PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, Accused-appellant Anastacio Amistoso is sentenced to suffer

v the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for
ANASTACIO AMISTOSO Y BROCA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT parole. Civil indemnity in the amount of ₱75,000.00, he is
ordered to pay the victim ₱75,000.00 as moral damages and
G.R. No. 201447               August 28, 2013 ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages. 
“Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction Insisting upon his innocence, Amistoso appealed to this Court.
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability SC affirmed with modification the judgment of conviction
based solely thereon” against Amistoso, expressly making him liable for interest on
the amounts of damages awarded. 
Facts:  Anastacio Amistoso (Amistoso) was charged before Ramoncito D. Roque (Roque), Officer-in-Charge, Inmate
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Masbate City with the rape Documents and Processing Division of the Bureau of
of his daughter, AAA, alleged to be 12 years old at the time of Corrections, informed the Court that Amistoso had died on
the incident. The Information specifically charged Amistoso December 11, 2012 at the New Bilibid Prison (NBP) and
with statutory rape under Article 266-A. attached to his letter a photocopy of the Death Report
 
RTC found Amistoso guilty, not of statutory rape, but of Yet, on February 22, 2013, the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO),
qualified rape under Article 266-A, paragraph (1)(a), in which represented Amistoso, unaware of its client’s demise,
relation to Article 266-B, paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal still filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s
Code, as amended.  Decision.
Having been convicted of Qualified Rape, he is hereby The Court required Roque to submit a certified true copy of
sentenced to the capital penalty of DEATH; to pay the victim Amistoso’s Death Certificate  which he complied accordingly.
the sum of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (Ph₱75,000.00) as
indemnity; to pay the said victim the sum of Fifty Thousand ISSUE: Does Amistoso’s death extinguish him of his criminal
Pesos (Ph₱50,000.00) as for moral damages, and to pay the liability?
costs. 
Held: Yes. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides
The Court of Appeals, affirmed Amistoso’s conviction for ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. –
qualified rape but modified the penalties imposed in Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
accordance with Republic Act No. 9346 and the latest 1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties;
jurisprudence on awards of damages.  and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefore is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs
before final judgment
In People v. Bayotas, the Court laid down the rules in case the
accused dies prior to final judgment:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as
the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by
Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the
accused prior to final judgment terminates his
criminal liability and only the civil liability directly
arising from and based solely on the offense
committed  Facts:
Given the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused
pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability, as well as his civil liability ex delicto. Since the
criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer
a defendant to stand as the accused, the civil action instituted
therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto
extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case.  The "plaza girls" were introduced to SAYO on different
Undeniably, Amistoso’s death on December 11, 2012
preceded the promulgation by the Court of its Decision.
When Amistoso died, his appeal before the Court was still
pending and unresolved. The Court ruled upon Amistoso’s
appeal only because it was not immediately informed of his
death.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff v. SUSAN SAYO Y REYES
AND ALFREDO ROXAS Y SAGON, Accused-Appellants.
G.R. No. 227704, April 10, 2019
ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. —
Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal
penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability
therefor is •extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment[.]
 
