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The Getae. Selected Questions Dans G. R
The Getae. Selected Questions Dans G. R
————— 1 —————
Edited by
GOCHA R. TSETSKHLADZE
PEETERS
LEUVEN – PARIS – WALPOLE, MA
2011
List of Abbreviations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XI
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 439
Alexandru AVRAM
Abstract
The first note questions the topics of tribute and gifts as political instruments. While
discussing Polybius (4. 45–46), Thucydides (2. 97), Xenophon (Anabasis 7. 3. 16–18
and 26–28) and some archaeological and epigraphical data, the author suspects that the
Getae, as ‘protectors’ of the Greek cities, regularly used such instruments (see IHist
15). The tribute (phoros) was the regular tax imposed by a treaty (a kind of assess-
ment), while the ‘gifts’ (d¬ra) were an all-purpose solution to any kind of emergency.
The second note analyses a tradition about the wars between Lysimachus and the
Getic king, Dromichaites, which largely differs from the moralising story produced by
Diodorus (21. 11–12). Polyaenus (Strategemata 7. 25) mentions inter alia a trick used
by one of Dromichaites’ men in order to capture Lysimachus. This seems to be sup-
ported by the text of a fragmentary papyrus which collects examples of how a minor
event can change the fate of great conquerors. If this interpretation is correct, we can
suppose that it was the ‘interpreter’ mentioned in the papyrus (where herm[eneus]
might be restored) who had used the apate described by Polyaenus.
The question of the relationship between the Thracians and the Greek cities
has been answered in different ways. A.H.M. Jones (1940, 27) wrote:
The Thracians were an intractable people, who did not take kindly to Hellenism,
and relations between the Greek cities and the neighbouring tribes had usually
been hostile. … The Greek colonies were mere islets of civilization in a sea of
barbarism.
In his commentary on a new edition of the well-known decree honouring
Menas from Sestos (Orienti Graeci inscriptiones selectae I, no. 339), J. Krauss
(1980, 15, no. 1) argued that the Thracian enemy was
auch durch die bedenkenlose ‘inhumane’ Art seiner Kriegsführung und durch
seine Grausamkeit gefährlich. Man behandelte ja Mensch und Vieh ganz in glei-
cher Weise, schlachete ab oder versklavte.
Such views were not accepted by C.M. Danov, who constantly warned that the
relationship between the Thracians and the Greek colonies could differ over
time and from one region to another. He wrote:
Wir sind nicht der Meinung, daß die ersten Begegnungen zwischen den altange-
sessenen Thrakern und den griechischen Seefahrern, Abenteurern und Kaufleuten,
die vor den Kolonisten kamen, immer feindlich gewesen seien. Eher ist anzuneh-
men, daß das Eindringen der Thraker in die griechischen Poleis an der westlichen
Pontosküste annähernd so verlief wie an der ägäischen Küste Thrakiens, mit dem
einzigen Unterschied, daß die Beziehungen zwischen Thrakern und Griechen an
der ägäischen Küste etwas gespannter waren (1976, 356).
Or:
Feindseligkeiten zwischen den Griechen und der eingesessenen Bevölkerung an
den Küsten des Pontos bestimmten trotz der offen oder versteckt geäußerten anti-
barbarischen Stimmungen der Autoren, die über sie berichten, nicht den Grundton
dieser Beziehungen (1976, 363).
Z.H. Archibald (2002, 66) recently argued that ‘the evidence from Thrace,
and the North Pontic region as well as Scythia, [was] not consistent with a
polarized view of Greeks and non-Greeks’. N. Ehrhardt seemed to prefer an
intermediate position. He rightly demonstrated ‘daß sich im politischen Ver-
hältnis von thrakischen Stämmen zu griechischen Städten einige Charakteris-
tika und Konstanten erkennen lassen’ (1988, 290–91).
