Neo-platonism and Maximus the Confessor on the

Knowledge of God

Demetrios BATHRELLOS, Athens, Greece

ABSTRACT
This article compares the different ways in which God and man know each other, as
according to Proclus’ The Elements of Theology and Maximus the Confessor’s Ambigua.
For Proclus, God knows man in a divine way and man knows God in a human way.
Knowledge depends on nature. For Maximus, knowledge depends also on the will.
God knows man and the world according to his will. Moreover, his voluntary incarna-
tion enables him to know in a human way; and conversely, man’s voluntary deification
enables him to know in a divine-like way. Furthermore, for Maximus knowledge has a
distinct existential dimension. God does not know those whose will opposes his will.
And man cannot know God unless he conforms his will to God’s will. For Maximus,
knowledge operates in a context of freedom, communion, and love.

The question of the relationship between Neo-platonism and Saint Maximus

the Confessor is obviously a very big one. Neo-platonism was a huge intel-
lectual movement, with many important representatives. Similarly, Maximus
the Confessor is a prolific writer, whose thought is very dense and deals with
most aspects of Christian theology. What I intend to do in this article is to draw
attention to some ways in which Neo-platonism on the one hand and Maximus
the Confessor on the other understand the knowledge of God, and to indicate
similarities and differences between them that will facilitate their comparative
understanding.
In order to make this endeavor easier, I will focus on two important texts.
The first comes from Proclus’ The Elements of Theology. This is a very impor-
tant work of Neo-platonism, a classic summary of neo-platonic metaphysics.
It is also a work that has proved extremely influential in the Christian tradition,
starting, of course, with Pseudo-Dionysius, with whom Maximus converses on
several occasions. My second text comes from the so-called Ambigua of Max-
imus. In the first part of this work, Maximus replies to questions arising from
works of Gregory of Nazianzus and Pseudo-Dionysius. No less than Scotus
Erigena, a ‘Christian Neo-platonist’, translated this part of Ambigua into Latin
and acknowledged that he came to know Dionysius through Maximus, ‘the

Studia Patristica LVIII, 117-126.

© Peeters Publishers, 2013.
118 D. BATHRELLOS

divine philosopher’.1 The whole work is of course very important in itself.

Needless to say, both texts will be examined within the wider context of Neo-
platonism and Maximus’ theology respectively.
One has of course to keep always in mind that here we will present the views
of two persons who belong to different intellectual traditions. Proclus is primarily
a philosopher, Maximus a theologian. The former is a pagan, the latter is a Chris-
tian. Both inhabit different ‘universes of discourse’. This awareness will help us
to avoid unnecessary oversimplifications that may lead to misunderstandings.

II

The title of my article has two interrelated meanings. The phrase ‘the knowl-
edge of God’ refers both to the way in which God knows us and to the way in
which we know God. I will examine both questions together because first they
are related to each other, and second what our thinkers, Proclus and Maximus,
say on the former is relevant to what they say on the latter.
I will begin with an important proposition from Proclus’ Elements of Theology,
proposition 124, in which Proclus writes the following:
Every God has an undivided knowledge of things divided and a timeless knowledge of
things temporal; he knows the contingent without contingency, the mutable immutably,
and in general all things in a higher mode than belongs to their station.
For if the gods have all their attributes in a mode consonant with their character as gods
(prop. 118), it is surely manifest that their knowledge, being a divine property, will be
determined not by the nature of the inferior beings which are its object but by their own
transcendent majesty. Accordingly their knowledge of things pluralized and passible
will be unitary and impassive: though its object be a thing of parts, yet even of such
the divine knowledge will be undivided; though its object be mutable, itself will be
immutable; though contingent, necessary; and though undetermined, determinate. For
the divine does not get knowledge [extraneously], from its inferiors: why then should
its knowledge be restricted by the nature of its object? Those inferiors, on the other
hand, have an indeterminate thought of the determinate divine nature, and changing
concepts of the immutable; its impassibility they conceive in terms of passion, its
timelessness in terms of time. For the lower can fall away from the higher; but that the
gods should receive aught from their inferiors is a thing which may not be.2

One of the things that Proclus attempts to do here is to protect the gods and
their way of knowing from contamination by elements that pertain to the infe-
rior ontological constitution of the world. For Proclus, unity, impassibility,

