[217] CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, INC.,v.
CA though physically weak, she was mentally sound and in complete possession of her
G.R. No. 155299 | July 24, 2007 | Austria-Martinez, J.
TOPIC​: ​Opinion Rule
SUMMARY​: Alfonso Kipte obtained a ₱1.2M loan from petitioner, secured by a real estate
mortgage signed by Avelina over her properties and surety agreement signed by Kipte as
principal and by Avelina as surety. Kipte failed to pay and the properties were foreclosed.
Avelina filed a complaint, denying having signed the documents. She died and her heirs
substituted her in the case. RTC ruled in favor of CBC but CA reversed, holding among others
that the deceased Avelina was an old widow, 80 years of age and blind even before she
purportedly signed the Real Estate Mortgage and Surety Agreement. Petitioner argues that the
fact of blindness requires the opinion of an expert witness (an ophthalmologist). The Court
disagreed and upheld the CA decision.
DOCTRINE​: ​The rule of evidence requiring the opinion of expert witnesses applies only to such
matters clearly within the domain of medical science, and not to matters that are within the
common knowledge of mankind which may be testified to by anyone familiar with the facts.
FACTS​:
● August 27, 1991​: Alfonso Kipte ​obtained a ₱1,200,000.00 loan from petitioner,
secured by a promissory note and a real estate mortgage signed by Avelina
over her properties of two adjoining parcels of land with improvements, consisting of
510 sq m situated in Mandaluyong City, covered by TCT Nos. 64018 and 59833. The
mortgage was annotated on the titles. ​The loan was also secured by a surety
agreement signed by Kipte as principal and by Avelina as surety.
o Due to Kipte’s failure to pay his indebtedness, the mortgaged properties
were foreclosed and auction sale was scheduled on August 17, 1992.
● Thus, Avelina and respondent Emmanuel Piñero filed the complaint with the RTC, with
Avelina denying having signed the documents. They alleged that:
o sometime in September 1992, Avelina was surprised to receive a
foreclosure notice from the notary public, stating that her properties would
be sold at public auction by virtue of a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure
filed by petitioner;
o after inquiring from petitioner, she learned that she allegedly executed a real
estate mortgage and a surety agreement to secure a loan of one Alfredo
Kipte, whom she does not know;
o the foreclosure is void since she never voluntarily executed the mortgage or
surety agreement, never appeared before the notary public, never received
any proceeds from the loan, and was never a business associate of Kipte;
o sometime in 1990, Emmanuel’s common-law wife, Ludivina Rinnoces,
asked Avelina to sign some documents allegedly pertaining to a loan from
one Cerila de Leon;
o Avelina signed these documents without reading the same, as she is blind,
and without knowing the contents thereof;
o in 1991, Ludivina again asked her to sign some documents, allegedly to pay
the account to Cerila; again, Avelina was not able to read or know the
contents of these documents;
● Petitioner, however, contends among others, that upon the execution of the
documents, Avelina was furnished with copies thereof; that Avelina freely and
voluntarily signed the documents; that at the time of the execution of the documents,
faculties, and she understood the nature of the transactions; and Avelina personally
appeared before the notary public.
● September 6, 1996​: Avelina died and was substituted by her heirs.
● RTC rendered in favor of CHINA BANKING CORPORATION and ERNESTO
BONIFACIO and orders the DISMISSAL of this action.
● However, CA reversed the RTC Decision, holding that:
o that the deceased Avelina was an old widow, 80 years of age and ​blind
even before she purportedly signed the Real Estate Mortgage and Surety
Agreement on August 26, 1991 and August 29, 1991, respectively;
o that Rebecca Piñero-Galang, daughter of Avelina, testified that in 1985, her
mother became totally blind, was not physically fit, and suffered an eye
disease or glaucoma;
o that Avelina herself testified that she was only persuaded to sign the
questioned documents as witness; that Ludivina guided her when she
signed the foregoing documents;
o that Avelina did not receive from Kipte, the principal borrower, any amount
as consideration of the mortgage attests to her credible theory that she was
only a witness to the execution of the documents; that her deportment in
court and the fact that she had to be guided to take the witness stand
constituted the "strongest proof of blindness";
o that the notary public, Atty. Restituto Fano, who claimed to have notarized
the Surety Agreement, said that he remembered Avelina to be an old lady,
with white complexion and white hair, and who had to be assisted and
accompanied to his table to be able to sign the questioned agreements; that
Atty. Fano noticed that "she could hardly see"; and that it was unusual for
Avelina, a woman of old age, to be so willing to act as surety to a
promissory note of petitioner Kipte, a complete stranger, which involved the
large amount of ₱1,200,000.00.
ISSUE/HOLDING/RATIONALE​: W/N the fact of blindness requires the opinion of an expert
witness, an ophthalmologist – NO.
● Petitioner’s Arguments:
o x x x that Avelina, being of sound and disposing mind despite old age, was
duly informed of the nature and purpose of these agreements by petitioner’s
branch manager and the notary public before she affixed her signature; and
o that the respondents could have easily submitted a medical certificate
attesting to the supposed blindness of Avelina or made an
ophthalmologist take the witness stand, but they did neither.
● The rule of evidence requiring the opinion of expert witnesses applies only to such
matters clearly within the domain of medical science, and not to matters that are within
the common knowledge of mankind which may be testified to by anyone familiar with
the facts.
● Thus, to prove whether one is blind, it is not necessary:
o to submit a medical certificate attesting to the blindness OR
o to require an expert witness, such as an ophthalmologist, to testify to such
fact, since the fact of blindness can be determined through common
knowledge and by anyone with sufficient familiarity of such fact.
● In this case, Avelina, then alive during the trial of the case, categorically testified and
attested to her own blindness, a fact which even the trial court noted, viz:
 x x x Q: So, when you signed it as a witness, you were guided by your
daughter-in-law?
A: I don [sic] not know who guided me because I could not see. x x x
x x x Q: You are an educated person Mrs. Witness, is it very basic for you to read first
know the contents of the document before signing it?
A: That is true, but I could not read, sir.

● Also established are the facts that:

o Avelina was already blind when she was manipulated into signing the
questioned documents by her daughter-in-law, Ludivina, who did not explain
to her the contents and true nature of the documents beforehand;
o that her hand had to be guided by Ludivina during the act of signing;
o that Avelina did not know that the Surety Agreement and Real Estate
Mortgage she signed were to secure the loan Kipte contracted from the
petitioner;
o that she was made to understand that she was to sign only as witness; and
o that Kipte was a total stranger to her, and, by this reason, it is implausible
that she agreed to be his surety. In fact, it was only after Avelina received
the notices of foreclosure that she learned that there was a mortgage
document among the papers she signed.
● Avelina's blindness was further confirmed by the testimonies of her children,
respondents Emmanuel M. Piñero and Rebecca Piñero-Galang.
● Even the notary before whom she supposedly appeared testified to the fact that she
was indeed blind and that she was not made to understand the documents.
● Based on the foregoing, it is therefore clear that Avelina was in fact blind, that she did
not know the contents of the documents she signed, and more importantly, that she
did not know the capacity in which she was signing these documents.
● The evidence presented by respondents are clear and convincing, sufficient to
overturn the presumption of regularity of the subject documents.

On Signature
● At the outset, it must be made clear that counsel for respondents stipulated to admit
merely the authenticity of Avelina’s signature, which was done during trial. The
admission of this fact does not by itself prove petitioner’s case, since at bottom, the
issue is not whether Avelina affixed her signature on the agreements in question, but,
ultimately, whether she gave her consent to be bound as surety. While it is true that
both the mortgage and surety agreement are public documents, notarization ​per se​ is
not a guarantee of the validity of the contents of a document. Generally, a notarized
document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due
execution and has in its favor the presumption of regularity. However, such
presumption is not absolute. It may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to
the contrary.

RULING​: ​Petition is ​DENIED. ​CA decision is ​AFFIRMED​.

218 US v. MANABAT ● We do not think the evidence as to the alibi can be accepted in view of the material
contradictions in the statements of the witnesses, and we are of opinion that,
(Super short case, this is basically the full text rearranged and in bullet points) even though the confession made before the justice of the peace were excluded
from the record, the evidence of the complaining witness is sufficient under all
TOPIC​: Opinion rule the circumstances to establish the guilt of the accused.
● The court below failed to take into consideration any ​aggravating circumstances,
SUMMARY​: Manabat was charged with the crime of robbery by breaking into the house of although since the crime was committed at nighttime and advantage was taken of
Feliciana Puri, and assaulting the latter to compel her to give him P6.50. The crime was done at the darkness for the commission of the offense, the penalty should have been
night and there was no light in the house, but Feleciana was able to identify the accused by the imposed in its maximum degree.
sound of his voice because they had known each other since childhood. Manabat initially signed ● We therefore reverse the sentence imposed by the trial court and instead thereof we
an extrajudicial confession, but withdrew the same during trial. SC held that regardless of the sentence the said Regino Manabat to six years ten months and one day's
exclusion of the extrajudicial confession, there was sufficient evidence to convict Manabat. imprisonment (presidio mayor) with the accessory penalties prescribed by law, the
indemnify cation of the said Feliciana Puri in the sum of 6 pesos and 50 centimos, with
DOCTRINE subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and the payment of the costs of both
instances. After the expiration of ten days let judgment be entered in accordance
FACTS herewith and ten days thereafter the case remanded to the court below for proper
● Manabat was charged with the crime of robbery. action.
● He entered the house of Feliciana Puri at night by breaking down her door. He struck
Feliciana with several blows with his fist and the butt end of the revolver, knocking out
a tooth and compelled her to give him P6.50. After he left the house, he fired his
revolver and shot through the window.
● The night was dark and there was no light in the house and the only mode by which
the witness was able to identify the accused was by the sound of his voice.
○ It was shown that Feliciana and the accused had known each other
intimately since their youth, having lived in the same barrio for many years,
so that there was nothing unreasonable in her assertion that she recognized
the accused by his voice, although she could not see his face on account of
the darkness.
● On that very night, Feliciana made a complaint to the Constabulary charging the
accused with the commission of the crime; that the following morning he was arrested
and, when he was brought before the justice of the peace, the ​accused signed a
written confession admitting his guilt.
● At the trial he withdrew the confession and offered three witnesses in defense to prove
an alibi, and stated that the alleged confession was made under threats and duress
and under fear of personal injury from the Constabulary who had him in detention.
● One of these witnesses, a relative of the accused, stated that the accused
arrived in the barrio on the afternoon preceding the night of the robbery​; having
come to ​attend the wedding of a mutual relative; that he was sick with fever ​and
was able to attend the wedding and that he was compelled to spend the night at the
house of the witness and was not absent therefrom during that night.
● The ​accused, however, as well as the witness Jose Bermuda, declared that he
had arrived in the barrio two days before the wedding, that he attended the
wedding, and had been compelled to leave it on account of sickness, when we
went to the house of the first witness and spent the night there.
● TC found the accused guilty. He was sentenced to three years eight months and one
day imprisonment, with the accessory penalties imposed by law, and to return to the
said Feliciana Puri the sum of 6 pesos and 50 centimos, with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs of the trial.

ISSUE​:
Whether the accused is guilty
[219] People v. Gilbert Wagas, ​supra1​
GR No. 157943 | Sept. 4, 2013 | J. Bersamin
TOPIC: ​Opinion Rule
SUMMARY: ​Gilbert Reyes Wagas was convicted by the RTC with estafa for issuing a bouncing
check amounting to P200,000 as payment for 200 bags of rice. However, the prosecution failed
to prove that it was actually Wagas who transacted with Ligaray, the complainant. The said
transactions were all done over the phone, and Ligaray never met personally with Wagas. The
person who signed the delivery receipt of the rice and the one who gave the post-dated check
was Cañada, the brother-in-law of Wagay, who is a seafarer and was out of the country during
the pendency of the case. Wagas admitted though that he issued the check payable to CASH,
but claims it was payment for another obligation to Cañada which did not push through. The
Court acquitted Wagas for the failure of the prosecution to establish the identity of the offender
beyond reasonable doubt.
DOCTRINE: ​Communications by telephone are admissible in evidence where they are relevant
to the fact or facts in issue, and admissibility is governed by the same rules of evidence
concerning face-to-face conversations except the party against whom the conversations are
sought to be used must ordinarily be identified. It is not necessary that the witness be able, at
the time of the conversation, to identify the person with whom the conversation was had,
provided subsequent identification is proved by direct or circumstantial evidence somewhere in
the development of the case. The mere statement of his identity by the party calling is not in
itself sufficient proof of such identity, in the absence of corroborating circumstances so as to
render the conversation admissible.
FACTS:
● Gilbert R. Wagas appeals his conviction for estafa under the decision rendered on July 11,
2002 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, in Cebu City (RTC), meting on him the
indeterminate penalty of 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 30 years of reclusion
perpetua, as maximum.
● On April 30, 1997, Wagas ordered 200 bags of rice over the phone from Alberto Ligaray.
Though reluctant at first, Ligaray and his wife accepted a BPI postdated check (May 8,
1997) as payment upon assurance that Wagas is in the lending business and has funds in
the bank. However, the check was dishonored when Ligaray tried to deposit it with Solid
Bank, his depository bank due to insufficient funds. Wagas promised that he would pay
upon his return to Cebu but despite repeated demands, Wagas did not pay Ligaray.
● However, it was established during cross-examination that Ligaray did not personally meet
with Wagas ever, that everything was over the phone, and that he released the bags of rice
directly to Robert Cañada, the brother-in-law of Wagas, who signed the delivery receipt.
● After Ligaray testified, the Prosecution formally offered the following: (a) BPI Check No.
0011003 in the amount of ₱200,000.00 payable to "cash;" (b) the return slip dated May 13,
1997 issued by Solid Bank; (c) Ligaray’s affidavit; and (d) the delivery receipt signed by
Cañada. After the RTC admitted the exhibits, the Prosecution then rested its case.
● Wagas, on the other hand, admitted that he did issue the check but it was to Cañada and
not to Ligaray, as payment for a portion of Cañada’s property that he wanted to buy, but the
sale did not push through so he did not fund the check anymore. He also signed an
acknowledgment letter dated July 3, 1997, admitting that he owed the P200,000, but
insisted that he did so only because Cañada and his sister (Cañada’s wife) begged him to
1
OG Digest by Ally Maraon, thanks Sir!  means that the offender must be able to obtain money or property from the offended party
assume responsibility to avoid jeopardizing Cañada’s application for overseas employment.
At the time of the trial, Cañada was then out of the country working as a seafarer.
● The RTC held that the Prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt all the elements
constituting the crime of estafa, namely:
(a) that Wagas issued the postdated check as payment for an obligation contracted at the
time the check was issued;
(b) that he failed to deposit an amount sufficient to cover the check despite having been
informed that the check had been dishonored; and
(c) that Ligaray released the goods upon receipt of the postdated check and upon Wagas’
assurance that the check would be funded on its date.
● Wagas filed a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration, arguing that the Prosecution did
not establish that it was he who had transacted with Ligaray and who had negotiated the
check to the latter; that the records showed that Ligaray did not meet him at any time; and
that Ligaray’s testimony on their alleged telephone conversation was not reliable because it
was not shown that Ligaray had been familiar with his voice.
● Wagas also sought the reopening of the case based on newly discovered evidence,
specifically: (a) the testimony of Cañada who could not testify during the trial because he
was then out of the country, and (b) Ligaray’s testimony given against Wagas in another
criminal case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
● On October 21, 2002, the RTC denied the motion for new trial and/or reconsideration,
opining that the evidence Wagas desired to present at a new trial did not qualify as newly
discovered, and that there was no compelling ground to reverse its decision.
● Wagas directly appealed to SC by notice of appeal. But the resolution was delayed
because, prior to the elevation of the case to SC, Wagas filed a petition for admission to
bail pending appeal, which was erroneously granted so SC had to file administrative
complaint against the RTC Judge
ISSUE w/ HOLDING: Whether the Prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt the
existence of all elements of the crime of estafa, as charged, as well as the identity of the
perpetrator of the crime - NO
● Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides:
Article 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by: x x x x
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud: x x x x
(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had
no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of
the check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his
check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that
said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence
of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.
● The essential elements of the crime charged are that: (a) a check is postdated or issued in
payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check is issued; (b) lack or insufficiency
of funds to cover the check; and (c) damage to the payee thereof.
● It is the criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of a check that is punishable, not the
non-payment of a debt. Prima facie evidence of deceit exists by law upon proof that the
drawer of the check failed to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three
days from receipt of the notice of dishonor.
● In order to constitute estafa under this statutory provision, the act of postdating or issuing a
check in payment of an obligation must be the efficient cause of the defraudation. This
 by reason of the issuance of the check, whether dated or postdated. In other words, the
Prosecution must show that the person to whom the check was delivered would not have
parted with his money or property were it not for the issuance of the check by the offender.
● The Prosecution established that Ligaray had released the goods to Cañada because of
the postdated check the latter had given to him; and that the check was dishonored when
presented for payment because of the insufficiency of funds. In every criminal prosecution,
however, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be established by proof
beyond reasonable doubt. In that regard, the Prosecution did not establish beyond
reasonable doubt that it was Wagas who had defrauded Ligaray by issuing the check, as
can be observed from the following:
1. Firstly, Ligaray expressly admitted that he did not personally meet the person with
whom he was transacting over the telephone;
2. Secondly, the check delivered to Ligaray was made payable to cash. Under the
Negotiable Instruments Law, this type of check was payable to the bearer and could
be negotiated by mere delivery without the need of an indorsement. This rendered it
highly probable that Wagas had issued the check not to Ligaray, but to somebody else
like Cañada, his brother-in-law, who then negotiated it to Ligaray. Relevantly, Ligaray
confirmed that he did not himself see or meet Wagas at the time of the transaction and
thereafter, and expressly stated that the person who signed for and received the
stocks of rice was Cañada.
○ It bears stressing that the accused, to be guilty of estafa as charged, must have
used the check in order to defraud the complainant. What the law punishes is the
fraud or deceit, not the mere issuance of the worthless check.
○ Wagas could not be held guilty of estafa simply because he had issued the check
used to defraud Ligaray. The proof of guilt must still clearly show that it had been
Wagas as the drawer who had defrauded Ligaray by means of the check.
3. Thirdly, Ligaray admitted that it was Cañada who received the rice from him and who
delivered the check to him.
○ Considering that the records are bereft of any showing that Cañada was then
acting on behalf of Wagas, the RTC had no factual and legal bases to conclude
and find that Cañada had been acting for Wagas. This lack of factual and legal
bases for the RTC to infer so obtained despite Wagas being Cañada’s
brother-in-law.
[ON EVIDENCE]
4. Finally, Ligaray’s declaration that it was Wagas who had transacted with him over the
telephone was not reliable because he did not explain how he determined that the
person with whom he had the telephone conversation was really Wagas whom he had
not yet met or known before then.
○ For purposes of reliability and trustworthiness. a telephone conversation like that
one Ligaray supposedly had with the buyer of rice to be first authenticated before
it could be received in evidence. Among others, the person with whom the
witness conversed by telephone should be first satisfactorily identified by voice
recognition or any other means.
○ Without the authentication, incriminating another person just by adverting to the
telephone conversation with him would be all too easy. In this respect, an
identification based on familiarity with the voice of the caller, or because of clearly
recognizable peculiarities of the caller would have sufficed. The identity of the
caller could also be established by the caller's self-identification, coupled with
additional evidence, like the context and timing of the telephone call, the contents
of the statement challenged, internal patterns, and other distinctive
characteristics, and disclosure of knowledge of facts known peculiarly to the
caller.
○ Verily, it is only fair that the caller be reliably identified first before a telephone
communication is accorded probative weight. The identity of the caller may be
established by direct or circumstantial evidence.
○ US Jurisprudence​: Communications by telephone are admissible in evidence
where they are relevant to the fact or facts in issue, and admissibility is governed
by the same rules of evidence concerning face-to-face conversations except the
party against whom the conversations are sought to be used must ordinarily be
identified.
■ It is not necessary that the witness be able, at the time of the conversation,
to identify the person with whom the conversation was had, provided
subsequent identification is proved by direct or circumstantial evidence
somewhere in the development of the case. The mere statement of his
identity by the party calling is not in itself sufficient proof of such identity, in
the absence of corroborating circumstances so as to render the
conversation admissible.
■ However, circumstances preceding or following the conversation may serve
to sufficiently identify the caller. The completeness of the identification goes
to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility, and the
responsibility lies in the first instance with the district court to determine
within its sound discretion whether the threshold of admissibility has been
met.
○ Yet, the Prosecution did not tender any plausible explanation or offer any proof to
definitively establish that it had been Wagas whom Ligaray had conversed with
on the telephone.
○ Ligaray’s statement that he could tell that it was Wagas who had ordered the rice
because he "know[s]" him was still vague and unreliable for not assuring the
certainty of the identification, and should not support a finding of Ligaray’s
familiarity with Wagas as the caller by his voice. It was evident from Ligaray’s
answers that Wagas was not even an acquaintance of Ligaray’s prior to the
transaction. Thus, the RTC’s conclusion that Ligaray had transacted with Wagas
had no factual basis. Without that factual basis, the RTC was speculating on a
matter as decisive as the identification of the buyer to be Wagas.
○ The letter of Wagas did not competently establish that he was the person who
had conversed with Ligaray by telephone to place the order for the rice. The letter
was admitted exclusively as the State’s rebuttal evidence to controvert or
impeach the denial of Wagas of entering into any transaction with Ligaray on the
rice; hence, it could be considered and appreciated only for that purpose. Under
the law of evidence, the court shall consider evidence solely for the purpose for
which it is offered, ​not for any other purpose. Fairness to the adverse party
demands such exclusivity. Moreover, the high plausibility of the explanation of
Wagas that he had signed the letter only because his sister and her husband had
pleaded with him to do so could not be taken for granted.
[ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE]
● It is a fundamental rule in criminal procedure that the State carries the onus probandi
in establishing the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, as a consequence
of the tenet ​ei incumbit probation, qui dicit, non qui negat​, which means that he who
 asserts, not he who denies, must prove, and as a means of respecting the
presumption of innocence in favor of the man or woman on the dock for a crime.
● Accordingly, the State has the burden of proof to show: (1) the correct identification of
the author of a crime, and (2) the actuality of the commission of the offense with the
participation of the accused.
○ All these facts must be proved by the State beyond reasonable doubt on the
strength of its evidence and without solace from the weakness of the
defense. That the defense the accused puts up may be weak is
inconsequential if, in the first place, the State has failed to discharge the
onus of his identity and culpability. The presumption of innocence dictates
that it is for the Prosecution to demonstrate the guilt and not for the accused
to establish innocence.
○ Indeed, the accused, being presumed innocent, carries no burden of proof
on his or her shoulders. For this reason, the first duty of the Prosecution is
not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal. For even if
the commission of the crime can be established, without competent proof of
the identity of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, there can be no
conviction.
● There is no question that an identification that does not preclude a reasonable
possibility of mistake cannot be accorded any evidentiary force. Thus, considering that
the circumstances of the identification of Wagas as the person who transacted on the
rice did not preclude a reasonable possibility of mistake, the proof of guilt did not
measure up to the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt demanded in criminal
cases. Perforce, the accused’s constitutional right of presumption of innocence until
the contrary is proved is not overcome, and he is entitled to an acquittal, even though
his innocence may be doubted.
● Nevertheless, an accused, though acquitted of estafa, may still be held civilly liable
where the preponderance of the established facts so warrants. Wagas as the admitted
drawer of the check was legally liable to pay the amount of it to Ligaray, a holder in
due course. Consequently, we pronounce and hold him fully liable to pay the amount
of the dishonored check, plus legal interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this
decision.

