The Challenge of The Past The Quest For Historical Legitimacy in Independent Eritrea R-Reid

The Challenge of the past: The Quest for Historical Legitimacy in Independent Eritrea
Author(s): Richard Reid

Source: History in Africa , 2001, Vol. 28 (2001), pp. 239-272
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/3172217
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms
Cambridge University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access
to History in Africa
This content downloaded from

196.190.154.222 on Mon, 21 Dec 2020 18:32:12 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
THE CHALLENGE OF THE PAST: THE QUEST
FOR HISTORICAL LEGITIMACY IN
INDEPENDENT ERITREA
RICHARD REID
UNIVERSITY OF ASMARA
In the 1960s a host of African nations discovered their independence

and, with it, rediscovered the pleasure and the pain of the past. States
such as Nigeria and Ghana, Tanzania and Uganda, using both local
and expatriate scholars, embarked on the reconstruction of "national
histories," with an enthusiasm which, at the beginning of the twenty-
first century, seems enviable. From an academic point of view, this pe-
riod witnessed the rejection of the colonial distortion of Africa's
past-i.e., the idea that basically the continent had none worth talk-
ing about-and the historiographical offensive which was thus
launched may be seen to have been ultimately successful.
In terms of African politics, history was seen in many new states as
a means of nation-building and the fostering of national identity. In
Tanzania, for example, precolonial leaders such as Mirambo and
Nyungu-ya-Mawe, the relative linguistic unity provided by Swahili,
and the anticolonial Maji Maji uprising were used, both consciously
and subliminally, to encourage the idea that Tanzanians had shared
historical experiences which straddled both the precolonial and the
colonial eras.
It must be conceded that history did not always prove as reliable
an ally to African politicians as to scholars of Africa. Penetration into
the Nigerian past served, indirectly at least, to magnify the regional-
ism which had already troubled the decolonization process in that ter-
ritory, and underlined the distinct historical experiences of, for ex-
ample, the Yoruba in the south and the Hausa-Fulani in the north.
Similar investigations in Uganda fueled the resentment felt by non-
Ganda peoples toward Buganda's favored position within the colonial
History in Africa 28 (2001), 239-272.

196.190.154.222 on Mon, 21 Dec 2020 18:32:12 UTC
240 Richard Reid
state and in the new republic, an

that too many scholars viewed th
Buganda. All this granted, howev
such research-the intellectual d
lowed the achievement of politic
which stands out to those who lo
in what is often an uninspirin
from the field created the oppor
of the past, and the process seem
romanticization, to have been r
until the disillusionment of the
we consider the case of Africa's
II
Eritrea had to wait rather longer for the discovery of independence

than the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. It also experienced a somewhat
more complex-and bloody-process of decolonization than most
other current members of the Organisation of African Unity. The
Eritrean independence war began in 1961 and moved through various
phases until the achievement of de facto liberation in 1991, followed
by a UN-observed referendum in 1993 which confirmed the nation's
sovereignty. Above all, the single most complicating feature about
Eritrea's decolonization was the fact that the colonial power was not
European but African; the latter was, moreover, Africa's only suppos-
edly independent state throughout the colonial era. Ethiopia had long
held a special place in the West's heart; in part this was connected to
the geopolitics of the region in the context of the Cold War, an argu-
ment which has been effectively outlined elsewhere.2 Ethiopia's pro-
Western stance after 1945 led the principal Western powers, already
feeling the pangs of guilt over their inertia during the Italian invasion
in 1935, to bolster Ethiopia as the key state in the region. The United
States, moreover, was able to develop Kagnew Station in Asmara itself
as its listening post for the Indian Ocean and the Middle East.
Later on, in the 1970s and 1980s, the Soviet Union took the place
of the United States as Ethiopia's sponsor, once the latter proclaimed
itself socialist under the Dergue government. Since the Second World
11In the ensuing discussion, sections of direct quotations which are placed in italics
indicate my emphasis, unless otherwise stated.
2See for example Ruth lyob, The Eritrean Struggle for Independence: Domination,
Resistance, Nationalism, 1941-1993 (Cambridge, 1995).

196.190.154.222 on Mon, 21 Dec 2020 18:32:12 UTC
Historical Legitimacy in Independent Eritrea 241
War, Eritrea's position has been complicated by the fact that it is situ-
ated in a region which is of considerable geopolitical importance.3
This was certainly true of the liberation war, which was seen by the
superpowers to be a destabilizing and disruptive force for change
which had to be suppressed. But there is a clear line of continuity
from the era of the Axumite empire in the early centuries A.D., when
the region also lay at the center of a thriving commercial network,
with the Red Sea as its main avenue. It is thus to modern Eritrea's ad-
vantage that it is located in a such a strategically valuable area, a situ-
ation which it can surely use to its benefit in the longer term. Yet it is
this very fact which, indirectly at least, worked against it, prolonged
the liberation struggle, and distorted the perception and interpretation
of the region's history.
Yet regional geopolitics is only part of the story. Eritrea's struggle
for legitimacy has been all the more difficult in the face of both the
intellectual and the emotional support which 'motherland' Ethiopia,
or various perceived versions of that entity, has enjoyed in the West
since the Middle Ages. The case is powerfully stated by Holcomb and
Ibssa, who argued that "Ethiopia encloses many nations," and that
the seizure of Eritrea was typical of Ethiopian expansionism. For its
part, Ethiopia argued with particular vehemence after the Second
World War that
both Eritrea and the Ogaden had been an integral part of Ethiopia's
'3,000-year' history. Such a diplomatic offensive required an elabo-
ration of the Ethiopian colonial mythology. Ethiopia and her in-
creasing number of advocates argued with one voice that the
former colonies should not be separated from the 'motherland'...4
The Portuguese were the first to be fired by the idea of the Chris-
tian kingdom of "Prester John" during their quest for direct access to
east Asia, determined in the process to bypass and undermine the
Muslim world. Over the ensuing centuries, missionaries, explorers,
and, eventually, honorary consuls laid their bricks on the foundations
of the myth. While such observers were compelled by their placement
in time to emphasize the essential decadence and savagery of the aver-
age "Abyssinian," there was nonetheless at least implicit admiration
for "Abyssinian" culture and heritage, encompassing the ancient glo-
3For example, Semere Haile, "Historical Background to the Ethiopia-Eritrea Con-

flict" in Basil Davidson and Lionel Cliffe, eds., The Long Struggle of Eritrea for
Independence and Constructive Peace (Trenton, 1988), 11.
4B.K. Holcomb and S. Ibssa, The Invention of Ethiopia: the Making of a Depen-
dent Colonial State in Northeast Africa (Trenton, 1990), 2-3, 230-31.

196.190.154.222 on Mon, 21 Dec 2020 18:32:12 UTC
242 Richard Reid
ries of Axum, the higher pursuit

albeit hagiographic, and of cours
larly impressive, standing as it d
hordes.
The idea of "Abyssinia" as the
depths of Africa was extremely i
of the region. In the late ninet
Gerald Portal made perhaps the c
For centuries the Abyssinians ha

all the nations around them have
persuasion of Islam. For centu
beaten against the mountain barr
succeeded in breaking into the cou
ter generation, this hardy Christ
sion of the fanatical Mahomm
form of Christianity. In the cou
has become cut off from the rest
in the midst of a stormy Moslem
A few years later, Berkeley echo

lowing the Ethiopian defeat of
1896. Ethiopia's triumph confirm
rican civilisation." The statement
pendence, as recognized in the ch
ated rather than asserted-was v
of several thousand years of "u
coupling if ever there was one. B
battle "may rank as a peculiar ph
ing less-that a European army of
be annihilated by a native Africa
... what a series of anomalies do

chiefly of Semitic blood, of dark
nation that is young today, thou
of Genesis was written, and was
worshipped Thor and Odin.6
Indeed, there could scarcely be a

"since their success at Adowa it has become the fashion in certain
sG.H. Portal, My Mission to Abyssinia (London, 1892), 81.

6G.F.H. Berkeley, The Campaign of Adowa and the Rise of Menelik (London,
1902), vii-viii.

196.190.154.222 on Mon, 21 Dec 2020 18:32:12 UTC
quarters to speak of them as almost European in organisation."7 This

certainly helped explain the defeat of a European army.
If this was the case, then the surrounding peoples were to be re-
garded, by comparison, as savage beyond redemption. In the 1840s
Walter Plowden referred to the highlanders of present-day Eritrea as
"a fierce and turbulent race," irregularly squeezed for tribute by the
comparatively civilized "Abyssinians."8 The coastal lowlanders were
"a wicked and treacherous race . . . at enmity with all men." They
were ungovernable, brave, and preserve their independence."' The
use of the term "ungovernable" is surely significant, for it presumably
means that these peoples could not be governed by the "Abyssinians."
The concept of "Abyssinia," with its attendant romanticism, is the
reference point from which everything else is relative: these wild,
bloodthirsty, and ungovernable people are precisely so because they
are not under "Abyssinian" control.
To the south, the Oromo-or "Galla" by their older designation-
come in for similar treatment. Henry Salt, in the early nineteenth cen-
tury, asserted that the "Galla" were "[l]ike the Goths and Vandals,"
pouring in destructive hordes into the "Abyssinian" region.'0 The im-
plication is that "Abyssinia" is akin to the Roman Empire, the cradle
of European civilization, beset by barbarous hordes; it is a Christian
island, again, struggling against the forces of paganism and destruc-
tion. The metaphor becomes mixed when Salt later confesses that he
feels
that I was dwelling among the Israelites ... It will be scarcely nec-
essary for me to observe, that the feelings of the Abyssinians to-
wards the Galla partake of the same inveterate spirit of animosity
which appears to have influenced the Israelites with regard to their
hostile neighbours...11
In the work of the missionary Samuel Gobat, the "Galla" are simi-
larly demonized. While the Ethiopians are
beautiful, strong, and active ... they are continually engaged in ha-
rassing wars with their ferocious neighbours, the Gallas, who are
perpetually invading the country from the south and west, and
71bid., 6.
8W.C. Plowden, Travels in Abyssinia and the Galla Country: With an Account of a
Mission to Ras Ali in 1848 (London, 1868), 39.
'Ibid., 24-25, 27.
t'Henry Salt, A Voyage to Abyssinia and Travels into the Interior of that Country
(London, 1814), 299-300.
1"Ibid., 306.