The combined testimonies of AAA, BBB, and CCC known as the
"plaza girls" disclosed that several months prior, these "plaza
girls" have been under the control and supervision of SAYO as
commercial sex workers. AAA testified in open court that she
was only fifteen (15) years old at the time she began working
for SAYO. 
occasions in 2004 by other "plaza girls." SAYO then started to
act as a pimp providing them with male customers for a
certain percentage. 
SAYO would regularly furnish AAA, BBB and CCC with male
customers. Whenever they have customers, SAYO would bring
them either to a motel or to ALFREDO ROXAS's house who
provides them a room for One Hundred Pesos (P100.00) for
thirty (30) minutes use of the room. ROXAS also provides
condom for the male customers at Thirty Pesos (P30.00).
The CIDG-WCCD conceptualized an entrapment operation Nine Hundred Pesos was handed by one of the customers to
called "Oplan Sagip Angel."  SAYO to cover the payment for the services of AAA, BBB and
CCC, the CIDG-WCCO agents executed the raid. 
PO3 Anthony Ong, PO2 Leonardo So and an agent from IJM
were designated to act as poseur-costumers. Peso bills would Recovered from the possession of ALFREDO ROXAS was the
be utilized during the entrapment operation as payments to marked money, the payment for the use of the room for
the owner of the apartment/room, for the pimp and for the sexual activities while the Nine Hundred Pesos intended for
services of the "plaza girls". the sexual services to be provided by the "plaza girls" was
recovered from SUSAN SAYO. 
The "Oplan Sagip Angel" operatives proceeded to the target
area in Pasig City. The three men who were tasked to pretend The [Defense's] Evidence
as customers stayed in front of the church at the Pasig Plaza.
SAYO testified on direct examination that while barking for
They were approached by SAYO who bluntly asked if they
jeepney passengers in front of the Pasig Cathedral Church, she
wanted women and she further inquired if they wanted 15
saw CCC, AAA and BBB together with the three male persons.
year-old girls. The three customers agreed to take the 15 year-
This group of men and CCC approached her and arrested her.
old girls offered by SAYO for Three Hundred Pesos each.
CCC asked her to accompany them to ALFREDO's house in
Thereafter, SAYO informed the three customers about a room
exchange for 100 Pesos and she agreed. Thereafter, She was
in Baltazar Street which they could rent for P100.00 for each
taken to a dark place and hauled immediately to a vehicle and
couple. The customers agreed on the price.
brought to jail where she met for the first time her co accused
Meanwhile, SAYO informed the "plaza girls" that they have ROXAS.
customers for that night. AAA, BBB and CCC met SAYO at the
ALFREDO ROXAS, on the other hand, claimed that he was
Pasig Plaza. There, she introduced them to the three men.
sleeping in his house when he was awakened by the barks of
After the negotiation was concluded, all of them proceeded to
the dogs. He went outside to see for himself what was the
the house of ALFREDO ROXAS. Upon reaching the house, they
commotion all about and saw CCC and Susan [Sayo] along with
were greeted by ROXAS who openly discussed with SAYO in
the men[,] AAA and BBB. One of the men asked him if they
front of the customers and the ["]plaza girls["] regarding the
could rent his room since it was the birthday of [CCC's]
transaction for the night. ROXAS told that the room rate for
compadre, but he refused,the male persons forced him to
each couple is P100.00. AAA saw the customers gave to
accept the money which turned out to be dusted with ultra
ROXAS the Three Hundred Pesos.
violet powder. He admitted having known CCC, AAA and BBB
The undercover agents, SAYO and ROXAS talked about the for about 6 to 7 months prior to the incident. As for SAYO, he
payment for the girls' services outside the house. When the just only met her on that day in front of the church in the
Pasig Plaza. When asked how he came to know CCC, AAA and
BBB, he said that they were just introduced to him by
someone in their place.
Ruling of the RTC
The RTC held that the prosecution was able to prove the guilt
of accused-appellants beyond reasonable doubt. Based on the
testimonies of AAA, BBB, and. CCC and the arresting officers.
On the other hand, both accused-appellants merely
interposed the defenses of denial and alibi which are both
inherently weak defenses
SUSAN SAYO found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
Qualified Trafficking in Persons under Section 4 (a,e) and
Section 6 (a) of R.A. 9208 insofar as minors AAA and BBB
ALFREDO ROXAS is likewise found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of Qualified Trafficking in Persons under Section 5 (a)
and Section 6 (a) of R.A. 9208, insofar as minors AAA and
BBB are concerned
As for complainant [CCC] who was no longer a minor at the
time of commission of the offense, accused Susan Sayo is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
trafficking in persons under Section 4 (a, e) of R.A. 9208.
Accused Alfredo Roxas y Sagon is likewise found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of trafficking in
persons under Section S(a) of R.A. 9208.
The CA Decision
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision with
modification, by adding an award of moral and exemplary
damages, but only to AAA and BBB. There was no discussion
on the omission of CCC in the award of damages.
Accused-appellants filed a Notice of Appeal on July 30, 2015
The Correctional Institution for Women certified that Sayo
had died on November 30, 2011 due to multiple organ failure,
secondary to cervical cancer attaching thereto the Certificate
of Death issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar.
Issues:
1. WON the guilt of Roxas is guilty of the information
charged
2. WON  SAYO is still criminally liable
Held:
1. No, The courts a quo committed serious error in
convicting Roxas for Qualified Trafficking of Persons and
Trafficking in Persons as the offenses proscribed under
Section 5 of RA 9208 are properly denominated as Acts
that Promote Trafficking in Persons.
Thus, the Court affirms with modification Roxas' conviction and
holds that he is guilty of one count of violation of Section
5(a) of RA 9208 for Acts that Promote Trafficking in Persons
and not Trafficking in Persons, qualified or otherwise.
Section 4 of RA 9208 refers to those acts which directly involve
trafficking in persons. Meanwhile, Section 5 refers to those
acts that promote or facilitate any of the aforementioned
predicate acts of Trafficking in Persons.
The RTC found that Roxas violated Section 5(a) of RA 9208 for
knowingly leasing a room for the purpose of prostitution.
 Unfortunately, in spite of this, it still convicted Roxas of ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal
Qualified Trafficking in Persons as regards minors AAA and liability is totally extinguished:
BBB and Trafficking in Persons as regards CCC. The CA, for its
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as
part, affirmed the RTC's ruling.
to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is ·extinguished only
It should be noted that the offenses punished under Section 5 when the death of the offender occurs before final
cannot be qualified by Section 6 as what the latter seeks to judgment[.]
qualify is the act of trafficking and not the promotion of
Likewise, the civil liability of Sayo arising from her criminal liability
trafficking. To be sure, this was clarified in the amendatory
is extinguished upon her death. 
law, RA 1036433 or the Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons
Act of 2012 where Section 6 was amended accordingly 1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability
Only violations of Section 4 on Trafficking in Persons can be
based solely thereon "the death of the accused prior to final
qualified. Section 5 on Acts that Promote Trafficking in
judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil
Persons, being separate and distinct offenses, cannot be
liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense
qualified as the law does not expressly provide therefor. The
committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
clarificatory amendment, being beneficial to the accused,
must be applied in his favor. The death of Sayo extinguished her criminal and civil liability
inasmuch as she is no longer a defendant to stand as the
Accordingly, Roxas' conviction of Qualified Trafficking in Persons
accused; the civil action is also extinguished, as it is grounded
and Trafficking in Persons as well as the sentence of life
on the criminal action.
imprisonment and a fine of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00)
must be modified.
The denomination of his conviction is corrected to Acts that
Promote Trafficking in Persons under Section 5(a) of RA 9208
with the appropriate penalty of imprisonment of fifteen (15)
years and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00).
2. NO, Court notes that Sayo had already died on
November 30, 2011. Thus, the death of Sayo
extinguished her criminal liability. Article 89,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
People of the Philippines vs. Clemente Ruling: Yes. It is not disputed that the filing of the Complaint
Bautista  with the OCP effectively interrupted the running of the 60-
day prescriptive period for instituting the criminal action for
GR 168641, April 27, 2007  slight physical injuries. However, the sole issue for resolution
in this case is whether the prescriptive period began to run
anew after the investigating prosecutor’s recommendation to
Facts: Clemente Bautista and Leonida Bautista had a dispute file the proper criminal information against respondent was
against Felipe Gonyena that eventually led the latter’s slight approved by the City Prosecutor. Moreover, Article 91
physical injuries. Gonyena then filed a private complaint provides that “the period of prescription shall commence to
against the respondents on August 16, 1999 in the Office of run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the
the Prosecutor. The information, however, was filed in the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be
Metropolitan Court only on June 20, 2000. The respondents interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and
contended that their case should be dismissed since the shall commence to run again when such proceedings
prescriptive period of 60 days has already lapsed from the terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted,
time the crime was committed. The Metropolitan Court or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to
rendered a decision that the offense had not yet prescribed. him.” 
The respondents elevated the issue with the RTC, however,
was denied as it concurred with the MeTC decision. The Court does not agree with the CA that upon the
Unsatisfied with the RTC’s decision, the respondents filed a approval of the investigating prosecutor’s recommendation
petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals where the CA for the filing of information against the respondent, the period
rendered a decision that the 60-day period was interrupted of prescription began to run again. It is a well-settled rule that
and ultimately concluded that the offense had prescribed by the filing of the complaint with the fiscal’s office suspends the
the time the Information was filed with the MeTC.  running of the prescriptive period.6 