1
For more on this, see the introduction of Ignatios Sakalis, in Maximus the Confessor, Ambi-
gua, vol. 14D (Thessalonica, 1992), 8.
2
The translation is by E.R. Dodds, in id. (ed.), Proclus, The Elements of Theology, A Revised
Text with Translation, Introduction, and Commentary, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1963), 111. I have put the
word ‘extraneously’ in brackets, because it does not appear in the text.
 Neo-platonism and Maximus the Confessor on the Knowledge of God 119

timelessness, immutability, and non-contingency are some of the gods’ funda-

mental idioms. By contrast, other beings are characterized by such qualities
as plurality, divisibility, temporality, passibility, mutability, and contingency.
The knowledge possessed by the gods must be characterized by the former
qualities, and not by the latter. The gods know the world in a way that befits
their perfection. Their knowledge is relative to them, not to the world.
As Professor Dodds has remarked, Proclus here attempts to reply to the argu-
ment of the platonic Parmenides, according to which God, who has perfect
intelligence, cannot know our imperfect world.3 Proclus’ reply is that the gods
do know the world, but in a way that is superior to the world’s imperfect real-
ity. However – and I will say this in a very tentative way – I am not sure that
his reply is absolutely satisfactory. To say that the gods know the world in a
manner that differs to ours makes very good sense to me. But to contrast so
sharply the qualities of this knowledge with the qualities of the object of
knowledge, seems to me potentially risky. Such knowledge may reflect an
epistemological subjectivism that risks precluding the true knowledge of the
other. This impression is strengthened by Proclus’ comment in another of his
works, namely his commentary on Plato’s Timaeus. There, while talking about
the knowledge of the gods, he states that ‘what is not necessary, is necessary in
the gods.’4 Does, therefore, Proclus believe that the gods have a true knowledge
of the world, does he really and fully differ from Parmenides? Given the wider
context of Greek philosophy and the fact that often the mode of knowledge
affects the content of knowledge, the way in which Proclus expresses himself
on this matter makes me wonder.
That this may be so is shown also by the fact that Proclus draws here a par-
allel between gods and humans. Humans cannot know the gods according to
what the gods are either. They can only know them in a way that pertains to
their (namely humans’) own epistemological capacities. Therefore they ‘have
an indeterminate thought of the determinate divine nature, and changing con-
cepts of the immutable; its impassibility they conceive in terms of passion, its
timelessness in terms of time’. Man has restrictions similar to those of the gods.
If the gods’ nature5 does not allow them to know what is inferior in its own
way, namely to know it as it is and not as they are, human beings’ nature does
not allow them to know what is superior as it is and not as they are. In the first
case the knowledge possessed by the gods cannot be ‘enfleshed’, in the second
the knowledge possessed by humans cannot be ‘deified’. The main difference

3
E.R. Dodds (ed.), Proclus, The Elements of Theology (1963), 266.
4
In Timaeum, 1.352.8.
5
Proclus seems to use the word ‘nature’ here in a way similar to what is meant by the same
term in Christian theology; see, for instance, prop. 9, in E.R. Dodds (ed.), Proclus, The Elements
of Theology (1963), 10, 17. For more on nature in Proclus, see Lucas Siorvanes, Proclus: Neo-
Platonic Philosophy and Science (New Haven and London, 1996), 136-40.
120 D. BATHRELLOS

is that the gods, being perfect, know the imperfect world in a perfect way,
whereas men, being imperfect, know the perfect gods in an imperfect way.
Could the fact that men have at best a limited and at worst a false understanding
of the gods perhaps also work the other way round?6
Moreover, it seems to me that Proclus’ proposition raises the question of
freedom. Proclus here seems to be saying that the gods are somehow compelled
by their nature to know things in a certain way. As Dodds’ translation puts it,
‘their knowledge, being a divine property, will be determined not by the nature
of the inferior beings which are its object but by their own transcendent
majesty.’7 Of course, as Proclus implies, it is better for the gods to be deter-
mined by their own nature and not by the nature of inferior beings. In this
respect, Proclus is justifiably wishing not to allow the nature of beings to deter-
mine the knowledge of the gods. But I wonder whether this is enough. Proclus’
gods have to know the world, because the world is anyway there, independently
of their will. Moreover, their knowledge of the world is not relevant to their
will either. Finally, these gods do not appear to have the freedom to know the
world in a way that is different to their nature. Proclus’ gods have fundamental
restrictions, ontological and epistemological, internal and external.8
Much the same applies to humans. It is because of their nature that men
cannot have a divine-like knowledge of the gods. Men lack the freedom to
acquire true divine knowledge.9