196.190.154.222 on Mon, 21 Dec 2020 18:32:12 UTC
244 Richard Reid
have already succeeded in subje

territory to their savage sway
It may be stated, with somewh

ceptions were an ill omen fo
other groups forcibly incorpor
end of the nineteenth century
substantial swathes of territory
ing an opportunism which se
Shoan ruler as "almost Europ
was "quite European in his met
the less civilized inhabitants."'3
as well as have been said of Haile Sellassie in the 1950s and 1960s.
III
The Red Sea coast was a prize long sought by whatever society, under
whatever ruler, existed in the region of what is now central-northern
Ethiopia. In more recent times, the winning of that prize has meant
the winning of Eritrea as well. The quest for the coast is demon-
strable, and even understandable; but the major intellectual challenge
facing scholars of Eritrea and the wider region of the Horn is the
question of why so many authors and commentators have regarded
the quest as right. The quest itself has so often been translated into a
legitimate claim in the post-Axum era. In the process, the inhabitants
of what is now Eritrea are faceless, passive creatures, with no achieve-
ments of their own. To paraphrase Walter Rodney, they have in effect
been removed from history.
This is especially true in the treatment of early Eritrea. Despite the
splintered succession of states and rulers in the modern Ethiopian re-
gion, each claimed as the successor of Axum and of course the prede-
cessor of modern Ethiopia, Harold Marcus asserts that the "Ethio-
pian nation" survived intact: "it has never disappeared as an idea and
always reappeared in fact."'4 This "fact" is open to serious question-
ing, while its widespread and uncritical acceptance has been, in recent
decades, more a matter of life and death than of purely academic in-
terest.
'2S.Gobat, ed. S.D. Clark, Journal of Three Years' Residence in Abyssinia (Lon-
don, 1851), 21.
'3Berkeley, Campaign, 35.
14H.G. Marcus, A History of Ethiopia (Berkeley, 1994), xiii.

196.190.154.222 on Mon, 21 Dec 2020 18:32:12 UTC
Axum itself, of course, is handed firmly to modern Ethiopia as part

of the latter's regional inheritance, despite the fact that its origins are
demonstrably to be found in southern highland Eritrea. Adulis, the
thriving port of the Axumite state, is "Ethiopian," according to
Marcus, even though it lies just south of Massawa on the modern
Eritrean coast. Adulis "was an impressive place," which befitted "its
centrality in Ethiopia's economy;" moreover, "visiting foreign ships
anchored in the channel to protect themselves against attack at night
by unruly local peoples."1s These "unruly" peoples are presumably
the ancestors of the uncivilized hordes of the Eritrean region de-
scribed above. Eritrea is, in effect, written out of the script, a charac-
ter without a role on the great Ethiopian stage.16
Similar treatment is handed out in analyses of the post-Axum era.
For this period, the key figure is the holder of the title Bahr Negash,
or "ruler of the seas," supposedly appointed by the central "Abyssin-
ian" government to control the region of Eritrea down to the coast.
Taddesse Tamrat, discussing the reign of the fifteenth-century ruler
Zara Yaqob, is worth quoting at length.
This king pursued an active foreign policy. An essential part of this

programme was his attempt to strengthen his control of northern
Ethiopia, and to secure a direct outlet to the Red Sea ... In 1448/9
he established military colonies in the districts of the Eritrean pla-
teau. The colonists were recruited from a [Shoan] tribe called
Maya, and their reception by the local people was clearly hostile ...
This was part of a general policy adopted by Zaria-Yafiqob
throughout his empire, and was aimed at strengthening the defence
of the kingdom and ensuring a more direct military control of the
provinces. In the Eritrean plateau, however, it was closely associ-
ated with his militant foreign policy and assumed a particular im-
portance. He grouped together the districts of Shire, Saraie,
Hamasen, and Bur, and placed them under one administration en-
trusted to the Bahir-Nagash. These administrative and military re-
arrangements were only a prelude to a more aggressive move
against formerly independent Muslim rulers of the islands of
Misiwwa and Dahlak . . . No doubt, this Christian activity was
looked at with much hostility by the local Muslims, and it prob-
ably led to armed conflicts.17
'sIbid., 5.
"6Only Alemseged Abbay, who supports the idea of the "trans-Mereb" identity
and to whom we will return below, is happy to give Axum jointly to Eritreans and
Tigrayans: see Alemseged Abbay, Identity Jilted or Re-imagining Identity? The Di-
vergent Paths of the Eritrean and Tigrayan Nationalist Struggles (Lawrenceville,
1998), 2.
'7Taddesse Tamrat, Church and State in Ethiopia, 1270-1527 (Oxford, 1972),
259-61.

196.190.154.222 on Mon, 21 Dec 2020 18:32:12 UTC
246 Richard Reid
Military expansionism into the E

of a "natural" Ethiopian expansio
both the highlands and the coa
they were insignificant obstacles
ment. Reflecting the perceptions
tianity of the region is seen to b
and accordingly Islam is the imp
as one of the greatest of Ethiopi
was deeply concerned about the

Muslim power on the Eritrean se
restoration of Christian suprema
only be complete if its impact was
ments. His recent campaigns aga
ern Shawa were doubtless resent
north, who may have co-operat
northern Tigre. This may have f
mediate reasons for his expeditio
Amda-Siyon, went to the sea of
mounted on an elephant and ent
and spears, killed my enemies, an
Such a statement could very e

Haile Mariam seven centuries late
region which is exposed to exter
the Ethiopian
or the M interior
the thirteenth-century
Belew go
under Zagwe control, while the
ethnically assimilated," pulled by
tral Ethiopia.19 Eritrea, then, wa
highland fringe of Christian A
necessarily against the lowland, c
East.
Despite the vicissitudes of the central power of the kingdom, there-

fore, the Christian character of northern Ethiopia was preserved
throughout the centuries after the advent of Islam ... [T]his devel-
opment was further enhanced by the economic dependence of the
islands of Misiwwa and Dahlak on their Christian hinterland, and
their solitary political position in relation to other Muslim coun-
tries in the Red Sea area. Until they were finally annexed by the
'8Ibid., 76-77.
"The Zagwe dynasty controlled the "Abyssinian" heartland from the eleventh to
the thirteenth centuries, when it was overthrown by the first ruler to claim the
Solomonic heritage.

196.190.154.222 on Mon, 21 Dec 2020 18:32:12 UTC
Ottomans in the second half of the sixteenth century, these islands

remained in the backwaters of Muslim expansion, and their only
importance to the Muslim world lay in serving as an outlet for the
products of the Christian hinterland. Their value to the Christian
kingdom also consisted in maintaining the long-distance commer-
cial contact with the Muslim powers of Egypt and Arabia who
firmly controlled the profitable trade of the Red Sea. In the final
analysis, it was the need to share in this lucrative traffic between
the Ethiopian interior and the Red Sea which provided Amda-Siyon
with sufficient economic reasons to demonstrate his military prow-
ess in the Eritrean region.20
Again, Eritrea is merely a prize to be won, trapped in a no-man's

land between competing ideologies and rival political ambitions. The
little history that is granted to the region is merely an extension of
that of either "Ethiopia" or the Middle East. However, what this does
in fact demonstrate is that Eritrea cannot be considered to have been
part of "historic Abyssinia," something which the historian of the lib-
eration war Roy Pateman has hitherto been almost alone in argu-
ing.21 As is also true of the nineteenth century, as we shall see, any
"Abyssinian" presence was maintained purely by brute force, and not
because the Eritrean plateau and lowlands were in any way an inte-
gral part of the Ethiopian highland polity.
This is also demonstrated by Marcus, a whole-hearted believer in
the "Greater Ethiopia" thesis, whose own analysis of this period
nonetheless indicates that Eritrea was not part of post-Axumite
"Abyssinia:"
Since Zara Yakob sought full access to the sea, he looked north-
ward to the Red Sea coast near the Christian-inhabited central
highlands of Tigray. In 1448-1449, he settled military colonies in
what is today Eritrea, reorganised the highlands into one adminis-
tration under a "ruler of the seas"(babr negash), and then attacked
the Muslim principalities at Mitsiwa and on the Dahlak Islands ...
It was indeed this period which brought the region once more to the
attention of Europe, "burnishing the spurious luster of Prester
John."22 This particular legend would flourish over the next few cen-
turies. Again, Pateman alone among foreign scholars, has argued
against interpreting the title of "ruler of the seas" as denoting any-
thing other than a periodic and shallow "Abyssinian" influence over
the region in question.23
21Taddesse, Church and State, 79-80.

