This is transformed into the idea of
human security and concerns the individual and the questions of justice, environment
or well-being, health and human rights. This transformation of the question of security
is also evident in the conflicts which are more and more infra-state. The mixture of civil
and military makes it more difficult for the classical army to respond, in spite of the
means available.
Bertrand Badie poses the question of Bdenaturation^ of the role of the State in a
world where notions of sovereignty, territoriality and of power are questioned more and
more. This Bdilution^ of sovereignty and power, this decentralization of international
relations making things increasingly complex is obliging States to modify their behav-
ior in negotiating with transnational actors or to modify the rules of international play
according to the situation (the right of intervention or the responsibility to protect are
examples of such modifications of the rules) (Badie 2004, 2013).
The passage from the old world, centered around the West, Bthe ‘entre-soi’ of
western nations alone in the world^, to a new globalized world has several conse-
quences: that Bcompetition is no longer competition for power but for weakness^, that
war between States no longer explains new forms of social and international conflict,
that violence has taken multiple forms: nationalism, religious fanaticism, populism, etc.
(Badie 2016). In the face of this assessment two options appear to exist. The first is for
the States to maintain an asymmetric violence with other actors. Such a situation would
logically lead to a weakening of power confronted by multiple threats which are
sometimes very diffuse. Military action, economic sanctions, diplomatic connivance
or club diplomacy (G7, G8, G20) either produce or amplify the inequalities which are a
source of humiliation and exclusion (some go back to colonization).
Humiliation, as the Arab Spring has shown, is a particularly efficient spring-
board for social movements. It was also the basis of extremism and is an
argument to justify the use of violence (for the diplomacy of connivance see
Badie 2011; for humiliation in international relations see Badie 2014).
The other solution is on the contrary to take action regarding the pathologies of the
international system and the anomalies produced by globalization. It means reducing
inequality, developing a social interdependence with a solidarist multilateralism in
answer to the anomies of the post-Cold War international system. This alternative is
the wish of international public opinion which is in the process of being formed (Badie,
Devin 2007). Therefore, for Bertrand Badie and conforming to durkheimian tradition,
the solution to international conflict is to change mentality, to replace the logic of
humiliation by a diplomacy of recognition which would favor the integration of the
most fragile countries. Such a Bdiplomacy of otherness^ would lead to international
solidarity founded on the principle of justice. In the tradition of Léon Bourgeois, this
solidarity intended as a right and duty founded on the principle of responsibility and
fraternity will come to pass in a global civil society as envisaged by John Burton
(Burton 1972). It will be the product of States, non-state actors, multilateral organiza-
tions, and the convergence of civil national societies. It will be the consequence of a
multiplication of exchanges, an increase in interdependence, of the construction of a
Am Soc (2017) 48:297–341 331

common identity and the realization of common objectives (Badie 2008, 2011).
Bertrand Badie realizes that this world civil society has not yet happened and that the
State remains the principal actor in international relations. However, Bthe international
banalization of the theme of the human rights, increasingly brings diplomatic relations
to an Binter-social^ level. This veering towards the inter-social is probably our main
achievement and touches even the grammar of diplomacy and its law. It modifies in
depth the stakes of the old international relations: non-state-actors, who refer to law
have certainly not reached the point where they can rival the States, to make them do
something or prevent them from doing something. They do not bring peace nor stop
wars. On the other hand they can today characterize peace and war, and decide almost
alone on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of war and so influence ever more strongly its
evolution (Badie 2007: 84; see also Badie 2002).
Other internationalists are developing this area of thought following this tradition of
sociology.32 This is the case of Marie-Claude Smouts whose attention is drawn mainly
to international institutions, especially the UN (Smouts 1972, 1983; Devin, Smouts
2011), to international opinion (Smouts 1997), to the environment (Smouts 2001a, b,
2003) or to post-colonial studies (Smouts 2007, 2010).
Guillaume Devin also follows this tradition. For him, the sociology of international
relations consists of studying Bthe international phenomena such as social events […]
underscore the continuity or discontinuity in modes of action, the constraints and the
dynamics that the actors continue to create, but in which they are also involuntarily
involved. This is the perspective proposed here under the name of Bsociology of
international relations^, but which could also be entitled BWorld Politics^ or
BInternational Politics^. It is evident that the use of term sociology does not cover a
one dimensional panorama of the contemporary world. It implies a rigorous look at
international reality as social reality as much on the micro-level of the actors as on the
macro of the ensemble of its composing parts (Devin, 2009: 3–4). This definition does
not limit the sociology of international relations to the relations between States. It is up
to sociology to study all that exists regarding the social in international relations. His
work - on international organizations, on international cooperation, multiculturalism,
multilateralism and transnational solidarity (Smouts 1987, 1998, 2002; Badie, Smouts
2003; Devin 2004, 2011, 2013, 2014; Badie, Devin 2007), on the contributions of
Norbert Elias, the importance of which has been also under-ligned by Frederic Ramel
(Devin 1995: 305–327; Ramel 2006: 91–93) and on the sociological concepts of
international relations (Devin 2015) - all continue to make important contributions to
transnational analysis.
The work of Zaiki Laïdi on globalization and the place of Europe should also be
mentioned (Laidi, 1997a, b, 1998a, b, 2001, 2004, 2008), as should be the contributions
inspired by the international political economics of Josepha Laroche on the develop-
ment of transnational relations, globalization and global governance (Laroche 1998,
2003), on the decline of the role of the State on the international scene and the
Bbrutalization of the world^ (Laroche 2011a), on loyalty as principle in a globalized

