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Cognitive Aspects of Bilingualism PDF
Cognitive Aspects of Bilingualism PDF
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Preface vii
vii
REFERENCES
Michel Paradis
McGill University, Montreal
Abstract
The cognitive architecture of bilingual speakers contains at least four systems involved
in verbal communication (i.e., implicit linguistic competence, explicit metalinguistic
knowledge, pragmatic abilities and affect/motivation). The neurofunctional system that
subserves implicit linguistic competence contains as many subsystems as the speaker
has acquired languages. Each subsystem contains its phonology, morphology, syntax,
semantics and lexicon. These language subsystems are differentially connected to a
single conceptual system that groups conceptual features together in accordance with
the specific lexical semantic constraints of words in each language and the relevant
pragmatic circumstances at the time of their use (Paradis 2004).
Three main points will be discussed: (1) the distinction between the cerebral repre-
sentation of concepts on the one hand and of lexical semantics on the other; (2) the
representation of languages (including lexical semantics) as dissociable subsystems of
the neurofunctional language system, connected to a single common conceptual system;
and (3) the lack of qualitative difference between unilingual and bilingual brains in terms
of conceptual organization and processing (though the contents of the representations
may, and often do, differ). To paraphrase Kecskes and Papp (2000: 37), the main ques-
tion will be: To what extent are the two languages [neuro] functionally independent, and
to what extent do they constitute a single [neuro]functional system? Special emphasis
will be placed on the relationship between the linguistic and conceptual levels.
1. B A C K G R O U N D
heard or seen, just as, in unilinguals, two different words will each evoke
their particular concepts (Paradis 2004).
Language A Language B
2. T H E N AT U R E O F R E P R E S E N TAT I O N S , T H E I R
O R G A N I Z AT I O N , A C Q U I S I T I O N A N D U S E A R E THE SAME
and their exact boundaries differ. Bilingual memory does not differ
in kind or in organizational principles from unilingual memory. It
can be said that “bilingual memory differs from monolingual mem-
ory to a great extent” (Kecskes & Papp 2003: 258) only with regard
to what is represented and processed, not how. The common concep-
tual base of bilinguals is identical in nature, organization, development
and use, to the unilingual conceptual base. It is simply bigger – at
least in most cases (a unilingual literature professor may have more
language-based concepts than a bilingual shepherd). The content of
representations may be impoverished and/or deviant with respect to
native speakers’ norms but it is stored and processed in the same way
as any “correct” language-governed concept. Therefore, the cognitive
functioning of bilinguals is identical to that of unilingual speakers.
If, by “cognitive functioning” one means the actual contents of the
ideas and values processed in the speaker’s mind, then the differ-
ence between the cognitive functioning of a unilingual and a bilingual
speaker is of the same kind as that between a native Hungarian speaker
and a native American English speaker: What they think may differ
but the principles that underlie the thinking and feeling processes are
the same.
As Kecskes and Papp (2003: 258) rightly assert, “Each language used
as an L1 of a community has a system of expectations and traditions.”
But unilinguals living in a bicultural environment also have two sets
of expectations and traditions for their native words and expressions,
depending on the context of their use. “Liberal” may be considered a
compliment in one group, an insult in another. Just as one can pre-
dict that a German speaker’s semantic boundaries of the word Freund
(an intimate friend) will change after living in California for 20 years,
where you introduce someone you have met at the bus stop 15 minutes
ago as “my friend Bill,” one can expect the notion of cold weather to
go through the same type of rearrangement when an English speaker
moves from northern Vermont to Florida. Under the influence of the
frequent use of the other language, concepts are modified in bilinguals
to include or exclude a feature or features (i.e., static interference)
in the same way that concepts are modified by new experience in
unilinguals.
speaker learns the word ballon to refer to large balls. In a similar way,
for the native English toddler, there comes a time when doggie takes on
additional features and is no longer applicable to all four-legged animals,
and the word cat is learned. The reverse may also occur in both bilingual
and unilingual situations, when a new concept moves from the specific
(one’s own house pet) to general (all dogs).
Cook (2003) considers that the notion of the integration continuum
is compatible with Paradis’ neurolinguistic theory of bilingualism in
unifying both L1 and L2 within the same architecture of the mind, but
that it differs in extending the continuum to concepts, whereas the neu-
rolinguistic theory of bilingualism “has a single unvarying conceptual
system” (p. 11). In the proposed theory, the bilingual conceptual sys-
tem has indeed a single conceptual system, but it is not unvarying.
Like the unilingual conceptual system (and perhaps even to a greater
extent), it varies over time as new L2 concepts are incorporated. Again,
the variation is in the contents, not in the nature or processing, of the
representations. The process of development is the same.
2.4. Similarity in Processing
In the bilingual language processing device, both language channels
interact during production, resulting sometimes in mixing, switching,
modifications and temporary dominance of either language (Kecskes &
Papp 2000). Similarly, sociolinguistic and/or dialectal registers may
interact in unilingual processing. As Labov (1972) pointed out, there
are no single-style speakers. Every speaker encountered by his research
team showed a shift in some linguistic variables as the context changed.
Unilinguals switch registers when addressing different people in differ-
ent circumstances. Unilingual parents do not speak to their children at
bedtime in the same register as they speak to a judge in a courtroom.
A change of register involves a change in lexicon, morphosyntax and
even pronunciation – as does switching between languages. Unilinguals
can mix registers the way bilinguals mix languages for a number of pur-
poses, including jocularity. For example, a French person may say to
a friend: “Hier j’ai rencontré Danielle et nous papotâmes” (Yesterday
I met Danielle and we chatted). The verb papoter (familiar register) is
used in the simple past (literary formal register), resulting in the intended
others are minor. Some elements are almost identical in any two given
languages. Bilingual language subsystems do not contain anything dif-
ferent from this; there is nothing specific to bilinguals. Whether one or
both of the bilingual’s language subsystems does or does not contain
items that are identical to the corresponding native system does not
make them different in nature; some deviant elements in one language
are actually legitimate in others. Nothing sets apart the bilingual lan-
guage systems except their size and actual content, though this content
is of the same type and in most cases is quantitatively derived.
The underlying mechanisms that sustain the various representations
and their processing are the same in all individuals, whichever language
or languages they speak. The only difference, for speakers with imper-
fect competence in a second, third or fourth language, is the degree
of reliance on other systems within the verbal communicative system
(metalinguistic knowledge and pragmatics) in order to compensate for
an incomplete implicit linguistic competence system – but this does not
affect the conceptual system subserved by declarative memory.
A good analogy to clarify what is proposed here might be a computer
program – say, MS Word – that underlies the typing of a document.
The program is invariable, irrespective of the characteristics of the texts
that are produced with its help. Documents may be typed in English
or German, in 10- or 14-point characters, in Times or Courier font;
parts of the text may be italicized or bolded; the text may be faultless
or riddled with typos. Nevertheless, the Word program that sustains
all the documents is the same. You may or may not actually use much
italicization of characters or a lot of underlining, but these functions
are available to you and to any user of MS Word. The texts differ only
(quantitatively) in the extent of the use of the available options.
To push the analogy a step further, let us assume that you type a text
in German, your second language. You may systematically fail to use
upper case for the initial letter of certain common nouns. Note that both
upper and lower case are available and upper case is used to a certain
extent when typing English. This is usually considered a transfer error
(an interference) that leads to an inaccurate text from the viewpoint of
standard German orthography. But all these transfers, errors and mod-
ifications are quantitative variations made possible by the underlying
3. C O N C L U S I O N
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Alajouanine, T., and Lhermitte, F. 1964. Non-verbal communication in aphasia. In
de Reuck, A. V. S. and O’Connor, M. (eds.), Disorders of language. London:
Churchill. 168–182.
Cook, V. 2002. Background to the L2 user. In Cook, V. (ed.), Portraits of the L2 user.
Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.1–28.
Cook, V. 2003. The changing L1 in the L2 user’s mind. In Cook, V. (ed.), Effects of the
second language on the first. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters. 1–17.
De Groot, A. M. B. 2002. Lexical representation and lexical processing in the L2 user. In
Cook, V. (ed.), Portraits of the L2 user. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters. 32–63.
Francis, W. S. 2005. Bilingual semantic and conceptual representation. In Kroll, J. F.,
and de Groot, A. M. B. (eds.), Handbook of bilingualism: psycholinguistic
perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 251–267.
Gurd, J. M., and Marshall, J. C. 1993. Aphasia and intelligence. In Blanken, G.,
Dittmann, J., Grimm, H., Marshall, J. C., and Wallesch, K. (eds.), Linguistic
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Harris, C., Aiçiçegi, A., and Gleason, J. 2003. Taboo words and reprimands elicit
greater autonomic reactivity in a first language than in a second language. Applied
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Kecskes, I., and Papp, T. 2000. Foreign language and mother tongue. Mahwah:
Lawrence Erlbaum.
Kecskes, I., and Papp, T. 2003. How to demonstrate the conceptual effect of L2 on L1?
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Kolers, P. A. 1968. Bilingualism and information processing. Scientific American,
218 (3): 78–86.
Labov, W. 1972. Sociolinguistic patterns. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
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paroxysmal aphasia. Brain and Language, 10: 1–23.
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Paradis, M. 1978. Bilingual linguistic memory: neurolinguistic considerations. Paper
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Paradis, M. 1981. Neurolinguistic organization of a bilingual’s two languages. LACUS
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Paradis, M. 1997. Représentation lexicale et conceptuelle chez les bilingues: deux
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Québec City: CIRAL. 15–27.
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Benjamins.
Pavlenko, A. 1999. New approaches to concepts in bilingual memory. Bilingualism:
Language and Cognition, 2: 208–230.
SYNERGIC CONCEPTS IN
THE BILINGUAL MIND
Istvan Kecskes
State University of New York, Albany
Abstract
This chapter seeks answer to the following questions: How does bilingualism modify
the concept-word symbiosis? How does the meaning structure (coresense, word-specific
semantic properties (WSP), culture-specific conceptual properties) change when a close
lexico-conceptual “equivalent” from another language is added to the existing con-
struct? First, I will discuss the theoretical foundation of synergic concepts from several
perspectives. Then, I will present a part of the results of two pilot studies whose goal
was to give some empirically founded answers (however preliminary) to the questions
above.
Synergism comes from the Greek word “synergos” meaning working together. It
refers to the interaction between two or more “things” when the combined effect is
greater than if you added the “things” on their own. This is a type of “when is one plus
one greater than two” effect, that is, an enhanced combined effect.
It is hypothesized that in the mind of bi- and multilingual speakers there are synergic
concepts that are the results of conceptual blending. Bilinguals get information about
the same or similar concepts through two language channels. Because they have a com-
mon underlying conceptual base (CUCB), the blended information results in concepts
that are neither exactly equal to the corresponding L1 concept nor to the correspond-
ing L2 concept. Depending on age, socio-cultural and psychological factors, and the
stage of cognitive and linguistic development of the individual, synergic concepts may
be more or less beneficial for his or her cognitive development. Restructuring existing
knowledge belonging to a particular label (word) in the L1 under the influence of new
knowledge gained through L2 is expected to have a positive effect on the overall cog-
nitive development, although this claim has not been fully proven yet. It is important
to emphasize that synergic concepts do not mean some kind of mixture of knowledge
and/or information. They are a group of concepts that are lexicalized in both languages
but may have a somewhat different socio-cultural load in each language. In the CUCB
of proficient bilinguals the two different socio-cultural loads are blended, which results
in a conceptual domain that is not equal to the content of the conceptual domain in either
language.
29
I. Kecskes and L. Albertazzi (eds.), Cognitive Aspects of Bilingualism, 29–61.
© 2007 Springer.
1. T H E O R E T I C A L B A C K G R O U N D
2. W O R D A N D C O N C E P T
Because the learner does not acquire the concept at the first encounter,
several other encounters with the same concept in various contexts should
follow until the concept is firmly established in the learner’s mind. Gagne
(1977: 99) claimed that “concrete concepts that are learned by young
children are often given fuller meaning and greater precision when they
are later brought to the formal level (as defined concepts) by learning
in school.” Thus concepts in the L1 are not learned; rather, they grow.
Conceptual content constantly changes under the influence of input and
the environment. For instance “dog” indicates a concept for an animal,
which has a tail and four legs, is a mammal, a domesticated animal,
etc. The important thing is that a concept does not indicate only a group
of sensations. Of course, we have sensations related to our concept of
“dog.” However, the concept is much more than just auditory and visual
sensations. We, for instance, cannot see that a certain dog is a mammal or
that it is domesticated. These properties do not exist in the environment;
they are part of our concept for “dog” that exists only in our mind.
Based on primary concrete concepts, we elaborate all other con-
cepts. As primary concepts usually develop through physical experience,
they are normally quite well defined. However, many concepts, mainly
abstract concepts derived from other concepts, are rather imprecise.
Because more steps of generalization and abstraction are involved, they
may become more and more blurred. In Piaget’s theory, the period from
about age ten or eleven on is considered the formal operations period
when genuinely abstract mental operations can be undertaken (e.g., the
ability to entertain hypothetical possibilities).
From the perspective of synergic concepts one of the most important
things in concept development is the fact that people have different
for constant concepts has not been successful. Several studies (e.g., Malt
1994; Smith & Sloman 1994) have suggested that acts of categorization
are not simply repeated; they actually vary. Different tasks and contexts
appear to create different categories. Barsalou (1993) demonstrated that
individual acts of categorization do not necessarily require an already
represented concept. Based on these claims, Smith and Samuelson
(1997) suggested a unified account of category stability and variability
that is not built on the notion of fixed, represented concepts.
In this chapter the word – concept relationship is understood as fol-
lows. A word (label) is a symbol that pulls together all knowledge and
information that has been connected with the use of that label. It encodes
the history of the use of that label in various situational contexts. The
amount of this knowledge and information with its fuzzy boundaries
creates what we call a concept.
A concept is a construct that blends knowledge gained from actual
situational contexts in an individual-centered way. The reason why
concepts convey relatively similar information for a particular speech
community is that community members have had relatively similar expe-
riences with the given label in language use. As Vygotsky (1962: 83)
pointed out:
word meanings evolve. When a new word has been learned
by the child, its development is barely starting: the word at
first is a generalization of the most primitive type; as the
child’s intellect develops, it is replaced by generalizations of
a higher and higher type – a process that leads in the end to
the formation of true concepts.
3. C O N T E X T U A L I T Y T H E O RY
linguistic level from the conceptual level. This is important for synergic
concepts because this distinction gives us the chance to explain the word
(linguistic level) – concept (conceptual level) relationship. However, as
I mentioned earlier, we must modify the two-level approach because
it represents a traditional, external perspective on context. It holds that
context modifies and/or specifies word meanings in one way or another.
Context is seen as a selector of lexical features because it activates
some of these features while leaving others in the background. This
approach has led to the idea of “underspecified word meaning” that
appears in several different contemporary linguistic theories, including
Bierwisch’s (1996, 1997) two-level conceptual semantics, Pustejovsky’s
(1995) theory of the generative lexicon, and Sperber and Wilson’s (1986,
1995) relevance theory. These approaches claim that the meaning of
the lexical units is underspecified and gets conceptual specification in
context. It is argued that the specification of word meaning in context is
accomplished by conceptual shift, which “shifts” the core meaning into
various conceptual fields, and by conceptual differentiation, which only
“differentiates” the core meaning within one and the same conceptual
domain, thereby yielding literal meanings. (e.g., Bierwisch 1996, 1997;
Bibok & Németh 2001).
The contextuality theory proposed here offers a more balanced
approach in which the lexical units also function like contexts. The
information encoded in a word is the result of contextual occurrences
of the given word, so, in a way, words comprise their prior contextual
use. As a consequence, when we utter a word it will create its own
context even if it is uttered without any “context” in the traditional
sense. The dynamic behavior of human speech implies a reciprocal
process between language and situational context. People attempt to
fit their language to a situation or context that their language, in turn,
helped to create in the first place (cf. Gee 1999). The dynamic relation-
ship of lexical units and situational context means that they mutually
define and depend on each other; they both create the world and are
created by it. Lexical units encode the history of their prior contextual
use. There are no meanings that are context-free because each lexi-
cal item is always implicitly indexed to a prior recurring context(s) of
reference.
with the given label as in L2, and the prior experience with the lexical
equivalent of the given L2 label in L1. For instance:
(2)
“school” – “escuela”
When a native speaker of English learning Spanish acquires the word
“escuela” as a corresponding label to the concept symbolized by the
word “school” in his mind, s/he uses the conceptual load attached to the
English word “school” even when s/he speaks Spanish. This conceptual
load may comprise the following senses:
4. W H AT I S I N A W O R D ?
4.1. Coresense
Coresense is abstracted from possible contextual occurrences of the
word. It is neither conceptual nor lexical, but the interface between
A
c
t.
s
i
Consense
t
[1]
C u
o a
r t
e Consense i
s [2] o
e n
n a
s l
Consense
e [n]
c
o
n
t
e
x
t
Conceptual level
the two levels. Coresense is not the sum of the most essential proper-
ties of the given category, but an abstraction from the most familiar,
regular, typical, and (generally, but not always) frequent uses of a
word. Coresense is not a pure linguistic phenomenon because it depends
on extralinguistic features such as familiarity, conventionality, and
frequency. It is an essential feature of the word that brings together
conceptual semantic and lexical semantic information.
Coresense has a unique relationship with the WSP and culture-specific
conceptual properties (CSCP). WSPs link the coresense to the lexical
level while CSCPs tie it to the conceptual level. CSCPs belong to
WSPs include such things as emotive coloring, stylistic value, and var-
ious kinds of contextual affinities (see Cruse 1990, for a more detailed
discussion of WSPs).
WSPs are the result of the recurrent use of words in particular contexts.
Originally, WSPs are the results of the interplay of the lexical unit and
context, and they are the best evidence for category stability and vari-
ability. They usually derive from metaphors or other figures of speech,
and over time they become conventionalized. Cruse (1992) argued that
words with WSPs can create a more emotive, more “colorful” context
than words without WSPs. Compare the following sentences:
(4)
Peter gave up the race. - - - - - - - - - - -> Peter chickened out of the race.
Bob repaired the car. - - - - - - - - - - - - -> Bob fixed the car.
4.2. Consense
Coresense should be distinguished from consense, which is the situated,
contextual meaning of a lexical unit. Coresense is the invariant, while
consense represents the possible variants. Consense realizes a particular
aspect or aspects of the coresense by uniting it with the appropriate WSP
and/or CSCP when the word is actually uttered in a particular situation.
Figure 1 demonstrates how coresense and consense fit within the
DMM. As the diagram shows, coresense is the interface between the
conceptual and lexical level. WSPs are links to the lexical level, while
CSCPs are ties to the conceptual level. Consenses are the variations
of coresense in context. The contextual interpretation of coresense
is expressed in a consense connected to other consenses to form an
utterance.
can be considered frozen metaphors that always have the same color of
meaning no matter how the context changes. They usually derive from
CSCPs that become lexicalized as a result of frequent recurring use. The
English phrase “chicken out” is a good example. Its original meaning is
rooted in the belief that chickens are cowardly animals. The metaphor-
ical link between the source domain and target domain can be easily
made: “cowards are chickens.” However, this metaphorical meaning
is lexicalized to the extent that nowadays no native speaker of English
will think of a chicken when s/he uses the word “chicken out.” This
does not change the fact that the word form shows its etymology very
clearly. According to the Diccionario Espasa Concise (Espasa-Calpe:
Madrid 2000), the Spanish lexical equivalent to the word “chicken out”
is “acobardarse.” The Spanish word, of course, has nothing to do with
“chicken,” because in the Spanish culture that metaphor is not lexicalized
the way it is in English.
In the mind of an English – Spanish bilingual the synergic concept
[SURRENDER] may be represented by the following lexical items (not
a full list!):
(6)
English words: surrender, capitulate, give up, chicken out, quit
Spanish words: rendir, capitular, renunciar, acobardarse, achiquitar
It is not difficult to discover that some of the lexical routes are the same
or very similar because the words come from the same Latin root such
as “capitulate – capitular,” “surrender – rendir,” “quit – achiquitar.”
However, there is no match where the words have some WSPs such as
“give up,” “chicken out,” and “acobardarse.”
5. P I L O T S T U D I E S2
5.1.1. Data collection Our subjects were adults of ages 25–45. We had
four groups and in each of them there were six females and six males:
Group A: Bilinguals with Chinese L1 and English L2, living in the U.S.
Group B: Bilinguals with Chinese L1 and English L2, living in China.
Group C: Native speakers of American English, living in the U.S.
Group D: Native speakers of Chinese (Mandarin), living in China.
The words were given to each subject in English only, with the exception
of the Chinese monolingual group where they received the translation
equivalents of the English words in Chinese.
10
Positive
8
6 Neutral
4 Negative
2
0
MC BC BE ME
Ambition
Table 2. Snack
Comparisons of connotations
12
No. of subjects
10 Positive
8
Neutral
6
Negative
4
2
0
MC BC BE ME
Snack
the Chinese culture having snacks is associated with women. Both the
monolingual Chinese group and the bilingual Chinese group in China
noted this. However, the bilingual Chinese group living in the U.S.
highlighted mainly the positive side of snacking.
[WEDDING]
CORESENSE: Ceremony when two people are joined in marriage.
