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Mark A. Bedau
Received: 24 June 2010 / Accepted: 6 January 201 1 / Published online: 27 January 201 1
© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 201 1
Abstract This paper describes and defends the view that minimal chemical li
essentially involves the chemical integration of three chemical functionalities: con
tainment, metabolism, and program (Rasmussen et al. in Protocells: bridging nonlivi
and living matter, 2009a). This view is illustrated and explained with the help of CM
and Rasmussen diagrams (Rasmussen et al. In: Rasmussen et al. (eds.) in Protocells
bridging nonliving and living matter, 71-100, 2009b), both of which represent the k
chemical functional dependencies among containment, metabolism, and program. T
CMP model of minimal chemical life gains some support from the broad view of l
as open-ended evolution, which I have defended elsewhere (Bedau in The philosophy
of artificial life, 1996; Bedau in Artificial Life, 4:125-140, 1998). Further support
comes from the natural way the CMP model resolves the puzzle about whether life
a matter of degree.
1 Introduction
Life seems to be one of the most fundamental categories in nature. A wild variety of
forms of life surround us, and we usually have no difficulty distinguishing the living
from the nonliving. A flower, a worm, and a bird are alive; a rock, a river, and a cloud
M. A. Bedau (13)
Reed College, Portland, OR, USA
e-mail: mab@reed.edu
M. A. Bedau
European School of Molecular Medicine, Milan, Italy
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Fig. 2 Rasmussen et al. (2009b) developed a more detailed representation of CMP systems, a The
Rasmussen diagram (right) of the three chemical subsystems in minimal chemical life, and in a CMP
diagram (left), b Minimal self-supporting functional triad of container, metabolism, and program, repre-
sented in a CMP diagram (left) and a Rasmussen diagram (right). The Rasmussen diagrams show a high-level
chemical representation of what underlies CMP diagrams
reactions. One important upshot is that many different Rasmussen diagrams collapse
to the same, single CMP diagram. The CMP model is a high-level abstraction.
Borderline cases are a fairly severe test of a theory. For theories of minimal chemi-
cal life, the most famous borderline case is the virus. Viruses typically are biologically
active only when they inhabit other cells as hosts; an available minimal chemical cell
host is shown in Fig. 3a. An isolated virus particle (Fig. 3b) is not considered alive by
most biologists today; note that the CMP diagram for the isolated virus (3b) is quite
different from the diagram of minimal chemical life (3a). This stark difference in the
virus diagram counts in favor of the CMP theory. But when a virus infects a cell and
inhabits it, and highjacks the cell's CMP machinery to copy the virus (Fig. 3c), then
the composite chemical system has a slightly more complex CMP diagram. Under
these conditions, the virus is part of a living system - another feature well represented
in CMP diagrams. So, the CMP model passes the virus test. The different states of a
virus (inert and infectious) are easily represented in CMP diagrams, and the diagram
of the infected host (3(c)) shows that the parasitic virus takes from C, M, and P but
gives them nothing back.
The virus example reveals something important about the CMP model. Viruses
are a classic borderline case, and borderline cases are sometimes due to insufficient
information. By contrast note that the CMP account of why viruses are borderline is
not epistemological but structural. The problem is not that we do not know enough
Springer
Fig.
pre-existing
3 A virus
form
depends
of (a)on
life, Oahost
its (b)
(a). A virus particle all by itself
(b) is not alive but inert. When
the virus infects the host, the
virus becomes part of a more
complex living system (c)
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about viruses to tell whether they are alive. Rather, we know all t
viruses, and we can capture the relevant information in a CMP
isolated virus particle is an inert polymer (Fig. 3b), perhaps inside
this virus particle infects a host (represented as a CMP protocell,
system provides the chemical resources that the virus particle nee
although the virus fails to support the containment, metabolism,
(Fig. 3c). The whole chemical system diagrammed in Fig. 3c, in
its host protocells, is itself alive. Once we have sorted out the
virus infecting a host, is there any further question to resolve
viruses are alive? I cannot imagine what that question might be
is that minimal chemical life is a matter of degree because ea
located on a precisely structured landscape of systems that diff
their neighbors and that are more or less alive. I return to this to
At this stage one should ask whether our earlier puzzles about
guise. If there is no agreement about a definition of life, why s
giance to a model that says minimal cellular life is a chemically
triad of container, metabolism, and program? A host of furthe
Are all three functionalities really necessary? Are no further f
sary? One can imagine further candidate functionalities, such
ior, autonomous information processing, responsiveness to the
to promote self-interest, or behaving purposefully. Why are cont
and program by themselves sufficient? The rough consensus in
cell community around the functional triad view gives us reason
ously, but the agreement will not convince skeptics that the CM
especially since the "consensus" around the CMP model in the
community is not universal.
One way to reply to this worry would be to agree that other
autonomous information processing and sensitivity to the en
properties of living systems, but to hold that they can be explain
40 Springer
I would explain the CMP model as a consequence of a more fundamental view of life,
a view that locates the essence of life as the exercise of the capacity to undergo autono-
mous proliferation and adaptation, ultimately involving to open-ended evolution. The
idea that life essentially involves the ability to evolve by natural selection has a long
pedigree (e.g., Maynard Smith 1975; Cairns-Smith 1985; Joyce 1994; Bedau 1996;
Ruiz-Mirazo et al. 2004). I want to defend a specific kind of view of life as primarily
identified with the holistic property of open-ended evolution (Bedau 1996, 1998).
