People v Mat-an

G.R. No. 215720, 21 February 2018

Martires, J.
TOPIC: Slight Physical Injury and Murder

FACTS:

On 13 April 2009, Oscar was charged with the crimes of Attempted Homicide and
Murder in two Informations. Norma was selling halo-halo beside Minda's store at Sunnyside
Fairview, Tacay Road, Baguio City; Clyde was in front of the same store. At that time, Minda
was inside her store cradling her 18-month-old granddaughter Anthonette in a blanket, its
ends tied behind her back. Moments later, Oscar entered the store and an argument ensued
between him and Minda. Apparently, Oscar was asking Minda why Ruby had not answered
his calls. Minda responded by telling Oscar not to create trouble and to return once he was
sober. There was silence for a few seconds; after which, Norma and Clyde heard Minda
moaning as if her mouth was being covered. Norma immediately ran inside the store where
she saw Oscar stab Minda twice. Norma pulled him out of the store and away from Minda.
Norma then asked Clyde, who followed her inside the store, to look for Sheyanne, Oscar and
Ruby's daughter. Norma also called out to neighbors for help. Before calling Sheyanne, Clyde
saw Oscar leaving the vicinity. The RTC found Oscar guilty of attempted homicide and
murder.

ISSUE:

Whether the trial and appellate courts erred in adjudging accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for the death of Minda Babsa-ay and injuries sustained by
Anthonette Ewangan.

HELD:

The Supreme Court concurs that the crime committed against Minda is Murder
qualified by abuse of superior strength. The circumstance of abuse of superior strength is
present whenever there is inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming
a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor, and the
latter takes advantage of it in the commission of the crime. The appreciation of the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength depends on the age, size, and strength
of the parties.

In this case, the prosecution was able to establish that Oscar abused his superiority
when he killed Minda. Indeed, it was sufficiently shown that Oscar was armed with a knife, a
deadly weapon, while Minda was then burdened by a child and had no means to defend and
repel the attacks of her assailant. Furthermore, the trial court noted that Oscar was of heavy
build and stood at 5' 10" in contrast to Minda's 4' 11" frame. Clearly, Oscar abused his
superiority afforded him by his sex, height, and build and a weapon when he attacked Minda
who was then carrying a child. Thus, the trial and appellate courts correctly convicted him of
murder.

The Court also concurs that Oscar can be held guilty only of slight physical injuries
with respect to Anthonette. The prosecution failed to present any evidence which would show
that Oscar also intended to kill Anthonette. Without the element of intent to kill, Oscar could
only be convicted for physical injury; and considering that Anthonette's wound was only
superficial, the appellate court correctly convicted Oscar of slight physical injury.

People v. Molina
G.R. No. 229712, 28 February 2018
Peralta, J.
TOPIC: Illegal Recruitment in a Large Scale

FACTS:

On 21 December 2007, accused-appellant Delia C. Molina and Juliet Pacon were

charged with the crime of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale. The case proceeded only against
accused-appellant Delia C. Molina, as co-accused Juliet Pacon was at-large. When arraigned
on 7 April 2009, accused Delia C. Molina pleaded not guilty. After pre-trial, trial on the merits
ensued. The prosecution presented as witnesses the five private complainants and Eraida
Dumigpi, Senior Labor and Deployment Officer of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA). On the other hand, the defense presented accused-appellant Delia C.
Molina as its lone witness. The trial court found accused Molina guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of illegal recruitment in large scale.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that accused-appellant is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale.

HELD:

The testimonies of private respondents and the records show that: (1) private
complainants Wilfredo Logo, Maylen Bolda and Maria Luya applied at the recruitment
agency for employment in South Korea and paid for their respective placement/processing fee
when the agency's provisional license was already issued; (2) Benjamin Delos Santos applied
before the issuance of the provisional license but paid the placement fee when the provisional
license was already issued, and (3) Gilbert Ubifia's application and payments were made after
the agency's license was suspended and before it was alleged lifted on 31 July 2000, but before
the agency's license expired on 31 March 2007. Hence, it appears that the recruitment agency,
which accused-appellant headed, was a licensee or holder of authority when the recruitment
of private complainants was made as the agency's license expired on 31 March 2007.
Nevertheless, accused-appellant is still liable under Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042.

Under Section 6, paragraph (m) of R.A. No. 8042, illegal recruitment "is deemed
committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a
group," and "[i]llegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be
considered an offense involving economic sabotage." Thus, the offense charged in the
Information is illegal recruitment in large scale because it was committed against the five
private complainants. Moreover, Section 6, paragraph (m) of R.A. No. 8042 provides that in
case of juridical persons, the officers having control, management or direction of their
business shall be liable. Accused-appellant, as President of the recruitment agency, is
therefore liable for illegal recruitment in large scale for failure. to reimburse the expenses
incurred by private complainants in connection with their documentation and processing for
purposes of deployment to South Korea, which did not actually take place without their fault
under Section 6, paragraph (m) of R.A. No. 8042.

Sarto v. People
G.R. No. 206284, 28 February 2018
Martires, J.
TOPIC: Bigamy

FACTS:

On 3 October 2007, Redante was charged with the crime of bigamy for allegedly
contracting two (2) marriages: the first, with Maria Socorro G. Negrete (Maria Socorro), and
the second, without having the first one legally terminated, with private complainant Fe R.
Aguila (Fe). The charge stemmed from a criminal complaint filed by Fe against Redante on 4
June 2007. The RTC found Redante guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy.
The trial court ratiocinated that Redante's conviction is the only reasonable conclusion for the
case because of his failure to present competent evidence proving the alleged divorce decree;
his failure to establish the naturalization of Maria Socorro; and his admission that he did not
seek judicial recognition of the alleged divorce decree.

