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Arellano University School of Law

Menlo St. Corner Taft Avenue, Pasay City

REVISED RULES ON EVIDENCE

(Testimonial Evidence Sections 34 to 54)

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the subject:

Evidence (Thursday 5:30PM – 9:30PM)
1st Semester S.Y. 2020 – 2021

Submitted to:
Judge Byron G. San Pedro

Submitted By:
GROUP 5 – 1st Report

Members:
Chua, John Kenneth
Gomez, Charliemayne
Lasam Jr., Belmar
Masiglat, Allyson Kim
Pilotin, Andrew Mark
Songco, Ken Felix

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 Testimonial Evidence (Sections 34 to 54)
Report Outline:
1. Confessions
2. Previous Conduct
3. Hearsay Evidence Rule
4. Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule
a) Dying Declaration
b) Statement of Decedent or Person of Unsound Mind
c) Declaration Against Interest
d) Declaration About Pedigree
e) Family Reputation or Tradition
f) Common Reputation
g) Res Gestae
h) Records of Regularly Conducted Business Activity
i) Entries in Official Records
j) Commercial Lists
k) Learned Treatises
l) Testimony or Deposition at a Former Proceeding
m) Child Witness Rule
n) Residual Exception
5. Opinion Rule
6. Character Evidence

I. Confessions
Section 34. Confession. — The declaration of an accused acknowledging his or her guilt of the
offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence
against him or her.

Confession – is the declaration of an accused acknowledging his or her guilt of the offense
charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him or
her.

Judicial Confession Extrajudicial Confession

DEFINITION:
One made by the accused before a court in Any admission made outside court.
which the case is pending and in the course
of legal proceedings therein. When one
enters a plea of guilty in a criminal case.

Note: In capital offenses, the prosecution is

required to present evidence notwithstanding
the plea of guilt by the accused and the court
must be satisfied that such plea was entered
voluntarily and with full comprehension of
the consequences of such act. (RULE 116, Sec
3)
AS TO ITS ABILITY TO SUSTAIN CONVICTION:

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 By itself, it can sustain a conviction. Cannot sustain a conviction unless its
voluntariness is proven and unless
(Subject to the provisions stated under Sec. 3 corroborated by evidence of the corpus
of Rule 116) delicti.

A confession, if freely and voluntarily made, is

deserving of the highest credit because it is
presumed to flow from the highest sense of
guilt.

Requisites For the Admissibility of Extrajudicial Confession:

1. The confession must have been intelligently made the accused realizing the importance
or legal significance of his act;
2. There must have been no violation of Sec 12, Art III of the 1987 Constitution;
3. The confession must involve an express and categorical acknowledgement of guilt;
4. The confession must have been given voluntarily;
5. The facts admitted must be constitutive of a criminal offense; and
6. Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of his
counsel, or in the latter’s absence, upon a valid waiver; otherwise such extrajudicial
confession shall be inadmissible as evidence any proceeding.

General Rule: An extrajudicial confession is admissible against the confessor only. It is

incompetent evidence against his co-accused for being hearsay and because of the res inter
alios acta rule (The rule on res inter alios acta provides that the rights of a party cannot be
prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another.)

Exception: When admissible against the co-defendants:

1. Interlocking Confessions;
2. When the confessant testified for his co-defendant;
3. If the co-defendants impliedly acquiesced in or adopted said confession;
4. Where the accused admitted the facts stated by the confessor after being apprised of
such confession;
5. If they are charged as co-conspirators of the crime which was confessed by one of the
accused and said confession is used only as corroborating evidence;
6. Where the confession is used as circumstantial evidence to show the probability of
participation by the co-conspirators;
7. Where the co-conspirator’s extrajudicial confession is corroborated by other evidence of
record

Admission or Confession Under Oath Not Required

There is no provision of law which prescribes that either confessions or admissions are not
competent evidence unless made under oath. It is the fact that they are made by the accused
and against his own interest which gives to them their evidentiary value, and provided the fact is
established it does not matter whether they are made under oath or not. (US vs Corrales)

Presumption of Voluntariness of Confession

A confession is presumed to be voluntary until the contrary is proved and the burden of proof is
upon the person who gave the confession. (People vs Dela Cruz)

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Custodial Investigation
It is present where the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and
begins to focus on a particular suspect who is taken into custody and asked questions that lead
into eliciting incriminating statements

Note: The presumption of regularity of official acts does not apply during in custody
investigation

Re-Enactment
It has, however, been held that the reenactment of the crime is not part of a formal official
investigation. The reenactment is a police continuance, designed to test the truthfulness of the
statements of the witnesses who had confessed the commission of the offense. Where the
accused acquiesced and willingly took part, although silently in the reenactment of a crime, his
acts therein may be considered evidence against him.

Case: People v. Dacanay

Facts: An Information was filed with the RTC, accused-appellant Antonio T. Dacanay (Antonio)
was charged with the crime of Parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code(RPC), as
amended. The RTC gave weight to the extrajudicial confession of Antonio and found him
guilty of the crime of Parricide.

The CA affirmed the RTC in toto and dismissed the appeal for lack of merit, on the ground that
Antonio failed to overcome the presumption of voluntariness attended by his extrajudicial
confession. In his defense, he averred that the twin defenses of alibi and denial, claiming
coercion and intimidation on the part of the police officers involved in the investigation of the
crime. In his Appeal, Antonio insists that his extrajudicial confession is inadmissible on the
ground that it was given under a "coercive physical or psychological atmosphere". To support
his claim, Antonio underscores the fact that he was inside a detention cell with two (2) or three
(3) other detainees when he allegedly confessed to the crime before the media.

Issue: W/N the extrajudicial admission is admissible in evidence?

Ruling:
Yes. At the outset, we note that Antonio had already admitted in his Appellant's Brief that he
was not under custodial investigation at the time he gave his extrajudicial confession.
Although he was not under custodial investigation, note must be taken that Antonio Dacanay
was inside a detention cell with two (2) or three (3) other detainees when he allegedly
confessed before the media. Lastly, although confession before the media does not form part
of custodial investigation, Antonio Dacanay should have been informed about the
consequences of his when he decided to confess his alleged guilt. Hence, Antonio's reliance
on constitutional safeguards is misplaced as much as it is unfounded.

Case: People v. Opiniano

Facts: Around 9:00 p.m. of November 29, 1997, PO2 Paule and SPO1 Eduardo Roderno of the
Caloocan police were traversing C-3 Road aboard a police-marked vehicle when they noticed
a man carrying a heavy-looking bag. When they approached him, the man ran away. After a
brief chase, the man was cornered. PO2 Paule noticed that he was nervous and sweating. His
right leg was stained with blood and his right waistline was bulging with an object, which
turned out to be a double bladed 9-inch mini kris. He did not answer when asked about the
bloodstain on his leg. They brought him to the police station where he identified himself as

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Jerry Dela Cruz. The bag yielded three (3) reams of Marlboro cigarettes, a lighter, some coins,
and a blue denim wallet with cash in different denominations amounting to P1,470.00. PO2
Paule also noticed that the P500.00 bill in the wallet was stained with fresh blood. Upon
further interrogation, Dela Cruz verbally confessed that he and his companions, whom he
later revealed as "Ango" or Lumayag, and Opiniano, "had just killed and robbed an old
couple." He was supposed to bring the contents of the bag to his cohorts in the illegal
settlers' area in Malabon. During cross-examination, PO2 Paule affirmed that Dela Cruz was
not aided by a lawyer, nor was his confession reduced into writing. PO2 Paule further
testified that when they informed Dela Cruz of his right to a lawyer, the latter remained silent.

Issue: W/N the confession is admissible?

Ruling:
No. Dela Cruz's extrajudicial confession without counsel at the police station without a valid
waiver of the right to counsel - that is, in writing and in the presence of counsel - is
inadmissible in evidence. Merely stating the rights of the accused without making sure he
understands such – this kind of perfunctory giving of the so-called Miranda rights is what this
Court has previously frowned upon as ineffective and inadequate compliance with the
mandates of the Constitution. Any confession obtained under these circumstances is awed
and cannot be used as evidence not only against the declarant but also against his co-
accused.

Case: Cruz v. People

Facts: Cruz, Jervoso, and Pardilla admitted to Dadlani that they stole and sold products of
Prestige Brands, and divided the proceeds among themselves. Cruz, Jervoso, and Pardilla
executed their written confession on the matter. Cruz and Jervoso went to the Makati Police
Station and reported that at about 5:00 p.m. on November 21, 2003, Dadlani, Ding, and an
unidentified male person forced them to sign a confession letter, which alleged that they
stole products from the warehouse; that on November 22, 2003, Dadlani, Lontoc, and Atty.
Simon forced them to translate their confession into their own handwriting; and that they
were intimidated into signing the letter and even detained at the company premises up to
11:15 p.m. and were allowed to leave only after affixing their signature to the confession
letter.

On November 24, 2003. Cruz and Jervoso filed with the Makati Prosecutor's Office a
Complaint grave threats, and incriminating innocent persons against Prestige Brands. At the
time of the trial the motion for reconsideration filed relative to the denial of the petition for
review (on the dismissal of the complaint) was still pending with the Department of Justice.

Issue: W/N the confession of Cruz is admissible?

Ruling:
No. The Court is not unmindful of the presumption of voluntariness of a confession. However,
the confessant may overcome such presumption provided that he or she substantiates that
one’s admission was not true and the confession was unwillingly given. In People v. Enanoria,
the Court held that there must be external manifestations to prove that the confession was
not voluntary. These external manifestations included institution of a criminal action against
the alleged intimidators for maltreatment, and evidence of compulsion, duress or violence on
the confessant.

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 II. Previous Conduct
Section 35. Similar Acts as Evidence. — Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at
one time is not admissible to prove that he or she did or did not do the same or similar thing
at another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan,
system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like.