My aim is not to engage in argument with one or other of these contradic-
tory views. I prefer to treat only the relationship between the Getae (as a
branch of the Thracians) and the cities of the west coast of the Black Sea.
Nevertheless, literary and epigraphic evidence for neighbouring regions, such
as the north coast of the Black Sea or the Thracian hinterland, will be used to
discuss parallels.
Let me take the example of Byzantium under pressure from the Thracians,
as described by Polybius (4. 45):
As Thrace encompasses their territory so effectually as to extend from one sea to
the other, they are engaged in perpetual and most difficult warfare with its inhab-
itants. They cannot on the one hand rid themselves of the war once for all by a
carefully prepared attack resulting in victory, owing to the great number of the
chieftains and their followers. For if they get the better of one, three other more
powerful chieftains are sure to invade their territory. Nor are they at all better off
if they give way and agree to terms and the payment of tribute (sugkatabántev
eîv fórouv kaì sunqßkav); for the very fact of their making concessions to one
chief raise against them enemies many times more numerous. So that they are, as
I said, involved in a warfare both perpetual and most difficult. … for, owners as
they are of the most fertile country, when they have carefully cultivated it and a
superb harvest is the result, and when the barbarians now appear and destroy part
of the crops, collecting and carrying off the rest, then indeed, apart from their lost
toil and expense, the very beauty of the harvest when they witness its destruction
adds to their indignation and distress.1
1
Translation W.R. Paton (London/New York 1922).
The situation became more difficult when Byzantium was attacked by the
Celts (‘Galatai’) under Commontorius:
[The Celts] placed the Byzantines in extreme danger. At first, during the inroads
made under Commontorius the first king, the Byzantines continued to pay on each
occasion (d¬ra) three thousand, five thousand, and sometimes even ten thousand
gold pieces to save their territory from being laid waste, and finally they are com-
pelled to consent to pay an annual tribute (fóron tele⁄n katˆ êniautón) of
eighty talents down to the reign of Cavarus, during which the kingdom came to
an end (Polybius 4. 46).
This passage gives us a good idea of the main instruments used by Byzantium:
the payment of tributes (fóroi) and the conclusion of conventions (sunq±kai).
But the question is whether (and how far) this was typical for the entire west-
ern coast of the Black Sea?
Polybius draws a difference between fórov and d¬ra. In order to regulate
relations with the Thracians, only the payment of tributes seems to have been
effective, possibly because a hostile coexistence between them was a constant.
But with the Celts, the citizens of Byzantium tried a new stratagem: they gave
the invaders gifts in the hope that they would spare the chora. Only when the
gifts (3000 or 5000, sometimes even 10,000 staters) proved to be insufficient
was Byzantium compelled to consent to a larger tribute of ca. 24,000 staters.
I suspect that Byzantium sought to come to a solution of the Celtic problem
by following what had worked for many centuries with its Thracian neigh-
bours. The explanation was first given by Thucydides when describing the
Odrysian kingdom in the time of Seuthes I:
As for the tribute which came in from the barbarian territory and from all the Hel-
lenic cities (fórov êk pásjv t±v barbárou kaì t¬n ¨Elljnídwn pólewn)
over which the Odrysians acquired sway in the time of Seuthes – who, succeeding
Sitalces on the throne, brought the revenues to a maximum – its value was about
four hundred talents in coin, and was paid in gold and silver; and gifts in equal
value to the tribute, not only of gold and silver (d¬ra oûk êlássw toútwn xru-
soÕ te kaì ârgúrou), but besides these all manner of stuffs, both embroidered
and plain, and other articles for household use, were brought as offerings to the
King, and not for him only, but also for the subordinate princes and nobles of the
Odrysians (to⁄v paradunasteúousí te kaî gennaíoiv ˆOdrus¬n). For these
kings had established a custom which was just the opposite of that prevailing in
the kingdom of the Persians, namely, to take rather than to give (lambánein
m¢llon Æ didónai); indeed it was more disgraceful for a man not to give when
asked than to ask and be refused. This custom was observed among the other
Thracians also; but the Odrysian kings, as they were powerful, followed it more
extensively; indeed it was not possible to accomplish anything without giving
gifts (oû gàr ¥n pr¢zai oûdèn m® didónta d¬ra) (Thucydides 2. 97).2
2
English translation by C. Foster Smith (London/New York 1919).