RULING: ​WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision rendered on
July 11, 2002 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, in Cebu City; and ACQUITS Gilbert R.
Wagas of the crime of estafa on the ground of reasonable doubt, but ORDERS him to pay
Alberto Ligaray the amount of ₱200,000.00 as actual damages, plus interest of 6% per annum
from the finality of this decision. No pronouncement on costs of suit. SO ORDERED.
[220] CAMACHO-REYES v. REYES
G.R. No. 185286 ​| ​August 18, 2010​| ​Nachura, J.
TOPIC​: ​Opinion Rule
SUMMARY: ​In 1972, Maria Socorro Camacho met Ramon Reyes in UP Diliman and they had a
romantic relationship. Camacho eventually graduated AB Sociology while Reyes dropped out
due to cutting classes and marijuana use. In 1976, they got married with a baby on the way. In
the first years of their marriage, Reyes, employed in his family’s business Aristocrat Restaurants,
gave his wife a monthly allowance of P1,500 for their family’s needs. Eventually, due to the
business’ slow advancement, Reyes resigned. Reyes then ventured into other businesses
without success and was now estranged with his wife and children. While away, Reyes did not
exert any effort to communicate with his wife and even had an extra-marital affair.
Camacho-Reyes, in her last efforts to save their marriage, asked her husband’s siblings’ help for
them to initiate marriage consultations but to no avail. Petitioner then filed a pleading for nullity of
marriage in the RTC. RTC granted the petition on the ground of psychological incapacity after
trial where two clinical psychologists, Dr. Dayan and Dr. Estrella Magno, and psychiatrist Dr.
Cecilia Villegas presented testimonial evidence. CA rejected the testimonies for being hearsay
because the doctors did not personally examine the respondent.
DOCTRINE: The Court held that the CA erred in rejecting the testimonies of the experts for
being hearsay. The lack of personal examination and interview of the respondent, or any other
person diagnosed with personality disorder, does not per se invalidate the testimonies of the
doctors. Neither do their findings automatically constitute hearsay that would result in their
exclusion as evidence.
FACTS:
● 1972: Maria Soccoro met Ramon at the University of the Philippines Diliman, both
were then 19 years old
o Casual acquaintanceship developed into a boyfriend-girlfriend relationship
o Both resided in Mandaluyong, saw each other every day and drove home
together
o Respondent held a job in their family business, the Aristocrat Restaurant
o Respondent has a habit of cutting classes and taking marijuana
● 1974: Respondent dropped out, continued to work for Aristocrat
● 1975: Petitioner finished university studies (AB Sociology)
● 5 December 1976: Petitioner, who was then five months pregnant and employed at
the Popular Center Foundation, married respondent
o Lived with respondent’s family in Mandaluyong
o All living expenses were shouldered by respondent’s parents
o Couple’s salary were spent solely for their personal needs
o Respondent gave petitioner a monthly allowance of P1,500
● 22 March 1977: First child was born, financial difficulties started
o Monthly allowance from respondent stopped after he resigned due to slow
advancement within the family business
o Respondent ventured into trading seafood in the province to supply hotels
and restaurants, which took him away from his family for days without
communication
o Petitioner suggested they live separately from her in-laws, which furthered
financial difficulties
o Respondents business floundered, tried managing a fishpond in Mindoro
but was also unsuccessful hence the sporadic allowance given to petitioner
o Respondent did not exert efforts to remain in touch with family while in
Mindoro
● 1979: Spouses moved in with petitioner’s mother, but they only became more
estranged
o Petitioner continued to carry burden of supporting a family not just
financially, but in most aspects as well
● 1985: Petitioner, who previously suffered a miscarriage, gave birth to their third son
o Respondent was then in Mindoro and did not even inquire on the health of
either the petitioner or the newborn
o A week later, respondent arrived in Manila, acting nonchalantly while
playing with the baby, with no attempt to find out how the hospital bills were
settled
● 1989: Respondent’s fishpond business stopped operations due to financial problems
o Though without means to support his family, respondent refused to work
o Engaged in scrap paper and carton trading but also failed; this added to the
debt of the spouses which eventually led to the deterioration of their
relationship
● 1996: Petitioner found out respondent was having an extra-marital affair
o One of the last straws for petitioner was when she underwent surgical
operation for removal of cyst, but respondent remained unconcerned
o Petitioner asked respondent’s siblings to intervene to save their marriage,
but siblings “waved the white flag” on respondent
o Adolfo Reyes, respondent’s elder brother and his spouse tried to invite
petitioner and respondent to counseling sessions but respondent was
uncooperative
● 1997: Adolfo brought his brother to Dr. Natividad Dayan for psychological assessment,
but he resisted
o Petitioner asked respondent to move out of their house
o Relationship with petitioner nor with his children did not improve
● 2001: Petitioner filed petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC,
alleging the latter’s psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations
under Article 36 of the Family Code
o Respondent denied allegations he was psychologically incapacitated, said
he was not remiss in performing his obligations as father and spouse
o RTC granted the petition on the ground of psychological incapacity after trial
where two clinical psychologists, Dr. Dayan and Dr. Estrella Magno, and
psychiatrist Dr. Cecilia Villegas presented evidence
● CA reversed the RTC ruling and declared marriage valid and subsisting. Experts’
testimonies were hearsay for they never personally examined and interviewed the
respondent.
● Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE + RATIO: ​ Is the marriage void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity? Y
​ ES.
● Taking into consideration the explicit guidelines in the determination of psychological
incapacity in conjunction to the totality of the evidence presented, with emphasis on
the pervasive pattern of behaviors of the respondent and outcome of the
assessment/diagnos[is] of expert witnesses, Dra. Dayan, Dra. Mango and Dra.
Villegas on the psychological condition of the respondent, the Court finds that the
 marriage between the parties from its inception has a congenital infirmity termed o In the case at bar, however, even without the experts’ conclusions, the
"psychological incapacity". factual antecedents (narrative of events) alleged in the petition and
o Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability of the parties to effectively established during trial, all point to the inevitable conclusion that respondent
function emotionally, intellectually and socially towards each other in relation is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.
to their essential duties to mutually observe love, fidelity and respect as well
as to mutually render help and support. RULING:​ ​Petition is ​granted.
o In short, there was already a fixed niche in the psychological constellation of
respondent which created the death of his marriage. There is no reason to
entertain any slightest doubt on the truthfulness of the personality disorder
of the respondent.
● Three experts [Dra. Dayan, Dra. Magno, and Dra. Villegas] were one in diagnosing
respondent with personality disorder. They were unanimous in their findings. Being
professionals and having solemn duties to their profession, the Court considered their
assessment/diagnosis as credible or a product of an honest evaluation on the
psychological status of the respondent.
o Clinical psychologist Dayan diagnosed the respondent as purportedly
suffering from Mixed Personality Disorder (Schizoid Narcissistic and
Anti-Social Personality Disorder).
o Further, clinical psychologist Magno found the respondent to be suffering
from an Antisocial Personality Disorder with narcissistic and dependent
features.
o Dr. Villegas diagnosed the respondent to be suffering from Personality
Disorder of the anti-social type, associated with strong sense of Inadequacy
especially along masculine strivings and narcissistic features.
● The Court held that the CA erred in rejecting the testimonies of the experts for being
hearsay. The lack of personal examination and interview of the respondent, or any
other person diagnosed with personality disorder, does not per se invalidate the
testimonies of the doctors. Neither do their findings automatically constitute hearsay
that would result in their exclusion as evidence.
● For one, marriage, by its very definition, necessarily involves only two persons. The
totality of the behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is generally
and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other.
o In this case, the experts testified on their individual assessment of the
present state of the parties’ marriage from the perception of one of the
parties, herein petitioner. Certainly, petitioner, during their marriage, had
occasion to interact with, and experience, the respondent's pattern of
behavior which she could then validly relay to the clinical psychologists and
the psychiatrist.
● Further, the clinical psychologists’ and psychiatrist’s assessment were not based
solely on the narration or personal interview of the petitioner.
o Other informants such as respondent’s own son, siblings and in-laws, and
sister-in-law (sister of petitioner), testified on their own observations of
respondent’s behavior and interactions with them, spanning the period of
time they knew him. These were also used as the basis of the doctors’
assessments.
● It is true that a clinical psychologist’s or psychiatrist’s diagnoses that a person has
personality disorder is not automatically believed by the courts in cases of declaration
of nullity of marriages. Indeed, a clinical psychologist’s or psychiatrist’s finding of a
personality disorder does not exclude a finding that a marriage is valid and subsisting,
and not beset by one of the parties’ or both parties’ psychological incapacity.
[221] Roxas v. Arroyo
(IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND THE WRIT OF
HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF MELISSA C. ROXAS)
G.R. No. 189155 | September 7, 2010. | Perez
Petitioner:​ MELISSA C. ROXAS
Respondents​: ​LORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GILBERT TEODORO, GEN. VICTOR S.
IBRADO, P/DIR. GEN. JESUS AME VERZOSA, LT. GEN. DELFIN N. BANGIT, PC/SUPT.
LEON NILO A. DELA CRUZ, MAJ. GEN. RALPH VILLANUEVA, PS/SUPT. RUDY GAMIDO
LACADIN, AND CERTAIN PERSONS WHO GO BY THE NAME[S] DEX, RC AND ROS
Topic: ​Opinion Rule
SUMMARY
Petitioner is an American citizen of Filipino descent. While in the U.S., Roxas enrolled in an
exposure program to the Philippines with the group Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-United
States of America (BAYAN-USA). In the course of her immersion in Tarlac, she and her
companions were abducted while they were resting. She was informed that she was being
detained for membership in the CPP-NPA. She was then separated from her companions and
was brought to a room, from where she could hear sounds of gunfire, noise of planes taking off
and landing, and some construction bustle. She was interrogated and tortured for 5 straight days
to convince her to abandon her communist beliefs. When she was released, Roxas filed a
petition for the issuance of Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data before the Supreme Court,
impleading the respondents on the belief that it was the government agents who were behind
her abduction and torture. SC issued the writs and referred the case to the CA for hearing,
reception of evidence and appropriate action. CA granted the writs but absolved the respondents
because it was not convinced that the respondents were responsible for the abduction and
torture of Roxas. Hence, this appeal by Roxas.
The Supreme Court ruled that the totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner does not
inspire reasonable conclusion that her abductors were military or police personnel and that she
was detained at Fort Magsaysay.The similarity between the circumstances attending a particular
case of abduction with those surrounding previous instances of enforced disappearances does
not, necessarily, carry sufficient weight to prove that the government orchestrated such
abduction. Moreover, the claim of the petitioner that she was taken to Fort Magsaysay was not
adequately established by her mere estimate of the time it took to reach the place where she
was detained and by the sounds that she heard while thereat. On account of this insufficiency in
evidence, a pronouncement of responsibility on the part of the public respondents, therefore,
cannot be made.
PROVISIONS APPLICABLE ​(not mentioned in the case but relevant to the topic)
Rule 130 – 7. Opinion Rule
SECTION 51. General Rule. ​— The opinion of a witness is not admissible, except as indicated
in the following sections. (48)
SECTION 52. Opinion of Expert Witness. ​— The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring
special knowledge, skill, experience, training or education, which he or she is shown to possess,
may be received in evidence. (49a)
SECTION 53. Opinion of Ordinary Witnesses. ​— The opinion of a witness, for which proper
basis is given, may be received in evidence regarding —
(a) The identity of a person about whom he or she has adequate knowledge;
(b) A handwriting with which he or she has sufficient familiarity; and
(c) The mental sanity of a person with whom he or she is sufficiently acquainted.
The witness may also testify on his or her impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or
appearance of a person. (50a)
DOCTRINE
In amparo proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to parallel circumstances as evidence
of military involvement depends largely on the availability or non-availability of other pieces of
evidence that has the potential of directly proving the identity and affiliation of the perpetrators.
Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable, must be preferred over mere circumstantial
evidence based on patterns and similarity, because the former indubitably offers greater
certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of the perpetrators.
In this case, the SC said practically said that the petitioner’s claim that the respondents were
responsible for her abduction and that she was taken to Fort Magsaysay were a mere opinion of
the petitioner.
FACTS
1. Petitioner Melissa Roxas​, an American citizen of Filipino descent, while in the United
States, ​enrolled in an exposure program to the Philippines with the group
Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-United States of America (BAYAN- USA) of
which she is a member.
2. On 19 May 2009, after doing survey work in Tarlac, Roxas and her companions rested
in the house of Mr. Jesus Paolo in Sitio Bagong Sikat.
o While Roxas and her companions were resting, 15 heavily armed men in
civilian clothes forcibly entered the house and dragged them inside a van.
o When they alighted from the van, she was informed that she is being
detained for being a member of Communist Party of the Philippines-New
People’s Army (CPP-NPA).
o She was then ​separated from her companions and was escorted to a
room that she believed was a jail cell from the sound of its metal
doors. From there, she could hear sounds of gunfire, noise of planes
taking off and landing, and some construction bustle.
3. She was ​interrogated and tortured for 5 straight days to convince her to
abandon her communist beliefs. The ​torture​, on the other hand, consisted of
taunting, choking, boxing and suffocating the petitioner​.
o Throughout the entirety of her ordeal, petitioner was made to suffer in
blindfolds even in her sleep. Petitioner was only relieved of her blindfolds
when she was allowed to take a bath.
o There were also a few times when she cheated her blindfold and was able
to peek at her surroundings.
4. Despite being deprived of sight, however, petitioner was still able to learn the
names of three of her interrogators who introduced themselves to her as "Dex,"
"James" and "RC."
o She was informed by “RC” that those who tortured her came from the
“Special Operations Group” and that she was abducted because her
name is included in the “Order of Battle.”
5. On 25 May 2009, Roxas was finally released and was given a cellular phone with a
sim card, a slip of paper containing an e-mail address with password, a plastic bag
containing biscuits and books, 34 the handcuffs used on her, a blouse and a pair of
shoes.
o She was sternly warned not to report the incident to the group Karapatan or
something untoward will happen to her and her family.
o After her release, Roxas continued to receive calls from RC thru the cell
phone given to her. Out of apprehension, she threw the phone and the sim
card.
6. Hence, on 01 June 2009, ​Roxas filed a petition for the issuance of Writs of Amparo
and Habeas Data before the Supreme Court, impleading the high-ranking officials of
 military and Philippine National Police (PNP), on the belief that it was the government
agents who were behind her abduction and torture.
7. On 09 June 2009, the Supreme Court issued the writs and referred the case to the
Court of Appeals for hearing, reception of evidence and appropriate action.
o The public respondents interposed the following defenses as a response:
▪ Petitioner's alleged abduction and torture as "stage managed”.
● In support of their accusation, the public respondents
principally rely on the statement of Mr. Paolo, as
contained in the Special Report of the La Paz Police
Statin where it was disclosed that, prior to the purported
abduction, petitioner and her companions instructed
him and his two sons to avoid leaving the house.
● From this statement, the public respondents drew the
distinct possibility that, except for those already inside
Mr. Paolo's house, nobody else has any way of
knowing where petitioner and her companions were at
the time they were supposedly abducted
▪ The Medical Certificate of the petitioner, as actually belies her
claims that she was subjected to serious torture for 5 days
● While the petitioner alleges that she was choked and
boxed by her abductors — inflictions that could have
easily produced remarkable bruises — her Medical
Certificate only shows abrasions in her wrists and
kneecaps.
▪ The petitioner’s claims of abduction and torture was no more than
a charade fabricated by the petitioner to put the government in
bad light, and at the same time, bring great media mileage to her
and the group that she represents.
● The above anomalies put in question the very
authenticity of petitioner's alleged abduction and torture,
more so any military or police involvement therein
▪ Nevertheless, even assuming the abduction and torture to be
genuine, the public respondents insist on the dismissal of the
Amparo and Habeas Data petition based on the following
grounds:
● (a) as against respondent President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo because of her immunity from suit
and
● (b) as against all of the public respondents, in general,
in view of the absence of any specific allegation in the
petition that they had participated in, or at least
authorized, the commission of such atrocities.
▪ Finally, the public respondents posit that they had not been
remiss in their duty to ascertain the truth behind the allegations of
the petitioner as both the police and military arms of the
government machinery undertook actions.
8. The Court of Appeals granted the privilege of writs of amparo and habeas data.
However, the court a quo absolved the respondents because it was not convinced that
the respondents were responsible for the abduction and torture of Roxas.
9. Aggrieved, Roxas filed an appeal with the Supreme Court.
ISSUES, HELD, RATIO ​(Issue 2 is relevant)
1) Whether or not the doctrine of command responsibility is applicable in an amparo petition.–
NO
Petitioner: ​Court of Appeals erred in absolving the public respondents from any responsibility in
her abduction and torture.
o Petitioner insists that the ​manner by which her abduction and torture was carried
out, as well as the sounds of construction, gunfire and airplanes that she heard
while in detention​, as these were detailed in her two affidavits and affirmed by her in
open court, ​are already sufficient evidence to prove government involvement.
o Proceeding from such assumption, ​petitioner invokes the doctrine of command
responsibility to implicate the high-ranking civilian and military authorities she
impleaded as respondents in her amparo petition.
SC:
Petitioner’s ​use of the doctrine of command responsibility as the justification in impleading
the public respondents in her amparo petition​, is legally inaccurate, if not incorrect.
o The ​doctrine of command responsibility is a rule of substantive law that establishes
liability and, by this account​, cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a
party-respondent in an amparo petition.
o As held in the case of ​Rubrico v. Arroyo​, the ​writ of amparo is ​a protective remedy
aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of the appropriate remedial measures and
directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to address specific violations or
threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or security.
o It does not fix liability for such disappearance, killing or threats,
whether that may be criminal, civil or administrative under the
applicable substantive law.
o Since the application of command responsibility presupposes an
imputation of individual liability, it is more aptly invoked in a full-blown
criminal or administrative case rather than in a summary amparo
proceeding.
o However, the inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility does
not preclude impleading military or police commanders on the ground that
the complained acts in the petition were committed with their direct or
indirect acquiescence.
▪ In which case, commanders may be impleaded — not actually on
the basis of command responsibility—but rather on the ground of
their responsibility, or at least accountability.
2) ​[RELEVANT] Whether the totality of evidence presented by the petitioner inspire reasonable
conclusion that her abductors were military or police personnel and that she was detained at
Fort Magsaysay ​(i.e., Whether the respondents are responsible for petitioenr’s abduction) ​– ​NO
Petitioner: ​ascribes some form of responsibility on the part of the respondents, based on her
assumption that they, in one way or the other, had condoned her abduction and torture. To
establish this assumption, she attempted to show that it was the government agents who were
behind her ordeal:
o The circumstances surrounding her abduction and torture — i.e., the forcible
taking in broad daylight; use of vehicles with no license plates; utilization of blindfolds;
conducting interrogations to elicit communist inclinations; and the infliction of physical
abuse — ​are consistent with the way enforced disappearances are being
practiced by the military or other state forces
o From the travel time required to reach the place where she was actually detained, and
also from the sounds of construction, gun-fire and airplanes she heard while thereat,
 she inferred and claimed that she was held inside the military camp Fort
Magsaysay
SC: SC is not impressed. The totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner does not
inspire reasonable conclusion that her abductors were military or police personnel and that she
was detained at Fort Magsaysay.
o First. ​The similarity between the circumstances attending a particular case of
abduction with those surrounding previous instances of enforced disappearances
does not, necessarily, carry sufficient weight to prove that the government
orchestrated such abduction.
o In amparo proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to parallel
circumstances as evidence of military involvement depends largely on
the availability or non-availability of other pieces of evidence ​that has
the potential of directly proving the identity and affiliation of the perpetrators.
▪ Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable, must be
preferred over mere circumstantial evidence based on
patterns and similarity, because the former indubitably offers
greater certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of the
perpetrators.
o IN THIS CASE: The petitioner was able to include in her Offer of Exhibits
the cartographic sketches of several of her abductors whose faces she
managed to see. ​While these may have given the certainty as to the
true identity and affiliation of her abductors, this potential had not
been realized because the faces described in such sketches remain
unidentified, much less have been shown to be that of any military or
police personnel​. Bluntly stated, the abductors were not proven to be part
of either the military or the police chain of command.
o Second. The ​claim of the petitioner that she was taken to Fort Magsaysay was
not adequately established by her mere estimate of the time it took to reach the
place where she was detained and by the sounds that she heard while thereat
o SC is not inclined to take the estimate and observations of the
petitioner as accurate on its face — ​not only because they were made
mostly while she was in blindfolds, but also in view of the fact that she
was a mere sojourner in the Philippines, whose familiarity with Fort
Magsaysay and the travel time required to reach it is in itself doubtful.
o With nothing else but obscure observations to support it, petitioner's
claim that she was taken to Fort Magsaysay remains a mere
speculation.
In sum, the petitioner was not able to establish to a concrete point that her abductors were
actually affiliated, whether formally or informally, with the military or the police organizations.
o Neither does the evidence at hand prove that petitioner was indeed taken to the
military camp Fort Magsaysay to the exclusion of other places. These evidentiary
gaps, in turn, make it virtually impossible to determine whether the abduction and
torture of the petitioner was in fact committed with the acquiescence of the public
respondents.
o On account of this insufficiency in evidence, a pronouncement of responsibility
on the part of the public respondents, therefore, cannot be made.
3) Whether the petitioner’s prayer for the return of her personal belongings shall be granted –
NO
SC agreed with the CA’s decision to deny this prayer of the petitioner by reason of the
failure of the latter to prove that the public respondents were involved in her abduction
and torture. To the mind of this Court, the prayer of the petitioner for the return of her
belongings is doomed to fail regardless of whether there is sufficient evidence to hold public
respondents responsible for the abduction of the petitioner.
o In the first place, an order directing the public respondents to return the personal
belongings of the petitioner is already equivalent to a conclusive pronouncement of
liability. ​The order itself is a substantial relief that can only be granted once the
liability of the public respondents has been fixed in a full and exhaustive
proceeding. As already discussed above, matters of liability are not determinable in a
mere summary amparo proceeding.
o More importantly, ​the scope and extent of the writ of amparo clearly excludes the
protection of property rights. A person's right to be restituted of his property is
already subsumed under the general rubric of property rights — which are no longer
protected by the writ of amparo.
4) Whether the petitioner’s prayer for an inspection of the detention areas of Fort Magsaysay
shall be granted – ​NO
SC agreed with the CA’s decision to deny this prayer of the petitioner because a contrary
stance would be equivalent to sanctioning a "fishing expedition," which was never
intended by the Amparo Rule in providing for the interim relief of inspection order.
A ​basic requirement before an amparo court may grant an inspection order is that the
place to be inspected is reasonably determinable from the allegations of the party
seeking the order.
o While the Amparo Rule does not require that the place to be inspected be identified
with clarity and precision, ​it is, nevertheless, a minimum for the issuance of an
inspection order that the supporting allegations of a party be sufficient in itself,
so as to make a prima facie case.
IN THIS CASE:​ Petitioner failed to give sufficient supporting allegations.
o Since the very estimates and observations of the petitioner are not strong enough to
make out a prima facie case that she was detained in Fort Magsaysay, an inspection
of the military camp cannot be ordered.
o An inspection order cannot issue on the basis of allegations that are, in
themselves, unreliable and doubtful.
5) Whether the petitioner’s writ of habeas data shall be granted – ​NO
CA: ​granted to the petitioner the privilege of the writ of habeas data, by enjoining the public
respondents from "distributing or causing the distribution to the public any records in whatever
form, reports, documents or similar papers" relative to the petitioner's "alleged ties with the
CPP-NPA or pertinently related to her abduction and torture.
SC: CA’s ruling is problematic because there was ​no evidence on record that shows that any
of the public respondents had violated or threatened the right to privacy of the petitioner.
The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to
privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy of individuals.
● It operates to protect a person's right to control information regarding himself,
particularly in the instances where such information is being collected through unlawful
means in order to achieve unlawful ends.
● An indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may be extended
is the showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened
violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim.