32
We cannot give all the names of Binternationalists^ who are part of the French tradition of the sociology of
international relations where the tendency is to transnationalism. We, therefore give the names of those whose
work seems the most significant.
332 Am Soc (2017) 48:297–341

world order (Laroche 2011b) or even on the sociology of the transnational elite
(Laroche 2012), all can be labeled with this same tradition.33
Last of all, the works of Didier Bigo - director of the Center for the study of
Conflicts, Liberty and Security (CCLS) and editor of the quarterly journal in French
of Cultures et conflict, founder and co-editor with Rob Walker of International political
sociology - concerning international political sociology and critical approaches to
security (PARIS school: Political Anthropological Research on International
Sociology) particularly on the issue of the link between security and liberty within
the framework of political anti-terrorism mainly in Europe (Bigo and Hermant 1988,
1991; Bigo 1992, 1996, 2007; Bigo and Guild 2005; Bigo and Tsoukala 2006, 2008a,
b; Bigo et al. 2008, 2010a) and also the questions linked to migratory flows (Bigo
2005a, b, c; Bigo et al. 2010b, 2013) should be mentioned. All can be considered as a
new version, this time post-positive, of this transnational sociological tradition.
The discipline of International Relations, in France, has not ceased to develop since
the end of the Second World War. A body of work which is scientific, diversified and of
good quality has not ceased to increase since the 1950s up to today. This French
‘connection’ or French ‘touch’ is enriching a discipline which still remains very
American. At the heart of this French connection it is possible to identify, amongst
the difference approaches, a tradition of sociology of international relations which dates
back to the reflections of pre-sociologists. The objective of this contribution is to trace
up to the present, the itinerary in the field of French international relations of this
sociological tradition, from Montesquieu and Tocqueville, of which the work, even if in
a fragmentary way, questions the relations between the internal milieu and the interna-
tional milieu. This contribution also has the aim of showing the influence of their
precursors on the sociological reflections on international relations of Raymond Aron
and Marcel Merle and on more contemporary authors. This influence is also evident in
their conception of international relations (importance of internal over external, inter-
penetration of the two orders, the idea of the historical progress of mankind), their
methodology (explicative or comprehensive, the method of the ideal type and compar-
ative method) and the findings of their analyses (the importance of political regimes in
studying external politics, the rise in the means of communication and exchange, the
relationship between industrialization and war, etc.).
It is undeniable that in this panorama of the sociology of international relations in
France, the figure of Raymond Aron has been and remains fundamental for the
discipline. His work, inspired by Weber, marks a break with Emile Durkheim’s and
Marcel Mauss’s tradition of sociology. Nevertheless, this has not prevented a parallel
development of an area of study, driven by Marcel Merle, which finds its place in the
continuity of the paths opened by Durkheim and Mauss.

33
Josepha Laroche has supported the creation of the Centre d’étude et de recherches transnationalistes of the
University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne. She is its Director and has created the network International Chaos,
which supplies information destined to students and researchers and also supplies on-line analyses (mainly by
a TV network). International Chaos is also a collection of the publishers Harmattan dedicated to transnational
studies. It publishes the works of authors interested in international questions from a transnational point of
view (for example: the Tunisian transition, the First World War at the cinema, microfinance, violence, etc).
This edition also publishes annually a transnational analysis of the international scene entitled Passage au
crible de la scène mondiale (Laroche 2013).
Am Soc (2017) 48:297–341 333