III

Now let us turn to Maximus. There is a passage in Maximus’ Ambigua that

deals with more or less the same subject, but in a different way. Maximus
writes that,
St Dionysius the Areopagite teaches us clearly that Scripture calls these logoi to which I
referred predeterminations (proorismoúv) and divine acts of willing (qe⁄a qelßmata).10

6
Dodds writes that ‘what the Intelligence knows is not the sensible world itself but the intel-
ligible causes wherein the sensible is pre-embraced’, E.R. Dodds (ed.), Proclus, The Elements of
Theology (1963), 289. Moreover, Siorvanes writes that, according to Proclus, ‘… gods and mortals
may look at the same thing, but divines see it “godly” and humans “humanly”. So we have two
objects, as it were, the object itself, and that appropriated in the perceiver’s mode. In this latter sense,
perception is anti-realist’; see L. Siorvanes, Proclus: Neo-Platonic Philosophy and Science (1996),
126 (italics mine).
7
Italics mine.
8
What is said here will become clearer when we present the views of Saint Maximus the
Confessor.
9
Proclus refers to ‘illumination’ (ellampsis) that is given to men by gods (Proclus, In Parm.
949.13-38, cited in Siorvanes, Proclus: Neo-Platonic Philosophy and Science [1996], 157-8), but
I doubt whether this enables them to overcome their epistemological restrictions.
10
Pseudo-Dionysius, On Divine Names 5.8, PG 3, 824C.
 Neo-platonism and Maximus the Confessor on the Knowledge of God 121

In a similar manner, those around Pantainos, who was a teacher of the great Clement, the
author of the Stromateis, say that Scripture likes to call them divine acts of willing. So,
when these people were asked by some others who were proud of their secular education
‘what do the Christians believe regarding the way in which God knows beings?’, having
argued that he knows the intelligible beings intellectually and the sensible beings sensibly,
they replied that God does not know the intelligible beings intellectually or the sensible
beings sensibly. For it is impossible for him who is above the beings to perceive them in
a way that pertains to them; so we say [they said] that God knows the beings as his own
objects of willing (÷dia qelßmata), adding the justification of their claim. Because, if he
created everything by his will, and no one will object to this, and since it is pious and
righteous to say always that God knows his own will, and given that God created every
creature willingly, therefore God knows beings as his own objects of willing, because he
created beings willingly. Starting from here, I think that it is in accordance with these
words that in Scripture it is said to Moses ‘I know you more than anyone else’11 and,
regarding some others, it is said that ‘the Lord knows those who are his’,12 and again it
is said to some people ‘I do not know you’.13 Namely, the movement of their will
(proairetik® kínjsiv) being either in accordance to the will and the word or God or
against them made each one of those mentioned to hear the [respective] divine voice.14

In his work On Divine Names, Pseudo-Dionysius reproduces much of what

Proclus writes in proposition 124.15 Maximus, however, in his treatment does
not follow Pseudo-Dionysius – at least he does not follow him closely. It would
be interesting to compare Pseudo-Dionysius and Maximus on this point, but I
do not have time for that here.16 It is noteworthy that Maximus claims that he
develops his ideas with reference not so much to Dionysius but to some
Christians belonging to the school of Pantainus. Who they are or which text
Maximus is referring to, I do not know.17 But I very much doubt whether there
has ever been any such authentic text.

11
Exodus 33:17. It is noteworthy that straight after God tells Moses the above words, Moses
asks the Lord to reveal Himself to him and God promises him to do this.
12
2Timothy 2:19; see Numbers 16:5.
13
Matthew 25:12.
14
PG 91, 1085A-C. By the time he wrote his Ambigua Maximus had not fully developed his
volitional vocabulary. This he will do later, during the monothelite controversy. It is clear from
the context of our text, however, that what he means by the word ‘qéljma’ here is the act or the
object of willing, and not the divine will as a natural faculty.
15
See, for instance, On Divine Names 7.2, PG 3, 868B-869C.
16
I will only mention that Pseudo-Dionysius understands God’s knowledge of beings on the
basis of Him being their cause ‘aîtía’ (On Divine Names 7.2, PG 3, 869A-C), which gives empha-
sis on protology, whereas Maximus’ use of the term ‘qelßmata’, understood as ‘proorismoí’,
gives emphasis also on eschatology.
17
Dumitru Staniloae gives the following reference for this text: Clement, Stromateis 4.26 in
PG 8, 1381A (see Agíou Mazímou Omologjtoú, Filosofiká kai Qeologiká Erwtßmata, Eis-
agwgß – Sxólia pr. Djmßtriov Staniloáe, met. Ignátiov Sakalßv [Aqßna, 1978], s. 180).
There, however, we only find the phrase ‘qéljma qe⁄on’, and nothing else.
122 D. BATHRELLOS

In this passage from Maximus’ Ambigua we see several interesting things.