IN THIS CASE: ​The petitioner failed to show an actual or threatened violation of her right to
privacy in life, liberty or security.
● The act ascribed by the Court of Appeals to the public respondents that would
have violated or threatened the right to privacy of the petitioner​, i.e., keeping
records of investigations and other reports about the petitioner's ties with the
CPP-NPA, was not adequately proven — considering that the origin of such records
were virtually unexplained and its existence, ​clearly, only inferred by the appellate
court from the video and photograph released by Representatives Palparan and
Alcover in their press conference.
● No evidence on record even shows that any of the public respondents had
access to such video or photograph.
● Therefore, ​the directive by the Court of Appeals enjoining the public respondents
from "distributing or causing the distribution to the public any records in whatever form,
reports, documents or similar papers" relative to the petitioner's "alleged ties with the
CPP-NPA," ​appears to be devoid of any legal basis.
o The public respondents cannot be ordered to refrain from distributing
something that, in the first place, it was not proven to have.
Disposition of the Case:
1) ​Further investigation with the use of extraordinary diligence must be made in order to
identify the perpetrators behind the abduction and torture of the petitioner​.
● The extraordinary diligence, as required by the Amparo Rule, was not fully observed in
the conduct of the police and military investigations in the case at bar.
o Task Group CAROJAN placed the fate of their investigations solely on
the cooperation or non-cooperation of the petitioner — who, they claim,
was less than enthusiastic in participating in their investigative efforts.
▪ While it may be conceded that the participation of the petitioner
would have facilitated the progress of Task Group CAROJAN's
investigation, ​this Court believes that the former's reticence to
cooperate is hardly an excuse for Task Group CAROJAN not
to explore other means or avenues from which they could
obtain relevant leads.
o Assuming the non-cooperation of the petitioner, Task Group
CAROJAN's reports still failed to explain why it never considered
seeking the assistance of Mr. Jesus Paolo — who, along with the
victims, is a central witness to the abduction.
▪ The recollection of Mr. Paolo could have served as a comparative
material to the sketches included in petitioner's offer of exhibits
that, it may be pointed out, were prepared under the direction of,
and first submitted to, the CHR pursuant to the latter's
independent investigation on the abduction and torture of the
petitioner. But as mentioned earlier, the CHR sketches remain to
be unidentified as of this date.
2) The ​Commission on Human Rights (CHR), pursuant to its Constitutional mandate to
"investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights and to provide
appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights," ​must be tapped in order to fill
certain investigative and remedial voids.
● SC noted that the CHR, unlike the police or the military, seems to enjoy the trust
and confidence of the petitioner as evidenced by her attendance and
participation in the hearings already conducted by the commission.
o Certainly, it would be reasonable to assume from such cooperation that the
investigations of the CHR have advanced, or at the very least, bears the
most promise of advancing farther, in terms of locating the perpetrators of
the abduction, and is thus, vital for a final resolution of this petition.
o From this perspective, SC also deemed it just and appropriate to
relegate the task of affording interim protection to the petitioner, also
to the CHR
Accordingly, CA decision is modified:
● CHR is appointed as the lead agency tasked with conducting further investigation
regarding the abduction and torture of the petitioner.
● Further directing the CHR to (a) furnish to the CA within ninety (90) days from receipt
of this decision, a copy of the reports on its investigation and its corresponding
recommendations; and to (b) provide or continue to provide protection to the petitioner
during her stay or visit to the Philippines, until such time as may hereinafter be
determined by this Court.
● The incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP), or his successor, and the
incumbent Chief of Staff of the AFP, or his successor, are directed to extend
assistance to the ongoing investigation of the CHR and to furnish the CHR a copy of
the reports of the investigations and their recommendations.
This case is referred back to the Court of Appeals, for the purposes of monitoring compliance
with the above directives and determining whether, in light of any recent reports or
recommendations, there would already be sufficient evidence to hold any of the public
respondents responsible or, at least, accountable.
RULING
Instant petition is partially meritorious.
AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioner's prayer for the return of her personal belongings;
AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioner's prayer for an inspection of the detention areas of Fort
Magsaysay.
REVERSING the grant of the privilege of habeas data, without prejudice, however, to any
modification that this Court may make on the basis of the investigation reports and
recommendations submitted to it under this decision.
MODIFYING the directive that further investigation must be undertaken.
[222] MARCOS v. HEIRS OF NAVARRO​2
G.R. No. 198240 | July 03, 2013 | Villarama, Jr., J.
TOPIC: Opinion Rule
SUMMARY: ​When the spouses Navarro died, their grandchildren by their son Andres claimed
ownership of one of the parcels of land they left behind on the strength of an Affidavit of Transfer
of Real Property allegedly executed by the late Andres Navarro Sr. Petitioner Luisa and her
sister Lydia, daughters of the Navarros, had the Affidavit examined by PO2 Alvarez, who found
that Andres, Sr.’s signature on the affidavit and the submitted standard signatures of Andres, Sr.
were not written by one and the same person. The sisters sued the respondents for annulment
of the deed of donation before the RTC of Masbate. The RTC disqualified PO2 Alvarez as
witness, ruling that her supposed testimony would be hearsay as she has no personal
knowledge of the alleged handwriting of Andres, Sr. The Court held that PO2 Alvarez was
qualified as a witness because she possessed all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications of a competent witness under the RoC. The Rules allow the opinion of an expert
witness to be received as evidence.
DOCTRINE:
The value of the opinion of a handwriting expert depends not upon his mere statements of
whether a writing is genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may afford in pointing out
distinguishing marks, characteristics and discrepancies in and between genuine and false
specimens of writing which would ordinarily escape notice or detection from an unpracticed
observer.
The use of the word “may” in Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence signifies that the
use of opinion of an expert witness is permissive and not mandatory on the part of the courts.
However, we have also recognized that handwriting experts are often offered as expert
witnesses considering the technical nature of the procedure in examining forged documents.
FACTS
● Spouses Andres Navarro, Sr. and Concepcion Medina-Navarro died in 1958 and 1993,
respectively.
o They left behind several parcels of land including a 108.3997-hectare lot (subject
lot) located in Cayabon, Milagros, Masbate.
● The spouses were survived by their daughters Luisa Navarro Marcos, herein petitioner, and
Lydia Navarro Grageda, and the heirs of their only son Andres Navarro, Jr.
o The heirs of Andres, Jr. are the respondents herein.
● Petitioner and her sister Lydia discovered that respondents are claiming exclusive
ownership of the subject lot.
o Respondents based their claim on the Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property dated
May 19, 1954 where Andres, Sr. donated the subject lot to Andres, Jr.
● Believing that the affidavit is a forgery, the sisters, through Assistant Fiscal Andres Marcos,
requested a handwriting examination of the affidavit.
o The PNP handwriting expert PO2 Mary Grace Alvarez found that Andres, Sr.’s
signature on the affidavit and the submitted standard signatures of Andres,
Sr. were not written by one and the same person​.
● Thus, the sisters sued the respondents for annulment of the deed of donation before the
RTC of Masbate, where the case was docketed as Civil Case No. 5215.
2
OG Digest by Mitzi Syjongtian 
● After the pre-trial, respondents moved to disqualify PO2 Alvarez as a witness.
o They argued that the RTC did not authorize the handwriting examination of the
affidavit. They added that presenting PO2 Alvarez as a witness will violate their
constitutional right to due process since no notice was given to them before the
examination was conducted.
o Thus, PO2 Alvarez’s report is a worthless piece of paper and her testimony
would be useless and irrelevant.
● RTC granted respondents’ motion and disqualified PO2 Alvarez as a witness.
o The RTC ruled that PO2 Alvarez’s supposed testimony would be hearsay as she
has no personal knowledge of the alleged handwriting of Andres, Sr.
o Also, there is no need for PO2 Alvarez to be presented, if she is to be presented
as an expert witness, because her testimony is not yet needed.
o Sisters’ MR: denied.
● CA: denied certiorari on the ground that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 5215 has mooted
the issue of PO2 Alvarez’s disqualification as a witness.
o MR: denied
▪ CA refused to take judicial notice of the decision of another CA Division
which reinstated Civil Case No. 5215. The CA held that a CA Justice
cannot take judicial notice of decisions or matters pending before
another Division of the appellate court where he or she is not a
member. The CA also held that the sisters were negligent for belatedly
informing it that Civil Case No. 5215 was reinstated.
PROCEDURE
● Petitioner filed for annulment of deed of donation based on finding of PNP handwriting
expert PO2 Mary Grace Alvarez that the ​signature on the affidavit of transfer and the
submitted standard signatures of Andres, Sr. were not written by one and the same
person​.
● After the pre-trial, respondents moved to disqualify PO2 Alvarez as a witness.
ARGUMENTS AND EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY PLAINTIFF/PROSECUTION
● PO2 Alvarez’s handwriting examination report
ARGUMENTS AND EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY DEFENDANT
● Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property dated May 19, 1954 where Andres, Sr. donated the
subject lot to Andres, Jr.
● As to disqualify PO2 Alvarez as a witness.
o They argued that the RTC did not authorize the handwriting examination of the
affidavit. They added that presenting PO2 Alvarez as a witness will violate their
constitutional right to due process since no notice was given to them before the
examination was conducted.
o Thus, PO2 Alvarez’s report is a worthless piece of paper and her testimony
would be useless and irrelevant.
ISSUE/S
1. W/N CA erred in refusing to reconsider the assailed decision in light of the
reinstatement of Civil Case No. 5215? YES
2. W/N PO2 Alvarez was correctly disqualified as a witness [NO]
RATIO
For #1
● The CA ruling that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 5215 has mooted the issue of PO2
Alvarez’s disqualification as a witness can no longer be justified. Hence, we reverse the
CA ruling.
● While we agree with the CA in considering the RTC’s Orders which dismissed Civil Case
No. 5215, we are unable to agree with its refusal to take judicial notice of the Decision of
another CA Division which reinstated Civil Case No. 5215. Subsequent proceedings were
even held in the reinstated Civil Case No. 5215 per Orders issued by the RTC which were
already submitted to the CA. That Civil Case No. 5215 was reinstated is a fact that cannot
be ignored.
For #2
● We also agree with petitioner that the RTC committed GAOD in disqualifying PO2 Alvarez
as a witness.
● In ​Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits System v. Republic
of the Philippines​, ​we said that a witness must only possess all the qualifications and none
of the disqualifications provided in the Rules of Court.
● Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence provides:
o SEC. 20. ​Witnesses; their qualifications.​ –Except as provided in the next
succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make
known their perception to others, may be witnesses.
Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a
crime unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification.
● Specific rules of witness disqualification are provided under Sections 21 to 24, Rule 130 of
the Rules on Evidence.
o Section 21 disqualifies a witness by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity.
o Section 22 disqualifies a witness by reason of marriage.
o Section 23 disqualifies a witness by reason of death or insanity of the adverse
party.
o Section 24 disqualifies a witness by reason of privileged communication.
● In ​Cavili v. Judge Florendo,​ we have held that the specific enumeration of disqualified
witnesses excludes the operation of causes of disability other than those mentioned in the
Rules. The Rules should not be interpreted to include an exception not embodied therein.
We said:
o The generosity with which the Rule allows people to testify is apparent. Interest
in the outcome of a case, conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law,
and religious belief are not grounds for disqualification.
Sections 19 and 20 of Rule 130 provide for specific disqualifications. Section 19
disqualifies those who are mentally incapacitated and children whose tender age
or immaturity renders them incapable of being witnesses. Section 20 provides
for disqualification based on conflicts of interest or on relationship. Section 21
provides for disqualification based on privileged communications. Section 15 of
Rule 132 may not be a rule on disqualification of witnesses but it states the
grounds when a witness may be impeached by the party against whom he was
called.
There is no provision of the Rules disqualifying parties declared in default from
taking the witness stand for non-disqualified parties. The law does not provide
default as an exception. The specific enumeration of disqualified witnesses
excludes the operation of causes of disability other than those mentioned in the
Rules. It is a maxim of recognized utility and merit in the construction of statutes
that an express exception, exemption, or saving clause excludes other
exceptions. x x x As a general rule, where there are express exceptions these
comprise the only limitations on the operation of a statute and no other exception
will be implied. x x x The Rules should not be interpreted to include an exception
not embodied therein.
● As a handwriting expert of the PNP, PO2 Alvarez can surely perceive and make known her
perception to others. We have no doubt that she is qualified as a witness. She cannot be
disqualified as a witness since she possesses none of the disqualifications specified under
the Rules.
o Respondents’ motion to disqualify her should have been denied by the RTC for it
was not based on any of these grounds for disqualification. The RTC rather
confused the qualification of the witness with the credibility and weight of her
testimony.
● Moreover, Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence is clear that the opinion of
an expert witness may be received in evidence, to wit:
o SEC. 49. ​Opinion of expert witness.​–The opinion of a witness on a matter
requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is
shown to possess, may be received in evidence.
● For instance, in ​Tamani v. Salvador,​ ​we were inclined to believe that Tamani’s signature
was forged after considering the testimony of the PNP document examiner that the case
involved simulated or copied forgery, such that the similarities will be superficial.
o We said that the value of the opinion of a handwriting expert depends not
upon his mere statements of whether a writing is genuine or false, but upon
the assistance he may afford in pointing out distinguishing marks,
characteristics and discrepancies in and between genuine and false
specimens of writing which would ordinarily escape notice or detection
from an unpracticed observer.
● Thus, we disagree with the RTC that PO2 Alvarez’s testimony would be hearsay.
Under Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, PO2 Alvarez is allowed to
render an expert opinion, as the PNP document examiner was allowed in ​Tamani​.​
o But the RTC already ruled at the outset that PO2 Alvarez’s testimony is hearsay
even before her testimony is offered and she is called to the witness stand.
Under the circumstances, the CA should have issued a corrective writ of
certiorari and annulled the RTC ruling.
● True, the use of the word “may” in Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence signifies that the use of opinion of an expert witness is permissive and not
mandatory on the part of the courts. ​Jurisprudence is also replete with instances
wherein this Court dispensed with the testimony of expert witnesses to prove
forgeries.
o However, we have also recognized that handwriting experts are often
offered as expert witnesses considering the technical nature of the
procedure in examining forged documents.
o More important, analysis of the questioned signature in the deed of donation
executed by the late Andres Navarro, Sr. in crucial to the resolution of the case.
● In sum, the RTC should not have disqualified PO2 Alvarez as a witness. She has the
qualifications of witness and possess none of the disqualifications under the Rules. The
Rules allow the opinion of an expert witness to be received as evidence. In ​Tamani​, we
used the opinion of an expert witness. The value of PO2 Alvarez’s expert opinion cannot
be determined if PO2 Alvarez is not even allowed to testify on the handwriting examination
she conducted.
RULING
WHEREFORE​, we ​GRANT​ the petition. We ​SET ASIDE​ the (1) Decision dated February 28,
2011 and Resolution dated July 29, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 92460, and
(2) Orders dated August 19, 2004 and October 11, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case
No. 5215. We ​DENY​ respondents’ motion to disqualify PO2 Mary Grace Alvarez as a witness.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
[223] Tolentino v. Sps. Jerrera
GR No. 179874 | June 22, 2015 | J. Peralta
SUMMARY: ​Amado acquired land from the heirs of Guillermo Jerera when they failed to
exercise their right to repurchase the property. Amado then consolidated his ownership over it,
then allegedly sold it to Servillano. Servillano then executed a DoS in favor of his daughter
RESP Maria. PETs filed a n action for quieting of title, recovery of property and damages before
the RTC, alleging that the Deed of Sale between Amado and Servillano was forged. RTC held in
favor of PETs, but CA reversed, saying that the Deed and the documentary evidence presented
by the PETs were mere photocopies and so the documentary bases for comparison were not
admitted. SC pointed out that the RTC directed in its dispositive the submission of the
documents to the NBI for examination and that it was allowable for the PETs to present the
photocopy before the court because the originals were still with the NBI. SC agreed that the
documents were forged, but that Maria was a holder for value and that PETs were barred by
laches.
DOCTRINE: ​The finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimonies of handwriting
experts because the judge must conduct an independent examination of a questioned signature
in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity.
FACTS:
● The subject property is a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 3789 with an area of
about 5,028 sqm., located in Roro, Sorsogon, covered by OCT No. 12494 and
registered on May 5, 1931 in the names of 6 co-owners who inherited it from
Guillermo Jerera:
o Servillano, Dionisia, Teofilo, and Cipriano each had a 1/5 share in the
property, while Maria and Rosa each had a 1/10 share. All of them are
surnamed Jerera.
● On June 27, 1933, Servillano, Dionisia, Teofilo, and Cipriano, and conveyed by way of
sale with right to repurchase within 2 years to Amado Dio, his heir and assigns, a
10,000 sqm. coconut land in Sorsogon for P122.
● On Dec. 7, 1967, Amado executed an affidavit of consolidation of ownership, stating
that Servillano, Dionesia, Teofilo and Cipriano have neither exercised their right to
repurchase the subject property within the 2-year period nor paid the amount of P122.
Thus, Amado consolidated his absolute ownership over the property, gave his children
and legal heirs the right to inherit it, and himself the right to administer and to dispose
of it.
o Amado declared the subject property in his name for taxation purposes
under Tax Dec. No. 9273.
● On Jan. 14, 1970, the Sps. Amado Dio and Modesta Domer allegedly executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale of the subject property in favor of Servillano for P585. On even
date, the property was declared for taxation purposes in Servillano’s name under Tax
Dec. No. 10326 which cancelled Tax Dec. No. 9273 in Amado’s name.
● On May 25, 1971, Servillano executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of the subject property
for P585 in favor of his daughter, Maria Jerera (Maria). [FIRST DEED OF SALE].
o Maria declared the property in her name for taxation purposes under Tax
Dec. No. 4826, which cancelled Tax Dec. No. 10326 in Servillano’s name.
● On Nov. 24, 1977, Servillano executed again a Deed of Absolute Sale of the subject
property for P585 in favor of Maria. [SECOND DEED OF SALE].
o Servillano also executed a Self-Adjudication of Real Property18 over the
same property, claiming that he was the only surviving co-owner; that his
co-owners had all died intestate without any debts and obligations; and that
pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 he adjudicated unto himself, his heirs and
assigns, the entire property.
● On October 27, 1978, Servillano caused OCT No. 1249 to be cancelled and TCT No.
T-1536422 to be issued and registered in his name. The subject property was
subdivided into 7 lots, under 7 different TCTs, all named under Maria.
● On May 21, 1998, petitioners Adelfa Dio Tolentino, Virginia, Renato, and Heirs of
Roberto, all surnamed Dio, filed a complaint before the RTC for quieting of title,
recovery of property and damages against Maria, her husband, and their heirs
(respondents). Petitioners allege that:
o The Deed of Sale executed on Jan. 14, 1970 by the Sps. Amado and
Modesta, conveying the property to Servillano, is simulated and/or fictitious
for being a forgery, hence, all transactions emanating from it are null and
void.
● In their answer, respondents claim that:
o The property was validly conveyed to Servillano thru a Deed of Sale on Jan.
14, 1970. Servillano, in turn, sold the same to Maria in the FIRST DEED OF
SALE, which was confirmed thru the SECOND DEED OF SALE.
o Having acquired the property for value and good faith and having been in
continuous and uninterrupted possession as owners for over 30 years since
1950, respondents have caused the property to be subdivided and
constructed residential buildings thereon.
o If indeed Amado was the owner of the property, he and petitioners should
have asserted adverse claims on it against respondents, instead of
remaining silent and sleeping on their rights.
● The RTC ruled in favor of petitioners, ruling that the Deed of Sale by Sps. Amado and
Modesta in favor of Servillano is simulated or fictitious for being a forgery:
o The testimony of the NBI document examiner Efren Flores declares that the
signature of Amado Dio in the questioned document of sale is significantly
different from that as appearing in sanitary permit and community tax
certificate which signature/s affixed thereon were made the basis of
comparison with the aforecited questioned document.
● The CA reversed the RTC and declared the validity of the Deed of Sale:
o The best evidence of a forged signature is an instrument itself reflecting the
alleged forged signature. The fact of forgery can only be established by a
comparison between the alleged forged signature and the authentic and
genuine signature of the person whose signature is theorized upon to have
been forged.
o Without the original document containing the alleged forged signature, one
cannot make a definitive comparison which would establish forgery. A
comparison based on a mere xerox copy or reproduction of the document
under controversy, such as the Deed of Sale in this case, cannot produce
reliable results.
o Under Sec. 22, Rule 132, evidence respecting the handwriting may also be
given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings
admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is
offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.
▪ However, the documentary bases for such comparison were mere
photocopies which were, in fact, not admitted, the court cannot
make one.
ISSUE w/ HOLDING:
[1] W/N this petition should be dismissed as to the other co-petitioners who did not sign
the verification a certification against forum shopping – NO
● Only petitioner Adelfa Tolentino signed the same, without any showing that she was
authorized to represent her co-petitioners. However, verification is deemed
substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth
of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters
alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.
● When all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common
cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification
against forum shopping substantially complies with the Rules.
[2 - RELEVANT] W/N the signatures of the Sps. Amado and Modesta were forged – YES
● Contrary to respondents’ claim that no original documents were submitted to the NBI,
records show that the RTC ordered the original copies of Exhibit K, the questioned
Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 14, 1970, and Exhibits L-2, L-4, L-6, M, M-2, the
documents containing the standard specimen signature of Amado and Modesta, to be
submitted to it for examination purposes by the NBI.
● Thereafter, the NBI transmitted a copy of Questioned Documents Report No. 196-300
which provided that the questioned document and the standard signatures of Amado
were not written by one and the same person, but no definite opinion can be rendered
on the signature of Modesta due to insufficiency of specimen submitted for
comparative analysis.
o The document containing the questioned signatures was examined and
photographed at the Office of the Provincial Assessor of Sorsogon, while
the other specimens submitted were then being retained in the NBI office for
safekeeping.
● Had petitioners really failed to submit the original copies then the trial court would
have simply refused to send them over to the NBI. That the NBI complied with the said
order by submitting the Questioned Documents Report confirms the Court’s view that
the original copies of the said Exhibits were submitted to the trial court and then turned
over to the NBI.
● Granted that petitioner’s formal offer of evidence included only photocopies,
respondents admitted the existence of such exhibits, but never objected to their
admission for being mere photocopies.
● On the alleged bias and partiality on the part of the NBI expert witness due to the
admitted fact that petitioners extended him a loan for his appendectomy, this does not
militate against the witness’ credibility.
o Petitioners’ eagerness to prove their cause which is mainly anchored on the
said expert witness’ testimony, should also be viewed alongside the
justifiable reasons of the urgency of his medical condition and the lack of
available funds to address it.
o Petitioners’ justification is supported by a duly notarized medical certificate
stating that the NBI expert witness, Efren Flores underwent an
appendectomy and was confined at Sorsogon Medical Mission Group
Hospital.
● The finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimonies of handwriting
experts because the judge must conduct an independent examination of a questioned
signature in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity.
o Upon a careful examination of pieces of documentary evidence such as the
sanitary permits and the affidavit of extrajudicial settlement signed by the
Spouses, the Court finds that petitioners have successfully proved that both
signatures of Amado and Modesta in the Deed of Absolute Sale were
indeed forged.
[3] W/N Maria is a buyer in good faith – YES
● A forged or fraudulent document may become the root of a valid title, if the property
has already been transferred from the name of the owner to that of the forger, and
then to that of an innocent purchaser for value.
o Rationale: a person who deals with registered property in good faith will
acquire a good title from a forger and be absolutely protected by a Torrens
title. A prospective buyer of a property registered under the Torrens system
need not go beyond the title, especially when she has no notice of any
badge of fraud or defect that would place her on guard.
● The burden of proving the status of a purchaser in good faith lies upon one who
asserts that status and this onus probandi cannot be discharged by mere invocation of
the legal presumption of good faith.
o A purchaser in good faith is one who buys property without notice that some
other person has a right to or interest in such property and pays its fair price
before she has notice of the adverse claims and interest of another person
in the same property.
o The honesty of intention which constitutes good faith implies a freedom from
knowledge of circumstances which ought to put a person on inquiry.
● The fact that Maria was aware of the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
May 25, 1971, and the Deed of Absolute Sale and the Self-Adjudication of Real
Property both dated Nov. 24, 1977, does not constitute knowledge of a defect or lack
of title of the vendor, or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent person to
inquire into the status such title.
o The second deed of sale was merely a confirmation of the first sale and not
an indication of knowledge on her part that the document of conveyance
from the primitive owner is void ab initio. Nor was it an attempt to ratify an
otherwise null Deed of Absolute Sale.
● The burden of proving the alleged simulation of a contract falls on those who impugn
its regularity and validity. A failure to discharge this duty will result in the upholding of
the contract.
o The primary consideration in determining whether a contract is simulated is
the intention of the parties as manifested by the express terms of the
agreement itself, as well as the contemporaneous and subsequent actions
of the parties.
o The most striking index of simulation is not the filial relationship between the
purported seller and buyer, but the complete absence of any attempt in any
manner on the part of the latter to assert rights of dominion over the
disputed property.
● As to the lack of consideration for the second deed of sale, it is presumed that a
written contract is for a valuable consideration. Thus, the execution of a deed
purporting to convey ownership of a realty is in itself prima facie evidence of the
existence of a valuable consideration and the party alleging lack of consideration has
the burden of proving such allegation.
 o Maria aptly explained that she no longer paid for a consideration for the
second Deed of Absolute Sale as it was a mere confirmation of the first
Deed of Absolute sale of the subject property for which she had paid P585.
o Her voluntary declaration of the subject property for taxation purposes and
payment of such tax strengthens her bona fide claim of title over the
property.
o Furthermore, after the Spouses sold the property to Servillano, the Jereras
asserted dominion over the subject property by taking possession and
claiming ownership of it. Hence, such sale cannot be considered simulated.