21R. Pateman, Eritrea: Even the Stones are Burning (Lawrenceville, 1998), 32-33.
22Marcus, History of Ethiopia, 26-27.
23Pateman, Even the Stones, 33-37.

19:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff on Thu, 01 Jan 1976 12:34:56 UTC
248 Richard Reid
But clearly more research on

history is critical. It is not diffic
nationalist scholars to at least c
some ethnic or political integrity
opposition to "Abyssinian" expan
relates how Eritrea, or some pa
Bahri," the land of the sea, fro
Again, it was supposedly ruled
the sea. Its border with Abyss
Mereb river. In the fifteenth cen
constantly invaded by Tigray:
Zula and Hirgigo were almost de

ever, in the same century the l
Abyssinians at a frontier on th
thrust into the territory was by
in 1540-41, but these in the end
1770 ... James Bruce travelled
Eritrea and Ethiopia were separa
another.24
This is, of course, a somewhat simplistic account; but the message

concerning the people of "Medri-Bahri" foiling an "Ethiopian" inva-
sion, even when the latter was supported by the European super-
power of the age, would not have been lost on those involved in the
liberation struggle both inside and outside Eritrea. Dealing with the
eighteenth century, Semere is more blunt, portraying, in rather more
stark colors than Bruce ever did, "Ethiopia" and "Eritrea" as separate
entities in recurrent conflict with one another. It was clearly impor-
tant to emphasize the historical continuity which lent gravity to the
endeavors of the ELF and EPLF. But oversimplistic interpretations,
which can be as transparent as they are understandable in a pre-inde-
pendence context, have not necessarily helped Eritrea's intellectual
cause. A number of primary European accounts basically support
Semere's thesis. Bruce, Salt, Gobat, Plowden, and Parkyns, to name
but a few, all depict to varying degrees the Eritrean highlands and
both western and coastal lowlands as separate from "Abyssinia," but
such sources are crying out for more creative and vigorous usage.25
24Semere Haile, "Historical background," 12-13.

2SJames Bruce, ed. C.F.Beckingham, Travels to Discover the Source of the Nile
(Edinburgh, 1964[1790]), 23, 26-27; Salt, Voyage, 213, 488; Gobat, Journal, 37-
38; Plowden, Travels in Abyssinia, 39; Mansfield Parkyns, Life in Abyssinia (Lon-
don, 1853; second ed., 1868), 51ff.

196.190.154.222 on Mon, 21 Dec 2020 18:32:12 UTC
IV
Analyses of the nineteenth century, and especially of the reigns of

Tewodros (1855-68), Yohannes (1872-89), and Menelik (1889-1913),
are revealing of scholars'attitudes toward Eritrea. These attitudes,
while undoubtedly often subconscious, highlight the scale of the task
involved in Eritrea's quest for intellectual legitimacy. Harold Marcus,
one of the most accomplished scholars in the field of Ethiopian stud-
ies, describes the notoriously violent Tewodros thus: "His ideas were
grand: he wanted to bring Ethiopia back to its political and religious
unity and to re-establish its natural and legendary boundaries, from
the Nile to the Red Sea."26 At the very least, the idea of Ethiopia's
"natural and legendary boundaries" is accepted uncritically. What we
might call the "imagined boundaries" of Ethiopia are just as impor-
tant, and sometimes more so, than the reality of Ethiopia's geopoliti-
cal position on the ground; ancient highland ambition is transformed
magically into reality, and distinguished authors and less-known com-
mentators alike manage to overlook the fact that much of the terri-
tory regarded as "traditionally" lying within "Abyssinia" was no-
where near being under the latter's control.
Through much of the nineteenth century, as is well documented,
the area presently known as Ethiopia was deeply and often violently
fragmented. Whatever unity was achieved during the so-called
Zemene Mesafint-the "era of the princes"-was usually the result of
brute force. Tewodros, the ruler commonly credited with initiating the
"reunification" process, was renowned for his brutality and excessive
use of force in both domestic and foreign affairs. His major preoccu-
pation was with rebellion in various provinces, including Gojjam,
Wollo, and parts of Tigray. He found himself unable to consolidate
his authority in the north; had he done so, as Donald Crummey ex-
plains, "he might have been able to develop an opening on the Red
Sea into a profitable avenue of intercourse with Europe. But here
again he lacked the time and patience, and instead resorted to repres-
sion and terrorism."27 Repeated rebellions suggest at the very least
that Tewodros had no legitimacy in those areas, and that the whole
concept of "reunification" needs to be reconsidered.
Perhaps instead we should be thinking in terms of a violent expan-
26H.G.Marcus, The Life and Times of Menelik II: Ethiopia, 1844-1913

(Lawrenceville, 1995[1975]), 20.
27D. Crummey, "The Violence of Tewodros" in B.A. Ogot, ed., War and Society in
Africa (London, 1972), 71-72.

196.190.154.222 on Mon, 21 Dec 2020 18:32:12 UTC
250 Richard Reid
sionism carried out in the first instance from the Shoa-Amhara heart-
lands, continued by the Tigrayan ruler Yohannes, and always in the
name of a loosely-defined idea of "Abyssinia" based on the combined
myths woven around Axum, Christianity, and Islam. Rarely, since the
Biblically-named Zemene Mesafint, has "Ethiopia" been able to
achieve any kind of practical unity. The sustained resistance to
Tewodros in the nineteenth century, the forced conquests undertaken
by both Yohannes and Menelik, uprisings and liberation struggles
among the Oromo and from within Eritrea-even, of course, from
within Tigray-all suggest that "Ethiopia" has not been able to claim
legitimacy in its modern form.
Popular resistance to Tewodros, as well as the politically- and eco-
nomically-motivated rebellions of particular chiefs, is well-attested in
some of the primary sources. Blanc, for example, describes the popu-
lar and bitter resentment of the peasantry in Gojjam, Tigray, and even
Shoa toward Tewodros' extortions, suggesting not a great centralizing
ruler in the modern "Abyssinian" tradition, but a local warlord
whose violent rise was facilitated by the feudal structures of the re-
gion; he found himself in a position to at least attempt to impose his
authority on several surrounding provinces.28 Yet, according to his
contemporary Markham, his "exorbitant demands upon the people"
led to widespread uprisings which reflected "a universal desire to be
rid of the tyrant."29 As Crummey suggests, Tewodros had no direct
access to the coast. Blanc, describing how the Naib or governor of
Massawa was taken hostage by Tewodros, asserted that "[i]t was only
on the representation of several influential merchants, who, fearing
that the Naib's relations would retaliate on the Abyssinian caravans,
impressed upon his Majesty the prudence of letting him depart." Al-
though referring to the Naib as his "vassal," this relationship seems
to have had scarcely any practical function, as Tewodros' commercial
supplies were clearly dependent on the goodwill of the authorities at
Massawa.30 Further inland, Tewodros had a better claim to authority,
but even here whatever control he exercised was based on force or the
threat of force. At Keren, for example, in what is now central high-
land Eritrea, Blanc was received by "Abyssinian" officers in charge of
a substantial garrison. But Blanc was unimpressed:
Early in the morning, at our second stage from Mahaber, these

specimens of Abyssinian soldiers made their appearance, and a
28H. Blanc, A Narrative of Captivity in Abyssinia (London, 1868), 8-9.

29C.R. Markham, A History of the Abyssinian Expedition (London, 1869), 84-85.
30Blanc, Narrative, 50.

196.190.154.222 on Mon, 21 Dec 2020 18:32:12 UTC
batch of more villainous-looking scoundrels I have never seen dur-

ing my stay in Abyssinia: evidently Theodore was not very particu-
lar as to whom he selected for such distant outposts, unless he con-
sidered the roughest and most disorderly the fittest for such du-
ties.31
The Bogos region was clearly not under convincing "Abyssinian"

control; and the status of Keren and the surrounding region as highly
disputed borderland remained unchanged during the reign of
Yohannes, who was confronted with Egyptian military power.
Perhaps the most thorough account of the period of Yohannes'
reign-the 1870s and 1880s-has been undertaken by Rubenson. His
account includes the argument that Werner Munzinger-the Swiss
businessman who made the transition from consular representative of
both Britain and France at Massawa to Egyptian governor-general
there-should be seen as the key figure in the creation of Eritrea. It
was he who encouraged the creation of an Egyptian territory in much
of what is now Eritrea, "separating" the region from Ethiopia. This
initiated a long-term process which saw increasing foreign influence
in the area, particularly in Bogos. Yohannes is presented as the
staunch defender of Ethiopian interests, utterly convinced of
Ethiopia's claim over the Kunama, Barya, and Bogos districts, and
much more besides.
Rubenson seems not to quibble with Yohannes' claims. In a map
indicating the "approximate limits of direct or indirect Ethiopian po-
litical and/or economic control," the whole of modern Eritrea is en-
closed within Ethiopia's reach, including the entire modern Eritrean
coastline.32 While such a visual aid reflects the author's own position
on regional geopolitics, it appears somewhat inconsistent with much
of the textual analysis, which indicates Ethiopia's inability to have
much influence north of the Mereb river. Rubenson quotes an indig-
nant letter written by Yohannes following Egyptian military expedi-
tions into the Eritrean highlands:
... as I understand, [Munzinger] has, by order of Your Highness,

collected an army and has entered the countries of Mouiess
[Bogos], Halhal and Khamassin [Hamasen], which are situated be-
tween the Abyssinian and Egyptian territories; Khamassin is the
original Capital of Abyssinia . . . from these territories my King-
dom extends as far as the coasts of the Red Sea, [and] we hope that
the countries on the coast which have been taken from us may be
restored . .33
3-ilbid., 90-91.
32Sven Rubenson, The Survival of Ethiopian Independence (London, 1976), 31.
3'Ibid., 297.

