Performance Pay and Productivity

By EDWARD P. LAZEAR*

Much of the theory in personnel economics relates to effects of monetary incentives

on output, but the theory was untested because appropriate data were unavailable.
A new data set for the Safelite Glass Corporation tests the predictions that average
productivity will rise, the firm will attract a more able workforce, and variance in
output across individuals at the firm will rise when it shifts to piece rates. In Safelite,
productivity effects amount to a 44-percent increase in output per worker. This firm
apparently had selected a suboptimal compensation system, as profits also in-
creased with the change. (JEL J00, J22, J3)

A cornerstone of the theory in personnel eco-
nomics is that workers respond to incentives.
Specifically, it is a given that paying on the
basis of output will induce workers to supply
more output. Many sophisticated models have
been offered, but they have gone largely un-
tested because of a lack of data. Of course, there
are some difficulties associated with perfor-
mance pay schemes that have been pointed out
in the literature.1 There is a literature that ex-
amines the choice of payment schemes and its
effects on profits and/or earnings.2 But overall,
* Graduate School of Business, 518 Memorial Way, Stan-
ford University, Stanford, CA 94305, and Hoover Institution
(e-mail: lazear@leland.stanford.edu). This research was sup-
ported in part by the National Science Foundation and by
the National Bureau of Economic Research. This is a revi-
sion of a September 1995 paper with the same name. I am
indebted to the management at Safelite Glass Corporation for
providing the data on which the empirical analysis is based.
Excellent comments by Joseph Guzman, David Levine, Sher-
win Rosen, Michael Schwarz, and Eric Stout are gratefully
acknowledged.
1
See Lazear (1986) for a detailed discussion of when to
pay a piece rate, which is defined to be payment on the basis
of output. Also, Eugene F. Fama (1991) discusses other rea-
sons for paying on the basis of some measured time interval.
George Baker (1992) discusses the difficulties created by pay-
for-performance structures when measurement is a problem. A
very early discussion of the incentive effects of piece rates can
be found in Sumner Slichter (1928 Ch. 13).
2 3
See, for example, Orley Ashenfelter and John H. Pen-
cavel (1976), Eric Seiler (1984), Charles Brown (1992), and
Allison Booth and Jeff Frank (1996), who look at compen-
sation method and resulting income. Pencavel (1978), Mar-
tin Brown and Peter Philips (1986), Claudia Goldin (1986),
Brown (1990), and Robert Drago and John S. Heywood
(1995) examine choice of compensation scheme and
changes in pay for performance over time.
1346
there have been few attempts to examine the
choice of payment scheme and its effect on
output.3 How sensitive is worker behavior to
incentives and what specific changes in behav-
ior are elicited? A newly available data set
allows these questions to be answered.
The analysis in this paper is based on data
from Safelite Glass Corporation, a large auto
glass company. During 1994 and 1995, after the
introduction of new management, the company
gradually changed the compensation method for
its workforce, moving them from hourly wages
to piece-rate pay. The effects, which are docu-
mented by examining the behavior of about
3,000 different workers over a 19-month period,
are dramatic and completely in line with eco-
nomic theory.
In what follows, the theory of piece-rate com-
pensation is sketched with particular emphasis
on the predictions that pertain to changes in the
compensation method used by Safelite. The the-
ory is backed up by the empirical results, the
most important of which are:
1. A switch to piece-rate pay has a significant
effect on average levels of output per worker.
This is in the range of a 44-percent gain.
There are some attempts to examine the effect of in-
centives on productivity. Sue Fernie and David Metcalf
(1996) find that when payment is contingent on perfor-
mance, jockeys perform better than when payment is unre-
lated to performance. Also, Harry J. Paarsch and Bruce S.
Shearer (1996) find that tree planters in British Columbia
produce higher levels of output when paid piece rates, but
that they become fatigued more rapidly.
VOL. 90 NO. 5 LAZEAR: PERFORMANCE PAY AND PRODUCTIVITY
2. The gain can be split into two components.
About half of the increase in productivity re-
sults from the average worker producing more
because of incentive effects. Some of the in-
crease results from an ability to hire the most
productive workers and possibly from a reduc-
tion in quits among the highest output workers.
None reflects the “Hawthorne effect.”
3. The firm shares the gains in productivity
with its workforce. A given worker receives
about a 10-percent increase in pay as a result
of the switch to piece rates.
4. Moving to piece-rate pay increases the vari-
ance in output. More ambitious workers
have less incentive to differentiate them-
selves when hourly wages are paid than
when piece-rate pay is used.
The evidence implies that the choice of com-
pensation method has important incentive ef-
fects, not that piece-rate schemes are more
profitable. In equilibrium, firms choose a com-
pensation method based on the costs and bene-
fits of the various schemes. Firms that continue
to pay hourly wages in equilibrium are those for
which the benefits of paying an hourly wage,
such as low monitoring costs and perhaps
higher quality output, outweigh the costs in the
form of lower output.
Some conclusions are unambiguous. Workers
respond to prices just as economic theory pre-
dicts. Claims by sociologists4 and others that
monetizing incentives may actually reduce out-
put are unambiguously refuted by the data. Not
only do the effects back up economic predic-
tions, but the effects are extremely large and
precisely in line with theory.
The evidence allows somewhat broader inter-
pretation. It is often difficult to obtain actual data
on consumers and their reactions to changes in
prices. Tests of even the most basic tenets of
economic theory are difficult to perform, at least at
a micro level. These data are well suited to that
purpose. While experiments bear out the basic
response of economic agents to prices, the data
used in this paper come from the real world rather