The proceedings against respondent were not terminated

Issue: Whether or not the respondents are exonerated upon the City Prosecutor's approval of the investigating
from Criminal Liability on the premise that the 60-day prosecutor's recommendation that the information be filed
prescriptive period has already lapsed?  with the court. The prescriptive period remains tolled from
the time the complaint was filed with the Office of the
Prosecutor until such time that respondent is either
convicted or acquitted by the proper court. 
The Office of the Prosecutor miserably incurred some delay
in filing the information but such mistake or negligence
should not unduly prejudice the interests of the State and
the offended party. As held in People v. Olarte,7 it is unjust to
deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on
account of delays that are not under his control. All that the
victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the
prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.8  ART. 36. Pardon; its effects.– A pardon shall not work the
The constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial cannot
be invoked by the petitioner in the present petition
considering that the delay occurred not in the conduct of
preliminary investigation or trial in court but in the filing of the
Information after the City Prosecutor had approved the
recommendation of the investigating prosecutor to file the
information.
ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL, Petitioner,
ALFREDO S. LIM Petitioner-Intervenor,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH EJERCITO
ESTRADA, Respondents.
GR No. 206666, January 21, 2015
restoration of the right to hold public office, or the right of
suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the
terms of the pardon.
Facts:
September 2007, Sandiganbayan convicted Estrada for the
crime of plunder with the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of
sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification.
October 2007, President Arroyo extended executive clemency,
by way of pardon to Estrada with "WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito
Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective
position or office, IN VIEW HEREOF and pursuant to the
authority conferred upon me by the Constitution, I hereby
grant executive clemency to JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA,
convicted by the Sandiganbayan of Plunder and imposed a
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. He is hereby restored to his
civil and political rights." Which Estrada received and accepted
by affixing his signature.
November 2009, Estrada filed a certificate of candidacy for the
position of President and has earned 3 oppositions in the
COMELEC. In 2012, Estrada filed a COC vying for the position
of Manila City Mayor. Then, Risos-Vidal filed a petition for
disqualification against Estrada.
COMELEC: petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Risos-Vidal
failed to present cogent proof sufficient to reverse Estrada's
right to seek public office as effectively restored by the pardon
vested by Arroyo.
Risos-Vidal then invoked the Court's jurisdiction saying that
the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it
failed to disqualify Estrada for having been convicted of
plunder, an offense involving moral turpitude. And for failing
to consider the perpetual disqualification of Estrada.
The restoration of his right to run for any public office is the
exception to the prohibition under Section 40 of the LGC, as
provided under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code. As
to the seeming requirement of Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code, i.e., the express restoration/remission of
a particular right to be stated in the pardon, the OSG asserts
that "an airtight and rigid interpretation of Article 36 and
Article 41 of the [RPC] would be stretching too much the clear
and plain meaning of the aforesaid provisions." Lastly, taking
into consideration the third Whereas Clause of the pardon
granted to former President Estrada, the OSG supports the
position that it "is not an integral part of the decree of the
pardon and cannot therefore serve to restrict its effectivity
Issue: whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling
that former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted
for in public office as a result of the pardon granted to him by
former President Arroyo.
Ruling:
ART. 36. Pardon; its effects.– A pardon shall not work the
restoration of the right to hold public office, or the right of
suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms
of the pardon.
A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment
of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.
ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal – Their
accessory penalties.– The penalties of reclusion perpetua and
reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of civil
interdiction for life or during the period of the sentence as the
case may be, and that of perpetual absolute disqualification
which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to
the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been
expressly remitted in the pardon.
Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all
his civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right
to seek public elective office, the focal point of this
controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former
President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified.
The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to
make the pardon conditional.
Contrary to Risos-Vidal’s declaration, the third preambular
clause of the pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada
has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position
or office," neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate
against the conclusion that former President Estrada’s rights
to suffrage and to seek public elective office have been
restored.
This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly
impose a condition or limitation, considering the unqualified
use of the term "civil and political rights"as being restored.
Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not an essential
part of an act as it is an introductory or preparatory clause
that explains the reasons for the enactment, usually
introduced by the word "whereas." Whereas clauses do not
form part of a statute because, strictly speaking, they are not
part of the operative language of the statute. In this case, the
whereas clause at issue is not an integral part of the decree of
the pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to
make the pardon conditional or to make its effectivity
contingent upon the fulfillment of the aforementioned
commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon.
People of the Philippines vs. Ma. Theresa Pangilinan
GR. No. 152662, June 13, 2012
FACTS:
Ma. Theresa Pangilinan, the respondent in this instant
case allegedly issued 9 checks with the aggregate amount of
P9,658,692 in favor of Virginia Malolos. But, upon Malolos'
presentment of the said checks, they were dishonored. So, on
Sept. 16, 1997, Malolos filed an affidavit-complaint for estafa
and violation of BP 22 against Pangilinan.
            On December 5, 1997, Pangilinan filed a civil case for
accounting, recovery of commercial documents, enforceability
and effectivity of contract and specific performance against
Malolos before the RTC of Valenzuela City. Later, Pangilinan
also filed on December 10, 1997, a "Petition to Suspend
Proceedings on the Ground of Prejudicial Question".
            On March 2, 1998, Assistant City Prosecutor Ruben
Catubay recommended Pangilinan's petition which was
approved by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. Malolos,
then, raised the matter before the DOJ.
            On January 5, 1999, Sec. of Justice Serafin Cuevas
reversed the resolution of the City Prosecutor and ordered the
filing of the informations for violation of BP 22 in connection