Section 36. Unaccepted Offer. — An offer in writing to pay a particular sum of money or to
deliver a written instrument or specific personal property is, if rejected without valid cause,
equivalent to the actual production and tender of the money, instrument, or property.

General Rule: Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible
to prove that he/she did or did not do the same or similar thing at another time

Exceptions: Said evidence may be received to prove a:

1. Specific intent;
2. Knowledge;
3. Identity;
4. Plan;
5. System;
6. Scheme;
7. Habit;
8. Custom;
9. Usage and the like.

Burden of the Party Offering Previous Act As Evidence

The offering party must allege and prove specific, repetitive conduct that might constitute
evidence of habit. It must be numerous enough to base on inference of systematic conduct.

Rape Shield
Under Rape Victim Assistance and Protection Act of 1998, it provides that in prosecutions for
rape, evidence of complainant’s past sexual conduct, opinion thereof or of his/her reputation
shall not be admitted unless, and only to the extent that the court finds, that such evidence is
material and relevant to the case.

Sexual Abuse Shield Rule in Rule on Examination of Child Witness

General rule: The following evidence is not admissible in any criminal proceeding involving
alleged child sexual abuse:
1. Evidence offered to prove that the alleged victim engaged in other sexual behavior, and
2. Evidence offered to prove the sexual predisposition of the alleged victim.

Exception: Evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged victim to prove that a
person other than the accused was the source of the semen, injury, or other physical evidence
shall be admissible. (A.M 004-07 SC)

Case: People vs. Santos

Facts: Santos was charged and convicted of murder and frustrated murder. On appeal, accused
makes the following assignment of errors: (1) his identification in the police lineup by the two
witnesses is inadmissible as he was not afforded his right to counsel; (2) he questions the trial

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court for admitting a sworn statement by one Ronaldo Guerrero, a witness in another criminal
case accused was also charged with the murder which had taken place in the very same site
where Bautista and Cupcupin were ambushed as such accused contends that the affidavit of
Ronaldo Guerrero was hearsay evidence, considering that the prosecution did not present
Ronaldo Guerrero as a witness during the trial.

Issue #1: W/N identification in the police line-up is not admissible on the ground that the
accused was not provided with a counsel?

Ruling:
There is no real need to afford a suspect the service of counsel at police line-up. The customary
practice is, of course, that it is the witness who is investigated or interrogated in the course of
a police line-up and who gives a statement to the police, rather than the accused who is not
questioned at all at that stage. In the instant case, there is nothing in the record of this case
which shows that in the course of the lineup, the police investigators sought to extract any
admission or confession from appellant Santos.

Issue #2: W/N the trial court may not admit a sworn statement of a witness taken from another
criminal case?

Ruling:
Section 34, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that “Evidence that one did or did not do
a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or a
similar thing at another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge,
identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage and the like." Trial court did not
commit reversible error in admitting the Guerrero affidavit for the limited purpose for proving
knowledge or plan or scheme, and more specifically, that appellant knew that the particular
corner of two (2) particular streets in Malabon was a good place to ambush a vehicle and its
passengers. As in fact, both in the instant case, as well as the case where Guerrero’s testimony
was originally presented, the scene of the crime is one and the same.

Case: People v. Nardo

Facts: Herein accused was charged of raping his eldest daughter. The prosecution presented
the victim as its main witness, while, the defense presented a number of witnesses who testified
to different occasion for which the victim was caught lying. After the trial, trial court, giving
credence to the testimony of the victim, convicted the accused. On appeal, the accused
presented series of letters allegedly written by the victim to the defense counsel asking said
counsel to help her father be acquitted.

Issue #1: Whether or not a minor witness’ credibility may be assailed by proving that she lies
on a number of occasions?

Ruling:
No. Rule 130, Section 34, of the Rules of Court provides that: "Evidence that one did or did not
do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did nor did not do the same
or a similar thing at another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge,
identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like.” While lying may constitute
a habit, we believe that the falsehoods committed by Lorielyn, assuming them for the moment
to be true, are petty and inconsequential. They are not as serious as charging one’s own father
of the sordid crime of rape, with all of its serious repercussions. Furthermore, as a rule, findings

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by the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are not to be disturbed, for the trial court is in
a better position to pass upon the same. Lastly, jurisprudence dictates that testimonies of child
victims are given full weight and credit, since when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says
that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed.
Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.

Issue #2: Whether or not letters written by the witness after trial containing details that is
contrary to testimony made in open court constitutes recantation of said testimony?

Ruling:
An affidavit of recantation, being usually taken ex parte, would be considered inferior to the
testimony given in open court. It would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken
before a court of justice simply because the witness who gave it later on changed his/her
mind for one reason or another. Such a rule would make a solemn trial a mockery, and place
the proceedings at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. Recantations are frowned upon by
the courts because they can easily be obtained from witnesses through intimidation or for
monetary consideration. A retraction does not necessarily negate an earlier declaration.
Especially, recantations made after the conviction of the accused deserve only scant
consideration.

Case: Republic of the Philippines v. Heirs of Felipe Alejaga

Facts: On December 28, 1978, Felipe Alejaga, Sr. filed with the District Land Office, Roxas City,
a Free Patent Application covering a parcel of land. It appears that on December 27, 1978,
when the application was executed under oath, Efren L. Recio, Land Inspector, submitted a
report of his investigation and verification of the land to the District Land Office, Bureau of
Lands, City of Roxas. On March 14, 1979, the District Land Officer of Roxas City approved the
application and the issuance of [a] Free Patent to the applicant. On March 16, 1979, the patent
was also ordered to be issued and the patent was forwarded to defendant Register of Deeds,
City of Roxas, for registration and issuance of the corresponding Certificate of Title.
Thereafter, an Original Certificate of was issued to [respondent] by defendant Register of
Deeds. On April 4, 1979, the heirs of Ignacio Arrobang, through counsel in a letter-complaint
requested the Director of Lands, Manila, for an investigation of the District Land Officer for
irregularities in the issuance of the title of a foreshore land in favor of respondent. The Chief,
Legal Division, Land Management Bureau, Manila, recommended to the Director of Lands the
appropriate civil proceeding for the cancellation of Free Patent Title and the corresponding
Original Certificate of Title in the name of respondent. In the meantime, respondent obtained
a NACIDA loan from the defendant Philippine National Bank (hereinafter referred to as PNB)
executed in Cebu City in the amount of P100,000.00 on August 18, 1981. The loan was
secured by a real estate mortgage in favor of defendant PNB. On April 18, 1990, the
government through the Solicitor General instituted an action for Annulment/Cancellation of
Patent and Title and Reversion against respondent, the PNB of Roxas City and defendant
Register of Deeds of Roxas City covering Free Patent Application.

Issue: W/N the part referring to the statement made by Recio in admitting that he had not
actually conducted an investigation and ocular inspection of the parcel of land may be
considered as independently relevant?

Ruling:
The doctrine on independently relevant statements holds that conversations communicated
to a witness by a third person may be admitted as proof that, regardless of their truth or

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 falsity, they were actually made. Evidence as to the making of such statements is not
secondary but primary, for in itself it (a) constitutes a fact in issue or (b) is circumstantially
relevant to the existence of such fact.

There are five kinds of independently relevant statements that are circumstantial evidence of
the facts in issue:
1. Statements of a person showing his state of mind; that is, his mental condition,
knowledge, belief, intention, ill will and other emotions
2. Statements that may identify the date, place and condition as illness and the like
3. Statements of a person from which an inference may be drawn as to the state of mind
of another person; i.e., the knowledge, belief, good or bad faith noticed of the latter
4. Statements that may identify the date, place and person in question
5. Statements showing the lack of credibility of a witness.

Since Cartagena’s testimony was based on the report of the investigation he had conducted,
his testimony was not hearsay and was, hence, properly admitted by the trial court.

III. Hearsay Evidence

Section 37. Hearsay. — Hearsay is a statement other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at a trial or hearing, offered to prove the truth of the facts asserted therein. A
statement is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) a non-verbal conduct of a person, if it is
intended by him or her as an assertion. Hearsay evidence is inadmissible except as otherwise
provided in these Rule.

A statement is not hearsay if the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject
to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is (a) inconsistent with the
declarant's testimony, and was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial
hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition; (b) consistent with the declarant's testimony
and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent
fabrication or improper influence or motive; or (c) one of identification of a person made after
perceiving him or her.

Hearsay – a statement other than one made by the declarant while testifying at a trial or
hearing, offered to prove the truth of the facts asserted therein.

Case: Anna Lerima Patula v. People of the Philippines

Facts: Petitioner was charged with estafa under an information filed in the Regional Trial
Court. Petitioner pled not guilty to the offense charged in the information. At pre-trial, no
stipulation of facts was had, and petitioner did not avail herself of plea bargaining. The only
other witness for the Prosecution was Karen Guivencan. In the course of Guivencan’s direct-
examination, petitioner’s counsel interposed a continuing objection on the ground that the
figures entered in Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives, inclusive, were hearsay because the
persons who had made the entries were not themselves presented in court. With that,
petitioner’s counsel did not anymore cross-examine Guivencan, apparently regarding her
testimony to be irrelevant because she thereby tended to prove falsification, an offense not
alleged in the information. The Prosecution then formally offered its documentary exhibits,
including Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives (like the originals and duplicates of the
receipts supposedly executed and issued by petitioner), inclusive, the confirmation sheets
used by Guivencan in auditing the accounts served by petitioner, and Guivencan’s so-called
Summary (Final Report) of Discrepancies The RTC, stating that inasmuch as petitioner had

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opted “not to present evidence for her defense” the Prosecution’s evidence remained
“unrefuted and uncontroverted, rendered its decision finding petitioner guilty of estafa.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied the motion.

Issue: W/N Guivencan’s testimony on the ledgers and receipts (Exhibits B to YY, and their
derivatives, inclusive) to prove petitioner’s misappropriation or conversion was inadmissible
for being hearsay?

