ST. MARY’S ACADEMY v.

WILLIAM CARPITANOS
G.R. No. 143363, February 6, 2002
CASE DIGESTED BY: Lopena, Maria Lourdes M.

DOCTRINE:

“In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the
‘injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong
done; the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural
sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes.’ In other words, the
negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. For, ‘negligence, no matter in what
it consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury
complained of.’ And ‘the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not have occurred.”’

FACTS:

St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive for the school year
1995-1996. A facet of the enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools from where
prospective enrollees were studying. As a student of St. Mary’s Academy, Sherwin
Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group. Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin,
along with other high school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by
defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School, Larayan,
Dapitan City. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of
the same school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result
the jeep turned turtle.

Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident.

RTC RULING:

St. Mary’s Academy is ordered to pay plaintiffs William Carpitanos and Luisa
Carpitanos; James Daniel, Sr. and Guada Daniel are subsidiarily liable in the event of
insolvency of principal obligor St. Mary’s Academy; James Daniel II, being a minor at the
time of the commission of the tort and who was under special parental authority of
defendant St. Mary’s Academy, is ABSOLVED; and Vivencio Villanueva is ABSOLVED
of any liability.

CA RULING:

The Court of Appeals promulgated a decision reducing the actual damages but otherwise
affirming the decision of the RTC in toto.

ISSUE:

W/N negligence of petitioner St. Mary’s Academy was the proximate cause of the death
of the victim.
SC RULING:

No. In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that
the ‘injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong
done; the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural
sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes.’ In other words, the
negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. For, ‘negligence, no matter in what
it consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury
complained of.’ And ‘the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not have occurred.

In this case, Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the
accident was not the negligence of petitioner or the reckless driving of James Daniel II,
but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. The traffic investigator also
stated in his report and testimony that the cause of the accident was the detachment of
the steering wheel guide that caused the jeep to turn turtle. Further, there was no
evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of
respondent Vivencio Villanueva.

Hence, the negligence of petitioner St. Mary’s Academy was only a remote cause of the
accident. Between the remote cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence of the
minor’s parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Petitioner then,
may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident.
JONAS AÑONUEVO vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 130003 : October 20, 2004
CASE DIGESTED BY: Lopena, Maria Lourdes M.

DOCTRINE:

The mere fact of violation of a statute is not sufficient basis for an inference that such
violation was the proximate cause of the injury complained. However, if the very injury
has happened which was intended to be prevented by the statute, it has been held that
violation of the statute will be deemed to be the proximate cause of the injury."

The leading case in contributory negligence, Rakes v. Atlantic Gulf clarifies that damages
may be mitigated if the claimant "in conjunction with the occurrence, [contributes] only
to his injury."

FACTS:
Villagracia was traveling along Boni Avenue on his bicycle, while Añonuevo, traversing
the opposite lane was driving his Lancer car. The car was owned by Procter and Gamble
Inc., the employer of Añonuevo's brother, Jonathan. Añonuevo was in the course of
making a left turn towards Libertad Street when the collision occurred. Villagracia
sustained serious injuries as a result, which necessitated his hospitalization several times,
and forced him to undergo four (4) operations.
Villagracia instituted an action for damages against Procter and Gamble Phils., Inc. and
Añonuevo before the RTC. He had also filed a criminal complaint against Añonuevo
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of, but the latter was subsequently acquitted of the
criminal charge.

RTC RULING:

The RTC rendered judgment against Procter and Gamble and Añonuevo, ordering them
to pay Villagracia
CA RULING:

The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision in toto.

ISSUE:

W/N Villagracia’s violation of a statute is sufficient to negate or mitigate recovery of

damages.

SC RULING:

No. The mere fact of violation of a statute is not sufficient basis for an inference that such
violation was the proximate cause of the injury complained. However, if the very injury
has happened which was intended to be prevented by the statute, it has been held that
violation of the statute will be deemed to be the proximate cause of the injury.

The failure of the bicycle owner to comply with accepted safety practices, whether or not
imposed by ordinance or statute, is not sufficient to negate or mitigate recovery unless a
causal connection is established between such failure and the injury sustained.
Neither can Villagracia be adjudge with contributory negligence. The leading case in
contributory negligence, Rakes v. Atlantic Gulf clarifies that damages may be mitigated if
the claimant "in conjunction with the occurrence, [contributes] only to his injury."
As between Añonuevo and Villagracia, the lower courts adjudged Añonuevo as solely
responsible for the accident. The petition does not demonstrate why this finding should
be reversed. It is hard to imagine that the same result would not have occurred even if
Villagracia's bicycle had been equipped with safety equipment. Añonuevo himself
admitted having seen Villagracia from ten (10) meters away, thus he could no longer
claim not having been sufficiently warned either by headlights or safety horns. The fact
that Añonuevo was recklessly speeding as he made the turn likewise leads the Court to
believe that even if Villagracia's bicycle had been equipped with the proper brakes, the
cyclist would not have had opportunity to brake in time to avoid the speeding car.
Moreover, it was incumbent on Añonuevo to have established that Villagracia's failure
to have installed the proper brakes contributed to his own injury. The fact that Añonuevo
failed to adduce proof to that effect leads the Court to consider such causal connection as
not proven.
Layugan vs IAC
GR No. 73998
November 14, 1988

Res ipsa loquitur Doctrine:

Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the
defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen
if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.

Facts:
Pedro T, Layugan filed an action for damages against Godofredo Isidro, alleging that
while at Baretbet, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya, the Layugan and a companion were repairing
the tire of their cargo truck with which was parked along the right side of the National
Highway; that defendant's truck, driven recklessly by Daniel Serrano bumped Layugan;
that as a result, Layugan was injured and hospitalized.

Defendant countered that the plaintiff was merely a bystander, not a truck helper being
a brotherin-law of the driver of said truck; that the truck allegedly being repaired was
parked, occupying almost half of the right lane, right after the curve; that the proximate
cause of the incident was the failure of the driver of the parked truck in installing the
early warning device, hence the driver of the parked car should be liable for damages
sustained by the truck of the herein defendant.

The trial court rendered its decision against the Plaintiff. The Intermediate Appellate
Court as earlier stated reversed the decision of the trial court and dismissed the
complaint. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
(1) Who is negligent in this case
(2) Whether doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur (The thing speaks for itself) is applicable

Decision:

Negligence, Defined; The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by

the personal judgment of the actor in a given situation; It is the law that determines
what would be reckless or negligent.

The question before us is who was negligent? Negligence is the omission to do something
which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the
conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and
reasonable man would not do, or as Judge Cooley defines it, "(T)he failure to observe for
the protection of the interests of another person, that degree of care, precaution, and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers
injury.

" In Picart vs. Smith, decided more than seventy years ago but still a sound rule, we held:

The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be
stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable
care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same
situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard
supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the
Roman Law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference
to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The Law considers what
would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and
prudence and determines liability by that.

In this case, the evidence on record discloses that three or four meters from the rear of the
parked truck, a lighted kerosene lamp was placed.

Therefore, it is clear from the foregoing disquisition that the absence or want of care of
Daniel Serrano has been established by clear and convincing evidence.

Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur, Defined.

At this juncture, it may be enlightening and helpful in the proper resolution of the issue
of negligence to examine the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur. This doctrine is stated thus:

Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the
defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen
if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care. Or
as Black's Law Dictionary puts it: Res ipsa loquitur. The thing speaks for itself. Rebuttable
presumption or inference that defendant was negligent, which arises upon proof that
instrumentality causing injury was in defendant's exclusive control, and that the accident
was one which ordinarily does not happen in absence of negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is
rule of evidence whereby negligence of alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from mere
fact that accident happened provided character accident and circumstances attending it
lead reasonably to belief that in absence of negligence it would not have occurred and
that thing which caused injury is shown to have been under management and control of
alleged wrongdoer. Hillen v. Hooker Const. Co., Tex. Civ. App., 484 S.W. 2d 113, 115.

Under doctrine of "res ipsa loquitur" the happening of an injury permits an inference of
negligence where plaintiff produces substantial evidence that injury was caused by an
agency or instrumentality under exclusive control and management of defendant, and
that the occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things would not happen if
reasonable care had been used.

The doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur can be invoked when and only when, under the
circumstance involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily available.

The doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is particular to the law of negligence
which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof
and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. The doctrine is not a rule of
substantive law but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience. The rule,
when applicable to the facts and circumstances of a particular case, is not intended to and
does not dispense with the requirement of proof of culpable negligence on the part of the
party charged. It merely determines and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence
thereof and facilitates the burden of plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty of due care.
The doctrine can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstances involved,
direct evidence is absent and not readily available. Hence, it has generally been held that
the presumption of inference arising from the doctrine cannot be availed of, or is
overcome, where plaintiff has knowledge and testifies or presents evidence as to the
specific act of negligence which is the cause of the injury complained of or where there is
direct evidence as to the precise cause of the accident and all the facts and circumstances
attendant on the occurrence clearly appear. Finally, once the actual cause of injury is
established beyond controversy, whether by the plaintiff or by the defendant, 110
presumptions will be involved and the doctrine becomes inapplicable when the
circumstances have been so completely elucidated that no inference of defendant's
liability can reasonably be made, whatever the source of the evidence, as in this case

Presumption of Negligence of Master or Employer; The presumption of negligence on

the part of the master or employer is juris tantum and not juris et de jure and
consequently, may be rebutted; It may be overcome by proof that the employer
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection or supervision of
his employees.

The private respondent is sued under Art. 2176 in relation to Art. 2180, paragraph 5, of
the Civil Code. In the latter, when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or
employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the
part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in
supervision over him after selection, or both. Such presumption is juris tantum and not
juris et de jure and consequently, may be rebutted. If follows necessarily that if the
employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in the selection and in the supervision
he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is
overcome and he is relieved from liability. In disclaiming liability for the incident, the
private respondent stresses that the negligence of his employee has already been
adequately overcome by his driver's statement that he knew his responsibilities as a
driver and that the truck owner used to instruct him to be careful in driving.

FF Cruz vs CA Digest
164 SCRA 733

Res ipsa loquitur Doctrine:

Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the
defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen
if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.

Facts:

The furniture manufacturing shop of petitioner was situated adjacent to the residence of
private respondents, Gregorio Mable. The latter first approached Eric Cruz, petitioner’s
plant manager, to request that a firewall be constructed between the shop and private
respondents’ residence which request was repeated several times but petitioner fell on
deaf ears.

A fire broke out in petitioner’s shop. The fire spread to private respondents’ house. Both
the shop and the house were razed to the ground. The cause of the conflagration was
never discovered.

Private respondents filed an action for damages against petitioner. The Court of First
Instance held for private respondents. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court. A motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied. Hence, petitioner filed the
instant petition for review.

Issue:

1. Whether doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable in this case; YES

2. Whether the petitioner was negligent in this case; Petitioner

Decision:

Damages; Negligence; Concept of the common law doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, whose application to the instant case petitioner objects
to, may be stated as follows:

Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the
management of the defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary
course of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use proper
care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that
the accident arose from want of care. [Africa v. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., G.R. No. L-12986,
March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 448.]

Doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, applicable in the case considering the presence of
combustible materials in the furniture shop, and the failure of petitioner to build a
firewall.

The facts of the case likewise call for the application of the doctrine, considering that in
the normal course of operations of a furniture manufacturing shop, combustible material
such as wood chips, sawdust, paint, varnish and fuel and lubricants for machinery may
be found thereon.