196.190.154.222 on Mon, 21 Dec 2020 18:32:12 UTC
252 Richard Reid
Wishful thinking, indeed, but

Harold Marcus, again, seems to
There was however a possible c

out any military investment, an
maments. This promising situa
of Egyptian power along Ethi
the khedive'sforces invaded th
Referring to the Egyptian tro

the district of Keren, moreove
in Ethiopia."3s This will come
his preceding analysis, which c
could by no stretch of the imagination-except that of
Ethiopianists-be considered part of "Ethiopia." This is further dem-
onstrated by the fact that around Massawa "Abyssinian caravans"
were frequently plundered with impunity.36 Rubenson himself indi-
cates his own understanding of the "ownership" of several of the dis-
puted regions when he states that "[r]eports about the invasion of
Abyssinia [by Egypt] reached European capitals in early August."37
Can these areas really be considered "Abyssinian" when Yohannes
demonstrably had no effective control over them, and when the in-
habitants themselves were engaged in a perpetual struggle to maintain
some degree of autonomy, caught between the fires of Egypt, Ethiopia
and, earlier, the Ottoman Empire?
Nonetheless, Ethiopia had on its side the maverick British officer
J.C. Kirkham, who was not trusted by his own government but whose
views elicited a certain amount of sympathy from Rubenson:
Kirkham rightly stressed that the attack on Bogos ... was the im-
mediate cause of the conflict. In particular, however, he emphasised
the need for Ethiopia to have access to the sea. After the transfer of
Massawa to Egypt in 1866 ... the duties on Ethiopian imports and
exports through that port had allegedly been raised to 36 per cent .
. . Then Ismail had occupied Anfilla, to which the Egyptians or
Turks had no historical right, "with the further intention ... of
taking the large salt plains adjoining, which are absolutely essential
to the inhabitants of Abyssinia..."38
34Marcus, Life and Times, 37.

3"Ibid., 78.
36Ibid., 79. In a later work, Marcus reiterates this general point, suggesting in ad-
dition that the province of Tigray "then included Eritrea," which is dubious to say
the least: Marcus, History of Ethiopia, 73.
37Rubenson, Survival, 299.
38Ibid., 299-300.

196.190.154.222 on Mon, 21 Dec 2020 18:32:12 UTC
The importance of the economic argument cannot be overstated,

and is recurrent in a wide range of literature: Eritrea was critical to
Ethiopia's economic well-being, while Eritrea itself was not economi-
cally viable without Ethiopia. Rubenson continues in the same vein as
Kirkham:
As if it was not sufficient to tax Ethiopia's export and import, the

Turkish administration had begun to covet another source of rev-
enue, the Tiltal salt plains some 70-80 kilometres inland from
Anfilla. These were of tremendous importance to the Ethiopians.
Not only had they as far back as history goes received most of their
supplies of the indispensable commodity from Tiltal, but salt bars
were the main currency of the country.39
Rubenson's perception of Eritrea as at least theoretical Ethiopian ter-

ritory is once again suggested.
A critical figure in the Yohannes period, of course, was Ras Alula,
the prominent Tigrayan soldier-statesman and the Emperor's right-
hand man. As his biographer Haggai Erlich has pointed out, the story
of Ras Alula has been interpreted in a variety of ways according to
political circumstances. Most obvious was the manner in which Alula
was portrayed by Mengistu Haile Mariam in the 1980s: for the
Dergue regime, Alula was "the military conqueror of Eritrea," and a
"killer of enemies on Eritrean soil."40 Mengistu was clearly thinking
of the EPLF. Erlich himself asserts that Alula "fortified Eritrea as
Ethiopia'sgate," and emphasizes the importance of the Tigrayan's sup-
posedly civilizing mission insofar as he "built Asmara (beginning in
1884) as a local capital, and around it he tried to modernize the
Eritrean economy and control intra-religious relations."41
Yet there is little escaping the fact that Alula's short-lived govern-
ment of the Eritrean highlands was maintained by military might
alone, indicated by the lingering bitterness of the "Christian elite" in
the region at seeing their own leaders usurped.42 Nonetheless, Erlich
prefers to consider Alula "the builder of Asmara as a part of a
pluralised Ethiopia and a defender against invaders from beyond the
seas.'"43 Eritrea, in other words, should be considered an indispens-
-3Ibid., 142. Walter Plowden, writing of the "Taltals" in the 1840s, explained how
"[t]he Abyssinians that need salt there, cut it under the protection of a large armed
force," which hardly suggests political control: Plowden, Travels in Abyssinia, 25.
40H. Erlich, Ras Alula and the Scramble for Africa: a Political Biography, Ethiopia
and Eritrea, 1875-1897 (Lawrenceville, 1996), xii.
41Ibid., ix.
42Ibid., x-xi.
43Ibid., xii.

196.190.154.222 on Mon, 21 Dec 2020 18:32:12 UTC
254 Richard Reid
able part of this equation, and of

ing factor, of course, is the idea
ist," at the forefront of the stru
all, responsible for keeping the It
struction of a small Italian for
and through his participation in
how, on his returning to indepen
Alula's image for the new Eritre

ible. The leaders of the new cou
that Alula was a great fighter aga
ers but for them he was a foreig
as part of colonial history: usurp
settling of foreign soldiers, malt
tion, dividing and ruling. They a
power in the effort to stem the
the glory to himself.
Erlich explains this attitude in te

Mengistu had clung to his own
the Tigrayan as a symbol of Ethi
tality. Erlich, however, had high
come to embrace a wider appreci
supposedly narrow nationalist
would never last; it was a histo
from the normal appreciation
Ethiopia at their center, and soon
fold and once again subscribe to
It is not immediately appar
Eritreans should feel compelled t
own. Eritreans might acknowle
objectively, in a broader region
Africa might consider the rele
Cetshwayo. But then we cannot u
impact of the "great Ethiopian t
of Alula "was glorious in the sen
all its resources, stem Western im
social institutions, and reunite
Never mind that much of this "r
violence and scarcely reflected th
region; the implication is clear e
44Ibid., xiii.
4SIbid.

196.190.154.222 on Mon, 21 Dec 2020 18:32:12 UTC
ous" period in Ethiopian history, and should therefore rejoice in a fig-

ure like Alula as all other Ethiopians are supposed to.
Erlich elaborates further on this perspective:
... the Alula message could and should be one of Ethiopian unity
through cultural pluralism and regional autonomy, of renewal of
the shared Ethiopian-Eritrean history, and of the construction of
towns, development of commerce, and promotion of intra-religious
understanding and tolerance.46
This appears to be a carefully-disguised criticism of the breakaway

Eritrean republic of the 1990s. Again, however, considering that the
Tigrayan Ras himself ruled in the Eritrean highlands by force and
force alone, it is difficult to see how the leadership of sovereign
Eritrea could ever have embraced him with the same enthusiasm as
Tigray, the rest of Ethiopia, or indeed Erlich himself.
Erlich's views on the period of the late nineteenth century become
even clearer as his study of Ras Alula progresses. In his introductory
pages, he refers no fewer than four times to the "loss" of Eritrea by
Ethiopia to the Italians, as though the entire area of modern Eritrea
belonged and had always belonged to Ethiopia.47 His own analysis of
Yohannes' movements into the Eritrean highlands suggests that the
local leadership of Hamasien was at best ambivalent about the Ethio-
pian connection, and was willing to play the Ethiopians and Egyp-
tians off one another in order to maintain some degree of indepen-
dence. Marcus also demonstrates this.48
At any rate, Ras Alula's eventual occupation of both Hamasien
and Serae by late 1876 was clearly purely military.49 The fact that the
Ethiopians were continually "raiding" the regions of Bogos, Habab,
and Beni Amer hardly indicates either firm control or even, indeed,
right of conquest.50 Following an attack on Ailet, along the Massawa
road, Ras Alula allegedly pompously declared: "Ethiopia goes up to
the sea; Egypt begins there.""5 There is a clear line of continuity from
the Tigrayan-Abyssinian attitude of the 1870s, through to the pater-
46Ibid., xv.
47Ibid., xi, 4, 6, 7.
48Marcus, Life and Times, 40, 42.
49Erlich, Ras Alula, 10-13.
-sMarcus, Life and Times, 77.
S'Erlich, Ras Alula, 17. A similar remark ran thus: "I have come to retake
Massawa from the Egyptians, I will not go away until my horse has drunk from
the Red Sea." Yohannes was also credited with some memorable one-liners, in-
cluding his remark that "I do not want a consul at Massawa. I want Massawa."
See ibid., 24.