First, we find the well-known theory of the logoi. The logoi can be defined as
‘the principles in accordance with which everything … was created’.18 I cannot
give here a detailed account of this theory or examine its relation to the platonic
and neo-platonic theory of the Forms. As the aforementioned ‘definition’ indi-
cates, the two theories are quite close to each other. The fact that the theory of
the logoi can be traced back to Origen,19 namely to somebody who was under
the spell of platonic and neo-platonic philosophy, is another indication of the
kinship that obtains between this theory and the theory of the Forms.
What is important for the purposes of this article is that in both Plato and
Plotinus the Forms have an independent reality. O’Meara, for instance, argues
that Plotinus did not believe that a divine intellect ‘thinks up’ the Forms.
On the contrary, he believed that the Forms have an independent existence and
that divine thought is identical with their activity.20 On this matter, Dodds
writes that ‘against the Christian doctrine of a deliberate creation in time the
Neoplatonists maintained an emanative creation which is timeless and unwilled.’
Further down he adds that ‘what is really important is the conception, common
to both writers [i.e. Plotinus and Proclus], of creation as a by-product (para-
koloúqjma, Plot., Enn. III.viii.4) of contemplation. God creates because he
thinks, but he does not think in order to create (In Parm. 791.14).’21
In the passage from Maximus that we cited, we can easily see in which ways
his thinking is similar or dissimilar to that of Proclus. First, Maximus also
believes, as Proclus does, that God does not know intelligible things intellectu-
ally or sensible things sensibly. This is so because he who is above the beings
perceives them in a way that pertains not to them but to him. Maximus does
not use Proclus’ sharp antitheses between God’s mode of knowing and the
world, but he agrees with his main point: God’s knowledge of the world is
primarily in conformity not with the world but with himself. This means that
the way in which God knows the world is relevant to his nature, to his being
God. But what about God’s will?
It is noteworthy that Maximus adopts Pseudo-Dionysius’ characterization of
the logoi as predeterminations (proorismoí) and acts or products of divine
willing (qe⁄a qelßmata). For Maximus, not only the creation of the world, but
also the very logoi according to which the world was created are products of
the divine will. It is noteworthy that, in contradistinction to neo-platonism, for
Maximus the logoi are not the unwilled products of divine thought, but prod-
ucts of the divine will. For Maximus, all this depends on God’s freedom. Man,
the world, and all its logoi exist only because God wants them to exist. The

18
Andrew Louth, Maximus the Confessor (London, 1996), 37.
19
A. Louth, Maximus the Confessor (1996), 37.
20
Dominic J. O’Meara, Plotinus: An Introduction to the Enneads (Oxford, 1993), 36.
21
E.R. Dodds, The Elements of Theology (1963), 290; italics mine.
 Neo-platonism and Maximus the Confessor on the Knowledge of God 123

logoi do not belong to the essence of God but to his will. Besides, the word
‘proorismoí’ (predeterminations) gives to the identity of the logoi an escha-
tological orientation. God creates freely and his creation has a purpose.
But Maximus goes a step further. After having said that God does not know
intelligible beings intellectually and sensible beings sensibly – which is a neg-
ative statement – he explains how, in his view, God knows beings. He argues
that God knows beings as products of his will. God created everything will-
ingly, and so he knows all as products of his will. Therefore his knowledge of
the world is not relevant only to his nature but also to his will, to his freedom.
Maximus goes yet another step further. We saw earlier that for both Proclus
and Maximus God’s knowledge of the world, and therefore of man as well, does
not depend (or does not depend heavily) on man’s nature. But here Maximus
tells us that such knowledge depends on man’s will. God’s knowledge of man
depends not only on the will of God, but also on the will of man! God knows
only those whose will moves in accordance with his will. God knew Moses
more than anyone else because he, more than anyone else, had directed his will
and his life towards God. Conversely, God does not know those whose will
contradicts the divine will. It is because of the way in which they have used
their will and their freedom that God will tell them: ‘I do not know you’!

