American Cold War Strategy:

Interpreting NSC 68
Editor: Ernest R. May
Publisher: Bedford / St. Martin’s

A Critical Review
By: Fareed W. Khan

February 2004
American Cold War Strategy: A Critical Analysis
Interpreting NSC 68 By: Fareed W. Khan

The fundamental design of those who control the Soviet Union and
the international Communist movement is to retain and solidify
their absolute power, first in the Soviet Union and second in the
areas now under their control. In the minds of the Soviet leaders,
however, achievement of this design requires the dynamic
extension of their authority and the ultimate elimination of any
effective opposition to their authority.
-- NSC 68

This portrayal of the Soviet Union by the government of the United States

during the post-World War II period is contained in numerous statements in NSC 68

– a document which is considered to be the foundation for US strategy during the

Cold War.

The document, which was drafted by a team of State Department officials

under the direction of Paul Nitze, Director of the Policy Planning Staff in early 1950,

gave credence to the American view that the Soviet Union was in the process of

implementing a plan for world domination. One of the starkest and most apocalyptic

sentiments expressed in the document was conveyed in the following comment:

The issues that face us are momentous, involving the

fulfillment or destruction of not only this Republic but of
civilization itself. (p. 26)

According to former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, by utilizing statements

laden with such foreboding language, the intent of the authors of NSC 68,

was to so bludgeon the mass mind of ‘top government’ that

not only could the President make a decision, but that
decision could be carried out. (p. 9)

In essence, by predicting a political and military catastrophe if the US failed to respond to

the Soviet challenge, the authors of NSC 68 hoped to counter strong opposition or harsh

criticism by senior government officials to some of the assertions and conclusions about

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American Cold War Strategy: A Critical Analysis
Interpreting NSC 68 By: Fareed W. Khan

the growing Soviet menace contained in the document.

This shift in the American portrayal of the Soviet Union from wartime ally to

post-War rival and potential enemy is paradoxical given the hopes expressed by

President Franklin Roosevelt in his vision of a world where the Soviet Union would

be one of the “four policemen” taking part in maintaining peace and international

order following the War.

In order to understand the change in the US government’s views about the

Soviet Union, one must examine the chronology of events between the end of the

War in 1945 and the start of the Korean War in 1950. The political strategizing, the

moves and countermoves by the United States and the Soviet Union play out like a

chess game with each side trying to outplay and outwit the other with the ultimate

prize being political and military advantage for the victor.

While the catalyst for the eventual beginning of the Cold War can be traced

back to the rivalries, disagreements and suspicion among “The Big Three” powers

during World War II, there are more obvious instances of actions by the Soviet Union

(or their Communist proxies in eastern Europe) during the post-War years which

caused the US government to perceive the USSR as a nation bent on political and

military domination. Similarly, US actions were perceived by the Soviets as a

threat to their interests in the post-War world. Consequently, these actions and

reactions by each country towards the other further intensified the suspicion and

distrust that had developed between the two nations in the post-War years.

Some of the events between 1945 and 1950 which raised alarms in the US

government included the following (p. 202-204):

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American Cold War Strategy: A Critical Analysis
Interpreting NSC 68 By: Fareed W. Khan

· September 1945: Communists take over Albania;

· March 1946: Communists take full control in Bulgaria;

· February 1947: Soviet Union rejects a US-sponsored plan to place

atomic weapons under the control of the United Nations;

· June-July 1947: Soviet Union and the “Eastern Bloc” nations reject
economic aid offered by the US under the Marshall Plan;

· January 1948: Communists take full control of Hungarian

government;

· February 1948: Communist coup in Czechoslovakia;

· July 1948: Soviet Union imposes the Berlin Blockade;

· September 1949: US President Harry Truman announces that the

Soviets have tested an atomic bomb;

· June 1950: Outbreak of the Korean War.

To senior government officials, these series of events were taken as evidence of

the Soviet Union’s desire for political domination of the Eurasian land mass. These

events tended to strengthen the arguments eventually made in NSC 68 that,

The massive fact of the iron curtain isolating the Soviet peoples
from the outside world, the repeated political purges within the
USSR, and the institutionalized crimes of the MVD [Soviet
Ministry of Internal Affairs] are evidence that the Kremlin does
not feel secure at home and that “the entire coercive force of the
socialist state” is more than ever one of seeking to impose its
absolute authority over “the economy, manner of life, and
consciousness of people. (p. 33)

In addition to concerns about the ideological and economic aspects of the

emerging Cold War rivalry, the US also had serious concerns about the military

capabilities of the USSR and how those capabilities might compare to that of the

Americans. The assessment of Soviet military forces in NSC 68 highlights the fact that,

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American Cold War Strategy: A Critical Analysis
Interpreting NSC 68 By: Fareed W. Khan

The Soviet Union actually possesses armed forces far in excess of

those necessary to defend its national territory. (p. 37)

In addition, it is noted that,

This excessive strength coupled now with an atomic

capability, provides the Soviet Union with great coercive
power for use in time of peace in furtherance of its objectives
and serves as a deterrent to the victims of its aggression from
taking any action in opposition to its tactics which would
risk war. (p. 39)

This questioning of the Soviet Union’s need for retaining a huge military

force, combined with their newly acquired nuclear capability, further elevated

the sense of apprehension towards the USSR within the US government. In turn,

this apprehension dramatically altered US plans for spending on its armed

forces. Evidence of the impact of this debate can be found in the fact that prior

to the release of NSC 68,

President Truman’s budget called for spending less than $13

billion for the Army, Navy, and Air Force . . . a year later,
after officially adopting NSC 68, Truman asked for more than
$60 billion for the armed services – almost two-thirds of the
total budget. (p. vii)

By portraying the Soviet Union as a nation “animated by a new fanatic

faith” which was diametrically opposed to that of the US and seeking world

domination, NSC 68 laid the foundation for US strategy and US response to the

Soviet Union for much of the Cold War. This slow transformation of the USSR

from American ally to enemy began during the political chaos that was Europe in

the years following World War II. This image was, in turn, reinforced by the Soviet

government’s involvement in the political upheavals in Eastern Europe and their

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American Cold War Strategy: A Critical Analysis
Interpreting NSC 68 By: Fareed W. Khan

unwillingness to become involved in any of the newly established international

economic institutions, or US economic aid through the Marshall Plan.

In light of these actions on the part of the Soviet Union, and considering the

desire of the American administration to protect its hard won political and economic

advantages after World War II, it is not unusual that the American government

perceived the Soviet Union as a political and military adversary. Furthermore,

since the two most devastating military conflicts of the 20th century resulted from

the unwillingness or inability of Western nations to deter a nation which sought

political and military dominance in Europe, the willingness of the United States to

undertake a political and military strategy to counter the perceived growing threat

from the Soviet Union should also not be seen as exceptional.

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