with Pangilinan's issuance of two checks, the charges involving
the other checks were dismissed. So, two counts of violation
for BP 22, both dated Nov. 18, 1999, were filed against
Pangilinan on Feb. 3, 2000 before the MeTC of Quezon City.
            On June 17, 2000, Pangilinan filed an "Omnibus Motion
to Quash the Information and to Defer the Issuance of
Warrant of Arrest” before MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City,
alleging that the criminal liability has been extinguished by
reason of prescription. The motion was granted. Malolos filed
a notice of appeal and the RTC reversed the decision of the
MeTC. According to the RTC, the offense has not yet
prescribed "considering the appropriate complaint that
started the proceedings having been filed with the Office of
the Prosecutor on 16 September 1997". Dissatisfied,
Pangilinan raised the matter to the Supreme Court for review
but it was referred to the CA "for appropriate action".
            On October 26, 2001, the CA reversed the decision of
the RTC and recognized Feb. 3, 2000 as the date of the filing of
the informations.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the filing of the affidavit-complaint for estafa
and violation of BP Blg. 22 against respondent with the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City on 16 September 1997
interrupted the period of prescription of such offense.
RULING:
Yes. Sec. 1, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides—
“xx
The institution of the criminal action shall interrupt the
running period of prescription of the offense charged unless
otherwise provided in special laws.”
Under Section 1 of Act No. 3326 which is the law applicable to
B.P. 22 cases, “[v]iolations penalized by special acts shall,
unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in
accordance with the following rules:… after four years for
those punished by imprisonment for more than one month,
but less than two years.” Under Section 2 of the same Act,
“[t]he prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are
instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run
again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy.
Since B.P. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of
imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more
than one year or by a fine for its violation, it therefore
prescribes in four (4) years in accordance with the aforecited
law. The running of the prescriptive period, however, should
be tolled upon the institution of proceedings against the guilty
person.
The affidavit-complaints for the violations were filed
against respondent on 16 September 1997.  The cases reached
the MeTC of Quezon City only on 13 February 2000 because in
the meanwhile, respondent filed a civil case for accounting
followed by a petition before the City Prosecutor for
suspension of proceedings on the ground of “prejudicial
question”.  The matter was raised before the Secretary of
Justice after the City Prosecutor approved the petition to
suspend proceedings.  It was only after the Secretary of Justice SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, petitioner, 
so ordered that the informations for the violation of BP Blg. 22 vs.
were filed with the MeTC of Quezon City. INTERPORT RESOURCES CORPORATION, MANUEL S. RECTO,
RENE S. VILLARICA, PELAGIO RICALDE, ANTONIO REINA,
Clearly, it was respondent’s own motion for the FRANCISCO ANONUEVO, JOSEPH SY and SANTIAGO
suspension of the criminal proceedings, which motion she TANCHAN, JR., respondents.
predicated on her civil case for accounting, that caused the “A preliminary investigation interrupts the prescription
filing in court of the 1997 initiated proceedings only in 2000. period.”
FACTS:
The Board of Directors of Interport Resources Corporation
(IRC) approved a Memorandum of Agreement with Ganda
Holdings Berhad (GHB). Under the Memorandum of
Agreement, IRC acquired 100% or the entire capital stock of
Ganda Energy Holdings, Inc. (GEHI), which would own and
operate a 102 megawatt (MW) gas turbine power-generating
barge. The agreement also stipulates that GEHI would assume
a five-year power purchase contract with National Power
Corporation. At that time, GEHI's power-generating barge was
97% complete and would go on-line by mid-September of
1994. In exchange, IRC will issue to GHB 55% of the expanded
capital stock of IRC amounting to 40.88 billion shares which
had a total par value of P488.44 million. On the side, IRC
would acquire 67% of the entire capital stock of Philippine
Racing Club, Inc. (PRCI). Under the Agreement, GHB, a
member of the Westmont Group of Companies in Malaysia,
shall extend or arrange a loan required to pay for the
proposed acquisition by IRC of PRCI. IRC alleged that, a press
release announcing the approval of the agreement was sent
through facsimile transmission to the Philippine Stock
Exchange and the SEC, but that the facsimile machine of the
SEC could not receive it. Upon the advice of the SEC, the IRC
sent the press release. The SEC averred that it received
reports that IRC failed to make timely public disclosures of its
negotiations with GHB and that some of its directors,
respondents herein, heavily traded IRC shares utilizing this
material insider information. Then, the SEC Chairman issued a
directive requiring IRC to submit to the SEC a copy of its
aforesaid Memorandum of Agreement with GHB. The SEC
Chairman further directed all principal officers of IRC to
appear at a hearing before the Brokers and Exchanges
Department (BED) of the SEC to explain IRC's failure to
immediately disclose the information as required by the Rules
on Disclosure of Material Facts. Then, the IRC sent a letter to
the SEC, attaching thereto copies of the Memorandum of
Agreement. Its directors, Manuel Recto, Rene Villarica and
Pelagio Ricalde, also appeared before the SEC to explain IRC's
alleged failure to immediately disclose material information as
required under the Rules on Disclosure of Material Facts. The
SEC Chairman issued an Order finding that IRC violated the
Rules on Disclosure of Material Facts, in connection with the
Old Securities Act of 1936, when it failed to make timely
disclosure of its negotiations with GHB. In addition, the SEC
pronounced that some of the officers and directors of IRC
entered into transactions involving IRC shares in violation of
Section 30, in relation to Section 36, of the Revised Securities
Act.  and 36 of the Revised Securities Act. Thus, it ruled that no
Respondent’s Argument: IRC filed an Omnibus Motion
alleging that SEC had no authority to investigate the subject
matter, since under Sec 8 of PD 902-A, as amended by PD
1758, jurisdiction was conferred upon the Prosecution and
Enforcement Dept (PED) of SEC 8. Also, that SEC violated their
right to due process when it ordered that the respondents
appear before SEC and show cause why no administrative, civil
or criminal sanctions should be imposed on them, and thus,
shifted the burden of proof to the respondents. Moreover,
they argue that this case is moot and academic, since any
criminal complaint that may be filed against them resulting
from the SEC's investigation of this case has already
prescribed. They point out that the prescription period
applicable to offenses punished under special laws, such as
violations of the Revised Securities Act, is twelve years under
Section 1 of Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3585 and
Act No. 3763, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of
Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and
Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall
Begin to Act."74 Since the offense was committed in 1994, they
reasoned that prescription set in as early as 2006 and
rendered this case moot. Such position, however, is
incongruent with the factual circumstances of this case, as
well as the applicable laws and jurisprudence.
CA’s Findings: The Court of Appeals determined that there
were no implementing rules and regulations regarding
disclosure, insider trading, or any of the provisions of the
Revised Securities Acts which the respondents allegedly
violated. Also, there is no statutory authority for the SEC to