IV

Thus far we have spoken of the way in which God’s knowledge of man is
relative to God’s nature and will as well as to man’s will. But how do things
work from man’s side? How does man know God?
We saw earlier that for Proclus man’s understanding of God depends heavily
on man’s nature and his consequent intellectual capacities. Man is an indetermi-
nate, mutable, passible, and temporal being. Therefore, he has ‘an indeterminate
thought of the determinate divine nature, and changing concepts of the immu-
table; its impassibility he conceives in terms of passion, its timelessness in
terms of time’.
Maximus seems to share to some extent Proclus’ view. For instance, at one
point in his Ambigua he attempts to explain Saint Gregory of Nazianzus’ state-
ment that ‘the monad was eternally moved towards the dyad until it reached
the triad (or Trinity).’22 This is Maximus’ comment on this statement:
For the triad is truly monad, because thus it is, and the monad truly triad, because thus
it subsists. Thus there is one Godhead that is as monad, and subsists as triad. But if,
hearing of movement, you wonder how the Godhead that is beyond infinity is moved,

22
See Gregory’s Oration 29.2 in Paul Gallay avec la collaboration de Maurice Jourjon (eds),
Grégoire de Nazianze, Discours 27-31 (Discours théologiques), Introduction, texte critique, tra-
duction, et notes, SC 250 (Paris, 1978), 180, 13-4 and in PG 36, 76B.
124 D. BATHRELLOS

understand that what happens is happening to us and not to it. For first we are illumi-
nated with the reason of its being, and then we are enlightened about the mode in
which it subsists, for we always understand that something is before we understand
how it is. Therefore movement of the Godhead is constituted by the knowledge about
the fact that it is and how it subsists that comes about through revelation to those who
receive it.23

Therefore, for Maximus, our nature affects the way in which we understand
God. But our knowledge of God is also affected by our will. Quite often Max-
imus explains how man’s fall, namely his voluntary decision to move against
God and his will, affected both his will and his knowledge of God. For instance,
in his dyothelite works he speaks against gnomic will, namely against a will
that depends on ignorance and deliberation, and oscillates between good and
evil.24 In many of his works he also explains how through ascetic struggle
man’s will can be healed so that man can acquire true knowledge of God.
Just after the passage that we are discussing, Maximus talks against the mode
of knowledge that depends on ignorance and search (hßtjsiv). Maximus sug-
gests that we should live according to our logos. Obviously this will restore us
to what we really are, and will also restore our human natural ability to have
some knowledge of God, which the fall has distorted.
But Maximus moves even beyond this. He says that if we direct our lives in
accordance with our logos, we will move beyond it, and we will reach God.
Our mind, and logos, and spirit (an indirect trinitarian hint) will be united to
the great mind, and logos, and spirit, namely to the Trinity. Then we will come
to know everything in a divine-like manner (qeoeid¬v), that is in a manner that
pertains not to man but to God himself.25
A similar movement can be seen also in God himself. Man, thanks to his
will, can move beyond his nature and know things in a divine-like manner.
God, thanks to his will, can also move ‘beyond’ his nature and know things in
a human-like manner. This happened when God, by becoming man, assumed
our own human rational soul and consequently our own way of knowing.26
So Maximus believes with Proclus that because of their respective natures God
and man know in a divine way and in a human way respectively. But he adds
to this that, thanks to their wills, God acquired the human way of knowing, and
man may be enabled to know in a divine-like way.

23
For both this passage and the abovementioned statement of St Gregory I have used Louth’s
translation with minor alterations (italics mine). See A. Louth, Maximus the Confessor (1996),
169 and 170 respectively. For the original, see PG 91, 1036C.
24
For more on this, see Demetrios Bathrellos, The Byzantine Christ: Person, Nature, and Will
in St Maximus the Confessor (Oxford, 2004).
25
PG 91, 1085C-1088A.
26
This is a classic orthodox position against apolinarianism, which claimed that the Son of
God did not assume a rational soul. Maximus adopts this position and mentions it very often.
 Neo-platonism and Maximus the Confessor on the Knowledge of God 125