Many years ago, M. Mauss (1969, 35–43;3 cf. Mauss 2001) drew attention
to this passage and compared it with another well-known episode reported by
Xenophon (Anabasis 7. 3. 26–28). At a banquet given by Seuthes II for his
guests, a certain Gnesippus of Athens, who had been instructed by a Hera-
cleides of Maroneia who was familiar with Thracian customs, asserted in the
presence of the king that ârxa⁄ov e÷j nómov kállistov toùv mèn ∂xontav
didónai t¬ç basile⁄ tim±v ∏neka, to⁄v dè m® ∂xousi didónai tòn basiléa
(7. 3. 28). In both cases we find an interpretatio Graeca of the modern anthro-
pologists’ concept of gift exchange.
This custom is supported convincingly by the archaeological evidence,
especially by the silver treasure from Rogozen with its phialai inscribed with
names in the genitive accompanied by the mention of location (Fol et al. 1986;
Fol 1988; Cook 1989; Archibald 1998, 265–69; Alexandrescu 1999, 280–
88).4 It is important to emphasise that the treasure was discovered in the area
of the Triballi, i.e. a people mentioned by Thucydides as independent of the
Odrysians (2. 96. 4) and, furthermore, responsible for the murder in 424 BC of
the Odrysian king, Sitalces (Thucydides 4. 11). On the other hand, one of
the names attested at Rogozen (KOTUOS EG BEOU) is also known from a
vase of the treasure from Agighiol in Dobrudja (Berciu 1969; 1974, 40–84;
Alexandrescu 1999, 183–279). As we know from Thucydides (2. 97. 1), in the
5th century BC Odrysian dominion reached the Danube (méxri ‰Istrou pota-
moÕ), considered as a kind of natural frontier between the Thracians and the
Scythians. It was, of course, not actual direct dominance but rather a form of
protectorate exercised by the Odrysian house based on the king’s suzerainty
over various peripheral paradynasts. The link between suzerain and vassal was
undoubtedly based, in part, on the custom of gift-giving described by Thucy-
dides and Xenophon. Thus, we are invited to suppose that in the mid-4th cen-
tury BC one Cotys of Beos repeatedly gave presents to his king and suzerain,
and that the king transmitted some part of these gifts to his vassals, so that the
gifts initially sent by Cotys may well have come to be owned by paradynasts
after an elaborate journey through various hands, as was the case with the
Rogozen and Agighiol treasures.5
3
First published in REG 34 (1921), 388–97.
4
For the inscriptions, see Mihailov 1988.
5
Cf. Hornblower 1991, 372–73: ‘So the Odrysian royal names, often in the genitive, on the
phialai are names not of the recipients but of the donors. So Thucydides was not quite right to
imply that the Odrysians received without giving. (But the place-names, like “from Ergiske”,
may be evidence that the vessels originally came from somewhere else, perhaps as presents to the
Odrysians who then gave them to the Triballians). … Thus in the Persian empire, the “generos-
ity” of the king was expected to be matched by reciprocal gifts of goods, tribute or service.
Thucydides’ sharp distinction between Thracians and Persians is therefore to some extent
unreal.’
The mechanics of such gift exchanges could constitute a paradigm for the
relationship between the same Odrysian king and the Greek cities of the coast.
Thucydides estimated the income of the Odrysian kings from tribute to be 400
talents; later, Diodorus (12. 50 2), clearly basing himself on Thucydides’ fig-
ures, mentions 1000 talents. Taking into account what Thucydides had written
about the amount of gifts being equal in value to the tribute, it is possible that
Diodorus simplified the question, giving a rounded figure of 1000 talents.