[4] W/N petitioners’ cause of action is barred by prescription – YES

● Neither Amado, who was living nearby the property, nor any of his
successors-in-interests — not to mention petitioner Adelfa who admitted having been
a long-time neighbor of Maria — have taken any appropriate action for the recovery of
its ownership and possession from respondents, despite having been registered in
Servillano’s name on Oct. 27, 1978 through the forged Jan. 14, 1970 Deed of
Absolute Sale.
● An action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust
prescribes in ten years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the
deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property.
o But this rule applies only when the plaintiff is not in possession of the
property, since if a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual
possession of the property, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect
seeks to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe.
● Petitioners were not in possession of the subject property when they filed their
complaint for. If their complaint were to be considered as that of enforcing an implied
trust, it should have been filed within 10 years from the issuance of TCT No. T-15364
in the name of the Maria, on Oct. 27, 1978. However, the complaint was filed only May
21, 1998 or about 20 years from the issuance of TCT No. T-15364, which is way
beyond the prescriptive period.
● Worse, such delay is unjustified and unreasonably long, and petitioners clearly failed
to exercise due diligence in asserting their right over the property. Therefore,
petitioners’ complaint is likewise barred by laches.

RULING: ​WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals
Decision dated July 6, 2007 and its Resolution dated August 22, 2007 in CA-G.R. CV No. 83337
are AFFIRMED.
[224] MANZANO v. GARCIA ○ CA​ ​Reversed​.
G.R. No. 179323 | November 28, 2011 | Leonardo-De Castro, J. ● Hence, this petition.

TOPIC: ​Opinion Rule ISSUE w/ HOLDING & RATIO:

W/N the​ presumption of validity​ has been ​overcome​. — ​YES.
PROVISIONS: ● VICENTE in this case is arguing ​that Garcia should have presented an expert
● SEC. 52, RULE 130. ​Opinion of Expert Witness. — The opinion of a witness on a witness​ to show that his signatures were forged.
matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience, training or education, which he ○ SC disagrees. ​Expert opinion is not binding on the courts and the courts
or she is shown to possess, may be received in evidence. (49a) still has the discretion whether to consider it or not, or base their decision on
their own.
SUMMARY: ​VICENTE​, as administrator of Constancio (his predecessor), filed a petition for ● While there are cases (​Rivera v Turiano​) where the courts found necessary to refer to
consolidation of ownership​, including a subject of land allegedly sold by ​Garcia thru a ​pacto an expert witness, the same is not true in this case. It is clear from the evidence of
de retro sale​. ​GARCIA opposed this and said that the ​pacto de retro sale was a forgery​; Garcia ​that there is ​discrepancy in the signatures between his IDs and the one on
thus, he filed a ​complaint for annulment ​of the alleged sale and recovery of owner’s title. With the pacto de retro.
respect to evidence, ​VICENTE presented the ​TCT over the property and the notarized duly ○ The court can readily conclude that it was ​indeed forgery.
executed pacto de retro sale. ​On the other hand, ​GARCIA presented IDs showing how ● VICENTE likewise argues in upholding the presumption of regularity ​in a notarized
different his signatures were from the one appearing in the pacto de retro sale. ​VICENTE​, deed of pacto de retro sale.
however, objects to Garcia’s evidence noted that the should have presented an ​expert witness​. ○ SC: While it is true that a notarized document enjoys such ​presumption​, it
SC​ sided with Garcia​, noting that ​expert opinion ​on Garcia’s signature is no longer necessary. is ​not absolute ​and m​ay be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.
Irregularities in a notarized documents may be established by oral evidence
DOCTRINE: Expert opinion is not binding on the courts and the courts still has the discretion of persons present in the notarization.
whether to consider it or not, or base their decision on their own. ]While there are cases (​Rivera ● IN THIS CASE​, the presumption has been overcome by the testimony of the
v Turiano)​ where the courts found necessary to refer to an expert witness, the same is not true attorney who notarized the document. As the very official who attested to the crucial
in this case. facts of the notarization, he admitted in open court that the person who appeared
● IN THIS CASE​, it is clear from the evidence of Garcia ​that there is ​discrepancy in before him is different from the one now in Court.
the signatures between his IDs and the one on the pacto de retro.
RULING: ​Petition is DENIED.
FACTS:
● This case involves a land sold through a pacto de retro, where the seller is
Respondent ​GARCIA and the buyer is Petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest
CONSTANCIO MANZAO​. Under the pacto de retro, Garcia reserved the right to
repurchase within three months.
● When ​Constancio passed away​, herein petitioner ​VICENTE was the administrator of
the intestate estate. Seeing that Garcia did not redeem the property within 3 months,
Vicente filed a​ petition for consolidation of ownership​.
○ GARCIA ​opposed this and said that the ​pacto de retro sale was a
forgery; that he and his wife could not have signed the said pacto de retro
sale as they were in the USA at the time.
○ Garcia then filed a ​complaint for the annulment ​of the pacto de retro sale
and recovery of owner’s title.
● The cases were consolidated and tried by the trial court.
○ VICENTE ​presented the ​TCT over the property and the notarized duly
executed pacto de retro sale.
○ GARCIA ​presented IDs showing how ​different his signatures were from
the one appearing in the pacto de retro sale
○ WITNESSES​, the attorney who notarized the pacto de retro and the witness
to the notarization both testified that the person who introduced himself
as “Marcelino Garcia” during the notarization was not the same
person ​as the one now in court (the real Marcelino is the one in court)
● RTC ruled ​IFO Vicente, upholding the ​validity of the notarized public document
and saying that Garcia failed to overcome its presumption of validity.
[225] GOMEZ v. GOMEZ-SAMSON​3
G.R. No. 156284 | February 6, 2007 | Chico-Nazario, J.
TOPIC: ​Opinion Rule
SUMMARY: ​AUGUSTO GOMEZ ​assailed the alleged ​deeds of donation inter vivos ​made by
his aunt Consuelo ​in favor of his cousin​s Rita and Jesus (Respondents), claiming that the
same were made by ​intercalating the deeds onto blank pieces of paper ​onto which Consuelo
affixed her signature. ​RESPONDENTS deny such allegations and instead interposed a claim for
damages (moral, compensatory) alleging bad faith in the filing of the suit. Despite presenting
various witnesses, Augusto c​ould not prove that such was the case. ​The ​RTC and CA
awarded ​moral and exemplary damages​, as well as attorney’s fees, to Rita and Jesus on
alleged bad faith in filing the case by Augusto. The ​SC did not find such bad fait​h, and
reasoned that Augusto only meant to prove his case with zeal. Thus, he was not entitled to
moral damages. If he was not entitled to moral damages, or any of compensatory, temperate or
nominal damages, he was likewise not entitled to exemplary damages. N​ot having filed the
case in bad faith, he was also not liable for attorney’s fees.
DOCTRINE: ​The opinion of the expert may not be arbitrarily rejected; it is to be considered by
the court in view of all the facts and circumstances in the case and when common knowledge
utterly fails, the expert opinion may be given controlling effect.
FACTS:
● PETITIONER​, ​Augusto Gomez is the Special Administrator for the intestate
estate of his aunt, the deceased Consuelo. Defendants Maria-Rita Samson-Gomez,
Jesus Gomez, and Ariston Gomez, Jr are 1st degree cousins of the petitioner.
○ Petitioner ​contends that defendants fraudulently prepared an antedated
Donation Inter Vivos and forged the signature of Consuela. In question
are three real properties in Marikina and Rizal, and various personal
properties (shares of stock, jewelry and collector’s items, Mercedes Benz
200, Toyota Corolla, and P200,000 on money market placement with BA
finance)
● RESPONDENTS ​deny the allegations. They claim the document was valid and
prayed for moral damages of P2,000,000.00; compensatory damages of
P1,000,000.00; exemplary damages of P500,000.00; attorney's fees of P200,000.00;
and that individual plaintiff be made jointly and severally liable with the estate of
Consuelo Gomez.
Evidence Presented
● PETITIONER: Only ​direct evidence presented ​by the Petitioner​, Augusto Gomez is
the testimony of ​ZENAIDA TORRES​, a D ​ ocument Examiner ​of the NBI.
● RESPONDENTS presented their own expert witness, FRANCISCO CRUZ​, Chief of
Document Examination of the PC-INP Crime Laboratory, and the testimonies of
Notary Public JOSE SEBASTIAL and that of several of the respondents including
Ariston Gomez, Jr. (Ariston, Jr.), who allegedly drafted said Deeds of Donation.
● (Very long story short) The RTC ruled for the Defendants and awarded damages to
the tune of Moral damages of ​P​1,000,000.00; Exemplary damages of ​P​250,000.00;
Attorney's fees of ​P​200,000.00.
3
OG Digest by Erickson Mariñas
● The CA affirmed the RTC’s Decision.
ISSUE w/ HOLDING & RATIO:
W/N ​petitioner was ​able to prove ​that the Deeds of Donation were ​merely intercalated ​into
two sheets of paper signed by Consuelo Gomez (Consuelo). — ​NO​.
Weight and Credibility of the Expert Witnesses
● Analysis of Torres’ testimony:
○ TORRES​:
■ Examined the two Deeds of Donation and her findings were that
the signatures therein were indeed those of Consuelo.
■ Opined that the documents were not typed or prepared in one
continuous sitting because the horizontal lines had some
variances horizontally.
■ admitted that the vertical lines did not show any variance.
■ testified that with respect to Document No. 401, the typewritten
words "Consuelo C. Gomez" were typed after the handwritten
signature "Consuelo C. Gomez." based on her analysis of the
letter "o" in the handwritten signature, which touches the letter "n"
in theopin typewritten name "Consuelo C. Gomez."
■ She could not, however, make any similar findings with respect to
Document No. 402, because the typewritten words "Consuelo C.
Gomez" and the handwritten signature "Consuelo C. Gomez" "do
not even touch" in the latter document.
○ COURT: ​Torres failed to convince the trial court that the Deeds of
Donation were not prepared in one sitting:
■ Significant that Torres herself admits that the signatures of
Consuelo in the Donations 401 and 402 ​are genuine contrary
to the allegations of Augusto in his complaint;
■ Augusto is now trying to shift the thrust of his attack, to a scenario
wherein Consuelo allegedly signed two papers in blank, and
thereafter, said Donations 401 and 402 were typed on top
■ Torres ​fell apart during cross-examination.
■ Admitted that she had not taken any specialized studies on the
matter of "Questioned Documents," except on one or two
seminars on "Questioned Documents."
■ Admitted that she had not passed the Board Exams, as a
Chemist;
■ Admitted that she has not written any thesis or similar work on the
subject matter at issue.
■ Regarding non-typing in one continuous sitting, she admitted that
she had never seen the typewriter used to type the Donations 401
and 402, nor even tried to get hold of it, before she made the
report;
■ There were no variances insofar as the vertical alignments of the
typewritten documents were concerned;
■ that there were only variances insofar as the horizontal
alignments are concerned;
■ Admitted that she had not used bromide when she took the
photographs of the two (2) Donations 401 and 402, which
photographs she later on enlarged.
 ■ Admitted that when she had taken the photographs of the two (2)
Donations, she had not put the typewritten pitch measure on top.
■ Admitted that when the photographs were enlarged, the alignment
of the typewritten words became distorted; more so when a
typewriter pitch measure is not used, when photographing the
documents.
■ Issue of typewriting in one sitting or not, is concerned, the
testimony of Torres was completely discredited
● Testimony of Francisco ​CRUZ​:
○ Cruz testified on this point that the Donations 401 and 402 were both typed
in one continuous sitting.
○ He was able to determine that the typewriter used was the elite typewriter,
○ Secondly, he noticed that the color tone of the typewriter ink is the same,
thru the entire documents.
○ He further concluded that both the horizontal and vertical alignments are in
agreement.
■ As per Cruz, by using an instrument which is a typewriting
measuring instrument produced by the Criminal Research Co.,
Inc. in the USA and placing said instrument to test the vertical
alignment from the top down to the bottom, there is a perfect
vertical alignment.
■ He showed to the court the enlarged photographs, indicating
clearly that all the vertical alignments are all in order.
○ He also found out that the horizontal and vertical alignments are in
agreement.
■ there is a slight disagreement in the spacing, but not in the
alignment.
● this was due to the pushing of the variable paper by the
typist.
○ Furthermore, he emphasized that the left margins are aligned and this
signifies that there was typing in one continuous sitting
○ All attempts by opposite counsel to discredit the testimony of Cruz on this
issue, proved futile.​17
● RE: allegation that the signature "Consuelo C. Gomez" was written before the
typewritten name "Consuelo C. Gomez."
○ TC Torres’s findings are based solely on a single handwritten letter “o”
which touches the typewritten letter “n
○ TC sided with Cruz who testified, citing authorities, that it is impossible to
determine accurately which came first, because there were no intersections
at all. Affirmed by CA
● COURT: ​Petitioner testimony of Zenaida Torres, having positively maintained
that the handwritten signatures "Consuelo C. Gomez" in both Deeds of Donation
were affixed before the typewritten name of Consuelo C. Gomez, cannot
possibly be overcome by the opinion of Francisco Cruz that was "neither here
not there."
○ SC agree with petitioner that ​positive evidence is, as a general rule,
more credible​ than​ negative evidence.
○ However, the reason for this rule is that the witness who testifies to a
negative may have forgotten what actually occurred, while it is impossible to
remember what never existed.
○ Expert witnesses, though, examine documentary and object evidence
precisely to testify on their findings in court.
○ It is, thus, highly improbable for an expert witness to forget his examination
of said evidence.
○ Consequently, whereas faulty memory may be the reason for the negative
testimonies delivered by ordinary witnesses, this is unlikely to be so with
respect to expert witnesses.
○ While we, therefore, cannot say that positive evidence does not carry an
inherent advantage over negative evidence when it comes to expert
witnesses, the process by which the expert witnesses arrived at their
conclusions should be carefully examined and considered.
○ In the case at bar, the expert witnesses cited sources as bases of their
observations.
○ Francisco Cruz's statement that "no finding or conclusion could be
arrived at," has basis on the sources presented both by him and by
Zenaida Torres.
■ Both sets of authorities speak of intersecting ink lines.
■ However, the typewritten words "Consuelo C. Gomez" barely
touch and do not intersect the handwritten signature Consuelo C.
Gomez in Document No. 401. In Document No. 402, said
typewritten words and handwritten signature do not even touch.
○ In the case at bar, therefore, the expert testimony that "no finding or
conclusion can be arrived at," was found to be more credible than the
expert testimony positively stating that the signatures were affixed
before the typing of the Deeds of Donation.
○ The former expert testimony has proven to be more in consonance with the
authorities cited by both experts.
● Espiritu v. CA: ​The opinion of the expert may not be arbitrarily rejected; it is to be
considered by the court in view of all the facts and circumstances in the case and
when common knowledge utterly fails, the expert opinion may be given controlling
effect.
● Petitioner Zenaida Torres was a court-appointed expert, as opposed to Francisco
Cruz who was merely designated by respondents.
○ While the expert witness' possible bias in favor of the side for whom he or
she testifies, and the fact that he or she is a paid witness, may be
considered by the trial court, the latter should weigh the same with all the
other evidence adduced during trial, as well as with the witness' deportment,
actions, ability, and character upon the witness stand.
○ The trial court is consequently given the discretion in weighing all these
circumstances in its determination of the expert witness' credibility, as it is in
a better position than the appellate courts to observe the demeanor of these
witnesses.
○ As there is no evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in
such determination, the latter is not reviewable by this Court.
● Petitioner stresses that Zenaida Torres conducted her tests on the carbon originals
of both Deeds of Donation that were then in the possession of the Notarial Register of
Quezon City. On the other hand, Francisco Cruz conducted his tests, with respect to
Document No. 401, on the original in the possession of Ariston, Jr.
○ This circumstance cannot be attributed to respondents.
○ After the examination of the documents by Zenaida Torres, fire razed the
Quezon City Hall.
 ○ The carbon originals of said Deeds were among the documents burned in
the fire.
○ Petitioner never rebutted respondents' manifestation concerning this
incident, nor accused respondents of burning the Quezon City Hall.
Alleged Patent Irregularities on the Face of the Assailed Deeds of Donation
● PETITIONER​, however, also presents the following ​circumstantial evidence and
arguments ​to prove the same, claiming that there are ​patent irregularities on the
face of the assailed Deeds of Donation:
○ Both deeds are each one-page documents contained in a letter size paper,
instead of the usual legal size paper, and typed single spaced, with barely
any margin on its four sides;
○ Donation of multiple properties were in the same document
○ The bodega mentioned in Doc. No. 402 was not owned by Consuelo.
○ If Doc. 401 is superimposed on Doc. 402, the signature of Consuelo on both
documents appear almost in the same place;
○ The whole of both Deeds of Donation were typed with only one typewriter.
○ The PTR Number and its date and place of issue appear in the right hand
side of the name and signature of Jose Sebastian, instead of below it;
○ The inserted date is different from the date of the clause "In WITNESS
WHEREOF, the parties hereunto set their hands in Quezon City, on the
20th day of April/1979"
○ The TAN Numbers and the Residence Certificate Numbers of the purported
donor and donees have already been typed with the same machine that
was used in typing the body of the deed and the body of the
acknowledgement;​42
○ It is highly questionable that a supposedly well-educated person like Ariston
Gomez, Jr. would not have thought of preparing at least five copies of each
document as there were four donees and one donor.​43
● CA it has been explained that the same was due to the fact that the said documents
were prepared by defendant ARISTON, JR., a non-lawyer inexperienced with the way
such documents should be executed and in how many copies
● COURT: not surprising that ​someone as unfamiliar and inexperienced in
preparing a deed of donatio​n, or any deed of conveyance for that matter prepared
the documents that are the subject matter of the case at bar in the manner that he did.
● PETITIONER: counters that the alleged irregularities "do not relate to the proper
construction or manner of writing the documents as would necessitate the expertise of
a lawyer.
○ Alleged irregularities are more apparent than real.
○ Irregularities does not affect the validity of the subject Deeds of Donation,
nor connotes fraud or foul play.
● COURT: Legal documents contained in 8 - x 11 paper are neither unheard of, nor
even uncommon. The same is true with regard to single-spaced legal documents
○ That the subject Deeds of Donation appear to have conveyed numerous
properties in two sheets of paper does not militate against their authenticity.
Not all people equate length with importance.
● SC: allegation concerning the use of one typewriter to encode both Deeds of
Donation, including the notarial acknowledgment portion, TAN, and residence
certificates, is purely paranoia.
○ It is common practice for the parties to a contract to type the whole
document, so that all the notary public has to do is to input his signature,
seal, and the numbers pertaining to his notarial registry.
● The use of single-paged documents also provides an explanation as to why the PTR
number and the date and place of issue are found in the right-hand side of the name
and signature of Jose Sebastian, instead of below it.
○ SC: Irrational, impractical, and contrary to human experience to use
another page just to insert those minute but necessary details.
○ Use of single-paged documents, taken together with the fact that the Deeds
of Donation are of almost the same length, are also the reasons why it does
not baffle us that the signatures of Consuelo appear at around the same
portions of these Deeds.
○ SC: would have been suspicious had these documents been of varying
lengths, but the signatures still appear on the same portions in both.
● SC: Only observations concerning the physical appearance of the subject Deeds of
Donation that truly give doubts as to their authenticity are the relatively small margins
on the sides of the same, the lack of copies thereof, and the alleged inclusion in
Document No. 402 of a bodega allegedly not owned by Consuelo.
○ These doubts are not enough to establish the commission of fraud by
respondents and to overturn the presumption that persons are innocent of
crime or wrong.
○ Good faith is always presumed.
○ It is the one who alleges bad faith who has the burden to prove the
same, who, in this case, is the petitioner.
○ The small margins in the said Deeds of Donation, while indicative of
sloppiness, were not necessarily resorted to because there was a need to
intercalate a long document and, thus, prove petitioner's theory that there
were only two pieces of paper signed by Consuelo.
○ Respondents admit that the use of one sheet of paper for both Deeds of
Donation was intentional, for brevity's sake.
○ While the ensuing litigation could now have caused regrets on the part of
Ariston, Jr. for his decision to sacrifice the margins for brevity's sake, there
still appears no indication that he did so maliciously.
● PETITIONER: testified that he could not find copies of the two Deeds of Donation with
the Bureau of Records Management. He, however, was able to find certified true
copies of these documents with the Register of Deeds and the Land Transportation
Commission.
○ According to the testimony of Ariston, Jr., the original of Document No. 401
was separated from the brown envelope, containing the other copies of the
Deeds of Donation, which Jose Sebastian left with respondents, as they
were trying to fit the same into a certain red album.
○ On the other hand, Maria Rita testified that one copy each of the duplicate
originals of Documents No. 401 and No. 402 were lost.
○ Notary public Jose Sebastian retained two copies of the Deeds of Donation
in his files.
● COURT: ​While it cannot be denied that the unfortunate incidents and accidents
presented by respondents do arouse some suspicions, the testimonies of Ariston, Jr.,
Maria Rita, and Jose Sebastian had been carefully examined by the trial court, which
found them to be credible.
 ● SC: this Court has ruled that the findings of the trial court respecting the credibility
of witnesses are accorded great weight and respect since it had the opportunity to
observe the demeanor of the witnesses as they testified before the court.
○ Unless substantial facts and circumstances have been overlooked or
misunderstood by the latter which, if considered, would materially affect the
result of the case, this Court will undauntedly sustain the findings of the
lower court.
● SC:​ All petitioner has succeeded in doing, however, is to instill doubts in our minds.
○ While such approach would succeed if carried out by the accused in
criminal cases, plaintiffs in civil cases need to do much more to overturn
findings of fact and credibility by the trial court, especially when the same
had been affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
○ It must be stressed that although this Court may overturn a conviction of the
lower court based on reasonable doubt, overturning judgments in civil cases
should be based on preponderance of evidence, and with the further
qualification that, when the scales shall stand upon an equipoise, the court
should find for the defendant.​56
● Respondents also point out that Ariston, Jr., the person they claim to have prepared
said Deeds of Donation, was never confronted during the trial with all these alleged
irregularities on the face of the Deeds of Donation.
○ TC was never given a chance to determine whether Ariston, Jr. would have
given a rational, logical and acceptable explanation for the same.
○ Respondents were deprived of a chance to rebut these observations by
testimonies and other evidence, and were forced to explain the same in
memoranda and briefs with the appellate courts, where these observations
started to crop up.
Payment of Donor’s Tax Before the Death of Consuelo
● PETITIONER: CA erred in its finding of fact that Consuelo herself paid the donor's tax
of the properties subject of the donation on 9 October 1979, as the evidence allegedly
shows that the Donor's Tax was paid on 4 December 1979, or a month after
Consuelo's death.
● COURT: it is well to note that the factum probandum petitioner is trying to
establish here is still the alleged intercalation of the Deeds of Donation on blank
pieces of paper containing the signatures of Consuelo. The factum probans this time
around is the alleged payment of the Donor's Tax after the death of Consuelo.
● Firstly,​ it is apparent at once that there is a failure of the factum probans​, even if
successfully proven, ​to prove in turn the factum probandum.
○ payment of the Donor's Tax after the death of Consuelo does not
necessarily prove the alleged intercalation of the Deeds of Donation on
blank pieces of paper containing the signatures of Consuelo.
● Secondly​, petitioner ​failed to prove this factum probandum.
○ Ariston, Jr. never testified that Consuelo herself physically and personally
delivered PCIB Check No. A144-73211 to the BIR.
○ He instead testified that the check was prepared and issued by Consuelo
during her lifetime, but that he, Ariston, Jr., physically and personally
delivered the same to the BIR.
○ On the query, however, as to whether it was delivered to the BIR before or
after the death of Consuelo, petitioner and respondents presented all the
conflicting evidence we enumerated above.
● The party asserting a fact has the burden of proving it.
○ Petitioner merely formulated conjectures based on the evidence he
presented, and did not bother to present Nestor Espenilla to explain the
consecutive numbers of the RTRs or what he meant with the words "on
even date" in his certification.
○ Petitioner did not present any evidence that the records of the BIR
Commissioner were falsified or antedated, thus, letting the presumption that
a public official had regularly performed his duties stand.
○ This is in contrast to respondents' direct evidence attesting to the payment
of said tax during the lifetime of Consuelo.
○ With respect to respondents' evidence, all that petitioner could offer in
rebuttal is another speculation totally unsupported by evidence: the alleged
fabrication thereof.
Credibility of Jose Sebastian
● PETITIONER: no credence should have been given to the testimony of the notary
public, ​Jose Sebastian​, as said Jose Sebastian is the ​same judge whom this Court
had dismissed from the service in ​Garciano v. Sebastian.
○ dismissal of Judge Jose Sebastian from the service casts a grave pall on his
credibility as a witness,
○ reliance by the Court of Appeals on the 22 November 1979 Certification by
Jose Sebastian is misplaced, considering the questionable circumstances
surrounding such certification.
○ Certification was made after the death of Consuelo, and claims that the
same appears to be a scheme by Jose Sebastian to concoct an opportunity
for him to make mention of the subject Deeds of Donation intervivos,
"despite the plain fact that the latter had utterly no relation to the matter
 referred to by Jose Sebastian in the opening phrase of the letter."​72
● It is well to note that, as stated by the Court of Appeals, Jose Sebastian was originally
a witness for petitioner Augusto.
○ Rule 132, Section 12, of the Rules of Court prohibits petitioner from
impeaching him:
● A witness may be considered as ​unwilling or hostile ​only if so declared by the court
upon adequate showing of his adverse interest, unjustified reluctance to testify, or his
having misled the party into calling him to the witness stand.
● The unwilling or hostile witness so declared, or the witness who is an adverse party,
may be impeached by the party presenting him in all respects as if he had been called
by the adverse party, except by evidence of his bad character.
● He may also be impeached and cross-examined by the adverse party, but such
cross-examination must only be on the subject matter of his examination-in-chief.
● This rule is based on the theory that a person who produces a witness vouches for
him as being worthy of credit, and that a direct attack upon the veracity of the witness
"would enable the party to destroy the witness, if he spoke against him, and to make
him a good witness, if he spoke for him, with the means in his hands of destroying his
credit, if he spoke against him."
● Neither had there been declaration by the court that Jose Sebastian was an unwilling
or hostile witness. He is also neither an adverse party, nor an officer, director nor a
managing agent of a public or private corporation or of a partnership or association
which is an adverse party.
● Even if Jose Sebastian had been declared by the court as an unwilling or hostile
witness, the third paragraph of Section 12 as quoted above, in relation to Section
11​75​ of the same Rule, only allows the party calling the witness to impeach such
 witness by contradictory evidence or by prior inconsistent statements, and never by
evidence of his bad character.
○ Thus, Jose Sebastian's subsequent dismissal as a judge would not suffice
to discredit him as a witness in this case.
● People v. Dominguez​, ​which, in turn cited Cordial v. People, ​that: ​(E)ven convicted
criminals are not excluded from testifying in court so long as, having organs of
sense, they "can perceive and perceiving can make known their perceptions to
others." The fact of prior criminal conviction alone does not suffice to discredit
a witness; the testimony of such a witness must be assayed and scrutinized in
exactly the same way the testimony of other witnesses must be examined for its
relevance and credibility​.
● The effect of this pronouncement is even more significant in this case, as Jose
Sebastian has never been ​convicted​ of a crime b ​ efore ​his testimony, but was
instead ​administratively sanctioned​ eleven years ​after​ such testimony.
● Scrutinizing the testimony of Jose Sebastian, we find, as the trial court and the Court
of Appeals did, no evidence of bias on the part of Jose Sebastian. On top of this, Jose
Sebastian's testimony is supported by the records of the notarial registry, which shows
that the documents in question were received by the Notarial Registrar on 2 July 1979,
which was four months before the death of Consuelo on 6 November 1979.
Alleged Unusual Circumstances Relative to the Execution and Notarization of the Subject Deeds
of Donation
● The last set of circumstantial evidence presented by petitioner to prove the alleged
intercalation of the subject Deeds of Donation on two blank papers signed by
Consuelo are the following allegedly unusual circumstances relative to the execution
and notarization of the said deeds.
● According to ​PETITIONER​:
○ The signing and acknowledgement of the Deeds of Donation on 21 April
1979 is highly improbable and implausible, considering the fact that
Consuelo left the same day for the United States on a pleasure trip;​78
○ The flight time of Consuelo on 21 April 1979 was 11:00 a.m. And even
assuming that the flight time was 1:00 p.m., as contended by respondents,
the ordinary boarding procedures require Consuelo to be at the airport at
least two hours before flight time, or 11:00 a.m points out that
respondents' alleged time frame is not enough to accomplish the following
acts:
■ respondents and Consuelo leaving Marikina at 7:00 a.m. and
arriving at the notary public Jose Sebastian's house at Pag-asa,
Q.C. at about 8:00 a.m. to 8:30 a.m.;
■ some "small talk with Jose Sebastian;
■ Jose Sebastian examining the documents;
■ Jose Sebastian having a closed meeting with Consuelo to discuss
the documents;
■ Jose Sebastian reading the documents to respondents line by line
and asking the latter whether they accepted the donation;
■ Jose Sebastian typing the notarial entries;
■ the parties signing the deeds;
■ Jose Sebastian talking privately with Consuelo, who paid the
former in cash for his services;
■ Ariston Gomez, Jr. driving Consuelo and other respondents back
to Marikina, and dropping the other respondents at their
respective residences;
■ picking up Consuelo's luggage; and
■ Ariston Gomez, Jr. bringing Consuelo to the Manila International
Airport;​79
○ It is contrary to human experience for Consuelo and respondents not to
make a prior arrangement with the notary public Jose Sebastian and instead
take a gamble on his being in his office
○ It is illogical for Consuelo to rush the execution of the donations when she
was in fact planning to come back from her pleasure trip shortly, as she
did;​81​ ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
○ The choice of a notary public from Quezon City is highly suspect, when
Consuelo and respondents reside in Marikina.
○ It is improbable that Consuelo paid Jose Sebastian in cash, for there is no
reason for her to carry much cash in peso when she was about to leave for
the United States in that same morning;​83
○ Residence certificate of Consuelo and the Defendants
○ If Consuelo was really frugal, she could have also made a will;
○ All the instrumental witnesses of the Deeds of Donation are biased, being
themselves either donees of the other Deed of Donation, or a relative of a
donee;​87​and
○ Respondents were not able to sufficiently and substantially explain the
belated transfer of the properties covered by the assailed Deeds of
Donation.
● COURT: does ​not find anything suspicious ​in a person wanting to transfer her
properties by donation to her loved ones before leaving for abroad via an airplane.
○ While many believe these days that taking the plane is the "safest way to
travel," this has not always been the case.
○ The fear that planes sometimes crash, now believed to be irrational, has
always been at the back of the minds of air travelers.
○ Respondents maintain in their testimonies before the RTC that the Deeds
were completed to the satisfaction of Consuelo only on 20 April 1979.
○ She allegedly wanted to have the documents signed and notarized before
she left for abroad.
● The claim ​that the flight time of Consuelo was at 11:00 a.m​. is ​hearsay thrice
removed, and thus cannot be given any weight.
○ Petitioner claims that he was told by his twelve-year old son that Consuelo
was leaving at 11:00 a.m. on 21 April 1979, such son having learned about
this from the maid of Consuelo when the son called Consuelo's house that
day.
○ This is in contrast to Maria Rita's positive testimony that the flight time was
at 1:00 p.m. on the same day.
○ Maria Rita joined Consuelo in this flight.
● As regards petitioner's claim that respondents' alleged time frame in the morning of 21
April 1979 was insufficient, this Court is not convinced.
○ petitioner did not present any proof that it had been impossible to perform
those alleged acts within three hours.
○ As argued by respondents, the one-paged documents can be read aloud
without difficulty within five to ten minutes each.
 ○ We can also take judicial notice of the fact that traffic is usually very minimal And costs of suit; with legal interest on all the amounts, except on costs and attorney's fees,
on Saturday mornings, and was much less of a problem in 1979. commencing from February 15, 1980, until fully paid.
● SC: Respondents and Consuelo's decision not to make a prior arrangement with
notary public Jose Sebastian does not surprise us either.
○ Respondents explain that, since the telephone lines of Marikina were
inefficient in the year 1979, they decided to take a calculated gamble.
○ It is not at all unreasonable to expect that Jose Sebastian would be at his
house on a Saturday, at around 8:00 a.m.
● With respect to the choice of a notary public from Quezon City,
○ SC:​ we find the explanation relative thereto satisfying.
■ ARISTON, JR. disclosed that they could not have gone to the
notary public whom his aunt, CONSUELO, knew because she did
not want to go to said notary public since our cousins whom she
didn't like had access to him and she wanted to keep the
execution of the deeds confidential.
● SC: CA had fully explained that the belated transfer of the properties does not affect
the validity or effects of the donations at all, nor dent the credibility of respondents'
factual assertions:
● SC :​ purpose of utilizing donation as a mode to transfer property is not in issue here.
● Finally, the allegations concerning the payment of Jose Sebastian in cash, the
suggestion that Consuelo should have also made a will, and the claim that all the
instrumental witnesses of the will are biased are purely speculative.
● SC: ​all these circumstantial evidence ​presented by petitioner had ​failed to
comply with the strict requirements in using circumstantial evidence, for which ​Section
4, Rule 133​ of the Rules of Court provides:
○ While the provision seems to refer only to criminal cases, it has been
pointed out that in some jurisdictions, no distinction is made between civil
and criminal actions as to the quality of the burden of establishing a
proposition by circumstantial evidence.
● In such jurisdictions the rule is generally stated to be that the circumstances
established must not only be consistent with the proposition asserted but also
inconsistent with any other rational theory.
● Leniency in the weighing of petitioner's evidence could only produce a mere
equipoise​: When the scales shall stand upon an equipoise and there is nothing in the
evidence which shall incline it to one side or the other, the court will find for the
defendant.
● Under this principle, the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on
the weaknesses of the defendant's claim. Even if the evidence of the plaintiff may be
stronger than that of the defendant, ​there is no preponderance of evidence on his
side if such evidence is insufficient in itself to establish his cause of action.​"