than a laboratory setting. Compensation, which
4 6
The hypothesis was first stated by E. L. Deci (1971).
Early evidence supporting the claim in the area of child
development is presented by Mark R. Lepper et al. (1973).
1347
reflects the most important price that a consumer
faces, truly matters to the workers in this setting,
and they respond accordingly.
I. Modeling Choice of Pay Scheme: Hourly
Wages Versus Piece Rates
The primary motivation behind instituting a
piece-rate scheme is to increase worker effort.
While it may seem obvious that moving from
hourly wages to piece rates would increase ef-
fort, it is not. When a firm institutes an hourly
wage schedule, it usually couples the payment
with some minimum level of output that is
acceptable. It is possible, therefore, that the
minimum acceptable output chosen for hourly
wage workers exceeds the level of output that
workers voluntarily choose under a piece rate.
Further, it may be that the minimum level cho-
sen under hourly wages is so high that only the
most able workers can make the cut. When
piece rates are instituted, more heterogeneity
might be tolerated, resulting in lower average
levels of output.
This suggests that the term “performance
pay” is not very useful. Even if we restrict
performance pay to refer to pay based on output
(rather than input), a broad set of compensation
schemes are included. Hourly wages that are
coupled with some minimum standard could be
called performance pay because an output-
based performance standard must be met to
retain employment. In fact, were workers ho-
mogeneous, an hourly wage structure with a
minimum number of units tolerated per hour
could achieve the efficient outcome.5
The conditions of the job determine which
workers choose to accept employment. If stan-
dards are too strict, only the most able will find
the job suitable, even at a high wage. A rough
sketch of a framework that permits an analysis
of the choice of standards and ability is given
here.6
5
To do this, simply solve for the efficient level of effort
per hour, which sets the marginal cost of effort equal to the
marginal value of effort. Require that level of effort as the
minimum standard for the job. Then, set the hourly wage
just high enough to attract workers to the firm.
A more complete version of the model is available in a
paper by the same title, National Bureau of Economic
Research Working Paper No. 5672 (Lazear, 1996).
1348 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
Define e to be the output level chosen by a
worker, which is a function of underlying abil-
ity, A, and of effort choice. Suppose that the
firm can observe e.
The firm that pays an hourly wage can spec-
ify some minimally acceptable level of output
per hour e 0 . The firm fires workers whose out-
put falls consistently below e 0 . Commensurate
with that level of required output is some wage,
W, that the firm offers. The worker’s utility
function is given by
(1) Utility 5 U~Y, X!
where Y is income and X is effort. Naturally,
U 1 . 0 and U 2 , 0.
Let A denote ability. Then output, e, depends
on ability and effort according to
(2) e 5 f~X, A!
with f 1 , f 2 . 0. For any given required level of
output e, and ability level, A, there is a unique
level of effort X that satisfies (2). Denote by
X 0 ( A) the level of effort necessary to satisfy
(3) e 0 5 f~X 0 ~A!, A!
for the required level of effort e 0 . It is clear that
given (2),
≠X f2
52 ,
≠A f1
which is negative. Higher-ability individuals
need exert less effort to achieve a given level of
output.
For any given pair of required output and wage,
(e0, W), there is a group of workers who will
accept the job. The minimum-ability individual
who will accept a job in lieu of leisure that re-
quires e0 of output to be produced is A0 such that
(4) U~W, X 0 ~A 0 !! 5 U~0, 0!
where U(0, 0) is interpreted as the utility asso-
ciated with leisure.
DECEMBER 2000
All workers with ability levels that exceed A 0
earn rents from employment because they are
required only to produce e 0 of output, and the
pain associated with producing it is lower than
the pain for individuals with ability A 0 , who are
just indifferent between working and not. How-
ever, because there is competition from other
firms, a worker must compare the rents earned
at this firm with those offered elsewhere.
Those willing to work at the firm must not
have work alternatives that are preferred to
those here. The utility that a worker of ability A
can get at another firm that does not necessary
pay workers of all types the same amount is
given by U(Ŵ( A), X̂( A)) where Ŵ, X̂ refer to
the wage and effort levels on the best alternative
job for worker of ability A. Higher-ability
workers are likely to find that the straight hourly
wage job is not as attractive as an alternative
that demands more, but pays more, even if the
less able workers would find such a job onerous.
Thus, there may exist an upper cutoff, A h , such
that
(5) U~W, X 0 ~A h !! 5 U~Ŵ~A h !, X̂~A h !!.
Those who choose to work at the current firm
have ability greater than A 0 , but less than A h . 7
A linear piece rate takes the form (be 2 K)
where K is the implicit charge for the job. The
utility that a risk-neutral worker receives can be
written
Utility under piece rate 5 U~bf~X*~A!, A!
2 K, X*~A!!
where X*( A) is the effort that an individual
with ability A chooses when faced with the
piece rate b.
7
Rents are higher on the current job for higher-ability
workers in that the more able accomplish the task more
easily. But other firms need not constrain all workers to earn
the same amount. It is for this reason that some high-ability
workers may choose to work elsewhere. If opportunities
outside are sufficiently bad, all workers with A . A 0 would
work at this firm and A h 5 `. It is also possible that there
are multiple crossings. These are assumed away for analytic
convenience.
VOL. 90 NO. 5 LAZEAR: PERFORMANCE PAY AND PRODUCTIVITY
FIGURE 1. COMPENSATION BEFORE
In order to fit the Safelite situation analyzed
in the empirical section below, it is useful to
model the effects of switching from an hourly
wage with minimum standard to a piece rate
with a minimum guarantee. As part of Safelite’s
plan, it offered a guarantee at approximately the
former wage. The guarantee was coupled, pre-
sumably, with the same minimum standard of
e 0 as before. Thus, the plan paid W to anyone