initiate and file any suit for civil liability under Sections 8, 30
civil, criminal or administrative proceedings may possibly be
held against the respondents without violating their rights to
due process and equal protection. The Court of Appeals
further decided that the Rules of Practice and Procedure
Before the PED, which took effect on 14 April 1990, did not
comply with the statutory requirements contained in the
Administrative Code of 1997. Section 8, Rule V of the Rules of
Practice and Procedure Before the PED affords a party the
right to be present but without the right to cross-examine
witnesses presented against him, in violation of Section 12(3),
Chapter 3, Book VII of the Administrative Code.   investigation conducted by the DOJ, this process cannot
ISSUES:
Whether or not the instant case has already
prescribed?  which determines the existence of probable cause, before a
RULING: No. The court granted the petition. The instant case
has not yet prescribed.
It is an established doctrine that a preliminary investigation
interrupts the prescription period. A preliminary investigation
is essentially a determination whether an offense has been
committed, and whether there is probable cause for the
accused to have committed an offense:
A preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and
it is often the only means of discovering the persons
who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to
enable the fiscal to prepare the complaint or
information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits
and has no purpose except that of determining
whether a crime has been committed or whether there
is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty
thereof.  gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing his complaint
Under Section 45 of the Revised Securities Act, which is
entitled Investigations, Injunctions and Prosecution of
Offenses, the SEC has the authority to "make such
investigations as it deems necessary to determine whether
any person has violated or is about to violate any provision of
this Act XXX." After a finding that a person has violated the
Revised Securities Act, the SEC may refer the case to the DOJ
for preliminary investigation and prosecution.
While the SEC investigation serves the same purpose and
entails substantially similar duties as the preliminary
simply be disregarded. In Baviera v. Paglinawan, this Court
enunciated that a criminal complaint is first filed with the SEC,
preliminary investigation can be commenced by the DOJ. In
the aforecited case, the complaint filed directly with the DOJ
was dismissed on the ground that it should have been filed
first with the SEC. Similarly, the offense was a violation of the
Securities Regulations Code, wherein the procedure for
criminal prosecution was reproduced from Section 45 of the
Revised Securities Act. 78 This Court affirmed the dismissal,
which it explained thus:
The Court of Appeals held that under the above
provision, a criminal complaint for violation of any law
or rule administered by the SEC must first be filed with
the latter. If the Commission finds that there is
probable cause, then it should refer the case to the
DOJ. Since petitioner failed to comply with the
foregoing procedural requirement, the DOJ did not
in I.S. No. 2004-229.
A criminal charge for violation of the Securities
Regulation Code is a specialized dispute. Hence, it must
first be referred to an administrative agency of special
competence, i.e., the SEC. Under the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction, courts will not determine a
controversy involving a question within the jurisdiction
 of the administrative tribunal, where the question
demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the specialized knowledge and
expertise of said administrative tribunal to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact. The Securities
Regulation Code is a special law. Its enforcement is
particularly vested in the SEC. Hence, all complaints for
any violation of the Code and its implementing rules
and regulations should be filed with the SEC. Where
the complaint is criminal in nature, the SEC shall
indorse the complaint to the DOJ for preliminary
investigation and prosecution as provided in Section
53.1 earlier quoted.
We thus agree with the Court of Appeals that
petitioner committed a fatal procedural lapse when he
filed his criminal complaint directly with the DOJ.
Verily, no grave abuse of discretion can be ascribed to
the DOJ in dismissing petitioner's complaint.
The said case puts in perspective the nature of the
investigation undertaken by the SEC, which is a requisite
before a criminal case may be referred to the DOJ. The Court
declared that it is imperative that the criminal prosecution be
initiated before the SEC, the administrative agency with the
special competence.
It should be noted that the SEC started investigative
proceedings against the respondents as early as 1994. This
investigation effectively interrupted the prescription period.
However, said proceedings were disrupted by a preliminary
injunction issued by the Court of Appeals on 5 May 1995,
which effectively enjoined the SEC from filing any criminal,
civil, or administrative case against the respondents herein.
Thereafter, on 20 August 1998, the appellate court issued the
assailed Decision in C.A. G.R. SP. No. 37036 ordering that the
writ of injunction be made permanent and prohibiting the SEC
from taking cognizance of and initiating any action against
herein respondents. The SEC was bound to comply with the
aforementioned writ of preliminary injunction and writ of
injunction issued by the Court of Appeals enjoining it from
continuing with the investigation of respondents for 12 years.
Any deviation by the SEC from the injunctive writs would be
sufficient ground for contempt. Moreover, any step the SEC
takes in defiance of such orders will be considered void for
having been taken against an order issued by a court of
competent jurisdiction.
An investigation of the case by any other administrative or
judicial body would likewise be impossible pending the
injunctive writs issued by the Court of Appeals. Given the
ruling of this Court in Baviera v. Paglinawan, the DOJ itself
could not have taken cognizance of the case and conducted its
preliminary investigation without a prior determination of
probable cause by the SEC. Thus, even presuming that the DOJ
was not enjoined by the Court of Appeals from conducting a
preliminary investigation, any preliminary investigation
conducted by the DOJ would have been a futile effort since
the SEC had only started with its investigation when
respondents themselves applied for and were granted an
injunction by the Court of Appeals.
Moreover, the DOJ could not have conducted a preliminary
investigation or filed a criminal case against the respondents
during the time that issues on the effectivity of Sections 8, 30
and 36 of the Revised Securities Act and the PED Rules of
Practice and Procedure were still pending before the Court of
Appeals. After the Court of Appeals declared the
aforementioned statutory and regulatory provisions invalid
and, thus, no civil, criminal or administrative case may be filed
against the respondents for violations thereof, the DOJ would
have been at a loss, as there was no statutory provision which
respondents could be accused of violating.
Accordingly, it is only after this Court corrects the erroneous
ruling of the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated 20 August
1998 that either the SEC or DOJ may properly conduct any
kind of investigation against the respondents for violations of
Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act. Until then,
the prescription period is deemed interrupted.
To reiterate, the SEC must first conduct its investigations and
make a finding of probable cause in accordance with the
doctrine pronounced in Baviera v. Paglinawan. In this case, the
DOJ was precluded from initiating a preliminary investigation
since the SEC was halted by the Court of Appeals from
continuing with its investigation. Such a situation leaves the