Now it is obvious that tribute was paid and gifts exchanged by the Greek
cities for protection. But the game seems to have been more complex. First of
all, for some coastal cities, especially those closer to the Danube, Scythian
protection might sometimes have been more attractive than Odrysian suze-
rainty. Herodotus (4. 78) mentions that the mother of the Scythian king Scyles
was a lady from Istros who gave her son a Greek education (êz ˆIstrijn±v dè
gunaikòv oœtov gínetai kaì oûdam¬v êpixwríjv, tòn ™ mßtjr aÀtj
gl¬ssán te ¨Elláda kaì grámmata êdídaze), and we are invited to see here
an alliance between Ariapeithes, Scyles’ father, and the Istrian aristocracy,
cemented by marriage (Archibald 1998, 109; Alexandrescu 1999, 105–07; cf.
Vinogradov 1997, 613–33; Dubois 1996, 11–14, no. 4; Oppermann 2004,
62–64). Secondly, Thucydides mentions that gifts were also sent to subordi-
nate princes and nobles (to⁄v paradunasteúousi). Consequently, we can
suppose that, if the tribute was perhaps collected periodically for the king, gifts
were commonly addressed not only to the king but also (if not especially) to
the paradynast who was closest to the city and thus in the best position to
guarantee its protection. Furthermore, if we accept this possibility, we must
suppose a real competition between local paradynasts to secure suzerainty over
the Greek cities. These local paradynasts seem to have been far more impor-
tant in this respect than the nominal authority of the king. Polybius probably
understood the striving and competitiveness of the Thracian chieftains. There-
fore, the case of Byzantium under pressure from Thracians and Celts is more
than merely paradigmatic.
Given the scarcity of evidence, it is hard to speculate about the relations
between the Greek cities and their Thracian/Getic neighbours at the time of the
Odrysian kingdom. After its collapse, we find the cities at first protected by
the Macedonians, then, after 281 BC, facing local barbarian chieftains alone.
Macedonian rule in the Lower Danube6 is a good example, as Ehrhardt notes
(1988, 299), ‘daß sich Eingriffe griechischer Mächte nicht unbedingt positiv
für die griechischen Poleis ausgewirkt haben’. The presence of Macedonian
garrisons and the repeated exactions imposed, especially by Lysimachus, were
6
In general, see Pippidi 1984, 151–63; Oppermann 2004, 140–52.
the cause of the revolt of the Greek cities against the diadoch, and it is interest-
ing to note that the Thracians and the Scythians of the same area supported this
action (Diodorus 19. 73. 2). Therefore, the context is far from being identical
with what would be found at the end of the 2nd century BC, when the Greek
cities were happy to welcome the officers of Mithridates VI Eupator as a guar-
antee of their security.
Given this climate of hostility in relations between Lysimachus and the cit-
ies of the western Black Sea, and the attested alliance between the same cities
and the barbarian population, it is possible to see a continuation of the same
old conflict in the wars between Lysimachus and Dromichaites, the Getic
king.7 The Getic king undertook the protection of the Greek cities, as the
Odrysian kings had done for more than a century.