RULING: ​WHEREFORE, subject to the modification of the assailed Decision, the Petition is
DENIED. The Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City in Civil Cases No. 36089
and No. 36090, which was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals, is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that the following portion be DELETED:
3. That Augusto Gomez and the estate of the late Consuelo Gomez, jointly and
solidarily should pay to Ariston Gomez, Jr. the following amounts:
Moral damages of ​P​1,000,000.00;
Exemplary damages of ​P​250,000.00
Attorney's fees of ​P​200,000.00
[226] Casumpang v. Cortejo
G.R. No. 171127; March 11, 2015;
Topic: Opinion Rule
SUMMARY: Dr. Casumpang, pediatrician, diagnosed Edmer Cortejo, son of Defendant, with
Bronchopneumonia. Dr Miranda observed the patient but belatedly diagnosed the same as
Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever. When the correct diagnosis was made, the boy was already at
Stage IV and the disease was irreversible. RTC and CA awarded damages. Casumpang claims
they were not negligent and presented the testimony of the Personnel Officer, Medical Director,
and Radiologists who viewed the boy’s chest x-ray results. The Court held that it cannot
consider them expert witnesses either for the sole reason that they did not testify on the
standard of care in dengue cases. Cortejo presented Dr. Jaudian as expert witness, and the
Court found him credible that even though he was a pathologist not a pediatrician, he possessed
knowledge and experience sufficient to qualify him to speak with authority on the subject. He
was a licensed medical practitioner specializing in pathology, who had practical and relevant
exposure in pediatrics and dengue related cases.
DOCTRINE: The competence of an expert witness is a matter for the trial court to decide upon in
the exercise of its discretion. The test of qualification is necessarily a relative one, depending
upon the subject matter of the investigation, and the fitness of the expert witness. In our
jurisdiction, the criterion remains to be the expert witness' special knowledge, experience and
practical training that qualify him/her to explain highly technical medical matters to the Court.
FACTS:
● Morning of April 20, 1988 Edmer Cortejo, son of Mrs. Jesus Cortejo had developed
a slight fever that lasted for one day
o few hours upon discovery, she brought Edmer to their family doctor;
o two hours after administering medications, Edmer's fever had subsided
● April 22, 1988
o 11:30 am Mrs. Cortejo brought Edmer to the Emergency Room of the San
Juan de Dios Hospital (​SJDH​) because of difficulty in breathing, chest pain,
stomach pain, and fever.
▪ Dr. Ramoncito Livelo (​Dr. Livelo​) initially attended to and
examined Edmer.
▪ After taking Edmer's medical history, Dr. Livelo took his vital
signs, body temperature, and blood pressure.
▪ Based on these initial examinations and the chest x-ray test that
followed, Dr. Livelo diagnosed Edmer with "bronchopneumonia."
▪ Edmer's blood was also taken for testing, typing, and for purposes
of administering antibiotics.
▪ Dr. Livelo then gave Edmer an antibiotic medication to lessen his
fever and to loosen his phlegm.
o Mrs. Cortejo did not know any doctor at SJDH.
▪ She used her Fortune Care card and was referred to an
accredited Fortune Care coordinator, who was then out of town.
▪ She was then assigned to Dr. Noel Casumpang (​Dr.
Casumpang)​ , a pediatrician also accredited with Fortune Care
o 5:30 pm Dr. Casumpang for the first time examined Edmer in his room.
▪ Using only a stethoscope, he confirmed the initial diagnosis of
"​Bronchopneumonia.​"
▪ Mrs. Cortejo entertained doubts on the doctor's diagnosis.
▪ She immediately advised Dr. Casumpang that Edmer had a high
fever, and had no colds or cough ​but Dr. Casumpang merely told
her that her son's "​blood pressure is just being active​," ​and
remarked that "​that's the usual bronchopneumonia, no colds, no
phlegm​."
● April 23, 1988
o 9:00 am Dr. Casumpang visited and examined Edmer
▪ Still suspicious about his son's illness, Mrs. Cortejo again called
Dr. Casumpang's attention and stated that Edmer had a fever,
throat irritation, as well as chest and stomach pain.
▪ Mrs. Cortejo also alerted Dr. Casumpang about the traces of
blood in Edmer's sputum.
▪ Despite these pieces of information, however, Dr. Casumpang
simply nodded, inquired if Edmer has an asthma, and reassured
Mrs. Cortejo that Edmer's illness is bronchopneumonia.
o 11:30 am Edmer vomited "phlegm with blood streak" ​prompting the
respondent (​Edmer's father​) to request for a doctor at the nurses' station.
o Forty-five minutes later, Dr. Ruby Sanga-Miranda (​Dr. Miranda​), one of the
resident physicians of SJDH, arrived.
▪ Dr. Miranda claimed that although aware that Edmer had vomited
"phlegm with blood streak," she failed to examine the blood
specimen because the respondent washed it away.
● advised the respondent to preserve the specimen for
examination.
▪ Dr. Miranda conducted a physical check-up covering Edmer's
head, eyes, nose, throat, lungs, skin and abdomen; and found
that Edmer had a low-grade non-continuing fever, and rashes that
were not typical of dengue fever.
▪ Dr. Miranda’s Medical Findings
● the patient's rapid breathing and then the lung showed
sibilant and the patient's nose is flaring which is a sign
that the patient is in respiratory distress;
● the abdomen has negative finding;
● the patient has low grade fever and not continuing;
● and the rashes in the patient's skin were not "Herman's
Rash" and not typical of dengue fever.
o 3:00 pm Edmer once again vomited blood.
▪ Upon seeing Dr. Miranda, the respondent showed her Edmer's
blood specimen, and reported that Edmer had complained of
severe stomach pain and difficulty in moving his right leg.
▪ Dr. Miranda then examined Edmer's "​sputum with blood​" and
noted that he was bleeding.
▪ Dr. Miranda suspected that Edmer could be afflicted with dengue,
so she inserted a plastic tube in his nose, drained the liquid from
his stomach with ice cold normal saline solution, and gave an
instruction not to pull out the tube, or give the patient any oral
medication.
▪ She thereafter conducted a tourniquet test, which turned out to be
negative.
 ▪ She likewise ordered the monitoring of the patient's blood
pressure and some blood tests. Edmer's blood pressure was later
found to be normal.
o 4:40 pm Dr. Miranda called up Dr. Casumpang at his clinic and told him
about Edmer's condition.
▪ Upon being informed, Dr. Casumpang ordered several
procedures done including: ​hematocrit, hemoglobin, blood typing,
blood transfusion and tourniquet tests​.
o 6:00 pm The blood test results came.
▪ Dr. Miranda advised Edmer's parents that the blood test results
showed that Edmer was suffering from "Dengue Hemorrhagic
Fever."
o One hour later Dr. Casumpang arrived at Edmer's room and he
recommended his transfer to the Intensive Care Unit (​ICU​), to which the
respondent consented.
▪ Since the ICU was then full, Dr. Casumpang suggested to the
respondent that they hire a private nurse.
▪ The respondent, however, insisted on transferring his son to
Makati Medical Center.
o After the respondent had signed the waiver, Dr. Casumpang, for the last
time, checked Edmer's condition, found that his blood pressure was stable,
and noted that he was "comfortable."
o The respondent requested for an ambulance but he was informed that the
driver was nowhere to be found.
o This prompted him to hire a private ambulance that cost him P600.00.
o 12:00 midnight Edmer, accompanied by his parents and by Dr.
Casumpang, was transferred to Makati Medical Center.
o Dr. Casumpang immediately gave the attending physician the patient's
clinical history and laboratory exam results. Upon examination, the
attending physician diagnosed "Dengue Fever Stage IV" that was already in
its irreversible stage.
● April 24, 1988
o Edmer died at 4:00 in the morning
o His Death Certificate indicated the cause of death as "Hypovolemic
Shock/hemorrhagic shock;" "Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever Stage IV."
● Respondent instituted an action for damages against SJDH, and its attending
physicians: Dr. Casumpang and Dr. Miranda before the RTC of Makati City alleging
that Edmer's death was caused by the negligent and erroneous diagnosis of his
doctors.
● RTC Ruling ​ruled in favor of respondent ​and awarded actual and moral damages,
plus attorney's fees and costs.
o found untenable the petitioning doctors' contention that Edmer's initial
symptoms did not indicate dengue fever.
o It faulted them for heavily relying on the chest x-ray result and for not
considering the other manifestations that Edmer's parents had relayed.
o It held that in diagnosing and treating an illness, the physician's conduct
should be judged not only by what he/she saw and knew, but also by what
he/she could have reasonably seen and known.
o It also observed that based on Edmer's signs and symptoms, his medical
history and physical examination, and also ​the information that the
petitioning doctors gathered from his family members​, dengue fever was a
reasonably foreseeable illness; yet, the petitioning doctors failed to take a
second look, much less, consider these indicators of dengue.
o found that aside from their self-serving testimonies, the petitioning doctors
did not present other evidence to prove that they exercised the proper
medical attention in diagnosing and treating the patient, leading it to
conclude that they were guilty of negligence.
o held SJDH solidarity liable with the petitioning doctors for damages based
on the following findings of facts:
▪ Dr. Casumpang, as consultant, is an ​ostensible agent of
SJDH​ because before the hospital engaged his medical services,
it scrutinized and determined his fitness, qualifications, and
competence as a medical practitioner;
▪ Dr. Miranda, as resident physician, is an ​employee of
SJDH​ because like Dr. Casumpang, the hospital, through its
screening committee, scrutinized and determined her
qualifications, fitness, and competence before engaging her
services; the hospital also exercised control over her work.
● Petitioners were ordered to pay solidarity and severally the respondent the following:
o Moral damages in the amount of P500,000.00;
o Costs of burial and funeral in the amount of P45,000.00;
o Attorney's fees of P50,000.00; and
o Cost of this suit.
● The petitioners appealed the decision to the CA.
● CA Ruling affirmed in tot the RTC Ruling
o SJDH and its attending physicians failed to exercise the minimum medical
care, attention, and treatment expected of an ordinary doctor under like
circumstances.
o found the petitioning doctors' failure to read even the most basic signs of
"​dengue fever​" expected of an ordinary doctor as medical negligence.
o petitioning doctors' testimonies as self-serving, noting that they presented
no other evidence to prove that they exercised due diligence in diagnosing
Edmer's illness.
o found Dr. Rodolfo Jaudian's (​Dr. Jaudian​) testimony admissible.
o Ruled that the hospital's liability is based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
▪ control which the hospital exercises over its consultants, the
hospital's power to hire and terminate their services, all fulfill the
employer-employee relationship requirement under Article 2180.
o held that SJDH failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the hiring and the supervision of its
physicians.
● Motion for Reconsideration was denied
● Position of Petitioners & Respondent
o Dr. Casumpang's Position (G.R. No. 171127)
▪ contends that he gave his patient medical treatment and care to
the best of his abilities, and within the proper standard of care
required from physicians under similar circumstances.
▪ dengue fever occurs only after several days of confinement.
▪ raised serious doubts on Dr. Jaudian's credibility
o Dr. Miranda's Position (G.R. No. 171217)
▪ faults the CA for holding her responsible for Edmer's wrong
diagnosis, stressing that the function of making the diagnosis and
 undertaking the medical treatment devolved upon Dr.
Casumpang, the doctor assigned to Edmer, and who confirmed
"bronchopneumonia."
▪ she exercised prudence in performing her duties as a physician
▪ there is no causal relation between the alleged erroneous
diagnosis and medication for "​Bronchopneumonia,​ " and Edmer's
death due to "​Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever​."
▪ claimed that Dr. Jaudian is not a qualified expert witness since he
never presented any evidence of formal residency training and
fellowship status in Pediatrics.
o Respondent
▪ contends that the petitioning doctors were negligent in conducting
their medical examination and diagnosis based on the following:
● (1) the petitioning doctors failed to timely diagnose
Edmer's correct illness
● (2) the petitioning doctors' medical examination was not
comprehensive, as they were always in a rush
● (3) the petitioning doctors employed a guessing game
in diagnosing bronchopneumonia.
▪ there is a causal connection between the petitioning doctors'
negligence and Edmer's untimely death, warranting the claim for
damages.
▪ asserted that SJDH is also negligent because it was not equipped
with proper paging system, has no bronchoscope, and its doctors
are not proportionate to the number of its patients.
ISSUE AND RATIO:
[nitpicked issue] W/N the the testimony of Dr. Jaudian is admissible - YES
1. First, we emphasize that we do not decide the correctness of a doctor's diagnosis, or
the accuracy of the medical findings and treatment. Our duty in medical malpractice
cases is to decide - based on the evidence adduced and expert opinion presented -
whether a breach of duty took place.
2. Second, we clarify that a wrong diagnosis is not by itself medical malpractice.
Physicians are generally not liable for damages resulting from a bona fide error of
judgment. Nonetheless, when the physician's erroneous diagnosis was the result of
negligent conduct (e.g., neglect of medical history, failure to order the appropriate
tests, failure to recognize symptoms), it becomes an evidence of medical malpractice.
3. Third, we also note that medicine is not an exact science; and doctors, or even
specialists, are not expected to give a 100% accurate diagnosis in treating patients
who come to their clinic for consultations. Error is possible as the exercise of judgment
is called for in considering and reading the exhibited symptoms, the results of tests,
and in arriving at definitive conclusions. But in doing all these, the doctor must have
acted according to acceptable medical practice standards.
4. Although Dr. Casumpang presented the testimonies of Dr. Rodolfo Jagonap and Dr.
Ellewelyn Pasion (​Dr. Pasion)​ , Personnel Officer and Medical Director of SJDH,
respectively as well as the testimonies of Dr. Livelo and Dr. Reyes (the radiologist who
read Edmer's chest x-ray result), these witnesses failed to dispute the standard of
action that Dr. Jaudian established in his expert opinion. We cannot consider them
expert witnesses either for the sole reason that they did not testify on the standard of
care in dengue cases.
5. On the whole, after examining the totality of the adduced evidence, we find that the
lower courts correctly did not rely on Dr. Casumpang's claim that he exercised
prudence and due diligence in handling Edmer's case. Aside from being self-serving,
his claim is not supported by competent evidence. As the lower courts did, we rely on
the uncontroverted fact that he failed, as a medical professional, to observe the most
prudent medical procedure under the circumstances in diagnosing and treating
Edmer.
6. A close scrutiny of ​Ramos and ​Cereno reveals that the Court primarily based the
witnesses' disqualification to testify as an expert on their ​incapacity to shed light on the
standard of care that must be observed by the defendant-physicians​. That the expert
witnesses' specialties do not match the physicians' practice area only constituted, at
most, one of the considerations that should not be taken out of context. After all, the
sole function of a medical expert witness, regardless of his/her specialty, is to afford
assistance to the courts on medical matters, and to explain the medical facts in issue.
7. US jurisprudence on medical malpractice demonstrated the trial courts' wide latitude of
discretion in allowing a specialist from another field to testify against a defendant
specialist.
8. In ​Brown v. Sims,​ a neurosurgeon was found competent to give expert testimony
regarding a gynecologist's standard of pre-surgical care. In that case, the court held
that since negligence was not predicated on the gynecologist's negligent performance
of the operation, but primarily on the claim that the pre-operative histories and
physicals were inadequate, the neurosurgeon was competent to testify as an expert.
9. Frost v. Mayo Clinic also allowed an orthopedic surgeon to testify against a
neurologist in a medical malpractice action. The court considered that the orthopedic
surgeon's opinion on the "immediate need for decompression" need not come from a
specialist in neurosurgery. The court held that:
It is well established that "the testimony of a qualified medical
doctor cannot be excluded simply because he is not a specialist x x
x." The matter of "x x x training and specialization of the witness
goes to the weight rather than admissibility x x x."
xxxx
It did not appear to the court that a medical doctor had to be a
specialist in neurosurgery to express the opinions permitted to be
expressed by plaintiffs' doctors, ​e.g.,​ the immediate need for a
decompression in the light of certain neurological deficits in a
post-laminectomy patient. As stated above, there was no issue as
to the proper execution of the neurosurgery. The medical testimony
supported plaintiffs' theory of negligence and causation. (​Citations
omitted)​
10. In another case, ​the court declared that it is the ​specialist's knowledge of the
requisite subject matter, rather than his/her specialty that determines his/her
qualification to testify​.
11. Also in ​Evans v. Ohanesian​,​91​ the court set a guideline in qualifying an expert witness:
To qualify a witness as a medical expert, it must be shown that the
witness ​(1) has the required professional knowledge, learning
and skill of the subject under inquiry sufficient to qualify him
to speak with authority on the subject; and (2) is familiar with
the standard required of a physician under similar
circumstances; where a witness has disclosed sufficient
knowledge of the subject to entitle his opinion to go to the jury, the
 question of the degree of his knowledge goes more to the weight of
the evidence than to its admissibility.