who would have earned less than W under the
piece rate, but paid the piece rate to all of those
whose compensation by the piece-rate formula
would have exceeded W. The scheme used is
Compensation 5 max@W, be 2 K#.
The situation is shown in Figure 1.
This scheme is typical of many salespersons’
plans. A draw, in this case equal to W, is paid to
workers whose output exceeds e 0 up to some
level of output, e*. At output greater than e*,
the worker begins to receive additional compen-
sation for increases in output. As long as the
worker produces e . e*, his compensation is
given by be 2 K. At most firms, workers who
continually dip into their draw by producing
e , e* are likely to find their employment
terminated after some period of time.
Low-ability workers have steep indifference
curves because additional effort must be com-
pensated by large increases in income. The solid
indifference curve through A is that of a rela-
tively low-ability worker. The dotted indiffer-
1349
AND AFTER AT SAFELITE
ence curve through A reflects the preferences of
a higher-ability worker since it takes less in-
come to induce him to provide a given amount
of effort.8
The hourly wage schedule is shown by the
step function that starts at zero, becomes verti-
cal at e 0 and then horizontal at point A. The
piece-rate schedule with guarantee is the same,
except that compensation rises with output
above e*, as shown by the upward-sloping seg-
ment. When workers are offered hourly wages,
all, even the most able, choose point A. When
offered the piece-rate schedule with a guaran-
tee, the less able worker (solid) still chooses A,
but the more able worker (dotted) chooses B.
This can be stated more formally in three prop-
ositions, which are proved in the Appendix.
PROPOSITION 1: Effort does not decrease
when the firm switches from hourly wages to
piece rates, and as long as there is some ability
type for which output rises, average effort in-
creases.
Because the guarantee binds for some work-
ers, but not for all, effort does not increase for
all workers. Workers whose optimal level of
effort lies to the left of e* in Figure 1 gain
nothing by increasing effort. But those whose
optimal level of effort is sufficiently high may
8
“Ability” can be read “ambition” in the interpretation
of A. Nothing is changed.
1350 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
choose to work enough to be on the upward-
sloping portion of the compensation function.
Another proposition can be stated, given two
conditions:9
Condition 1: If a worker with ability A chooses
to work at an effort level in the piece-rate range,
then any worker with ability greater than A also
chooses to work at an effort level in the piece-
rate range.
Condition 2: If a worker with ability A chooses
to work at an effort level in the wage-guarantee
range, then any worker with ability less than A
also chooses to work at an effort level in the
wage-guarantee range.
Then,
PROPOSITION 2: A sufficient condition for
the average ability of the workforce to be non-
decreasing, and more generally, to rise after the
switch to piece rates is that some workers ac-
cept the guaranteed wage and some workers
choose to work enough to be in the piece-rate
range.
Average ability rises because the ability of
the lowest-quality worker does not change as a
result of the switch in compensation scheme,
but the ability of the highest-quality worker
rises. Because a piece rate allows the more able
to work harder and receive more from the job,
and because the hourly wage does not, more
able workers prefer piece rates. The least-able
worker is indifferent between the two schemes.
Switching to piece rates has the effect of chang-
ing the pool of applicants to Safelite. Those who
prefer to work at high levels of effort favor
Safelite over other firms in the industry after the
switch.
Finally,
PROPOSITION 3: A sufficient condition for
the range of worker ability and output to rise
after the switch to piece rates is that some
9
Define X 5 g(e, A) as the inverse of (2). Then it can
be shown that Condition 1 and Condition 2 hold as long as
≠g(e, A)/≠A , 0, ≠g(e, A)/≠e . 0, and ≠U(Y, X)/≠X 2 .
0 all hold.
DECEMBER 2000
workers choose to work enough to be in the
piece-rate range.
Even if underlying ability levels did not
change, variance in productivity would rise be-
cause workers choose the same level of output
under an hourly wage, but type-specific levels
of output under piece rates. When it is recog-
nized that the maximum ability level increases
under a piece rate, the change in output variance
becomes even greater.10
II. Data
Safelite Glass Corporation is located in Co-
lumbus, Ohio, and is the country’s largest in-
staller of automobile glass. In 1994, Safelite,
under the direction of CEO Garen Staglin and
President John Barlow, implemented a new
compensation scheme for the auto glass install-
ers. Until January 1994, glass installers were
paid an hourly wage rate, which did not vary in
any direct way with the number of windows that
were installed. During 1994 and 1995, installers
were shifted from an hourly wage schedule to
performance pay—specifically, to a piece-rate
schedule. Rather than being paid for the number
of hours that they worked, installers were paid
for the number of glass units that they installed.
The rates varied somewhat. On average install-
ers were paid about $20 per unit installed. At
the time that the piece rates were instituted, the
workers were also given a guarantee of approx-
imately $11 per hour. If their weekly pay came
out to less than the guarantee, they would be
paid the guaranteed amount. Many workers
ended up in the guarantee range.
Staglin and Barlow changed the compensa-
tion scheme because they felt that productivity
was below where it should have been. Produc-
tivity could have been raised by requiring a
higher minimum level of output under a time-
rate system. If all workers had identical prefer-
ences, this would have worked well. Given
differences in work preferences, a uniform in-
10
The condition that some workers continue to opt for
the guaranteed wage is not superfluous. If all workers opt
for the piece rate, then it is possible that even very low
ability workers who did not work before now work for the
firm. Their addition could actually result in a lowering of
average ability.
VOL. 90 NO. 5 LAZEAR: PERFORMANCE PAY AND PRODUCTIVITY 1351