It must also be noted that negligence or want of care on the part of petitioner or its
employees was not merely presumed. The Court of Appeals found that petitioner failed
to construct a firewall between its shop and the residence of private respondents as
required by a city ordinance; that the fire could have been caused by a heated motor or a
lit cigarette; that gasoline and alcohol were used and stored in the shop; and that workers
sometimes smoked inside the shop [CA Decision, p. 5; Rollo, p. 33.]

Even without applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, petitioner’s failure to construct
a firewall between its shop and the residence of private respondents, in accordance
with city ordinances, supports a finding of negligence.

Even without applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, petitioner’s failure to construct
a firewall in accordance with city ordinances would suffice to Support a finding of
negligence.

Failure to comply with an ordinance providing for safety regulations is an act of

negligence.

In the instant case, with more reason should petitioner be found guilty of negligence since
it had failed to construct a firewall between its property and private respondents’
residence which sufficiently complies with the pertinent city ordinances. The failure to
comply with an ordinance providing for safety regulations had been ruled by the Court
as an act of negligence [Teague v. Fernandez, G.R. No. L-29745, June 4, 1973, 51 SCRA
181.]

The Court of Appeals, therefore, had more than adequate basis to find petitioner liable
for the loss sustained by private respondents.
Africa vs Caltex
GR No. L-12986, March 31, 1966

Facts:

Sometime in the afternoon of March 18, 1948, a fire broke out at the Caltex service station
at the corner of Antipolo St. and Rizal Avenue, Manila. It started while gasoline was being
hosed from a tank truck into the underground storage, right at the opening of the
receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was inserted. The fire spread to and burned
several houses. The owners, among them petitioner spouses Africa and heirs of Ong, sued
respondents Caltex Phil., Inc., the alleged owner of the station, and Mateo Boquiren, the
agent in charge of its operation, for damages. The CFI and CA found that the petitioners
failed to prove negligence of the respondents, and that there was due care in the premises
and with respect to the supervision of their employees.

Issue:

Whether or not, without proof as to the cause and origin of the fire, the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur should apply so as to presume negligence on the part of the respondents.

Ruling:

Yes. Res ipsa loquitur literally means “the thing or transaction speaks for itself.” For the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to apply, the following requisites should be present:
(a) the accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s
negligence;
(b) it is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or
defendants; and
(c) the possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is
eliminated.

In the case at bar, the gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and employees,
was under the control of respondents. A fire occurred therein and spread to and burned
the neighboring houses. The persons who knew or could have known how the fire started
were respondents and their employees, but they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever.
It is a fair and reasonable inference that the incident happened because of want of care.
The negligence of the employees was the proximate cause of the fire, which in the
ordinary course of things does not happen. Therefore, the petitioners are entitled to the
award for damages.
Pressumption of Negligence:

Pressumption of Negligence:
Capili vs Sps Cardana
Gr No. 157906
Facts:
Jasmin Cardaña was walking along the perimeter fence of the San Roque Elementary
School when a branch of a caimito tree located within the school premises fell on her,
causing her instantaneous death. The Cardañas alleged in their complaint that even as
early as December 15, 1992, a resident of the barangay, Eufronio Lerios, reported on the
possible danger the tree posed to passersby. Lerios even pointed to the petitioner the tree
that stood near the principal's... office. The Cardañas averred that petitioner's gross
negligence and lack of foresight caused the death of their daughter.
Issue:
Whether petitioner is negligent and liable for the death of Jasmin Cardaña. Held:
While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while the mere happening
of an accident or injury will not generally give rise to an inference or presumption that
it was due to negligence on defendant’s part, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which
means, literally, the thing or transaction speaks for itself, or in one jurisdiction, that the
thing or instrumentality speaks for itself, the facts or circumstances accompanying an
injury may be such as to raise a presumption, or at least permit an inference of negligence
on the part of the defendant, or some other person who is charged with negligence.
x x x where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which caused the
injury complained of was under the control or management of the defendant, and that
the occurrence resulting in the injury was such as in the ordinary course of things would
not happen if those who had its control or management used proper care, there is
sufficient evidence, or, as sometimes stated, reasonable evidence, in the absence of
explanation by the defendant, that the injury arose from or was caused by the
defendant’s want of care.
The procedural effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is that petitioner’s negligence
is presumed once respondents established the requisites for the doctrine to apply.
Once respondents made out a prima facie case of all requisites, the burden shifts to
petitioner to explain. The presumption or inference may be rebutted or overcome by
other evidence and, under appropriate circumstances a disputable presumption, such as
that of due care or innocence, may outweigh the inference.
Thus, as school principal, petitioner is expected to oversee the safety of the
school’s premises.1âwphi1 The fact that she failed to see the immediate danger posed by
the dead and rotting tree shows she failed to exercise the responsibility demanded by
her position. Moreover, even if petitioner had assigned disposal of the tree to another
teacher, she exercises supervision over her assignee. The record shows that more than a
month had lapsed from the time petitioner gave instruction to her assistant Palaña on
December 15, 1992, to the time the incident occurred on February 1, 1993. Clearly, she
failed to check seasonably if the danger posed by the rotting tree had been removed.
Thus, we cannot accept her defense of lack of negligence. G.R. No. 132607 May 5, 1999
CEBU SHIPYARD AND ENGINEERING WORKS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
WILLIAM LINES, INC. and PRUDENTIAL GUARANTEE and ASSURANCE
COMPANY, INC., respondents.
Doctrine:
Facts: Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works, Inc. (CSEW) is a domestic corporation
engaged in the business of dry-docking and repairing of marine vessels while the private
respondent, Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. (Prudential), also a domestic
corporation is in the non-life insurance business.
William Lines, Inc. (plaintiff below) is in the shipping business. It the owner of M/V
Manila City, a luxury passenger-cargo vessel, which caught fire and sank on February 16,
1991. At the time of the unfortunate occurrence sued upon, subject vessel was insured
with Prudential for P45,000,000.00 pesos for hull and machinery. The Hull Policy
included an "Additional Perils (INCHMAREE)" Clause covering loss of or damage to the
vessel through the negligence of, among others, ship repairmen. The Policy provided as
follows:
Subject to the conditions of this Policy, this insurance also covers loss of or damage to
Vessel directly caused by the following:
xxx xxx xxx
Negligence of Charterers and/or Repairers, provided such Charterers and/or Repairers
are not an Assured hereunder.
xxx xxx xxx
provided such loss or damage has not resulted from want of due diligence by the
Assured, the Owners or Managers of the Vessel, of any of them Masters, Officers, Crew
or Pilots are not to be considered Owners within the meaning of this Clause should they
hold shares in the Vessel. 2
Petitioner CSEW was also insured by Prudential for third party liability under a
Shiprepairer's Legal Liability Insurance Policy. The policy was for P10 million only, under
the limited liability clause, to wit:
7. Limit of Liability
The limit of liability under this insurance, in respect of any one accident or series of
accidents, arising out of one occurrence, shall be [P10 million], including liability for costs
and expense which are either:
(a) incurred with the written consent of the underwriters hereon, or
(b) awarded against the Assured.3
On February 5, 1991, William Lines, Inc. brought its vessel, M/V Manila City, to the Cebu
Shipyard in Lapulapu City for annual dry-docking and repair.
On February 6, 1991, an arrival conference was held between representatives of William
Lines, Inc. and CSEW to discuss the work to be undertaken on the M/V Manila City.
The contracts, denominated as Work Orders, were signed thereafter, with the following
stipulations:
10. The Contractor shall replace at its own work and at its own cost any work or material
which can be shown to be defective and which is communicated in writing within one (1)
month of redelivery of the vessel or if the vessel was not in the Contractor's Possession,
the withdrawal of the Contractor's workmen, or at its option to pay a sum equal to the
cost of such replacement at its own works. These conditions shall apply to any such
replacements.
11. Save as provided in Clause 10, the Contractor shall not be under any liability to the
Customer either in contract or for delict or quasi-delict or otherwise except for negligence
and such liability shall itself be subject to the following overriding limitations and
exceptions, namely:
(a) The total liability of the Contractor to the Customer (over and above the liability to
replace under Clause 10) or of any sub-contractor shall be limited in respect of any defect
or event (and a series of accidents arising out of the same defect or event shall constitute
one defect or event) to the sum of Pesos Philippine Currency One Million only.
(b) In no circumstance whatsoever shall the liability of the Contractor or any Sub-
Contractor include any sum in respect of loss of profit or loss of use of the vessel or
damages consequential on such loss of use
xxx xxx xxx
20. The insurance on the vessel should be maintained by the customer and/or owner of
the vessel during the period the contract is in effect. 4
While the M/V Manila City was undergoing dry-docking and repairs within the
premises of CSEW, the master, officers and crew of M/V Manila City stayed in the vessel
using their cabins as living quarters. Other employees hired by William Lines to do
repairs and maintenance work on the vessel were also present during the dry-docking.
On February 16, 1991, after subject vessel was transferred to the docking quay, it caught
fire and sank, resulting to its eventual total loss.
On February 21, 1991, William Lines, Inc. filed a complaint for damages against CSEW,
alleging that the fire which broke out in M/V Manila City was caused by CSEW's
negligence and lack of care.
On July 15, 1991 was filed an Amended Complaint impleading Prudential as co-plaintiff,
after the latter had paid William Lines, Inc. the value of the hull and machinery insurance
on the M/V Manila City. As a result of such payment Prudential was subrogated to the
claim of P45 million, representing the value of the said insurance it paid.
RTC Ruling: The trial court ruled in favor of respondents
CA Ruling: On September 3, 1997, the Court of Appeals affirmed the appealed decision
of the trial court.
Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies in this case.
Ruling: Yes. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies.
The finding by the trial court and the Court of Appeals that M/V Manila City caught fire
and sank by reason of the negligence of the workers of CSEW, when the said vessel was
under the exclusive custody and control of CSEW is accordingly upheld. Under the
circumstances of the case, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies. For the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur to apply to a given situation, the following conditions must concur (1) the
accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; and
(2) that the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive
control of the person charged with negligence.
The facts and evidence on record reveal the concurrence of said conditions in the case
under scrutiny. First, the fire that occurred and consumed M/V Manila City would not
have happened in the ordinary course of things if reasonable care and diligence had been
exercised. In other words, some negligence must have occurred. Second, the agency
charged with negligence, as found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals and as
shown by the records, is the herein petitioner, Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works,
Inc., which had control over subject vessel when it was docketed for annual repairs. So
also, as found by the regional trial court, "other responsible causes, including the conduct
of the plaintiff, and third persons, are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence. 11
What is more, in the present case the trial court found direct evidence to prove that the
workers and/or employees of CSEW were remiss in their duty of exercising due diligence
in the care of subject vessel. The direct evidence substantiates the conclusion that CSEW
was really negligent. Thus, even without applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, in light
of the direct evidence on record, the ineluctable conclusion is that the petitioner, Cebu
Shipyard and Engineering Works, Inc., was negligent and consequently liable for
damages to the respondent, William Lines, Inc.
e National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (NAWASA), whereby the former
undertook to furnish all tools, labor, equipment, and materials (not furnished by Owner),
and to construct the proposed 2nd lpo-Bicti Tunnel, Intake and Outlet Structures, and
Appurtenant Structures, and Appurtenant Features, at Norzagaray, Bulacan, and to
complete said works within eight hundred (800) calendar days from the date the
Contractor receives the formal notice to proceed (Exh. A).
The project involved two (2) major phases: the first phase comprising, the tunnel work
covering a distance of seven (7) kilometers, passing through the mountain, from the Ipo
river, a part of Norzagaray, Bulacan, where the Ipo Dam of the defendant National Power
Corporation is located, to Bicti; the other phase consisting of the outworks at both ends
of the tunnel.
By September 1967, the plaintiff corporation already had completed the first major phase
of the work, namely, the tunnel excavation work. Some portions of the outworks at the
Bicti site were still under construction. As soon as the plaintiff corporation had finished
the tunnel excavation work at the Bicti site, all the equipment no longer needed there
were transferred to the Ipo site where some projects were yet to be completed.
The record shows that on November 4,1967, typhoon 'Welming' hit Central Luzon,
passing through defendant's Angat Hydro-electric Project and Dam at lpo, Norzagaray,
Bulacan. Strong winds struck the project area, and heavy rains intermittently fell. Due to
the heavy downpour, the water in the reservoir of the Angat Dam was rising perilously
at the rate of sixty (60) centimeters per hour. To prevent an overflow of water from the
dam, since the water level had reached the danger height of 212 meters above sea level,
the defendant corporation caused the opening of the spillway gates."
RTC Ruling: In favor of Engineering Construction, Inc.
CA Ruling: The appellate court sustained the findings of the trial court that the evidence
preponlderantly established the fact that due to the negligent manner with which the
spillway gates of the Angat Dam were opened, an extraordinary large volume of water
rushed out of the gates, and hit the installations and construction works of ECI at the lpo
site with terrific impact, as a result of which the latter's stockpile of materials and
supplies, camp facilities and permanent structures and accessories either washed away,
lost or destroyed.
The appellate court further found that:
It cannot be pretended that there was no negligence or that the appellant exercised
extraordinary care in the opening of the spillway gates of the Angat Dam. Maintainers of
the dam knew very well that it was far more safe to open them gradually. But the spillway
gates were opened only when typhoon Welming was already at its height, in a vain effort
to race against time and prevent the overflow of water from the dam as it 'was rising
dangerously at the rate of sixty centimeters per hour. 'Action could have been taken as
early as November 3, 1967, when the water in the reservoir was still low. At that time, the
gates of the dam could have been opened in a regulated manner. Let it be stressed that
the appellant knew of the coming of the typhoon four days before it actually hit the
project area. (p. 53, L-47379, Rollo)
As to the award of damages, the appellate court held:
We come now to the award of damages. The appellee submitted a list of estimated losses
and damages to the tunnel project (Ipo side) caused by the instant flooding of the Angat
River (Exh. J-1). The damages were itemized in four categories, to wit: Camp Facilities
P55,700.00; Equipment, Parts and Plant — P375,659.51; Materials P107,175.80; and
Permanent Structures and accessories — P137,250.00, with an aggregate total amount of
P675,785.31. The list is supported by several vouchers which were all submitted as
Exhibits K to M-38 a, N to O, P to U-2 and V to X- 60-a (Vide: Folders Nos. 1 to 4). The
appellant did not submit proofs to traverse the aforementioned documentary evidence.
We hold that the lower court did not commit any error in awarding P 675,785.31 as actual
or compensatory damages.
However, We cannot sustain the award of P333,200.00 as consequential damages. This
amount is broken down as follows: P213,200.00 as and for the rentals of a crane to
temporarily replace the one "destroyed beyond repair," and P120,000.00 as one month
bonus which the appellee failed to realize in accordance with the contract which the
appellee had with NAWASA. Said rental of the crane allegedly covered the period of one
year at the rate of P40.00 an hour for 16 hours a day. The evidence, however, shows that
the appellee bought a crane also a crawler type, on November 10, 1967, six (6) days after
the incident in question (Exh N) And according to the lower court, which finding was
never assailed, the appellee resumed its normal construction work on the Ipo- Bicti
Project after a stoppage of only one month. There is no evidence when the appellee
received the crane from the seller, Asian Enterprise Limited. But there was an agreement
that the shipment of the goods would be effected within 60 days from the opening of the
letter of credit (Exh. N).<äre||anº•1àw> It appearing that the contract of sale was
consummated, We must conclude or at least assume that the crane was delivered to the
appellee within 60 days as stipulated. The appellee then could have availed of the services
of another crane for a period of only one month (after a work stoppage of one month) at
the rate of P 40.00 an hour for 16 hours a day or a total of P 19,200.00 as rental.
But the value of the new crane cannot be included as part of actual damages because the
old was reactivated after it was repaired. The cost of the repair was P 77,000.00 as shown
in item No. 1 under the Equipment, Parts and Plants category (Exh. J-1), which amount
of repair was already included in the actual or compensatory damages.
Issue: Whether or not the National Power Corporation was negligent.
Ruling: It is clear from the appellate court's decision that based on its findings of fact and
that of the trial court's, petitioner NPC was undoubtedly negligent because it opened the
spillway gates of the Angat Dam only at the height of typhoon "Welming" when it knew
very well that it was safer to have opened the same gradually and earlier, as it was also
undeniable that NPC knew of the coming typhoon at least four days before it actually
struck. And even though the typhoon was an act of God or what we may call force
majeure, NPC cannot escape liability because its negligence was the proximate cause of
the loss and damage.
Furthermore, the question of whether or not there was negligence on the part of NPC is
a question of fact which properly falls within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and
will not be disturbed by this Court unless the same is clearly unfounded.
Likewise, the respondent court did not err in reducing the consequential damages from
P333,200.00 to P19,000.00. As shown by the records, while there was no categorical
statement or admission on the part of ECI that it bought a new crane to replace the
damaged one, a sales contract was presented to the effect that the new crane would be
delivered to it by Asian Enterprises within 60 days from the opening of the letter of credit
at the cost of P106,336.75. The offer was made by Asian Enterprises a few days after the
flood. As compared to the amount of P106,336.75 for a brand new crane and paying the
alleged amount of P4,000.00 a day as rental for the use of a temporary crane, which use
petitioner ECI alleged to have lasted for a period of one year, thus, totalling P120,000.00,
plus the fact that there was already a sales contract between it and Asian Enterprises,
there is no reason why ECI should opt to rent a temporary crane for a period of one year.
The appellate court also found that the damaged crane was subsequently repaired and
reactivated and the cost of repair was P77,000.00. Therefore, it included the said amount
in the award of of compensatory damages, but not the value of the new crane. We do not
find anything erroneous in the decision of the appellate court that the consequential
damages should represent only the service of the temporary crane for one month. A
contrary ruling would result in the unjust enrichment of ECI.
The P120,000.00 bonus was also properly eliminated as the same was granted by the trial
court on the premise that it represented ECI's lost opportunity "to earn the one month
bonus from NAWASA ... ." As stated earlier, the loss or damage to ECI's equipment and
facilities occurred long after the stipulated deadline to finish the construction. No bonus,
therefore, could have been possibly earned by ECI at that point in time. The supposed
liquidated damages for failure to finish the project within the stipulated period or the
opposite of the claim for bonus is not clearly presented in the records of these petitions.
It is not shown that NAWASA imposed them.
As to the question of exemplary damages, we sustain the appellate court in eliminating
the same since it found that there was no bad faith on the part of NPC and that neither
can the latter's negligence be considered gross.
Government Service Insurance System vs. Pacific Airways Corporation
629 SCRA 219, G.R. No. 170414 August 25, 2010