xxxx

Nor is it critical whether a medical expert is a general practitioner or

a specialist ​so long as he exhibits knowledge of the subject.
Where a duly licensed and practicing physician has gained
knowledge of the standard of care applicable to a specialty in
which he is not directly engaged but as to which he has an
opinion based on education, experience, observation, or
association wit that specialty, his opinion is competent.
(​Emphasis supplied​)
12. Finally, ​Brown v. Mladineo ​adhered to the principle that the witness' familiarity, and not
the classification by title or specialty, which should control issues regarding the expert
witness' qualifications:
The general rule as to expert testimony in medical malpractice
actions is that "a specialist in a particular branch within a profession
will not be required." Most courts allow a doctor to testify if they are
satisfied of his familiarity with the standards of a specialty, though
he may not practice the specialty himself. One court explained that
"it is the scope of the witness' knowledge and not the artificial
classification by title that should govern the threshold question of
admissibility.
Application to the Present Case

13. In the case and the facts before us, we find that Dr. Jaudian is competent to testify on
the standard of care in dengue fever cases.
14. Although he specializes in pathology, it was established during trial that he had
attended not less than 30 seminars held by the Pediatric Society, had exposure in
pediatrics, had been practicing medicine for 16 years, and had handled not less than
50 dengue related cases.
15. As a licensed medical practitioner specializing in pathology, who had practical and
relevant exposure in pediatrics and dengue related cases, we are convinced that Dr.
Jaudian demonstrated sufficient familiarity with the standard of care to be applied in
dengue fever cases. Furthermore, we agree that he possesses knowledge and
experience sufficient to qualify him to speak with authority on the subject.
[227] PAJE v CASINO​4
G.R. Nos. 207257, 2027276, 207282, 207366 | February 3, 2015 | Del Castillo, J.
TOPIC: ​Hearsay Rule; Learned Treatise
SUMMARY: ​The Department of Environment and Natural Resources, issued an Environmental
Compliance Certificate for a proposed coal-fired power plant at Subic, Zambales to be
implemented by RP Energy. Hon. Teodoro Casino and a number of legislators filed a Petition for
Writ of Kalikasan against RP energy, SBMA, and Hon. Ramon Paje as the DENR secretary on
the ground that actual environmental damage will occur if the power plant project is implemented
and that the respondents failed to comply with certain laws and rules governing or relating to the
issuance of an ECC and amendments thereto. The Court found that the Casino group was not
able prove grave environmental damage, on the other hand, RP Energy was able to present
several experts to refute the Casiño Group’s allegations. Further, the report by experts
generated during the social acceptability consultations showing the alleged negative
environmental assessment of the project was not given credence.
The hearsay rule here concerns scientific studies and articles from the internet that challenged
the Circulating Fluidized Bed (CFB) technology used in the project. These were not given
credence by the Court and were not deemed exceptions to the hearsay rule under the learned
treatises exception - due to the failure of the petitioners, the Casiño Group, invoking them to
provide expert witnesses that could testify that the studies and articles were written by experts in
their subjects.
The opposing side, which supported the CFB technology to be used in their project, was able to
present witnesses who had credentials and were qualified to testify as technical witnesses to
explain to the workings of the technology and its supposed environmental impact.
DOCTRINES:
On Scientific Studies presented by Casino group: ​In order for the learned treatises exception
to the hearsay rule to apply, a witness expert in the subject has to testify that the writer of the
statement in the treatise, periodical or pamphlet used is recognized in his profession or calling
as expert in the subject.
On RP Energy’s presentation of several experts to refute the Casiño Group’s allegations:
Although courts are not ordinarily bound by testimonies of experts, they may place whatever
weight they choose upon such testimonies in accordance with the facts of the case. The opinion
of the expert may not be arbitrarily rejected; it is to be considered by the court in view of all the
facts and circumstances in the case and when common knowledge utterly fails, the expert
opinion may be given controlling effects.
On Casino Group’s r​ eport by experts generated during the social acceptability
consultations proved the alleged negative environmental assessment of the project: ​The
alleged statements by these experts cannot be given weight because they are hearsay
evidence. None of these alleged experts testified before the appellate court to confirm the
pertinent contents of the Final Report. No reason appears in the records of this case as to why
the Casiño Group failed to present these expert witnesses.
4
Added to Kae’s digest
FACTS
● The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) and Taiwan Cogeneration Commission
entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), with an intention to build a power
plant in Subic Bay, to supply reliable and affordable power to Subic Bay Industrial Park.
○ The SBMA Ecology Center issued an Environmental Compliance Certificate
(ECC) in favor of Taiwan Cogeneration for the installation and operation of a
Circulating Fluidized Bed (CFB) Coal-Fired Thermal Power Plant at Sitio
Naglatore
● Taiwan Cogeneration assigned all its rights and interests under the MOU to Redondo
Peninsula Energy (RP Energy), which is a corporation organized and existing under PH
Law with the primary purpose of building, owning and operating powerplants in the PH.
○ RP Energy contracted GHD to prepare an Environmental Impact Assessment for
the proposed coal power plant
● 2008: The Sanggunian Panglungsod of Olongapo City issued a Resolution expressing the
City Govt’s objection to the coal-fired power plant as an energy source, and urges to
consider a safer alternative source of energy for Subic Bay
○ DENR subsequently issued an ECC to RP Energy
● 2011: The Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Zambales and the Liga ng mga Barangay of
Olongapo City respectively issued resolutions objection gto this power plant as an energy
source.
● 2012: The Casiño Group filed ​a petition for a Writ of Kalikasan​; alleging, among others,
that:
○ The power plant would cause great environmental damage - that there would be:
■ I. Thermal pollution of coastal waters
■ Ii. Air pollution due to dust and combustion gases
■ iii. Water pollution from toxic coal combustion waste
■ Iv. Acid deposition in aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems.
● It would adversely affect the health of the residents of the municipalities of Subic,Zambales,
Morong, Hermosa, and the City of Olongapo
ISSUES:
[1] WN the Casiño Group was able to prove that the construction and operation of the
power plant will cause grave environmental damage -- NO
[W/N the scientific studies presented are admissible -- NO]
Not Experts
● The three witnesses presented by the Casiño Group are not experts on the CFB
technology nor on environmental matters. They even admitted on cross-examination
that they are not competent to testify on the environmental impact of the subject
project. The three witnesses:
○ Palatino - a former freelance writer, and now a Congressman with a degree
of BS Education major in Social Studies
○ Hermoso, a Director of the PREDA Foundation (Allegedly involved in
environmental concerns), and a member of Greenpeace; BS Sociology
graduate.
○ Lacbain - Incumbent Vice-Gov of Zambales; Accounting graduate with a
Master in Public Administration
Scientific Studies not testified by an expert witness = Hearsay
 ● The petitioners cited various scientific studies or articles and websites from the
internet. However, these, along with the alleged Key Observations and
Recommendations on the Proposed Project, were ​NOT testified to by an expert
witness
○ These are basically hearsay in nature and cannot be given probative weight.
● Lacbain admitted that he did not personally conduct any study on the environmental or
health effects of the coal-fired power plant, but only attended seminars and
conferences pertaining to climate change.
● Palatino stated that he was furnished by the concerned residents the Key
Observations and Recommendations on the Proposed Project, and that he merely
received and read five scientific studies and articles challenging the CFB technology.
○ He further stated that he does not personally know any of the authors of the
studies nor read other materials about coal-fired power plants.
Not an Exception to Hearsay Rule
● RoC, Learned treatises - ​A published treatise, periodical or pamphlet on a subject of
history, law, science, or art is admissible as tending to prove the truth of a matter
stated therein if the court takes judicial notice, or a witness expert in the subject
testifies, that the writer of the statement in the treatise, periodical or pamphlet is
recognized in his profession or calling as expert in the subject
● The scientific studies in the Petition cannot fall under this exception. The Court cannot
take judicial notice of it, and no witness expert in the subject matter of this case
testified that the writers of these scientific studies are recognized in their profession or
calling as experts in the subject.
In comparison, RP Energy was able to present several experts to refute the Casiño
Group’s allegations.
● Witness Wong: BS Mechanical Engineering from Worcester Polytechnic Institute; a
Consulting Engineer of Steam Generators of URS, etc.
○ Was able to explain the CFB → [explained the scientific process] That
since CFB is newer technology than PC or stalker fire, it has better
environmental production. There will be a lower percentage of emissions
than any other technology for coal
● Sarrki: Master of Science degree in Chemical Engineering, and is the Chief Engineer
for Process Concept → [Says more science stuff]
● Ouano: A licensed Chemical Engineer, Sanitary Engineer and Environmental Planner
in the PH, etc.
Court also noted that RP Energy controverted in detail the afore-summarized allegations
of the Casiño Group on the four areas of environmental damage that will allegedly occur
upon the construction and operation of the power plant
● RP Energy further argued, a matter which the Casiño Group did not rebut or refute,
that the waste generated by the plant will be properly handled.
● Anent the claims that the plant is susceptible to earthquake and landslides, Dr. Ouano
testified otherwise
In upholding the evidence and arguments of RP Energy, relative to the lack of proof as
to the alleged significant environmental damage that will be caused by the project, the
appellate court relied mainly on the testimonies of experts, which we find to be in
accord with judicial precedents. Thus, we ruled in one case: ​[ON EXPERT OPINION]
Although courts are not ordinarily bound by testimonies of experts,
they may place whatever weight they choose upon such testimonies in
accordance with the facts of the case. The relative weight and sufficiency
of expert testimony is peculiarly within the province of the trial court to
decide, considering the ability and character of the witness, his actions upon
the witness stand, the weight and process of the reasoning by which he has
supported his opinion, his possible bias in favor of the side for whom he
testifies, the fact that he is a paid witness, the relative opportunities for study
and observation of the matters about which he testifies, and any other
matters which serve to illuminate his statements. ​The opinion of the expert
may not be arbitrarily rejected; it is to be considered by the court in
view of all the facts and circumstances in the case and when common
knowledge utterly fails, the expert opinion may be given controlling
effects. ​The problem of the credibility of the expert witness and the
evaluation of his testimony is left to the discretion of the trial court whose
ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of an abuse of that
discretion.
● Hence, we sustain the appellate court’s findings that the Casiño Group failed to
establish the alleged grave environmental damage which will be caused by the
construction and operation of the power plant.
[W/N report by experts generated during the social acceptability consultations on the
alleged negative environmental assessment of the project can be given credence – NO]
● According to the Casiño Group, from December 7 to 9, 2011, the SBMA conducted
social acceptability policy consultations with different stakeholders on RP Energy’s
proposed 600 MW coal plant project at the Subic Bay Exhibition and Convention
Center.
o The results thereof are contained in a document prepared by SBMA entitled
"Final Report: Social Acceptability Process for RP Energy, Inc.’s 600-MW
Coal Plant Project"
o We note that SBMA adopted the Final Report as a common exhibit with the
Casiño Group in the course of the proceedings before the appellate court.
● The Final Report stated that there was a clear aversion to the concept of a coal-fired
power plant from the participants. Their concerns included environmental, health,
economic and socio-cultural factors.
o Pertinent to this case is the alleged assessment, contained in the Final
Report, of the potential effects of the project by three experts: (1) Dr. Rex
Cruz (Dr. Cruz), Chancellor of the University of the Philippines, Los Baños
and a forest ecology expert, (2) Dr. Visitacion Antonio, a toxicologist, who
related information as to public health; and (3) Andre Jon Uychiaco, a
marine biologist.
● The Final Report stated these experts’ alleged views on the project, thus:
The specialists shared the judgment that the conditions were not present to
merit the operation of a coal-fired power plant,and to pursue and carry out
the project with confidence and assurance that the natural assets and
ecosystems within the Freeport area would not be unduly compromised, or
that irreversible damage would not occur and that the threats to the flora
and fauna within the immediate community and its surroundings would be
adequately addressed. The three experts were also of the same opinion that
the proposed coal plant project would pose a wide range of negative
impacts on the environment, the ecosystems and human population within
the impact zone.
 o Fourth, because the reason for the non-presentation of the alleged expert
The specialists likewise deemed the Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) witnesses does not appear on record, we cannot assume that their
conducted by RPEI to be incomplete and limited in scope. testimonies are being unduly suppressed.
● By ruling that we do not find a sufficiently compelling reason to compel the taking of
The specialists also discussed the potential effects of an operational the testimonies of these alleged expert witnesses in relation to their serious objections
coalfired power plant [on] its environs and the community therein. to the power plant project, we do not foreclose the possibility that their testimonies
could later on be presented, in a proper case, to more directly, specifically and
Based on their analyses of the subject matter, the specialists recommended sufficiently assail the environmental soundness of the project and establish the
that the SBMA re-scrutinize the coal-fired power plant project. requisite magnitude of actual or threatened environmental damage, if indeed present.

The specialists also urged the SBMA to conduct a Comprehensive Cost And
Benefit Analysis Of The Proposed Coal Plant Project Relative To Each RULING: Court denied the privilege of the writ of kalikasan and the application for an
Stakeholder Which Should Include The Environment As Provider Of environment protection order due to the failure of the Casiño Group to prove that its
Numerous Environmental Goods And Services. constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology was violated or threatened.

They also recommended an Integrated/Programmatic Environmental Impact

Assessmentto accurately determine the environmental status of the
Freeport ecosystem as basis and reference in evaluating future similar
projects. The need for a more Comprehensive Monitoring System for the
Environment and Natural Resources was also reiterated by the panel.

● The alleged statements by these experts cannot be given weight because they
are hearsay evidence. None of these alleged experts testified before the
appellate court to confirm the pertinent contents of the Final Report. ​No reason
appears in the records of this case as to why the Casiño Group failed to present these
expert witnesses.