TABLE 1—DATA DESCRIPTION

Variable Definition Mean Standard deviation

PPP dummy A dummy variable equal to 1 if the 0.53
worker is on PPP during that
month
Base pay Hourly wage $11.48 $2.94
Units-per-worker-per-day Average number of units of glass 2.98 1.53
installed by the given worker
during the month in question
Regular hours Regular hours worked during the 153 41
given month
Overtime hours Overtime hours worked that month 19 19
Pay Pay actually received in a given $2,254 $882
month
Pay-per-day Actual pay per eight hours worked; $107 $36
this differs from PPP pay in that
the wage guarantee and other
payments are included in the total
Cost-per-unit Actual pay for a given worker, $40 $62
divided by the number of units
installed by that worker in a
given month
Log of pay-per-day Log of actual pay per eight hours 4.62 0.29
worked
Separation dummy A dummy equal to 1 if the 0.047
employee quit during this month

Notes: There were 2,755 individuals who worked as installers over the 19-month period covered by the data. The unit of
analysis is a person-month. There are 29,837 person-months of good data. Pay-per-day is calculated only for workers whose
total hours in a month exceeded 10 and cost-per-unit only for workers whose monthly units installed exceeded 3.

crease in required output, coupled with a wage
increase, would not be received in the same way
by all workers. In particular, the lower-output
workers would find this more burdensome than
the higher-output workers. In order to avoid
massive turnover, the firm adopted a piece-rate
schedule, which allowed those who wanted to
work more to earn more, but also allowed those
who would accept lower pay to put forth less
effort.
Safelite has a very sophisticated computer-
ized information system, which keeps track of
how many units of each kind each installer in
the company installs in a given week. Safelite
provided monthly data. Since PPP (Perfor-
mance Pay Plan) was phased in over a 19-month
period, many workers were employed under
both regimes. Thus, data on individual output
are available for most installers both during the
hourly wage period and during the PPP period.
This before-and-after comparison with person-
specific data provides a very clean body of
information on which to base an analysis of
performance pay incentives.
Some basic characteristics of the sample are
reported in Table 1. The data are organized as
follows. Each month provides an independent
unit of observation. There are 38,764 person-
months of data covering a 19-month period.
Over the 19-month period, there was a total of
3,707 different individuals who worked for
Safelite as installers. The number of “good”
observations is 29,837 when partial months and
observations with incomplete data are dropped
from the data set.
There are a number of possible productivity
measures. The one that most Safelite managers
look to is units-per-worker-per-day. This is the
total number of glass units per eight-hour day
that are installed by a given worker. The units-
per-worker-per-day number for each individual
observation relates to a given worker in a given
month. Thus, units-per-worker-per-day is the
average number of units per eight-hour period
installed by the given worker during the given
month.
The average number of glass units installed
per day over the entire period is 2.98, with a
1352 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
TABLE 2—MEAN AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS
Hourly wages
Number of observations 13,106
Variable Mean
Units-per-worker-per-day 2.70
Actual pay $2,228
PPP pay $1,587
Cost-per-unit $44.43
Note: 1,485 observations were dropped because the individual spent part of the month on PPP and part on hourly wages.
standard deviation of 1.53. The average actual
pay was $2,254, which is above the amount that
would be paid had the worker received exactly
the amount to which he was entitled based on a
straight piece rate. The difference reflects vaca-
tion, holiday, and sick pay, as well as two other
factors. First, not all workers are on PPP during
the period. When on hourly wages, some re-
ceived higher compensation than they would
have had they been on PPP, given the number of
units installed. Of course, when a given worker
switches to PPP, incentives change and his out-
put may go up enough to cover the deficit.
Second, even when workers are on PPP, a sub-
stantial fraction of person-weeks calculated on
the basis of the PPP formula comes in below the
guaranteed weekly compensation. The guaran-
tee binds for those worker weeks, and actual
pay then exceeds PPP pay. In all months after
the introduction of PPP, at least some workers
received the guaranteed pay and some earned
more than the guarantee. Thus, the sufficient
conditions for Propositions 2 and 3 are met
throughout the period.
Means for actual and PPP pay reveal almost
nothing about the effects of PPP on perfor-
mance and sorting. A more direct approach is
needed. Table 2 presents some means of the key
variables and breaks them down by the PPP
dummy, which is set equal to one if the worker
in question is on PPP during the given month.11
The story that will be told in more detail
below shows up in the simple means. The av-
erage level of units-per-worker-per-day is about
11
Only observations where workers were on one pay
regime or the other for the full month are used. Partial
month observations are deleted.
DECEMBER 2000
OF KEY VARIABLES BY PAY STRUCTURE
Piece rates
15,246
Standard deviation Mean Hourly wages
1.42 3.24 1.59
$794 $2,283 $950
$823 $1,852 $997
$75.55 $35.24 $49.00
0.54 units, or 20 percent higher in the piece-rate
regime than in the hourly wage regime. Also,
the variance in output goes up when switching
from hourly wages to piece rates, as can be seen
by comparing the standard deviations of 1.59 to
1.42.12
Thus, Propositions 1, 2, and 3, which state
that both mean and variance in output rise when
switching from hourly wages to piece rates, are
borne out by the simple statistics. Further, note
that there is good indication that profitability
went up significantly with the switch. The cost
per unit is considerably lower in the piece-rate
regime than it is with hourly wages.13
The simple statistics do not take other factors
into account. In particular, auto glass demand is
closely related to miles driven, which varies
with weather. Major storms, especially hail,
also cause glass damage. Month effects and
year effects matter. Perhaps more important, the
management change that took place before PPP
was instituted had other direct effects on the
company that may have changed output during
the sample period, irrespective of the switch to
PPP. To deal with these factors, month and year
dummies are included. The simplest specifica-
tion in the first row of Table 3 yields a coeffi-
cient on the PPP dummy of 0.368. Evaluated at
12
This number includes within-worker components as
well as between-worker components. The latter is of interest
and is investigated in more detail below.
13
The fact that actual pay has only risen slightly after the
switch to PPP than before reflects the phase-in pattern of the
PPP program. Lower-wage areas were brought into the
program first, which means that the PPP 5 1 data are
dominated by lower-wage markets. This pattern also affects
the differences between piece-rate and hourly wage output
if early switchers to PPP have different average output
levels than late switchers to PPP.
VOL. 90 NO. 5 LAZEAR: PERFORMANCE PAY AND PRODUCTIVITY 1353

TABLE 3—REGRESSION RESULTS

Dummy for
PPP person- Time
Regression month since New
number observation Tenure PPP regime R2 Description
1 0.368 0.04 Dummies for month and year included
(0.013)
2 0.197 0.73 Dummies for month and year; worker-
(0.009) specific dummies included (2,755
individual workers)
3 0.313 0.343 0.107 0.05 Dummies for month and year included
(0.014) (0.017) (0.024)
4 0.202 0.224 0.273 0.76 Dummies for month and year; worker-
(0.009) (0.058) (0.018) specific dummies included (2,755
individual workers)
5 0.309 0.424 0.130 0.243 0.06 Dummies for month and year included
(0.014) (0.019) (0.024) (0.025)

Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficients.