Doctrine: When a plaintiff’s own negligence is the immediate and proximate cause of his injury,
he cannot recover damages.
FACTS: On 2 April 1996, the Twin Otter aircraft of Philippine Airways Corporation
(PAC) arrived at the Manila International Airport from El Nido, Palawan. In command
of the aircraft was Ely B. Bungabong and Michael F. Galvez as co-pilot. After the last
passenger disembarked, PAC’s pilots proceeded to the PAC Hangar located at the other
end of the airport. Galvez contacted ground control to ask for clearance to taxi to taxiway
delta. Rogelio Lim, ground traffic controller on duty at the Air Transportation Office
(ATO), issued the clearance on condition that he be contacted again upon reaching
taxiway delta intersection.
PAC’s pilots then proceeded to taxi to taxiway delta. Upon reaching fox 1, Galvez
requested clearance to make a right turn to fox 1 and to cross runway 13 in order to
proceed to fox 1 bravo. ATO granted the request. Upon reaching runway 13, PAC’s pilots
did not make a full stop at the holding point to request clearance right before crossing
runway 13. Without such clearance, PAC’s pilots proceeded to cross runway 13.
Meanwhile, the Philippine Airlines’ (PAL) Boeing 737, manned by pilots Rogelio Casiño
and Ruel Isaac, was preparing for take-off along runway 13. The PAL pilots requested
clearance to push and start on runway 13. Ernesto Linog, Jr., air traffic controller on duty
at the ATO issued the clearance. Subsequently Linog, Jr. gave PAL’s Boeing 737 clearance
to take off. While already on take-off roll, Casiño caught a glimpse of the Twin Otter on
the left side of the Boeing 737 about to cross runway 13. The PAL pilots attempted to
abort the take-off by reversing the thrust of the aircraft. However, the Boeing 737 still
collided with the Twin Otter.
PAC, Bungabong, and Galvez filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against
PAL, Casiño, Isaac, ATO, Lim, Linog, Jr., and ATO’s traffic control supervisor, Danilo
Alzola. The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), as insurer of the Boeing 737
that figured in the collision, intervened.
RTC – proximate cause of the collision was the negligence of Alzola, Lim, and Linog, Jr., as ATO’s
traffic control supervisor, ground traffic controller, and air traffic controller, respectively, at the
time of the collision. The trial court further held that the direct cause of the collision was the
negligence of Casiño and Isaac, as the pilots of the Boeing 737 that collided with the Twin Otter.
CA – AFFIRMED RTC DECISION

ISSUE: WHO AMONG THE PARTIES ARE LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENCE.

RULING: To ascertain who among the parties is liable for negligence, The Rules of the
Air of the Air Transportation Office must be referred to. In this case, however, the Boeing
737 and the Twin Otter were not both taxiing at the time of the collision. Only the Twin
Otter was taxiing. The Boeing 737 was already on take-off roll. The Rules of the Air
provide:
2.2.4.6 Taking Off. An aircraft taxiing on the maneuvering area of an aerodrome shall give
way to aircraft taking off or about to take off.46 (Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, PAL’s aircraft had the right of way at the time of collision, not simply because
it was on the right side of PAC’s aircraft, but more significantly, because it was "taking
off or about to take off."
PAC’s Pilots
For disregarding PAL’s right of way, PAC’s pilots were grossly negligent. We find it hard
to believe that PAC’s pilots did not see the Boeing 737 when they looked to the left and
to the right before approaching the runway. It was a clear summer evening in April and
the Boeing 737, only 200 meters away, had its inboard lights, outboard lights, taxi lights,
and logo lights on before and during the actual take-off roll. The only plausible
explanation why PAC’s pilots did not see the Boeing 737 was that they did not really look
to the left and to the right before crossing the active runway.
Records show that PAC’s pilots, while still 350 meters away, prematurely requested
clearance to cross the active runway. ATO points out that PAC’s pilots should have made
a full stop at the holding point to ask for updated clearance right before crossing the
active runway. Had PAC’s pilots done so, ATO would by then be in a position to
determine if there was an aircraft on a take-off roll at the runway. The collision would
not have happened.
ATO, Alzola, Lim, and Linog, Jr.
The Rules of Air Control govern airplane traffic management and clearance at the then
Manila International Airport. It contains several provisions indicating that airplane traffic
management and clearance are not the sole responsibility of ATO and its traffic
controllers, but of the pilots-in-command of aircrafts as well. Therefore, even if ATO gave
both PAL’s pilots and PAC’s pilots clearance to take off and clearance to cross runway
13, respectively, it remained the primary responsibility of the pilots-in-command to see
to it that the respective clearances given were suitable. Since the pilots-in-command have
the final authority as to the disposition of the aircraft, they cannot, in case a collision
occurs, pass the blame to ATO for issuing clearances that turn out to be unsuitable. PAC’s
defense, that it did not matter whether the clearance was premature or not as long as the
clearance was actually granted, only reveals their poor judgment and gross negligence in
the performance of their duties.
On the other hand, evidence on record shows that the air traffic controller properly issued
the clearance to take off to the Boeing 737. Nothing on record indicates any irregularity
in the issuance of the clearance. While Alzola and Lim, as found by the trial court in the
criminal case for reckless imprudence, may have been negligent in the performance of
their functions, such negligence is only contributory. Their contributory negligence arises
from their granting the premature request of PAC’s pilots for clearance to cross runway
13 while the Twin Otter was still 350 meters away from runway 13. However, as
explained earlier, the granting of their premature request for clearance did not relieve
PAC’s pilots from complying with the Rules of the Air.