Culture-specific conceptual properties highlighted in the definitions and
sentences of different groups:
ME: Celebration (party), tradition, sacredness, expenses
MC: “enclosed city” (tie), giving money
BE: differences: banquet, red packet vs. rings, church
BC: differences, expenses
Just like in the other two examples there is some correlation between
the answers of the monolingual Chinese group and the bilingual Chinese
group living in China (Table 3). In the case of this concept the difference
between the two groups is minimal, which can be explained by the fact
that the word refers to a strongly conventionalized concept. The bilingual
Chinese in the U.S. have come closer to the monolingual English. They
highlighted mainly the ceremonial part of the concept.
Table 3. Wedding
Comparisons of connotations
12
No. of subjects
10
8 Positive
6
4 Neutral
2
0 Negative
MC BC BE ME
Wedding
sentences. Some of the words were given in their idiomatic use. For
instance:
(8)
After the accident Sarah decided to break up with Bob.
The police officer taught David a lesson.
Subjects were expected to read the English sentences very carefully and
write down a word or expression in their native tongue (L1) that comes
to their mind when they see the English word in that context. Two hours
later they were presented with the word selected in their L1. The subjects
were asked to write a sentence in their L1 using that particular word. We
sought answers to the following questions:
Two hours later the subjects were presented with the L1 word they
selected: This is your word in L1. Please write a sentence in L1 with
this word.
5.2.2. Data analysis As in the first pilot study, subjects were given words
belonging to different parts of speech such as “credit,” “score,” “break
up,” “lesson,” “wipe out,” “nurse,” “cup,” “traffic.”
Some of the words were used in their metaphorical sense. There is no
space here to present all results so I will focus only on three concepts:
[score], [cup] and [lesson]. Subject responses in the tables will be given
in English. Although the translations were checked by several bilingual
speakers they may distort the original sense of the L1 word used by a
subject. Still, even these translations can give us some idea about how
bilingual speakers think about the given concepts.
[SCORE]
The sentence with this word “The game just started and there is no score
yet” was heavily biased for sport. We wanted to see whether speak-
ers of different languages would keep this sense of the word in their
responses.
It is clear from the responses given in Table 4 that the concept exists in
the cultures represented by the respondents. All sentences in the different
languages referred to the sport aspect of the concept, which means that
the subjects kept the sense in which the word was used in English. There
are only two exceptions: one Spanish and one Korean subject used the
concept in an educational sense. Differences occurred in the type of
sports the subjects associated the concept with. For instance, a Hindi
respondent referred to cricket scores, and a Pole mentioned football
(meaning “soccer”).
[CREDIT]
The sentence with this word “How many credits did you get?” (Table 5)
was neutral contextually. It could trigger basically any aspect of the
concept including education, sport or banking. The table shows that the
educational aspect prevailed across cultures. This may be due to the fact
that most of the respondents are or used to be students not long ago, so
they had this common prior experience.
Spanish Word in L1: score Word in L1: points Word in L1: scoreboard Word in L1: points Word in L1: no response
Sentence in L1: Anais Sentence in L1: We Sentence in L1: The Sentence in L1: The Sentence in L1: no
scored 3 points last don’t have enough point scoreboard of the game game finished with 13 response.
Sunday in basketball. required for the test yet. is not ready yet. points.
Korean Word in L1: points Word in L1: score Word in L1: score Word in L1: score Word in L1: score
gained Sentence in L1: I Sentence in L1: Our Sentence in L1: How Sentence in L1: Both
Sentence in L1: At the received a low grade for tennis team went up by many scores do they teams were not able to
Korean-Japanese physical education. 2 times what it was get? score.
soccer game, Koreans before.
gained one point and
won the game 1-0.
Chinese Word in L1: score/points Word in L1: score Word in L1: win points
Sentence in L1: In this Sentence in L1: The Sentence in L1: How
game, there is a big coach wasn’t satisfied much was the total
I S T VA N K E C S K E S
difference between the with the scores of the score of the game?
two scores. ball game.
Hindi Word in L1: number Word in L1: points
Sentence in L1: In what Sentence in L1: By how
number is the cricket many points did you
match? win?
Polish Word in L1: final score Word in L1: score a goal
Sentence in L1: We Sentence in L1: There is
could guess a game no score a football
score. game.
Spanish Word in L1: not given Word in L1: credits Word in L1: credits Word in L1: credits Word in L1:
Sentence in L1: The Sentence in L1: I need Sentence in L1: I have Sentence in L1: How credits/classes
credits at the university to get 64 credits to 49 credits at the many credits did you Sentence in L1: How
are very expensive. graduate as a chef. university. get last semester at the many classes are you
university? taking this semester?
Korean Word in L1: credits Word in L1: credits Word in L1: credit (as Word in L1: school Word in L1: school
Sentence in L1: How Sentence in L1: How in credit card) credits credits
many credits are you many credits are you Sentence in L1: You Sentence in L1: How Sentence in L1: I signed
taking this semester? taking? have to build your credit many credits have you up for 9 credits this
to get a credit card. taken so far? semester.
Chinese Word in L1: credit Word in L1: credit Word in L1: credits
Sentence in L1: I have Sentence in L1: How Sentence in L1: I have
completed all my many credits are you taken 12 credits.
credits. taking this semester?
Hindi Word in L1: not given Word in L1: number
Sentence in L1: How Sentence in L1: How
many points in this much marks did you
subject? get in your exam?
Polish Word in L1: credits Word in L1: bank credit
Sentence in L1: I got Sentence in L1: How
SYNERGIC CONCEPTS IN THE BILINGUAL MIND
[LESSON]
This word was used in its metaphorical sense in the following sentence:
“The police officer taught David a lesson.” (Table 6) Out of the seventeen
subjects, eight used the word in its literal sense, and the others tried to
keep the figurative sense used in the English sentence. In this case indi-
vidual learner differences play an important role because the figurative
use of the word depends mainly on the bilingual speaker’s familiarity
with this figurative sense. The absence or presence of a similar figurative
sense attached to the L1 lexical equivalent also was an important factor.
All Spanish speakers but one used an equivalent word in its literal sense,
while four out of five Korean subjects understood the figurative sense
of the word and attempted to reconceptualize it according to their L1.
6. D I S C U S S I O N
The results of the pilot studies demonstrated that the conceptual system
is, to some extent, affected by the new language. The content of existing
L1 concepts was modified when subjects lived in different socio-cultural
environments. Modification mainly occurred in the CSCPs. The second
pilot study showed that the L1 core conceptual content is strong even in
fluent bilinguals. It affects how bilingual speakers use synergic concepts,
and what aspects of the synergic concepts they highlight in language
production.
The use of synergic concepts and adjustments to the aspects of the con-
ceptual content depend on several socio-cultural and individual factors
that belong to conceptual socialization (Kecskes 2003). The develop-
ment of the CUCB goes together with conceptual socialization, which
refers to the transformation of the conceptual system that undergoes char-
acteristic changes to fit the functional needs of the new language and
culture. During the process of conceptual socialization the L1-dominated
conceptual base is being gradually restructured, making space for and
engaging with the new knowledge and information coming through the
second language channel. This leads to the gradual development of
a conscious awareness of how another culture is different from one’s
own culture, the ability to reflect upon this difference in language pro-
duction, and the development of an identity that is the reflection of
Spanish Word in L1: lesson Word in L1: lesson Word in L1: lesion Word in L1: lesson Word in L1: to teach, to
Sentence in L1: Elizabeth Sentence in L1: My Sentence in L1: During Sentence in L1: I’ll educate
gave me a lesson yesterday brother takes tae the tennis game I got a help you learn the Sentence in L1: Juan’s
after school. kwon do lessons. leg injury [lesion]. lesson. mother punished him.
Korean Word in L1: to discipline, Word in L1: class, Word in L1: warning Word in L1: discipline Word in L1: lecture
teach a lesson lesson Sentence in L1: The Sentence in L1: The Sentence in L1: That
Sentence in L1: You learn Sentence in L1: It is teacher gave him a police officer was teacher’s lecture was
to not play with matches something you learn warning. disciplining David. great.
only after burning through class
yourself. Only personal experience.
experience teaches you a
lesson.
Chinese Word in L1: give a lesson Word in L1: lessons Word in L1: give a
Sentence in L1: The Sentence in L1: The lesson
parents’ ideas about teacher gave a lesson Sentence in L1: That
educational opportunities to the whole class policeman is scolding
gives the child a good strictly. the pedestrian who
lesson. violated the law.
Hindi Word in L1: education Word in L1: to teach
Sentence in L1: Children a lesson
go to school to get an Sentence in L1: Good!
education. He learned his lesson.
SYNERGIC CONCEPTS IN THE BILINGUAL MIND
I got a lesson.
the dual culture. Examples in the first pilot study demonstrated that
bilingual Chinese subjects modified their perception of the concepts
“ambition,” “snack,” and “wedding.” They were ready to amalgamate
American cultural information with existing Chinese understanding of
the concepts.
I use the term “conceptual socialization” to distinguish the pro-
cess from “language socialization,” (cf. Ochs 1988; Willett 1995;
Mitchell & Myles 1998) which has its roots in anthropological linguis-
tics. Language socialization research represented by a number of studies
(cf. Ochs & Schieffelin 1984; Ochs 1988; Willett 1995; Platt & Trudi
1997) emphasizes that language and culture are inseparable because they
are acquired together: each supports the development of the other. Ochs’
and Schieffelin’s work has focused on L1 development. There are very
few studies that extend the paradigm to second language acquisition (i.e.,
Willett 1995; Platt & Trudi 1997). Willett (1995) conducted a longitudi-
nal study with young classroom learners of ESL in an elementary school
with an international intake. Based on her results she argued that lan-
guage socialization is a complex process in which participants construct
and evaluate shared understandings through negotiation. This process
leads to changes not only in their identity but also in social practices.
Conceptual socialization broadens the scope of the paradigm of lan-
guage socialization, which has its main focus on language developmen-
tal issues. Conceptual socialization differs from language socialization
in that it emphasizes the primacy of mental processes in the symbiosis of
language and culture, and aims at explaining the bidirectional (or tri- or
x-directional) influence of the two or more languages in bi- and multi-
lingual development. The process of conceptual socialization is strongly
tied to the emergence of the CUCB that is responsible for the operation
of two language channels. New knowledge and new information are
processed through existing knowledge. The language learner can pick
up a word or a fixed expression as a functional unit based on observa-
tions of use. What s/he cannot pick up, however, is the “load,” the CSCP
that that expression may carry. This fact is crucial for the development
of synergic concepts. Conceptual socialization has two sides which are
inseparable: a skill side and a content side. They are two sides of one
and the same phenomenon. Synergic concepts are connected with the
content side. The skill side means that conceptual socialization will be
reflected in the actual language skills: structural well-formedness, lan-
guage manipulation, sentence structuring and lexical quality. Changes
in both sides are qualitative rather than quantitative. The skill side of the
conceptual socialization process is measurable (Kecskes & Papp 2000,
2003). Changes in the content side, however, can hardly be measured.
They are qualitative changes in the content of what the language learner
says and the way the language learner behaves in communication.
In the first pilot study bilingual Chinese speakers’ attitudes to con-
cepts such as “ambition,” “snack,” and “wedding” differed from that
of monolingual speakers. They used the concepts slightly differently in
their sentences as well. The second pilot study demonstrated that there
is no full correlation between language proficiency and conceptual flu-
ency. The dominance of L1 in the conceptual content of words was very
strong even in bilinguals with advanced language proficiency. Knowl-
edge may be blended and present in synergic concepts; however, it does
not mean it is used in a native-like way. This is where synergic concepts
are tied with conceptual socialization. Synergic concepts make it possi-
ble for speakers to sound native-like if they wish to, because they have
developed the conceptual knowledge native-like language use requires.
The question is whether they really want to sound native-like. This is,
however, another issue that I do not wish to discuss here.
7. C O N C L U S I O N
This chapter argued that in the mind of bi- and multilingual speakers
there are synergic concepts that are the results of conceptual blending.
Synergic concepts are notions that are lexicalized in both languages but
have a different socio-cultural load in each language. In the CUCB of
proficient bilinguals the two different socio-cultural loads are blended.
This may result in a conceptual domain that is not equal to the content
of the conceptual domain in either language.
The development of synergic concepts is the result of conceptual
blending which is the driving force of the development of any concepts.
Conceptual blending is not a bi- or multilingual phenomenon. It occurs in
the mind of monolingual speakers as well. However, there is significant
NOTES
REFERENCES
M AT R I X : S C H E M AT I C U N I V E R S A L S .
H O W M A N Y M I N D S D O E S A B I L I N G U A L H AV E ?
Liliana Albertazzi
University of Trento, Italy
Abstract
None of the current reflection on language universals analyzes the categorial question
from the point of view of the ontological levels of reality. The levels of the cogni-
tive processing of information and its linguistic expression are sometimes discussed,
but not the ontological levels of reality, probably because of the “linguistic” ver-
sion of ontology as a simple theory of descriptions which predominated in the last
century. This chapter underlines the structural difference among different kinds of cat-
egories, avoiding the errors that may derive from imprecise delimitation of their roles.
As to ontological categories, the analysis emphasizes the difference between general
ontological categories and regional ontological ones. Finally, the chapter shows that
“recognizing” an item does not mean, by default, applying a taxonomic category or a
base category. On that basis, a proposal is made of experiments verifying the existence
of presentative pathologies, that is, pathologies occurring at the very base format of
representations.
1. P O E T RY R E S E M B L E S PA I N T I N G S ?
sometimes in conflict with each other, and which may affect both the
reference and the conceptualization.
Moreover, this greater complexity cannot be explained by simply
adding additional categories. The conflict may come about at several
levels, for instance when growing up monolingual and then learning
a second or third language; learning implicitly and explicitly; being
brought up bilingual; acquiring different types of language, for exam-
ple, a spoken language and a sign language (on the development of
Creole sign languages see Pinker 1994; Golden-Meadow et al. 1995;
Emmorey 2004). The conflict may also concern different components of
bilingualism, like proficiency, fluency, forms of low and elite bilingual-
ism, individual pragmatic abilities, and emotional motivations. Finally,
the conflict may arise not only on aspects of conceptualization rela-
tive to specific grammatical bases (Pavlenko 1999) but even within an
alternative general paradigm, such as the ones underlying the Western
languages or the Asiatic languages (On this type of bilingualism see
Wei 1994; Noguchi & Fotos 2000; Shin & Milroy 2000; Mishina-Mori
2005), with the further variant of bilinguals who live, for example, in
highly industrialized Western contexts, or vice versa.
Analysis of bi- and multilingualism has a crucial problem to solve:
determining how conceptual representations are organized on the basis
of two or more conceptual systems with differing degrees of relational
complexity (Clark 2005). Put more concisely: is the mind of a bilin-
gual or multilingual different from the mind of a monolingual (On this
topic see De Groot et al. 1997. See also Hakuta 1986. On the effect of
L2 on L1 see specifically Kecskes & Papp 2000 and Kecskes in this
volume).
2. C AT E G O R I Z AT I O N I N A S I A N A N D
W E S T E R N C U LT U R E S A N D L A N G U A G E S
3. I S S U E S F O R D I S C U S S I O N
(Marty 1916–1920 II: 1–67). In those occurrences, the names arouse the
same concept, choosing different means to lead toward it. Briefly, the
images or the imaginative content can change, but the meaning (i.e., the
way in which the object is intended) does not. The internal linguistic
form of a linguistic sign is then a psychic component of the sign itself
(see Apresjan 1974; Violi 1997: 8.5.2).
When these modes of referring are lexicalized, they make desig-
nation possible without the original relationship having constantly to
be reiterated: this is the case of lexicalized metaphors, which do not
exist in all languages and may not have a shared meaning, therefore
cannot be “translated.” The problem of the inner linguistic form is con-
sequently of particular importance when two or more reference systems
interact – that is, in bi- and multilinguals – because meaning may be
activated at all these levels of inner and outer form of the two or more
languages.
The innatist and relativist theories have been put forward in several
variants and with differing degrees of radicalness. The problem is that
linguistic analysis sometimes combines innatist claims (the existence of
universal parameters) with relativist assumptions. In numerous authors,
universal structures of taxonomic categorization (variously understood
as necessary and sufficient conditions in componential semantics, lists of
distinctive classes, syntactic and/or formal structures) coexist with pro-
totypical universals that have little to do with them. This may be evidence
for the third ontological option in categorization, namely the ontological
value of different types of categorization and different ontological levels
of reality.
The same situation is apparent in Lakoff’s work, where image-
schemata (like “container”) are tied to perceptive invariants which are
prevalently visual/sensomotorial, and therefore universal, but ample
recognition is given to the anthropocentrism and cultural relativism of
the types of conceptualization, as in the case of the radial categorization
of the Dyrbal (Lakoff 1997: 6). However, as shown in categorization
of terms by multilingual speakers, the semantic categories conveyed
by word meanings do not all map in the same way onto the conceptual
categories in specific domains (containers, e.g.) (Clark 2005: 460–461).
Moreover, radial categories are actually a description of the semantic
4. A N A LT E R N AT I V E A P P R O A C H TO C AT E G O R I Z AT I O N
4.1. Categories
I am aware that the linguist is specifically interested in the dynamics of
lexical areas in which categories are placed within a system, and the way
in which they oppose and boundary themselves according the constraints
imminent to the system itself. A scholar in bi- and multilingualism
is consequently interested in eventual superposition and interference
between the different configurations of semantic areas. Strictly speaking,
the problem of ontological categorization is a philosophical problem.
However, the two questions interrelate and my aim is to disentangle
some of the interrelated problems.
The current discussion on language universals fails to analyze the
categorial question from the point of view of the ontological levels of
reality. The levels of the cognitive processing of information and its
linguistic expression (Levinson 2003) are sometimes discussed, but not
the ontological levels of reality, probably because of the “linguistic”
version of ontology as a simple theory of descriptions which predom-
inated in the last century (Quine 1969; Putnam 1975; Bickerton 1981,
1984). In my analysis I shall stress the structural difference between cat-
egories, avoiding the errors that may derive from imprecise delimitation
of their roles. Moreover, I shall emphasize the difference between gen-
eral ontological categories and regional ontological ones. Finally, I shall
show that “recognizing” an item does not mean, by default, applying a
taxonomic category or a base category.
In the classical Aristotelian classification, the categories are univer-
sal classes of being which can be affirmed or predicated of any object.
They entail a pre-established organization like that by proximate genus
and specific difference (Categories 5: 2a). In the Aristotelian table of
categories, therefore, “category” has a twofold meaning: (i) that of the
genera of predication, the column of predicates expressing the same
meaning; and (ii) that of the summum genus, the predicate that defines
the common feature of each column. In the category “zebra,” for exam-
ple, the substance expresses what the thing is, the quality of how it is,
the time and space when and where it is, etc. The determination of a sub-
ject is predicated by an inherence relationship. The categories therefore
(i) are predicamenta, (ii) have “grammatical genesis,” and (iii) possess
“ontological value”.
As we have seen, the Aristotelian category has ontological value, but
it has subordinate features as well. The “logical” aspect of categories,
for example, resides in the fact that they are the highest predicates; and
the “linguistic” aspect resides in their grammatical genesis, that is, in
the fact that the predicates are extrapolated from propositions and then
analyzed in themselves or in their primary dimension. In short, starting
from Aristotle’s position, categories can be interpreted in three ways:
(1) categories with lexical terms (semantic interpretation) (Trendelen-
burg 1833);
(2) categories as concepts, supreme predicates (logical interpretation)
(Apel 1963);
(3) categories as real determinations (ontological interpretation)
(Bonitz 1853).
One may argue that the categories merely furnish the predicative frame-
work within which to locate certain predicates, a sort of location for
the species of the predication. In other words, the categories are points
of view with which to classify the concepts that distinguish between the
objects of thought, corresponding to which are various kinds of state-
ment (Zeller 1859: 68). In modern terms, a conception like this would
allow graded or partial category membership.
One may argue that analysis of the grammatical differences between
the categories shows that they are concepts, not forms of statements or
manners of predicating concepts. However, they are not concepts in the
sense of mere mental representations but instead in their relation to the
judgment, insofar as they are the predicate. They express logical rela-
tionships (Trendelenburg 1833). For example, the category of substance
has its grammatical genesis in the substantive, those of quantity and qual-
ity in the adjective, that of relation in comparison, those of where and
when in the adverbs of place and time, those of doing and undergoing
in the active and passive forms of verbs, that of posture in the perfect
tense (for intransitive verbs). However, not all parts of the discourse
(e.g., the article) have a correspondent category. Then, on the basis of
the same language diverse ontologies can be framed (think of Plato and
use Husserl’s terminology): that is, those categories which concern par-
ticular domains of reality like the mind, language, society (Hartmann
1935; Husserl 1970, 1982; Poli 2002). In other words, the ambit of
linguistic reference comprises a general invariant categoriality which
concerns the existent as such, and a specific categoriality relative to
the realm of reference comprising the cognitive and social processes
that give rise to language. From this latter point of view the categories
are necessarily mixed, because they relate to categories of perceptive
type (e.g., sensory schemata functionally transposed into a language’s
cognitive grammar), of psychological type (figural contents, auxiliary
representations, and linguistically expressed mental contents), and of
social type (specific elaboration of the conceptualization and grammar
of languages reflecting cultural factors in the broad sense, which may
greatly differ). Consequently, there is no single meaning of “category”
but different senses of the term referring to its diverse valences.
When pronouncing in favor of an innatist or relativist account of
language, therefore, it is important to make use of the proper and non-
synonymous senses of the term “category.” This is of special importance
for analysis of conceptualization in bi- and multilinguals, and it may have
consequences on the cultural organization of a society which comprises
linguistic minorities.
As mentioned, one may also have to pronounce simultaneously in
favor of the universal and relativist value of the categories, but without
lapsing into contradiction. I will now clarify this point.