196.190.154.222 on Mon, 21 Dec 2020 18:32:12 UTC
256 Richard Reid
nalistic-nationalist declarations o
notion of "unity or death" expre
1980s. And the reality on the gr
ality, that is, of rejection of the
The Abyssinian "historical imag
powerful hold on past protagon
ther enhanced during the reig
Empress Taitu, Menelik's wife
derived primarily from its polit
gion."52 Mythology was especi
appears captured by it: discussing
he explains that "[t]he Ethiopia
triotism and nationalism that wa
ies.",53
Colonial Italy's defeat and the events surrounding it are certainly
worthy of examination, although this is outside the scope of this pa-
per. What is of interest is the manner in which "an ancient patriotism
and nationalism" was sparked by the battle of Adwa itself, and not
just among Ethiopians. In his treatment of the Adwa episode, John
Markakis states that "[s]urprisingly, the Ethiopians did not pursue the
Italians to the sea. On the contrary, in a conciliatory move, Menelik
allowed them to retain their colonial possessions in Eritrea north of
the Mareb river."54 Harold Marcus seems similarly puzzled: "We do
not know why Menilek made this historic cession of territory-the
first for an Ethiopian ruler."ss
In fact, it is not at all "surprising," on closer examination, that the
Ethiopians did not push the Italians into the Red Sea. Marcus himself,
indeed, has the answer:
The decision may have stemmed from Menilek's political anxiety

about the north and the empire's continuing economic crisis . ..
[H]e believed his army's shortage of supplies and draft animals pre-
cluded an expedition to Tigray.56
It is doubtful in the extreme that Menelik's army could have advanced

much further than it did following the defeat of the Italians, having
already overstretched its supply routes. Certainly it could not have
s2Marcus, Life and Times, 72.

3"Ibid., 87.
S4John Markakis, Ethiopia: Anatomy of a Traditional Polity (Addis Ababa, 1974),
25.
ssMarcus, History of Ethiopia, 91.
-6sIbid.

196.190.154.222 on Mon, 21 Dec 2020 18:32:12 UTC
sustained a push deep into Eritrean territory, seizing Asmara and ulti-
mately Massawa. Nonetheless, Markakis suggests that Menelik gra-
ciously renounced his natural claim to Eritrea; he may as well have
written that Menelik allowed the Italians to retain his colonial posses-
sions in Eritrea.
The idea of Menelik's fundamental military weakness is supported,
interestingly, by Bahru Zewde, who states that in 1895-96 the Ethio-
pians faced serious logistical and supply problems.57 Such military
problems suggest that Menelik could not in fact claim to have any
control over this region; the Ethiopians were clearly unaccustomed to
prolonged large-scale military operations, never mind military occu-
pation, in a region so far north. Menelik's situation, indeed, places
Ras Alula's Eritrean residency in context, bearing in mind that Alula
was very much "closer to home"-Tigray-than Menelik. It is worth
noting, however, that Bahru points toward the unusual hardships of
the period-namely the Great Ethiopian Famine of 1888-92-as be-
ing the cause of these logistical problems, rather than any inherent
Ethiopian weakness.58
Bahru, at any rate, seems somewhat confused as to how to deal
with Eritrea. Discussing the aftermath of the Adwa campaign, he
writes:
The boundary delimitation agreement between Ethiopia and the

Italian colony of Eritrea was concluded in 1900, when the Marab
river became the official boundary between the two territories ...
This has remained probably the most serious shortcoming of the
victory at Adwa, and of Menilek's policy as far as Ethiopia is con-
cerned. Adwa failed to resolve Ethiopia's centuries-old quest for an
outlet to the sea ... Paradoxically, Menilek, architect of the largest
empire ever built in the Ethiopian region, presided over a series of
events which barred it completely from the sea ... The problem
was solved only with the liberation of Eritrea [by the British] in
1941 and its federation with Ethiopia eleven years later ...59
The implication here is that "Ethiopia" had never actually had con-
trol over the Eritrean coastline, and that this was an "ancient" his-
torical ambition, the assumption again being that "Ethiopia" can be
said to have existed in a recognizable form over several centuries. But
Bahru later states that "[b]y a treaty with Italy, dated 10 July 1900,
17Bahru Zewde, A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1974 (London, 1991), 76-

77.
8Ibid., 71; see also Berkeley, Campaign of Adowa, 354-55.

59Bahru, Modern Ethiopia, 84-85.

196.190.154.222 on Mon, 21 Dec 2020 18:32:12 UTC
258 Richard Reid
Eritrea was severed from Ethiopia

appears in contradiction to his
Eritrea had in fact been part of E
belief, as we shall see. Nor is he
and others to Menelik signified th
tered empire, while "[h]ighlands
to rejoin the motherland."'' The
The post-Menelik period-the era of Haile Sellassie and the Dergue-

saw the increasingly forceful articulation of the centralizing, unified
Ethiopian state thesis from the direction of Addis Ababa, and its
growing support among scholars of the region. This was an ideologi-
cal edifice, effectively and cunningly built by authors both local and
expatriate, and it was only destroyed-and then only partially-with
the unexpected achievement of Eritrean independence toward the end
of the twentieth century. While some expressed their Ethiocentrism
through subtle semantics, others were rather more blatant. Erlich, as
we have seen, is one of many competent scholars who became be-
witched by Ethiopia. "How," he asked with evident awe, "did Ethio-
pia, an ancient nation, a Christian African kingdom between the
Black Continent and the Muslim Middle East, manage to survive to
modern times, when other local civilisations crumbled in the face of
European imperialism?"62 A good question, and one which could be
pursued further. Interestingly, the separation of Ethiopia from "black
Africa" is reminiscent of nineteenth-century writings which stressed
that somehow "Abyssinia" was closer to Europe and therefore wor-
thy of more attention. If it is to be admired, then it must be removed
from Africa; ancient Egypt underwent similar surgery.
Markakis, again, asserted that "[a]t the dawn of the twentieth cen-
tury the Ethiopian state had attained its present form, except for
Eritrea, which was reclaimed after the Second World War."63 This
might almost pass us by, but it represents nonetheless a curious distor-
tion of the region's past. It is surely not possible to "reclaim" some-
thing that was not originally possessed. Again, the acceptance of
Ethiopia's modern claim as having a solid historical grounding is a
60Ibid., 113.
61Marcus, History of Ethiopia, 95.
62H. Erlich, Ethiopia and the Challenge of Independence (Boulder, 1986), ix.
63Markakis, Anatomy, 25.

196.190.154.222 on Mon, 21 Dec 2020 18:32:12 UTC
hurdle which few writers have managed to clear. Bahru Zewde ex-
plained that the British plan in the 1940s regarding Eritrea and the
Ogaden
envisaged the severance of the territories from Ethiopia . . . The

predominantly Christian highlands, integrated with their Tegrean
kin in Ethiopia, were to form a separate state. In effect, the plan
envisaged a further amputation of Ethiopia in the north.64
A similar phrase is used when he refers to the "the amputation of

the Marab Melash (Eritrea)."6s The argument continues in a like
vein, although now rather more forceful:
From the time of the conclusion of the Liberation campaign

[1941], Ethiopia had put forward its claims to both the Ogaden
and Eritrea ... In the case of Eritrea, too, Ethiopia had a strong
case on the grounds of history, national defence and access to the
sea. The Eritrea region, known as the Marab Melash before the in-
stitution of Italian rule in 1890, had been Ethiopia's northernmost
province. Twice, in 1895 and in 1935, it had served as a base for
Italian aggression against Ethiopia. The region also provided the
ultimate solution to Ethiopia's perennial quest for a coastline. On
all these grounds, Ethiopia argued that the only proper way to dis-
pose of the Italian ex-colony was by restoring it to the mother
country."66
But again there appears to be something of a contradiction here, with

two quite separate and incompatible arguments being forwarded. On
the one hand, the situation in the 1940s represented the final, and
best, chance for Ethiopia to acquire a coastline, something to which
the empire had always aspired. On the other hand, it is suggested that
Ethiopia had in fact always controlled the region. Nonetheless,
Bahru's own feelings on the matter are never far away: discussing the
influence of the comparatively modern Eritrean colonial administra-
tion on ideas of governance in Ethiopia, he asserts that "a number of
Eritreans" were "moved by the magnetic pull of the motherland."''67
This supposedly explains why some Eritreans migrated southward, al-
though clearly it does not explain why a number of Ethiopians moved
in the opposite direction.
The dubious "motherland" concept has obscured more vigorous
64Bahru, Modern Ethiopia, 180-81.

6Slbid., 94. "Mereb Melash" refers to "the land beyond the Mereb river," and was
the precolonial Abyssinian name for much of modern Eritrea.
"hibid., p.181.
67ibid., p.107.

