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LEGISLATIVE POWERS

(1.) Bar question:

Although the power of taxation is basically legislative in character, it is NOT

the function of Congress to:

(A) fix with certainty the amount of taxes.

(B) collect the tax levied under the law.
(C) identify who should collect the tax.
(D) determine who should be subject to the tax.

(2.) Fill in the blanks:

The State's inherent power to tax is vested exclusively in the Legislature. We

have since ruled that the power to tax includes the power to grant tax
exemptions Thus, the imposition of taxes, as well as the grant and withdrawal
of tax exemptions, shall only be valid pursuant to a legislative enactment.

(3.) Can Congress limit the LGUs power to tax?

(a) Can Congress REVOKE the LGUs’ power to tax?

No. The 1987 Constitution directly conferred on local government units
the power to tax [Sec. 5, Art. X], which means that it cannot just be
withdrawn by legislative enactment. By and large, however, the
national legislature is still the principal of local government units, which
cannot defy its will or modify or violate it. Being so, any form of
autonomy granted to local governments will necessarily be limited and
confined within the extent allowed by the central authority.

(b) What is the effect of Section 5, Article X of the Constitution on the fiscal
position of municipal corporations?
Local government units have the power to create their own sources
of revenue, levy taxes, etc., but subject to such guidelines and
limitations set by Congress.

(c) Does this power of the LGUs to tax under the Constitution deprive
Congress of its power to grant tax exemptions?
No. The power of local governments to impose taxes and fees is always
subject to limitations which Congress may provide by law.

Khristian Damielle Jamer – 4th Year Block A

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(4.)

(i) Investigatory Power

Balag vs. Senate of the Phil, EN BANC, JULY 3, 2018, G.R. No. 234608;
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS OF CAMILO L. SABIO, J. ERMIN ERNEST LOUIE
R. MIGUEL, vs. HONORABLE SENATOR RICHARD GORDON, et al.,
EN BANC, G.R. No. 174340 October 17, 2006)

Question: A law is passed creating the Presidential Anti-Corruption

Commission and exempting certain officials thereof from the Congress’
power of inquiry. Is the law valid?
No. Such a provision is repugnant to Sec. 21, Art. VII, of the
Constitution; thus, invalid. The power of Congress to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation encompasses everything that
concerns the administration of existing laws, as well as
proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends to
government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions
are within the power of Congress to regulate or abolish. Certainly, a
mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad
power of Congress in the absence of any constitutional basis.
Furthermore, such a provision, being in the nature of an immunity, is
inconsistent with Art. XI, Sec. 1, of the Constitution which states that
“public office is a public trust”, as it goes against the grain of public
accountability and places PCGG members and staff beyond the reach of
the courts, Congress and other bodies.

(ii) Inquiries in aid of legislation

1. Question: Can Congress or any of its committees compel certain
persons to appear before it and testify, in aid of legislation, on
matters that are at the same time pending before the courts? Will
the sub judice rule apply against Congress?
Yes. A criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or a
quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of
legislative inquiry, otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert
any intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy of
instituting a criminal or an administrative complaint. Surely, the
exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of which the power of
legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made
subordinate to a criminal/administrative investigation.

2. Question: When can the right against self-incrimination be invoked

in a congressional inquiry?
Yes. When an incriminating question is asked, since they have no way
of knowing in advance the nature or effect of the questions to be
asked of them, the persons compelled to appear may invoke their
right against self-incrimination.

Khristian Damielle Jamer – 4th Year Block A

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(iii) Contempt power

Fill in the blank:

The exercise by the legislature of the contempt power is a matter of self-
preservation as that branch of the government vested with the
legislative power, independently of the judicial branch, asserts its
authority and punishes contempts thereof. The contempt power of the
legislature is, therefore, sui generis.

1. What are the limitations of inquiries in aid of legislation and the

contempt power?
The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries, i.e. right to privacy, right against self-incrimination,
period of imprisonment.

2. What is the Doctrine of Operational Proximity?

Only communications at that level are (1)close enough to the
President to be revelatory of his deliberations or to (2)pose a
risk to the candor of his advisers. It is "operational proximity"
to the President that matters in determining whether the President’s
confidentiality interests is implicated.

Not every person who plays a role in the development of presidential

advice, no matter how remote and removed from the President, can
qualify for the executive privilege.

3. Can executive privilege overrule the right to information on matter

of public concern under the Bill of Rights?
Yes. The right to information is not an absolute right. There is a
recognized public interest in the confidentiality of certain
information and such is a recognized principle in other democratic
States. The jurisprudential test laid down by this Court in past
decisions on executive privilege is that the presumption of privilege
can only be overturned by a showing of compelling need for
disclosure of the information covered by executive privilege.