From Maximus’ passage that we are discussing, it becomes obvious that Max-
imus not only says more than Proclus on God’s knowledge of man and man’s
knowledge of God, but also transforms the meaning of the word ‘knowledge’
itself. Knowledge, for Maximus, is not a purely rational, intellectual activity,
but it receives existential meaning.27 Maximus associates knowledge with free-
dom, relationship, and love.
First, God’s knowledge operates in the context of freedom. God knows crea-
tures as products of his will. God knows only those people who freely respond
to his will and his word. Man also knows God only on the basis of a free,
voluntary response to God’s word and to God’s will.
Second, God’s knowledge functions in the context of relationship. ‘God
knows those who are his’. If someone chooses to move out of his relationship
with God or not even to begin this relationship, then God will not know him
and of course this man will not be able to know God.
Third, this relationship functions within the context of love. Maximus has
written extensively on love. In our passage he hints at the parable of the foolish
virgins. It is to them that the groom, that is Christ, says: ‘I do not know you.’
A standard interpretation of this parable in the Christian tradition tells us that
these virgins were foolish because they did not do acts of love.28 This parable
in Matthew’s Gospel is part of a series of eschatological passages that culmi-
nate in the famous passage that refers to the Last Judgment.29 There Christ
condemns those who did not feed the hungry, give drink to the thirsty, welcome
strangers, clothe the naked, and visit the sick and those in prison, namely those
who did not show love to their neighbour and thereby to Christ himself. These
people cannot know God and to those par excellence God will say: ‘I do not
know you.’30
In this New Testament passage, those who love Christ and their neighbour
will inherit eternal life, whereas the others will inherit eternal hell. Hell is here
opposed to life, hell is death. Those whom God does not know are dead.
No-one can exist, unless he is known by God. God does not know evil, and

27
I am grateful to Prof. Stephen Gersh for drawing my attention to the fact that the meaning
of knowledge in Proclus cannot be reduced to that of a purely rational activity but shares some
of the characteristics that we find also in Maximus. However, I should mention that Maximus has
a distinct understanding of the term, shaped by his Christian faith and theology. For the way in
which Proclus brings together knowledge, faith, salvation, love, and theurgy, see, for instance,
L. Siorvanes, Proclus: Neo-Platonic Philosophy and Science (1996), 189-99.
28
There is another similar passage in Matthew 7:22, where Christ says ‘I never knew you;
depart from me the workers of anomy’.
29
Matthew 25:31-46.
30
All this fits well with Maximus’ emphasis on eschatology, implied in the world ‘proori-
smoí’, to which we referred earlier.
126 D. BATHRELLOS

evil does not exist. Evil does not exist, not because it is an ontologically inferior
entity – as is the case in Plotinus who identifies evil with matter31 – but because
it is not something that God willed. Evil does not exist because it is something
that opposes God’s will and God’s love – and therefore it is something that
God does not know.32

VI

The question of the relationship between philosophy and theology is one on

which theologians have spent a lot of time and energy, especially, I think, in
modern times. The Fathers of the Church, including Maximus, felt that there
are philosophies or philosophical positions that should be openly dismissed and
even attacked. However, they also felt that there are some other philosophical
systems and positions which could be drawn on in order to facilitate the
expression of the Christian message. Neo-platonism belongs partly to the
latter category.
In his Confessions, Augustine writes that he found in the writings of neo-
platonists some truths, but he could not find some others – those that can be found
only in Christianity.33 A little later, Pseudo-Dionysius used Proclus’ neo-plato-
nism in order to give his Christian theology a certain – in his view suitable –
form. With regard to the content of proposition 124 from Proclus’ The Elements
of Theology, even Nicholas of Methone, a 12th-century theologian who wrote
a refutation of this work, argued that ‘these things also would be correct, if they
were said about the only [true] God.’34
Maximus also agrees with some things said by Proclus in proposition 124 of
The Elements of Theology. He almost repeats some of Proclus’ statements, but
also adds a lot more to them. For Maximus, they alone would not do. I think
that Maximus would agree that philosophy in general and neo-platonism in
particular have some good points. But he would also say that, from a Christian
point of view, even the best they have to say may not be good enough.

31
On this, see D.J. O’Meara, Plotinus (1993), 81-3. On page 82 O’Meara writes that ‘by
“privation of the good” the Christian theologians mean, not an existing reality, but a wilful turn-
ing away of the soul from god’ (italics mine).
32
It is noteworthy that, for Proclus, intellective Intellect does not know evil, because evil
has no Form (see L. Siorvanes, Proclus: Neo-Platonic Philosophy and Science [1996], 157). For
Maximus, however, God does not know evil, because evil is against his will.
33
See chapter viii of his Confessions.
34
Athanasios D. Angelou (ed.), Nikoláou MeqÉnjv, ˆAnáptuziv t±v Qeologik±v StoixeiÉ-
sewv Próklou PlatwnikoÕ Filosófou, A Critical Edition With an Introduction on Nicholas’
Life and Works (Athens, 1984), 119.