196.190.154.222 on Mon, 21 Dec 2020 18:32:12 UTC
260 Richard Reid
examination of the relationship

within this concept, however,
with regard to what constitutes
most energetic exponents of the
Negash, primarily through his w
the period of the Federation. Th
demic study of the region's histo
pecially among "local" scholars
stantial Eritrean-Ethiopian dias
cated much of his career to argum
an integral part of Ethiopia, as
struggle in general and the EPLF
On one level this argument is
through the portrayal of Eritr
1920s and 1930s as being inextr
ism and reflecting a deeply-he
Tigrinya-speakers of the Eritr
alarmed the Italian colonial gover
policy aimed at breaking "once
tional links" between the Tigri
Eritrean highlanders' supposedly
cited by the coronation in 1931
in Addis Ababa, Haile Sellassie.6
1935 removed the supposed threa
voke the boundary treaties and l
possessing the Eritrean highla
"sentiments of Ethiopian natio
large numbers of Eritreans wh
tance movement."71
There is, therefore, no such thing as Eritrean nationalism or pro-
test-any such expressions of resistance are subsumed within the
greater Ethiopian cause. Those who might point toward the uprising
of Bahta Hagos, in 1894, as an example of Eritrean resistance will be
disappointed: such acts of often violent protest are summarily dis-
missed. The Bahta Hagos revolt was a "minor incident," while other
"small-scale acts of resistance were carried out mostly by Tigrinyans,
who identified with Ethiopia." Eritrean Muslims, on the other hand,
68Tekeste Negash, Italian Colonialism in Eritrea, 1882-1941 Policies, Praxis, and

Impact (Uppsala, 1987), 127.
69Ibid., 129.
70Ibid., 50.
71Ibid., 131.

196.190.154.222 on Mon, 21 Dec 2020 18:32:12 UTC
collaborated with the colonial state "in exchange for peace and secu-
rity."72 And that, as they say, is that.
In part this lack of Eritrean resistance is attributed to the extreme
diversity among, and indeed antagonism between, the nine major eth-
nic groups of the territory.73 Yet at the same time it can be explained
by the advanced degree of collaboration in Eritrea with the Italians.
Collaboration, Tekeste explains,
was easily elicited from the Tigre, Baria, Kunama, Bogos and Saho
peoples . . . [T]he Ethiopian state considered these regions as its
borderlands and therefore essential for its security. To maintain
their large armies, the Ethiopian kings had institutionalised peri-
odic raids into the borderlands as well as into the rebellious heart-
lands of the kingdom. By using the north and northwestern parts of
Eritrea as its peripheries the Ethiopian state had deepened the feel-
ings of alienation of these communities in relation to the kingdom.
Collaboration with colonialism . . . meant, for these border re-
gions, an end to periodical raids.74
This contradicts somewhat the idea of Eritrea as an integral part of

Ethiopia, another example of an author, like Haile Sellassie himself,
making a claim which flies in the face of historical reality. At best,
huge areas of Eritrea are historical "borderlands," rendering the ear-
lier use of the term "repossession" to explain Ethiopian ambitions
specious to say the least. As for the Tigrinya-speakers, Tekeste empha-
sizes the "absence of an Eritrean national consciousness within the
territorial boundaries created by the colonial system." Rather, a sense
of "Ethiopian-ness" or Ethiopian nationalism was "prevalent among
the largest ethnic group in Eritrea, namely the Tigrinyans."75
No one in the 1940s made any coherent argument for Eritrean in-
dependence; the pro-independence and anti-union movements of this
period are portrayed as a muddled and motley crew scarcely worthy
of the description "political parties." But the Unionist Party "cam-
paigned for an unconditional union with Ethiopia." Further, the UP
"negated the existence of Eritrean nationalism and the experience of
Eritrea as a separate political entity (1882-1941), by its sustained
campaign for union with Ethiopia." Fifty years of colonial rule "had
not weakened the 'irredentist sentiments' of the Tigrinyan people."''76
But the final confusion strikes when it is argued that the UP desired
721bid., 136-37.
73Ibid., 132, 134.
74Ibid., 134.
7SIbid., 161, 163-64.
761bid., 181.

196.190.154.222 on Mon, 21 Dec 2020 18:32:12 UTC
262 Richard Reid
"the incorporation into Ethiop

been part of the precolonial Eth
glaring, while the use of the ter
vocacy of restoration-now sur
Similar arguments-and sim
Tekeste's later work, which m
dealing with the buildup to and
eration of the 1950s.78 An im
Tekeste uses it to reject complete
tation of history, accusing the E
own ends, in a study which is
Ethiocentric corpus. This is a
questions and themes, somethin
credit, and many of these canno
ment is an elaboration of his ear
had no responsibility for disman
Eritreans-and the Tigrinya-sp
cally undermined Eritrean aut
union.
Indeed, the author actually suggests that Ethiopia did not even
want Eritrea.79 This is an intriguing argument but unfortunately one
which is not supported by any serious evidence, and which in any
case Tekeste himself repeatedly disproves.80 In this sense he goes fur-
ther than even Marcus, who describes Haile Selassie's systematic un-
dermining of Eritrea'sfederal constitution-which sat ill with his cen-
tralizing ethos-and openly states that "the Eritrean Assembly had
been forced to vote to end the federation and fully to join the prov-
ince to Ethiopia."81 The threat of force in the final dissolution of the
federation in 1962 is well-attested, with the illegal harassment of anti-
union members of the Assembly by police chief Tedla Ogbit, and
armed guards surrounding the building outside and watching the pro-
ceedings from inside during the final act.82
The Christians of the Eritrean highlands-who, indeed, are identi-
fied from the outset as "Eritrean Tigrayans"-are presented as a
fickle and cynical group, first of all working for union with their Ab-
yssinian brothers and later violently taking over the liberation
77Ibid.
78Tekeste Negash, Eritrea and Ethiopia: the Federal Experience (Uppsala, 1997).
79Ibid., 57, 58.
s8Ibid., 49, 54-56, 78, 133.
"'Marcus, History of Ethiopia, 175.
82See Pateman, Even the Stones, 68ff.

196.190.154.222 on Mon, 21 Dec 2020 18:32:12 UTC
struggle. Unfortunately, within this basic thesis, there is no explana-

tion of the political evolution of Eritrea's Tigrinya-speakers, and we
are left none the wiser about the origins of the struggle for indepen-
dence. That a number of highlanders favored some kind of closer re-
lationship with Ethiopia in the 1940s is hardly in doubt; what Tekeste
completely overlooks is the process which drove so many ordinary
Eritreans into the arms of the liberation movements in the 1960s and
1970s. But then, it would have been very difficult to address this key
theme seriously, as he argues that Eritreans destroyed their own fed-
eral autonomy, an argument which throws subsequent events into an
even more confusing light. The UP is, once again, depicted as a well-
oiled machine with popular support, clear objectives, and talented
leaders. The "separatist parties," however, are almost insignificant,
with confused leadership and massive internal contradictions.
But Tekeste's own contradictions are rather more apparent. Ini-
tially, we are told that the United Nations'compromise decision re-
garding federation was the best possible solution as it managed to
please virtually everyone. Later, however, we learn that in fact the ar-
rangement was unworkable, ambiguous, and pleased no one, least of
all Haile Sellassie. Throughout the book, there is at least implied sup-
port from the author for Ethiopia's historical claims to the Red Sea
coast, yet he finishes by asserting that Ethiopia never in fact con-
trolled the coast before the 1952-91 period, as part of the dubious ar-
gument that Ethiopia did not actually need Eritrea. Moreover, Tedla
Bairu, the first Chief Executive of the federal government in Asmara,
is demonized as having almost single-handedly dismantled Eritrean
autonomy without assistance from Addis Ababa; but it is also fre-
quently argued that Haile Selassie'sown representative in Asmara was
politically more important than the Chief Executive, who was merely
the former's "errand boy." Clearly it is simply not possible to argue
both successfully.
The chapter dealing with the independence struggle-which within
the professed confines of the study may be seen as unnecessary, other
than providing an opportunity to elaborate on the political message-
is equally depressing. In dealing with the liberation war, undue em-
phasis is placed on the civil war between the EPLF and ELF, presum-
ably in an attempt to underline the idea of Eritrea's lack of ethnic and
religious viability. This unworthy spectacle is unquestionably an im-
portant aspect of the struggle, and must not be glossed over; it also
has possible implications for the future of pluralism in sovereign
Eritrea. But to approach the war from this angle alone does little
credit to the author, especially in light of his preceding analysis.

196.190.154.222 on Mon, 21 Dec 2020 18:32:12 UTC
264 Richard Reid
Moreover, the EPLF's military vi

mistakesthan to anything achiev
This is simply bad grace. Amo
those who did not relish the dism
prowess of the EPLF is widely ac
dence, the EPLF then proceeded t
tionalist agenda. The backward
which Tekeste is right to caution
hardly much better. Tekeste fall
determination to dismiss the basis for modern Eritrean nationalism
and refusal to credit the EPLF with either achievements or political
programme.
One of the problems lies in the common assertion that the linguis-
tic connection provided by Tigrinya in both Tigray and the Eritrean
highlands denotes, or should denote, cultural and political unity.
Tekeste Negash finds an ally in Alemseged Abbay, who has argued in
no uncertain terms that highland Eritrea and Tigray are in reality a
complete and indivisible unit: "Tigrayans, south of the Mereb river,
and the Kebessa (highland) Eritreans, north of the Mereb river, are
ethnically one people, tied by common history, political economy,
myth, language and religion."84 The puzzle for Alemseged is that dur-
ing the liberation war-in which both regions were ostensibly united
in the struggle against an oppressive Amhara state-they developed
separate identities, leading to the pursuit of divergent destinies after
1991. Tigrayans and Eritreans "betrayed the conventional wisdom
and expected logic of establishing an ethno-regional state."85 There is
little need to return to the precolonial accounts, cited above, which do
not support the idea of what Alemseged calls the "trans-Mereb iden-
tity." Nonetheless, Eritrea had, and will continue to have, no internal
cohesion or identity; "religious passion" kept Christian highlanders
and Muslim lowlanders "poles apart."86
There can be little doubt that there were different views of
"Eritrea" among Eritreans in the 1940s especially, but again the
politicization of scholarship prevents a clear understanding of these
views, their development over time, and their implications for modern
Eritrean history. The nationalism of the liberation struggle was a "vi-
rus," according to Alemseged, which destroyed the common sense of
"3For example, see C. Clapham, Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionary

Ethiopia (Cambridge, 1988).
84Alemseged, Identity Jilted, 1.
KSIbid.
8lIbid., 5; also ibid., 22, 28.