Ruling:
Yes. Her being the only witness who testified on the entries effectively deprived the RTC of
the reasonable opportunity to validate and test the veracity and reliability of the entries as
evidence of petitioner’s misappropriation or conversion through cross-examination by
petitioner. The denial of that opportunity rendered the entire proof of misappropriation or
conversion hearsay, and thus unreliable and untrustworthy for purposes of determining the
guilt or innocence of the accused. To elucidate why the Prosecution’s hearsay evidence was
unreliable and untrustworthy, and thus devoid of probative value, reference is made to
Section 36 of Rule 130, Rules of Court, a rule that states that a witness can testify only to
those facts that she knows of her personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from her own
perception, except as otherwise provided in the Rules of Court.

Case: People of the Philippines v. Ricardo Aguirre y Maniping alias “Palakit”

Facts: On October 2, 1984, Ricardo Aguirre, a 23-year old bachelor also known as “Palakit,”
was indicated in the Regional Trial Court at Tagudin, Ilocos Sur for the crime of rape with
homicide. He was arraigned on November 21, 1984 and, assisted by counsel de officio,
pleaded guilty. The prosecution presented evidence “to prove the commission of the crime.”
The evidence consisted in the testimony of seven witnesses, and several documents, inclusive
of two (2) extrajudicial confessions of Ricardo. Based on the testimonies presented, the
witnesses produced the basic facts and the antecedents leading to the apprehension of
Ricardo Aguirre. Aguirre was arrested and brought to the house of ViceMayor Juan Patilao at
sitio Lugacan, where Aguirre was again interrogated. The investigation at the Vice-Mayor’s
house, conducted shortly after midnight, was an “informal” one. It was done in the presence
of the Vice-Mayor, the two (2) barangay captains, Romeo Torres and Ponciano Bagwasa, and
the two (2) members of the CHDF who were with the arresting party, Zosimo Balbin and
Espiritu Abongan. The accused briefly described how he had struck the victim’s head after he
had abused Lolita Cabel. Afterwards, Aguirre, the Vice-Mayor and the other police and
barangay officers proceeded to the scene of the crime at Kindorneog. At the crime scene, too,
Aguirre narrated what he had done to Lolita Cabel. After the interrogation, they requested
Aguirre to write, in his own hand and in the vernacular, an addendum to show that he had not
been intimidated, and had given his statement freely and voluntarily. Nine (9) days later, or on
June 13, 1984, another written statement was given by the accused in the same place, and
again in the Ilocano dialect. This second statement contains more details from Aguirre; but his
account of the crime is substantially the same. The evidence thus presented establishes
Aguirre’s guilt of the crime independently of his plea of guilt. Of this, this Court has satisfied
itself. The evidence more than adequately proves the following facts: Gregorio Cabel had
been drinking gin and beer with Aguirre and one other, in Namitpit. After their drinking
session, Gregorio and Aguirre began to walk home together, but when Aguirre saw Lolita
Cabel at Tilek, he left Gregorio and joined Lolita on the way home. Gregorio stayed behind, to
rest for a while in Bungbungian. On resuming his way homeward, Gregorio met Aguirre, who
was running towards him “as if he was afraid.” A few minutes later Gregorio saw a slipper on
the road and heard a woman moaning; Moving towards the sound, he saw Lolita Cabel lying

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 on the ground, some meters away from the road. Lolita Cabel’s head was bloody, her jeans
and panties had been stripped from her, the panties ripped, her dress lifted up to her breast.
The place itself also exhibited signs of violence: a pool of blood, “disturbed” grass. This too
was the sight beheld by Lolita’s husband, Soriano, and the others who went with him to the
site, on being told by Gregorio of the incident. In response to Gregorio’s question, Lolita
whispered that it was “Palakit” who had raped her and struck her head with a stone. She
repeated her identification of “Palakit” as her assailant to her husband, upon his arrival at the
scene. Lolita’s skull was broken; she was bleeding from her wounds; the wounds were mortal,
resulting in her death not long afterwards. She was obviously very weak, and in a state of
shock when she spoke to Gregorio, and then to her husband, identifying “Palakit” as her
attacker. There was no person known as “Palakit” in that place except Ricardo Aguirre.

Issue: W/N the evidence presented establishes Aguirre’s guilt of the crime independently of
his plea of guilt?

Ruling:
Yes. Based on the facts, it leaves no room to doubt the guilt of Aguirre alias “Palakit” of the
crime charged, independently of his extrajudicial confessions. It but needs to point out that
Lolita’s statements identifying “Palakit” as her assailant are in the premises, admissible if not
precisely as a dying declaration at least as part of the res gestae. The reiteration of the
confessions, their substantial sameness, and the total absence of any proof or even claim of
irregularity, or of violence, intimidation or other form of pressure attendant upon their
utterance or execution, conduce to no other conclusion save that they were voluntarily and
knowingly given and should thus be admissible against the confessant. At the very least, they
should be appreciated as circumstantial proof that Aguirre’s sixth and last confession, his plea
of guilty, had been entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.

IV. Exceptions to the Hearsay Evidence

Exceptions:
1. Dying Declaration
2. Statement of Decedent or Person of Unsound Mind
3. Declaration Against Interest
4. Declaration About Pedigree
5. Family Reputation or Tradition
6. Common Reputation
7. Res Gestae
8. Records of Regularly Conducted Business Activity
9. Entries in Official Records
10. Commercial Lists
11. Learned Treatises
12. Testimony or Deposition at a Former Proceeding
13. Child Witness Rule
14. Residual Exception

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 IV.A. Dying Declaration
Section 38. Dying Declaration. — The declaration of a dying person, made under the
consciousness of an impending death, may be received in any case wherein his or her death is
the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death.

Requisites:
1. Consciousness by the declarant of his impending death;
2. Communication by the declarant of the cause and surrounding circumstance of his
looming death;
3. Competence of the declarant to testify; and
4. Declaration is offered in any case relative to declarant’s death as the subject of inquiry.

Time Interval
General Rule: The intervening time from the making if a dying declaration up to the time of death
is immaterial in its admissibility, as long as it was made under the consciousness of impending
death.

Exception:
1. If there is retraction made by the declarant before he died; or
2. His declaration is ambiguous to whether he believed that his death was imminent when
he made such declaration.

Factors in determining whether the declarant is conscious of his impending death:

1. The words or statements of the declarant on the same occasion;
2. His conduct at the time the declaration was made; and
3. The serious nature of his wounds as would necessarily engender a belief on his part that
he would not survive therefrom.

Assailing a dying declaration:

The declaration may be attacked in the same manner as one would do a testimony in open court.
The declarant himself may be impeached through the normal methods provided for under the
rules.

Doctrine of Completeness:
A dying declaration to be admissible must be complete in itself. To be complete in itself does not
mean that the declarant must recite everything that constituted the res gestae of the subject of
his statement, but that his statement of any given fact should be a full expression of all that he
intended to say as conveying his meaning in respect of such fact. The reason upon which complete
declarations are generally excluded, or if admitted, accorded little or no weight, is that since the
declarant was prevented (by death or other circumstance) from saying all that he wished to say,
what he did say might have been qualified by the statements which he was prevented from
making (People vs. De Joya).

Form of Dying Declaration:

The Revised Rules on Evidence do not require that a dying declaration must be made in writing
to be admissible. Indeed, to impose such a requirement would exclude many statements from a
victim in extrimis for want of paper and pen at a critical moment (People vs. Viocente).

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 Case: People v. Calinawan
Facts: Accused, Romeo D. Calinawan, was convicted of Murder for the killing of Janice
Nevado Silan. The Regional Trial Court in its decision pointed out that the dying declaration
of the victim to her brother corroborated her daughter’s statement that the accused killed her
mother.

Issue: W/N the dying declaration of the victim is admissible as evidence by way of exception
to the Hearsay Rule?

Held: For a dying declaration to be deemed an exception to the Hearsay Rule, the following
conditions must concur:
1. The declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the
declarant’s death;
2. That at the time the declaration;
3. The declarant was competent as a witness; and
4. The declaration is offered in a criminal case for Homicide, Murder, or Parricide where
the declarant is the victim.

Although in the case at bar, there is doubt whether the victim was aware of her impending
death, her statement, nevertheless, is admissible as an exception to the Hearsay Rule for
being part of the res gestae.

In order for a statement to be considered part of res gestae, the following elements must
concur:
1. The principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence;
2. The statement was made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and
3. The statement concerns the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances.

IV.B. Statement of Decedent or Person of Unsound Mind

Section 39. Statement of Decedent or Person of Unsound Mind. — In an action against an
executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of
unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or
against such person of unsound mind, where a party or assignor of a party or a person in
whose behalf a case is prosecuted testifies on a matter of fact occurring before the death of
the deceased person or before the person became of unsound mind, any statement of the
deceased or the person of unsound mind, may be received in evidence if the statement was
made upon the personal knowledge of the deceased or the person of unsound mind at a time
when the matter had been recently perceived by him or her and while his or her recollection
was clear.

Such statement, however, is inadmissible if made under circumstances indicating its

lack of trustworthiness.

Requisites:
1. The witness is a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case
is prosecuted.
2. The action is against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased
person or a person of unsound mind;

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 3. The subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against the estate of such
deceased person or against person of unsound mind;
4. His testimony refers to any matter of fact which occurred before the death of such
deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind.

IV.C. Declaration Against Interest

Section 40. Declaration against Interest. — The declaration made by a person deceased or
unable to testify against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration
was at the time it was made so far contrary to the declarant's own interest that a reasonable
person in his or her position would not have made the declaration unless he or she believed it
to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or herself or his or her successors in
interest and against third persons. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal
liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating
circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.

Requisites:
1. The declarant must be dead or unable to testify;
2. The declaration must be against the interest (pecuniary, moral, or penal) of the declarant;
3. The fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to
declarant’s own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the
declaration unless he believed it to be true; and
4. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate
the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the
trustworthiness of the statement.