Diodorus mentions in an obscure context (21. 11) a territory occupied by
Lysimachus which the ‘Thracians’ (i.e. Getae) hoped to recapture while liber-
ating Agathocles, Lysimachus’ son (êlpíhontev âpolßcesqai t®n âfjÇr-
jménjn aût¬n xÉran üpò Lusimáxou), and later (21. 12. 3) the fortifica-
tions held previously by the ‘Thracians’ (tà froúria tà próteron üpárzanta
Qraçk¬n), which Dromichaites thought to recover after having captured Lysi-
machus himself. The same territories are mentioned by Pausanias (1. 9. 7) as
being on ‘the other side’ of the Danube (tà péran ‰Istrou). What is meant
by ‘the other side’? Since we do not know on which side of the Danube Dro-
michaites’ seat lay (the enigmatic ÍJliv of Diodorus), it is impossible to
answer this question convincingly. If Dromichaites reigned over a region situ-
ated to the north of the Danube, we can accept that he held some froúria on
the south bank and that Lysimachus had occupied them. The alternative expla-
nation is that Dromichaites’ kingdom lay south of the Danube (possibly in the
vicinity of Sboryanovo), and that the fortifications taken by Lysimachus were
north of the river. But, if this is correct, it would be rather difficult to explain
why Lysimachus preferred an expedition beyond the Danube to a direct attack
at the heart of the Getic kingdom.8 Therefore, it seems more likely to view
Dromichaites as a Getic king ruling north of the Danube who, through holding
some positions on the south bank, was ready to act as protector of the Greek
cities against the Macedonian conqueror.9
7
The chronology of Lysimachus’ campaigns (two at least but perhaps more) remains puz-
zling and will not be discussed here. See particularly Saitta 1955 (a first campaign in the early
290s, a second in 292/1 BC); contra Lund 1992, 46. For different interpretations, see also Jor-
danov 1990; Gattinoni 1992, 182–86.
8
I differ on this point with Lund (1992, 46–47). Oppermann (2004, 142) also agrees that
‘möglicherweise wird der Herrschersitz Helis, der jedoch nur einer von vielen gewesen sein
kann, nördlich der Donau gelegen haben’.
9
Pippidi 1971, 92–93; 1984, 161: ‘À tenir compte de l’essor de la puissance gète à la fin du
IVe siècle et de l’intérêt depuis toujours manifesté par leurs chefs pour les cités grecques de
The protection afforded by the Getic king to the Greek cities and the nature
of the relationship are illustrated by three decrees from Istros: for the ambas-
sadors to Zalmodegikos (IHist 8, 3rd century BC); for Agathocles, son of
Antiphilos (IHist 15, ca. 200 BC); and for Meniskos, son of Theodoros,
recently published and more or less contemporary with the decree for Agath-
ocles (Milchev 2002).10
The decree in honour of Agathocles mentions more stages in the relation-
ship between Istros and the Thracians (Getae) who were led by a chieftain
(ãrxwn) named Zoltes:
l’actuel littoral roumain, on pensera plutôt que l’initiative des hostilités a dû appartenir à Dro-
mikhaitès et qu’en répondant à ses incursions Lysimaque ne faisait que veiller à l’intégrité de ses
frontières. C’est ainsi que j’entends le récit passablement confus de Pausanias sur l’issue des
luttes entre les deux adversaries, et plus précisément la phrase où il affirme qu’en fin de compte
Lysimaque s’est vu contraint d’abandonner à Dromikhaitès … tà péran ‰Istrou. À la diffe-
rence de ceux qui prennent cette expression au sens que le premier aurait abandonné au second
les territories auparavant conquis au-delà du Danube, je préfère y voir l’aveu du fait qu’au terme
d’une guerre qui semble avoir affecté les deux combatants dans une égale mesure, ils ont dû se
mettre d’accord pour considérer le Danube comme une frontière provisoire de leurs possessions.’
Cf. Oppermann 2004, 142 with n. 149.
10
The readings and restorations can be improved: the author used a manuscript of Werner
Peek’s, and Peek has seen only photographs of the inscription.
8. then he persuaded Rhemaxos’ son to send the 600 horsemen who finally
achieved victory over Zoltes (ll.51–57).
11
See, for earlier editions and commentaries, Pippidi 1962, 75–88; 1975, 31–55; Bengtson
1962 = 1974, 377–88; Moretti 1976, no. 131. French translation: Bertrand 1992, 195–97, no.