One thing in favor of my view of life as open-ended evolution is that is explains
the central place of the CMP model. If life fundamentally involves the process of
open-ended evolution, then we should expect minimal cellular life forms to consist
of a functionally integrated triad of container, metabolism, and program. The process
of natural selection requires a varied population of reproducing entities with functional
properties under the control of heritable information. The heritable informational con-
trol of functional properties is what we have been referring to as the "program" in a
minimal cell. In order for programs to control cellular functionality, they need a source
of raw materials and energy from the environment, and that is provided by what we
have been calling a metabolism. Finally, what we have been calling a container is
needed in order to spatially concentrate and protect the molecular components of the
program and metabolism while the system assembles and organizes itself, grows and
finally reproduces.
Note also that, if there is a combinatorial^ large family of possible forms of infor-
mational control of metabolism and containment, and if information inheritance is
somewhat imperfect, then the process of evolution by natural selection would take
place. In time, natural selection might be able to improve those functionalities and
their integration. Figure 4 is a crude cartoon of how a population of reproducing CMP
systems could evolve by the process of natural selection. Truly open-ended evolution
might require an appropriate approximation of unlimited genetic variation, but I will
leave those details unsettled here, since they do not affect my overall argument.
Let me digress to prevent one misunderstanding of my view of life. I am not inter-
ested in the meaning of the word 'life' (or its translations in other languages). Anyone
who does not know the meaning of the word can look it up in a dictionary. I am asking
a different question, one about the true nature of the phenomena referred to by that
word. Furthermore, I am not interested in the analysis of our current conception of life.
Our concepts are full of preconceptions, and when viewed on a very long time scale,
they are continually in flux. There is every reason to think that the concepts of life
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Fig. 4 Evolution of CMP struc
with arrows and stop signs. A l
by natural selection
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Any adequate theory of life should explain why such heterogeneous properties char-
acteristically coexist in nature, especially since each of the hallmarks can be possessed
by things that are not alive.
One important virtue of the view of life as open-ended evolution is its unified
explanation for Mayr's hallmarks of life; the view implies that we should expect those
heterogeneous-seeming properties to coexist in nature. If life consists primarily of
systems undergoing open-ended evolution, we should expect life to arise when natu-
ral selection produces complex adaptive organization in historically connected organ-
isms with evolved genetic programs. Furthermore, the random variation and historical
contingency in open-ended evolution explain why living phenomena are especially
unpredictable and involve unique and variable individuals. Finally, if open-ended evo-
lution is produced by a branching process involving birth, reproduction, and death of
individuals, then we can understand why it would give rise to a wealth of qualitative
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Fig. 5 Diagrams of some of the ways in which CMP subsys
support each other. CMP diagrams can contain up to nine ar
metabolism, and program. In CMP diagrams none, one, tw
can have a circular arrow , independently of any other ar
are fully integrated functionally, so the six inner arrows f
arrows . For example, the arrows С -> M and С -> P regi
and program to function properly, because the container co
parasites and poisons
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Д /Д /д' л /л /д
(а) (Ь) (с) (d) (e) (f)
Fig. 6 Six kinds of CMP diagrams with one
configurations of circular arrows, dependin
this figure implicitly assume that the cont
corner , and the program (P) is at the lowe
from container to metabolism; this means tha
the container. In diagram (c) the metabolism
help the proper functioning of the metaboli
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Fig. 8 A set of Rasmussen diagrams which differ
for minimal chemical life only by omitting one catal
canonical Rasmussen diagram is alive, then each of
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6 Conclusion
This paper connects two very different perspectives on life: (1) the CMP model
of minimal chemical life as involving the chemical integration of containment,
metabolism, and program (Rasmussen et al. 2009a), and (2) the broad view of life
as the process of open-ended evolution, which I have defended previously (Bedau
1996, 1998). Constructing minimal chemical forms of life in the laboratory requires
one to target some particular kind of chemical systems, and the protocell research
community is largely aiming to make systems that chemically integrate containment,
metabolism, and program, and thereby are able to grow, reproduce, and in the long
run evolve. In this way, CMP systems are the minimal chemical requirements for a
population of CMP systems that reproduce and evolve by natural selection. For this
reason, the CMP model is a natural ally of the view of life as open-ended evolution.
Cmp and Rasmussen diagrams crisply identify the kinds of functional support
involved in these minimal chemical forms of life. Furthermore, the space of CMP
systems provides a way to categorize and grade minimal chemical systems on the
degree to which they are alive. This resolves one of the long-standing puzzles about
whether or not the life/nonlife distinction is a dichotomy. And all of this illustrates the
view that explaining life hallmarks and puzzles is centrally involved in defending any
theory of life (Bedau 1998, 2007).
Acknowledgments The methods for diagramming CMP systems, and the emphasis on the CMP model of
life, are deeply indebted to the representations of protocell chemical organization in Rasmussen diagrams,
which were developed in collaboration with Rasmussen et al. (2009b). My colleagues are not responsible
for how I have applied our earlier work. Thanks also to the audience at Artificial Life XI, August 2009,
when an earlier version of this work was presented. For helpful discussion, thanks to Kate Elgin.
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