Distinction:
Declaration Against Interest
Made by a person who is neither a party nor
in privity with a party to the suit is a
secondary evidence.
Secondary evidence is admissible only when
the declarant is already dead or unavailable to
testify as a witness.
Exception to the hearsay rule.
Must have been made ante litem motam, i.e.
before the controversy.
May be admitted against himself or
successors-in-interest and against third
persons.
Admission Against Interest
Made by a party to a litigation or by one in
privity with or identified in legal interest with
such party.
Primary evidence is admissible whether the
declarant is available as a witness.
Covered by the hearsay rule.
May be made at any time, before or during
the trial
Used only against the party admitting.

Case: People v. Bernal

Facts: Accused-appellant Theodore Bernal, was convicted by the court a quo of the crime of
kidnapping for the abduction and disappearance of Bienvenido Openda, Jr. The body of the
victim was never found. But the court, in convicting the accused, gave weight on the
testimony of one Salito Enriquez to establish ample reason for him to contemplate revenge
upon the victim. Based on the testimony of witness Enriquez, the victim confided to him that
he was having an affair with the accused’s wife.

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 Issue: W/N the revelation of the victim to witness Enriquez be admitted as evidence in
establishing the guilt of the accused?

Ruling:
Yes. Openda, Jr.’s revelation to Enriquez regarding his illicit relationship with Bernal’s wife is
admissible in evidence, pursuant to Section 38 (now Section 40), Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence, viz.: A statement may be admissible when it complies with the following
requisites, to wit: 1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; 2) that it relates to a fact
against the interest of the declarant; 3) that at the time he made said declaration the
declarant was aware that the same was contrary to his aforesaid interest; and 4) that the
declarant had no motive to falsify and believed such declaration to be true. Openda, Jr.,
having been missing since his abduction, cannot be called upon to testify. His confession to
Enriquez, definitely a declaration against his own interest since affair with Naty Bernal was a
crime, is admissible in evidence to his own detriment.

IV.D. Declaration About Pedigree

Section 41. Act or Declaration About Pedigree. — The act or declaration of a person deceased
or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him or her by
birth, adoption, or marriage or, in the absence thereof, with whose family he or she was so
intimately associated as to be likely to have accurate information concerning his or her
pedigree, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the
relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration. The word "pedigree" includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage,
death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the
relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree.

Pedigree – includes relationship, family, genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and
the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of
family history intimately connected with pedigree.

Requisites:
1. The declarant is dead or unable to testify;
2. The act or declaration is about pedigree of another person related to the declarant by
birth, adoption, or marriage or, in the absence thereof, with whose family he or she was
so intimately associated as to be likely to have accurate information concerning his
pedigree;
3. The relationship between the relative and the declarant is shown by evidence other than
such act or declaration; and
4. The act or declaration occurred before the controversy or ante litem motam.

Case: Tison v. CA
Facts: Petitioners in this case are claiming half of the estate of the deceased Teodora Dezoller
Guererro by way of their right of representation in lieu of their father who is the brother of
the latter. Petitioners’ evidence of their filiation with the deceased Teodora Dezoller Guererro
consists mainly of the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison, one of the petitioners, the
baptismal, death and marriage certificates, the various certifications from the civil registrar, a
family picture, and several joint affidavits executed by third persons all of which she identified
and explained in the course and as part of her testimony. Tison’s testimony is to the effect

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 that Teodora Dezoller Guererro in her lifetime, or sometime in 1946, categorically declared
that the she is her niece.

Issue #1: W/N testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison’s testimony that Teodora Dezoller
Guererro’s categorical declaration that she is the latter’s niece be admitted as evidence in
ascertaining the relationship between the two?

Ruling:
Yes. Such statement is considered a declaration about pedigree which is admissible, as an
exception to the hearsay rule, under Section 39 (now Section 41), Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, subject to the following conditions: 1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; 2)
that the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; 3) that
such relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration; and 4) that the
declaration was made ante litem motam, that is, not only before the commencement of the
suit involving the subject matter of the declaration, but before any controversy has arisen
thereon.

Issue #2: W/N the other documents offered in evidence sufficiently corroborate the
declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guererro in her lifetime regarding the pedigree of
petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison or, if at all, it is necessary to present evidence other than
such declaration.

Ruling:
The general rule, therefore, is that where the party claiming seeks recovery against a relative
common to both claimant and declarant, but not from the declarant himself or the declarant’s
estate, the relationship of the declarant to the common relative may not be proved by the
declaration itself. There must be some independent proof of this fact. As an exception, the
requirement that there be other proof than the declarations of the declarant as to the
relationship, does not apply where it is sought to reach the estate of the declarant himself
and not merely to establish a right through his declarations to the property of some other
member of the family.

IV.E. Family Reputation or Tradition

Section 42. Family Reputation or Tradition Regarding Pedigree. — The reputation or tradition
existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its
members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of
the family, either by consanguinity, affinity, or adoption. Entries in family bibles or other
family books or charts, engraving on rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as
evidence of pedigree.

General Rule: A reputation may not be introduced in evidence in order to prove a matter subject
of the reputation because reputation evidence is hearsay evidence as the witness is not
testifying to a matter of his personal knowledge but rather as to the reputation. The persons or
people who are the source of the reputation cannot be cross-examined by the adverse party.

Exceptions: Family reputation and Common reputation.

Requisites:
1. There is controversy in respect to the pedigree of any member of the family;

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 2. The reputation or tradition of the pedigree of the person concerned existed previous to
the controversy;
3. The statement is about the reputation or tradition of the family in respect to the pedigree
of any member of the family; and
4. The witness testifying to the reputation or tradition regarding pedigree of the person
concerned must be a member of the family of said person either by consanguinity or
affinity.

How to establish family reputation or tradition with respect to one’s pedigree:

1. Through testimony in open court of a witness who must be a member of the family either
by consanguinity or affinity; or
2. Through entries in:
a) Family Bible;
b) Family books or charts;
c) Engravings on the rings; or
d) Family portraits and the like.

Case: Jison v. CA
Facts: Monina Jison filed a petition for recognition as an illegitimate child of Francisco Jison.
Monina alleged that she is the daughter of Francisco who impregnated her mother who was
then employed as the nanny of Francisco’s daughter. She claims that she has openly and
continuously possessed the status of an illegitimate child of Francisco and that the latter had
also openly and continuously recognized her as such. The trial court categorized Monina’s
many evidence as hearsay evidence, incredulous evidence, or self-serving evidence and ruled
against her. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and ruled
in favor of Monina and declared her to be the illegitimate daughter of Francisco. The Court of
Appeals ruled that the testimonies of Monina’s witnesses were sufficient to establish Monina’s
filiation.

Issue: W/N the letters written by Francisco’s relatives allegedly attesting to Monina’s filiation
are admissible as evidence?

Ruling:
No. The Court held that the scope of the enumeration contained in the second portion of
Section 40 (now Sec.42), Rule 130, in light of the rule of ejusdem generis, is limited to object
which are commonly known as “family possessions,” or those articles which represent, in
effect, a family’s joint statement of its belief as to the pedigree of a person. These have been
described as objects “openly exhibited and well known to the family,” or those “which, if
preserved in a family, may be regarded as giving a family tradition. Other examples of these
objects which are regarded as reflective of a family’s reputation or tradition regarding
pedigree are inscriptions on tombstones, monuments or coffin plates. Plainly then, Exhibits S
to V, as private documents not constituting “family possessions” as discussed above, may not
be admitted on the basis of Rule 130, Section 42.

IV.F. Common Reputation

Section 43. Common Reputation. — Common reputation existing previous to the controversy,
as to boundaries of or customs affecting lands in the community and reputation as to events
of general history important to the community, or respecting marriage or moral character,
may be given in evidence. Monuments and inscriptions in public places may be received as
evidence of common reputation.

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 IV.G. Res Gestae
Section 44. Part of the Res Gestae. — Statements made by a person while a startling
occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto, under the stress of
excitement caused by the occurrence with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given
in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act
material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res
gestae.

The res gestae exception covers statements which are admissible in evidence as part of the res
gestae. It actually consists of 2 exceptions: (1) excited utterances; and (2) verbal acts.

Excited Utterances – statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or
immediately prior or subsequent thereto, under the stress of excitement caused by the
occurrence regarding the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res
gestae.

Requisites For Admissibility of Excited Utterances:

1. There is a startling occurrence as the principal act. There must be some shock, startling
enough to produce this nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and
unreflecting,
2. There is no opportunity to contrive. The utterance must have been before there has been
time to contrive and misrepresent; the statements need not be strictly contemporaneous
with the exciting cause; they may be subsequent to it, provided there has not been time
for the exciting influence to lose its sways and to be dissipated , and
3. The statement, under the stress of excitement caused by, and relates to, the occurrence.
It may emanate from an observer, or bystander, and not necessarily from the injured
person.

Verbal Acts – statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue and giving it a
legal significance may be received in evidence as part of the res gestae.

Verbal Acts Require:

1. An equivocal principal act,
2. A statement material to the issue,
3. The statement must accompany the main act, and
4. The utterance must provide legal significance or elucidate the act.

Requisites for Admissibility of Verbal Acts:

1. The principal act to be characterized must be equivocal;
2. The equivocal act must be material to the issue;
3. The statement must accompany the equivocal act; and
4. The statement gives a legal significance to the equivocal act.

Factors To Be Considered To Determine Spontaneity of the Declaration:

1. The time that has lapsed between the occurrence of the act or transaction and the making
of the statements;
2. The place where the statement is made;
3. The condition of the declarant when the utterance is given;

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 4. The presence or absence of intervening events between the occurrence and the statement
relative thereto; and
5. The nature and the circumstances of the statement itself.