4.2. Reference
As Greenberg observed in his well-known papers on universals:
located (see also James 1950 II: Chapter 4; Pöppel & Logothetis
1986; Pöppel 1994; Albertazzi 2002a).
4.3. Patterns
The introduction of the psyche (I deliberately use the Aristotelian term
instead of “mind” because it is situated, that is, comprises a broader
array of phenomena) into the relation between linguistic expression and
ontological reference is nothing new. Consider twentieth-century lin-
guistics, from the physiologically based theories of Wundt (1904) and
Steinthal (1968) to the already-mentioned descriptive ones of Marty or
Bühler. The notion has assumed considerable importance in the devel-
opment of cognitive science after decades of dominance by rationalism
embedded in the first generations of AI and the logical-formal approach
to natural language.
The thesis of the conceptual character of semantics, in particular the
presence of conceptual universals embedded in the semantics of natu-
ral language has been sustained in cognitive science on very different
philosophical premises which have very different meanings from the
categorial point of view.
This thesis is put forward by representationalists like Fodor, mental-
ists like Johnson-Laird and Wierzbicka, and experientialists like Lakoff,
Langacker and Talmy. All of these have argued for the uniqueness
of the human mind reflected in the conceptual (Langacker 1990) pro-
cessing of languages; but also taking into account the relativity and/or
anthropomorphism of specific conceptual categories and forms of con-
strual developed by language communities. Evidently, the thesis of the
universality of some cognitive components and the thesis of linguistic
relativism are linked, but different authors have interpreted the relation-
ship between them in very different ways. The proponents of a lingua
mentalis, for example, cannot hold the same assumptions as the propo-
nents of experientialist theories. The assumptions of Wierzbicka, who
connects mental operations with grammatical structures, are very close
to those of a universal grammar and therefore presuppose the existence
of language universals common to all languages, suggesting the idea
of a lingua mentalis. Conversely, those of Lakoff relate to an experien-
tialist conception of the mind as embodied or rooted in sensomotorial
experience. In other words, this is more an Aristotelian psyche than a
Leibnizian or computational mind. The concept of “primitive” – even if
it shares the criticism of the concept of “naturalistic taxa” as the ordering
of items into a system of concepts – differs profoundly among authors:
for Wierzbicka (1996), for example, these are primitives similar to those
of componential semantics.
This point is crucial because, for example, cognitive semantics is
often criticized for adhering to a correspondence theory of mean-
ing (semantics as conceptual semantics). The criticism is directed at
Wierzbicka as well as Langacker and Lakoff, despite the considerable
differences between their positions; and above all despite the impor-
tance given to prototypical categorization (Rosch 1978) by each of them
(Lakoff 1987; Langacker 1990; Wierzbicka 1996) – where concepts
are functions of environmentally-based but subjectively characterized
experience (Lakoff & Johnson 1999).
As I have pointed out, however, if the foundation of the categorization
of schemata and image-schemata lies at the neuronal level, then the
criticism of psychophysical correspondence brought against cognitive
linguistics is entirely justified: conceptualization becomes a reflection
of the physical world’s properties according to the dictates of classical
psychophysical theory (see e.g., Zeki 1993; Pulvermüller 1999; Martin
2001). There is consequently a conflict inherent in cognitive linguistics
which must be resolved at categorial level.
Another point concerns the fact that analysis by cognitive semantics
has centered on spatial categorization (Miller & Johnson-Laird 1976;
Lyons 1977). Within the debate on the eminently spatial nature of lin-
guistic conceptualization, not only are the points of departure different,
but also the referents. For example, the referent for representationalist
theory is early research in artificial intelligence (the mind as a com-
puter), that for mentalist theory is a cultural Platonism (the idea of
semantic primitives), that for experientialist theory is Gestalt psychol-
ogy and, more generally, phenomenology (the experiential and bodily
basis of human categories) (Svorou 1994; Ungerer & Schmid 1996;
Heine 1997). An approximate grouping of theories conceals the differ-
ences between diverse approaches only apparently coming together in
the same “relativist theory” of spatial conceptualization.
Finally, one may agree that primitives can be identified in linguistic
categorization (Jackendoff 1983; Wierzbicka 1996; Lamb 1999) without
immediately attributing them either semantic or conceptual significance
– that is, without considering them to be a set of conceptual features rep-
resenting the properties of a category. Vice versa, by referring to the
Kantian notion of empirical concept, one considers them semiotic prim-
itives connected with perception. It is important to underline, however,
that the idea of empirical concepts in Kantian terms is not the same as
in British empiricism: the first are cognitive routes, the second are more
like mental images or inner models. Also, Kantian empirical concepts
are not immediately tied to action, so that the dichotomy between “rep-
resenting for thinking” and “representing for doing” does not apply to
them (see Prinz 2005).
Generally, when dealing with problems regarding conceptualization,
the questions to ask about space are still those raised by James: How
do we apprehend space? How is the system of real space and spatial
relations constructed, starting from infancy? (See also Clark 2004: 461.)
How do we perceive the third dimension? What role does cognition play
in the perception of space? (James 1950 II: Chapter XX).
Put in these terms, the question of primitives can be addressed by
adopting Eco’s distinction among Cognitive Type (CT), Nuclear Con-
tent (NC) and Molar Content (MC). A CT is a sort of procedural rule
for organizing multimedia perceptive experience. It comprises charac-
teristic notes or typical features and serves to identify occurrences of
primary-level entities (Eco 1997: Chapter 3, 3.3.1ff; Albertazzi 2004a).
In the first instance it can be compared to the base categories of cognitive
psychology (Rosch 1978) but only if its character as a procedural rather
There are then the changes of meaning that occur in the translation of
the same negotiated contents from one language to another (Eco 2003:
Chapter 4). The NC differs from the CT because it derives from the nego-
tiation of various individual CTs in a particular language community, so
that the public (i.e., semantic) meaning of the entity is collectively stan-
dardized (Eco 1997: 3.3.2.). The NC, which broadly corresponds to
the lexical meaning of a term, may obviously be more multi-faceted in
speakers of more than one language, because of their differing inner
linguistic forms, with the consequent constraints and feedbacks that the
facets of one language may exert on those of a different language. In
the case of bi- and multilinguals, it is of particular importance to ana-
lyze the NC because it indicates the set of specific facets that have been
negotiated and incorporated into the lexicon of a particular language.
This may concern both specific content/s and the mode/s of reference,
given that there may be different ways to encode and access knowledge.
It is in this, according to additive theories, that one of the advantages
of bilingualism or multilingualism consists, which give greater capacity
to distinguish between word and concept, and therefore greater flex-
ibility in the cognitive abilities underlying the formats of conceptual
networks.
Finally, the point of view of a particular language community is
expressed by another sort of information: MC (Eco 1997: Chapter 3,
3.3.3), which comprises highly diverse information items. Distinguish-
ing among CT, NC and MC may be useful for the analysis of how
different languages relate to their underlying concepts (Weinreich 1953).
Additionally, from this point of view lexical items rarely have the
same meaning as their translation equivalents (Paradis 1997). In short,
the conceptual contents negotiated in the semantics of the lexicon
may be qualitatively diverse, especially in the case of bi- and multi-
linguals, but not so the procedural rules for pattern recognition, which
are universal.
From a categorial point of view, paying attention to the subjec-
tive character of the CTs seems to support the hypotheses of classical
Ockhamist nominalism. But in fact it does not. Eco himself stresses the
presence of what Plato in the Phaedo called “nervatures” of being and
which no form of epistemological conventionalism can afford to ignore.
4.4. Schemata
A schema is structured on certain perceptive characteristics of the entity
in question. For example, it comprises secondary and tertiary figural
qualities and expressive movement . On this basis the schema of Rattus
is universal, even if it is intrinsically dynamic (constructed on the basis
of Abschattungen; Husserl 1982: Section 3, iii), and even if, because of
its structural instantiation in a CT, it is subjectively connoted in relation
to the individual who is its bearer in a particular setting and a particular
community.
However, the schema is not to be understood in the descriptive sense as
offering defining conceptual or lexical properties. Indeed, it maintains its
invariance until a certain topological deformation takes place in the type
itself. The extendedness (not “metric extension,” which relates to the
computational idea of schema as image/picture, silhouette or contour) of
the Rattus schema, for example, is not conceptually deformable beyond
certain limits, after which it assumes features pertaining to a “different
type” of item.
Defense of the existence of universals in the form of schematic uni-
versals should not be regarded as a weak defense, because it maintains
an ontological foundation (the structure of intentional reference at pri-
mary level) which forms its matrix. Subjective integrations, including
ratiomorphic categorizations such as anticipatory scheme, relation, and
abstraction, are structural components of the schema at the level of the
primary organization of information in the spatio-temporal qualitative
5. A WAY O U T A N D C O N C L U S I O N
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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G R A M M AT I C A L G E N D E R I N T H E B I L I N G U A L
LEXICON: A
PSYCHOLINGUISTIC APPROACH
Angeliki Salamoura
University of Cambridge, UK
Abstract
This chapter is organized as follows. The first section is a general introduction to
grammatical gender from various perspectives. Section 2 reviews studies which compare
L2 with L1 gender processing; Section 3 discusses the role of the L1 gender informa-
tion during L2 gender processing; and Section 4 focuses on the (language-shared or
language-specific) nature of gender representation in the bilingual lexicon. After a brief
overview of the present study which investigates further the nature of gender represen-
tations in the bilingual lexicon (Section 5), Sections 6, 7 and 8 present in detail two
experiments on gender representation and discuss the experimental findings. Finally,
Section 9 draws together the present and previous evidence on the representation of
gender in the bilingual lexicon and gender processing in L2.
1. I N T R O D U C T I O N
Kroll 2001; Jared & Szucs 2002). If this nonselective activation is not
restricted to semantic and word-form information only, but also extends
to gender information, then the processing of a word in one language
that requires access to its gender should be affected by the gender of its
translation-equivalent in the other language.
Finally, one natural question that follows from the above concerns
regards the nature of the mental representation of gender: Is there a com-
mon integrated gender system or are there two distinct gender systems in
the bilingual mental lexicon? Most findings on the organization of the
bilingual lexicon converge on the view that the conceptual/semantic
level is language-shared whereas the word-form level is language-
specific (e.g., Gerard & Scarborough 1989). This is the prevalent
approach that the majority of bilingual studies and models have adopted,
albeit with some variations, since the mid-eighties (e.g., Paradis 1985;
Perecman 1989; Kroll & Stewart 1994; Kroll & de Groot 1997). Up to
now, however, all discussion about the organization of the bilingual lexi-
con has revolved, with few exceptions, around the particulars of the rep-
resentation of a word at the conceptual/semantic and form levels, leaving
relatively untouched the issue of the representation of lexical-syntactic
information, such as grammatical gender, which makes up a word’s
“grammatical meaning.” Is gender information commonly represented
for L1 and L2 as a word’s semantic information, or is it represented
separately?
In spite of the significance of gender for speech well-formedness
and the apparent difficulties it poses for L2 learning and processing,
only fairly recently has psycholinguistic research begun to explore the
workings of gender processing in L2 and the nature of gender represen-
tations in the bilingual lexicon1 . The aim of this paper is to review recent
research on the above issues and to present new empirical evidence that
clarifies the nature of the mental representation of grammatical gender
in bilinguals/advanced L2 learners. I assume a broad definition of bilin-
gualism. Bilinguals are defined as all individuals who regularly use two
languages at any level of proficiency. Therefore, the terms bilinguals
and second language (L2) learners will be used interchangeably in this
paper, following established practice in the bilingual literature.
2. H O W D I F F E R E N T I S L 2 G E N D E R
PROCESSING FROM L1 GENDER PROCESSING?
3. T H E R O L E O F T H E L 1 G E N D E R S Y S T E M
IN THE PROCESSING OF L2 GENDER
The role of the L1 gender system has been investigated during gender
processing in L2 production, listening and visual word recognition, and
during gender assignment in L2. The main question was whether the
gender information of one language influences the processing or assign-
ment of gender in the other language. In all studies reported in this
section, apart from Paris and Weber (2005), the critical manipulation
concerned the relation between the gender of the target responses and
their translation in the other language. One segment of the target stimuli
shared gender with their translation equivalent nouns, while the rest had
a different gender from their translation.
Costa et al. (2003) tested four groups of highly proficient bilin-
guals. In three experiments, Croatian-Italian bilinguals named pictures
by means of gender-marked definite determiner + noun or definite
determiner + adjective + noun in their L2 (Italian). Naming latencies
were not affected by whether the Croatian translation of the Italian tar-
get responses had the same or different gender. The same result held
under conditions of speeded naming or mixed language naming (target
pictures were named in L2 and filler pictures in L1). In two further
similar tasks with target responses in the form of gender-marked def-
inite determiner + noun, Spanish-Catalan bilinguals named pictures
in their L1 (Spanish), and Catalan-Spanish, while Italian-French bilin-
guals named pictures in their L2 (Spanish and French respectively). The
findings were the same as those of the first groups of bilinguals: the
production of L2 gender-marked phrases was not influenced by the gen-
der values of their L1 translations and, likewise, the production of L1
phrases was not influenced by the gender values of their L2 translations.
Costa et al. (2003) claimed that, although their results do not distinguish
between a language-shared or language-separate gender system in the
bilingual lexicon, they suggest the autonomy of the L1 and L2 gen-
der systems in highly proficient bilinguals, regardless of the symmetry
between the two systems in terms of gender values and gender agree-
ment targets. Croatian, for example, has three gender values (masculine,
feminine, neuter) as opposed to Italian, which has only two (masculine,
feminine); all other language pairs used in the study have an equal num-
ber and type of gender values (masculine, feminine). Additionally, in
all Romance languages definite determiners are gender agreement tar-
gets in a determiner + noun NP, whereas Croatian has no determiners
and thus the corresponding NP does not require computation of gender
agreement.
These findings, however, cannot be considered conclusive with
respect to the role of the L1 gender system during L2 production for the
following reasons. First, all participants in the Costa et al. (2003) study
were highly proficient, almost balanced bilinguals. This proficiency is
evidenced by their L2 error rates, which were not significantly different
from those of the native speaker groups tested on the same material6 .
This low error rate is surprising for L2 production that involves retrieval
of grammatical gender since the difficulty of L2 learners, even advanced
L2 learners, with gender assignment and gender agreement in L2 is well
attested (Rogers 1984; Dewaele & Véronique 2001; Sabourin 2001,
2003). It may be the case therefore that the autonomy of gender systems
observed in this study is restricted to highly proficient, balanced bilin-
guals, whereas the influence of the L1 gender values is more pronounced
in less fluent, L1-dominant bilinguals.
Second, the failure to observe any effect from L1 may also be due
to the type of processes involved in determiner retrieval in the target
languages used in the study (Italian, Spanish, and French). In the L1
literature a gender-congruency effect has been reported in Dutch and
German with a picture-word interference task, that is, picture naming
with a gender-marked (Det + N) NP was faster in the presence of a
distractor word of the same gender (gender-congruent) than a distrac-
tor of a different gender (gender-incongruent) (Schriefers 1993; van
Berkum 1997; La Heij et al. 1998; Schriefers & Teruel 2000). This
effect was not obtained in Romance languages – Italian, Spanish, Catalan
and French (Costa et al. 1999; Miozzo & Caramazza 1999; Alario &
Caramazza 2002). A plausible explanation of this difference was pro-
vided by Miozzo and Caramazza (1999) in terms of early and late
selection languages. In Dutch and German the gender value of the head
noun is sufficient to fully determine the form of the appropriate def-
inite determiner. Thus, determiner selection in these languages takes
4. T H E R E P R E S E N TAT I O N O F G R A M M AT I C A L
GENDER IN THE BILINGUAL LEXICON
5. T H E P R E S E N T S T U D Y
While the previous studies investigated the role of the L1 gender infor-
mation during the processing of L2 gender in comprehension and
production (for L1-dominant bilinguals) and asked whether L1 and L2
have one shared or two independent gender systems, they did so by
looking only at cases of translation-equivalent L1 and L2 nouns. If,
however, there is an integrated L1 and L2 gender system – at least for
L1-dominant bilinguals – as previous studies seem to suggest, this sys-
tem will not be restricted to translation-equivalent words but encompass
all L1 and L2 nouns.
The present study will test for cross-language gender effects between
non translation-equivalent L1 and L2 nouns during comprehension and
production, that is, the activation and access of gender representations
during grammaticality judgment (Experiment 1) and picture naming
tasks (Experiment 2). If L1 and L2 have an integrated gender system,
accessing the gender of a noun in one language will subsequently affect
accessing the gender of a different noun with the same gender value in the
Lemma level
Masc
er Gen
Gend der
′
Finger
“century” o der “finger”
Masc
Lemma level
Gen
r Fem der
Gende
′
Finger
der
“edition” “finger”
Lemma level
Fem Masc
er Gen
d der
Gen
′
Finger
“edition” der
“finger”
6. P R O F I L E O F T H E B I L I N G U A L S I N T H I S S T U D Y
7. E X P E R I M E N T 1 : G R A M M AT I C A L I T Y J U D G M E N T S
The task was divided into two blocks. In the within language block,
primes and targets were in L1 (Greek). In the between languages block,
primes were in L1 (Greek) and targets in L2 (German). In both Greek
and German the definite determiner and the noun of an NP must agree in
terms of grammatical gender, number and case. Number and case were
kept constant throughout the task (singular nominative). More impor-
tantly, a key manipulation in the material was that none of the nouns in
the German NPs had the same gender as its Greek translation (e.g., Wort
(“word”) is neuter while its Greek translation λέξη is feminine). This
procedure ensured that any effect obtained in the BLg block would not
be due to priming of the gender of the Greek translation of the target NP.
All L1 (Greek) primes and target NPs consisted of gender-opaque
nouns. Greek, unlike German, morphologically marks grammatical gen-
der on the noun ending. More specifically, nouns can be divided into two
categories. The first are nouns that have identical inflectional suffixes
across all three genders in the nominative singular (-oς is attached to
masculine, feminine, and neuter word forms). I will term these gender-
opaque nouns since grammatical gender cannot be recovered from the
word ending alone7 (see Bates et al. 1996 for a similar classification of
nouns in Italian). The second are nouns that have different inflectional
suffixes according to gender in the nominative singular. I will refer to
these as gender-transparent nouns.
This choice of gender-opaque NPs for Greek was made to deflect
claims that gender judgment with gender-transparent NPs can be a very
superficial process, a mere check between the definite determiner and
the noun ending without any access and retrieval of the gender feature
of the noun. For this reason, gender-opaque NPs, which require access
to the mental lexicon to retrieve gender information, were thought to
be more appropriate to use in a grammaticality judgment task in which
processing of gender is fairly explicit. Had the L2 NPs been gender-
transparent, it would have been possible for L2 learners to retreat to a
conscious strategy on L2 gender decision (“infer the grammatical gender
from the gender-transparent noun ending”).
If equivalent gender representations are shared among L1 and L2
nouns of the same gender, a cross-language gender-congruency effect
is expected. That is, activation of a gender representation via a NP in
one language will not dissipate immediately and will speed subsequent
processing of a NP in the other language that requires access to the same
gender as opposed to a different gender. If gender representations are not
shared between L1 and L2, then a gender-congruency effect is expected
within L1.
Finally, to investigate whether any priming effect obtained in this
paradigm derives from the repetition of the definite determiner form
between primes and targets, ungrammatical NPs were arranged into
pairs of “primes” and “targets,” and were controlled for determiner con-
gruency (whether the determiner was repeated or not between “primes”
and “targets”) and gender transparency of the noun ending. If repe-
tition of the definite determiner form is a determinant of priming in
this task, then priming should be obtained both with grammatical and
ungrammatical NPs.
7.1. Method
7.1.1. Material The critical materials were grammatical NPs compris-
ing a definite determiner and a noun. There was a within language (WLg)
block which contained 16 gender-opaque Greek (L1) target NPs (6 mas-
culine, 5 feminine and 5 neuter) and a between language (BLg) block
which contained 16 German (L2) NPs (6 masculine, 5 feminine and
5 neuter). Both blocks used the same primes: 32 grammatical gender-
opaque Greek (L1) NPs. The German NPs did not involve correlations
between phonological form and grammatical gender (Köpcke & Zubin
1984) as far as possible. The same also holds for the German material
used in the ungrammatical NPs.8 None of the nouns in the German NPs
had the same gender as its Greek translation to ensure that any effect
obtained in the BLg block would not be due to translation priming.
In the Gender-Congruent (CON) condition, each target NP was pre-
ceded by a prime NP with the same gender, and therefore the same
definite determiner, in the WLg block or its translation equivalent deter-
miner in the BLg block. In the Gender-Incongruent (INC) condition,
each target NP was preceded by a prime NP with a different gender
and hence a different definite determiner in the WLg block or a non-
translation equivalent determiner in the BLg block. Target NPs in the
WLg and BLg blocks were paired based on frequency, syllable and let-
ter length. In each block within each prime condition every prime NP
Table 2. Frequency and average length in syllables and letters of the critical
grammatical material of Experiment 1
Table 4. Frequency and average length in syllables and letters of the critical
ungrammatical material of Experiment 1
asked to write down the correct L2 definite determiner for each noun.
This post-test questionnaire was used to determine which items had to
be removed from the data analysis, as explained in the results section
below. Each experimental session lasted approximately 30 min.