prosecution of the case at a standstill, and neither the SEC nor
the DOJ can conduct any investigation against the
respondents, who, in the first place, sought the injunction to
prevent their prosecution. All that the SEC could do in order to
break the impasse was to have the Decision of the Court of
Appeals overturned, as it had done at the earliest opportunity
in this case. Therefore, the period during which the SEC was
prevented from continuing with its investigation should not be
counted against it. The law on the prescription period was
never intended to put the prosecuting bodies in an impossible
bind in which the prosecution of a case would be placed way
beyond their control; for even if they avail themselves of the
proper remedy, they would still be barred from investigating
and prosecuting the case.
Indubitably, the prescription period is interrupted by
commencing the proceedings for the prosecution of the
accused. In criminal cases, this is accomplished by initiating
the preliminary investigation. The prosecution of offenses
punishable under the Revised Securities Act and the Securities
Regulations Code is initiated by the filing of a complaint with
the SEC or by an investigation conducted by the SEC motu
proprio. Only after a finding of probable cause is made by the
SEC can the DOJ instigate a preliminary investigation. Thus,
the investigation that was commenced by the SEC in 1995,
soon after it discovered the questionable acts of the
respondents, effectively interrupted the prescription period.
Given the nature and purpose of the investigation conducted
by the SEC, which is equivalent to the preliminary
investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases, such
investigation would surely interrupt the prescription period.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition
is GRANTED. This Court hereby REVERSES the assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 20 August
1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 37036 and LIFTS the permanent
injunction issued pursuant thereto. This Court
further DECLARES that the investigation of the respondents
for violations of Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities
Act may be undertaken by the proper authorities in
accordance with the Securities Regulations Code. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
DR. ENCARNACION C. LUMANTAS, M.D., petitioner  v. HANZ
CALAPIZ, REPRESENTED BY HIS PARENTS, HILARIO CALAPIZ,
JR. and HERLITA CALAPIZ, respondent
G.R. No. 163753               January 15, 2014
The acquittal of the accused does not necessarily mean his
absolution from civil liability.
Facts: Hanz Calapiz had an emergency appendectomy and
subsequently circumcision at no added cost to spare him the
pain, with the parents’ consent. On the following day, Hanz
complained of pain in his penis and his testicles were swollen.
The child urinated abnormally after the petitioner forcibly
removed the catheter, but the petitioner dismissed the
abnormality as normal. Hanz was discharged from the hospital
over his parents’ protestations, and was directed to continue
taking antibiotics.
Hanz was confined in a hospital because of the abscess
formation on his penis. Presuming that the ulceration was
brought about by Hanz’s appendicitis, the petitioner referred
him to Dr. Henry Go, an urologist, who diagnosed the boy to
have a damaged urethra. Thus, Hanz was operated on three
times.
When his damaged urethra could not be fully repaired and
reconstructed, Hanz’s parents brought a criminal charge for
RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO SERIOUS PHYSICAL
INJURIES.  established the sufferings of Hanz as the result of the
MTCC: Petitioner pleaded not guilty, the case was transferred
to the RTC
Prosecution: Dr. Rufino Agudera, the physician who had
operated on Hanz twice to repair the damaged urethra,
explained that the injury to the urethra had been caused by
trauma but could not determine the kind of trauma that had
caused it.
Defense: Petitioner contended that at the time of his
examination of Hanz, he had found an accumulation of pus at
the vicinity of the appendix two to three inches from the penis
that had required immediate surgical operation; that after
performing the appendectomy, he had circumcised Hanz with
his parents’ consent by using a congo instrument, and not
cauterized; that he had then cleared Hanz on once his fever
had subsided; that he had found no complications when Hanz
returned for his follow up check-up; and that the abscess
formation had been brought about by burst appendicitis.
RTC: Acquitted the petitioner of the crime for insufficiency of
the evidence but was liable for moral damages because there
was a preponderance of evidence showing that Hanz had
received the injurious trauma from his circumcision by the
petitioner. 
CA: Affirmed the RTC sustaining the award of moral
damages. It opined that even if the petitioner had been
acquitted of the crime charged, the acquittal did not
necessarily mean that he had not incurred civil liability
considering that the Prosecution had preponderantly
circumcision.
Issues: Whether the CA erred in affirming the petitioner’s civil The failure of the Prosecution to prove his criminal negligence
liability despite his acquittal of the crime of reckless with moral certainty did not forbid a finding against him that
imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries. there was preponderant evidence of his negligence to hold
him civilly liable. With the RTC and the CA both finding that
Hanz had sustained the injurious trauma from the hands of
Held: No, it is obvious that every person criminally liable for a
the petitioner on the occasion of or incidental to the
felony is also civilly liable. Nevertheless, the acquittal of an
circumcision, and that the trauma could have been avoided,
accused of the crime charged does not necessarily extinguish
the Court must concur with their uniform findings. In that
his civil liability. In Manantan v. Court of Appeals, the Court
regard, the Court need not analyze and weigh again the
elucidates on the two kinds of acquittal recognized by our law
evidence considered in the proceedings a quo. The Court, by
as well as on the different effects of acquittal on the civil
virtue of its not being a trier of facts, should now accord the
liability of the accused:
highest respect to the factual findings of the trial court as
1. Acquittal on the ground that the ACCUSED IS NOT THE affirmed by the CA in the absence of a clear showing by the
AUTHOR OF THE ACT or omission complained of. petitioner that such findings were tainted with arbitrariness,
There is NO civil liability, for a person who has been capriciousness or palpable error.
found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission
cannot and can never be held liable for such act or
omission. 
2. Acquittal based on REASONABLE DOUBT on the guilt of
the accused. There is civil liability which may be
proved by preponderance of evidence only.
Although it found the Prosecution’s evidence insufficient to
sustain a judgment of conviction against the petitioner for the
crime charged, the RTC did not err in determining and
adjudging his civil liability for the same act complained of
based on mere preponderance of evidence. In this
connection, the Court reminds that the acquittal for
insufficiency of the evidence did not require that the
complainant’s recovery of civil liability should be through the
institution of a separate civil action for that purpose.
 Antonio Daluraya v Marla Oliva
GR No. 210148
The civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if
there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action
that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise
did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or
omission imputed to him.
Facts: Marina Oliva was crossing the street when a Nissan
Vanette, ran her over. She was rushed to the hospital but
eventually died, prompting her daughter, herein respondent
Marla Oliva (Marla), to file a criminal case for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide against Antonio Daluraya,
the purported driver of the vehicle.
 