Test For Admissibility of Res Gestae

The test of admissibility of evidence as part of the res gestae is whether the act, declaration, or
exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it
characterizes as to be regarded a part of the principal fact or even itself, and also whether it clearly
negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.

Doctrine of Independent Relevant Statement

A declarant’s statement may have relevance to an issue in a case from the mere fact that the words
were spoken or written, irrespective of the truth or falsity of the assertion. The statements are
admissible for some relevant reason independent of their truth or falsity. They are relevant
because the statement itself is either the very fact in issue or a circumstantial evidence of a fact
in issue.

Distinction:
Res Gestae Dying Declaration
Res gestae may be that of the killer himself A dying declaration can only be made by a
after or during the killing. dying victim.
Res gestae the statement may precede, Dying declaration is made only after the
accompany or be made after the homicidal homicidal attack has been committed.
act was committed.
Res gestae has its basis on spontaneity of the Dying declaration is being given based upon
statement. the awareness of impending death.

People v. Santillan
Facts: Geraldo Santillan and four John Does were charged with the crime of murder. That on
or about the 28th day of March 2004 in Caloocan, Manila, the accused, conspiring together
and mutually aiding with one another, without any justifiable cause, with deliberate intent to
kill, treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and stab with bladed weapon Ernesto Garcia
Mariang, hitting the latter on the different parts of the body, thereby inflicting upon him
serious physical injuries which cause his instant death.

Issue: Whether or not his statements is admissible as part of res gestae?

Ruling:
Yes. A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay
character, may nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites concur; namely: (a) the
declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death;
(b) at the time the declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of an
impending death; (c) the declarant is the competent as witness; and (d) the declaration is
offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is a victim.
All of the said requisites are present in this case. Hence, it is admissible as part of the res
gestae.

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 IV.H. Records of Regularly Conducted Business Activity
Section 45. Records of Regularly Conducted Business Activity. — A memorandum, report,
record or data compilation of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made by
writing, typing, electronic, optical or other similar means at or near the time of or from
transmission or supply of information by a person with knowledge thereof, and kept in the
regular course or conduct of a business activity, and such was the regular practice to make
the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation by electronic, optical or similar means,
all of which are shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witnesses, is
excepted from the rule on hearsay evidence.

Business Activity – should not be confined to activities of a commercial enterprise. It should

include activities of any profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not
conducted for profit or for legitimate purposes.

Case: PAL v. Jaime Ramos, et. al.

Facts: Jaime Ramos, Nilda Ramos, Erlinda Ilano, Milagros Ilano, Daniel Ilano and Felipa
Javalera, are officers of the Negros Telephone Company who held confirmed tickets for PAL
Flight No. 264 from Naga City to Manila on September 24, 1985, scheduled to depart for
Manila at 4:25 p.m. They claim in their Complaint that they went to the check-in counter of
the defendant’s Naga branch at least one (1) hour before the published departure time but no
one was at the counter until 30 minutes before departure, but upon checking-in and
presentation of their tickets to the employee/clerk who showed up, their tickets were
cancelled and the seats awarded to chance passengers. The evidence on record does not
support the above contentions. It is to be noted that there were two other confirmed
passengers who came ahead of the private respondents but were refused accommodation
because they were late. PAL presented as evidence the plaintiffs’ tickets with notation “late
4:04” and the passenger manifest which showed that two other passengers who arrived earlier
than plaintiffs, were not accommodated. They later filed a complaint for damages arising from
the breach of contract of carriage before RTC Imus. Private respondents claimed they were on
time and that it was actually PAL personnel who were late which accounted for their late
check-in and PAL advanced the check-in time and the departure of their flight resulting in
their non-accommodation. (the flight left at 4:13pm, ahead of schedule)

RTC found defendant guilty of breaching the contract of carriage in bumping off the private
respondents, ordering them to pay damages. PAL appealed to the CA, which affirmed the
RTC in toto.

Issue: W/N the documents presented by PAL admissible? Which should prevail the oral
testimony of plaintiffs or the documentary evidence presented by PAL?

Ruling:
Yes. In the absence of any controverting evidence, the documentary evidence presented to
corroborate the testimonies of PAL’s witnesses are prima facie evidence of the truth their
allegations. The plane tickets of the private respondents, with emphasis on the printed
condition of the contract of carriage regarding check-in time as well as on the notation “late
4:02” stamped on the flight coupon by the check-in clerk immediately upon the check-in of
private respondents) and the passenger Manifest of Flight PR 264, which showed the non-
accommodation of Capati and Go and the private respondents) are entries made in the
regular course of business which the private respondents failed to overcome with substantial

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 and convincing evidence other than their testimonies. Consequently, PAL carry more weight
and credence.

A writing or document made contemporaneously with a transaction in which are evidenced

facts pertinent to an issue, when admitted as proof of those facts, is ordinarily regarded as
more reliable proof and of greater probative force than the oral testimony of a witness as to
such facts based upon memory and recollection. The hearsay rule will not apply in this case as
statements, acts or conduct accompanying or so nearly connected with the main transaction
as to form a part of it, and which illustrate, elucidate, qualify or characterize the act, are
admissible as part of the res gestae.

IV.I. Entries in Official Records

Section 46. Entries in Official Records. — Entries in official records made in the performance
of his or her duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a
duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

Official Record – is a document of some kind, a book or paper, on which entries are made by a
public officer in the performance of his duties.

Requisites:
1. The entries must have been made in official records;
2. The entry must have been made by a public officer of the Philippines in the performance
of his duty or by a person in the performance of a duty specifically enjoined by law; and
3. The entrant must have personal knowledge of the facts stated by him or such facts were
acquired by him from reports made by persons under a legal duty to submit the same.

Case: People of the Philippines v. Manuel Corpuz

Facts: On January 18, 2005, Manuel was charged with two (2) counts of murder committed
upon the persons of Romana P. Arcular (Romana) and Leonila C. Risto (Leonila) under two (2)
Informations. On May 3, 2005, Manuel, with the assistance of counsel, was arraigned and
pleaded not guilty to the charges against him. The defense submitted in evidence a copy of
the police blotter taken when Leonilo and Juaquinito reported the incident to the Abuyog
Police Station. In the said police blotter, it was stated that the suspect was still unknown; and
that Leonilo saw the dead bodies of Leonila and Romana, without any indication about
witnessing the actual hacking of the two by Manuel.

RTC found Manuel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of murder. RTC gave
credence to the testimony of Leonilo considering that he knew Manuel prior to the incident;
that the incident happened in broad daylight; and that no improper motive was attributed to
him in testifying against the accused. The CA affirmed. Manuel insists that the trial and
appellate courts erred in ruling that the prosecution was able to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. He argues that his conviction was based mainly on the testimony of
Leonilo who, however, is not a credible witness. He points out that the police blotter clearly
contradicts Leonilo’s testimony that he actually saw Manuel hack Leonila and Romana. Thus,
there is reasonable doubt on Leonilo’s identification of Manuel as the person responsible for
the deaths of the two victims.

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Issue: W/N the trial and appellate courts erred in convicting accused-appellant manuel corpuz
for the deaths of Romana Arcular and Leonila Histo despite the prosecution’s failure to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt?

Ruling:
No. Entries in the police blotter are not evidence of the truth thereof but merely of the fact
that the entries were made. Affidavits executed before the police or entries in such police
blotters cannot prevail over the positive testimony given in open court. The entry in the police
blotter is not necessarily entitled to full credit for it could be incomplete and inaccurate,
sometimes from either partial suggestions or for want of suggestions or inquiries. Without
the aid of such the witness may be unable to recall the connected collateral circumstances
necessary for the correction of the first suggestion of his memory and for his accurate
recollection of all that pertain to the subject.

Case: Sabili v. COMELEC

Facts: When petitioner filed his COC for mayor of Lipa City for the 2010 elections, he stated
therein that he had been a resident of the city for two (2) years and eight (8) months.
However, it is undisputed that when petitioner filed his COC during the 2007 elections, he and
his family were then staying at his ancestral home in Barangay (Brgy.) Sico, San Juan,
Batangas. Private respondent Florencio Librea filed a "Petition to Deny Due Course and to
Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and to Disqualify a Candidate for Possessing Some Grounds
for Disqualification" against him before the COMELEC. Citing Section 78 in relation to Section
74 of the Omnibus Election Code, private respondent alleged that petitioner made material
misrepresentations of fact in the latter’s COC and likewise failed to comply with the one-year
residency requirement under Section 39 of the Local Government Code. Allegedly, petitioner
falsely declared under oath in his COC that he had already been a resident of Lipa City for two
years and eight months prior to the scheduled 10 May 2010 local elections. The COMELEC
Second Division granted the Petition of private respondent, declared petitioner as disqualified
from seeking the mayoralty post in Lipa City, and canceled his Certificate of Candidacy for his
not being a resident of Lipa City and for his failure to meet the statutory one-year residency
requirement under the law.

Issue: W/N the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Sabili failed to
prove compliance with the one-year residency requirement for local elective officials?

Ruling:
Yes. Even without being sworn to before a notary public, Honrade’s Certification would not
only be admissible in evidence, but would also be entitled to due consideration.

In Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Lianga Bay and Community Multi-purpose

Cooperative, Inc., we explained that the following three (3) requisites must concur for entries
in official records to be admissible in evidence:
1. The entry was made by a public officer, or by another person specially enjoined by law
to do so;
2. It was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other
person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and
3. The public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts stated by him,
which facts must have been acquired by him personally or through official
information.

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As to the first requisite, the Barangay Secretary is required by the Local Government Code to
“keep an updated record of all inhabitants of the barangay.” Regarding the second requisite,
we have explicitly recognized in Mitra v. Commission on Elections, that “it is the business of a
punong barangay to know who the residents are in his own barangay.” Anent the third
requisite, the Barangay Captain’s exercise of powers and duties concomitant to his position
requires him to be privy to these records kept by the Barangay Secretary.