Dependent variable: In output-per-worker-per-day.
Number of observations: 29,837.

the mean of the log of units-per-worker-per-
day, this coefficient implies that there is a 44-
percent gain in productivity with a move to
PPP.
There are three possible interpretations of this
extremely large and statistically precise effect.
First, the gain in productivity may result from
incentive effects associated with the program.
Second, the gain may result from sorting. A
different group of workers may be present after
the switch to piece rates. Third, the pattern of
implementation may cause a spurious positive
effect. Suppose that Safelite picked its best
workers to put on piece rates first. The PPP
dummy coefficient would pick up an ability
effect because high-ability workers would have
more PPP months than low-ability workers. Un-
less ability is correlated with region in a partic-
ular way, the third explanation can be ruled out
because Safelite switched its stores to PPP on a
regional basis, starting with Columbus, Ohio,
where the headquarters is located, and moving
out. The other two effects can all be identified
by using the data in a variety of ways.
When worker dummies are included in the
regression, the coefficient drops to 0.197 from
0.368. The 0.197 is the pure incentive effect that
results from switching from hourly wages to
piece rates. Evaluated at the means, it implies
that a given worker installs 22 percent more
units after the switch to PPP than he did before
the switch to PPP. This estimate controls for
month and year effects. Individual ability is
held constant as is shop location by including
the person dummies. Approximately half of the
44-percent difference in productivity attributed
to the PPP program reflects an incentive effect.
Nor does this gain appear to be a Hawthorne
effect.14 This can be seen by examining regression
3 in Table 3. The regression includes a variable for
tenure and also one for time that the worker has
been on the PPP program. It is zero for all months
before the individual is on piece rates. It is the
number of years that the individual has been on
piece rates in the current person-month observa-
tion. For example, a worker who started 1994 on
hourly wages and was switched to PPP on July 1,
1994 would have time since PPP equal to zero for
the June 1994 observation, to 0.5 for the January
1995 observation, and to 1.0 for the June 1995
observation.
Consider the estimates with fixed effects in
regression 4. The coefficient of 0.273 on time
since tenure coupled with a PPP dummy coeffi-
cient of 0.202, means that the initial effect of
switching from hourly wage to piece rate is to
increase log productivity by 0.202. After one year
14
The Hawthorne effect, named after the Hawthorne
Western Electric Plant in Illinois, alleges that any change is
likely to bring about short-term gains in productivity.
1354 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
on the program, the increase in log productivity
has grown to 0.475. The Hawthorne effect would
imply a negative coefficient on time since PPP. If
the Hawthorne effect held, then the longer the
worker were on the program, the smaller would be
the effect of piece rates on productivity. The re-
verse happens here. After workers are switched to
piece rates, they seem to learn ways to work faster
or harder as time progresses.
III. Sorting
Tenure effects are large and significant. Us-
ing regression 3 of Table 3, it is estimated that
one year of tenure raises log productivity by
about 0.34. As is true of all tenure estimates,
there are two interpretations. The first is learn-
ing. Turnover rates are over 4 1⁄2 percent per
month, and the mean level of tenure is only
about two-thirds of a year. It would not be
surprising to see a worker increase his wind-
shield installation rate dramatically during the
first few months on the job. The second inter-
pretation is one of sorting. Those who are not
making it get fired or quit early. Regression 4 of
the table assists in interpretation.
Regression 4 reports the estimates of the re-
gression in regression 3, including fixed effects
for individuals. Thus, the tenure coefficient re-
flects the effect of tenure for a given worker,
averaged across individuals. The estimate of
0.20 on log productivity can be interpreted as
the average effect of learning within the sam-
ple.15 Thus, the effect of learning appears
substantial.
The theory stated in Propositions 2 and 3
suggests that the optimal piece rate is imple-
mented such that both mean and range of
worker ability should rise after the switch to
piece rates. The theory implies specifically that
there should be no change in the number of
low-ability workers who are willing to work
with the firm, but that piece rates would allow
high-ability workers to use their talents more
lucratively. Thus, the top tail of the distribution
should thicken.
15
The term “average” is used cautiously. The sample
contains different numbers of observations at each tenure
level so that the average picks up not only nonlinearities, but
different tenure effects for different types of individuals that
may be more or less heavily weighted in the sample.
DECEMBER 2000
Underlying ability is difficult to measure, but
actual output can be observed. The fifth regres-
sion of Table 3 provides evidence on this point.
“New regime” is a dummy set equal to one if
the individual was hired after January 1, 1995,
by which point almost the entire firm had
switched to piecework. The theory predicts that
workers hired under the new regime should
produce more output than the previously hired
employees.16 Indeed, workers hired under the
new regime have log productivity that is 0.24
greater than those hired under the old regime,
given tenure.
Separations can also be examined. Suppose
that workers must try the job for a while to
discover their ability levels. Workers who find
the job unsuitable leave. Then, looking at the
relation of ability to separation rates (quits plus
layoffs) before and after the switch to piece
rates will provide evidence on the validity of
Propositions 2 and 3.
A separation is defined as an observation in
which the worker in question did not work
during the subsequent month. Thus, a dummy is
set equal to one in the last month of employ-
ment. Those workers who work through July
1995 (the last month for which data are avail-
able) have this dummy set equal to zero for
every month in which they worked. A worker
who was employed, say from January 1994
through February 1995, would have the dummy
equal to zero in every month of employment,
except for February 1995, when it would equal
one.
Table 4 reports a breakdown of separation
rates by PPP regime and by worker output de-
ciles where output is defined as units-per-
worker-per-day during the previous month.17
First note that simple effect of a move to PPP
increases turnover from 3.3 percent per month
to 3.6 percent per month, but the difference is
not statistically significant.18 The direction of
16
Taken literally, the theory implies that none of the
low-output incumbents should leave since the guarantee
makes them no worse off than before, but some higher-
quality workers are now willing to take the job.
17
This is done so that no mechanical connection be-
tween low output per week and separation would exist as a
result of leaving in the middle of a week.
18
Note that the turnover rates in Table 4 are lower than
the one reported in Table 1. This is because in order to be
VOL. 90 NO. 5 LAZEAR: PERFORMANCE PAY AND PRODUCTIVITY 1355