PAL’s Pilots
Records show that PAL’s pilots timely requested clearance to take off. Linog, Jr., ATO’s
air traffic controller, duly issued the clearance to take off.

Proximate Cause
After assiduously studying the records of this case and carefully weighing the arguments
of the parties, we are convinced that the immediate and proximate case of the collision is
the gross negligence of PAC’s pilots. In this case, the fact that PAC’s pilots disregarded
PAL’s right of way and did not ask for updated clearance right before crossing an active
runway was the proximate cause of the collision. Were it not for such gross negligence
on the part of PAC’s pilots, the collision would not have happened.
The Civil Code provides that when a plaintiff’s own negligence is the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. PAC and its pilots, whose own
gross negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of their own injuries, must bear
the cost of such injuries. They cannot recover damages.

LBC AIR CARGO, INC., vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 101683. February 23, 1995.*

Doctrine: The doctrine, in essence, is to the effect that where both parties are negligent, but the
negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to
determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last
clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the
consequences thereof (Picart vs. Smith, 37 Phil. 809). Stated differently, the rule would also mean
that an antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of damages for the
supervening negligence of, or bar a defense against liability sought by, another if the latter, who
had the last fair chance, could have avoided the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.

Facts:

The case arose from a vehicular collision which occurred at about 11:30 in the morning of
15 November 1987. Rogelio Monterola, a licensed driver, was traveling on board his
Suzuki motorcycle towards Mangagoy on the right lane along a dusty national road in
Bislig, Surigao del Sur. At about the same time, a cargo van of the LBC Air Cargo
Incorporated, driven by defendant Jaime Tano, Jr., was coming from the opposite
direction on its way to the Bislig Airport. On board were passengers Fernando Yu,
Manager of LBC Air Cargo, and his son who was seated beside Tano. When Tano was
approaching the vicinity of the airport road entrance on his left, he saw two vehicles
racing against each other from the opposite direction. Tano stopped his vehicle and
waited for the two racing vehicles to pass by. The stirred cloud of dust made visibility
extremely bad. Instead of waiting for the dust to settle, Tano started to make a sharp left
turn towards the airport road. When he was about to reach the center of the right lane,
the motorcycle driven by Monterola suddenly emerged from the dust and smashed head-
on against the right side of the LBC van. Monterola died from the severe injuries he
sustained.

RTC Ruling:

On 29 July 1990, the trial court dismissed both cases on the ground that the proximate
cause of the "accident" was the negligence of deceased Rogelio Monterola.

CA Ruling:

Private respondent appealed the dismissal of the civil case to the Court of Appeals. On
18 July 1991, the appellate court reversed the court a quo.

Issue:
Whether or not the proximate cause of the incident was the negligence of Tano hence
making him liable for the damages.

Ruling:

YES. From every indication, the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of
Tano who, despite extremely poor visibility, hastily executed a left turn (towards the
Bislig airport road entrance) without first waiting for the dust to settle. It was this
negligent act of Tano, which had placed his vehicle (LBC van) directly on the path of the
motorcycle coming from the opposite direction, that almost instantaneously caused the
collision to occur. Simple prudence required him not to attempt to cross the other lane
until after it would have been safe from and clear of any oncoming vehicle.

Petitioners poorly invoke the doctrine of "last clear chance" (also referred to, at times, as
"supervening negligence" or as "discovered peril"). The doctrine, in essence, is to the effect
that where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in
time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or
negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear
opportunity to avoid the impeding harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the
consequences thereof (see Picart v. Smith, 37 Phil. 809). Stated differently, the rule would
also mean that an antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of
damages for the supervening negligence of, or bar a defense against liability sought by,
another if the latter, who had the last fair chance, could have avoided the impending
harm by the exercise of due diligence (Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. Baesa, 179 SCRA
384; Glan People’s Lumber and Hardware v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 173 SCRA
464).chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In the case at bench, the victim was traveling along the lane where he was rightly
supposed to be. The incident occurred in an instant. No appreciable time had elapsed,
from the moment Tano swerved to his left to the actual impact, that could have afforded
the victim a last clear opportunity to avoid the collision.

It is true, however, that the deceased was not all that free from negligence in evidently
speeding too closely behind the vehicle he was following. We, therefore, agree with the
appellate court that there indeed was contributory negligence on the victim’s part that
could warrant a mitigation of petitioners’ liability for damages.
LUZ PALANCA TAN, Petitioner, vs. JAM TRANSIT, INC., Respondent.

Doctrine: Res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law and does not constitute an
independent or separate ground for liability. Instead, it is considered as merely
evidentiary, a mode of proof, or a mere procedural convenience, since it furnishes a
substitute for, and relieves a plaintiff of, the burden of producing a specific proof of
negligence. In other words, mere invocation and application of the doctrine do not
dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence.
Facts: Petitioner Luz Palanca Tan alleged that she was the owner of a passenger-type
jitney. The said jitney figured in an accident at an intersection along Maharlika Highway,
Calauan, Laguna, as it collided with a JAM Transit passenger bus bound for Manila. The
bus was driven by Eddie Dimayuga.
At the time of the collision, Tan’s jitney was loaded with quail eggs and duck eggs (balot
and salted eggs). It was driven by Alexander M. Ramirez. Tan alleged that Dimayuga
was reckless, negligent, imprudent, and not observing traffic rules and regulations,
causing the bus to collide with the jitney which was then, with care and proper light
direction signals, about to negotiate a left turn towards the feeder or barangay road going
to the Poblacion. The jitney turned turtle along the shoulder of the road and the cargo of
eggs was destroyed. Ramirez and his helper were injured and hospitalized. Tan prayed
for damages.
Respondent JAM Transit, Inc. admitted ownership of the subject passenger bus and that
Dimayuga was under its employ. However, it denied the allegations in the Complaint,
and claimed that the accident occurred due to the gross negligence of Ramirez. As
counterclaim, JAM sought payment for damages.
RTC: Applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the RTC found the JAM passenger bus
driver at fault as he was then violating a traffic regulation when the collision took place.
Thus, the RTC ruled in favor of Tan. Aggrieved, JAM appealed to the CA.
CA: The CA granted the appeal and dismissed the complaint on the ground that there
was nothing on record that supported the RTC’s finding that the JAM passenger bus was
overtaking Tan’s jitney. The CA held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can only be
invoked when direct evidence is nonexistent or not accessible. The CA concluded that res
ipsa loquitur could not apply in this case because the doctrine does not dispense with the
requirement of establishing proof of negligence.

Issue:
Whether or not res ipsa loquitur is applicable in this case?

Ruling:
No. Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase that literally means "the thing or the transaction
speaks for itself." It is a maxim for the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury,
taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a
presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s prima facie case, and present a
question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation. Where the thing that caused
the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his
servants; and the accident, in the ordinary course of things, would not happen if those
who had management or control used proper care, it affords reasonable evidence -- in the
absence of a sufficient, reasonable and logical explanation by defendant -- that the
accident arose from or was caused by the defendant’s want of care.
This rule is grounded on the superior logic of ordinary human experience, and it is on
the basis of such experience or common knowledge that negligence may be deduced from
the mere occurrence of the accident itself. Hence, the rule is applied in conjunction with
the doctrine of common knowledge.
However, res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law and does not constitute an
independent or separate ground for liability. Instead, it is considered as merely
evidentiary, a mode of proof, or a mere procedural convenience, since it furnishes a
substitute for, and relieves a plaintiff of, the burden of producing a specific proof of
negligence. In other words, mere invocation and application of the doctrine do not
dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence.
It is simply a step in the process of such proof, permitting plaintiff to present, along with
the proof of the accident, enough of the attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine,
creating an inference or presumption of negligence, and thereby placing on defendant
the burden of going forward with the proof. Still, before resort to the doctrine may be
allowed, the following requisites must be satisfactorily shown:
1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s
negligence;
2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or
defendants; and
3. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is
eliminated.
Was petitioner able to establish the above requisites? Yes. The SC do not subscribe to the
finding of the CA that petitioner had direct access to the evidence surrounding the
accident, but since she failed to present it, the doctrine would not operate to apply.
While Ramirez took the witness stand, he was only able to testify that he drove along
Maharlika Highway in San Isidro, Barangay Bangyas, Calauan, Laguna, Tan’s passenger
jitney loaded with salted eggs, balot and quail eggs for delivery at around 5:00 a.m. when
he met an accident, causing the vehicle to turn turtle. Obviously, Ramirez had no vivid
recollection of how the passenger jitney was actually hit by the JAM passenger bus.
Further, for some unknown reasons, the other possible eyewitnesses to the mishap were
not available to testify.
The SC appreciated that in the absence of testimonial or direct evidence, the petitioner
can still be provided with remedies. Indeed, no 2 motor vehicles traversing the same lane
of a highway with double yellow center lines will collide as a matter of course, both
ending up on the opposite lane, unless someone is negligent. Driving the bus gave
Dimayuga exclusive management and control over it. No contributory negligence could
be attributed to Ramirez relative to the incident on the basis of the available evidence.
Ma-ao Sugar Central Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
189 SCRA 88
G.R. No. 83491 August 27, 1990

Doctrine: Res ipsa loquitur. The doctrine was described recently in Layugan v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, thus: Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management
of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if
those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of
an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.

Facts:
On March 22, 1980, Famoso was riding with a co-employee in the caboose or “carbonera”
of Plymouth No. 12, a cargo train of the petitioner, when the locomotive was suddenly
derailed. He and his companion jumped off to escape injury, but the train fell on its side,
caught his legs by its wheels and pinned him down. He was declared dead on the spot.
Investigation of the accident revealed that the derailment of the locomotive was caused
by protruding rails which had come loose because they were not connected and fixed in
place by fish plates. Fish plates are described as strips of iron 8" to 12" long and 3 1/2"
thick which are attached to the rails by 4 bolts, two on each side, to keep the rails aligned.
Although they could be removed only with special equipment, the fish plates that should
have kept the rails aligned could not be found at the scene of the accident.
RTC Ruling:
Regional Trial Court of Bago City. Judge Marietta HobillaAlinio ruled in her favor but
deducted from the total damages awarded 25% thereof for the decedent’s contributory
negligence and the total pension of P41,367.60 private respondent and her children would
be receiving from the SSS for the next five years.
CA Ruling:
Court of Appeals2 sustained the rulings of the trial court except as to the contributory
negligence of the deceased and disallowed the deductions protested by the private
respondent.
Issue:
Is the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitor applicable in this case?
Ruling:
Yes. There is no question that the maintenance of the rails, for the purpose inter alia of
preventing derailments, was the responsibility of the petitioner, and that this
responsibility was not discharged. At any rate, the absence of the fish plates—whatever
the cause or reason—is by itself alone proof of the negligence of the petitioner. Res ipsa
loquitur. The doctrine was described recently in Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate
Court,4 thus:

Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the
defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not
happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose
from want of care.
According to Jose Treyes, its own witness, who was in charge of the control and
supervision of its train operations, cases of derailment in the milling district were
frequent and there were even times when such derailments were reported every hour.3
The petitioner should therefore have taken more prudent steps to prevent such accidents
instead of waiting until a life was finally lost because of its negligence.