7.2. Results
Target response latencies that fell into any of the following categories
were excluded from the data analyses:
(i) latencies from trials on which the wrong button was pressed,
(ii) latencies from target trials that were “misprimed,” that is, preceded
by a prime trial on which the wrong button was pressed,
(iii) latencies longer than a preset time of 2.5 s,
(iv) latencies that deviated more than 2.5 standard deviations (SD) from
a participant’s or an item’s mean (outliers),
(v) latencies from L2 target trials on which the correct button was
pressed but the participant failed to produce the correct definite
determiner for the same L2 noun in a post-test “gender check-up”
questionnaire.
The same but separate analyses were performed for grammatical and
ungrammatical items.
(both Fs < .392). The mean RTs in Table 5 show that participants were
faster at judging a target NP grammatical following a prime NP with the
same gender than one with a different gender, and they were also faster
at doing so in their L1 than L2 target responses.
ANOVAs were also run on the lost data. The significant results of
these analyses are reported below. A 2(CON vs. INC) × 2(WLg vs.
BLg) ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Language in the
Total Lost (= Errors + Long Responses) data rates (F1 (1, 25) = 9.83,
MSe = .095, p < .01; F2 (1, 30) = 12.94, MSe = .045, p = .001)
and the Total Error data rates (F1 (1, 25) = 4.33, MSe = .065, p < .05;
F2 (1, 30) = 5.32, MSe = .034, p < .05), indicating that both the
overall lost and error data were more numerous in L2 than L1. Most
importantly, the gender-congruency effect was non-significant in all lost
data analyses, suggesting that the gender manipulation of primes did not
significantly affect the number of errors produced during grammaticality
judgment in L1 or L2. Similarly, the off-line errors in the post-test
“gender check-up” questionnaire (i.e., cases where participants failed
to produce the correct definite determiner for the critical L2 nouns)
CON
RT 804 1071 267
SD 142 219
%Errora 1.4 11
%Longb 1 2.9
INC
RT 883 1122 239
SD 139 239
%Errora 4.8 12
%Longb 0.5 1.9
Difference 79 51
CON = Gender-Congruent, INC = Gender-Incongruent, RT = mean Response Time
(in ms), SD = Standard Deviation.
a Mean percentage of total error data.
b Mean percentage of total long responses (outliers and responses over the 2.5 s cut-off
collapsed).
were not significantly more numerous in the BLg INC (9.1% ) than BLg
CON (7.2% ) condition (both Fs < .765). This finding implies that NPs
appearing in the INC conditions were not inherently more difficult than
those appearing in the CON conditions.
CON
RT 1035 1372 337
SD 159 333
%Errora 3.6 17.9
%Longb 1.5 2.1
INC
RT 1044 1345 301
SD 165 301
%Errora 7.2 23.6
%Longb 1 3.6
Difference 9 −27
CON = Determiner-Congruent, INC = Determiner-Incongruent, RT = mean Response
Time (in ms), SD = Standard Deviation.
a Mean percentage of total error data.
b Mean percentage of total long responses (outliers and responses over the 2.5 s cut-off
collapsed).
8. E X P E R I M E N T 2 : P I C T U R E N A M I N G
endings of the distractor nouns (masc. -ας, -άς; fem. -η; neut. -µα)10 .
Any effect obtained in the WLg block could not therefore be attributed
to priming of the surface form of the noun endings.
In every block each of the 15 pictures had three different versions,
one for each of the three distractor conditions. In the gender-congruent
(CON) condition, each picture was combined with a distractor noun
that had the same gender as the picture name. In the gender-incongruent
(INC) condition, each picture was combined with a distractor noun that
had a different gender from the picture name. In the Baseline condition,
each picture was combined with a string of 5 X (e.g., XXXXX). An
example set of target and distractor material can be viewed in Table 7,
and the full list of picture names and distractor words can be found in
the Appendix.
L1 and L2 picture names of the same gender in the WLg and
BLg blocks were paired based on frequency, syllable and letter length
(one-way ANOVAs: all Fs(1, 28) < 1.43, p > .24) as were the
L1 distractor nouns across the CON and INC experimental conditions
(one-way ANOVAs for frequency, number of syllables and letters: all
Fs(1, 28) < .75, p > .39). Each one of the L1–L2 picture pairs received
the same L1 distractor words in the CON and INC conditions. Table 8
presents the mean frequency, syllable and letter length of critical items
for Experiment 2. Pairs of picture names and distractors were never
In total each list contained 106 trials (90 target + 16 practice trials).
Every participant was tested on one of the two experimental lists which
were used equally often during the task. Thus, all participants saw all
three versions of the 30 (15 L1 and 15 L2) experimental pictures.
8.2. Results
Target response latencies that fell into any of the following categories
were discarded from the data analyses:
(i) latencies from trials on which the response produced was not the
designated one,
(ii) latencies from trials on which the response was “don’t remember”
or “don’t know”,
(iii) latencies from trials on which there was a pause between the two
words of the NP (disfluency) or a response was repaired,
Baseline
RT 658 846 188
SD 63 106
%Errora 1.5 6.6
%Longb 3.6 4.9
CON
RT 741 875 134
SD 71 120
%Errora 3.3 8.7
%Longb 3.6 5.4
INC
RT 783 920 137
SD 68 118
%Errora 3.9 6.9
%Longb 1.5 4.9
INC-CON
Difference 42 45
WLg = Within-Language, BLg = Between-Languages, CON = Gender-Congruent,
INC = Gender-Incongruent, RT = mean Response Time (in ms), SD = Standard
Deviation.
a Mean percentage of data lost due to error.
b Mean percentage of long responses (outliers and responses over the 2.5 s cut-off
collapsed).
For the response latencies, a 2(CON vs. INC) × 2(WLg vs. BLg)
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Gender Congruency
(F1 (1, 25) = 39.39, MSe = 12123.3, p < .001; F2 (1, 28) = 23.19,
MSe = 1065.9, p < .001) and a significant main effect of Language
(F1 (1, 25) = 32.08, MSe = 1533.1, p < .000; F2 (1, 28) = 57.35,
MSe = 4356.3, p < .001). The interaction of the main factors did not
reach significance (both Fs < .16). The mean RTs in Table 9 show that
participants were faster at producing a target NP when the distractor
word was of the same gender than of a different gender, and they were
also faster when the target response was in their L1 than their L2.
In addition, both Table 9 and Figure 3 show that the CON-baseline and
INC-baseline differences are bigger in the WLg than BLg conditions and
a second set of ANOVAs examined this issue. The 2(WLg vs. BLg) ×
2(CON-baseline vs. INC-baseline) ANOVA confirmed the above.
It yielded a significant main effect of language (F1 (1, 25) = 8.47, MSe =
8450.1, p < .01; F2 (1, 28) = 14.37, MSe = 1343.5, p = .001), indicat-
ing that the CON and INC differences from the baseline were shorter BLg
than WLg. The main effect of gender congruency was also significant
140
120
Difference from the baseline
100
80 CON
60 INC
40
20
0
Within Lg Between Lg
Figure 3. Effect of the two main factors (Language & Gender Congruency) in
Experiment 2.
(F1 (1, 25) = 32.1, MSe = 1533.2, p < .001; F2 (1, 28) = 23.2,
MSe = 1065.9, p < .001), indicating that the INC-baseline differ-
ences were bigger than those of the CON-baseline both WLg and BLg,
that is, once again showing a WLg and BLg gender-congruency effect.
The interaction was non-significant (both Fs < .17, p > .6).
The significant results in the lost data analyses are reported below.
For the total lost (= errors + long responses) data rates, a 2(CON vs.
INC) × 2(WLg vs. BLg) ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of
language (F1 (1, 25) = 12.3, MSe = .048, p < .01; F2 (1, 28) = 7.34,
MSe = .039, p < .05). The main effect of gender congruency was sig-
nificant in the participant analysis (F1 (1, 25) = 4.38, MSe = .02, p =
.047) and non-significant in the item analysis (F2 (1, 28) = 1.23),
reflecting a tendency for participants (but not items) to produce more
“lost” responses in the CON than INC conditions in both the WLg and
BLg blocks. The interaction of the main factors did not reach signif-
icance (both Fs < .33). In the long response analysis (outliers and
responses over the 2.5 s cut-off collapsed) only the main effect of lan-
guage was significant (F1 (1, 25) = 8.52, MSe = .023, p < .01;
F2 (1, 28) = 9.71, MSe = .013, p < .01). For the total error rates,
a 2(CON vs. INC) × 2(WLg vs. BLg) ANOVA revealed a significant
main effect of language in the participant analysis (F1 (1, 25) = 7.27,
MSe = .048, p < .05) and a marginally significant effect in the item
analysis (F2 (1, 28) = 4.1, MSe = .038, p = .053). It also showed
a significant interaction of the main factors in the participant analysis
(F1 (1, 25) = 4.8, MSe = .012, p < .05) but not in the item analysis
(F2 (1, 28) = .069, p = .79). Simple contrasts in the participant data
showed a significant difference between the BLg CON (8.7%) and BLg
INC (6.9%) conditions (F1 (1, 25) = 8.19, MSe = .01, p < .01).
In summary, the effect of language was significant in all the lost
data categories in both participant and item analyses, indicating that
participants produced errors and long responses more frequently in L2
than L1. This is not surprising given that the participants’ L1 proficiency
surpassed that of their L2 (all were L1-dominant bilinguals). In addition,
participants were more likely to produce errors in naming a picture in
L2 (but not L1) when the distractor word was gender-congruent with the
picture name than when it was gender-incongruent.
In the BLg block, error trials were also divided into: “wrong
determiner – L1 CON” signifying a wrong determiner congruent with
the gender of the L1 translation of the target L2 NP, and “wrong
determiner – L1 INC” signifying a wrong determiner incongruent with
the gender of the L1 translation of the target L2 NP. The effect of gender
congruency was not significant in the analyses of these two types of
error responses in the BLg block (both Fs < .66), showing that partic-
ipants were not likely to produce more “wrong determiner – L1 CON”
responses in an L1–L2 gender-congruent trial (2.8%) than in an L1–L2
gender-incongruent trial (2.6%). Note also that in this task all L2 target
nouns had a different gender from their L1 translations.
Finally, the mean proportion of “wrong determiner – L1 CON”
responses (35.8%) was not significantly different from that of “wrong
determiner – L1 INC” responses (37.3% ) across all conditions in the
BLg block as tested by a Wilcoxon signed-ranks test (participants:
z = −.092, p > .9; items: z = −.357, p > .7). Together these
results confirm the effectiveness of the different gender manipulation
between L2 target names and their L1 translation because they indicate
that the gender of the L1 translation of the target picture either did not
affect performance or any effect was constant across all conditions. Oth-
erwise, one would have expected more “wrong determiner – L1 CON”
errors overall. The only source of the effect must therefore have been
the gender of the distractor word.
8.3. Discussion
The results show a gender-congruency effect within and, more impor-
tantly, across languages from L1 to L2 in oral production. Naming a
picture in L1 was on average 42 ms faster following L1 gender-congruent
distractor words compared to gender-incongruent ones. Similarly, nam-
ing a picture in L2 was on average 45 ms faster after L1 semantically
unrelated but gender-congruent than gender-incongruent distractors.
The difference between the gender-congruency effect in L1 and L2
naming was non-significant. In addition, as expected, picture naming
was faster in L1 than in L2 (in both gender-congruent and gender-
incongruent conditions) by L1-dominant bilinguals. These findings
9. C O N C L U S I O N S
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
NOTES
1. This delayed interest may partly be due to the fact that the bulk of psycholinguistic
research on L2 learning and processing is in English, a language that lacks
grammatical gender.
2. A gender monitoring task requires deciding on the gender of a word or a phrase.
3. A grammaticality judgment task entails judging whether a phrase, clause or sentence
is grammatically acceptable or not.
4. The only exception in this pattern were response times (RTs) in the naming task
which yielded no effect of noun ending.
5. Neither Holmes and Dejean de la Bâtie (1999) nor Taraban and Kempe (1999)
provide a language history of their L2 participants but their overall performance
(and particularly their error rates) indicates that they are most probably late rather
than early L2 learners.
6. In fact, the Catalan-Spanish bilinguals produced significantly fewer errors than the
native Spanish speakers in Experiment 4A.
7. The distinction between gender-transparent and -opaque nouns is based on their
inflectional suffix in the nominative singular only as this is the case and number in
which all critical nouns are used in the experiments of this study.
8. The only exceptions were two grammatical (Brille [‘glasses’], Kerze [‘candle’]) and
another two ungrammatical German NPs (Reise [‘journey’], Tasse [‘cup’]) which
presented a correlation between feminine gender and noun ending -e. These excep-
tions were unavoidable given that the L2 NPs had to be matched with the L1 NPs in
terms of frequency of occurrence, syllable and letter length as closely as possible.
9. These exceptions were unavoidable considering that L1 and L2 “target” NPs had
to be matched for frequency, syllable and letter length, in addition to the rest of
the restrictions in selecting the L2 nouns as well as the uneven distribution of the
three genders among nouns in the two languages (the order of gender frequency in
Greek was: neuter > feminine > masculine, whereas in German it was masculine >
feminine > neuter).
10. The only exception was one pair of picture name and distractor word (masc.: κoυβάς
“bucket” – βήχας “cough”).
11. The advantages of this method over the on-line measurement of latencies via a voice
key are discussed in detail by Morrison and Ellis (1995).
12. One way such priming could be effected is via lexical/translational links that are
assumed to exist between translation equivalent L1 and L2 lemmas/lexical nodes
(Kroll & Stewart, 1994). These links are stronger from L2 to L1 than vice versa in
L1-dominant bilinguals (ibid.).
13. For similar results in the bilingual Stroop task, see Preston and Lambert (1969) and
Chen and Ho (1986).
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APPENDIX
Between-Language Block
Target NPs Prime NPs
g CON INC g
Ungrammatical NPs
Within-Language Block
Target NPs Prime NPs
g∗∗ CON g INC g
Between-Languages Block
Target NPs Prime NPs
g∗∗ CON g INC g
Abstract
In this chapter we aim to give a taste of the current research in bilingualism and numerical
cognition. Far from being an exhaustive review, our chapter is intended to frame the
relationship between bilingualism and number processing into a novel perspective, by
reporting some of the most recent empirical findings. We will first introduce the topic by
focusing more generally on the link between language and number processing. A great
deal of our knowledge of numbers is traded, thought and manipulated by means of
language. But how essential is verbal language to numerical knowledge itself? Recent
studies have tentatively addressed the question by looking at numerical abilities in human
populations having a very poor lexicon for numbers. Their results will be briefly out-
lined before addressing the more specific issue of bilingualism. We will then turn to
the field of cognitive arithmetic, which has attracted most efforts and produced most of
the studies lying at the convergence between bilingualism and mathematical cognition.
As a general principle, basic experimental paradigms and effects that were originally
described with monolingual participants were employed to explore arithmetic compe-
tence in the first and second languages of bilingual participants. We will end by showing
how the introduction of novel experimental paradigms in the last few years promises to
challenge the conclusions drawn by previous studies.
1. L A N G U A G E I N N U M E R I C A L C O G N I T I O N
2. B I L I N G U A L I S M A N D S I M P L E A R I T H M E T I C
which the nodes are numbers instead of words and the links between
them represent arithmetical relations (Ashcraft 1992). Basically, it is
assumed that, upon presentation of a multiplication problem, activation
would automatically spread from activated operands to linked nodes,
such as the product (Collins & Loftus 1975). Finally, division may be
solved through the retrieval of multiplication facts (e.g., LeFevre &
Morris 1999; Rusconi et al. 2006a).
Several neuropsychological studies have shown that arithmetic
fact retrieval can be selectively damaged after brain injuries (e.g.,
McCloskey 1992), supporting the notion that arithmetic facts are likely
stored separately from either other semantic knowledge or other numeri-
cal skills. However, although a neuropsychological dissociation between
language-related abilities and arithmetic facts retrieval has been consis-
tently reported (e.g., Warrington 1982; Rossor et al. 1995; Butterworth
et al. 1996; Delazer et al. 2004), both behavioral and electrophysiolog-
ical evidence has been documented showing that similar mechanisms
may govern both the arithmetic lexicon (at least for multiplication) and
the word lexicon (e.g., McNeil & Warrington 1994; Niedeggen & Rösler
1999; Pesta et al. 2001; Galfano et al. 2004), thus supporting models for
cognitive arithmetic based on associative networks (e.g., Ashcraft 1992).
One critical issue in the domain of cognitive arithmetic is whether
language plays any role in the long-term-memory representation of arith-
metic facts. In this regard, McCloskey (1992) hypothesized that arith-
metic knowledge is stored in a single, amodal, notation-independent
abstract format, which can be accessed from various numerical formats
(e.g., Arabic, written verbal, spoken verbal) only after stimuli have been
transcoded into an abstract form by notation-specific modules. Follow-
ing this view, arithmetic fact retrieval occurs independently of surface
format and is inevitably associated with semantic processing of numbers.
An alternative view is represented by the Triple Code model proposed
by Dehaene and Cohen (1995; also see Dehaene et al. 2003), according
to which arithmetic facts (especially multiplication) would be learned by
rote and stored in memory as chains of verbal associations. Thus, in order
to retrieve the result of a simple fact, it is necessary to transcode numerical
stimuli into the language in which arithmetic was first learned (also see
Spelke & Tsivkin 2001). Finally, in the Encoding Complex model put
arithmetic problems and no arithmetic sign was presented. The task was
simply to decide whether a target word (e.g., forty-two) was present or
not in the previous display where two cue words had been shown (e.g.,
six and seven), by pressing one of two response keys. The manipulation
is not trivial because verbal and Arabic numerals are not processed in a
similar way. Damian (2004), for example, showed that digits gain fast
access to numerical magnitude but not to lexical representations, where
number words gain fast access to their lexical codes but not to number
magnitude. By employing naming and magnitude judgment tasks, he
showed that the difference between Arabic and verbal numerals emerges
when notation is blocked (i.e., participants are shown numbers in one
format only within each block). Similarly, Fias et al. (2001) showed that
the activation of lexical codes from Arabic distractors occurs too slowly
to generate Stroop interference when participants are naming number
words, where Fias (2001) showed that the activation of number magni-
tude from a number word occurs too slowly to generate a SNARC effect
(which indexes access to number magnitude; Dehaene et al. 1993) in a
phoneme monitoring task.
Rusconi et al.’s (2006c) participants were highly proficient bilinguals
who were asked to fill in a questionnaire (adapted from Sholl 1996) to
assess their level of bilingualism and then to perform a word-matching
task both in L1 and in L2 (in separate blocks). Words were presented in
lower case both in the cue and in the target display. Neither active access
to number semantics nor translation of number words from one language
to another was necessary to perform the task. The word-matching task
could easily be performed by processing orthographic and lexical infor-
mation only. Unlike bilinguals tested with production and/or verification
tasks (see e.g., Bernardo 2001), these participants could get no advan-
tage from translating a pair of operands into their preferred language
for arithmetic (which was L1 for all of them), because they were not
required to solve any arithmetic problem, and a systematic translation
would probably slow down performance in the matching task.
To summarize their results, the effect of arithmetic relatedness was
found in a word-matching task. The presence of interference both in
L1 and in L2 for small size facts suggested that bilinguals possess mul-
tiple arithmeticons, at least for the easiest facts (see also Campbell &
Xue 2001); the use of an indirect task rendered it extremely unlikely that
participants intentionally translated both L1 and L2 cues into abstract
codes, retrieved their product and then translated it back into L1 or L2
(which is necessary to solve simple arithmetic problems according to
McCloskey 1992). In addition, verbal numerals gain faster access to the
lexical rather than to the number magnitude code (e.g., Damian 2004),
so a response could well be selected before activation could reach the
lexical representation of product numbers through a putative semantic
network (i.e., along the path: number words in the cue → their seman-
tic nodes → semantic node of their product → product number word).
In other words, arithmetic facts activation occurred even in a word-
matching task, where only lexical information was relevant. The effect
was larger for small than for large facts, in line with the hypothesis that
small facts are more likely to be learned by rote (Campbell et al. 1999;
Dehaene et al. 2003).
The novelty of Rusconi et al.’s (2006c) study consists of having
employed an indirect task to test for associative links between num-
ber words and having extended this paradigm to a sample of bilinguals.
It speaks directly to the issue of whether language plays any role in the
long-term-memory representation of number facts, which is one of the
major questions in simple arithmetic and is important both from a the-
oretical and an educational perspective. As already mentioned, both the
obligatory semantic mediation (McCloskey 1992) and the verbal cod-
ing (Dehaene et al. 2003) hypotheses assume the cognitive system stores
simple arithmetic facts in a single associative network (of either seman-
tic or lexical nodes), whereas the encoding-complex model (Campbell
1994) posits the possibility of as many associative networks as the avail-
able numerical formats. By employing an indirect task (i.e., a task which
does not require arithmetic fact retrieval – and in which fact retrieval
would actually interfere with performance), it was possible to probe
passive spreading of activation between arithmetically related nodes
without eliciting intentional transcoding and retrieval processes.
LeFevre et al. (1988) had already introduced number words as tar-
gets in a number-matching task, but the cue was always composed
of Arabic digits so that participants were forced to access an abstract
number representation to compare cues and targets (unless one assumes
there is a fast direct pathway between Arabic digits and written verbal
numerals). In Rusconi et al.’s (2006c) case, only written words were
presented and visual word form representations were sufficient to com-
ply with task demands. Their results showed that two written number
words are sufficient to activate the representation of the verbal numeral
indicating their product in the absence of any arithmetic cues. In turn,
this might be evidence of long-term associative links between lexi-
cal representations of number words in multiple languages, which, in
accordance with Campbell and Epp’s (2004) proposal, are limited to
small-size facts.