Case: Cercado-Siga v. Cercado

Facts: In their Complaint against Vicente Cercado et al, petitioners Simplicia Cercado-Siga et
al. claimed that they are the legitimate children of the late Vicente and Benita Castillo (Benita),
who were married last 9 October 1929 in Pililla, Rizal. To prove the marriage between Vicente
and Benita, petitioners presented documents Contrato Matrimonial or the marriage contract,
among others;

In their Answer, respondents alleged that they are the legitimate heirs of Vicente and
Leonora, who were married on 27 June 1977 as evidenced by a marriage certificate registered
with the Local Civil Registrar of Binangonan, Rizal. They averred that petitioners are not the
real-parties-interest to institute the case because they failed to present their birth certificates
to prove their filiation to Vicente; that the marriage between Vicente and Benita was not valid;
that the document showing that Vicente was married to Benita is not a certified true copy;
and that they are now estopped by laches.

RTC ruled in favor of petitioners upholding the validity of the marriage between Vicente and
Benita and considered the subsequent marriage between Vicente and Leonora as void and
bigamous. CA found that the Contrato Matrimonial of Vicente and Benita, being a private
document, was not properly authenticated, hence, not admissible in evidence. For failure of
petitioners to prove their cause of action by preponderance of evidence, the appellate court
reversed and set aside the Decision and Resolution of the RTC.

Issue: W/N the marriage contract presented by petitioners is admissible?

Ruling:
No. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that it is a private document. As early as in the case
of U.S. v. Evangelista, it has been settled that church registries of births, marriages, and deaths
made subsequent to the promulgation of General Orders No. 6823 and the passage of Act
No. 190 are no longer public writings, nor are they kept by duly authorized public officials.
They are private writings and their authenticity must therefore be proved as are all other
private writings in accordance with the rules of evidence.

Under Section 20, Rule 132, Rules of Court, before a private document is admitted in
evidence, it must be authenticated either by the person who executed it, the person before
whom its execution was acknowledged, any person who was present and saw it executed, or
who after its execution, saw it and recognized the signatures, or the person to whom the
parties to the instruments had previously confessed execution thereof. As observed by the
Court of Appeals, petitioners failed to present any one of such witnesses. In fact, only
Simplicia testified that her mother gave her the marriage contract. Unfortunately however, she
was not present during its execution nor could she identify Benita’s handwriting because
Simplicia admitted that she is illiterate.

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 IV.J. Commercial Lists
Section 47. Commercial Lists and the Like. — Evidence of statements of matters of interest to
persons engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register, periodical, or other published
compilation is admissible as tending to prove the truth of any relevant matter so stated if that
compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used
and relied upon by them therein.

Requisites:
1. There is a list, register, periodical, or other published compilation;
2. Such published compilation contains statements of matters of interest to persons
engaged in an occupation;
3. The compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation; and
4. The compilation is generally used and relied upon by the persons engaged in that
occupation.

Case: MERALCO v. Quisumbing

Facts: In the Decision promulgated on January 27, 1999, the Court disposed of the case as
follows: WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the orders of public respondent Secretary of
Labor dated August 19, 1996 and December 28, 1996 are set aside to the extent set forth
above. The parties are directed to execute a Collective Bargaining Agreement incorporating
the terms and conditions contained in the unaffected portions of the Secretary of Labor's
orders of August 19, 1996 and December 28, 1996, and the modifications set forth above. The
retirement fund issue is remanded to the Secretary of Labor for reception of evidence and
determination of the legal personality of the MERALCO retirement fund. Dissatisfied with the
Decision, various motions for reconsideration was filed.

Issue: Whether or not the All Asia Capital report is a valid commercial list contemplated under
Section 45 of Rule 130?

Ruling:
No. The All Asia Capital report upon which the Union relies to support its position regarding
the wage issue cannot be an accurate basis and conclusive determinant of the rate of wage
increase. Section 45 of Rule 130 Rules of Evidence provides: Commercial lists and the like. —
Evidence of statements of matters of interest to persons engaged in an occupation contained
in a list, register, periodical, or other published compilation is admissible as tending to prove
the truth of any relevant matter so stated if that compilation is published for use by persons
engaged in that occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them therein. Under the
afore-quoted rule, statement of matters contained in a periodical, may be admitted only "if
that compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally
used and relied upon by them therein." As correctly held in our Decision dated January 27,
1999, the cited report is a mere newspaper account and not even a commercial list. At most, it
is but an analysis or opinion which carries no persuasive weight for purposes of this case as
no sufficient figures to support it were presented. Neither did anybody testify to its accuracy.
It cannot be said that businessmen generally rely on news items such as this in their
occupation. Besides, no evidence was presented that the publication was regularly prepared
by a person in touch with the market and that it is generally regarded as trustworthy and
reliable. Absent extrinsic proof of their accuracy, these reports are not admissible. In the same
manner, newspapers containing stock quotations are not admissible in evidence when the
source of the reports is available. With more reason, mere analyses or projections of such

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 reports cannot be admitted. In particular, the source of the report in this case can be easily
made available considering that the same is necessary for compliance with certain
governmental requirements.

IV.K. Learned Treatises

Section 48. Learned Treatises. — A published treatise, periodical or pamphlet on a subject of
history, law, science, or art is admissible as tending to prove the truth of a matter stated
therein if the court takes judicial notice, or a witness expert in the subject testifies, that the
writer of the statement in the treatise, periodical or pamphlet is recognized in his or her
profession or calling as expert in the subject.

Requisites:
1. There is a published treatise, periodical or pamphlet;
2. It is on the subject of law, art, science or history; and
3. The writer of the statement in the treatise, periodical, or pamphlet is recognized in his
profession or calling as expert in the subject. Such recognition may be proved by an
expert witness or taken judicial notice of by the Court.

Admissibility Depends:
1. The court take judicial notice thereof, or
2. The work is testified to by a witness, equally acknowledged as an expert in the same field
of study, that the writer of the statement in the treatise, periodical or pamphlet is
recognized in his profession or calling as an expert in the subject.

IV.L. Testimony or Deposition at a Former Proceeding

Section 49. Testimony or Deposition at a Former Proceeding. — The testimony or deposition
of a witness deceased or out of the Philippines or who cannot, with due diligence, be found
therein, or is unavailable or otherwise unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding,
judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in
evidence against the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him or her.

Requisites:
1. The witness or deponent is dead or out of the Philippines or who cannot, with due
diligence, be found therein, or is unavailable or otherwise unable to testify;
2. The former case or proceeding involves the same parties and subject matter; and
3. The adverse party had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness or deponent in the
former case or proceeding.

Case: People of the Philippines v. Lanie Ortiz-Miyake

Facts: Lanie Ortiz-Miyake was charged with illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa. Upon
arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges. Of the three complainants in the
case for illegal recruitment in large scale, Marasigan was the only one who testified at the
trial. The two other complainants, Generillo and Del Rosario, were unable to testify as they
were then abroad.

The prosecution sought to prove that Generillo and Del Rosario, the two other complainants
in the illegal recruitment case, were also victimized by appellant. In lieu of their testimonies,
the prosecution presented as witnesses Lilia Generillo, the mother of Imelda Generillo, and
Victoria Amin, the sister of Del Rosario. The evidence presented by the parties were

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contradictory but the RTC found the prosecution's evidence more credible. Judgment was
rendered by said court convicting appellant of both crimes as charged.

RTC convicted appellant of illegal recruitment in large scale. In convicting appellant in the
illegal recruitment case, the decision therein of the Regional Trial Court stated that the facts
in the foregoing estafa cases were the same as those in the illegal recruitment case before it.
It, therefore, adopted the facts and conclusions established in the earlier decision as its own
findings of facts and as its rationale for the conviction in the case before it.

Issue: W/N the appellant is guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale?

Ruling:
No. Under the Section 47 of Rule 130, the accused in a criminal case is guaranteed the right of
confrontation. Such right has two purposes: first, to secure the opportunity of cross-
examination; and, second, to allow the judge to observe the deportment and appearance of
the witness while testifying. This right, however, is not absolute as it is recognized that it is
sometimes impossible to recall or produce a witness who has already testified in a previous
proceeding, in which event his previous testimony is made admissible as a distinct piece of
evidence, by way of exception to the hearsay rule. The previous testimony is made admissible
because it makes the administration of justice orderly and expeditious.

Case: Harry Go v. People

Facts: Harry Go, Tonny Ngo, Jerry Ngo and Jane Go were charged before the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila for Other Deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC). The private prosecutor filed with a Motion to Take Oral Deposition of Li Luen Ping, the
victim, alleging that he was being treated for lung infection at Cambodia and that, upon
doctor's advice, he could not make the long travel to the Philippines by reason of ill health.
MeTC granted the motion after the prosecution complied with the directive to submit a
Medical Certificate of Li Luen Ping. Petitioners sought its reconsideration which the MeTC
denied.

RTC declared the MeTC Orders null and void. The RTC held that Section 17, Rule 23 on the
taking of depositions of witnesses in civil cases cannot apply suppletorily to the case since
there is a specific provision in the Rules of Court with respect to the taking of depositions of
prosecution witnesses in criminal cases, which is primarily intended to safeguard the
constitutional rights of the accused to meet the witness against him face to face. CA reversed.

Issue: Whether or not the deposition taking of the complaining witness in Laos and Cambodia
is valid?

Ruling:
No. The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge in open court. The
Procedure for Testimonial Examination of an Unavailable Prosecution Witness is Covered
Under Section 15, Rule 119. This is true especially in criminal cases where the Constitution
secures to the accused his right to a public trial and to meet the witnesses against him face to
face. The requirement is the "safest and most satisfactory method of investigating facts" as it
enables the judge to test the witness' credibility through his manner and deportment while
testifying. It is not without exceptions, however, as the Rules of Court recognizes the
conditional examination of witnesses and the use of their depositions as testimonial evidence
in lieu of direct court testimony.