196.190.154.222 on Mon, 21 Dec 2020 18:32:12 UTC
Tigrinya-speaking unity among the leaders of the struggle. Consider-

ing that this unity was supposedly "primordial," it was destroyed sur-
prisingly easily.87 In any case, more recent events have indicated that
there were rather greater differences between the Eritrean and
Tigrayan liberation fronts than were apparent to Alemseged Abbay
during his research.
Alemseged agrees with Tekeste in his dismissal of Eritrean nation-
alism, insofar as most Eritrean highlanders in the 1940s "revered"
Christian Ethiopia.88 However, this is contradicted later in the analy-
sis when it is suggested that Tigrinya-speakers, in fact, "saw nothing
attractive about joining with Ethiopia," thus merely adding to the
confusion.89 But there are other significant differences between
Tekeste and Alemseged. As already stated, Alemseged qualifies this
supposed reverence by asserting that it was mainly connected to an
affinity with Tigray. Moreover, contrary to Tekeste's central thesis,
Alemseged explains that the Unionist Party was financed and actively
directed from Addis Ababa. Indeed, "Ethiopia's heavy hand did not
allow the Unionist Party independence," while "[t]errorism forced
many to desert the Independence Bloc and join the Unionist Party."o9
Further, unlike Tekeste, Alemseged asserts that Ethiopia actively
sought the dissolution of the federation, which was wholly incompat-
ible with the Shoan centralizing ethos. The act of dissolution in 1962
was carried out under threat of force, and many Eritreans who had
favored some kind of relationship with Ethiopia suddenly became bit-
terly disillusioned.91 Throughout all this, there is also some confusion
as to the role of Wolde-ab Woldemariam, held by some as the "Father
of Eritrean nationalism." This epithet may or may not be accurate-
more research is needed on the evolution of his political beliefs-but
on the pages of Alemseged's book he flits about like a political butter-
fly, filling the roles of unconditional unionist and Ethiopia-worship-
per, trans-Mereb nationalist, and ultimately impassioned and fre-
quently imperiled exponent of Eritrean independence. Despite the ex-
tensive use of direct quotes from Wolde-ab himself, which are of un-
doubted interest, no explanation is given of how this enigmatic figure
evolved as he did. More rigorous study of Wolde-ab may reveal much
concerning the origins of Eritrean identity.
Markakis, again, states that "[t]he Amhara-Tigre group, the
87Ibid., 12.
88Ibid., 29.
89Ibid., 40.
S"Ibid., 37, 69.
9"Ibid., 72ff.

196.190.154.222 on Mon, 21 Dec 2020 18:32:12 UTC
266 Richard Reid
Abyssinians of old, are consider

within the expanded empire ... [T]
mous province and the highlands
the very real differences on either
in outlook and historical experien
all too apparent in recent years. T
less be less than happy to be thr
the Amhara. But Markakis goes fu
Tigre sensibilities by allowing the
after the battle of Adua. The hi
historical extension of Tigre pr
Tigrinya."92 Again, there is little
assertion-certainly none is offere
guage-while the apparent tensio
eign policy and Tigrayan "sen
Markakis' earlier statement regard
fore, is "naturally" and "historic
empire. To drive the point home,
sions: "The province of Tigre, alre
separation of the Eritrean highlan
ritory in the south to Wollo prov
brought the total number of prov
The Eritrean portion of the platea

tension of Tigre province; consequ
ans of the dominant ethnic grou
of whom are Christians ... Histori
Ethiopian empire.94
And further, with only slight mo
Generally speaking, the Christian

proximately half of the populatio
Ethiopia for unification. However
tians of Eritrea are Tigre, their en
is somewhat tempered by the trad
the Shoa dynasty that rules Ethio
Even here, any expression of Eri

simply representing Tigrayan war
92Markakis, Anatomy, 48, 57.

93Ibid., 289.
94Ibid., 361.
9SIbid., 362.

196.190.154.222 on Mon, 21 Dec 2020 18:32:12 UTC
Eritrean nationalism per se cannot possibly exist, since the territory

"naturally" and "historically" belongs to the Ethiopian empire. So
much for the Christian-Tigrayan-Eritreans; yet even Muslim opposi-
tion is explained away:
The Muslims of Eritrea, who constitute the other half of its popula-
tion, were generally opposed to union with Ethiopia, though the al-
ternative they found most attractive, namely, independence, was
obviously not a viable one given the economic interdependence of
Ethiopia and Eritrea and the manifest determination of the former
not to accept such a solution ...96
By the time Markakis' book was published, the predominantly-

Muslim Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) had been in the field for thir-
teen years, with considerable success, but clearly neither it nor the na-
scent EPLF had made little impact on Markakis' analysis. As with
many such analyses, there is a faintly patronizing and dismissive tone
regarding Eritreans themselves. They are credited with no significant
achievements, innovations, or indeed any noteworthy characteristics.
They do not do anything; things are done to them, or for them, as the
case may be.
Ullendorff is in complete agreement. Amid much talk of physical
and racial types, Ullendorff explains unsubtly that "Eritrea was al-
ways an artificial creation, for the people on both sides of the frontier
are one in race and civilisation."97 At the time of Ullendorff's writing,
a sovereign Eritrea was unthinkable, and the point is reiterated on
several occasions:
... Menelik had shaped another Empire, different in form and

composition from its predecessors. The country had grown out of
all recognition... but the extreme north, Eritrea, had been aban-
doned to a European colonial power. There were many Abyssinians
in the north who could not forget or forgive this detachment of one
of the oldest parts of the ancient Axumite kingdom.98
Haile Selassie, however, repaired this historical damage:
One of the Emperor's main triumphs in the field of foreign and in-
ternal policy alike was the federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia un-
96Ibid.
97E. Ullendorff, The Ethiopians: an Introduction to Country and People (London,
1973), 35. It might be wondered why, if Eritrea was wholly artificial in creation,
the "ancient Abyssinians" shouldgive it a separate name-"Mereb Melash"-in
the precolonial period.
9"Ibid., 90.

196.190.154.222 on Mon, 21 Dec 2020 18:32:12 UTC
268 Richard Reid
der the sovereignty of the Ethiop

able unit economically, and cultu
cially severed from the Tigrai p
highland regions formed an inte
ans were bound to engage in irre
rate Administration was flying in
realities alike, and in 1962 her P
and to dismantle the federal struc
Thus the dissolution of the feder

and desirable; but how then do w
started a year before the "volunt
it seems:
. . the future of the northernmost and ancient part of historic

Abyssinia might be as bright as was its most remote past. At
present the political situation in parts of Eritrea is tense owing to
the activities of the (largely foreign inspired and financed) Eritrean
Liberation Front.100
This liberation front, then, not only lacks a future; it is pushing

against the past. Nationalism must be explained away thus; it c
not be otherwise, when Eritrea was inextricably linked to the m
Abyssinian body. The same arguments made by Ullendorff were m
by both the imperial regime and the Dergue, which refused to rec
nize that either the ELF or the EPLF had any kind of legitimacy as
expression of nationalism.
Haile Sellassie undoubtedly held something of a romantic appeal i
the West, as also among the African diaspora. He was dignified
rica, the representative of that ancient Christian tradition, a civili
tion in an uncivilized continent. His imperial and majestic prese
with all the various titles that went with it, towered over that of m
of his Third World contemporaries. All this is to some degree unde
standable. Yet even the Dergue regime had its ardent supporters ou
side that brutal arena, and again Eritrea struggled to have its histo
cal case provided with a fair hearing. Peter Schwab was one such ad
mirer, forcefully arguing that the Dergue offered a great new start
Ethiopia, while at the same time inadvertently demonstrating c
historical continuity between the imperial and socialist regime
terms of expansionism. Throughout his analysis, there is both imp
and explicit support for the violence now infamously associated wi
the Dergue regime, and in particular the violence directed at such
99Ibid., 192-93.
'"IIbid., 194.