TABLE 4—SEPARATION RATES BY REGIME AND DECILE

Difference between
PPP and hourly
Hourly regime PPP regime separation rates
Separation Number of Standard Separation Number of Standard Standard
Decile rate observations error rate observations error Difference error
Lowest
0 0.041 1,641 0.005 0.039 1,285 0.005 20.002 0.007
1 0.043 1,465 0.005 0.038 1,491 0.005 20.006 0.007
2 0.042 1,358 0.005 0.037 1,625 0.005 20.005 0.007
3 0.039 1,245 0.005 0.037 1,691 0.005 20.002 0.007
4 0.037 1,282 0.005 0.034 1,693 0.004 20.003 0.007
5 0.038 1,279 0.005 0.04 1,792 0.005 0.002 0.007
6 0.025 1,223 0.004 0.03 1,777 0.004 0.005 0.006
7 0.029 1,135 0.005 0.03 1,879 0.004 0.001 0.006
8 0.03 880 0.006 0.022 2,169 0.003 20.008 0.007
9 0.033 2,437 0.004 0.027 339 0.009 20.007 0.009
Highest
Overall 0.033 13,945 0.002 0.036 15,741 0.002 0.003 0.002

the change is not surprising since a major
change in the pay system may make some of the
incumbents unhappy enough to leave or may
signal that the firm has become less tolerant of
low productivity.
Second, theory predicts that those at the
higher end of the ability spectrum should see
turnover rates that decline. Although the highest
output deciles are the ones that experience the
largest declines in separation rates, the differ-
ences are not statistically significant.
IV. Fixed Effects
Some of the theoretical predictions can be
tested by estimating person-specific fixed ef-
fects. Since the data set consists of multiple
observations on a given individual over time
and under different regimes, person-specific
effects can be estimated. Fixed effects are
estimated from a regression of the log of output-
per-worker-per-day on tenure and time dum-
mies. Should this be done using data from both
regimes combined or from one or the other?
Some workers were employed in both hourly
in the sample for Table 4, the worker must have been with
the firm during the previous month as well. Thus, those who
leave during their first month are included in Table 1 but not
in Table 4.
wage and piece-rate regimes whereas some
worked in only one regime. The theory implies
that incentives are muted during the hourly
wage period, so it is not clear that fixed effects
based on output during the hourly wage period
are good proxies for ability. This might suggest
using the fixed effects estimated during the
piece-rate regime for those who worked in both
regimes. But then separation behavior over the
two regimes cannot be examined since no one
who worked in both hourly wage and piece-rate
regimes left the firm during the hourly wage
regime.
An alternative is to use the hourly wage re-
gime estimated fixed effects, based on the argu-
ment that fixed effects are highly correlated
across periods. Indeed, there is evidence of
strong correlation. Figure 2 shows the scatter-
plot, which reveals the pattern. The correlation
between the fixed effect from the hourly wage
period and that from the piece-rate period is
0.72 with 1,519 observations. This correlation is
high, but not perfect. There are some workers
who performed relatively better under the
hourly wage system than under the piece-rate
system and vice versa. A regression of the fixed
effect from the piece-rate regime on the same
individual’s fixed effect from the hourly wage
regime yields a coefficient of 0.700 with a stan-
dard error of 0.017. The constant term is 20.04
with a standard error of 0.01. The effect of
1356 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
FIGURE 2. SCATTERPLOT OF FIXED EFFECTS FROM
THE TWO REGIMES
ability on effort is attenuated during the hourly
wage period because there is less incentive to
put forth effort. If the fixed effect of output in
the piece-rate period measures true ability,
whereas the fixed effect during the hourly wage
period measures ability only imperfectly, then
the coefficient in the regression of piece-rate
fixed effects on hourly wage fixed effects is
biased toward zero.19 The fact that it equals
0.700 suggests that workers do reveal their abil-
ities to a large extent even during the hourly
wage period.20
This evidence provides a rationale for using
the hourly wage-period fixed effects to examine
turnover. The median level of fixed effect for
those who leave no later than two months after
the start of the piece-rate system (the leavers) is
0.15 with an upper bound of the 95-percent
confidence interval of 0.19. The median level of
fixed effect for those who stay beyond the initial
two months (the stayers) is 0.22 with a standard
error of lower bound of the 95-percent confi-
dence interval at 0.21. The medians are signif-
19
The bias is caused by the standard errors-in-variables
problem, where the observed independent variable is not the
true effect, but instead the true effect plus measurement
error.
20
The relation of ability to output need not be mono-
tonic, especially during the hourly wage period. Since the
lowest- and highest-ability workers, A 0 and A h , earn no
rents, they should be least concerned about losing their jobs.
Middle-ability workers earn rents and may therefore put
forth additional effort to reduce the likelihood of a termi-
nation.
DECEMBER 2000
TABLE 5—VARIATION IN FIXED EFFECTS
Difference
Standard between 90th
deviation and 10th
Number of in fixed percentile in
Regime individuals effects fixed effects
Hourly wage 1,519 0.65 1.28
Piece rate 1,519 0.64 1.12
icantly different, with the more able, as
measured by pre-period fixed effects, being
more likely to stay.21
There is no evidence that the stayers have
higher variance in ability than the leavers. The
standard deviation of the fixed effects for the
stayers is 0.68 and that for the leavers is 0.89,
with number of observations equaling 1,511 and
659, respectively. More evidence on this point
is presented in Table 5, where fixed effects
estimated on hourly wage-regime data are com-
puted for those individuals who worked in both
regimes.
Again, the results of Table 5 suggest that the
prediction about variance in ability finds no
support in the fixed effects results.22 The stan-
dard deviation in fixed effects among piece-rate
workers is virtually identical during the piece-
rate and hourly wage regime. The 90-10 per-
centile is higher during the hourly wage regime.
Although Table 2 reveals an increase in the
variance in output when the firm switches from
hourly wages to piecework, the increase in vari-
ance does not reflect an obvious change in the
dispersion of underlying ability.
Summarizing, it is clear that person-specific
effects are important. They play a significant
role in the interpretation of the results of Table
3, and their pattern is consistent with the theory
in that their mean levels tend to rise as the firm
goes from time rates to piece rates. They pro-
vide no support for the hypothesis that variance
in underlying ability increases when the firm
switches from time rates to piece rates. Ability
21
Part of this difference may reflect pure selection that
would occur even in the absence of a regime change. Pre-
sumably, the tenure variable included in the output regres-
sion controls for most of the regime-independent sorting.
22
The difference between this sample and the previous
one is that the former sample included those who left before
piece-rate-based fixed effects could be estimated.
VOL. 90 NO. 5 LAZEAR: PERFORMANCE PAY AND PRODUCTIVITY
FIGURE 3. KERNEL DENSITIES IN THE TWO REGIMES
is higher among those who work at the end of
the sample period than among workers present
at the beginning of the sample period. Most of
the increase in ability is a result of selection
through the hiring process that occurs after
piece rates are adopted.
The effect of differential changes in turnover
rates, hiring policy, and incentives can be sum-
marized by the kernel densities of output shown
in Figure 3. The two distributions look rather