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 IV.M. Child Witness Rule
A statement made by a child describing any act or attempted act of child abuse, not
otherwise admissible under the hearsay rule, may be admitted in evidence in any criminal or
non-criminal proceeding. (Section 28 of RECW)

Child Witness – any person who at the time of giving testimony is below 18 years old; or in child
abuse cases, may be over 18 but is found by the court unable to fully take care of himself or
protect himself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, or discrimination because of a physical
or mental disability or condition.

Requisites:
1. The statement must be made by a child;
2. The statement describes any act or attempted act of child abuse;
3. The child is unable to testify;
4. The hearsay statement is corroborated by other admissible evidence; and
5. The proponent shall make known to the adverse party the intention to offer such
statement and its particulars to provide him a fair opportunity to object.

When is a Child Considered Unavailable:

1. He/she is deceased, suffers from physical infirmity, lack of memory, mental illness; or will
be exposed to severe psychological injury;
2. Is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has been unable to
procure his attendance by process or other reasonable means.

Factors to Consider:
1. Whether there is a motive to lie;
2. The general character of the declarant child;
3. Whether more than one person heard the statement;
4. Whether the statement was spontaneous;
5. The timing of the statement and the relationship between the declarant child and
witness;
6. Cross-examination could not show the lack of knowledge of the declarant child;
7. The possibility of faulty recollection of the declarant child is remote; and
8. The circumstances surrounding the statement are such that there is no reason to
suppose the declarant child misrepresented the involvement of the accused.

Case: People v. Ibanez

Facts: Appellants Edwin and Alfredo with Jesus Taniares were all charged in an information for
the murder of Wilfredo Atendido y Dohenog. Edwin and Alfredo pleaded not guilty while
Taniares remained at large. Rachel, Wilfredo’s adolescent daughter, gave an eyewitness
testimony and allegedly witnessed the murder happen before her eyes and even further
stated that it was Edwin and Alfred who committed the murder. Alfredo and Edwin alleged
that it was Jesus who committed the murder and such statement was even allegedly arrived
immediately after the murder transpired. The trial court convicted Edwin and Alferdo as guilty
of murder beyond reasonable doubt and such conviction was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.

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Issue: W/N the Courts erred in giving credence to the testimony of Rachel?

Ruling:
No. The Court cannot take Rachel's testimony lightly simply because she was a mere child
when she witnessed the incident and when she gave her testimony in court. There is no
showing that her mental maturity rendered her incapable of testifying and of relating the
incident truthfully. With exceptions provided in the Rules of Court, all persons who can
perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses. That
is even buttressed by the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness which species that every
child is presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden of proof
lies on the party challenging the child's competence. Only when substantial doubt exists
regarding the ability of the child to perceive, remember, communicate, distinguish truth from
falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court will the court, motu proprio or on
motion of a party, conduct a competency examination of a child.

Case: People of the Philippines v. Alvin Esugon y Avila

[G.R. No. 195244. June 22, 2015]
Facts: Carl, 5-year old son of the victim, testified that on the night of the incident, he, his
younger sister, and his mother and father, were sleeping on the ground floor of their house.
He saw Esugon enter their house and stab her mother with a knife. Although there was no
light at the ground floor, there was light upstairs. After his mother got stabbed, his father
chased the Esugon. Carl positively identified Esugon, a neighbor who often goes to their
house, as the one who stabbed his mother. On cross-examination, Carl likewise admitted that
he did not see very well the perpetrator because there was no light Esugon was charged with
the crime of Robbery with homicide on the basis of the information relayed by Carl. Esugon
denied the accusation. According to him, on the evening in question, he had gone home at 11
o’clock pm. His mother corroborated his testimony.

RTC found Esugon guilty of the crime charged. CA affirmed. Esugon contends that the
adverse testimony of the 5-year old Carl, being filled with inconsistencies, was not credible,
but doubtful; that unlike him, his sisters, who were then at the second floor of the house, were
not roused from sleep; that contrary to Carl's recollection, the place was not even dark when
the stabbing attack on the victim occurred because his father said that he had turned the light
on upon hearing somebody shouting "Magnanakaw!;" and that his father had then gotten his
bolo, and gone outside the house.

Issue: W/N the identification of appellant as the perpetrator of the crime was credible and
competent considering that the identifying witness was a 5 year old kid?

Ruling:
Yes. That the witness is a child cannot be the sole reason for disqualification. The
dismissiveness with which the testimonies of child witnesses were treated in the past has long
been erased. Under the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness (A.M. No. 004- 07-SC 15
December 2000), every child is now presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this
presumption, the burden of proof lies on the party challenging the child's competency. Only
when substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive, remember,
communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in
court will the court, motu proprio or on motion of a party, conduct a competency
examination of a child. The assessment of the credibility of witnesses is within the province of
the trial court. The appellant did not object to Carl's competency as a witness. He did not

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 attempt to adduce evidence to challenge such competency by showing that the child was
incapable of perceiving events and of communicating his perceptions, or that he did not
possess the basic qualifications of a competent witness. All that the Defense did was to
attempt to discredit the testimony of Carl, but not for once did the Defense challenge his
capacity to distinguish right from wrong, or to perceive, or to communicate his perception to
the trial court.

IV.N. Residual Exception

Section 50. Residual Exception. — A statement not specifically covered by any of the
foregoing exceptions, having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is
admissible if the court determines that (a) the statement is offered as evidence of a material
fact; (b) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other
evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (c) the general
purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will be best served by admission of the
statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception
unless the proponent makes known to the adverse party, sufficiently in advance of the
hearing, or by the pre-trial stage in the case of a trial of the main case, to provide the adverse
party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the
statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant.

Requisites for Admissibility:

1. The statement must possess circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness akin to specific
hearsay exceptions;
2. The statement is offered as evidence of a material fact;
3. The statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other
evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts;
4. Admission of the evidence will serve the purpose of the rules and justice;
5. The proponent notifies the opponent of the intention to offer the statement, with details
of the name and address of the declarant, sufficiently in advance of the hearing, or
pretrial conference as prelude to trial, for the adverse party’s fair opportunity to meet
the intention.

V. Opinion Rule
Section 51. General Rule. — The opinion of a witness is not admissible, except as indicated in
the following sections.

Section 52. Opinion of Expert Witness. — The opinion of a witness on a

matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience, training or education, which he or she is
shown to possess, may be received in evidence.

Section 53. Opinion of Ordinary Witnesses. — The opinion of a witness, for which proper basis
is given, may be received in evidence regarding —
a. The identity of a person about whom he or she has adequate knowledge;
b. A handwriting with which he or she has sufficient familiarity; and
c. The mental sanity of a person with whom he or she is sufficiently acquainted.

The witness may also testify on his or her impressions of the emotion, behavior,
condition or appearance of a person.

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General Rule: The opinion of a witness is not admissible. (R130S51)

Exceptions:
1. Opinion of Expert Witness — The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special
knowledge, skill, experience, training or education, which he or she is shown to possess,
may be received in evidence.
2. Opinion of Ordinary Witnesses — The opinion of a witness, for which proper basis is
given, may be received in evidence regarding:
a) The identity of a person about whom he or she has adequate knowledge;
b) A handwriting with which he or she has sufficient familiarity;
c) The mental sanity of a person with whom he or she is sufficiently acquainted; and
d) The witness may also testify on his or her impressions of the emotion, behavior,
condition or appearance of a person.

Case: Lydia Lavarez, et. al. v. Angeles Guevarra, et. al.

[G.R. No. 206103. March 29, 2017]
Facts: The sons and daughters of the siblings of Rebecca Zaballero filed an action for
reconveyance, partition, accounting, and nullification of documents, with damages, against
Angeles Guevarra, Augusto Sevilla, Jr., Asteria S. Yra, Antonio Sevilla, Alberto Sevilla, Adelina S.
Alvarez, and Aristeo Sevilla. Respondents alleged that there was nothing to partition since
they were not aware of any real or personal properties which their aunt Rebecca had left
behind. Said properties which were included in the complaint had already been validly
donated to them by Rebecca.

RTC declared that the deeds of donation executed by Rebecca Zaballero in favor of
respondents null and void being tainted with vices of consent. CA affirmed.

Issue: W/N Rebecca, possessed sufficient mentality to make the subject deeds of donation
which would meet the legal test regarding the required capacity to dispose?

Ruling:
No. To determine the intrinsic validity of the deed of donation subject of the action for
annulment, Rebecca's mental state/condition at the time of its execution must be taken into
account. Factors such as age, health, and environment, and the intricacy of the document in
question, among others, should be considered. Rebecca's doctor during her lifetime, Dr.
Bernardo Jorge Conde, who was presented as an expert witness, testified that Rebecca had
been suffering from dementia, which was more or less permanent, and had been taking
medications for years. The Court ruled that at the time of the execution of the Deeds of
Donation covering numerous properties, Rebecca was already at an advanced age of 75,
afflicted with dementia, not necessarily in the pinkest of health since she was then, in fact,
admitted to the hospital, it can be reasonably assumed that the same had the effects of
impairing her brain or mental faculties so as to considerably affect her consent, and that fraud
or undue influence would have been employed in order to procure her signature on the
questioned deeds. As to Dr. Conde's expert opinion, it is settled that the testimony of expert
witnesses must be construed to have been presented not to sway the court in favor of any of
the parties, but to assist the court in the determination of the issue before it.