The argument that no one had been hurt before because of such derailments is of course
not acceptable. And neither are we impressed by the claim that the brakemen and the
conductors were required to report any defect in the condition of the railways and to fill
out prescribed forms for the purpose. For what is important is that the petitioner should
act on these reports and not merely receive and file them. The fact that it is not easy to
detect if the fish plates are missing is no excuse either. Indeed, it should stress all the more
the need for the responsible employees of the petitioner to make periodic checks and
actually go down to the railroad tracks and see if the fish plates were in place.

Mercury Drug Corporation vs. Baking Mercury Drug Corporation vs. Baking
523 SCRA 184, G.R. No. 156037 May 25, 2007

Doctrine: When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a
presumption of the law that there has been negligence on the part of the employer, either in the
selection of his employee or in the supervision over him after such selection; Presumption may be
rebutted by a clear showing on the part of the employer that he has exercised the care and diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee.
FACTS: On November 25, 1993, Sebastian M. Baking went to the clinic of Dr. Cesar Sy
for a medical check-up. Dr. Sy found that respondent’s blood sugar and triglyceride were
above normal levels. Dr. Sy then gave respondent two medical prescriptions – Diamicron
for his blood sugar and Benalize tablets for his triglyceride. Respondent then proceeded
to petitioner Mercury Drug Corporation (Alabang Branch) to buy the prescribed
medicines. However, the saleslady misread the prescription for Diamicron as a
prescription for Dormicum. Thus, what was sold to respondent was Dormicum, a potent
sleeping tablet.
Unaware that what was given to him was the wrong medicine, respondent took one pill
of Dormicum on three consecutive days (from November 6-8). On November 8 or on the
third day he took the medicine, respondent figured in a vehicular accident. The car he
was driving collided with the car of one Josie Peralta. Respondent fell asleep while
driving. Suspecting that the tablet he took may have a bearing on his physical and mental
state at the time of the collision, respondent returned to Dr. Sy’s clinic. Upon being shown
the medicine, Dr. Sy was shocked to find that what was sold to respondent was
Dormicum, instead of the prescribed Diamicron. Hence, respondent filed a complaint for
damages against petitioner.
Petitioner contends that the proximate cause of the accident was respondent’s negligence
in driving his car.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner was negligent, and if so, whether such negligence was the
proximate cause of respondent’s accident
RULING: Yes.
Obviously, petitioner’s employee was grossly negligent in selling to respondent
Dormicum, instead of the prescribed Diamicron. Considering that a fatal mistake could
be a matter of life and death for a buying patient, the said employee should have been
very cautious in dispensing medicines. She should have verified whether the medicine
she gave respondent was indeed the one prescribed by his physician. The care required
must be commensurate with the danger involved, and the skill employed must
correspond with the superior knowledge of the business which the law demands.
Here, the vehicular accident could not have occurred had petitioner’s employee been
careful in reading Dr. Sy’s prescription. Without the potent effects of Dormicum, a
sleeping tablet, it was unlikely that respondent would fall asleep while driving his car,
resulting in a collision. (Complementing Article 2176 is Article 2180).
As regards the award of moral damages, we hold the same to be in order. Moral damages
may be awarded whenever the defendant’s wrongful act or omission is the proximate
cause of the plaintiff’s physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar
injury in the cases specified or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil
Code. Respondent has adequately established the factual basis for the award of moral
damages when he testified that he suffered mental anguish and anxiety as a result of the
accident caused by the negligence of petitioner’s employee.
G.R. No. L-47379 May 16, 1988
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ENGINEERING CONSTRUCTION,
INC., respondents.
Doctrine: When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause
of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the
immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due care, the
plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
Facts: On August 4, 1964, plaintiff Engineering Construction, Inc., being a successful
bidder, executed a contract in Manila with the National Waterworks and Sewerage
Authority (NAWASA), whereby the former undertook to furnish all tools, labor,
equipment, and materials (not furnished by Owner), and to construct the proposed 2nd
lpo-Bicti Tunnel, Intake and Outlet Structures, and Appurtenant Structures, and
Appurtenant Features, at Norzagaray, Bulacan, and to complete said works within eight
hundred (800) calendar days from the date the Contractor receives the formal notice to
proceed (Exh. A).
The project involved two (2) major phases: the first phase comprising, the tunnel work
covering a distance of seven (7) kilometers, passing through the mountain, from the Ipo
river, a part of Norzagaray, Bulacan, where the Ipo Dam of the defendant National Power
Corporation is located, to Bicti; the other phase consisting of the outworks at both ends
of the tunnel.
By September 1967, the plaintiff corporation already had completed the first major phase
of the work, namely, the tunnel excavation work. Some portions of the outworks at the
Bicti site were still under construction. As soon as the plaintiff corporation had finished
the tunnel excavation work at the Bicti site, all the equipment no longer needed there
were transferred to the Ipo site where some projects were yet to be completed.
The record shows that on November 4,1967, typhoon 'Welming' hit Central Luzon,
passing through defendant's Angat Hydro-electric Project and Dam at lpo, Norzagaray,
Bulacan. Strong winds struck the project area, and heavy rains intermittently fell. Due to
the heavy downpour, the water in the reservoir of the Angat Dam was rising perilously
at the rate of sixty (60) centimeters per hour. To prevent an overflow of water from the
dam, since the water level had reached the danger height of 212 meters above sea level,
the defendant corporation caused the opening of the spillway gates."
RTC Ruling: In favor of Engineering Construction, Inc.
CA Ruling: The appellate court sustained the findings of the trial court that the evidence
preponlderantly established the fact that due to the negligent manner with which the
spillway gates of the Angat Dam were opened, an extraordinary large volume of water
rushed out of the gates, and hit the installations and construction works of ECI at the lpo
site with terrific impact, as a result of which the latter's stockpile of materials and
supplies, camp facilities and permanent structures and accessories either washed away,
lost or destroyed.
The appellate court further found that:
It cannot be pretended that there was no negligence or that the appellant exercised
extraordinary care in the opening of the spillway gates of the Angat Dam. Maintainers of
the dam knew very well that it was far more safe to open them gradually. But the spillway
gates were opened only when typhoon Welming was already at its height, in a vain effort
to race against time and prevent the overflow of water from the dam as it 'was rising
dangerously at the rate of sixty centimeters per hour. 'Action could have been taken as
early as November 3, 1967, when the water in the reservoir was still low. At that time, the
gates of the dam could have been opened in a regulated manner. Let it be stressed that
the appellant knew of the coming of the typhoon four days before it actually hit the
project area. (p. 53, L-47379, Rollo)
As to the award of damages, the appellate court held:
We come now to the award of damages. The appellee submitted a list of estimated losses
and damages to the tunnel project (Ipo side) caused by the instant flooding of the Angat
River (Exh. J-1). The damages were itemized in four categories, to wit: Camp Facilities
P55,700.00; Equipment, Parts and Plant — P375,659.51; Materials P107,175.80; and
Permanent Structures and accessories — P137,250.00, with an aggregate total amount of
P675,785.31. The list is supported by several vouchers which were all submitted as
Exhibits K to M-38 a, N to O, P to U-2 and V to X- 60-a (Vide: Folders Nos. 1 to 4). The
appellant did not submit proofs to traverse the aforementioned documentary evidence.
We hold that the lower court did not commit any error in awarding P 675,785.31 as actual
or compensatory damages.
However, We cannot sustain the award of P333,200.00 as consequential damages. This
amount is broken down as follows: P213,200.00 as and for the rentals of a crane to
temporarily replace the one "destroyed beyond repair," and P120,000.00 as one month
bonus which the appellee failed to realize in accordance with the contract which the
appellee had with NAWASA. Said rental of the crane allegedly covered the period of one
year at the rate of P40.00 an hour for 16 hours a day. The evidence, however, shows that
the appellee bought a crane also a crawler type, on November 10, 1967, six (6) days after
the incident in question (Exh N) And according to the lower court, which finding was
never assailed, the appellee resumed its normal construction work on the Ipo- Bicti
Project after a stoppage of only one month. There is no evidence when the appellee
received the crane from the seller, Asian Enterprise Limited. But there was an agreement
that the shipment of the goods would be effected within 60 days from the opening of the
letter of credit (Exh. N).<äre||anº•1àw> It appearing that the contract of sale was
consummated, We must conclude or at least assume that the crane was delivered to the
appellee within 60 days as stipulated. The appellee then could have availed of the services
of another crane for a period of only one month (after a work stoppage of one month) at
the rate of P 40.00 an hour for 16 hours a day or a total of P 19,200.00 as rental.
But the value of the new crane cannot be included as part of actual damages because the
old was reactivated after it was repaired. The cost of the repair was P 77,000.00 as shown
in item No. 1 under the Equipment, Parts and Plants category (Exh. J-1), which amount
of repair was already included in the actual or compensatory damages.
Issue: Whether or not the National Power Corporation was negligent.
Ruling: It is clear from the appellate court's decision that based on its findings of fact and
that of the trial court's, petitioner NPC was undoubtedly negligent because it opened the
spillway gates of the Angat Dam only at the height of typhoon "Welming" when it knew
very well that it was safer to have opened the same gradually and earlier, as it was also
undeniable that NPC knew of the coming typhoon at least four days before it actually
struck. And even though the typhoon was an act of God or what we may call force
majeure, NPC cannot escape liability because its negligence was the proximate cause of
the loss and damage.
Furthermore, the question of whether or not there was negligence on the part of NPC is
a question of fact which properly falls within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and
will not be disturbed by this Court unless the same is clearly unfounded.
Likewise, the respondent court did not err in reducing the consequential damages from
P333,200.00 to P19,000.00. As shown by the records, while there was no categorical
statement or admission on the part of ECI that it bought a new crane to replace the
damaged one, a sales contract was presented to the effect that the new crane would be
delivered to it by Asian Enterprises within 60 days from the opening of the letter of credit
at the cost of P106,336.75. The offer was made by Asian Enterprises a few days after the
flood. As compared to the amount of P106,336.75 for a brand new crane and paying the
alleged amount of P4,000.00 a day as rental for the use of a temporary crane, which use
petitioner ECI alleged to have lasted for a period of one year, thus, totalling P120,000.00,
plus the fact that there was already a sales contract between it and Asian Enterprises,
there is no reason why ECI should opt to rent a temporary crane for a period of one year.
The appellate court also found that the damaged crane was subsequently repaired and
reactivated and the cost of repair was P77,000.00. Therefore, it included the said amount
in the award of of compensatory damages, but not the value of the new crane. We do not
find anything erroneous in the decision of the appellate court that the consequential
damages should represent only the service of the temporary crane for one month. A
contrary ruling would result in the unjust enrichment of ECI.
The P120,000.00 bonus was also properly eliminated as the same was granted by the trial
court on the premise that it represented ECI's lost opportunity "to earn the one month
bonus from NAWASA ... ." As stated earlier, the loss or damage to ECI's equipment and
facilities occurred long after the stipulated deadline to finish the construction. No bonus,
therefore, could have been possibly earned by ECI at that point in time. The supposed
liquidated damages for failure to finish the project within the stipulated period or the
opposite of the claim for bonus is not clearly presented in the records of these petitions.
It is not shown that NAWASA imposed them.
As to the question of exemplary damages, we sustain the appellate court in eliminating
the same since it found that there was no bad faith on the part of NPC and that neither
can the latter's negligence be considered gross.
Oscar del Carmen Jr. v Geronimo Bacoy
GR No. 17738770, April 25, 2012

Facts:

Spouses Monsalud and their daughter died from being run over by a jeepney
driven by a certain Allan Maglasang. The jeepney was owned by Oscar del Carmen Jr.
Allan was declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt in a criminal case while the father of
the late Mrs. Monsalud, Geronimo Bacoy filed an independent civil action against the
former in behalf of the minor children left by the Monsalud spouses. Del Carmen Jr.
claimed he was a victim as well as Allan stole the jeep and was not hired as a driver by
the former but a conductor (and had been released from employment lately)It was the
brother of Allan, Rodrigo who was hired as a driver. Del Carmen Jr. filed a carnapping
case against Allan but was dismissed by the court for insufficient evidence.