109; German translation: Schuller 1996, 102–04. I add that 1. 18–19 is now to be restored:
o[ûdéna kín]dunon úp[ologi|s]ámenov (cf. IHist 12, 1. 10–11). For further commentaries, see
≤tefan 1974; Avram 2001, 603–05. About the activities of the Istrian euergetae, see Gauthier
1985, 33–36; Nawotka 1997; Anghel 1999–2000.
12
English translation from Austin 1981. For the d¬ra, see Vinogradov 1997, 89.
Now although this story is largely to be rejected (first of all, the date and the
circumstances of Lysimachus’ violent death in 281 BC are well known; fur-
thermore, the number of 100,000 dead is absurd), it may reflect an established
tradition regarding Dromichaites’ ‘stratagem’. Polyaenus’ aim was simply to
collect stratjgßmata, and not to describe the full context of the events he
relates. Therefore, it is possible that, as in other cases he recounts, his concern
is exclusively to verify the reliability of the stratagem; he seems to have
embroidered the other aspects at will (Martin García 1991; Bianco 1997;
Schettino 1998; etc.).
The tradition concerning the trick used by Dromichaites seems to be revealed
by a very fragmentary papyrus of the 1st century AD, first published by
W. Schubart (1950, 75–77, no. 39), which gives examples of the fate of some
Hellenistic kings and cites the opinion of a certain ˆArist[ - -] (l. 9), who con-
trasted the vanity of various kings with the quiet life of leading philosophers:
…]ratji dusqum[ía …
… eî]v tòn ãlkimon Púrron x[ártav …
… gr]acásjv, kaqˆ oÃv mèn ker[…
… t®n] dˆ ên Suríaç{n} múljn êze[…
5 … L]usímaxon Dromixaítou erm[…
…..]n kaì Ptolema⁄on tòn Kera[unòn
. aï S]eleúkou miaifoníai kljr[…
…..]ineíav üpò Galat¬n di[…
…..]n kal¬v oŒn e˝pen ˆArist[…
10 …..]a oÀtwv ânójton eür[eq±nai …
…..] ån eΔzaito m¢llon om[…
…..]j Mídav kaì Sólwn m[…
…..]v kaì ˆAristeídjv kaì S[wkrátjv
… kaì Plát]wn Æ Perdí[kkav …
L.11: quite sure ÊOm[jrov].
The probable moralising character of the text given by this papyrus has been
recognised by several scholars (Alfonsi 1953, 303–09; Nenci 1953, 28–29;
Lévêque 1957, 17–18; Mazzarino 1966, 356–58; Burelli Bergese 1990, 118–
20), and the thrust of it has been summarised by C. Franco in the following
terms:
Dopo il riferimento a vicende relative a Pirro, Lismaco e Tolemeo, viene appro-
vata e riportata l’opinione di Aris[…]: non si potrebbe trovare alcuno così
irragionevole da non augurarsi di essere un saggio piuttosto che un re, Omero
piuttosto di Mida, Solone piuttosto di […], Aristide e Socrate e […] e Platone
piuttosto che Perdicca (Franco 1993, 260).
Franco prudently observed that, since the circumstances of death of all the
other kings mentioned in the text are given, it could have been the same for
Lysimachus (l.5), thus providing unexpected support for the isolated tradition
reported by Polyaenus:
La menzione congiunta nel papiro di Lisimaco e Dromichaites potrebbe nascon-
dere un riferimento alla morte del diadoco: secondo Polieno [7.25] Lisimaco
sarebbe infatti stato ucciso dal re barbaro. La testimonianze è isolata, e contra-
detta senz’altro dal complesso della tradizione: tuttavia quel dato che in Polieno
potrebbe sembrare scaturito da un errore, trova nel collegamento con il papiro
Schubart un significativo riscontro, che suggerisce l’esistenza di una tradizione
antica per la quale Lisimaco non era stato solo prigioniero, bensì vittima di Dro-
michaites (Franco 1993, 261–62).
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13
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