In France, the discipline has had great precursors, but Raymond Aron played a
decisive role in so far as he was the first to draw together the disciplines of
sociology, philosophy and history and to be interested in international relations.
Before him the field was dominated by a school of very talented historians such
as Pierre Renouvin and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle and also remarkable lawyers of
the ilk of Georges Scelle. But I believe that international relations in the sense that
we use it today - as a study of all the component of the international system
including geostrategic, integrating internal dynamics and the role of the actors -
dates from the works of R. Aron. His work Paix et guerre entre les nations,
published in 1962, without doubt marked a boom. And still today, it is still a great
book, always as stimulating to consult, even if Aron did not envisage some recent
developments. But it is not a manual. And in order to launch a discipline a
manual is necessary. For this, on the pedagogical side we have a lot to thank
Marcel Merle for. In 1963 he published a work, La vie internationale, which
introduced students to the sociological and political dimension of international
relations. Following this, his sociology of international relations, reedited three
times, initiated whole classes of students to IR (Smouts, 2002: 83).

Marie-Claude Smouts makes a distinction between two founding figures of the

French tradition of the sociology of international relations. Raymond Aron was the
first to envisage a theoretical approach at the outset of international relations (which
linked sociology, philosophy and history) with his major work Paix et guerre entre les
nations. The second is Marcel Merle who was the first to produce a manual of
international relations, La vie internationale, which became a work which was
indispensable in making the subject part of academia in France. The subjects
treated and the methodology used are different in these two scientific ap-
proaches and this has led us to conclude that the French tradition of interna-
tional relations can be divided into two schools.
The first school, inspired by Weber and Simmel, is comprehensive, historical and
comparative. It distinguishes the internal milieu from the external milieu, making its
specificity the international environment. The subject of study of this sociology is
exclusively concerned with interstate relations. Anarchy, the State and war are all given
a central role. It is for this reason, rightly or wrongly, that these authors frequently
follow the realist or neorealist trend. Raymond Aron is the founder of this comprehen-
sive school which today is in the minority in France.
The second school, inspired by Durkheim, is both positive and explicative. The
object of study of this sociology is transnational relations. It does not make a radical
separation between the internal milieu and the external milieu and, consequently,
considers that there is no difference between social phenomena located within the
national society and outside (Merle 1976). Globalization and its effects have a central
place, the implication of which is to consider the actors, the relations and processes of
integration as a whole. It considers that the pathologies and anomies of the international
system are the consequence of a lack of integration and that the progressive decline of
the State and its power are the effects of globalization. Marcel Mauss is the precursor of
this school. Marcel Merle is the founder of the behaviorist version. Bertrand Badie has
renewed the lines and foundations. This school is the one that currently dominates the
sociology of international relations in France.
334 Am Soc (2017) 48:297–341

Finally, a third school has developed. This is a school which has united the
constructivist and post-positive approaches of the emblematic figures of Thomas
Lindemann and Didier Bigo. Thomas Lindemann proposes a constructivist perspective
to such subjects of international relations as war and recognition. Didier Bigo’s
program of international political sociology is Bto modify the debate which has been
presented by the internationalists^. He endeavors to overcome the usual oppositions of
internal and external, State and society, enemy and friend, micro and macro etc., using a
materialistic and constructivist epistemology inspired by the works notably of
Bourdieu, Foucault, Deleuze and Elias (Bigo, 2016). The two approaches which are
different from the traditional schools open a third way of development and yet another
vision of international relations.
Each one of the above tackles an aspect of international reality with a specific
intellectual tool. The image proposed by Joseph S. Nye of the repartition of power on a
three-dimensional international chessboard is an interesting way of understanding how
complementary these different schools of sociology are to one another (Nye 2004).
Aron’s sociology of international relations gives an understanding of diplomatico-
military relations that States weave. These are essentially bilateral and take place at the
top of the board. We can look to durkheimian tradition for an understanding of the
multilateral relations which exist between States and international organizations at the
middle of the board and for transnational relations which escape control of govern-
ments taking place at the bottom of the board. The constructivist point of view
identifies the way in which each intersubjective space influences the behavior, identity
and interests of the agents. The post-positive approach allows the questioning of
concepts and tools used by the internationalists in considering international relations.
The French tradition of sociology, as the transatlantic connections of its founders,
Raymond Aron and Marcel Merle, bear witness and also today new generations of
internationalists, has alimented the different approaches to the discipline and continues
to do so. These different approaches: liberal, transnational, Marxist, constructivist and
critical analysis all find in sociology a source of inspiration in understanding the
complexity of international relations.

Acknowledgements I would like to thank the reviewers of this paper for their useful commentaries. I am
also grateful to Patricia Laurie for her assistance in the elaboration of the english version of this text, Julien
Larregue for the coordination of this special issue and the Springer editorial team.

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