196.190.154.222 on Mon, 21 Dec 2020 18:32:12 UTC
ruptive forces as the Eritrean liberation fronts. The latter were under-
mining the great socialist experiment presided over by Mengistu Haile
Mariam:
... those who maintain that the Ethiopian revolution is far too vio-
lent and thus must be condemned have missed the point. It was not
the Dergue that initiated the violence against the civilian opposi-
tion. Mengistu and the Dergue made it clear that they would use
violence to the deadliest extent necessary to maintain the revolu-
tion. Confronted by opposition in the cities, within the Dergue, in
Eritrea, in the Ogaden, in Tigre and from Somalia, Mengistu de-
cided that if he did not eliminate those he considered counter-revo-
lutionary, they would eliminate him and prevent socialism from be-
ing instituted in Ethiopia ...101
Such a glaring contradiction is difficult to fathom, with the Dergue

exonerated and made responsible in the same breath. Mengistu him-
self had rather more in common with Emperor Tewodros than he
might have cared to admit. At any rate, this seems a somewhat
shameless defence of state terrorism; the continuity from the imperial
age of violent expansionism is clear to the reader, but not, apparently,
to Schwab himself, who appears to believe that anything was justifi-
able through the introduction of ideological rhetoric. Happily, accord-
ing to Schwab, all turns out for the best: "In 1984 Ethiopia is
cleansed of opponents and everyday life is peaceful and largely non-
violent." 102
By 1984 Ethiopia had launched six major offensives against the
Eritrean liberation fronts, all of which had failed at huge cost, and by
this time the Eritrean forces were themselves poised to make signifi-
cant advances against the Ethiopian army. This was true despite the
massive material and human support for Mengistu's regime from the
direction of the Soviet Union. And this, of course, is merely the mili-
tary dimension: Schwab appears equally ignorant of the abuses of the
civilian population by the Ethiopian forces, and not only in Eritrea.
But the point is repeated:
Overall, then, Ethiopia is now generally free from oppositional ten-

dencies. Even in Eritrea and the Ogaden, where opposition was
once both organised and powerful, relative calm has been restored,
and the opposition has been essentially destroyed. Political dissent
has been muted.'03
""'P. Schwab, Ethiopia: Politics, Economics and Society (London, 1985), 42.
'02Ibid., 67.
1'3Ibid., 70.

196.190.154.222 on Mon, 21 Dec 2020 18:32:12 UTC
270 Richard Reid
All, then, was rosy in the Dergu

of Schwab's writing Ethiopia's
well underway. It would have b
mentioned it. There are no surpr
There are, of course, lessons he
persuasion, i.e., that it is pruden
gardless of whatever one might
In 1977 the noted scholar I.M.Le

"clumsy and brutal" imposition o
struction and dismemberment of
Ethiopia lose Eritrea and the Oga
pia will remain" . . . Despite the
that time, it was precisely the c
and the severe implementation of
whole and permitted socialist val
Lewis and others were wrong; L
such as that which existed in Ethi
letariat and the peasantry can cert
lution. Mengistu was accurate in
remedy. 104
He is also now wanted for crim

this was written, the Dergue c
Eritrea was independent. "Lew
whether Lenin was therefore wro
Not everyone was so incautious
regardless of the mistakes of par
cality of a sovereign Eritrea is
elite."What can the new rulers l
asked Harold Marcus in the mid-1990s. The answer:
They can take heart that, notwithstanding the most extreme cases
of secession and governmental weakness, the country reunited.
There is no escaping the essential wholeness of Ethiopia's highlands
and environs. The two have functioned as an economic unit histori-
cally, and there seems little reason to think that modern politics can
disrupt that long-standing pattern.'05
That Eritrea won its independence is a fact that cannot be undone;

but there can now be an attempt to make that victory seem pyrrhic,
hollow, as though the war was really for nothing. Why bother with
independence when "the historic connections between Ethiopia and
104Ibid., 116-17.
10SMarcus, History of Ethiopia, 217-18.

196.190.154.222 on Mon, 21 Dec 2020 18:32:12 UTC
Eritrea are obvious and unassailable[?]" Indeed, such connections,

"instead of being explained away ... ought to be stressed and reinter-
preted so that the two polities can work out a joint destiny."106 This
makes some sense, although veterans of the liberation war might re-
gard the idea of a "joint destiny" with some unease. But
Ethiocentrism is alive and well, and the challenge for Eritrea remains
as difficult as ever:
It may take several generations before the logic of geography and

history works to recreate the larger political and economic sphere
necessary for a better future. In the end, Ethiopia will rise again.107
VI
Whatever the particular slant of the above scholarship-that Eritreans

are Tigrayan, that they are historically part of the Ethiopian empire,
that they have no genuine nationalism of their own, that they enjoy
neither political nor economic viability-one broad and omnipresent
theme is clear. Eritrea should not exist as an independent state: it has
no right to sovereignty, from whatever perspective, because it has no
identity and cannot hope to have one in the future. Its history is al-
ways that of somebody else. The liberation forces won the wrong war,
at the wrong time, against the wrong enemy. Their victory is a breath-
taking anomaly which sits ill with so many career theses. Sovereign
Eritrea's illogicality lies in its defiance of "geography" and in its sup-
posed manipulation of history. Yet the confusion and contradiction
inherent in the collective attempt to explain Eritrea away is something
which, at the very least, invites investigation.
In recent years, Eritrea has won a little more systematic intellectual
support-or at least interest-and has attracted a small body of aca-
demics and other writers concerned at least to unravel the confusion
and contradiction. The precolonial history of what is now Eritrea has
yet to be written; but probably the best study of modern Eritrea is
that by Ruth Iyob, who has provided a detailed account both of the
origins and growth of Eritrean nationalism, and of the Eritrean ques-
tion in an international context.108 Others, such as Roy Pateman,
have provided broad-brush approaches to the Eritrean past and
pointed toward the folly of making the assumptions outlined
1'6Ibid., 219. See as well Tekeste Negash, Federal Experience, 176-77.

'17Ibid., 220.
0l8Iyob, Eritrean Struggle for Independence.

196.190.154.222 on Mon, 21 Dec 2020 18:32:12 UTC
272 Richard Reid
above.'09 His work, and that of t

of great significance, but it mus
point for more specific and vi
saidof slightly earlier work writ
eration war, which can be seen in
support for what was hardly a
work of Lionel Cliffe, Basil Dav
chard Sherman was important.11
Eritrea, then, faced a physical st
tellectual one. The physical confr
care of themselves, without too
year liberation war was long, grim
at least, seemingly hopeless. Yet
be just as difficult. The specia
among Western politicians but b
quivered with scholarly excitem
Ethiopia's "3000 years of histor
challenge. This host of Ethiopia-w
inside Ethiopia itself, will need t
claim sovereignty.
This is not a matter of David
empathy for the apparent under
study in how the past may be us
quiry, particularly in a region w
past is still
pungent, and where
death. Eritrea
and historians of E
which to maneuver than the n
chroniclers in the 1960s. Many
Eritrea's attempt to place itself o
be a greater determination to sh
region's history to Ethiopia's detr
challenge can Eritrea claim, final
tion, and with it the ability to f
past.
'0oPateman, Even the Stones.

"' D. Connell, Against All Odds: a
(Lawrenceville, 1993).
"'Lionel Cliffe and Basil Davidson, T
dence; Tesfatsion Medhanie, Eritr
(Amsterdam, 1986); R. Sherman, Erit
1980).

196.190.154.222 on Mon, 21 Dec 2020 18:32:12 UTC

The Challenge of The Past The Quest For Historical Legitimacy in Independent Eritrea R-Reid

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

The Challenge of The Past The Quest For Historical Legitimacy in Independent Eritrea R-Reid

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

The Challenge of the past: The Quest for Historical Legitimacy in Independent Eritrea

Author(s): Richard Reid

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/3172217

This content downloaded from

In the 1960s a host of African nations discovered their independence

History in Africa 28 (2001), 239-272.

This content downloaded from

state and in the new republic, an

Eritrea had to wait rather longer for the discovery of independence

This content downloaded from

3For example, Semere Haile, "Historical Background to the Ethiopia-Eritrea Con-

This content downloaded from

ries of Axum, the higher pursuit

For centuries the Abyssinians ha

A few years later, Berkeley echo

... what a series of anomalies do

Indeed, there could scarcely be a

sG.H. Portal, My Mission to Abyssinia (London, 1892), 81.

This content downloaded from

quarters to speak of them as almost European in organisation."7 This

This content downloaded from

have already succeeded in subje

It may be stated, with somewh

This content downloaded from

Axum itself, of course, is handed firmly to modern Ethiopia as part

This king pursued an active foreign policy. An essential part of this

This content downloaded from

Military expansionism into the E

was deeply concerned about the

Such a statement could very e

Despite the vicissitudes of the central power of the kingdom, there-

This content downloaded from

Ottomans in the second half of the sixteenth century, these islands

Again, Eritrea is merely a prize to be won, trapped in a no-man's

21Taddesse, Church and State, 79-80.

This content downloaded from

But clearly more research on

Zula and Hirgigo were almost de

This is, of course, a somewhat simplistic account; but the message

24Semere Haile, "Historical background," 12-13.

This content downloaded from

Analyses of the nineteenth century, and especially of the reigns of

26H.G.Marcus, The Life and Times of Menelik II: Ethiopia, 1844-1913

This content downloaded from

Early in the morning, at our second stage from Mahaber, these

28H. Blanc, A Narrative of Captivity in Abyssinia (London, 1868), 8-9.

This content downloaded from

batch of more villainous-looking scoundrels I have never seen dur-

The Bogos region was clearly not under convincing "Abyssinian"

... as I understand, [Munzinger] has, by order of Your Highness,

This content downloaded from

Wishful thinking, indeed, but

There was however a possible c

Referring to the Egyptian tro

34Marcus, Life and Times, 37.

This content downloaded from

The importance of the economic argument cannot be overstated,

As if it was not sufficient to tax Ethiopia's export and import, the

Rubenson's perception of Eritrea as at least theoretical Ethiopian ter-

This content downloaded from

able part of this equation, and of

Alula's image for the new Eritre

Erlich explains this attitude in te