similar, but it is clear that the piece-rate distri-
bution lies to the right of the hourly wage dis-
tribution. Further, the peak value of the density
function during the piecework regime is lower
than that of the hourly wage regime. There is
less concentration of output around the modal
value under piece rates than there is under
hourly wages.23
V. Pay and Profitability
The effect of the program on pay can be
traced also. Table 6 reports the effects of the
switch to the PPP regime.
The log of pay-per-worker went up by 0.068,
implying about a 7-percent increase in compen-
23
The model in Figure 1, taken literally, implies that
there should be holes in the data, which are not found. There
are a number of possible explanations. First, workers may
try to get into the piece-rate range and fail. Second, since the
unit of measurement is a month, there may be some weeks
during which the worker hits the piece-rate range and others
where he does not, averaging out to some amount between
2.5 and 5 units. Third, the worker may not guess e 0 per-
fectly, and this creates variance around e 0 . Finally, there
may be other reasons to exceed the minimum level of
output.
1357
TABLE 6—REGRESSION RESULTS
Regression
number PPP dummy R2 Description
1 0.068 0.06 Dummies for month
(0.005) and year included
2 0.099 0.76 Dummies for month
(0.004) and year; worker-
specific dummies
included (2,755
individual workers)
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses below the
coefficients.
Dependent variable: In pay-per-day.
Number of observations: 29,837.
sation. Recall that the increase in productivity
for the firm as a whole was 44 percent. Regres-
sion 2 of Table 6 implies that the log of pay for
a given worker rose by 0.099, implying a 10.6-
percent gain in earnings. This is just under half
the increase in per-worker productivity. Thus,
the firm passes along some of the benefits of the
gain in productivity to its existing workforce.
The effect without worker dummies is smaller
than that with worker dummies because the
newer workers are paid less than the more se-
nior workers whom they replace. Further, 92
percent of workers experienced a pay increase,
with a quarter of the workers receiving in-
creases at least as large as 28 percent.
Did profits rise? This depends on the increase
in productivity relative to the increase in labor
and other costs. Given the numbers (44-percent
increase in productivity, 7-percent increase in
wages), it is unlikely that other variable costs of
production ate up the margin still given to the
firm. The piece-rate plan seems to have been
implemented in a way that likely made both
capital and labor better off.24
There is one cost that has been ignored
throughout. Piecework requires measurement of
output. In Safelite’s case, the measurement
comes about through a very sophisticated in-
formation system. But the system involves peo-
ple and machines that are costly. Indeed, in
equilibrium, firms that pay hourly wages or
monthly salaries are probably those for whom
24
The firm’s earnings are up substantially since the switch
to piece rates, but this could reflect other factors as well.
1358 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
measurement costs exceed the benefits from
switching to output-based pay.
In this case, the gains in productivity were
very large. Further, the information systems
were initially put in place for reasons other
than monitoring worker productivity, having
to do with inventory control and reduced in-
stallation lags. The economies of scope in
information technology, coupled with the la-
bor productivity gains, are probably large
enough to cover whatever additional cost of
monitoring was involved.25
VI. Quality
One defect of paying piece rates is that qual-
ity may suffer.26 In the Safelite case, most qual-
ity problems show up rather quickly in the form
of broken windshields. Since the guilty installer
can be easily identified, there is an efficient
solution to the quality problem: The installer is
required to reinstall the windshield on his own
time and must pay the company for the replace-
ment glass before any paying jobs are assigned
to him. This induces the installer to take the
appropriate amount of care when installing the
glass in the first place.27
Initially, Safelite used another system that
relied on peer pressure.28 When a customer
reported a defect, the job was randomly as-
signed to a some worker in the shop that was
responsible for the problem.29 The worker as-
signed to do the re-do was not necessarily the
worker who did the original installation and the
25
This was not always so. Whenever a firm switches
from one pay system to another, it is almost certain that one
system does not maximize profit.
26
27
See Lazear (1986) and Baker (1992).
Beth J. Asch (1990) examines the effects of compen-
sation schemes on military recruiter performance with a
focus on quality dimensions. As recruiters receive incentive
pay for signing up recruits, there is a tendency to take
lower-quality applicants.
28
See Eugene Kandel and Lazear (1992) for a discussion
of the effects of peer pressure and norms in an organization.
29
There are two advantages of assigning the re-work to
the shop rather than the individual. First, the customer gets
faster service since it is unnecessary to wait for the avail-
ability of the original installer. Second, some workers will
have already separated from the firm before the defect is
noticed. Assigning the work to the shop deals with this
problem. Neither argument provides a rationale for forcing
the re-work to be done by others without pay.
DECEMBER 2000
worker was not paid for doing the repair work.
But workers knew the identity of the initial
installer. If one installer caused his peers to
engage in too many re-dos, his coworkers pres-
sured him to improve or resign. More recently,
the system was changed to assign re-do work to
the worker who did the initial installation.
Workers are not paid for the re-do, but they are
not charged for the wasted glass or for other
costs associated with the re-do, as a fully effi-
cient system would require. The outcome has
been that quality has gone up after the switch to
PPP, rather than down. The firm surveys its
customers on their satisfaction with the job. The
customer satisfaction index rose from slightly
under 90 percent at the beginning of the sample
period to around 94 percent by the end of the
sample period. Because re-dos are costly to the
worker, he is motivated to get it right the first
time around.
VII. Piecework Is Not Always Profitable
It is interesting that the productivity gains are
so large for this particular firm. Of course, this
is only one data point and it is one where the
case for piece rates seems especially strong.
Output is easily measured, quality problems are
readily detected, and blame is assignable.
Managerial and professional jobs may not be
as well suited to piecework. The fact that the
productivity gains are so large in this case is
worthy of attention, but these results do not
imply that all firms should switch to piece-rate
pay.
Piece-rate pay, defined narrowly, is used
sparingly in the United States. Although it is
difficult to obtain data on the distribution of
piece-rate work, one national survey, the Na-
tional Longitudinal Survey of Youth,30 asked
whether a worker was on piece rates up through
1990. Results from this survey are shown in
Table 7.
In a subsample of 7,438 workers, 3.3 percent
reported being on piece rates. The number var-
ies significantly by occupation. As expected,
managers, whose output is difficult to measure,
30
The NLSY is a nationally representative sample of
12,686 young men and young women who were 14 to 22
years of age when they were first surveyed in 1979.
VOL. 90 NO. 5 LAZEAR: PERFORMANCE PAY AND PRODUCTIVITY 1359