ISSUE:

Whether the trial and appellate courts erred when they found petitioner Redante Sarto
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.

HELD:

For a person to be convicted of bigamy, the following elements must concur: (1) that
the offender has been legally married; (2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved
or, in case of an absentee spouse, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
according to the provisions of the Civil Code; (3) that the offender contracts a second or
subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity. Redante admitted that he had contracted two marriages. He, however,
put forth the defense of the termination of his first marriage as a result of the divorce obtained
abroad by his alien spouse. The Court is convinced that Redante failed to prove the existence
of the divorce as a fact or that it was validly obtained prior to the celebration of his
subsequent marriage to Fe. Aside from the testimonies of Redante and Maria Socorro, the only
piece of evidence presented by the defense to prove the divorce, is the certificate of divorce
allegedly issued by the registrar of the Supreme Court of British Columbia on 14 January 2008.

This certificate of divorce, however, is utterly insufficient to rebut the charge against
Redante. First, the certificate of divorce is not the divorce decree required by the rules and
jurisprudence. As discussed previously, the divorce decree required to prove the fact of
divorce is the judgment itself as rendered by the foreign court and not a mere certification.
Second, assuming the certificate of divorce may be considered as the divorce decree, it was
not accompanied by a certification issued by the proper Philippine diplomatic or consular
officer stationed in Canada, as required under Section 24 of Rule 132. Lastly, no copy of the
alleged Canadian law was presented by the defense. Thus, it could not be reasonably
determined whether the subject divorce decree was in accord with Maria Socorro's national
law. Further, since neither the divorce decree nor the alleged Canadian law was satisfactorily
demonstrated, the type of divorce supposedly secured by Maria Socorro - whether an
absolute divorce which terminates the marriage or a limited divorce which merely suspends it
- and whether such divorce capacitated her to remarry could not also be ascertained. As such,
Redante failed to prove his defense that he had the capacity to remarry when he contracted a
subsequent marriage to Fe. His liability for bigamy is, therefore, now beyond question.

People v. Estrada
G.R. No. 225730, 28 February 2018
Martires, J.
TOPIC: Illegal Recruitment in a Large Scale and Estafa

FACTS:

Estrada was indicted for the crime of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and Esta/a
under four (4) separate Informations. Private complainants separately met Estrada on various
dates from February to April 2009. During their respective meetings, Estrada represented
herself as having power and authority to deploy persons abroad for overseas employment.
Cortez recalled that in their initial meeting, Estrada told him that she works for Worldview
International Corporation (Worldview), a private recruitment agency for overseas
employment. She later told him, however, that she changed agency because Worldview's
license had expired. After their respective meetings, Estrada offered private complainants
various jobs in Dubai. In particular, Sevillena was offered a job as a baker after he refused the
initial job offer in Saudi Arabia; Cortez was offered a job as a waiter; and Antonio was offered
a job as a cashier after she refused the first job offer as a saleslady. The private complainants
transacted only with Estrada to whom they submitted all the documents necessary for their
overseas placement and to whom they paid processing, placement, and other fees.
Specifically, Sevillena paid P8,000.00 as processing fee and Pl 7,000.00 as placement fee; Cortez
similarly paid P8,000.00 as processing fee and Pl 7,000.00 as placement fee; Antonio paid
Pl0,000.00 as processing fee and Pl5,000.00 as placement fee. However, even after undergoing
PDOS, payment of the fees required, and submission of the documentary requirements,
Estrada still failed to deploy them abroad. Estrada repeatedly promised them that their plane
tickets were still being processed. Estrada, however, failed to deliver on her promised
deployment of the private complainants; thus, they were prompted to file criminal cases
against Estrada. The RTC found Estrada guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of
illegal recruitment in large scale and three (3) counts of estafa under Article 315(2) (a) of the
Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE:

Whether the trial and appellate courts erred in finding estrada guilty of illegal
recruitment in large scale and three (3) counts of estafa despite the prosecution's failure to
prove the essential elements of these crimes by proof beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD:

The Court is convinced that the prosecution was able to establish the essential
elements of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale. First, it is not disputed that Estrada
is not licensed or authorized to recruit workers for overseas placement. During the trial, the
defense admitted the POEA Certification which stated that Estrada is not included among the
list of employees submitted by ABCA for POEA acknowledgment. Therefore, Estrada is not
authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment. This fact was not denied by Estrada
in her defense anchored only on the allegation that she did not recruit the private
complainants but merely mentioned ABCA and Worldview to them. Second, the prosecution
was able to establish that Estrada unlawfully engaged in activities which refer to recruitment
and placement under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code and Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042.
Specifically, the prosecution was able to sufficiently demonstrate that Estrada promised and
recruited private complainants for employment abroad for a fee. Finally, it is clear that
Estrada committed illegal recruitment activities against the three (3) private complainants.
Thus, the trial and appellate courts properly convicted Estrada of the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale.

The Court also sustains Estrada's conviction for three (3) counts of estafa under Article
3 l 5(2)(a) of the RPC. A conviction for illegal recruitment whether simple or committed in
large scale would not preclude punishment for estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC. In
this case, testimonial evidence established by proof beyond reasonable doubt that Estrada
falsely represented herself as possessing power to deploy persons for overseas placement. By
these pretenses, Estrada deceived the private complainants into believing that she would
provide them their desired jobs in Dubai. This active representation of having the capacity to
deploy the private complainants abroad despite not having the authority or license to do so
from the POEA constituted deceit - the first element of estafa. Moreover, because of her
assurances, the private complainants parted with their money in order to pay Estrada the
various fees which they thought were necessary for their deployment abroad resulting in
damage to each of the private complainants - the second element of estafa.