RTC held del Carmen Jr. subsidiary liable and held the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur. The CA adjudged Oscar Jr. liable to the heirs of the victims based on the
principle that the registered owner of a vehicle is directly and primarily responsible for
the injuries or death of third parties caused by the operation of such
vehicle. It disbelieved Oscar Jr.’s defense that
the jeep was stolen not only because the carnapping case filed against Allan
and his companions was dismissed but also because, given the circumstances, Oscar Jr.
is deemed to have given Allan the implied permission to use the subject vehicle because
the brothers were assigned to said jeep. After a day’s work, the jeepney would be parked
beside the brothers’ house and not returned to del Carmen’s residence; the jeep could
easily be started even without the use of an ignition key; the said parking area was not
fenced or secured to prevent the unauthorized use of the vehicle which can be started
even without the ignition key.

Issue:

Whether or not, the owner of vehicle is directly and primarily liable for injuries
caused by the operation of such

Ruling:

The SC held the petitioner liable for quasi-delict resulting from his jeep’s use, as
all requisites under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are present. First, no person just
walking along the road would suddenly be sideswiped and run over by an on-rushing
vehicle unless the one in charge of the said vehicle had been negligent. Second, the jeep
which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of petitioner as its owner. When
petitioner entrusted the ignition key to Rodrigo (Allan’s friend), he had the power to
instruct him with regard to the specific restrictions of the jeep’s use, including who or
who may not drive it. As he is aware that the jeep may run without the ignition key, he
also has the responsibility to park it safely and securely and to instruct his driver Rodrigo
to observe the same precaution. Lastly, there was no showing that the death of the
victims was due to any voluntary action or contribution on their part.
 The aforementioned requisites having been met, there now arises a
presumption of negligence against the petitioner, which he could have overcome by
evidence that he exercised due care and diligence in preventing strangers from using his
jeep. Absent the circumstance of unauthorized use or that the subject vehicle was stolen
which are valid defenses available to a registered owner, the petitioner cannot escape his
civil liability on this present case.
Proximate Cause:

Pantaleon vs American Express

Gr No. 174269
Facts:
The petitioner (Pantaleon) and his family, joined an escorted tour of
Western Europe. In Coster Diamond House, Amsterdam, Mrs. Pantaleon was about to
bought a 2.5 karat diamond brilliant cut, a pendant and a chain, all of which totaled U.S.
$13,826.00. To pay these purchases, around 9:15am, Pantaleon presented his American
Express Credit Card together with his passport. By 9:40am, Pantaleon was already
worried about further inconveniencing the tour group, he asked the store clerk to cancel
the sale. the store manager though asked him to wait a few more minutes. Around
10:00am (around 45 minutes after Pantaleon had presented his AmexCard), Coster
decided to release the items even without American Express International, Inc.’s (herein
respondent, Amex for brevity) approval of the purchase. This was 30 minutes after the
tour group was supposed to have left the store. The spouses Pantelon returned. Their
offers of apology were met by their tourmates with stony silence. The tour group’s visible
irritation was aggravated when the tour guide announced that the city tour of
Amsterdam was to be canceled due to lack of remaing time. Mrs. Pantaleon ended up
weeping. After the star-crossed tour had ended, the Pantaleon family proceeded to the
United States before returning to Manila. While in the United States, Pantaleon continued
to use his AmEx card, several times without hassle or delay, After the star-crossed tour
had ended, the Pantaleon family proceeded to the United States before returning to
Manila on 12 November 1992. While in the United States, Pantaleon continued to use his
AmEx card, several times without hassle or delay, but with two other incidents similar
to the Amsterdam brouhaha. On 30 October 1991, Pantaleon purchased golf equipment
amounting to US $1,475.00 using his AmEx card, but he cancelled his credit card
purchase and borrowed money instead from a friend, after more than 30 minutes had
transpired without the purchase having been approved. On 3 November 1991, Pantaleon
used the card to purchase children’s shoes worth $87.00 at a store in Boston, and it took
20 minutes before this transaction was approved by respondent.
Issue:
Whether Amex breached its obligation to petitioner?
Held:
Yes, based on the testimonial representations of Pantaleon and respondent’s
credit authorizer, Edgardo Jaurigue, the normal approval time for purchases was "a
matter of seconds." Based on that standard, respondent had been in clear delay with
respect to the three subject transactions. As it appears there had been delay on the part
of respondent in approving the purchases. On the premise that there was an obligation
on the part of respondent "to approve or disapprove with dispatch the charge purchase,"
petitioner argues that the failure to timely approve or disapprove the purchase
constituted mora solvendi on the part of respondent in the performance of its obligation.
The requisites of Mora solvendi for finding of default are:
1.) that the obligation is demandable and liquidated;
2.) the debtor delays performance;
3.) and the creditor judicially or extrajudicially requires the debtor’s performance.
 Petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals had wrongly applied the principle
of mora accipiendi, which relates to delay on the part of the obligee in accepting
the performance of the obligation by the obligor.
The requisites of mora accipiendi are:
1. an offer of performance by the debtor who has the required capacity; 2. the offer must
be to comply with the prestation as it should be performed; and 3. the creditor refuses
the performance without just cause.
In relying on the invocation by respondent of "just cause" for the delay,
since while just cause is determinative of mora accipiendi, it is not so with the case of
mora solvendi. Generally, the relationship between a credit card provider and its
card holders is that of creditor-debtor, with the card company as the creditor
extending loans and credit to the card holder, who as debtor is obliged to repay the
creditor. This relationship already takes exception to the general rule that as between
a bank and its depositors, the bank is deemed as the debtor while the depositor is
considered as the creditor.
Such delay would not fall under mora accipiendi, which contemplates that
the obligation of the debtor, such as the actual purchases on credit, has already
been constituted. Herein, the establishment of the debt itself (purchases on credit of
the jewelry) had not yet been perfected, as it remained pending the approval or consent
of the respondent credit card company. Still, in order for us to appreciate that
respondent was in mora solvendi, we will have to first recognize that there was indeed
an obligation on the part of respondent to act on petitioner’s purchases with "timely
dispatch," or for the purposes of this case, within a period significantly less than the one
hour it apparently took before the purchase at Coster was finally approved.
The findings of the trial court, amply established that the tardiness on the
part of respondent in acting on petitioner’s purchase at Coster did constitute culpable
delay on its part in complying with its obligation to act promptly on its customer’s
purchase request, whether such action be favorable or unfavorable. The somewhat
unusual attending circumstances to the purchase at Coster – that there was a deadline
for the completion of that purchase by petitioner before any delay would redound to the
injury of his several traveling companions – gave rise to the moral shock, mental
anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation sustained by the
petitioner, as concluded by the RTC. Those circumstances are fairly unusual, and should
not give rise to a general entitlement for damages under a more mundane set of facts.
Perla Compania de Seguross vs Sps. Sarangaya
GR No. 147746, October 25, 2005

Facts:

In 1986, Spouses Gaudencio Sarangaya III and Primitiva Sarangaya erected Super
A Building, a semi-concrete, semi-narra, one-storey commercial building fronting the
provincial road of Santiago, Isabela. It has three doors which were leased out. The two-
storey residence of the Sarangayas was behind the second and third doors of the building.
On the left side of the commercial building stood the office of the Matsushita Electric
Philippine Corporation (Matsushita).

In 1988, Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. through its branch manager Bienvenido
Pascual, entered into a contract of lease of the first door beside the Matsushita office. It
was converted into a two door so he had a garage where he parked a company car 1981
model 4-door Ford Cortina which he used to supervise different towns. In July 7, 1988,
Pascual went to San Fernando, Pampanga leaving the car. Three days later, when he
returned and warmed up the car, it made an odd sound. On the second try, there was
again an odd sound and a small flames came out of its engine so he was startled, stopped
the car, went out and pushed it out of the garage. Soon, fire spewed out of its rear
compartment and burned the whole garage where he was trapped so he suffered burns
in the face, legs and arms. The spouses were busy watching TV when they heard 2 loud
explosions, smelt of gasoline and fire burned all their belongings. The city fire marshall
investigated and concluded that the fire was accidental.

Spouses Sarangaya filed a complaint against Pascual for gross negligence and
Perla for lacking the required diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employee. The RTC decided that Pascual and Perla liable jointly and solidarily. Pascual
was held liable under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The CA affirmed the RTC’s
decision but modified the amount of damages.

Issue:

Whether or not, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable.

Ruling:

Yes. Res ipsa loquitur , is a Latin phrase which literally means “the thing or the
transaction speaks for itself. It relates to the fact of an injury that sets out an inference to
the cause thereof or establishes the plaintiff’s prima facie case. The doctrine rests on
inference and not on presumption. The facts of the occurrence warrant the supposition of
negligence and they furnish circumstantial evidence of negligence when direct evidence
is lacking.

Based on the theory that the defendant either knows the cause of the accident or
has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and the plaintiff, having no knowledge thereof,
is compelled to allege negligence in general terms. Plaintiff relies on proof of the
happening of the accident alone to establish negligence. It provides a means by which a
plaintiff can pin liability on a defendant who, if innocent, should be able to explain the
care he exercised to prevent the incident complained of defendant’s responsibility to
show that there was no negligence on his part.

The requisites of Res Ipsa Loquitur are the following:

1. The accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is
negligent
- “Ordinary” refers to the usual course of events. Flames spewing out of a car
engine, when it is switched on, is obviously not a normal event. Neither does an explosion
usually occur when a car engine is revived. Pascual, as the caretaker of the car, failed to
submit any proof that he had it periodically checked - negligence

2. The cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge and
3. The injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution on the part of the person injured.

Moreover, the is caso fortuito when:

a. The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence was independent of the
human will.
b. It was impossible to foresee the event which constituted the caso fortuito or, if it
could be foreseen, it was impossible to avoid.
c. The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible to perform an obligation in
a normal manner .
d. The person tasked to perform the obligation must not have participated in any
course of conduct that aggravated the accident
G.R. No. L-65295 March 10, 1987
PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. and ARMANDO U. CARBONEL, petitioners,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and LEONARDO DIONISIO, respondents.

DOCTRINE: When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause
of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the
immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due care, the
plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.