Daluraya was charged in an information for a criminal case of
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide in connection
with the death of Marina Oliva (no separate civil action)
 
After presentation of evidence by the prosecution, Daluraya
filed an urgent motion to dimiss (demurrer) asserting, inter
alia that he was not positively identified by any of the
prosecution witnesses as the driver of the vehicle that hit the
victim, and that there was no clear and competent evidence of
how the incident transpired.
MeTC: Granted Daluraya’s demurrer and case was dismissed
for insufficiency of evidence. MeTC found that:
 Marla merely testified on the damages sustained by
her family but she failed to identify Daluraya as the
driver of the vehicle that hit her mother;
 Serrano also did not identify Daluraya as the driver of
the said vehicle;
 Dr. Ortiz merely testified on the autopsy results; and
 PSI Gomez, while he did investigate the incident,
likewise declared that he did not witness the same.
RTC: Affirmed MeTC
 
CA: Reversed RTC’s Decision. CA held that the MeTC's Order
showed that Daluraya's acquittal was based on the fact that
the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. As such, Daluraya was not exonerated from civil
liability.
 
Issue: Whether or not the CA was correct in finding Daluraya
civilly liable for Marina Oliva's death despite his acquittal in
the criminal case for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide on the ground of insufficiency of evidence?
 
Ruling: No. 
In Manantan v. CA, the Court expounded on the two kinds of
acquittal recognized by our law and their concomitant effects
on the civil liability of the accused, as follows:
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different
effects on the civil liability of the accused. 
1. An acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the
author of the act or omission complained of. This
 instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person
who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any
act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for
such act or omission. There being no delict, civil
liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil
action, if any, which may be instituted must be based
on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is
the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court. 2.
 