3. C O N C L U S I O N
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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T H E R O L E O F C R O S S-L I N G U I S T I C A N D
C R O S S-C U LT U R A L E X P E R I E N C E S I N
BILINGUALS’ DIVERGENT THINKING
Anatoliy V. Kharkhurin
American University of Sharjah
Abstract
Research addressing the possible consequences of bilingualism for individuals’ creative
abilities has revealed a contradiction between experimental findings of bilinguals’ supe-
riority in creative tasks and real life observations of no significant relationship between
being bilingual and being creative. This chapter makes an attempt to resolve this con-
tradiction and investigates a possible effect that bilingualism might have on creative
abilities. Three factors in cross-linguistic and cross-cultural experiences of bilingual
individuals are examined: language proficiency, age of second language acquisition, and
experience and participation in two cultures. The empirical study with Russian-English
bilingual immigrants living in the United States and English monolingual native speak-
ers revealed that cross-linguistic factors in bilinguals’ development had an influence on
their divergent thinking abilities, which is a necessary component of creative thought.
These findings suggest that although bilingualism may lay the foundation of creative
thinking it does not necessarily imply being creative. To account for these findings,
a cross-language transfer is proposed as a cognitive mechanism facilitating divergent
thinking in bilinguals. A specific architecture of bilingual memory in which two lexi-
cons are mutually linked to the shared conceptual system is theorized to facilitate the
functioning of the cross-language transfer.
The present study contributes to creativity research by examining the effect of bilin-
gualism on creative thinking. It will start out with a brief survey of existing literature
on the relationship between bilingualism and creativity and discuss an apparent con-
tradiction therein. Although it is suggested that bilinguals show greater performance
on creativity tests, we do not see outbursts of creativity among nationals of bilingual
countries. To account for this contradiction, the study will offer a perspective on the rela-
tionship between bilingualism and creativity, in which bilingualism facilitates divergent
thinking. Divergent thinking is assumed as a necessary but not sufficient trait of creative
behavior. Subsequently, it will present empirical findings indicating the factors in bilin-
gual development that may contribute to bilinguals’ superiority in divergent thinking.
The following discussion will outline a model of bilingual memory, whose structure
is suggested to facilitate cognitive processes underlying this trait. It will specifically
175
I. Kecskes and L. Albertazzi (eds.), Cognitive Aspects of Bilingualism, 175–210.
© 2007 Springer.
1. T H E R E L AT I O N S H I P S B E T W E E N B I L I N G U A L I S M A N D
C R E AT I V I T Y: A R E B I L I N G U A L S T R U LY C R E AT I V E ?
the fact that these individuals have acquired their languages in primarily
monocultural environment of the respective countries (e.g., Belgium,
Canada, and Switzerland). Thus, they cannot benefit from the potential
cognitive advantages of the cross-cultural experience. More generally,
it is entirely possible that the inconsistency in the findings in research
on cognitive impacts of bilingualism can be explained by a failure to
have controlled for this factor.
Altogether, there is an obvious discrepancy between the observation
of no remarkable differences between bilinguals’ and monolinguals’
creative performance in real life and the finding of significantly supe-
rior performance of bilinguals on creativity tests in laboratory settings.
In view of proposed explanations, although bilingualism might have
an influence on creativity, this influence seems to be indirect. That
is, bilingualism may encourage the use of certain cognitive processes
in a more efficient way, which paves the way for more sophisticated
cognitive processing. The latter may result in creative production in
some individuals, but other factors in their development (e.g., intelli-
gence, education, motivation, personal experience) may play a more
dominant role.
2. W H Y M I G H T B I L I N G U A L S H AV E
A D VA N TA G E S I N D I V E R G E N T T H I N K I N G P E R F O R M A N C E ?
3. W H AT FA C TO R S I N B I L I N G U A L S ’
DEVELOPMENT MIGHT INFLUENCE THEIR DIVERGENT
THINKING?
4. E M P I R I C A L E V I D E N C E O F
B I L I N G U A L S ’ P E R F O R M A N C E O N D T TA S K
4.3. Results
An ANOVA was performed with four norm-referenced DT measures
(fluency, flexibility, elaboration, and originality) as dependent vari-
ables and language group (monolingual vs. bilingual) as an independent
variable. The analysis showed that bilingual participants outperformed
their monolingual counterparts on the ATTA measures of fluency
(F(1, 154) = 7.61, p < .01), flexibility (F(1, 154) = 5.96, p < .05),
and elaboration (F(1, 154) = 2.16, p = .14), but there was no sig-
nificant difference in their performance on the measure of originality
(see Figure 1). This finding indicates that bilingualism has an impact on
the ability to rapidly produce a large number of ideas or solutions to a
problem (fluency), the capacity to consider a variety of approaches to
a problem simultaneously (flexibility), and to think through the details
of an idea and carry it out (elaboration). However, it does not have an
effect on the tendency to produce ideas different from those of most
other people (originality).
Furthermore, a multiple regression analysis was applied to the data
from the bilingual group to determine whether there was a direct rela-
tionship between the factors in the cross-linguistic and cross-cultural
experiences and the four traits of divergent thinking. Standard multi-
ple regressions were performed between the composite PNT score, age
of L2 acquisition, and CEC as independent variables and ATTA mea-
sures of fluency, flexibility, elaboration, and originality as the respective
dependent variables. The analysis revealed that the age of L2 acquisition
contributed significantly to prediction of bilinguals’ fluency and flexi-
bility scores (β=−.26, p < .01 and β=−.24, p < .05, respectively). The
negative correlation indicates that bilinguals who acquired L2 earlier in
life tended to show greater fluency and flexibility in divergent think-
ing. In addition, it was found that the composite PNT score contributed
significantly to prediction of participants’ elaboration score (β = .28,
p < .01). The positive correlation indicates that bilinguals who were
more proficient in both languages tended to show greater elaboration
(a) (b)
17.00 17.00
16.00 16.00
Flexibility
Fluency
15.00 15.00
14.00 14.00
13.00 13.00
Bilingual Monolingual Bilingual Monolingual
Language group Language group
(c) (d)
17.00 17.00
16.00 16.00
Elaboration
Originality
15.00 15.00
14.00 14.00
13.00 13.00
Bilingual Monolingual Bilingual Monolingual
Language group Language group
The data
4.5.1. The effect of the age of L2 acquisition on divergent thinking
above provides evidence that the age at which L2 was acquired relates
to the ability to establish links between unrelated concepts from distant
categories (fluency and flexibility in divergent thinking). The negative
correlation indicates that individuals who acquired L2 at a younger age
show greater divergent thinking abilities. This finding corresponds with
the reports of bilingual children’s performance in the immersion pro-
grams (Swain & Lapkin 1982). A number of studies conducted in the
1970s with students in an early French immersion program in Toronto
and Ottawa (Canada) showed that the age of entering the program could
be an essential factor in bilingual children’s cognitive development. In
the same fashion, other studies reported an age-related decline in encod-
ing new information (Craik & Jennings 1992) and decrease in working
memory capacity (Kharkhurin et al. 2001), cognitive processing speed,
and attention (Kemper 1992).
A possible explanation for these findings could be the notion that the
changes in bilingual memory modulated by early acquisition of both
languages may result in certain cognitive advantages. As predicted by
Lenneberg’s (1967) critical period hypothesis, if L2 acquisition occurs
before the age of puberty, it will be relatively fast, successful and quali-
tatively similar to first language (L1). He relates these advantages to the
fact that language learning occurs before lateralization is complete. The
brain at an early age is still flexible and therefore allows more detailed
analysis of incoming linguistic information, which may result in a greater
level of attainment in language acquisition (see Newport 1990, “less is
more” hypothesis, for a similar view). Later on, as the person matures
and learns various cognitive strategies, this early advantage may be lost.
The studies with connectionist networks provide evidence for the mat-
uration hypothesis. For example, Elman (1993) demonstrated that the
training of a recurrent connectionist network with complex grammati-
cal rules fails if the model is fully formed and equipped with adult-like
capacity from the onset. However, learning is successful if the model
initially has a restricted child-like capacity that gradually matures into
an adult-like one.
5. B I L I N G U A L M E M O RY M O D E L
6. L E M M A A N D W O R D F O R M
M E D I AT E D C R O S S-L A N G U A G E T R A N S F E R
(4)
(6)
(7) (2)
(8) (5)
L1 (3) L2
pig buy poke cat kaufen Katze Sack
Lemma level
to buy a pig in a poke (1)
die KatzeimSack kaufen
“cat”
{cat}
(2) (3)
{Katze}
(6)
(4)
{pig}
(8)
PIG BURGLAR
Figure 2. Illustration of a lemma mediated spreading activation underlying cross-language transfer. Schematic
representation of (a) a fragment of bilingual memory structure, and (b) the information flow in bilingual memory.
Bilingual memory consists of the distributed lexical features level, language specific lemma level, and distributed
conceptual features level. The presentation of the English word “cat” activates a lemma cat in the English lexicon
(1) This lemma in turn activates conceptual features that represent the literal meaning of a cat (2) as well as
the conceptual representation of the additional meaning of the lemma cat such as the one in the “cat burglar”
(3) Thereby the conceptual representation of BURGLAR is activated (4) At the same time, the conceptual
representation of a cat sends partial activation back to the lemma level in German lexicon thereby activating a
lemma Katze (5) This lemma sends partial activation to the conceptual representation of the additional meaning
of the lemma Katze such as the one in “die Katze im Sack kaufen” (6) Accordingly, the latter sends partial
activation back to the lemma level in English lexicon thereby activating a set of lemmas corresponding to the
idiom “to buy a pig in a poke.” Therefore, among the others, a lemma pig is activated (7) and in turn, triggers its
corresponding conceptual features (8).
7. T H E E F F E C T S O F C R O S S-L I N G U I S T I C
EXPERIENCE ON DIVERGENT THINKING IN THE
F R A M E W O R K O F T H E B I L I N G U A L M E M O RY M O D E L
connections from L1 than from L2, and the strength of these links
would be different for first and second languages. Due to lexical access
asymmetry, more conceptual features can be accessed through L1 than
through L2. Since the vast majority of the conceptual system in late
bilinguals was established during L1 acquisition, and since L2 lexical
features were mapped to the conceptual features through the L1 lexical-
conceptual route, there might be fewer shared conceptual features that
have direct links from both lexicons in the memory of individuals who
acquired L2 later in life. This may result in a less efficient cross-language
transfer, and consequently in poorer divergent thinking performance.
Indeed, this study shows that bilinguals who acquired L2 earlier in life
outperformed those who acquired L2 later on the fluency and flexibility
ATTA measures.
7.2. Language Proficiency
The influence of the age of L2 acquisition on modifications in bilingual
memory can theoretically be complimented by the effect of language
proficiency. If the age of L2 acquisition may determine the directions
of lexical-conceptual routes, the proficiency in L1 and L2 may deter-
mine the strength of connections between the lexical and conceptual
systems. The degree of linguistic skills may influence the intensity of
lexical access: greater language proficiency may result in establish-
ing stronger and more elaborate links to the conceptual system. As
a result, more concepts become readily available for cross-language
transfer. Following this assumption, bilinguals who attained high exper-
tise in both languages would have stronger and more efficient links
between lexical and conceptual levels then those who were not able to
develop any of their languages to a high degree. Thus, bilinguals highly
proficient in both languages would employ the cross-language transfer
mechanism more effectively and therefore may show greater divergent
thinking performance compared to their less proficient counterparts.
The present study supports this theory by showing that bilinguals with
higher composite PNT score scored higher on the elaboration ATTA
measure.
Altogether, both factors in cross-linguistic experience are theorized
to influence connections between lexical and conceptual representations
8. C O N C L U S I O N
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
NOTES
1. One of the widely used definitions of creativity indicates that this is an ability to
produce work that is novel (i.e., original or unexpected), appropriate (i.e., useful or
meets task constraints; e.g., Sternberg & Lubart 1995), and can be “put to some use”
(Martindale 1989, p. 211).
2. The term “culture” has numerous overlapping meanings that sometimes are
misleading and provide unclear definitions. Traditional associations with the word
“culture” refer to the art, knowledge, and sophistication gained through exposure to
the art exemplars as well as to the artistic and literary heritage of a particular nation.
In this work, culture reflects social and anthropological aspects of human behavior.
It is defined as a set of beliefs, moral norms, customs, practice, and social behavior
of a particular nation or group of people whose shared beliefs and practices identify
the particular place, class, or time to which they belong.
3. The present study defines bilingualism in the broadest possible terms including indi-
viduals who are fluent in at least two languages, individuals who actively use, or
attempt to use, more than one language, even if they have not achieved fluency in
the second language (Kroll & de Groot 1997).
4. The CEC was introduced to account for a strong argument in acculturation literature
that the age of arrival and the length of residence in a new country are conceptu-
ally different and have different implications for immigrants of different ages (e.g.,
Birman & Trickett 2001). Individuals who were exposed to different cultures early
or late in life may develop perceptual differences of L1 and L2 cultural values,
which might be rooted in variations in their cognitive functioning. The present study
assumes that it is prudent to measure the length and the age of individuals’ exposure
to both cultures since the frequency and recency of exposure to different cultural
settings may have impact on the cognitive system.
5. Note that they were overwhelmingly immigrants from the former Soviet Union resid-
ing in Brooklyn, and therefore might have been influenced by the pervasive Russian
immigrant community of Brooklyn.
6. The distributed nature of the lexical features presumes that the same word forms
can be shared by words in each language. For example, a word “marker” in English
shares phonological features with a Russian word “marka” /stamp/. This is a particu-
larly important notion for understanding a phenomenon of a cross-language transfer
as discussed below in a section on the word form mediated association routes in
bilingual memory.
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TA S K A N D C O N T E X T E F F E C T S I N B I L I N G U A L
LEXICAL PROCESSING
Ton Dijkstra
Nijmegen Institute for Cognition and Information, Nijmegen
Abstract
All language users are aware of the ambiguity of words and the role that context plays
to reduce this ambiguity. For instance, a word like “bank” will have a different mean-
ing when one is talking about cash flow or about water flow. Thus, which semantic
representation is ultimately derived from the lexicon must somehow be affected by con-
text information. It is also clear that the task at hand must affect the type of lexical
information that is selected for use. When one must name a word, its pronunciation
or phonology needs to be retrieved, whereas allocating the object named to a semantic
category requires a response based on word meaning. Although these facts are obvious
to anyone, it is quite common in psycholinguistics to ignore the effects of task and
context and talk about general models for particular domains of language processing.
Researchers have a tendency to speak about, for instance, models of word recognition
and parsing, as if performance would not depend on the actual circumstance in which
it occurs. Fortunately, there is an increasing interest in the effects of task demands and
different types of context on language processing. In this chapter, we consider this issue
for the domain of bilingual word recognition.
In the first part of the chapter, I describe a model for bilingual word recognition
that gives only a rudimentary account of context and task effects. To demonstrate that
this will not do, a number of reaction time studies are discussed next, showing the
effects of different types of context on bilingual lexical processing. It will become
evident that different types of context may affect word recognition in different ways.
Later, in the second part of the chapter, the proposed bilingual word recognition model
is therefore extended to include a system that explicitly takes into account task and
context aspects. Finally, I will illustrate that the extended model is compatible not only
with reaction time data, but also with data from electrophysiological and neuroimaging
techniques.
213
I. Kecskes and L. Albertazzi (eds.), Cognitive Aspects of Bilingualism, 213–235.
© 2007 Springer.
1. T H E L A N G U A G E U S E R F R A M E W O R K
2. PA RT 1 : T H E B I A M O D E L
Conceptual system
Conceptual Grammatical
Sentence parser encoder
memory
Formulator
Syntax
Phonological
Word recognizer encoder
Lexicon &
morphology
Phonology Articulator,
Signal recognizer
motor control
Knowledge
sources
Dutch English
Language
Dutch English
Word words words
pos 1 pos 4
Letter
pos 2 pos 3
pos 1 pos 4
Feature
pos 2 pos 3
Visual input
(3) Task demands (e.g., whether the task is lexical decision or naming);
(4) Lexical items (primes) preceding the item in question (target); (5) The
preceding sentence; (6) The instruction the participant received. In
every-day language comprehension, many of these context types (and
others) are present that may affect the recognition of words. In the fol-
lowing sections, we will give a compact review of experimental studies
(mostly done in our lab) with respect to such context effects on the
recognition of interlingual homographs and cognates.
2.2. Interlingual Homographs (IHs)
As explained above, an interlingual homograph is a word that is
orthographically identical but semantically different across languages.
Examples of Dutch-English interlingual homographs are ROOM
(meaning “cream”), ANGEL (meaning “sting”), and LIST (meaning
“trick”). Interestingly enough, Dutch-English bilinguals seldom notice
that there is something “special” about song titles like “White Room”
by the pop group Cream, “Angel Eyes” by Sting, and the film title
“Schindler’s List” by Spielberg.
Several studies have shown that the result patterns obtained for inter-
lingual homograph processing depend on stimulus list composition and
task demands. For instance, Dijkstra et al. (1998b) had Dutch-English
bilinguals perform three variants of the lexical decision task: an English
lexical decision task with IHs, but without exclusively Dutch words; an
English lexical decision with IHs and Dutch words (the latter requiring
a “no” response); and a generalized lexical decision task with IHs and
Dutch words, in which both English and Dutch words required a “yes”
response. Among the stimulus materials were IHs of four different fre-
quency categories: HFE–HFD (BAD), HFE–LFD (LIST), LFE–HFE
(BOOM), and LFE–LFD (SMART). Other items included were one-
language matched English controls, nonwords derived from English
words, and, in Experiments 2 and 3, exclusively Dutch words. The
result patterns in the three experiments were quite different for the IHs
relative to their matched purely English controls. The first experiment
led to about the same reaction times for IHs and English controls, while
the second led to inhibition and the third to facilitation. The conclusion
on the basis of this study was that, assuming a similar underlying lexical
3. PA RT I I : T H E B I A + M O D E L
From a general point of view, there are two ways in which contex-
tual factors may affect language processing. One possibility is that the
effects of context cannot be considered apart from the process of lexical
activation. In other words, bilingual processing varies qualitatively and
quantitatively due to strong interactions with many different types of
contextual factors. If this dynamic situation were the case, the best we
might do as experimenters analyzing language processing would be to
make an ordered list of more and less important factors in various cir-
cumstances. Fortunately, however, it appears that there is more stability
to lexical processing than an extremely interactive view would predict.
Some context factors (e.g., the type of task performed) have systematic
effects on processing, which can be isolated from the underlying pro-
cesses and representations. In line with this latter position, the BIA+
model assumes that there is a lexical system subserving processes that
remain relatively unaffected in different contexts and task situations, and
a decision system that uses the output of the lexical processing system
in accordance with the task at hand.
Thus, the BIA+ model extends the earlier BIA model (described
above) by adding a task/decision system that uses lexical activation
in accordance with task and context (Figure 3). As a consequence,
observed response patterns will vary systematically across experimen-
tal conditions. The BIA+ model differs from the BIA model also in
terms of its representations. It incorporates orthographic, phonologi-
cal, and semantic representations that are assumed to interact within the
Task schema
Identification system
L1/L2 Semantics
Language nodes
SE SE SD
Lexical level
OE OE OD
corroborate this view, but it is puzzling that the obtained result patterns
appear to differ across studies (Altarriba et al. 1996; Schwartz & Kroll
submitted).
3.3. Processing of Interlingual Homographs:
RT and fMRI Evidence
Van Heuven et al. (submitted) conducted an RT and an fMRI study
involving IH processing by monolinguals and Dutch-English bilinguals.
One issue they investigated was whether the BIA+ model’s distinction
between a language processing system and a task/decision system is
reflected in brain activation. Another issue was whether tasks varying
in the assumed degree of competition lead to activation differences in
areas of the brain that have been associated with cognitive control. Three
lexical decision experiments were conducted: an English visual lexical
decision task performed by 12 Dutch-English bilinguals; a generalized
visual lexical decision task (GVLD) by 12 Dutch-English bilinguals; and
an English visual lexical decision task (EVLD) by 12 monolinguals. In
the fMRI study, the participants performed the tasks in a 1.5T scanner
(letter strings were presented for 500 ms).
Analysis of the RT and brain imaging data for the three participant
groups in the various tasks showed the following. With respect to the
RTs for bilinguals in the EVLD, slower RTs were found for IHs than for
controls. In the GVLD, the RTs for the bilinguals were non-significantly
different for IHs and controls, and the same held in the EVLD of the
monolinguals.
In the EVLD, there was more brain activity for the IHs than for Con-
trols in the left inferior/middle frontal gyrus (BA 44/45/46) and in the
medial part of superior frontal cortex (BA 32/6/8), which is part of
the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC). In the GVLD, more brain
activity was also found for the IHs than for the controls in the left
inferior/middle frontal gyrus, but the activity was about the same for
IHs and controls in the medial/superior frontal cortex. Finally, there
were no brain activation differences for IHs and controls in the EVLD
for monolinguals.
A comparison of the two tasks (EVLD and GVLD) for the bilinguals
indicated strong dACC activity in the EVLD but not in the GVLD, and
this finding was accompanied by inhibitory effects in the RTs for the
IHs in the EVLD.
These result patterns for RTs and brain activity can be accounted for
when the inhibition effect for IHs in the EVLD is interpreted as evidence
for competition between the English and the Dutch readings of the IHs.