● After due consideration, we find that, based on the statements in the Final Report,
there is no sufficiently compelling reason to compel the testimonies of these alleged
expert witnesses for the following reasons:
o First, the statements are not sufficiently specific to point to us a flaw in the
study or design/implementation of the project which provides a causal link
or, at least, a reasonable connection between the construction and
operation of the project vis-à-vis potential grave environmental damage. In
particular, they do not explain why the Environmental Management Plan
(EMP) contained in the EIS of the project will not adequately address these
concerns.
o Second, some of the concerns raised in the alleged statements, like acid
rain, warming and acidification of the seawater, and discharge of pollutants
were, as previously discussed, addressed by the evidence presented by RP
Energy before the appellate court. Again, these alleged statements do not
explain why such concerns are not adequately covered by the EMP of RP
Energy.
o Third, the key observations of Dr. Cruz do not clearly and specifically
establish how these omissions have led to the issuance of an ECC that will
pose significant negative environmental impacts. The recommendations
suggest points for improvement, but they do not clearly show why such
recommendations are indispensable for the project to comply with existing
environmental laws and standards, or how non-compliance with such
recommendations will lead to an environmental damage of the magnitude
contemplated under the writ of kalikasan.
[228] People v. Castillo
G.R. No. 186533. August 9, 2010
SUMMARY: ​Castillo was convicted by the trial court for raping AAA, a minor allegedly suffering
mental retardation. He contends that the prosecution was not able to sufficiently establish that
AAA was actually a mental retardate because the witness presented was not did not have a
doctorate degree. The Court held that the opinion of an ordinary witness may be received
regarding the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted, if proper basis is
given.
DOCTRINE: ​,It is competent for the ordinary witness to give his opinion as to the sanity or
mental condition of a person, provided the witness has had ​sufficient opportunity to observe
the speech, manner, habits, and conduct​ of the person in question.
FACTS:
● In a Complaint, appellant was charged by AAA, assisted by her mother, BBB, with the
crime of rape.
● At the pre-trial conference, both the prosecution and the defense failed to make any
stipulation of facts.
● The prosecution presented the following witnesses:
○ AAA, the private offended party; Dr. Thessa Marie Antillon-Malimas (Dr.
Antillon-Malimas), the doctor in Gingoog District Hospital who examined
AAA;
○ BBB, the mother of AAA, who was also presented as rebuttal witness; and
○ Myrna delos Reyes-Villanueva, the Guidance Psychologist at the Northern
Mindanao Medical Center who conducted psychological tests on AAA to
determine her mental capacity.
● RTC Convicted the appellant and CA affirmed.
● Appellant contends that the records are bereft of any evidence that would
conclusively show that AAA was suffering from mental retardation​. BBB’s
declaration that AAA is a slow thinker does not sufficiently establish AAA’s mental
retardation.
○ Further, the ​"expert witness qualification" of the prosecution’s supposed
expert witness is ​highly questionable because she had not acquired any
doctorate degree in the field of psychology or psychiatry. More so, the
psychological tests administered by her on AAA were inadequate to
establish AAA’s mental capacity.
● Appellant anchors his argument for acquittal on the alleged failure of the prosecution
to establish AAA’s mental retardation to make him guilty of rape under Article 266-A,
par. 1(b), of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant concludes that his guilt has not been
proven beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUE/RATIO: ​Whether the prosecution was able to sufficiently establish AAA’s mental
retardation ​[YES]
● In People v. Dalandas, citing People v. Dumanon, this Court held that mental
retardation can be proven by evidence other than medical/clinical evidence, such as
the testimony of witnesses and even the observation by the trial court.
● Section 50, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence ​explicitly provides:
SEC. 50. Opinion of ordinary witnesses. – The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is
given, may be received in evidence regarding-
(c) The mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.
The witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or
appearance of a person. [Emphasis supplied].
● Accordingly, it is competent for the ordinary witness to give his opinion as to the sanity
or mental condition of a person, provided the witness has had ​sufficient opportunity
to observe the speech, manner, habits, and conduct​ of the person in question.
● Commonly, the witness must detail the factors and reasons upon which he bases his
opinion before he can testify as to what it is.
● Supreme Court of Vermont said: "A ​non-expert witness may give his opinion as to
the sanity or insanity of another​, when based upon conversations or dealings which
he has had with such person, or upon his appearance, or upon any fact bearing upon
his mental condition, with the witness’ own knowledge and observation, he having first
testified to such conversations, dealings, appearance or other observed facts, as the
basis for his opinion."
● The ​mother of an offended party in a rape case, though not a psychiatrist, if she
knows the physical and mental condition of the party, how she was born, what
she is suffering from, and what her attainments are​, is competent to testify on the
matter.
○ Thus, even though the Guidance Psychologist who examined AAA may not
qualify as an expert witness, though the psychological tests conducted by
her on AAA may not be accurate to determine AAA’s mental capacity, such
circumstance is not fatal to the prosecution’s cause.
● In the same way, though the ​Guidance Psychologist ​who examined AAA may not be
qualified as an expert witness, her ​observations, however, as regards the
appearance, manner, habits and behavior of AAA, is also admissible in evidence
as an ordinary witness’ testimony.
○ Even before the Guidance Psychologist administered the psychological
tests on AAA, she already noticed that AAA lacked personal hygiene. While
conversing with AAA, she observed that AAA has low level mental
functioning as she has difficulty understanding simple things, has a vague
concept of big numbers and time ─ like days of the week, and has
regressed behavior that is not congruent to her age, i.e., 21 years old at the
time of her examination. She also stated that she was not able to administer
the Purdue Non-Language Test, which is an Intelligence Quotient Test, on
AAA due to the latter’s inability to identify the items therein.
● This Court, in People v. Dalandas,​ clarified that a mental retardate, in general,
exhibits a slow rate of maturation, physical and/or psychological, as well as
impaired learning capacity.
● Further, the mental retardation of persons and the degrees thereof may be
manifested by their overt acts, appearance, attitude and behavior​. The dentition,
manner of walking, ability to feed oneself or attend to personal hygiene, capacity to
develop resistance or immunity to infection, dependency on others for protection and
care and inability to achieve intelligible speech may be indicative of the degree of
mental retardation of a person. All these may be testified on by ordinary witnesses
who come in contact with an alleged mental retardate.
● It bears stressing that the deprivation of reason contemplated by law need not be
complete; mental abnormality or deficiency is sufficient. Thus, it is clear from the
foregoing that AAA’s impaired learning capacity, lack of personal hygiene and difficulty
in answering simple questions, as testified to by her mother and the Guidance
Psychologist who had an opportunity to observe her appearance, manner, habits and
behavior, are indicative that she is truly suffering from some degree of mental
retardation.
[229] Hernandez v. San Juan Santos
G.R. No. 166470 | August 7, 2009 | Corona, J.
Topic: Opinion Rule
SUMMARY ​[TW: mental illness; abuse]
Lulu inherited properties from her mother and her maternal uncle worth around P50 million. She
eventually lived with her father and his new family (step-mother and step-siblings; petitioners).
The father and the step-family administered Lulu’s properties and had been dissipating them (by
selling and leasing properties that belonged to her). Lulu eventually sought help from her
maternal cousin (respondent). Respondent found out that Lulu was being maltreated (she was
being forced to live in the basement under extremely dire living conditions and with hardly any
money). Respondent filed a petition for guardianship. RTC granted and CA affirmed. Meanwhile,
petitioners abducted Lulu. Respondent filed a petition for WHC. CA granted. The Court ruled in
favor of respondent and held that placing Lulu under legal guardianship of respondent was
proper since the fact of Lulu’s incompetency was duly established. The issuance of WHC is also
proper.
DOCTRINE
Under Section 50, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, ​an ordinary witness may give his opinion
on the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted. Lulu's attending
physicians spoke and interacted with her. Such occasions allowed them to thoroughly observe
her behavior and conclude that her intelligence level was below average and her mental stage
below normal. Their opinions were admissible in evidence. ​Furthermore, where the sanity of a
person is at issue, expert opinion is not necessary.
FACTS
● Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez (Lulu) was left by her father (Felix) in the care of
her maternal uncle (Sotero) when her mother died
● Her father remarried and had three more children (petitioners)
● Lulu, as the only child of her mother and the sole testate heir of her uncle Sotero, Lulu
inherited real properties (worth around P50 million)
● Lulu eventually went to live with her father and his new family when she was only 10
years old
○ She stopped schooling when she was in Grade 5 allegedly due to her
“violent personality”
● Upon reaching age of majority, Lulu was given full control of her estate
○ However, since Lulu did not finish even her elementary education, her father
Felix continued to exercise actual administration over her properties
○ During this time, Felix and petitioners undertook various projects involving
Lulu’s properties (some of the properties were sold)
○ One of her half-sisters got Lulu to sign an SPA believing it to be an
authorization to appear in court in her behalf regarding one of her properties
under litigation
■ It turned out that the SPA was an authorization for the half-sister
to sell the property
○ Her half-brother also asked to be authorized to lease another 45-hectare
property purportedly for her benefit
● Upon the death of her father, petitioners took over the task of administering her
properties
● Eventually, Lulu sought assistance of her maternal first cousin (respondent), after
learning that petitioners had been dissipating her estate
○ Lulu was being made to live in the basement of petitioners and was
receiving a measly daily allowance of P400 for her food and meds
○ Respondent was appalled as Lulu was severely overweight, unkempt, and
smelled of urine since she was occupying a cramped room with little
lighting, no running water, and no proper toilet (she urinated and defecated
in the garden)
○ Due to her poor hygiene, Lulu was brought by respondent to several
physicians for a medical exam
■ Lulu was found to be afflicted with tuberculosis, rheumatism and
diabetes from which she was suffering several complications.
● Thereafter, the San Juan family demanded an inventory and accounting of Lulu’s
estate from petitioners.
○ However, the demand was ignored.
● Respondent filed a petition for guardianship
○ Petitioners opposed
○ Petitioners claimed that some of the properties belonged to the second wife
as part of the conjugal partnership with Lulu’s father; denied that Lulu was
incompetent; aruged that Lulu was illiterate and that the SPA was valid; sale
of other properties can no longer be questioned due to prescription
○ Lulu testified regarding her experience with her stepmother and half-siblings
■ Claimed that she inherited properties from the side of her mother
but the properties were dissipated by petitioners as they lived a
“luxurious” lifestyle
■ When asked to explain this allegation, Lulu said that her
stepmother and half-siblings rode in cars while she was made to
ride a tricycle.
○ Medical specialists testified to explain the results of Lulu’s examinations
which revealed the alarming state of her health.
■ Not only was Lulu severely afflicted with diabetes mellitus and
suffering from its complications, she also had an existing
artheroselorotic cardiovascular disease (which was aggravated by
her obesity).
■ Furthermore, they unanimously opined that in view of Lulu’s
intelligence level (which was below average) and fragile mental
state, she would not be able to care for herself and self-administer
her medications.
● RTC appointed respondent as legal guardian over Lulu and her property
● CA affirmed
● Petitioners appealed to the SC
● Meanwhile, Lulu moved to a Marikina apartment and was provided with two
housemaids to take care of her
○ However, she was abducted
○ Respondent sought assistance from the PNP
● PNP discovered that Lulu was being kept in Rizal by petitioners
○ Petitioners were initially hostile against the investigation but eventually told
the police that Lulu voluntarily left because her guardian had allegedly been
maltreating her
● Respondent filed a Petition for WHC
○ CA granted
● Case involving guardianship and PWHC were consolidated
ISSUE: ​W/N Lulu is an incompetent who requires the appointment of a judicial guardian over her any criminal liability in connection with the dissipation of Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez’s
person and property - YES estate and her unlawful abduction from the custody of her legal guardian.
● Petitioners: Opinions of Lulu’s attending physicians regarding her mental state were Treble costs against petitioners.
inadmissible in evidence as they were not experts in psychiatry and her incompetence SO ORDERED.
was not proved
● Respondents: Lulu had been confined in a psychosocial rehabilitation center and
convalescent home care facility since 2004 due to violent and destructive behavior.
○ She also had delusions of being physically and sexually abused by "Boy
Negro" and imaginary pets she called "Michael" and "Madonna."
○ Medical reports indicated that Lulu had unspecified mental retardation with
psychosis
● Court agrees with respondents
● [RELEVANT] Under Section 50, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, an ordinary witness
may give his opinion on the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently
acquainted.
○ Lulu's attending physicians spoke and interacted with her. Such occasions
allowed them to thoroughly observe her behavior and conclude that her
intelligence level was below average and her mental stage below normal.
○ Their opinions were admissible in evidence.
● Furthermore, where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not
necessary.
○ The observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence establishing the
person's state of mental sanity will suffice.
○ Here, the trial judge was given ample opportunity to observe Lulu personally
when she testified before the RTC.
● Who are considered as incompetents?
○ Section 2, Rule 92 - persons who, although of sound mind but by reason of
age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes are incapable of taking
care of themselves and their property without outside aid, are considered as
incompetents who may properly be placed under guardianship.
● RTC and CA both found that Lulu is an incompetent and incapable of taking care of
herself and her properties due to her ailments and weak mind
○ These are questions of fact that are generally not reviewable by the Court;
none of the exceptions to the GR are present
○ Court adopts factual finding of RTC as affirmed by CA
● Also, no reversible error on findings as to the need to appoint a judicial guardian for
Lulu
● Issuance of WHC is also proper
○ A writ of ​habeas corpus ​extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the
one entitled thereto.
○ Respondent, as the judicial guardian of Lulu, was duty-bound to care for
and protect her ward. For her to perform her obligation, the respondent must
have custody of Lulu.
○ Thus, she was entitled to a writ of ​habeas corpus a ​ fter she was unduly
deprived of the custody of her ward.
WHEREFORE​, the petitions are hereby ​DENIED​.
Petitioners are furthermore ordered to render to respondent, Lulu’s legal guardian, an accurate
and faithful accounting of all the properties and funds they unlawfully appropriated for
themselves from the estate of Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez, within thirty (30) days from
receipt of this decision. If warranted, the proper complaints should also be filed against them for
[230] CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V. BELAGAN
G.R. No. 132164 | Oct 19, 2004 | Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
TOPIC: ​Character Evidence
SUMMARY: ​Magdalena Gapuz filed an application for permit to operate a pre-school with DECS
Office Bagiuo City wherein Belagain was a superintendent. During inspection, Belagan suddenly
placed his arms around her shoulders and kissed her cheek. When Magdalena followed up on
her application, Belagan’s reply was “Mag-date muna tayo”. Magdalena then filed a complaint
charging respondent with sexual indignities and harassment. In respondent’s MR, he attacked
Magdalena’s character, integrity and credibility based on the several offenses charged against
Magdalena before MTC Bagui and with Brgy. Chairmen.
Court ruled that Magdalena is a credibile witness. The exception under Sec 51 (a)(3) does not
apply in this case given that it is only for criminal cases and inadmissibility of character evidence
for they do not relate to the offense charged. Magdalena’s derogatory record is also not
sufficient to discredit her credibility. Court found Belagan guilty of grave misconduct but lowered
the penalty to suspension for 1 year in view of his length of service.
DOCTRINE
Generally, the character of a party is regarded as legally irrelevant in determining a controversy.
One statutory exception is that relied upon by respondent, which is Section 51 (a) 3, Rule 130 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence. Provision pertains only to criminal cases, not to administrative
offenses.
Not every good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved under this provision.
Only those which would establish the probability or improbability of the offense charged.
Character evidence must be limited to the traits and characteristics involved in the type of
offense charged.
Settled is the principle that evidence of one’s character or reputation must be confined to a time
not too remote from the time in question. In other words, what is to be determined is the
character or reputation of the person at the time of the trial and prior thereto, but not at a period
remote from the commencement of the suit.
PROVISION
RULE 130 SEC. 51. Character evidence not generally admissible; exceptions.—
(a) In Criminal Cases:
xxxxxx
(3) The good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved if it tends to establish
in any reasonable degree the probability or improbability of the offense charged.”
FACTS
● The instant case stemmed from two (2) separate complaints filed respectively by
Magdalena Gapuz​, founder/directress of the “Mother and Child Learning Center,” and
Ligaya Annawi​, a public school teacher at Fort Del Pilar Elementary School, against
respondent Dr. Allyson Belagan, Superintendent of the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (DECS), all from Baguio City. Magdalena charged respondent with
sexual indignities and harassment​, while Ligaya accused him of ​sexual
harassment and various malfeasances.
Magdalena
● March 1994: Magdalena filed an ​application with ​DECS Office in Baguio City for a
permit to operate a pre-school.
o One of the requisites for the issuance of the permit was the ​inspection of
the school premises by the DECS Division Office. Since the officer assigned
to conduct the inspection was not present, respondent volunteered his
services.
● June 1994​: In the course of the inspection, while both were descending the stairs of
the second floor, respondent ​suddenly placed his arms around her shoulders and
kissed her cheek.
o Dumbfounded, she muttered, “Sir, is this part of the inspection? Pati ba
naman kayo sa DECS wala ng values?” Respondent merely sheepishly
smiled. At that time, there were no other people in the area. Fearful that her
application might be jeopardized and that her husband might harm
respondent, Magdalena just kept quiet.
o When Magdalena ​followed up her application​, Belagan’s reply was
“Mag-date muna tayo”. She declined, explaining that she is married. She
then left and reported the matter to DECS Assistant Superintendent Peter
Ngabit.
o She was forced to reveal the incident to her husband when the latter asked
why the permit has not yet been released. They went to the office and
respondent denied having a personal relationship with Magdalena.
Respondent also forwarded his recommendation to approve Magdalena’s
application.
● September 1994​: Magdalena read from a local newspaper that certain female
employees of the DECS in Baguio City were charging the respondent with sexual
harassment.
o She then wrote a letter-complaint for sexual indignities and harassment to
former DECS Secretary Ricardo Gloria.
Ligaya
● On four separate occasions, respondent touched her breasts, kissed her cheek,
touched her groins, embraced her from behind and pulled her close to him, his organ
pressing the lower part of her back.
● also charged respondent with: (1) delaying the payment of the teachers’ salaries; (2)
failing to release the pay differentials of substitute teachers; (3) willfully refusing to
release the teachers’ uniforms, proportionate allowances and productivity pay; and (4)
failing to constitute the Selection and Promotion Board, as required by the DECS rules
and regulations.
DECS Secretary
● In a Join Decision, it found respondent guilty of 4 counts of sexual indignities or
harassments committed against Ligaya and 2 counts of sexual advances or indignities
against Magdalena. He was dismissed from service.
CSC
● Affirmed DECS Secretary’s decision in case of Magdalena but dismissed complaint of
Ligaya. The CSC ruled that respondent’s transgression against Magdalena constitutes
grave misconduct.
Resp filed MR. Magdalena charged with several offenses before MTC Baguio (grave/light oral
defamation, slight physical injuries, unjust vexation, light/grave threats, etc.) and with the
Barangay Chairmen of Brgy. Gabriela Silang and Brgy. Hillside, Baguio City (defamation,
habitual trouble maker, grave threats, etc.)
● Respondent claimed that the numerous cases filed against Magdalena cast doubt on
her character, integrity, and credibility.
● CSC denied MR.
CA
● Reversed CSC Resolutions and dismissed Magdalena’s complaint.
● Held that Magdalena is an unreliable witness, her character being questionable. Given
her aggressiveness and propensity for trouble, “she is not one whom any male would
attempt to steal a kiss.” In fact, her “record immediately raises an alarm in any one
who may cross her path.”
● In absolving respondent from the charges, the Appellate Court considered his
“unblemished” service record for 37 years.
ISSUE/ RATIO
1. W/N complaining witness, Magdalena Gapuz is credible - YES
● Generally, the character of a party is regarded as legally irrelevant in determining a
controversy. One statutory exception is that relied upon by respondent, which is
Section 51 (a) 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
The exception under Sec 51 (a)(3) does not apply in this case.
● Provision ​pertains only to criminal cases​, not to administrative offenses.
● Even assuming that this technical rule of evidence can be applied here, still, we
cannot sustain respondent’s posture.
o Not every good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved
under this provision. Only those which would establish the probability or
improbability of the offense charged.
o This means that the ​character evidence must be limited to the traits and
characteristics involved in the type of offense charged​.
● In the present administrative case for sexual harassment, ​respondent did not offer
evidence that has a bearing on Magdalena’s chastity​. What he presented are
charges for grave oral defamation, grave threats, unjust vexation, physical injuries,
malicious mischief, etc. filed against her.
o Certainly, these pieces of evidence are inadmissible under the above
provision because they do not establish the probability or
improbability of the offense charged.
o Obviously, in invoking the above provision, what respondent was trying to
establish is Magdalena’s lack of credibility and not the probability or the
improbability of the charge. In this regard, a different provision applies.
Magdalena’s derogatory record is not sufficient to discredit her credibility
● Credibility means the disposition and intention to tell the truth in the testimony given. It
refers to a person’s integrity, and to the fact that he is worthy of belief.
● Under Rule 132 Sec 11, a witness may be discredited by evidence attacking his
general reputation for truth, honesty or integrity.
● CA was correct in holding that although she is the offended party, Magdalena, by
testifying in her own behalf, opened herself to character or reputation attack pursuant
to the principle that a party who becomes a witness in his own behalf places himself in
the same position as any other witness, and may be impeached by an attack on his
character or reputation.
● Here, ​cases and complaints are no longer reliable proofs of Magdalena’s
character or reputation.
o First, most of the twenty-two (22) cases filed with the MTC of Baguio City
relate to acts committed in the 80’s, particularly, 1985 and 1986. While the
acts complained of before the Brgy Chairmen took place in 1978 to 1979.
▪ Settled is the principle that evidence of one’s character or
reputation must be confined to a time not too remote from
the time in question. In other words, what is to be determined
is the character or reputation of the person at the time of the
trial and prior thereto, but not at a period remote from the
commencement of the suit.
▪ It is unfair to presume that a person who has wandered from
the path of moral righteousness can never retrace his steps
again. Certainly, every person is capable to change or
reform.
o Second, respondent failed to prove that Magdalena was convicted in any of
the criminal cases specified by respondent.
▪ The general rule prevailing in a great majority of jurisdictions is
that it is not permissible to show that a witness has been arrested
or that he has been charged with or prosecuted for a criminal
offense, or confined in jail for the purpose of impairing his
credibility.
▪ Grounds or theories: (a) that a mere unproven charge against the
witness does not logically tend to affect his credibility, (b) that
innocent persons are often arrested or accused of a crime, (c)
that one accused of a crime is presumed to be innocent until his
guilt is legally established, and (d) that a witness may not be
impeached or discredited by evidence of particular acts of
misconduct.
▪ Significantly, the same Section 11, Rule 132 Revised Rules on
Evidence provides that a witness may not be impeached by
evidence of particular wrongful acts. Such evidence is rejected
because of the confusion of issues and the waste of time that
would be involved, and because the witness may not be prepared
to expose the falsity of such wrongful acts.
● CSC Resolution is supported by substantial evidence.
o As aptly pointed out by the Solicitor General, Magdalena testified in a
straightforward, candid and spontaneous manner. Her testimony is replete
with details, such as the number of times she and respondent inspected the
pre-school, the specific part of the stairs where respondent kissed her, and
the matter about her transient boarders during summer. Magdalena would
not have normally thought about these details if she were not telling the
truth.
o Magdalena’s testimony is also corroborated by DECS Asst. Division
Superintendent.
o With Magdalena’s positive testimony and that of Ngabit, how can we
disregard the findings of the DECS and the CSC? Surely, we cannot debunk
it simply because of the Court of Appeals’ outdated characterization of
Magdalena as a woman of bad reputation.
 ▪ There are a number of cases where the triers of fact believe the
testimony of a witness of bad character and refuse to believe one
of good character.
▪ As a matter of fact, even a witness who has been convicted a
number of times is worthy of belief, when he testified in a
straightforward and convincing manner.

2. W/N the conduct of Belagan constituted grave misconduct - YES

● Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or
standard of behavior, especially by a government official.
o To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be
connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a
public officer.
● In grave misconduct as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of
corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule, must
be manifest.
o Corruption as an element of grave misconduct consists in the act of an
official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or
character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary
to duty and the rights of others.
● This is apparently present in respondent’s case as it concerns not only a stolen kiss
but also a demand for a “date,” an unlawful consideration for the issuance of a permit
to operate a pre-school. Respondent’s act clearly constitutes grave misconduct,
punishable by dismissal.

3. W/N the penalty of dismissal must be imposed - NO

● Respondent has served the government for a period of 37 years, during which, he
made a steady ascent from an Elementary Grade School Teacher to Schools Division
Superintendent. In devoting the best years of his life to the education department, he
received numerous awards.
● This is the first time he is being administratively charged.
● He is in the edge of retirement. In fact, he had filed his application for retirement when
Magdalena filed her complaint.
● Length of service and other analogous cases can be considered as mitigating,
aggravating, or alternative circumstances in determining the penalties under the law.
● Conformably with our ruling in a similar case of sexual harassment, and respondent’s
length of service, unblemished record in the past and numerous awards, the penalty of
suspension from office without pay for one (1) year is in order.