FACTS: In the early morning of 15 November 1975 — at about 1:30 a.m. — private
respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home — he lived in 1214-B Zamora Street,
Bangkal, Makati — from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss, the general manager
of a marketing corporation. During the cocktails phase of the evening, Dionisio had taken "a
shot or two" of liquor. Dionisio was driving his Volkswagen car and had just crossed the
intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets at Bangkal, Makati, not far from
his home, and was proceeding down General Lacuna Street, when his car headlights (in his
allegation) suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on "bright" and thereupon he saw a
Ford dump truck looming some 2-1/2 meters away from his car. The dump truck, owned by
and registered in the name of petitioner Phoenix Construction Inc. ("Phoenix"), was parked
on the right hand side of General Lacuna Street (i.e., on the right hand side of a person facing
in the same direction toward which Dionisio's car was proceeding), facing the oncoming
traffic. The dump truck was parked askew (not parallel to the street curb) in such a manner
as to stick out onto the street, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There were no
lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck,
front or rear. The dump truck had earlier that evening been driven home by petitioner
Armando U. Carbonel, its regular driver, with the permission of his employer Phoenix, in
view of work scheduled to be carried out early the following morning, Dionisio claimed that
he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car
smashed into the dump truck. As a result of the collision, Dionisio suffered some physical
injuries including some permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold
bridge dentures.
Dionisio commenced an action for damages in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga
basically claiming that the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner
in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix.
Phoenix and Carbonel, on the other hand, countered that the proximate cause of Dionisio's
injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident, while under the
influence of liquor, without his headlights on and without a curfew pass. Phoenix also sought
to establish that it had exercised due rare in the selection and supervision of the dump truck
driver.
RTC RULING: The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Dionisio and against Phoenix
and Carbonel.
CA RULING: Phoenix and Carbonel appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court. That
court in CA-G.R. No. 65476 affirmed the decision of the trial court but modified the award
of damages.

ISSUE: Whether or not Leonardo Dionisio was negligent at the time of the accident.

RULING: Yes. The conclusion we draw from the factual circumstances outlined above is that
private respondent Dionisio was negligent the night of the accident. He was hurrying home
that night and driving faster than he should have been. Worse, he extinguished his
headlights at or near the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets and thus
did not see the dump truck that was parked askew and sticking out onto the road lane.
Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of First Instance and the Intermediate Appellate Court
that the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful
— or negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked in other words, the negligence
of petitioner Carbonel. That there was a reasonable relationship between petitioner
Carbonel's negligence on the one hand and the accident and respondent's injuries on the
other hand, is quite clear. Put in a slightly different manner, the collision of Dionisio's car
with the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's
negligence.
We believe, secondly, that the truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static
condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient cause. The collision between the dump
truck and the private respondent's car would in an probability not have occurred had the
dump truck not been parked askew without any warning lights or reflector devices. The
improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone
driving down General Lacuna Street and for having so created this risk, the truck driver must
be held responsible. In our view, Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time than
the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to the accident, was not an efficient
intervening or independent cause. What the Petitioners describe as an "intervening cause"
was no more than a foreseeable consequent manner which the truck driver had parked the
dump truck. In other words, the petitioner truck driver owed a duty to private respondent
Dionisio and others similarly situated not to impose upon them the very risk the truck driver
had created. Dionisio's negligence was not of an independent and overpowering nature as
to cut, as it were, the chain of causation in fact between the improper parking of the dump
truck and the accident, nor to sever the juris vinculum of liability.
We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the
"immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care"
and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are
subject to mitigation by the courts (Article 2179, Civil Code of the Philippines).
Under Article 2179, the task of a court, in technical terms, is to determine whose negligence
— the plaintiff's or the defendant's — was the legal or proximate cause of the injury. That
task is not simply or even primarily an exercise in chronology or physics, as the petitioners
seem to imply by the use of terms like "last" or "intervening" or "immediate." The relative
location in the continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or
omissions, is only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into account. Of more
fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent act or omission of each party and
the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the
community. The petitioners urge that the truck driver (and therefore his employer) should
be absolved from responsibility for his own prior negligence because the unfortunate
plaintiff failed to act with that increased diligence which had become necessary to avoid the
peril precisely created by the truck driver's own wrongful act or omission. To accept this
proposition is to come too close to wiping out the fundamental principle of law that a man
must respond for the foreseeable consequences of his own negligent act or omission. Our
law on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of living in society and to allocate
them among the members of society. To accept the petitioners' pro-position must tend to
weaken the very bonds of society.

TOPIC: PRESUMPTIONS OF NEGLIGENCE

RES IPSA LOQUITOR- THE THING SPEAKS FOR ITSELF
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LUZON STEVEDORING
CORPORATION, defendant-appellant.
[G.R. No. L-21749. September 29, 1967.]
EN BANC REYES, J.B.L., J p:

DOCTRINE:
Where an immovable and stationary object like the Nagtahan bridge, uncontrovertedly
provided with adequate openings for passage of watercraft, is rammed by a barge
exclusively controlled by appellant, causing damage to its supports, there arises a
presumption of negligence on appellant's part or its employees, manning the barge or the
tugs that towed it. In the ordinary course of events, such a thing does not happen if proper
care is used. In Anglo-American Jurisprudence, the inference arises by what is known as the
"res ipsa loquitur" rule.

FACTS:
In the early afternoon of August 17, 1960, barge L-1892, owned by the Luzon Stevedoring
Corporation was being towed down the Pasig river by tugboats "Bangus" and "Barbero," also
belonging to the same corporation, when the barge rammed against one of the wooden piles
of the Nagtahan bailey bridge, smashing the posts and causing the bridge to list. The river,
at the time, was swollen and the current swift, on account of the heavy downpour in Manila
and the surrounding provinces on August 15 and 16, 1960.

Sued by the Republic of the Philippines for actual and consequential damage caused by its
employees, amounting to P200,000 (Civil Case No. 44562, CFI of Manila), defendant Luzon
Stevedoring Corporation disclaimed liability therefor, on the grounds that it had exercised
due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees; that the damages to the
bridge were caused by force majeure; that plaintiff has no capacity to sue; and that the
Nagtahan bailey bridge is an obstruction to navigation.

CFI : June 11, 1963, held that the Luzon Stevedoring Corporation liable for the damage
caused by its employees and ordering it to pay plaintiff the actual cost of the repair of the
Nagtahan bailey bridge which amounted to P192,561.72, with legal interest thereon from the
date of the filing of the complaint.

Defendant appealed directly to the Supreme Court (in effect waived its right to dispute any
finding of fact made by the trial Court).

ISSUE:
Whether or not the collision of appellant's barge with the supports or piers of the Nagtahan
bridge was in law caused by fortuitous event or force majeure.

RULING:
NO.
Considering that the Nagtahan bridge was an immovable and stationary object and
uncontrovertedly provided with adequate openings for the passage of water craft, including
barges like of appellant's, it is undeniable that the unusual event that the barge, exclusively
controlled by appellant, rammed the bridge supports raises a presumption of negligence on
the part of appellant or its employees manning the barge or the tugs that towed it. For in the
ordinary course of events, such a thing does not happen if proper care is used. In Anglo
American Jurisprudence, the inference arises by what is known as the "res ipsa loquitur"
rule.
The appellant strongly stresses the precautions taken by it on the day in question: that it
assigned two of its most powerful tugboats to tow down river its barge L-1892; that it
assigned to the task the more competent and experienced among its patrons, had the
towlines, engines and equipment double-checked and inspected' that it instructed its patrons
to take extra precautions; and concludes that it had done all it was called to do, and that the
accident, therefore, should be held due to force majeure or fortuitous event.

These very precautions, however, completely destroy the appellant's defense. For caso
fortuito or force majeure (which in law are identical in so far as they exempt an obligor from
liability) by definition, are extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable, "events that
could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable" (Art. 1174, Civ. Code of
the Philippines). It is therefore, not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or
anticipated, as is commonly believed but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid.
The mere difficulty to foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee the same: "un
hecho no constituye caso fortuito por la sola circunstancia de que su existencia haga mas
dificil o mas onerosa la accion diligente del presento ofensor". The very measures adopted
by appellant prove that the possibility of danger was not only foreseeable, but actually
foreseen, and was not caso fortuito.

Otherwise state, the appellant, Luzon Stevedoring Corporation, knowing and appreciating
the perils posed by the swollen stream and its swift current, voluntarily entered into a
situation involving obvious danger; it therefore assumed the risk, and can not shed
responsibility merely because the precautions it adopted turned out to be insufficient. Hence,
the lower Court committed no error in holding it negligent in not suspending operations and
in holding it liable for the damages caused.

It avails the appellant naught to argue that the dolphins, like the bridge, were improperly
located. Even if true, these circumstances would merely emphasize the need of even higher
degree of care on appellant's part in the situation involved in the present case. The appellant,
whose barges and tugs travel up and down the river everyday, could not safely ignore the
danger posed by these allegedly improper constructions that had been erected and, in place,
for years.

Ramos vs. Court of Appeals Ramos vs. Court of Appeals

321 SCRA 584, G.R. No. 124354 December 29, 1999
Doctrine: When the doctrine of res ipsa loqui-tur is availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert medical
testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself provides the proof of negligence.—Res ipsa
loquitur is not available in a malpractice suit if the only showing is that the desired result of an
operation or treatment was not accomplished.
FACTS: Plaintiff Erlinda Ramos, a 47 year old robust woman, married to Rogelio Ramos had
occasional complaints of discomfort due to pains allegedly caused by the presence of a stone
in her gall bladder. She was advised to undergo an operation for the removal of a stone in
her gall bladder. Dr. Hosaka decided that she should undergo a "cholecystectomy" operation
in DLSMC (another defendant) on June 17, 1985 at 9:00 A.M and assured Rogelio that he will
get a good anesthesiologist. She was admitted a day before the scheduled operation. The
following day, at 7:30 am, she was given injections. Her hands were held by Herminda
(sister-in-law) as they went down from her room to the operating room. At the operating
room, Herminda saw about two or three nurses and Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez, the other
defendant, who was to administer anesthesia. Although not a member of the hospital staff,
Herminda introduced herself as Dean of the College of Nursing at the Capitol Medical
Center who was to provide moral support to the patient, to them. Herminda was allowed to
stay inside the operating room. At around 9:30 A.M., Dr. Gutierrez reached a nearby phone
to look for Dr. Hosaka who was not yet in. at 12:15noon, Dr. Hosaka arrived. Herminda then
saw Dr. Gutierrez intubating the hapless patient. She thereafter heard Dr. Gutierrez say, "ang
hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan" She thereafter
noticed bluish discoloration of the nailbeds of the left hand of the hapless Erlinda even as Dr.
Hosaka approached her. She then heard Dr. Hosaka issue an order for someone to call Dr.
Calderon, another anesthesiologist and was then able to intubate the patient. Meanwhile,
Rogelio, who was outside the operating room, saw a respiratory machine being rushed
towards the door of the operating room. He also saw several doctors rushing towards the
operating room.
Erlinda Ramos stayed at the ICU for a month and was released four months after. During
the whole period of her confinement, she incurred hospital bills amounting to P93,542.25 and
has been in a comatose condition. She cannot do anything. She cannot move any part of her
body. She cannot see or hear. She is living on mechanical means. She suffered brain damage
as a result of the absence of oxygen in her brain for four to five minutes. After being
discharged from the hospital, she has been staying in their residence, still needing constant
medical attention, with her husband Rogelio incurring a monthly expense ranging from
P8,000.00 to P10,000.00. She was also diagnosed to be suffering from "diffuse cerebral
parenchymal damage". Petitioners filed a civil case for damages against herein private
respondents alleging negligence in the management and care of Erlinda Ramos.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT RES IPSA LOQUITUR IS APPROPRIATE IN THE CASE AT