According to BIA+, such competition takes place not only within the lex-
icon (lateral inhibition), but also at the level of responding: The English
and Dutch readings of the same item are linked to two different and com-
peting responses (“yes” vs. “no”). This view is supported by the brain
data. The dACC has been associated with conflict detection and moni-
toring incompatible responses (Barch et al. 2000; Botvinick et al. 2001;
Gehring et al. 2001). The presence of dACC activity in the EVLD can
therefore be interpreted as the consequence of response-based conflict
for the IHs relative to the controls. (Because the BOLD response for IHs
turned out to be higher than for control words and for pseudowords, the
observed increased brain activation cannot be ascribed to lexical status.)
On the basis of further analyses, Van Heuven et al. reached the conclu-
sion that a whole network of brain areas (also involving basal ganglia
and cerebellum) may be recruited to resolve the response conflict for
the IHs.
To summarize this study, the behavioral results for Dutch-English
bilinguals indicate that both readings of an IH become active and com-
pete, whereas the imaging data show that the most involved brain areas
are located in the left superior frontal regions (medial part) and bilat-
erally in the inferior and middle frontal regions. The dorsal anterior
cingulate cortex is more active when ambiguous language information
leads to competing task-relevant responses; more generally, it appears
that language conflicts may be resolved with the help of brain areas
associated with cognitive control.
Again, the results of this study involving IHs are different from
those in the fMRI part of the study of Rodriguez-Fornells et al. (2002),
mentioned above. According to these authors, their Catalan-Spanish
bilinguals were able to effectively block the influences of a second lan-
guage by using a phonological route to conduct the task at hand. As for
the ERP part of the study, it appears that stimulus differences (IHs vs one-
language words) and/or task differences (lexical decision vs. go/no-go)
may underlie the observed differences in result patterns (note that a more
recent word production study by Rodriguez-Fornells et al. [2005] found
evidence supporting language nonselective lexical access.)
Altogether, the results of our electrophysiological and neuroimaging
studies are in line with the RT studies that support a language nonselec-
tive model of lexical access, such as the BIA+ model. In addition, the
ERP studies provide some insight in the relationship of RT differences
to N400 effects, for example, in semantic priming. The MRI study pro-
vides evidence with respect to the distinction between a representational
system and cognitive control/task aspects in terms of differently located
brain areas. Future research may attempt to extend functional models
of bilingual processing (based to a large extent on RT data) to include
electrophysiological and neuroimaging data (Dijkstra & Van Heuven,
in press).
4. C O N C L U S I O N
2. What is the exact nature of the decision criteria and strategies that
participants use?
As an alternative or complement to changing the relative activation of
L1/L2 lexical items, it may be that certain types of contexts affect the
setting of the decision criteria that are used to perform the task. However,
this view begs the question of how to consider such decision criteria and
their sensitivity to local and more global context effects. An even more
difficult issue here is whether a task/decision system can be specified
to such an extent that it can be implemented in a computational model
like the BIA-framework. Given that this problem has been around for
over 15 years, it does not seem likely that it will be resolved in the
near future.
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R E P R E S E N TAT I O N A N D S K I L L I N S E C O N D
LANGUAGE LEARNERS AND PROFICIENT
BILINGUALS
Abstract
What does it take to become a skilled bilingual? Past research on the acquisition of a
second language (L2) by adult learners has focused on the degree to which the attainment
of proficiency is constrained by the age at which L2 exposure occurs (e.g., Johnson &
Newport 1989; Birdsong 1999; Flege 2003), by the degree of transfer from the first
language (L1) to the L2 (e.g., MacWhinney 1997; Pienemann 1998), and by the context
of acquisition (e.g., Freed 1995). Most of this work has addressed issues of represen-
tation. The general assumption is that the representations at each level of linguistic
analysis gradually approximate those of native speakers with increasing proficiency in
the L2, although particularly for the phonology and syntax, there may be limits to how
completely these representations can be acquired (e.g., Flege et al. 1995; Weber-Fox &
Neville 1996). In addition to acquiring representations of the lexicon, grammar, and
phonology of the L2, it is also necessary to acquire a set of cognitive skills that enable
the L2 to be processed automatically (e.g., DeKeyser 2001; Segalowitz & Hultstijn
2005) and to learn to negotiate the activation of the two languages so that the intended
language is selected (e.g., Green 1998; Grosjean 2001).
1. I N T R O D U C T I O N
Heuven 2002; Van Hell & Dijkstra 2002), listening (Marian & Spivey
2003), and speaking (Hermans et al. 1998; Costa et al. 1999), there is
evidence that aspects of both languages are active and potentially com-
pete for selection. Although we might expect that the weaker L2 would
be affected by the more dominant L1 when learners are in early stages
of L2 acquisition, the observation of parallel language activity among
the most proficient bilinguals suggests that L2 skill is not a simple mat-
ter of overcoming the influence of L1. It also suggests that proficient
bilinguals may be particularly expert in executing the control that is
required to accomplish skilled performance in the presence of potential
competition, an implication that has been supported in recent studies of
executive function in early bilinguals during childhood and in old age
(e.g., Bialystok 2005).
The paper is organized in four sections. First, we review the evi-
dence regarding the development of L2 proficiency in light of the recent
findings for parallel activity of both languages. We then consider how
models of automaticity have been applied to language learning and
examine the evidence that has been taken to support the presence of
increased processing skill in the L2. In the third section of the chapter,
we present the results of studies that have specifically addressed the
factors that appear to modulate the cognitive processes that support
skilled L2 use, including individual differences in memory and atten-
tional resources, aspects of the context of language exposure, and the
interactions between them. Finally, we discuss the implications of the
evidence we have reviewed for the cognitive consequences conferred by
bilingualism.
Our discussion will focus primarily on skill at the level of lexical
access because that is the context in which there has been the great-
est research activity. However, we briefly consider findings at the
level of the phonology and grammar where they are relevant to the
development of L2 skill. Throughout the chapter we adopt a broad def-
inition of bilingualism to include all individuals who use more than
one language regularly. We distinguish bilingual groups with respect to
their proficiency in the L2, their relative language dominance, and the
degree to which the context of language use supports each of the two
languages.
2. D E V E L O P I N G L 2 P R O F I C I E N C Y A S A N A D U LT
For adult learners, the process of acquiring a high level of skill in a sec-
ond language, particularly for individuals restricted to tutored instruction
in a classroom environment, is typically a difficult and less than fully
successful experience. Some past studies of learners during early stages
of L2 acquisition suggest that access to the L2, at both the level of the
lexicon and grammar, is initially mediated through the L1 and that only
with increasing L2 proficiency are learners able to use the L2 indepen-
dently (e.g., Kroll & Stewart 1994; Talamas et al. 1999; MacWhinney
2005). To the extent that the L1 provides information about the L2,
the learner will benefit from transfer (but see Flege 1987, for evi-
dence that cross-language similarity can impede as well as facilitate
L2 development).
Psycholinguistic research on language processing in the L2 has
focused primarily on the performance of relatively skilled adult bilin-
guals, with fewer studies that specifically address the changes that occur
in language processing as L2 skill develops. One question that has
received some attention in the literature is whether and when learners
are able to directly access the meaning of new words in the L2 without
mediation via the L1. An early study by Potter et al. (1984) suggested
that even L2 learners at early stages of acquisition are able to concep-
tually process the meaning of words in the L2 directly. The evidence
on which this claim was based involved a comparison of picture nam-
ing and word translation, language processing tasks that engage shared
component stages in speech planning. Potter et al. argued that if learners
rely on the translation of the L2 word to understand it, then translation
from the L1 into the L2 should be a relatively direct lexical process of
word association, without conceptual processing. In contrast, naming a
picture in the L2 would first require conceptual understanding and only
after the L1 name of the picture was retrieved could the association to
L2 be accessed. By this logic, translation should be performed faster
than picture naming. In a series of experiments, Potter et al. (1984)
showed that learners and highly proficient bilinguals were able to trans-
late words and name pictures in the L2 in about the same amount of
time, suggesting that direct word associations between the L1 and L2
were not active. A surprising result in this study was that although the
learners were slower to perform tasks in the L2 than the highly proficient
bilinguals, the pattern of their data was the same, suggesting a common
mechanism.
Subsequent research challenged the conclusions of Potter et al.
(1984) by showing that learners at stages of acquisition earlier than
Potter et al.’s (19984) participants did indeed appear to rely on access
to the L1 translation equivalent when using the L2 (e.g., Kroll & Curley
1988; Chen & Leung 1989). These studies used the same comparison
of translation and picture naming as used in the Potter et al. experi-
ments, but showed that at low levels of proficiency learners were faster
to translate into the L2 than to name pictures in the L2, suggesting that
translation was mediated directly by word-to-word associations from
the L1 to the L2. At higher levels of proficiency, the results replicated
the pattern reported by Potter et al. (1984) with similar performance
for translation and picture naming, supporting a process of conceptual
mediation across the two languages.
A number of studies provided evidence to support a shift from initial
reliance on L1 translations to more direct conceptual processing of the
L2, with increasing proficiency in the L2. Talamas et al. (1999) used a
translation recognition task first reported by De Groot (1992) in which
individuals are shown a word in one language followed by a word in
the other language and are asked to judge whether the second word is
the correct translation of the first word. Two groups of English-Spanish
learners were tested who differed in their L2 proficiency in Spanish. In
the critical conditions of the experiment, the second word was not the
correct translation of the first word but a foil that was similar in form or
meaning to the translation equivalent. For example, if the first word was
man in English, the second word might be hambre, which means hunger
in Spanish but resembles the form of the correct translation, hombre. In
addition to form-relatives of the translation equivalent, other foils were
semantically related, such as mujer in Spanish, which means woman.
The time to reject the foil as the incorrect translation was compared to
the time to reject a completely unrelated distractor. Talamas et al. (1999)
found that less proficient learners were more likely to be fooled by the
translation relatives than the semantically related foils. The magnitude of
interference was greater for the form pairs than for the semantic pairs. In
contrast, the opposite pattern was found for the more proficient learners
who produced greater interference for the semantic pairs than for the
form pairs. Talamas et al. argued that the shift in sensitivity from form
to meaning reflected a change in the degree to which learners were able
to process the meaning of the L2 words directly with increasing skill
in the L2.
There has been a great deal of debate concerning the issue of how
early in L2 learning access to the meaning of L2 words is available,
with some studies supporting the initial claim by Potter et al. (1984) that
even learners at the earliest stages have direct access to the meanings of
words in the L2 (e.g., Altarriba & Mathis 1997; De Groot & Poot 1997;
Frenck-Mestre & Prince 1997), and other studies support the idea that
conceptual access changes as L2 skill increases (e.g., Dufour & Kroll
1995). More critically, in the time since these studies appeared, there has
been a flood of research findings on the performance of highly proficient
bilinguals that suggests that even at very high levels of L2 skill there is
parallel activity of both languages.
It is beyond the scope of the present chapter to review the findings on
language nonselectivity exhaustively, but we summarize the main results
briefly (see recent reviews by Dijkstra 2005, this volume; and Kroll et al.
2005). The recent experiments on visual and spoken word recognition
demonstrate that when a highly skilled bilingual sees or hears a word
in one language, information about the form relatives of that word are
active in the other language. Thus, if a bilingual in English and Spanish
sees the word actor in English, the cognate translation of that word in
Spanish, actor, will also be activated briefly. When word forms in two
languages also converge semantically, as in the case of cognates, there
is typically facilitation in word recognition (e.g., Dijkstra et al. 1998;
Van Hell & Dijkstra 2002), although interference has been observed
when similarly spelled cognates map onto different pronunciations in
the two languages and when bilinguals are required to read the words
aloud (e.g., Schwartz et al. in press). When word forms in two lan-
guages correspond to different meanings, as in the case of interlingual
homographs, an inhibitory pattern is typically observed (e.g., Dijkstra
et al. 1998; Jared & Szucs 2002; Von Studnitz & Green 2002). Perhaps
Lexical
links
L1 L2
Conceptual Conceptual
links links
Concepts
Figure 1. The revised hierarchical model (adapted from Kroll & Stewart 1994).
Figure 2, to account for the persistent form activity across the bilingual’s
two languages (and see Dijkstra & Van Heuven [2002] for a descrip-
tion of the BIA+ model, an extended version of the BIA model). The
BIA model takes the Interactive Activation Model first described by
McClelland and Rumelhart (1981) for monolingual word recognition
and extends it to the bilingual case so that activity among feature and
letter information feeds into both of the bilingual’s languages. Unlike
the monolingual model, the BIA model includes a set of language nodes
that serve to sort out the intended language by integrating bottom-up
activation with top-down inhibition.
Whereas the RHM assumes that the lexical representations of the
two languages are functionally independent, the BIA model assumes
that the bilingual lexicon is integrated and that access is language non-
selective. Because the RHM was initially proposed to account for the
translation performance of learners and relatively proficient bilinguals,
it is more of a model of production than perception. In contrast, the
BIA model was proposed to account for the earliest processes engaged
during the comprehension of words in each language. One way of rec-
onciling the apparently conflicting claims associated with each model is
to assume that the activity of the L1 involves different representations
Dutch English
Language node
level
Dutch English
Word level words words
pos 1 pos 4
Letter level
pos 2 pos 3
pos 1 pos 4
Feature level
pos 2 pos 3
Visual input
Figure 2. The bilingual interactive activation model (adapted from Dijkstra &
Van Heuven 1998).
3. D E V E L O P I N G A U TO M AT I C I T Y A N D
I N H I B I TO RY C O N T R O L I N L 2
3.1. Automaticity
Skilled performance typically involves the development of auto-
maticity of the component cognitive processes (e.g., Kahneman
1973; Schneider & Shiffrin 1977). Although automaticity has been
operationalized in a variety of ways in the cognitive literature
(Segalowitz & Hulstijn 2005), most definitions include the following
four characteristics: processing is fast, requires little or no attentional
effort (i.e., consumes few cognitive resources), occurs outside of con-
scious awareness, and is ballistic in nature (i.e., cannot be stopped once
it has been initiated). The issue we consider is whether this character-
ization also applies to the acquisition of L2 as a new skill and how
automaticity of the L2 might be measured.
In studies of adult L2 learners, it is clear that learners typically become
faster in processing the L2 as they become more proficient. In Figure 3,
we illustrate this effect with data from a study by Kroll et al. (2002).
These are data for a simple task – naming words aloud in the L1 and
the L2. Two groups of native English speakers learning French are
compared, one more proficient and the other less proficient. The less
proficient group had been studying French less than 5 years and the
more proficient group for more than five years. As each of the graphs
in Figure 3 show, less proficient learners were slower and less accurate
to name words in L2 than more proficient learners. A further result of
interest is that less proficient learners were also slower to name words
in L1 than the more proficient learners, although the two groups were
800
Less
700
proficient
More
600
proficient
500
L1 L2
Language of naming
1
0.9 Less
0.8 proficient
0.7 More
proficient
0.6
0.5
L1 L2
Language of naming
Figure 3. Performance data from two groups of learners (Kroll et al. 2002). Mean
naming latencies (in ms) and percent accuracy for naming words aloud in the L1 and L2
are shown for two groups of native English speakers learning French. One group is less
proficient in French as the L2 as the other is more proficient.
both native English speakers and the lists of words in each languages
appeared in separate blocks. As we will suggest later in the chapter, this
difference in L1 performance is consistent with the hypothesis that L1
must be inhibited for L2 to be spoken when learners are at early stages
of L2 acquisition
On one level, it might seem appealing to assume that as the pro-
cessing of L2 becomes more automatic, it becomes more accurate and
faster. As the data shown in Figure 3 suggest, lexical access is faster
and more reliable and the ability to access the L2 phonology is more
skilled with increasing L2 proficiency. However, automaticity is dis-
tinct from a simple increase in speed of processing (e.g., Segalowitz &
Hulstijn 2005). That is, a given change in performance could be due to
By this account, increased speed and accuracy alone does not indicate
increased automaticity. Rather there is reorganization that changes the
consistency with which processing occurs. One proposal for how this
change comes about has been suggested by Logan’s (1988) instance
theory of automaticity. Logan argued that there are two routes by which
processing can occur. Initially, the system must compute each step in
the process using some algorithm. Since this requires the computation
of every step in the process, this first route is slower and requires more
cognitive resources. However, each time these initial algorithms are
computed, a memory trace of that process is left in memory, and a new
memory trace is laid with each subsequent completion of the algorithm.
So the second possible route for processing involves a search for the
memory trace of the required steps. As the number of memory traces
increases (i.e., with increasing practice), the system can more rapidly
find a memory trace of the processing steps and implement the process
based on this memory trace. This theory of automaticity is considered a
race model in that the route by which processing occurs is the route which
wins the “race” to identify the steps required to perform the process.
Automaticity, therefore, is considered to be attained when the memory
retrieval process is completed more quickly than the algorithmic process,
thereby increasing the efficiency of processing.
Within the domain of L2 learning, there are a number of different ways
in which automaticity might develop, especially because different levels
of language processing may impose differential processing demands
that affect the rate at which these changes occur. But even within this
brief review of automaticity, what is apparent is that the process of
become proficient in the L2 is not simply a matter of acquiring adequate
representations for the L2. Rather, that process must be accompanied by
the development of cognitive procedures that themselves change with
increased L2 skill.
3.2. Inhibitory Control
Of the cognitive skills that are likely to be recruited during L2 learning,
a prime candidate for predicting success in this process is inhibitory
control. Although the research reviewed earlier suggests that even pro-
ficient bilinguals are unable to switch off one of their two languages
when the context requires one language alone, during the earliest stages
of L2 learning it is not clear how learners can ever begin to produce the
L2 given the overwhelming dominance of the L1 without some degree
of inhibition.
Green (1998) proposed the Inhibitory Control (IC) model as a sketch
of how this process might work. The model, shown in Figure 4, embeds
the bilingual’s lexicon in a complex system of cognitive control mech-
anisms that serve to focus attention on the task to be performed and to
reactively inhibit the representations not to be produced. The insight here
was that linguistic representations alone do not enable actions. Lexical,
grammatical, and phonological forms need to be selected both within
and across languages to enable bilinguals to use the intended language.
Without modulation by what Green called task schemas, it would be
virtually impossible to engage linguistic representations in the specific
tasks required by the context.
The empirical context in which the predictions of the IC model have
been examined most extensively is language switching. At the lexical
level, the main prediction of the model is that to the extent that the L1
is more active than the L2, it will require greater inhibition than the L2.
Meuter and Allport (1999) examined the predicted asymmetry by asking
Bilingual Language
Input lexico-semantic task
system schema
Output
830 740
810 720
790 700
770 680
No-switch Switch No-switch Switch
Figure 5. Patterns of language switch costs in picture naming for two groups of Spanish-
Catalan bilinguals who differ in their proficiency and language dominance (adapted from
Costa & Santesteban 2004).
they heard the other tone. In both the mixed and blocked conditions,
the timing of the tones was varied relative to the presentation of the
picture to tap into the time course of speech planning. The participants
were relatively proficient but late Dutch–English and English–French
bilinguals. For present purposes, the critical result concerns the effects
of language mixture on the two languages. The time for Dutch–English
bilinguals to name pictures in each language and under each condition is
shown in Figure 6. For L2, the requirement to keep both languages active
in the mixed condition had little consequence relative to the blocked
condition. In contrast, for L1, there was a marked cost in processing
time when both languages were required to be active. Furthermore, like
the language switching data, under the mixed language conditions the
L1 naming latencies were actually longer than those in L2. Under the
blocked conditions, the more typical advantage of L1 relative to L2
was obtained. The pattern of results suggests that L1 is normally active
during the planning of L2 speech and must be inhibited.
800
750
700
650
600
L1 L2
Language
Figure 6. Mean latencies (in ms) to name pictures in L1 and L2 for Dutch-English
bilinguals under mixed and blocked language conditions (adapted from Kroll et al.
in preparation).
4. M O D U L AT I N G AT T E N T I O N A N D
LANGUAGE SELECTION
Even highly proficient bilinguals often say that speaking in the L2, par-
ticularly under formal circumstances, is mentally exhausting and that
they experience word finding difficulties and make speech errors that
they would never otherwise make. Research on the attentional mod-
ulation of L2 performance supports L2 speakers’ phenomenology in
demonstrating that the L2 requires the allocation of greater processing
resources than the L1 (e.g., Miyake & Friedman 1998; Hasegawa et al.
2002). If greater cognitive and attentional resources are needed to
process L2, then a clear prediction is that individuals who normally
have more of those resources should be advantaged in the process of
L2 acquisition and performance (for a recent review of this topic, see
Michael & Gollan 2005). To illustrate how individual differences might
modulate L2 processing, we review four studies from our own work
that examine different aspects of this problem. A particular hypothesis
is that cognitive resources may be allocated to controlling the persistent
activity of the unintended language that we have suggested is a feature
of using two languages not only during early stages of learning but also
once individuals become skilled in the L2.
in this study. In the second experiment, Kroll et al. again examined the
performance of L2 learners but compared their performance to highly
proficient bilinguals and also administered a reading span measure to
assess the role of memory resources in modulating L2 skill. The crit-
ical result concerned the effects of span on translation performance
when the words to be translated were cognates or not. As noted ear-
lier, cognates are translation equivalents that share aspects of lexical
form (i.e., orthography and/or phonology). In translation, bilinguals are
typically faster to translate cognates than matched non-cognate target
words (e.g., De Groot 1992). However, the cognate facilitation observed
in word translation for proficient bilinguals is not a superficial reflec-
tion of lexical transparency; cognate translations are affected by the
same semantic variables that influence non-cognate translation (e.g.,
Kroll & Stewart 1994). In the Kroll et al. study, the degree of cog-
nate facilitation was modulated by reading span. Ironically, L2 learners
with higher memory span enjoyed less cognate facilitation compared
to learners with lower memory span (see Figure 7). In fact, the higher
memory span learners were slower than the lower memory span learn-
ers when translating cognates. The results suggests that the learners with
greater memory resources avoided relying upon cues made available by
the orthographic overlap of cognates, even when these cues would have
enhanced their performance. Because shared lexical form is not a reliable
cue to translation (i.e., there are also interlingual homographs or false
friends), there is reason to resist reliance on superficial similarity. With
greater memory resources available, these learners appeared to be able to
exert more attentional control when translating from one language into
the other.
