Yu Yang

and

The Secretary of State for the Home Department

Grounds of Appeal

1.
a. At paragraph 11 of her judgment, the judge stated, “Dr XPert did not offer
himself to be cross-examined at this hearing. This undermines the appellant’s
case”.

b. At paragraph 12, the judge also stated that, “As for the psychological report by
Dr XPert, with the greatest of respect to the renowned doctor, it is a report on
what the appellant has told him. Judges are not bound by expert reports. My
finding is that Dr XPert has been hoodwinked as was the case in IY (Turkey) v
Secretary of State for the Home Department1.

c. It is submitted that the judge has committed an error in her judgment by

completely rejecting the expert report due to the sole fact that the expert did
not offer to be cross-examined and by undermining the case of the appellant
because of that. According to the decision of the Court of Appeal in the case
Tarlochan Singh v SSHD2, it is not sufficient simply to reject an expert
evidence because the expert had not been cross-examined. Moreover, as per
the decision in Y (Sri Lanka) v Secretary of State for the Home Department3, it
is not open to the Tribunal to reach a conclusion that the expert has been
misled by an exaggerated or dishonest account without good and objective
reason for doing so. In addition, according to Ibrahim v Secretary of State for
the Home Department4 and R (on the application of Beqaraj) v Special
Adjudicator5, psychiatric and medical evidence in support of an appellant’s
claim deserves careful and specific consideration and Tribunals should not
make credibility findings in isolation from it.

2.
a. At paragraph 17, the judge states “…I find it incredible on the balance of
probabilities..”

b. At paragraph 23, the judge stated, “In her statement, it was crystal clear and
beyond all reasonable doubt that the appellant was not fleeing her country for
fear of prosecution.”

1
[2012] EWCA Civ 1560.
2
[1999] EWCA Civ 1773.
3
[2009] EWCA Civ 362.
4
[1998] INLR 511.
5
[2002] EWHC 1469.
 c. It is submitted that the judge has failed to apply the correct standard of proof,
i.e. that of a reasonable degree of likelihood (Sivakumaran6) while assessing
the evidence of the appellant, neither the balance of probabilities not the
beyond reasonable doubt.

3.
a. At paragraph 17, the judge also stated that “As the daughter of a wealthy
businessman she no doubt had a mobile phone and would have received texts
from her father and her agent.”

b. At paragraph 19, the judge stated, “No reasonable authority would have
detained her for this minor behaviour”.

c. At paragraph 20, the judge stated “If the Hong Kong Authorities wished to
punish the appellant, it is not at all credible that they would have let her go
twice”.

d. It is submitted that the judge has mistakenly approached the evidence by being
influenced by her own values and environment, which has been warned by the
Court of Appeal to be dangerous for the ends of justice (Y v Secretary of State
for the Home Department7).

4.
a. At paragraph 18, the judge stated, “I find it to be totally implausible”.

b. At paragraph 25, the judge stated that, “Applying my own values and common
sense, I have come to the conclusion that the said behaviour was a pretext and
I have no doubt whatsoever that she has attempted to hoodwink Dr Xpert in
order to stay in this country and enrich her position. She will not hoodwink
me.”

c. It is submitted that placing too much weight on “plausibility” has been

regarded as dangerous (HK v SSHD)8, rather the judge had to be on guard to
avoid implicitly recharacterizing the nature of the risk based on their own
perceptions of reasonability (Y v SSHD)9.

5.
a. At paragraph of the judgement the judge stated that she had given the
appellant’s case “anxious scrutiny” which was her duty pursuant to the
Bugdaycay10 case.

b. It is submitted that the judge ignored the clear evidence of trauma suffered by
the appellant evident by the expert. Rather, the judge dismissed the case based
on the findings of the Secretary of State for the Home Department and her
own belief and morals.

6
[1988] AC 958.
7
[2006] EWCA Civ 1233.
8
[2006] WECA Civ 1037.
9
No. 7.
10
[1987] AC 514.
 6. Based on the above grounds of appeal, it can be concluded that there is a good chance
that the judgement of the judge in this case will be reversed in an appeal.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

Cases:

 Bugdaycay v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1987] AC 514.

 HK v Secreatary of State for the Home Department [2006] WECA Civ 1037.

 Ibrahim v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1998] INLR 511.

 R (on the application of Beqaraj) v Special Adjudicator [2002] EWHC 1469.

 R v Secretary of State for Home Department (Sivakumaran)[1988] AC 958.

 Tarlochan Singh v SSHD [1999] EWCA Civ 1773.

 (Turkey) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] EWCA Civ 1560.

 Y (Sri Lanka) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 362.

 Y v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 1233.