2. An acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt
of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the
accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is
not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by
preponderance of evidence only.
In Dayap v Sendiong
 
the civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if
there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action
that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise
did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or
omission imputed to him.
Thus, if demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by
the court, the accused has the right to adduce evidence on the
civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the
act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not
exist.  SC: Petition Granted. CA reversed
A punctilious examination of the MeTC's Order, which the RTC
sustained, will show that Daluraya's acquittal was based on
the conclusion that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist, given that the prosecution
was not able to establish that he was the author of the crime
imputed against him.
 
Such conclusion is clear and categorical when the MeTC
declared that "the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
are wanting in material details and they did not sufficiently
establish that the accused precisely committed the crime
charged against him."
 
Furthermore, when Marla sought reconsideration of the
MeTC's Order acquitting Daluraya, said court reiterated and
firmly clarified that "the prosecution was not able to establish
that the accused was the driver of the Nissan Vanette which
bumped Marina Oliva" and that "there is no competent
evidence on hand which proves that the accused was the
person responsible for the death of Marina Oliva."
Records disclose that Daluraya's acquittal was based on the
fact that "the act or omission from which the civil liability
may arise did not exist" in view of the failure of the
prosecution to sufficiently establish that he was the author of
the crime ascribed against him. Consequently, his civil liability
should be deemed as non-existent by the nature of such
acquittal.
DR. FERNANDO SOLIDUM vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
 GR No. 192123 – March 10, 2014
SUBJECT: Reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical
injuries
FACTS:
Gerald Albert Gercayo was born with an imperforate anus. 2
days after his birth, Gerald underwent colostomy. 3 year after,
Gerald was admitted at the Ospital ng Maynila for a pull-
through operation. Petitioner Dr. Solidum was one of the
anesthesiologists. During the operation, Gerald experiences
bradycardia, and went into a coma. His coma lasted for 2
weeks, but he regained consciousness only after a month. He
could no longer see, hear or move.
Agitated by her son’s helpless and unexpected condition, Ma
Luz Gercayo lodged a complaint for reckless imprudence
resulting in serious physical injuries.
RTC: guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical
injuries. Solidum failed to monitor and to properly regulate
the level of anesthetic agent administered on Gerald.
CA: Affirmed. Applied the doctrine of res ipsa liquitor.
ISSUE:
(1) WON the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor was applicable
(2) WON Dr. Solidum was liable for criminal negligence.
HELD:
(1) Res Ipsa Liquitor cannot be applied.
RIL is literally translated as “the thing or the transaction
speaks for itself.” It means that “where the thing which causes
injury is shown to be under the management of the
defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course
of things does not happen if those who have the management
use proper case, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident
arose from want of case.” It is applied in conjunction with the
doctrine of common knowledge.
However, the doctrine is not a rule of substantive law, but
merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience.
The doctrine, when applicable to the facts and circumstances
of a given case, is not meant to and does not dispense with
the requirement of proof of culpable negligence against the
party charged. It merely determines or regulates what shall be
prima facie evidence thereof, and help the plaintiff in proving
a breach of duty. It can be invoked on when, under the
circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not
readily available.
Essential requisites:
 a) The accident was of a kind that does not ordinarily
occur unless someone is negligent;
b) The instrumentality or agency that caused the injury
under the exclusive control of the person charged; and
c) The injury suffered must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution of the person injured.
Although is the 2nd and 3rd element are present, considering
that the anesthetic agent and the instruments were
exclusively within the control of Dr. Solidum, and that the
patient, being then unconscious during the operation, could
not have been guilty of contributory negligence, the 1st
element was undeniably wanting. Bradcardia would not
ordinarily occur during the process of a pull-through
operation.
(2) NO!
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the
protection of the interest of another person that degree of
care, precaution, and vigilance that the circumstances justly
demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. Reckless
imprudence, on the other hand, consists of voluntarily doing
or failing to do, without malice, an act from which material
damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution
on the part of the person performing or failing to perform
such act.
The prosecution did not prove the elements of reckless
imprudence BRD because the circumstances cited by the CA
were insufficient to establish that Dr. Solidum had been guilty
of inexcusable lack of precaution in monitoring the
administration of the anesthetic agent of Gerald.
An action upon medical negligence – whether criminal, civil or
administrative – calls for the plaintiff to prove by competent
evidence each of the following 4 elements, namely;
a) The duty owned by the physician to the patient, as
created by the physician-patient relationship, to act in
accordance with the specific norms or standards
established by his profession;
b) The breach of the duty by the physician’s failing to act
in accordance with the applicable standard of care;
c) The causation, i.e., there must be a reasonably close
and causal connection between the negligent act or
omission and the resulting injury; and
d) The damages suffered by the patient.
The standard of care is an objective standard by which the
conduct of a physician sued for negligence or malpractice may
be measured, and it does not depend, therefore, on any
individual physician's own knowledge either. In attempting to
fix a standard by which a court may determine whether the
physician has properly performed the requisite duty toward
the patient, expert medical testimony from both plaintiff and
defense experts is required. The judge, as the trier of fact,
ultimately determines the standard of care, after listening to
the testimony of all medical experts

The testimonies the prosecution presented did not prove

beyond reasonable doubt that Dr. Solidum had been recklessly
imprudent in administering the anesthetic agent to Gerald. Dr.
Solidum was criminally charged for “failing to monitor and
regulate properly the levels of anesthesia administered to said
Gerla and using 100% halothane and other anesthetic
medications.” However, the findings of Dr. Vertido, one of the
anesthesiologist, was revealingly concluded that “although the
anesthesiologists followed the normal routine and
precautionary procedures, still hypoxia and its corresponding
side effects did occur.” Hence, 100% halothane is not what
should be administered; it should be 100% oxygen.