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 Case: Bobby Avelino y Bulawan v. People of the Philippines
[G.R. No. 181444. July 17, 2013]
Facts: Bobby Avelino was charged with the crime of murder before the RTC of Manila for
allegedly shooting Chairman Hispano. At the trial, the prosecution presented Alfredo
Manalangsang who positively identified Avelino to be the assailant. He saw Avelino stooping
down at the Chairman’s body and pulling the opening of his bonnet down to his chin to
ascertain if the Chairman was still alive. Avelino advanced the defense of denial and alibi. He
testified that at the time of the incident in question, he and his wife checked in at the Pharaoh
Hotel in Sta. Cruz, Manila to spend the night but his car got stolen so they had to go to the
police station to report the incident.

RTC found Avelino guilty beyond the reasonable doubt of the crime murder qualified by
treachery. CA affirmed.
Avelino contends that Manalangsang's testimony contradicts with the medical findings, and
should then be disregarded. Avelino claims that Manalangsang's statements that Hispano was
shot in a downward direction conflict with the findings of the medico-legal that the trajectory
of the bullets is in an upward direction.

Issue: W/N the CA erred in disregarding the inconsistencies between the statements of
Manalangsang and the findings of the medico-legal as to the position of the gunman?

Ruling:
No. The CA was correct in not giving credence to the opinion of SOCO PSI Cabamongan as
regards the position of the gunman when the latter shot Hispano. Cabamongan asserted that
the gunman was on board the owner-type jeep when Hispano was shot, which is opposed to
Manalangsang’s testimony. However, case records reveal that Cabamongan was presented as
an ordinary witness. Hence, his opinion regarding the location of the gunman in relation to
the place where the empty shells were found is immaterial.

Case: People of the Philippines v. Emiliano Duranan

[G.R. Nos. 134074-75. January 16, 2001]
Facts: Nympha Lozada, who was 25 years old at the time of the incidents in question, is
considered to be retarded and finished up to the sixth grade only. Emilio Duranan lived with
the Lozada’s family in the same apartment where he rented a room that he shared with
several other people. The first rape took place in the afternoon of March 7, 1994 in the
common bathroom of the apartment. The second rape took place in the early morning of the
following day. In another incident, on March 12, Duranan asked complainant to let him use
their bathroom. However, after being given permission, he grabbed Nympha by the hand and
pulled her inside the bathroom. Duranan only stopped molesting Nympha when he heard
somebody coming. Virginia, mother of the victim, testified that she saw Nympha leave the
bathroom, quickly followed by Duranan. Virginia noticed that her daughter's lower lip was
bruised. When she confronted her daughter about it, the latter revealed for the first time what
had happened to her. They then took complainant to Camp Crame for examination. Dr.
Rosalina O. Cosidon, who examined Nympha submitted a report indicating the possibility of
intercourse that caused Nympha's loss of virginity within the last five days. Duranan filed a
demurrer to the evidence but was denied. The defense presented Duranan’s alleged
roommates and his wife as witnesses. With respect to the first incident of rape, Duranan
could not have possibly committed such because he was not at home at that time. As to the
second incident of rape, Duranan contends that it was impossible for him to commit rape in
his room because there were at least 6 other people there at the time.

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RTC found Duranan guilty of 2 counts of rape. Duranan contends that he cannot be convicted
of rape since the victim's mental age was not proven. He argues that under Art. 335(2) of the
Revised Penal Code, an essential element for the prosecution for rape of a mental retardate is
a psychiatric evaluation of the complainant's mental age to determine if her mental age is
under twelve. He further claims that only in cases where the retardation is apparent due to
the presence of physical deformities symptomatic of mental retardation can the mental
evaluation be waived.

Issue: W/N the RTC erred in holding that the victim is deprived of reason despite the absence
of testimony by a competent medical expert to that effect and despite strong evidence on the
record to the contrary?

Ruling:
No. Rule 130, S50 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides: Opinion of Ordinary witnesses.
— The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given may be received in evidence
regarding (c) the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted. The
mother of an offended party in a case of rape, though not a psychiatrist, if she knows the
physical and mental condition of the party, how she was born, what she is suffering from, and
what her attainments are, is competent to testify on the matter.

It is competent for the ordinary witness to give his opinion as to the sanity or mental
condition of a person, provided the witness has had sufficient opportunity to observe the
speech, manner, habits, and conduct of the person in question. Generally, it is required that
the witness details the factors and reasons upon which he bases his opinion before he can
testify as to what it is non-expert witness may give his opinion as to the sanity or insanity of
another, when based upon conversations or dealings which he has had with such person, or
upon his appearance, or upon any fact bearing upon his mental condition, with the witness'
own knowledge and observation, he having first testified to such conversations, dealings,
appearance or other observed facts, as the basis for his opinion.

VI. Character Evidence

Section 54. Character Evidence Not Generally Admissible; Exceptions. — Evidence of a
person's character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in
conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:
a. In Criminal Cases:
1) The character of the offended party may be proved if it tends to establish in
any reasonable degree the probability or improbability of the offense charged.
2) The accused may prove his or her good moral character, pertinent to the moral
trait involved in the offense charged. However, the prosecution may not prove
his or her bad moral character unless on rebuttal.
b. In Civil Cases: Evidence of the moral character of a party in a civil case is admissible
only when pertinent to the issue of character involved in the case.
c. In Criminal and Civil Cases: Evidence of the good character of a witness is not
admissible until such character has been impeached.

In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of character of a person is admissible,

proof may be made by testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion.
On cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct.

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 In cases in which character or a trait of character of a person is an essential element of a
charge, claim or defense, proof may also be made of specific instances of that person's
conduct.

Character – The aggregate of the moral qualities which belong to and distinguish an individual
person; the general result of one’s distinguishing attributes. (Black’s Law Dictionary, 2004)

Uses of Character Evidence:

1. As circumstantial evidence, that is, that a person acted in conformity with his character.
2. As direct evidence of character, where character itself is the fact in issue.
3. To impeach the adverse party’s witness.
4. To rehabilitate a witness whose character has been impeached.

General Rule: Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is not admissible for the
purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion. (R130S54)

Exceptions:
1. In certain criminal cases;
2. In civil cases; and
3. In case the character of a witness has been previously impeached.

Note: The reason for this is that the evidence of a person’s character does not prove that such
person acted in conformity with such character or trait in a particular occasion.

Character Evidence in Criminal Cases:

As to the Accused
He may prove his good moral They may not prove the bad
character which is pertinent
to the moral trait involved in
the offense charged.
As to the Prosecution As to the Offender
His good or bad moral
moral character of the character may be proved as
accused which is pertinent to long as it tends to establish
the moral trait involved in the in any reasonable degree the
offense charged, unless in probability or improbability
rebuttal when the accused of the offense charged.
opens the issue by
introducing evidence of his
good moral character.

Character Evidence in Civil Cases: The moral character of either party thereto cannot be proved
unless it is pertinent to the issue of character involved in the case. (Sec. 54, Rule 130)

Civil Cases Where Issue of Character is Involved:

1. In civil actions for libel or slander, where the character of the aggrieved person is a fact
in issue that may be proved by both plaintiff and defendant;
2. In civil actions for seduction, where the woman seduced must be of good reputation;
3. In cases involving negligent hiring; and
4. In child custody cases, where the character of the parents or guardians is a fact-in-issue.

Proof of Bad Character:

1. Cross examination; or
2. Independent evidence of bad character.

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Adverse Party’s Witness – a witness may be impeached by the party against whom he or she was
called, by contradictory evidence, by evidence that his or her general reputation for truth,
honesty, or integrity is bad, or by evidence that he or she has made at other times statements
inconsistent with his or her present testimony, but not by evidence of particular wrongful acts,
except that it may be shown by the examination of the witness, or record of the judgment, that
he or she has been convicted of an offense. (R132S11)

Party’s Witness – if the good character of a witness has been impeached, the party presenting
the witness may rehabilitate his witness by presenting evidence of his good character. A party
cannot present evidence of the good moral character of his witness if the same has not been
impeached.

Case: People of the Philippines v. Rafael Diopita y Guzman

[G.R. No. 130601. December 4, 2000]
Facts: At about 9 o’clock in the evening, Dominga Pikit-pikit was walking on her way home
from work when suddenly a man appeared from behind and dragged her through to the
cornfields. With the full moon shining on his face, Dominga got a good look at the man who
turned out to be Diopita. Diopita took her belongings and raped her. Dominga went to the
police. PO3 Steve dela Cruz, who was on duty at the Intelligence and Investigation Section,
made a follow-up on the case. He went to the victim's house and interviewed Dominga.
Dominga gave a description of the suspect and his possible whereabouts. Acting on that
information, PO3 dela Cruz went to the scene of the crime to investigate and there he
recovered a colored white/yellow, size ten (10) slipper. Since Dominga earlier disclosed that
the suspect headed north after committing the crime, he proceeded to that direction where
he came upon four houses about 15 to 50 meters away from the scene of the crime. 4 men
who fitted the description were invited to the police station. Dominga pointed Diopita. The
police then had Diopita try on the recovered slipper and it easily fitted him. Diopita was
detained and was charged with the crime of Robbery with Rape. Diopita denied the charge
and claimed that at the evening in question, he was with his wife, son and fellow Jehovah’s
Witnesses at another place for an informal Bible session.

RTC convicted Diopita of the crime charged. Diopita maintains that it was impossible for him
to have committed the crime charged since he is a person of good moral character, holding
as he does the position of "Ministerial Servant" in the congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses,
and that he is a godly man, a righteous person, a responsible family man and a good
Christian who preaches the word of God.

Issue: W/N Diopita’s good moral character being a ministerial servant be enough to acquit
him of the crime charged?

Ruling:
No. The fact that Diopita is endowed with such "sterling" qualities hardly justifies the
conclusion that he is innocent of the crime charged. Similarly, his having attained the position
of "Ministerial Servant" in his faith is no guarantee against any sexual perversion and
plunderous proclivity on his part. Indeed, religiosity is not always an emblem of good
conduct, and it is not the unreligious alone who succumbs to the impulse to rob and rape. An
accused is not entitled to an acquittal simply because of his previous good moral character
and exemplary conduct.

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