(5.) Oversight function

ABAKADA GURO Partylist vs Purisima, EN BANC, G.R. No. 166715, August
14, 2008

1. What are the three categories of Congress’ oversight function?

The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its oversight
powers may be divided into three categories, namely: scrutiny,
investigation and supervision.

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a. Scrutiny
Congressional scrutiny implies a lesser intensity and continuity of
attention to administrative operations. Its primary purpose is to
determine economy and efficiency of the operation of
government activities. In the exercise of legislative scrutiny,
Congress may request information and report from the other branches
of government. It can give recommendations or pass resolutions for
consideration of the agency involved.

b. Congressional investigation
While congressional scrutiny is regarded as a passive process of looking
at the facts that are readily available, congressional investigation
involves a more intense digging of facts. The power of Congress to
conduct investigation is recognized by the 1987 Constitution under
section 21, Article VI.

c. Legislative supervision
The third and most encompassing form by which Congress exercises its
oversight power is thru legislative supervision. "Supervision" connotes
a continuing and informed awareness on the part of a
congressional committee regarding executive operations in a
given administrative area. While both congressional scrutiny and
investigation involve inquiry into past executive branch actions in order
to influence future executive branch performance, congressional
supervision allows Congress to scrutinize the exercise of delegated
law-making authority, and permits Congress to retain part of that
delegated authority.

2. Does Congress have a veto power over executive action?

Yes. Congress exercises supervision over the executive
agencies through its veto power. It typically utilizes veto provisions
when granting the President or an executive agency the power to
promulgate regulations with the force of law. These provisions require
the President or an agency to present the proposed regulations to
Congress, which retains a "right" to approve or disapprove any
regulation before it takes effect. Such legislative veto provisions usually
provide that a proposed regulation will become a law after the
expiration of a certain period of time, only if Congress does not
affirmatively disapprove of the regulation in the meantime. Less
frequently, the statute provides that a proposed regulation will become
law if Congress affirmatively approves.

Khristian Damielle Jamer – 4th Year Block A

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(6.) Power to declare the existence of state of war

SANLAKAS vs. Exec Secretary, EN BANC, G.R. No. 159085, February 3,
2004

1. What is the fundamental basis of this provision?

Section 23, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution: The Congress, by a vote
of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting
separately, shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a
state of war.

In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law,

authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such
restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper
to carry out a declared national policy.

2. Bar Question: Congress shall have the sole power to declare the
existence of a state of war by vote of:

a. three-fourths of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting

jointly;
b. two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting jointly;
c. two-thirds of both Houses in separate session assembled, voting
jointly;
d. two-thirds of both Houses in joint session, voting
separately.

3. Does Congress have the power to declare a State of Rebellion?

Yes. If the Congress can “declare the existence of a state of war”, it most
certainly has the power to declare a state of rebellion.

(7.) Power to act as Board of Canvassers in election of President

Brillantes et al vs. COMELEC, EN BANC, G.R. No. 163193, June 15, 2004

Question: Can the COMELEC conduct an unofficial quick-count of the

votes cast for the positions of President and Vice-President through the
electronic transmission of results?
No. Congress has the sole and exclusive authority to canvass the
votes for the election of President and Vice-President, pursuant to
Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution.

(8.) Power to judge President’s physical fitness to discharge the

functions of the Presidency
Estrada vs. Desierto, EN BANC, G.R. No. 146710-15, March 2, 2001

Question: Suppose that the President becomes suddenly gravely ill and
had not been seen or heard of for thirty days. No notice was sent by his

Khristian Damielle Jamer – 4th Year Block A

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office or by the cabinet members to the President of the Senate and/or to

the house Speaker. The Vice-President, thinking that the President is
already unable to discharge the functions of his office, declared that she is
now the President. The House of Representatives immediately passed a
Resolution expressing support to the Vice-President as the new President;
likewise, the Senate passed a similar resolution. Thereafter, the Executive
Secretary wrote Congress that the ill President is just on temporary leave
of absence; that the resolutions of both houses are invalid for failure to
comply with Article VI, Section 11 requiring prior notice from either the
President or from the majority of the cabinet members; and that the Vice-
President has no power to adjudge the inability of the President to
discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. Is the ES correct?

No. Both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo

as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that
the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary, after being absent
for thirty days without any notice from him or his cabinet members.
Congress thus clearly rejected petitioner's claim of inability. In fine, even if
the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully
claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable
to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and
the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure president made by
a co-equal branch of government.

Khristian Damielle Jamer – 4th Year Block A