RULING: ​WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
January 8, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 44180 is REVERSED. The CSC Resolution Nos. 966213
and 972423 are AFFIRMED, subject to the modification that respondent ALLYSON BELAGAN is
SUSPENDED from office without pay for ONE (1) YEAR, with full credit of his preventive
suspension.
[231] Lim v. CA​5
G.R. No. 91114 ​| ​September 25, 1992 ​| ​Davide, J.
SUMMARY: ​Lim seeks to quash the subpoena of Dr. Acampado who is her psychiatrist and who
was diagnosed here with schizophrenia from testifying in the annulment case as an expert
witness. RTC denied the motion holding that the testimony is not privileged. SC held that the
content of the testimony of Dr. Acampado is not privileged because it failed to satisfy the
elements in order to properly invoke the rule. Dr. Acampado testified as an expert witness not a
physician who attended to Lim. She merely answered hypothetical questions not based on the
information she obtained from examining Lim.
DOCTRINE: ​"'Character' is what a man is, and 'reputation' is what he is supposed to be in what
people say he is. 'Character' depends on attributes possessed, and 'reputation' on attributes
which others believe one to possess. The former signifies reality and the latter merely what s
accepted to be reality at present."
NATURE OF CASE:
Annulment of Marriage
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the order denying Lim’s motion to
quash the subpoena for Dr. Acampado
FACTS
● Petitioner Nelly Lim and private respondent Juan Sim are lawfully married to each
other. In 1987, Juan Sim filed with RTC Pangasinan a petition for annulment of such
marriage on the ground that ​Nelly Lim has been allegedly suffering from a mental
illness called ​schizophrenia "before, during and after the marriage and until the
present.";
● On Jan. 11, 1989, Juan Sim’s counsel announced that he would present as his next
witness ​the Chief of the Female Services of the National Mental Hospital, Dr.
Lydia Acampado, a Doctor of Medicine who specializes in Psychiatry;
1. Sim’s counsel orally applied for the issuance of a subpoena ad
testificandum requiring Dr. Acampado to testify on Jan. 25;
2. Nelly Lim’s counsel ​opposed the motion on the ground that ​the testimony
sought to be elicited from the witness is privileged since the latter had
examined the petitioner in a professional capacity and ​had diagnosed
her to be suffering from schizophrenia;​
● Lim’s counsel ​filed a motion to quash subpoena​.
1. It was argued that having seen and examined Lim in a professional
capacity, ​Dr. Acampado is barred from testifying under the rule on the
confidentiality of a physician-patient relationship.
● Sim’s counsel contended, however, that Dr. Acampado would be ​presented as an
expert witness and ​would not testify on any information acquired while attending to
the petitioner in a professional capacity;
● RTC: ​Respondent Judge Victorio denied the motion and allowed the witness to
testify​. However, Nelly Lim’s counsel was advised to interpose his objection once it
becomes apparent that the testimony sought to be elicited is covered by the privileged
communication rule.
5
OG digest by flores
1. Dr. Acampado took the witness stand and was asked hypothetical questions
related to her field of expertise;
2. She neither revealed the illness she examined and treated the Lim for nor
disclosed the results of her examination and the medicines she had
prescribed;
3. Acampado was asked to render an opinion as to what kind of illnesses are
stelazine tablets applied to; she was ​asked to render an opinion on
hypothetical facts respecting certain behavior of a person​; and finally she
admitted she saw and treated Nelly Lim.
● Lim filed with the CA a petition for certiorari seeking to annul the order of RTC judge
denying Lim’s motion to quash the subpoena.
● CA: CA denied Nelly Lim’s petition on the ground that ​"​the petitioner failed in
establishing the confidential nature of the testimony given by or obtained from
Dr. Acampado when she testified on January 25, 1969.​"
1. A physician is ​not disqualified to testify as an expert concerning a patient's
ailment, when he can disregard knowledge acquired in attending such
patient and make answer solely on facts related to the hypothetical
question.
2. The rule on privileged communication in the relation of physician and patient
proceeds from the fundamental assumption that the communication to
deserve protection must be confidential in their origin. ​The claimant of the
privilege has the burden of establishing in each instance all the facts
necessary to create the privilege​, including the confidential nature of the
information given.
● Hence this petition under Rule 45 seeking to annul the denial of her motion to quash
the subpoena ad testificandum.
ARGUMENTS AND EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY COMPLAINANT
● That the rule on physician-patient privileged communication under Section 21, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court should apply;
● That Dr. Acampado was summoned as an attending physician of petitioner;
● That the testimony given by or obtained from Dr. Acampado is confidential
ISSUE + RATIO:
Is Dr. Acampado’s testimony privileged? NO.
● Rule 130.24 (c) states that:
1. "SEC. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. -- The
following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the
following cases:
2. (c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot
in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined as to any
advice or treatment given by him or any information which he may have
acquired in attending such patient in a professional capacity, which
information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, and which
would blacken the reputation of the patient."
History of the Provision
● It is a reproduction of paragraph (c), Rule 130.21 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court
with two (2) modifications, namely: (a) the inclusion of the phrase "advice or treatment
given by him," and (b) substitution of the word reputation for the word character.
 ● Said Section 21 in turn is a reproduction of paragraph (f), Section 26, Rule 123 of the
1940 Rules of Court with a modification consisting in the change of the phrase "which
would tend to blacken" in the latter to "would blacken."
● Verily, these changes affected the meaning of the provision. Under the 1940 Rules of
Court, it was sufficient if the information would tend to blacken the character of the
patient. In the 1964 Rules of Court, a stricter requirement was imposed; it was
imperative that the information would blacken such character. With the advent of the
Revised Rules on Evidence on July 1989, the rule was relaxed once more by the
substitution of the word character with the word reputation.
● There is a distinction between these two concepts. "'Character' is what a man is, and
'reputation' is what he is supposed to be in what people say he is. 'Character' depends
on attributes possessed, and 'reputation' on attributes which others believe one to
possess. The former signifies reality and the latter merely what s accepted to be
reality at present."
Rule on Physician-Patient Privilege
● This rule on the physician-patient privilege is ​intended to facilitate and make safe
full and confidential disclosure by the patient to the physician of all facts,
circumstances and symptoms​, untrammeled by apprehension of their subsequent
and enforced disclosure and publication on the witness stand, to the end that the
physician may form a correct opinion, and be enabled safely and efficaciously to treat
his patient. ​It rests in public policy and is for the general interest of the
community​.
● Since the ​object of the privilege is to protect the patient, it may be waived if no timely
objection is made to the physician's testimony.
● In order that the privilege may be successfully claimed, the following requisites
must concur​: ​[RELEVANT]
1. the privilege is ​claimed in a civil case​;
2. the person against whom the privilege is claimed is ​one duly authorized to
practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics​;
3. such person ​acquired the information while he was attending to the
patient in his professional capacity​;
4. the ​information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity​ and
5. the information was confidential, and, if disclosed, ​would blacken the
reputation​ (formerly character) of the patient.
● These requisites ​conform with the four (4) fundamental conditions necessary for the
establishment of a privilege against the disclosure of certain communications, to wit:
1. The ​communications must originate in a confidence ​that they will not be
disclosed.
2. This element of ​confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory
maintenance of the relation​ between the parties.
3. The ​relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be
sedulously fostered​.
4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the
correct disposal of litigation.
● The physician is considered acting in a professional capacity when he attends to the
patient for curative, preventive, or palliative treatment. Thus, only disclosures which
would have been made to the physician to enable him "safely and efficaciously to treat
his patient" are covered by the privilege.
● It is to be emphasized that "it is the tenor only of the communication that is privileged.
The ​mere fact of making a communication, as well as the date of a consultation and
the number of consultations, are therefore not privileged from disclosure​, so long as
the subject communicated is not stated.
● One who claims this privilege must prove the presence of these aforementioned
requisites.
IN THIS CASE:
● FIRST​, Petitioner Nelly Lim failed to discharge that burden. In the first place, Dr.
Acampado was presented and qualified as an expert witness.
● She DID NOT DISCLOSE anything obtained in the course of her examination,
interview and treatment of Mrs. Lim;
▪ the facts and conditions alleged in the hypothetical problem did
not refer to and had no bearing on whatever information or
findings the doctor obtained while attending to Lim.
● No showing that Dr. Acampado's answers to the questions propounded to her relating
to the hypothetical problem were influenced by the information obtained from the
petitioner;
● In fine, ​her expert opinion excluded whatever information or knowledge she had
about Lim which was acquired by reason of the physician-patient relationship
existing between them. As an expert witness, her testimony before the trial court
cannot then be excluded.
● The rule on this point is summarized as follows:
1. The predominating view, is that ​the statutory physician-patient privilege is
not violated by permitting a physician to give expert opinion testimony in
response to a strictly hypothetical question in a lawsuit involving the
physical mental condition of a patient whom he has attended professionally,
where his opinion is based strictly upon the hypothetical facts stated,
excluding and disregarding any personal professional knowledge he may
have concerning such patient.
● The physician must base his opinion solely upon the facts hypothesized in the
question, excluding from consideration his personal knowledge of the patient acquired
through the physician and patient relationship. ​If he cannot or does not exclude from
consideration his personal professional knowledge of the patient's condition ​he should
not be permitted to testify​ as to his expert opinion.
● Secondly​, it is quite clear from Dr. Acampado's testimony that the petitioner Nelly Lim
was never interviewed alone and always with a third party.
● Information elicited during consultation with a physician ​in the presence of third
parties removes such information​ from the mantle of privilege.
● Some courts have held that the casual ​presence of a third person destroys the
confidential nature of the communication between doctor and patient and thus
destroys the privilege, and that under such circumstances the doctor may testify.
● Thirdly​, except for the petitioner's sweeping claim -- that the information given by Dr.
Acampado brings disgrace and invites reproach to petitioner by falsely making it
appear in the eyes of the trial court and the public that the latter was suffering from a
mental disturbance called schizophrenia -- which caused, and continues to cause,
irreparable injury to the name and reputation of petitioner and her family, -- which is
based on a wrong premise, ​nothing specific or concrete was offered to show that
indeed, the information obtained from Dr. Acampado would blacken the
former's "character" (or "reputation").
● Dr. Acampado never disclosed any information obtained from the petitioner regarding
the latter's ailment and the treatment recommended therefor.
 ● Finally​, while petitionr’s counsel filed motion for the quashal of the said subpoena a
day before the witness was to testify, the petitioner makes no claim in any of her
pleadings that her counsel had objected to any question asked of the witness on the
ground that it elicited an answer that would violate the privilege, despite the trial
court's advice that said counsel may interpose his objection to the testimony once it
becomes apparent that the testimony, sought to be elicited is covered by the
privileged communication rule.
1. Even granting ex gratia that the testimony of Dr. Acampado could be
covered by the privilege, the failure to seasonably object thereto amounted
to a waiver thereof.

RULING: ​Petition ​denied​.

232 PEOPLE v. LEE
G.R. No. 139070 | May 29, 2002 | Puno, J.
TOPIC:​ Character Evidence
PROVISIONS APPLICABLE:
Sec. 51, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence​: ​Character evidence not generally
admissible; exceptions:​--
a) In Criminal Cases:
1. The accused may prove his good moral character which is pertinent to the
moral trait involved in the offense charged.
2. Unless in rebuttal, the prosecution may not prove his bad moral character
which is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged.
3. The ​good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved
if it tends to establish in any reasonable degree the probability or
improbability of the offense charged​. xxxx
SUMMARY: ​Lee was convicted for murder of his neighbor, Joseph Marquez. He assails his
conviction arguing that the testimony of victim’s mother was not credible and that TC erred in
hastily tagging him as the assailant based merely on the biased declaration of the mother
without considering the shady character of the victim (e.g., thief and drug addict) based on the
letter of the victim’s mother to the Mayor surrendering her son for rehabilitation, which raises the
probability that there was a different assailant. SC sustained his conviction and held that proof of
the bad moral character of the victim, in this case, is irrelevant to determine the probability or
improbability of his killing. There was no connection between the deceased’s drug addiction and
thievery with his violent death. Also, Lee was charged with murder committed through treachery
and evident premeditation; hence proof of the victim’s bad character is not necessary.
DOCTRINE:​ ​See highlighted in the ratio.
FACTS:
● Herminia Marquez and her son, Joseph Marquez, were in the ​living room of their
house ​watching a basketball game on TV while the wife was upstairs putting the baby
to sleep.
○ Herminia looked away from the game and casually glanced at her son. ​To
her surprise, she saw a hand holding a gun coming out of the open
window which was transparent behind Joseph.
○ She looked up and saw Noel Lee peering through the window and
holding the gun aimed at Joseph.
○ Before she could warn him, Joseph turned his body towards the window,
and simultaneously, Lee fired his gun hitting Joseph’s head.
○ Herminia shouted for help and with the aid of her ​kumpare brought Joseph
to the MCU Hospital where he later died.
● Police investigators arrived at the hospital and Herminia told them that her son was
shot by Noel Lee.
● Eventually, an Information was filed against Noel Lee charging him with the ​murder
committed through treachery and evident premeditation.
○ Prosecution was able to establish the fact that Lee was charged with
frustrated homicide in 1984 and attempted murder in 1989.
○ Defense argued the following:
■ Joseph had a bad reputation in their neighborhood as a thief
and drug addict. As proof of the victim’s bad reputation, Lee
presented a ​LETTER ​handwritten by his mother, Herminia,
addressed to Mayor Rey Malonzo of Caloocan, stating:
● Herminia was surrendering her son to the Mayor for
rehabilitation because he was hooked on shabu, a
prohibited drug, and was a thief.
● Herminia was scared that eventually Joseph might
not just steal but kill her and everyone in their
household because of his drug habit
■ As to the 2 criminal cases filed against him, the information for
attempted murder was dismissed as a result of the victim’s
desistance while in the frustrated homicide case, the real
assailant appeared and admitted his crime
● RTC: Lee is GUILTY of MURDER. Sentenced him to death.
● In the present case, Lee argued that RTC erred in hastily tagging him as the
assailant based merely on the biased declaration of the mother without
considering the shady character of the victim which raises the probability that
there was a different assailant.
ISSUES/HOLDING/RATIO:
1. ​[MAIN]​ W/N TC erred in not considering the shady character of the victim -- ​NO
● GR: Character or reputation of a party is legally irrelevant in determining a
controversy, so that evidence relating thereto is NOT admissible.
○ CHARACTER: nature of a person, his disposition generally, or his
disposition in respect to a particular trait such as peacefulness or
truthfulness.
○ REPUTATION: community estimate of him.
○ Reason for the rule: If issues were so influenced by person’s character, trial
would have aspects of a popularity contest rather than a factual inquiry into
the merits.
● EXCs: Sec. 51, Rule 130 in both criminal and civil cases.
[1st EXC] CHARACTER EVIDENCE OF THE ACCUSED IN CRIMINAL CASES (Sec. 51 (a)(1)
& (2) of Rule 130)
● GOOD MORAL CHARACTER [Sec. 51 (a)(1)]: The accused may prove such ​if
pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged.
○ When the accused presents proof of his good moral character, this
strengthens the presumption of innocence, and where good character and
reputation are established, an inference arises that the accused did not
commit the crime charged.
○ Character evidence must be relevant and germane to the kind of the act
charged, e.g., on a charge of rape, character for chastity; on a charge of
assault, character for peacefulness or violence; on a charge for
embezzlement, character for honesty and integrity.
● BAD MORAL CHARACTER [Sec. 51 (a) (2)]: Prosecution may not prove the bad
moral character of the accused except ​only in rebuttal ​and ​when such evidence is
pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged.
○ WHY? To avoid unfair prejudice to the accused who might otherwise be
convicted not because he is guilty but because he is a person of bad
character
 ● PROCEDURE: ○ ITC, Lee is charged with murder committed through treachery and
○ The offering of character evidence on his behalf is a privilege of the evident premeditation.
defendant, and the prosecution cannot comment on the failure of the ○ The presence of the aggravating circumstance of treachery negates the
defendant to produce such evidence. necessity of proving the victim’s bad character to establish the probability or
○ Once the defendant raises the issue of his good character, the prosecution improbability of the offense charged and, at the same time, qualifies the
may, in rebuttal, offer evidence of the defendant’s bad character. killing of Joseph Marquez to murder
● ITC, it was the prosecution that first presented evidence of the bad moral
character of Lee by citing the 2 criminal cases pending against him. 2. [NOT RELEVANT] W/N Herminia’s testimony is biased, incredible and inconsistent -- ​NO
○ The presentation of this evidence, however, was not objected to by ● Herminia’s testimony on direct examination is positive, clear and straightforward. She
Lee. was subjected by defense counsel to rigorous cross and re-cross examinations and
yet she stuck to her testimony given in the direct examination.
[2nd EXC; NOT RELEVANT] CHARACTER EVIDENCE OF THE WITNESS ● There is no merit in Lee’s contention that Herminia’s testimony is inconsistent and not
● With respect to a witness in both criminal and civil cases, his/her bad moral character in line with her affidavit
may be proved by either party as provided under Sec. 11, Rule 132 ○ Affidavits are generally considered inferior to open court declarations
because affidavits are taken ex-parte and are almost always incomplete and
[3rd EXC] CHARACTER EVIDENCE OF THE OFFENDED PARTY IN CRIMINAL CASES (Sec. inaccurate. Oftentimes, they are executed when the affiant’s mental
51 (3) of Rule 130) faculties are not in such a state as to afford him a fair opportunity of
● Character evidence, whether good or bad, of the offended party may be proved “​if it narrating in full the incident that transpired.
tends to establish in any reasonable degree the probability or improbability of ■ ITC, Herminia corrected her affidavit by saying in open court on
the offense charged​.” cross-examination that she saw the hand and the gun coming out
● Usually offered to support a claim of self-defense in an assault or homicide case or a of the open window, not from a hole in the window.
claim of consent in a rape case.
○ RAPE AND ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS or in any prosecution involving RULING:
an unchaste act perpetrated by a man against a woman where the RTC decision affirmed insofar as Lee is found guilty of murder for the death of Joseph. The
willingness of a woman is material death sentence imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua.
■ GR: Woman’s character as to her chastity is admissible to show
whether or not she consented to the man’s act.
■ EXC: When the woman’s consent is immaterial such as in
statutory rape or rape with violence or intimidation.
○ [RELEVANT] ​HOMICIDE CASES: a pertinent character trait of the victim is
admissible in 2 situations:
■ as evidence of the deceased’s aggression;
● The pugnacious, quarrelsome or trouble-seeking
character of the deceased or his calmness, gentleness
and peaceful nature, as the case may be, is relevant in
determining whether the deceased or the accused was
the aggressor
■ as evidence of the state of mind of the accused.
● When the evidence tends to prove self-defense, the
known violent character of the deceased is also
admissible to show that it produced a reasonable belief
of imminent danger in the mind of the accused and a
justifiable conviction that a prompt defensive action was
necessary
● ITC, proof of the bad moral character of the victim is irrelevant to determine the
probability or improbability of his killing.
○ LEE has not alleged that the victim was the aggressor or that the killing was
made in self-defense. No connection bet. the deceased’s drug addiction and
thievery with his violent death.
● MOREOVER, proof of the victim’s bad moral character is not necessary in cases
of murder committed with treachery and premeditation ​[People v. Soliman]
[233] PEOPLE v. SOLIMAN
G.R. No. L-9723 | June 28, 1957 | BAUTISTA, J.
TOPIC: ​Character Evidence
SUMMARY: ​Soliman and Palin were sentenced to the extreme penalty of death for the murder
of Basa. The defense argues that the trial court erred in not allowing the defense to prove that
the deceased had a violent, quarrelsome or provocative character cannot also deserved
consideration. Court held that the argument cannot be given consideration
DOCTRINE: While good or bad character may be availed of as an aid to determine the
probability or improbability of the commission of an offense (Sec. 15, Rule 123; now Sec. 54,
Rule 130), such is not necessary in crime of murder where the killing is committed through
treachery premeditation
The proof of such character may only be allowed in homicide cases to show “that it has
produced a reasonable belief of imminent danger in the mind of the accused and a justifiable
conviction that a prompt defensive action was necessary.” (Moran Comments on the Rules of
Court, 1952 ed, Vol. 3, 126.) This rule does not apply to cases of murder
FACTS
● April 29, 1955, 2 A.M. (Murder) – While Ernesto Basa and Ernesto Balaktaw were
sleeping in a pushcart and on a box, respectively, along the sidewalk of Sto. Cristo
Street in Manila, Balaktaw was awakened when someone kicked his hand. Upon
awakening, Balaktaw saw Sofronio Palin proceed toward the head of Ernesto Basa
and hold the latter by the shoulder at which moment his companion Geronimo Soliman
stabbed Basa many times with a balisong. Thereafter, the assailants ran away.
● Balaktaw took Basa to a calesa and proceeded to a police outpost and reported the
incident to Patrolman Tolentino. The patrolman boarded the calesa and directed the
driver to proceed to Mary Johnston Hospital. From there, the three transferred to an
ambulance and proceeded to the North General Hospital where Basa was treated, but
Basa expired in the morning of the same day​.
● 4 P.M. (Autopsy) – Dr. Mariano Lara, Chief Medical Examiner of the Manila Police
Department, made an autopsy of the deceased and found that the cause of death is
as follows: “Profuse exsanguinating hemorrhage (only 850 cc. recovered) and shock
due to multiple (7) stab wounds, two (2) being fatal, piercing the pyloric portion of the
stomach, duodenum, jejunum, hepatic flexure of colon and right kidney.”
● Criminal case​ – Soliman and Palin were charged with murder before the CFI.
● Testimony of accused Soliman ​(Self-defense)
○ On April 21, 1955, Basa boxed Soliman as the latter was not able to lend his
pushcart to the former, because of which he suffered physical injuries. The
incident was settled amicably on the same day by the companions of Basa.
On another occasion, Basa beat up Soliman with an iron pipe and the latter
had to undergo medical treatment.
○ In the night of April 29, 1955, while Soliman was passing Sto. Cristo Street,
Basa called him and asked for a drink, but he told Basa that he had no
money. Basa then forced him to give him money and boxed him, and as
Basa had three companions, Soliman pulled out his knife prompting the
three to run away.
○ He and Basa fought, in the course of which he stabbed him. While they
were fighting, Palin came, separated them, and advised him to surrender to
the policy. He then went home and asked his brothers to accompany him to
the Meisic Station.
● Testimony of accused-appellant Palin (Corroborated the testimony of co-accused
Soliman)
○ While Palin was eating at a restaurant at the corner of Sto. Cristo and
Azcarraga Streets in the morning in question, he saw Soliman and Basa
grappling with each other. He then tried to separate them and succeeded in
doing so. Thereafter, he asked Soliman to surrender and the latter heeded
his advice.
● CFI Decision ​– Convicted Soliman and Palin of murder, sentenced each to suffer the
extreme penalty of death, and order to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum
of P6,000.
● The conviction is mainly predicated on the testimony of sole eyewitness Ernesto
Balaktaw, supported by some circumstantial evidence.
ISSUES:
[1] WN the trial court erred in not allowing the defense to prove that the deceased had a
violent, quarrelsome or provocative character -- NO.
● While good or bad character may be availed of as an aid to determine the probability
or improbability of the commission of an offense (Sec. 15, Rule 123; now Sec. 54,
Rule 130), such is not necessary in crime of murder where the killing is committed
through treachery premeditation.
● The proof of such character may only be allowed in homicide cases to show “that it
has produced a reasonable belief of imminent danger in the mind of the accused and
a justifiable conviction that a prompt defensive action was necessary.” (Moran
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1952 ed, Vol. 3, 126.) This rule does not apply to
cases of murder.
[2] W/N Balaktaw is a credible witness -- YES
● The trial court is in a better position to pass upon and gauge the credibility of a witness
because of its opportunity to observe the conduct, demeanor and manner of testifying
of the witness.
● ITC, the trial court has been most careful in taking notice not only of the conduct of the
witness during the trial, but of other extraneous matters that may help in reaching a
correct conclusion.
● The court found the testimony of Balaktaw worthy of credence not only because it is in
part corroborated by the testimony of Soliman himself who admitted having inflicted
the wounds that caused the death of the victim (although by way of self-defense), but
also because it is supported by the nature of the wounds as found by Dr. Lara in his
autopsy.
● The court brushed aside the defense of Soliman because the same runs counter to
the nature and character of the wounds inflicted on the deceased. The testimony of
the medical examiner, the autopsy and the pictures presented show that the wounds
were inflicted when the deceased Basa was in a lying position as testified to by
witness for the prosecution, Ernesto Balaktaw.
● The trial court made also careful observation of the conduct and demeanor of the two
accused during the trial and in this respect made the following observation:
 ○ The accused Soliman is a well-built man, robust and apparently strong. The
accused Palin is a little bigger than the other accused and of stronger
physique.
○ The deceased, while slightly higher in stature than the accused Soliman,
has a thinner constitution and much smaller than the accused Palin.
○ The apparent indifference of the accused to all the court proceedings in
spite of the seriousness of the crime charged against them, and the manner
of testifying in short, curt and confused manner, convinced this court that
they gave little importance to the case against them and to the proceeding
in court.

Re: Argument that the testimony of Balaktaw is self-contradictory and inconsistent with the
testimony of Pat. Tolentino and Det. Senen
● The alleged contradictions refer to unimportant details or circumstances. Further, the
Solicitor General explained and reconciled these in his brief. The Court is satisfied that
the alleged contradictions or inconsistencies cannot destroy the credibility of the
witness.

Re: Balaktaw mismatching the two accused when made to identify them and committing a
mistake in designating their nicknames
● While it is true that at the start of his testimony this witness was confused in identifying
the accused by their names, however, when he was asked by the court immediately
thereafter to put his hands on each of them, he was able to identify them correctly.

[3] W/N the trial court erred in not granting the defense’ motion for new trial based on
newly discovered evidence -- NO.

● The criminal record of Balaktaw cannot be considered as newly discovered evidence

because the same was available to the defense much prior to the trial of the instant
case. Said record can be obtained from the Criminal Identification Section of the
Manila Police Department months prior to the trial of the instant case.
● The fact that a person has been previously convicted of a crime does not necessarily
disqualify him as a witness for he may still prove to be a truthful one.

RULING The decision appealed from is modified in the sense of imposing upon appellants
merely the penalty of ​reclusion perpetua,​ affirming the decisions in all other respects, with costs.