BAR. -YES

RULING: Before resort to the doctrine may be allowed, the following requisites must be
satisfactorily shown:
1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's
negligence;
2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or
defendants; and
3. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is
eliminated.
In the above requisites, the fundamental element is the "control of instrumentality" which
caused the damage. Such element of control must be shown to be within the dominion of
the defendant. In order to have the benefit of the rule, a plaintiff, in addition to proving injury
or damage, must show a situation where it is applicable, and must establish that the essential
elements of the doctrine were present in a particular incident.
In the present case, Erlinda submitted herself for cholecystectomy and expected a routine
general surgery to be performed on her gall bladder. On that fateful day she delivered her
person over to the care, custody and control of private respondents who exercised complete
and exclusive control over her. At the time of submission, Erlinda was neurologically sound
and, except for a few minor discomforts, was likewise physically fit in mind and body.
However, during the administration of anesthesia and prior to the performance of
cholecystectomy she suffered irreparable damage to her brain. Thus, without undergoing
surgery, she went out of the operating room already decerebrate and totally incapacitated.
Obviously, brain damage, which Erlinda sustained, is an injury which does not normally
occur in the process of a gall bladder operation. In fact, this kind of situation does not in the
absence of negligence of someone in the administration of anesthesia and in the use of
endotracheal tube. Normally, a person being put under anesthesia is not rendered
decerebrate as a consequence of administering such anesthesia if the proper procedure was
followed. Furthermore, the instruments used in the administration of anesthesia, including
the endotracheal tube, were all under the exclusive control of private respondents, who are
the physicians-in-charge. Likewise, petitioner Erlinda could not have been guilty of
contributory negligence because she was under the influence of anesthetics which rendered
her unconscious.
Considering that a sound and unaffected member of the body (the brain) is injured or
destroyed while the patient is unconscious and under the immediate and exclusive control
of the physicians, we hold that a practical administration of justice dictates the application
of res ipsa loquitur. Upon these facts and under these circumstances the Court would be able
to say, as a matter of common knowledge and observation, if negligence attended the
management and care of the patient. Moreover, the liability of the physicians and the
hospital in this case is not predicated upon an alleged failure to secure the desired results of
an operation nor on an alleged lack of skill in the diagnosis or treatment as in fact no
operation or treatment was ever performed on Erlinda. Thus, upon all these initial
determination a case is made out for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
Medical malpractice cases do not escape the application of this doctrine. Although generally,
expert medical testimony is relied upon in malpractice suits to prove that a physician has
done a negligent act or that he has deviated from the standard medical procedure, when the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert medical testimony
is dispensed with because the injury itself provides the proof of negligence. The reason is
that the general rule on the necessity of expert testimony applies only to such matters clearly
within the domain of medical science, and not to matters that are within the common
knowledge of mankind which may be testified to by anyone familiar with the
facts. Ordinarily, only physicians and surgeons of skill and experience are competent to
testify as to whether a patient has been treated or operated upon with a reasonable degree
of skill and care. However, testimony as to the statements and acts of physicians and
surgeons, external appearances, and manifest conditions which are observable by any one
may be given by non-expert witnesses. Hence, in cases where the res ipsa loquitur is
applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon proper proof of injury
to the patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where the court from its fund of common
knowledge can determine the proper standard of care. Where common knowledge and
experience teach that a resulting injury would not have occurred to the patient if due care
had been exercised, an inference of negligence may be drawn giving rise to an application of
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without medical evidence, which is ordinarily required to
show not only what occurred but how and why it occurred. When the doctrine is
appropriate, all that the patient must do is prove a nexus between the particular act or
omission complained of and the injury sustained while under the custody and management
of the defendant without need to produce expert medical testimony to establish the standard
of care. Resort to res ipsa loquitur is allowed because there is no other way, under usual and
ordinary conditions, by which the patient can obtain redress for injury suffered by him.
 Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
300 SCRA 20
G.R. No. 119092 December 10, 1998

Doctrine: A party who asserts that another person, by violation of the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code, contributed to the collision of vehicles, has the burden of showing a causal connection
between the injury received and the alleged violation, i.e., that the violation of the statute was the
proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially contributed thereto; Negligence,
consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law, like any other negligence, is without legal
consequence unless it is a contributing cause of the injury.

Facts:

This case involves a collision between a Mercedes Benz panel truck of petitioner Sanitary
Steam Laundry and a Cimarron which caused the death of three persons and the injuries
of several others. The accident took place at the Aguinaldo Highway in Imus, Cavite on
August 31, 1980. All the victims were riding in the Cimarron. One of those who died was
the driver.
The passengers of the Cimarron were mostly employees of the Project Management
Consultants, Inc. (PMCI). They had just visited the construction site of a company project
at Lian, Batangas. The other passengers were family members and friends whom they
invited to an excursion to the beach after the visit to the construction site. The group
stayed at Lian beach until 5:30 p.m., when they decided to go back to Manila.chanrobles
virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

The Cimarron, with Plate No. 840-4J, was owned by Salvador Salenga, father of one of
the employees of PMCI. Driving the vehicle was Rolando Hernandez. It appears that at
about 8:00 p.m., as it was traveling along Aguinaldo Highway in Imus, Cavite on its way
back to Manila, the Cimarron was hit on its front portion by petitioner’s panel truck,
bearing Plate No. 581 XM, which was traveling in the opposite direction. The panel truck
was on its way to petitioner’s plant in Dasmariñas, Cavite after delivering some linen to
the Makati Medical Center. The driver, Herman Hernandez, claimed that a jeepney in
front of him suddenly stopped. He said he stepped on the brakes to avoid hitting the
jeepney and that this caused his vehicle to swerve to the left and encroach on a portion
of the opposite lane. As a result, his panel truck collided with the Cimarron on the north-
bound lane.

The driver of the Cimarron, Rolando Hernandez, and two of his passengers, namely,
Jason Bernabe and Dalmacio Salunoy, died. Several of the other passengers of the
Cimarron were injured and taken to various hospitals.
RTC Ruling:
The Regional Trial Court of Makati found petitioner’s driver to be responsible for the
vehicular accident and accordingly held petitioner liable to private respondents for
P472,262.30 in damages and attorney’s fees.
CA Ruling:
Its decision was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Is the driver of Cimarron guilty of contributory negligence?
Ruling:
No. First of all, it has not been shown how the alleged negligence of the Cimarron driver
contributed to the collision between the vehicles. Indeed, petitioner has the burden of
showing a causal connection between the injury received and the violation of the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code. He must show that the violation of the statute was the
proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially contributed thereto.
Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law, like any other negligence,
is without legal consequence unless it is a contributing cause of the injury. 3 Petitioner
says that "driving an overloaded vehicle with only one functioning headlight during
nighttime certainly increases the risk of accident," 4 that because the Cimarron had only
one headlight, there was "decreased visibility," and that the fact that the vehicle was
overloaded and its front seat overcrowded "decreased [its] maneuverability." 5 However,
mere allegations such as these are not sufficient to discharge its burden of proving clearly
that such alleged negligence was the contributing cause of the injury.

Vallacar Transit vs Catubig

Gr No. 177512
Facts:
Respondent;s husband, was on his way home from Dumaguete City and riding
in tandem on a motorcycle with his employee, Emperado. Catubig was the one driving
the motorcycle. While approaching a curve, Catubig tried to overtake a slow moving ten
wheeler cargo truck by crossing-over to the opposite lane, which was then
being traversed by the Ceres Bulilit bus driven by Cabanilla, headed for the opposite
direction. The two vehicles collided causing the death of Catubig and Emperado.
Petitioner contended that the proximate cause of the collision was the sole negligence of
Catubig when he imprudently overtook another vehicle at a curve and traversed the
opposite lane of the road.
Issue:
Whether petitioner is vicariously liable for the death of Catubig?
HELD:
No. Imputing fault or negligence on the part of the employer for the fault
or negligence of its employee does not apply to petitioner since the fault or negligence
of Cabanilla has never been established by respondent. To the contrary, the totality of
the evidence shows that the proximate cause of the collision is attributable to the
negligence of Catubig. The RTC concluded that Catubig’s overtaking of a slow-moving
truck, while approaching a curve, was the immediate and proximate cause of the
collision which led to his own death. The presumption that employers are negligent
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code flows from the negligence of their employees.
Having adjudged that the immediate and proximate cause of the collision resulting in
Catubigs death was his own negligence, and there was no fault or negligence on
Cabanillas part, then such presumption of fault or negligence on the part of petitioner,
as Cabanillas employer, does not even arise.
Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
300 SCRA 20
G.R. No. 119092 December 10, 1998

Doctrine: A party who asserts that another person, by violation of the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code, contributed to the collision of vehicles, has the burden of showing a causal connection
between the injury received and the alleged violation, i.e., that the violation of the statute was the
proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially contributed thereto; Negligence,
consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law, like any other negligence, is without legal
consequence unless it is a contributing cause of the injury.

Facts:

This case involves a collision between a Mercedes Benz panel truck of petitioner Sanitary
Steam Laundry and a Cimarron which caused the death of three persons and the injuries of
several others. The accident took place at the Aguinaldo Highway in Imus, Cavite on August
31, 1980. All the victims were riding in the Cimarron. One of those who died was the driver.
The passengers of the Cimarron were mostly employees of the Project Management
Consultants, Inc. (PMCI). They had just visited the construction site of a company project at
Lian, Batangas. The other passengers were family members and friends whom they invited
to an excursion to the beach after the visit to the construction site. The group stayed at Lian
beach until 5:30 p.m., when they decided to go back to Manila.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

The Cimarron, with Plate No. 840-4J, was owned by Salvador Salenga, father of one of the
employees of PMCI. Driving the vehicle was Rolando Hernandez. It appears that at about
8:00 p.m., as it was traveling along Aguinaldo Highway in Imus, Cavite on its way back to
Manila, the Cimarron was hit on its front portion by petitioner’s panel truck, bearing Plate
No. 581 XM, which was traveling in the opposite direction. The panel truck was on its way
to petitioner’s plant in Dasmariñas, Cavite after delivering some linen to the Makati Medical
Center. The driver, Herman Hernandez, claimed that a jeepney in front of him suddenly
stopped. He said he stepped on the brakes to avoid hitting the jeepney and that this caused
his vehicle to swerve to the left and encroach on a portion of the opposite lane. As a result,
his panel truck collided with the Cimarron on the north-bound lane.

The driver of the Cimarron, Rolando Hernandez, and two of his passengers, namely, Jason
Bernabe and Dalmacio Salunoy, died. Several of the other passengers of the Cimarron were
injured and taken to various hospitals.
RTC Ruling:
The Regional Trial Court of Makati found petitioner’s driver to be responsible for the
vehicular accident and accordingly held petitioner liable to private respondents for
P472,262.30 in damages and attorney’s fees.
CA Ruling:
Its decision was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals.

Issue:
Is the driver of Cimarron guilty of contributory negligence?

Ruling:
No. First of all, it has not been shown how the alleged negligence of the Cimarron driver
contributed to the collision between the vehicles. Indeed, petitioner has the burden of
showing a causal connection between the injury received and the violation of the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code. He must show that the violation of the statute was the
proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially contributed thereto. Negligence,
consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law, like any other negligence, is without legal
consequence unless it is a contributing cause of the injury. 3 Petitioner says that "driving an
overloaded vehicle with only one functioning headlight during nighttime certainly increases
the risk of accident," 4 that because the Cimarron had only one headlight, there was
"decreased visibility," and that the fact that the vehicle was overloaded and its front seat
overcrowded "decreased [its] maneuverability." 5 However, mere allegations such as these
are not sufficient to discharge its burden of proving clearly that such alleged negligence was
the contributing cause of the injury.