4.2. Study 2: Errors in Spoken Translation
A second set of informative results comes from research examining
errors that learners make in attempting to translate words. Tokowicz
et al. (2004) were interested in the types of errors made when translating
words, focusing on factors that potentially influence L2 performance:
working memory capacity and study abroad experience. The partici-
pants were relatively proficient L2 learners who were native English
speakers with Spanish as the L2. Some of them had spent a substantial
300
Mean 250
magnitude 200
of cognate 150
facilitation Low span learners
(ms) 100
50 High span learners
0
L1 to L2 L2 to L1
Direction of translation
150
100 125
Lexical Lexical
75 100
translation translation
75
(ms)
50 relative relative
50
25 Meaning Meaning
25
0 relative relative
0
–25 Lower Higher –25 Lower Higher
span span –50
–50 span span
Memory span group Memory span group
Figure 8. Mean magnitude of interference (in ms) in translation recognition for control
learners confined to the classroom vs. immersed learners studying abroad as a function
of their relative memory span. Data are shown for interference generated by lexical
translation relatives and meaning relatives (adapted from Linck & Kroll 2005).
The results support the predictions of the BIA model (see Figure 2) in
that the bottom-up activation of alternatives in each of the bilingual’s
two languages appears to be outside cognitive control processes. Only
later in the process can cognitive resources modulate the selection of the
correct language alternatives.
5. C O G N I T I V E C O N S E Q U E N C E S O F B I L I N G U A L I S M
6. C O N C L U S I O N S
Our goal in this chapter was to provide a brief review of the psycholin-
guistic studies that have examined the cognitive basis of L2 learning
and proficient bilingual performance. The research we have reviewed
suggests clearly that successful attainment of L2 skills relies on cogni-
tive support in addition to the development of linguistic representations.
Although much of the research on this topic is at an early stage of devel-
opment, both with respect to empirical paradigms and with respect to
theory building, the available studies provide an initial foundation that
we believe holds promise for answering these questions. The initial pic-
ture based on this preliminary evidence is already quite complex and
likely to become more so with the next generation of research findings.
For example, we have discussed inhibitory mechanisms as if they are
a unitary phenomenon. The cognitive literature has begun to consider
AUTHOR’S NOTES
The writing of this chapter was supported in part by NSF Grant BCS-
0418071 to Judith F. Kroll. Correspondence concerning this chapter
should be addressed to Judith F. Kroll, Department of Psychology,
Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA 16802 USA. Email
address: jfk7psu.edu
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Abstract
When you speak about the sea, in some languages you have to refer to it in the mas-
culine gender (il mare in Italian), in others in feminine (la mer in French), and in still
others in neuter (Mopemo in Bulgarian). Examples such as these are usually provided as
arguments for the arbitrariness principle going back to Ferdinand de Saussure’s (1916)
postulate on the arbitrary nature of the relationship between the two aspects of the verbal
sign – concepts and acoustic images. Grammatical gender is widely assumed to be a
prime example of arbitrariness due to the fact that there is ample cross-linguistic variabil-
ity in the genders of nouns referring to one and the same concept and little systematicity
in the mapping between different gender categories (e.g., masculine, feminine, and
neuter) and the meaning of nouns within languages.
In the face of so much arbitrariness, a curious observer may ask whether the relation-
ship between language(s) and thought may also be arbitrary or, alternatively, subject
to certain constraints. While cognitive constraints on language are rarely in the focus
of attention (however, see the literature on working memory and language processing,
e.g., Caplan & Waters 1999; MacDonald & Christiansen 2002), there has been plenty of
speculation and a growing amount of experimental data collected to address the possi-
bility that cross-linguistic variation is associated with variation in mental processes. The
latter view is usually subsumed under the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis (Whorf 1956) whose
strong version of linguistic determinism has long been discredited but whose softer for-
mulation in terms of linguistic relativity has undergone a revival in recent years. The two
issues are indeed intertwined, especially if the general conceptual or mental apparatus of
humans is held to be cross-linguistically and cross-culturally universal. The arbitrariness
principle would then predict dissociation between the variability of linguistic compe-
tence and behavior and the universality of mental processes and representations. In this
sense, it would preclude the possibility for a “Whorfian” influence of the language we
speak on the way we view extra-linguistic reality.
271
I. Kecskes and L. Albertazzi (eds.), Cognitive Aspects of Bilingualism, 271–299.
© 2007 Springer.
1. A LT E R N AT I V E V I E W S O N G R A M M AT I C A L G E N D E R
“similarity and gender” hypothesis in which the same effects are seen as
a consequence of similarity in linguistic contexts. Vigliocco et al. (2005)
see German as a language with a weaker correspondence between the
genders of nouns referring to humans and the sex of referents, that is,
more arbitrariness, because of its tripartite gender system.
Furthermore, a debate is currently under way on the locus of gram-
matical gender effects, which is based on the distinction between
experimental paradigms involving language processing. While one view
considers grammatical gender to be part of speakers’ conceptualization
of even non-sexed objects in such languages (Boroditsky & Schmidt
2000), the alternative “lexicalist” position was recently defended by
Vigliocco et al. (2005). As a reminder, earlier Sera et al. (1994) showed
the presence of such effects in both their label and non-label (lexical
and non-lexical) tasks. In their comparison of gender-specific effects
on similarity judgments accompanied or not by a verbal shadowing
task (meant to produce verbal interference and thus eliminate purely
lexical effects), Phillips and Boroditsky (2003) found that similarity
ratings did not differ across tasks. Based on these and similar results
(Boroditsky & Schmidt 2000), they argue that, once established, the
effect is not language-specific (not dependent on language processing
since objects appear to have conceptual gender). Vigliocco et al. (2005)
conclude that such gender-specific effects may be strictly limited to ver-
bal tasks, given that they found no such effects in a picture similarity
judgment task which could be performed without recourse to lexical
labels (experiment 4), and that these mechanisms may have a role in
language development but do not extend to conceptual structures. In a
related discussion of how and when language affects cognition, Hunt
and Agnoli (1991) maintained that the impact is only in terms of com-
putation costs for users of a language, and not in terms of specific
representations.
2. G R A M M A R E F F E C T S I N B I L I N G U A L S
this kind of influence. Three recent studies have addressed this issue.
Athanasopoulos (2006) examined the effects of variation in grammati-
cal number marking systems in the two languages of Japanese-English
bilinguals on a similarity of pictures task, and found evidence supporting
the hypothesis that acquisition of a second language with different gram-
matical properties from the first language can further alter cognition. In
addition, Athanasopoulos (2006) established that better knowledge of
grammatical number in their L2 led Japanese-English speakers to resem-
ble monolingual speakers of English in their behavior and concluded that
L2 effects on cognition correlate with L2 proficiency.
Two further studies have explored the possibility that knowledge of a
second grammatical gender system may affect speakers’ performance in
categorization tasks in similar ways as it does first-language speakers.
Bassetti (2005) compared grammatical gender’s effect on object percep-
tion in Italian-German bilingual and in Italian monolingual nine-year-old
children in a voice attribution task. She found an effect of Italian gram-
matical gender in the performance of the Italian monolingual children
but not in the Italian-German bilingual children (only items of opposite
genders in their two languages were included in the materials). While
this is an interesting result in itself, her findings were based on only 12
test items. Bassetti concludes that when the bilingual’s two grammatical
gender systems are in conflict, grammatical gender ceases to constitute a
reliable cue; therefore, bilingualism eliminates a language-induced bias
in the perception of reality.
A notable exception to the predominantly “monolingual” picture on
grammatical gender effects has been a study reported in Phillips and
Boroditsky (2003) in which Spanish-German bilinguals who were also
fluent in English (thus, in fact, trilingual) rated the similarity of objects
and animals to human males and females. Participants’ experience with
Spanish ranged from 1 to 61 years and with German from 1 to 67 years.
On a scale from 1 (not fluent) to 5 (very fluent), they rated themselves as
quite fluent, that is, on average 4.19 in Spanish, 4.27 in German and 4.28
in English. Phillips and Boroditsky found a significant positive correla-
tion between people’s relative proficiency in Spanish/German and their
biases in the similarity task. Their judgments were aligned more with the
grammatical gender system of a language if their self-rated proficiency
based on previous studies which have concluded that the German system
does not affect classifications as much as Spanish and French (Sera
et al. 1994; Vigliocco et al. 2005). We expected that Bulgarian-Spanish
and Bulgarian-German speakers would agree on the classification of
items that are of the same gender in Spanish and German systematically
by showing the greatest degree of consensus on those items (matching
masculine, MM, and matching feminine, FF) in comparison with items
whose translation equivalents are of different genders in German and
Spanish (mismatching items).
Finally, previous studies with monolinguals have also demonstrated
“indirect” cross-linguistic effects, such as an apparent effect of Spanish
gender among speakers of English (4th grade and older) and German
(only children up to 4th grade were tested for German) but no cross-
linguistic effect of French gender (Sera et al. 2002). Thus, if we find
that one language’s gender assignments can predict the classification of
words by speakers of other second languages, we expected the source of
such an effect to be the “semantically strong” Spanish, but not German
or French, as second languages. These linguistic constructions may then
reflect shared ideas about the properties of gender.
3. E X P E R I M E N T 1 : B I L I N G U A L S W I T H
BULGARIAN AS THEIR FIRST LANGUAGE
3.1. Participants
The participants in this experiment were three groups of bilinguals
whose first language was Bulgarian. There were 19 Bulgarian-English
bilinguals (11 women, 8 men) whose average age was 13.83 years (range
13–14), 16 Bulgarian-German bilinguals (9 women, 7 men) with an
average age of 15.70 years (range 15–16), and 15 Bulgarian-Spanish
bilinguals (9 women, 6 men) with an average age of 15.86 years (range
15–16). They had studied their second language since the age of 12 for
2 years (English) or for 4 years (German and Spanish). Bulgarian was
the first language for all of them; none knew a third language other than
English, or had a parent whose first language was not Bulgarian. All
participants were high school students in one of the so-called “language
3.4. Results
The dependent variable was calculated as the mean percent of feminine
choices across participants in the by-item analyses, and across items
in the by-participant analyses. For example, if all participants chose
feminine for a given item, the value of the dependent variable for that
item would be 100%, and if they all chose masculine, the value of
the mean percent choice of feminine (FCh%) would be 0% indicating
an absolute bias against feminine in favor of masculine. Chance level
3.6. Discussion
The results of the analyses of bilinguals’ choices as a function of the
grammatical gender distinctions available in their second language show
that bilinguals aligned their categorization in this task with the grammars
of their respective second languages. Both German- and Spanish-
speaking bilinguals preferred feminine more for Bulgarian neuter nouns
whose translation equivalent in their second language was also feminine,
4. E X P E R I M E N T 2 : B I L I N G U A L S W I T H G E R M A N
AS THEIR FIRST LANGUAGE
4.1. Participants
The participants in this experiment were three groups of bilinguals
whose first language was German: 17 German-English bilinguals
(7 women,10 men) whose average age was 24.12 years (range 20–
33), 15 German-French bilinguals (11 women, 4 men) with an average
4.6. Discussion
As in our first experiment, bilingual speakers based their
re-classifications of neuter nouns in the first language on the grammatical
gender distinctions available in their second language. This effect was
5. C O N C L U S I O N
Spanish children but not in adults: boys’ choice of male gender for the
masculine nouns was higher, as was girls’ choice of female for the femi-
nine nouns. This result, in addition to the interaction in Bulgarian adults
mentioned above, speaks in favor of exploring this research issue fur-
ther. Such an agenda fits well into a general focus on how experience
enters the scene in linguistic and non-linguistic behavior, an aspect of
cognitive behavior that is well worth pursuing.
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BEYOND LANGUAGE:
CHILDHOOD BILINGUALISM ENHANCES
H I G H-L E V E L C O G N I T I V E F U N C T I O N S
Abstract
Children growing up in a bilingual environment have to build up two language systems
from the linguistic input. They will use the two languages alternately as a function of
their interlocutor in their everyday interaction. At a young age, a bilingual child may be
faced with somewhat different requirements than a monolingual one. This chapter will
discuss the possible changes that bilingualism might induce in the cognitive system in
this early phase of development. Adult neuroimaging evidence suggests that bilingualism
can result in differential functional specialization of the two languages depending on
the age of acquisition, and moreover, can even lead to reorganization at neuronal level.
Here we present behavioral studies indicating that bilingual children outperform their
monolingual peers on tasks that require high levels of cognitive control, such as executive
function and false-belief tasks. The extensive experience bilingual children gain in
inhibiting one language while switching to the other may lead to an enhancement of
their domain-general executive control abilities that are involved in different aspects of
cognitive functioning.
1. I N T R O D U C T I O N
2. Y O U N G B I L I N G U A L B R A I N S
There is no doubt that the human brain can acquire two or more lan-
guages at different stages of development. The studies investigating how
the bilingual brain deals with two languages in adulthood can also carry
important insights about what might be happening during the develop-
mental process. Early and late bilinguals are actually faced with the two
languages in diverse stages of brain maturation and cognitive develop-
ment, which would predict differences in language processing and in
the neural substrates for the languages between these two populations.
The interest of this field of research in bilingualism is twofold: one is
related to the issue of brain plasticity and focuses mainly on the negative
correlation between brain maturation and second language proficiency.
The other addresses the question of differential brain specialization and
investigates whether a new language could possibly engage brain regions
that are different from the ones serving the first language, or if the two
languages are actually processed by the same neural substrates.
Addressing the first issue, some studies found that in the initial phase
of learning a second language adults out-perform children (Snow &
Hoefnagel-Hole 1978); nevertheless, the vast majority of the research
data indicates that persons who have started learning a second language
early in their childhood achieve higher levels of proficiency (Johnson &
Newport 1989; Newport 1990). Various theories have been formulated
to explain the phenomenon of an apparent critical period for acquir-
ing different aspects of a new language. According to a maturational
hypothesis, the language acquisition capacity declines during develop-
ment due to changes in specific brain structures that lose their plasticity.
Johnson and Newport (1989), studying Chinese and Korean immigrants,
found a linear relation between the age of arrival to the United States
and the level of language proficiency. According to their data, language
acquisition seems to clearly decline up to puberty and reaches a plateau
afterwards. Moreover, only those persons showed a comparable perfor-
mance to native speakers who learned the second language before the
age of six. Alternatively the “less is more” hypothesis was proposed by
Newport (1990), suggesting that young children’s limited information
processing and working memory capacities could be the reason why
they acquire a new language more easily. These limited capacities form
a “narrow window” that constrains the amount of information entering
in the computational system but at the same time allows a better analysis
and faster processing of the data that actually gets in.
Furthermore, Pallier et al. (2003) found data that might shed new light
on the critical period hypothesis. In their study, adults of Korean origin
who were adopted by French families between ages 3 and 8 showed no
recollection of the Korean language in behavioral tests and no specific
brain activation when comparing the Korean language to a language they
had never heard. Additionally, they had similar results to native speak-
ers of French when tested with French linguistic stimuli. The authors
argue that the plasticity of the language system can be very high even
in middle childhood and early linguistic influences remain malleable to
redescription for quite a long period.
The second question related to the representation of the two lan-
guages in the bilingual brain has been a subject of great debate over
the last ten years. The experimental results derived from imaging and
neurophysiological studies have provided ambiguous results; therefore
it seems hard to establish if there is a common cortical substrate within
which all languages operate. The main question that arises is whether
3. W H AT D O E S B I L I N G U A L I S M M E A N F O R
THE DEVELOPING COGNITIVE SYSTEM?
4. C H A L L E N G I N G T H E B I L I N G U A L M I N D
5. S H A R P E N I N G E X E C U T I V E F U N C T I O N S
D U R I N G L A N G U A G E S W I T C H I N G A N D M O N I TO R I N G
Mean error on Day and Night stroop Mean RT on Day and Night stroop
120
9
8 100
7
6 80
5 60
4
3 40
2
20
1
0 0
Bilinguals Monolinguals Bilinguals Monolinguals
Figure 1. Mean error and SD of the two groups on the Day and Night Stroop task (left);
and mean RT (sec) and SD of the two groups on the Day and Night Stroop task (right).
error rate (p = .01 – see left figure) and faster reaction time (p = .03 –
see right figure) than the monolingual group (Figure 1).
The higher performance of bilingual children on these different exec-
utive function tasks may be a consequence of the permanent monitoring
of the languages, and training in inhibiting one language while activating
the other, that transfers and enhances performance in tasks that involve
inhibition and selection.
6. L O O K I N G I N TO O T H E R S ’ M I N D S
THROUGH THE LENSES OF TWO LANGUAGES
(Siegal & Beattie 1991; Freeman & Lacohee 1995). These modifications
have led to an improvement in the performance of 3-year-old chil-
dren. Besides, there is further evidence showing that three-year-olds,
though they do not pass the standard ToM task yet, possess an implicit
knowledge about false beliefs, as suggested by their anticipatory look-
ing behavior (Clements & Perner 1994). Moreover, the finding by
Onishi and Baillargeon (2005), that even infants may appeal to men-
tal states to predict others’ behavior, raises serious questions as to what
the standard theory of mind tasks measure in 3 to 5-year-old preschool
children.
One answer could be what the authors argued on the other hand;
namely, that solving a typical ToM task also requires the development
of inhibitory functions (Leslie & Thaiss 1992; Carlson et al. 1998; Leslie
et al. 2005). They posit that in these tasks children need well-developed
executive functions to inhibit the default assumption that beliefs are true
(Leslie et al. 2005) or to inhibit a prepotent response involved in the ToM
tasks (the tendency to refer to the reality and indicate an empty location;
Carlson et al. 1998).
Many studies found a functional link between performance on ToM
and executive function tasks (Carlson & Moses 2001), and that children
with autism also showed associated impairments in ToM and EF (Oznoff
et al. 1991). Furthermore, individual performance on ToM was found
to correlate with performance on EF tasks (Carlson & Moses 2001).
Imaging and patient studies have shown that the medial prefrontal cortex
plays an important role in performing ToM tasks (Fletcher et al. 1995;
Stuss et al. 2001), an area regularly associated with EF.
Taking into account the above evidence about the controversial false-
belief task, we will describe two different frameworks in which bilingual
preschoolers may come to solve false-belief problems earlier than their
monolingual peers. According to the first, the exercise of bilingual chil-
dren in conceiving a concept as having two different output labels in
the two languages might transfer and concretize in an advantage in
understanding that the same reality could be represented differently
by two people. Consequently, bilingual children will be at an advan-
tage when dealing with the different representations involved in the
ToM tasks (their own true belief and the protagonist’s false-belief ).
80
68
60
40 32
20
0
Bilinguals Monolinguals
Figure 2. Percent of bilinguals and monolinguals passing the standard ToM task.
7. C O N C L U D I N G R E M A R K S
The bilingual condition could be stimulating for the highly plastic devel-
oping mind of the child, and seems to induce specific changes in the
brain and in the cognitive system. In this chapter we have investi-
gated different proposals related to the nature of these changes. The
experimental evidence appears to be more in favor of one of the three ini-
tially presented hypotheses. On one side, there was the domain-general
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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C R O S S-L I N G U I S T I C A N D C O G N I T I V E S T R U C T U R E S
I N T H E A C Q U I S I T I O N O F W H-Q U E S T I O N S I N A N
I N D O N E S I A N-I TA L I A N B I L I N G U A L C H I L D
Antonia Soriente
Max Planck Institute of Evolutionary Anthropology, Jakarta
Abstract
This chapter examines language development in a bilingual child growing up with two
typologically distinct languages – Italian and Jakarta Indonesian. It presents a case
study of unbalanced bilingualism and focuses on the development of WH-forms and
concludes that dominance of the loose Indonesian syntactic pattern results in a non-
target word order in the construction of early WH-questions in Italian. In conclusion, the
chapter identifies cross-linguistic structures in quantitative and qualitative perspectives
and hypothesizes theoretical explanations for cross-linguistic dominance and the gradual
emergence of correct usage of Italian grammatical structures. In so doing, the study
considers how children recognize languages as separate systems and how they gradually
develop the cognitive patterns required for competence in separate though practically
co-extensive linguistic domains.
1. I N T R O D U C T I O N
WH-forms rest in most cases in-situ, do not trigger inversion (Cole et al.
in press)4 , and display an obviously different intonation pattern5 .
This chapter presents an overview of the studies on developmental
bilingualism followed by sub-sections presenting data on the acquisition
of WH-forms in Italian, in JI, and in the bilingual child. The final section
discusses cross-linguistic structures of these WH-forms.
2. D E V E L O P M E N TA L B I L I N G U A L I S M
3. M E T H O D O L O G Y
caretaker and attend a local kindergarten. The siblings interact with each
other either in either language depending on the context.
Guglielmo is fluent in JI. He uses it in all contexts except when
interacting with his mother. From an early age he appeared to com-
prehend Italian, though his production was very limited until the age
of three. As expected, his Italian is typically mixed with Indonesian
elements and though he is now five years old, he is able to speak
Italian relatively fluently. However, he does so with clearly identifiable
imperfections.
The data presented below were taken from video recording transcrip-
tions and from notes in diaries. The hour-long recordings were made
weekly beginning when the child was eight months old. In these record-
ings, the two children are shown playing with each other as they normally
do. Occasionally other actors enter the picture, such as visitors or the
Indonesian maid and, when in Italy, relatives. For the most part, Italian
or Indonesian were deliberately used in order to generate the required
data base, though in some of the recordings both languages are used
when both mother and father are present.
The data in this study have only partially been coded and entered into a
longitudinal database. This is part of a larger study currently under way at
the Max Plank Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology (MPI) in Jakarta
in which these data, when completely coded, will be compared to a larger
corpus of more than nine hundred thousand records of eight monolingual
JI children recorded over four years. Comparing the data to monolingual
acquisition patterns is necessary for ascertaining the degrees of similar-
ity and difference from target structures. Herein, the MPI data base and
the Italian data drawn from the CHILDES database (MacWhinney &
Snow 1985) are crucial referents for analyzing the acquisition of
WH-forms. They are also necessary for comparing syntactic structures
and for discussing cross-linguistic effects in the forms deviating from
the monolingual targets.
All the WH-forms were analyzed and coded according to form and
position in both languages. The same analysis was applied to the input.
The purpose was to analyze the frequency of occurrence of the different
WH-forms as well as the hierarchy of their cognitive function and their
sequence and age of emergence.
4. F O R M , F U N C T I O N A N D C O G N I T I O N I N W H-Q U E S T I O N S
apa what 39 33
siapa who 12 6
mana where 24 37
gimana how 6 6
kenapa why 5 4
kok how come 8 11
kapan when 1 0.2
berapa how much 5 2
kenapa
“why” 5 %
gimana apa
“how” 6% “what”
39%
mana
“where”
24% siapa
“who”
12%
kok
“how come” 11% kapan “when” 0.20%
berapa
kenapa “how much”
“why” 4% 2%
gimana
“how” 6%
apa
“what”
33%
mana
“where”
38%
siapa
“who”
6%
the use of kok (“how come”). Children use it more than adults, which
becomes an important aspect of the following data and analysis. These
differences between input and output are in all likelihood due to cogni-
tive differences between children and adults, and to the nature of their
worlds. Time is critical for adults in a way that it simply is not for chil-
dren. Clearly, cognitively speaking it is far easier to understand “what”
than “when” and this simple explanation adequately accounts for the
developmental sequence.
To summarize this data set, what is most significant is that “what”
questions are by far the most common. This is a simple fact of cognition
in that the easiest of all linguistic tasks is to label an object with a name.
This is the most rudimentary aspect of learning a language for both
adults and children. Once again, these figures confirm the general pattern
found in the acquisition of other languages as well as the hierarchical
developmental sequence. Through combining the study of syntactical
structures and the developmental sequence of the emergence of WH-
interrogatives, we can explore far more complex questions and revealing
information regarding cognition.
5. S Y N TA C T I C S T R U C T U R E S I N W H-Q U E S T I O N S
I N T H R E E L I N G U I S T I C C O N T E X T S : I TA L I A N ,
J A K A RTA , I N D O N E S I A N A N D B I L I N G U A L
5.1. Italian
In Italian canonical interrogative sentences the WH-form always pre-
cedes the verb and occupies the initial position in the sentence, and in
some cases, the dislocated position. On the other hand, yes-no questions
display the same structure as statements with the difference in rising into-
nation (Fava 2001: 97–98). Commenting upon WH-questions, Guasti
(1996) notes that in Italian there is a Subject Auxiliary Inversion (SAI)
that has been analyzed by Rizzi (1990) involving movement to the begin-
ning of the sentence. In the interrogative sentences, the subject cannot
intervene between the WH-operator and the verb. Thus, the subject may
occur at the end of the sentence or in a left-dislocated position. In the
acquisition of WH-questions, Italian children do not produce questions
1a)
Gianni cosa fa? Left peripheral position
Gianni what do-ind.pres.3sg
What does Gianni do?
1b)
Cosa fa Gianni? Right peripheral position
what do-ind.pres.3sg Gianni
1c)
Cosa fa? Null subject
what do-ind.pres.3sg
1d)
*Cosa Gianni fa? –
what Gianni do-ind.pres.3sg
the other operators like dove (“where”) have a formulaic aspect (Antelmi
1997: 170). Nevertheless, atypical structures with in-situ positions of
the WH-operators were never produced. For this reason, Antelmi con-
siders the first WH-questions as fixed structures reproducing a particular
intonation pattern where the WH- is NP with copular constructions of
identification and location.
This is confirmed by the analysis of the data in the CHILDES
database where very few in-situ WH-questions occur, and instances of
WH-questions in left peripheral position, especially in copular sentences
with “cosa,” “che,” and “dove.”
younger children (until 2;5) commonly use “what” and “where” but
rarely “who,” and in addition do not pose adjunct questions. Adjunct
questions emerge at 2;5 – first kenapa (“why”) then gimana (“how”)
and much later kapan (“when”). In Indonesian, kapan (“when”) emerges
only at 3;4, and in terms of frequency to a far lesser extent than all other
WH-expressions9 .
A syntactic analysis of WH-questions as proposed by Cole et al. (2001
and in press) shows that essentially JI is a WH-in-situ language, although
instances of sentence-initial WH may occur. From the MPI database it
emerges that WH-words occur in the same position as their no-WH-NP
counterpart. This is interesting as JI allows a great degree of word order
freedom; therefore, some object NPs can appear in preverbal position.
As for adjuncts, these appear post-verbally and pre-verbally. As a result,
questions of time, place, manner, and reason can appear either after or
before the verb but not necessarily in the leftmost position. There is
no evidence for obligatory movement to the beginning of the sentence
(Cole et al. in press).
2a)
Potong rambut di mana?
cut hair loc where
Where did you cut your hair?
2b)
Di mana potong rambut?
loc where cut hair
All the WH-forms as listed in Table 3 above are poly-functional; that is,
they function as indefinites amongst their other functions. As for cul-
turally significant differences affecting WH-interrogatives, kok (“how
come”) is an especially interesting case. It has the tendency to occur at
the left end of the sentence and can be used to perform an unusually
varied set of functions.
In addition, on the issue of development, JI children prefer the in-situ
structure especially in object position. Thus beyond the cognitive issue
of the sequence and timing of the emergence of WH-interrogatives, there
are some striking syntactic differences which are important to identify,
different systems that the child is growing up with. The word kapan is
related to the Indonesian verbal system mainly based on modality and
aspect in which a great deal of vagueness is implied. Italian, however,
has a more complex tense based system. Obviously Guglielmo has not
yet been able to acquire this system. This is clearly demonstrated by
the fact that at least until the age of five, he was not able to control
tense-marking elements in Italian12 .
This type of developmental complexity and the creative use of
language are indications of the degree to which syntactic mixing is
occurring, as will be explored further below.
The following graphs (Figures 2 and 3) compare the acquisition of
WH-forms between monolinguals and the bilingual child. Figure 2
shows the difference between the pattern for monolingual Indone-
sians and Guglielmo, and Figure 3 shows the difference between the
emergence of WH-forms for monolingual Italians and Guglielmo.
Figure 2 shows that the acquisition of the Indonesian WH-forms in the
bilingual child follows the general trend of monolingual children, except
for the siapa (“who”) form that emerges relatively later in the bilingual
child. This might be due to a lack of input, though no in-depth study of
this data has been carried out as of yet. If we exclude “who” (siapa),
the pattern of acquisition is similar to other languages in which “where”
50
40
30
20
10
0
apa siapa mana gimana kenapa kapan
WH-forms
Indonesian (monolinguals) Guglielmo
40
30
20
10
0
che chi dove come perche' quando
WH-forms
Acquisition of WH-forms
Comparison between monolinguals and the bilingual child
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
what who where how why when
Indonesian Italian Guglielmo Indonesian Guglielmo Italian
6. A N A LY S I S O F T H E D ATA13
3a) G2;8
Questa la casa siapa? Ini rumah siapa?
dem.prox-f.sg def-f.sg house-f.sg who dem.prox home who
Whose house is this?
3b)
Di chi è questa casa?
of who be-ind.pres.3sg dem.prox-f.sg house-f.sg
In the utterance (3a) it is clear that the child is slowly putting together the
pieces and gradually achieving competence in Italian. This is revealing,
as at this stage, though his production of Italian is still limited to the
expression of single words such as demonstratives (questa, “this”) or
nouns (la casa, “the house”), he is able to put these things together and
his task is aided by the relatively flexible Indonesian system. Thus the
above mentioned sentence lacks a copula as appropriate in Indonesian
and uses the function word (siapa, “who”) but still in the Indonesian
manner. This is the stage where this kind of mixed sentence is mostly
produced, and in the case of the WH-questions, maintained in their
Indonesian form. It is interesting that by this time he was able to produce
4a) G3;9
Si chiama che cos’è?
refl.3sg call-ind.pres.3sg what thing = be-ind.pres.3sg
What is it called?
4b)
Come si chiama?
how refl.3sg call-ind.pres.3sg
5) G3;2
I pesci mangiare che cos’é? Ikan makan apa?
def-m.pl fish-m.pl eat-inf what thing = be-ind.pres.3sg fish eat what
What are the fish eating?
does not undergo any morphological change as the child uses the
infinitive form.
The WH-form che cosa (“what”) in object position is still left in-situ.
Sentences like this are very frequent in the database and in the diary
study, especially between the ages of 3;2 to 4;0. It is interesting to
note that the child does not recognize the copula è (“is”) as a verb
but considers it to be a unit with the WH-form “what.” This kind
of pattern is also used very frequently with the other WH-forms
considered below.
6) G3;5
Dicomprato che cos’è? (Yang) dibeli apa?
pass-buy-ppart-m.sg what thing = be-ind.pres.3sg rel pass-buy what
What did you buy?
This mixed sentence where the WH-forms in object position rest in-situ
is also interesting because the child produces a focused question with
the Indonesian passive marker di-, which can be analyzed as a copula
construction with a headless relative clause with the relativizer (yang
“that”) in the subject position (see Aman 1999).
In this case, the mistake is in the deletion of the relativizer. As
Aman has shown, this kind of mistake is common in children (Aman
1999: 4).
The following question still exemplifies Guglielmo’s tendency to
leave the question word in-situ when he speaks Italian.
7) G3;3
Gulli vuoi andare che cosa? Gulli mau ke mana?
Gulli want-ind.pres.2sg go-inf what thing? Gulli want to where
Where is Gulli going? (where am I going?)
In the example (7) it is clear that the placement of che cosa (“what”),
which actually should be dove (“where”), matches JI syntax in that this
mimics the normal Indonesian word order (keeping in mind the inherent
flexibility in Indonesian). The Italian correspondent dove starts to be
productively used only at 2;5, and in many of the examples is left in-situ.
It is interesting to note that the use of vuoi (“you want”) incorrectly
conjugated to match the third singular person of the subject, shows a clear
influence of the Indonesian system where “mau” means both volition
and near future. In this case where the sentence was uttered while the
child was getting ready to go out, Guglielmo was not expressing volition
but near future15 .
The following is an example of the WH-form of “who” still in-situ.
8) G3;7
Maeldane vuole salutare chi è? Maeldane mau
Maeldane want-3sg greet-inf who be-ind.pres.3sg Maeldane want
salamin siapa?
greet-IN who
Who will Maeldane greet?
Sentences 9–11 exemplify the developmental stage where the child pro-
duces Italian questions in which the WH-form dove rests in-situ and
other structures of Indonesian are transferred.
9a) G3;2
Di Gulli dov’ è? (Yang) Gulli (punya) mana?
of Gulli where = be-ind.pres.3sg rel Gulli have where
Where’s mine?/which one is mine?
10a) G3;6
Comprato dov’è? Dibeli mana?
buy-ppart-m.sg where = be-ind.pres.3sg pass-buy where
Where did you buy it?
10b)
Dove l’hai comprato?
where acc.3sg = have-ind.pres.2sg buy-ppart-m.sg
11) G3;9
Vuoi andare dove, Ma? Mau ke mana Ma?
want-2sg go-inf where Mom want loc where Mom
Where are you going Mom?
In a pragmatic context where the child is asking the mother where she is
going, the use of the verb vuoi (“want”) seems to be due to contact with
Indonesian, which uses the verb “want” to indicate future and volition.
The question, not ungrammatical in Italian, would sound pragmatically
more appropriate if it was uttered omitting the modal verb vuoi.
As for come (“how”), its frequency of occurrence is very low in
comparison to other WH-forms. Also, it tends to occur in pre-posed
position in expressions that can be considered as fixed structures, as in
the following case in which he asks the name of something he either
did not know or could not remember. At this stage, we can see that his
language has developed to the point where he can produce the target
structure as follows.
12) G3;7
Come si chiama?
how refl.3sg call-ind.pres-3sg
What (how)is it called?
The following sentence was uttered while the child was trying to put
together a toy car.
13a) G3;11
Come faccio? Gimana bikinnya
how do-ind.pres.1sg how do-3sg
How do you do it? (How does it work?)
This is not exactly what an Italian would say in this context. The
word order is awkward. The appropriate question should be phrased
as follows:
13b)
Come si fa?
how imps do-ind.pres.3sg
The next two examples show that the adjunct perché, from the very
beginning of production, is in pre-posed position. This effectively
reproduces the appropriate Italian word order.
14) G3;11
Perché tajam, per che cos’è, per tusukare tanti dinosauri16 ?
why sharp for what thing=be-ind.pres.3sg for pierce-inf many dinousar
Why is it sharp? Why is that? To pierce many dinosaurs?
The next sentence displays one of the very few examples contain-
ing a when-question in Italian. It was recorded at the age of 4;4
and occurred when the child was talking on the phone to his mother,
who had been away for a while. The use of the Indonesian tempo-
ral adverbial lama demonstrates that the child still produces mixed
structures.
15) G4;4
Mamma quando vieni? No lama
Mommy when come-ind.pres.2sg neg long time
Mom, when are you coming back? Not too long.
7. D I S C U S S I O N : T H E E V I D E N C E F O R
C R O S S-L I N G U I S T I C I N F L U E N C E
16)
Apa tadi Dek Ido bilang?
what earlier younger.brother Ido say
What did you (brother Ido) say?
To this date, the child has not produced such sentences. This may be
because the frequency of such expressions in JI is very low and there
is no such input in Italian. In short, it is a question of low input on one
side and on the other a complete lack of any such input.
and therefore is the preferred form. The case study of bilingual children
acquiring Cantonese and English (Yip & Matthews 2000) displayed
exactly the same tendency of acquisition of in-situ WH-forms from
the Cantonese dominant language to the weaker English language.
Unfortunately, that case study has not been supported by other
longitudinal studies on similar bilinguals.
The fact that in many fewer cases Guglielmo leaves the adjuncts come
(“how”) perché (“why”) and quando (“when”) in-situ can be explained
because they were acquired at a more mature cognitive stage and because
in JI these elements typically appear in initial sentence position. In par-
ticular for perché which is invariably placed at the beginning of the
interrogative sentences, it might be that it corresponds to kok (“how
come”) and kenapa (“why”) in JI. If kenapa can occur in-situ though
the tendency is in fronted position, kok only and exclusively occurs in
fronted position and is particularly liked by children. As for the other
adjunct, quando (“when”), the paucity of examples does not permit
much discussion.
No case of transfer of Italian to JI has been observed in this area
of grammar, but the fact that no occurrence of the mentioned adja-
cency constraint (allowed in JI) being violated in Italian WH-questions
has been noticed in Guglielmo’s corpus could be the indirect expla-
nation of the rule in Italian. Nor has any study been carried out on
the intonation of JI sentences produced by the bilingual child as com-
pared to JI monolinguals, to demonstrate different intonational patterns
reproducing Italian ones.
Müller (1998) debates whether ambiguity of input might be cru-
cial for the occurrence of cross-linguistic structures. The scarcity of
examples of echo questions in adult Italian in this database, and the
left dislocated position structures both in the monolingual and bilin-
gual corpus, might have been interpreted as ambiguous by the child.
So we can pose the following question: Is it possible that the quantita-
tively significant production of in-situ questions, especially for “what,”
“where,” and “who” (the first WH-words acquired by the child) might
have been triggered by what has been generalized by the child in
the right dislocated position WH-expressions? Or were they produced
as a consequence of the few instances of echo-questions? Though
8. C O N C L U S I O N
A B B R E V I AT I O N S
loc: locative
m: masculine
MPI: Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology
neg: negation
pass: passive
ppart: past-participle
pres: present tense
prox: proximal
refl: reflexive
rel: relativizer
sg: singular
NOTES
1. The dominant language of a bilingual, in a broad definition, refers here to the lan-
guage used with higher proficiency and following the trends of development of
monolinguals, whereas the weaker language is the one where the pace of develop-
ment is slower. Dominance also depends on quality and quantity of input resulting in
quality and quantity in the output. No MLU (mean length of utterance) calculation
has been performed simply because in Jakarta Indonesian the MLU calculation is
not considered without problems. As an isolating language with some agglutinating
features it is very difficult to calculate the number of morphemes in an utterance
and also the MLUw (mean word length of utterance) is considered difficult to apply
as it depends on what constitutes a word, a problem that in some cases cannot
be resolved. It can be interesting to see that the same problematic issue has been
addressed by Yip and Matthews (2000: 197) for Cantonese. As Döpke (1998: 564)
observes, MLU may not be directly comparable across languages, especially those
of different morphological types.
2. Many of the features listed above are also shared by Standard Indonesian though
the main difference is in a stricter verbal morphology and less free word order (see
Sneddon 1996, Musgrave 2001).
3. On this issue, recently Salvi and Vanelli (2005: 55–66) have proposed a dou-
ble word order for Italian: SV in accusative sentences, and VS in inaccusative
sentences.
4. Another relevant difference is that the so called WH-words in Jakarta Indonesian
do not represent, as in Italian, a coherent class of words, but can be treated as
pro-adverbs (Musgrave 2006 pc.).
5. Despite the interesting issues behind it, no particular study has been carried out on
the different intonational patterns in Italian and JI, nor in the utterances produced
by the bilingual child.
6. Data for English refer to a work done by Bloom et al. (1982) aimed to study the
acquisition of WH-questions by seven English speaking children aged two to three.
Data for Jakarta Indonesian come from the Child Acquisition project of the Max
Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology in Jakarta and data for Italian are
based on the CHILDES corpus.
7. For a detailed cross-linguistic summary of the study of the development of
WH-questions in other languages, see Clancy (1989: 329)
8. Cameron-Faulkner et al.’s work on the child directed speech approach shows that
there is interdependence between the language used by adults addressing children
and what children learn at particular stages. In documenting the proportional dis-
tribution of the kind of utterances that children hear early in their third year of
life, they noted that in a surprisingly high proportion of questions (one third of the
mothers’ utterances), they actively elicited linguistic interaction with their children
(Cameron-Faulkner et al. 2003: 851). In exploring these discursive contexts, they
found that “what” was the most common and accounted for half of all the WH-
questions, followed by “where,” “why,” “how” and “which.” Interestingly enough,
they make no mention of “when,” which is predictable, as “when” universally
emerges later.
9. This issue is confirmed by another Indonesian case study carried out by Dardjowid-
joyo (2000). He notices that Echa, the child he studied, starts with “mana” and
“apa” (before the age of 2;0) and only later, she produces questions with “siapa” and
“gimana.” At the beginning Echa does not seem to be able to differentiate between
“apa” and “siapa” and “mana” means “where” and “which”. “Kapan” “when” is
not acquired productively until the age of three (Dardjowidjoyo 2000:129).
10. This confirms the tendency that early-acquisition of WH-questions in-situ is error
free as the syntactic structure is simpler since it does not involve movement
(Cole et al. in press).
11. Data refer to a database containing so far about 20,000 utterances of one-hour
monthly video-recordings taken during the age of 1;5 and 4;6. A number of data
refer to the diary study.
12. Just to give a simple example, every time the child is asked a when-question
“quando” related to the past, he simply replies with ieri “yesterday.” Ieri is the
translation of the temporal expression in Jakarta Indonesian kemaren that means
indeed yesterday but it is often used also to refer in a quite vague way to any time
in the past and whose meaning is essentially contextual.
13. In the data produced by Guglielmo, I use the orthographic convention to mark the
Italian forms in italic whereas the Jakarta Indonesian ones are underlined. Where
necessary, the JI version of the mixed utterances produced by the child is displayed
on the right.
14. It is important to notice that his sister Beatrice at more or less at the same
age produces exactly the same kind of structures where the WH-form che cosa
“what” is inappropriately used in many cases but probably means the WH-form
by default. Early inappropriate uses of “what” for “where” are mentioned also
cross-linguistically by other authors like Yip and Matthews (2000: 199) in their
Cantonese English case study.
15. The use of “want” in this meaning happens all the time in Italian sentences and is
employed in exactly the same way by Guglielmo’s younger sister.
16. This example is interesting because it shows the question word perché (“why”) and
the form per che cos’è (“for what”) in the same sentence, and because other mixing
features appear in the sentence like the morphological mixing of the Indonesian
word tusuk (“pierce”) followed by the Italian infinitive suffix of the verb.
17. In order to explain the late acquisition of the WH-question, Clark (1973) proposes
that its late acquisition depends on the fact that in English, time expressions are
derived from space expressions. He explicitly states that: “description of time is
based on spatial metaphor in which time is viewed as a single dimensional asym-
metric continuum, running horizontally from front to back through the speaker”
(Clark 1973: 52). This might explain some of the expressions used by the bilingual
child in response to “when” questions in Jakarta Indonesian and Italian prior to the
age of three where he used to reply with numbers or with a location.
REFERENCES