TABLE 7—PIECE-RATE PROPORTIONS IN THE NATIONAL
LONGITUDINAL SURVEY OF YOUTH
Number in Percent
occupation piece
Occupation in NLSY
Professional/technical 1,848
Managers/officials/proprietors 468
Sales 477
Clerical 1,522
Craftsmen 2,278
Operatives 296
Nonfarm labor 543 13.8
Farm labor 6 16.7
TOTAL 7,438
are least likely to be on piece rates. At the other
extreme, about 14 percent of laborers are paid
piece rates. The use of incentive pay, broadly
defined, is more widespread. Pencavel (1978 p.
228, Table 2) reports a peak of 30 percent of
workers in manufacturing who received incen-
tive pay in the United States in 1945–1946, with
a downward trend afterward.
The relative paucity of piece-rate pay in the
United States is not particularly disturbing for
this study. For one thing, piece rates remain
more prevalent in other countries. For example,
using a data set on manufacturing in Sweden
(which accounts for 20 percent of the work-
force), it is found that 22 percent of workers
received piece-rate pay as late as 1990. But
even were this not the case, the experiment
would be relevant. As far as the workers are
concerned, the effect of a change in compensa-
tion was exogenous, and the data consist of
about 3,000 independent worker responses to
that common change. The implication of the
study is not that firms should switch to piece-
work, but rather that when workers faced a new
compensation scheme, they responded by alter-
ing effort, turnover, and labor-supply behavior
in the way predicted by theory.
VIII. Summary and Conclusion
The results imply that productivity effects
associated with the switch from hourly wages to
piece rates are quite large. The theory implies
that a switch should bring about an increase in
average levels of output and in its variance.
These predictions are borne out. The theory
does not imply that profits must rise. Market
equilibrium is characterized by firms that
choose a variety of compensation methods.
Firms choose the compensation scheme by
rate comparing the costs and benefits of each
1.4
scheme. The benefit is a productivity gain.
0.9 Costs may be associated with measurement dif-
1.3 ficulties, undesirable risk transfers, or quality
1.3 declines.
3.6 The theory above implies that average output
9.8
per worker and average worker ability should
rise when a firm switches from hourly wages to
3.3 piece rates. The minimum level of ability does
not change, but more able workers, who
shunned the firm under hourly wages, are at-
tracted by piece rates. As a result of incentive
effects, average output per worker rises. Thus,
average ability and output, as well as variance
in output and range of ability, should rise when
a firm switches from hourly wages to piece
rates.
The effects of changing the compensation
method were estimated using worker-level
monthly output data from Safelite Glass Com-
pany. The primary predictions of the theory are
borne out. Moving to a piece-rate regime is
associated with a 44-percent increase in produc-
tivity for the company as a whole. Part of the
gain reflects sorting, part reflects incentives, and
some may reflect the pattern in which the
scheme was implemented. The incentive effect
of the piece-rate scheme accounts for an in-
crease in productivity of about 22 percent. The
rest of the 44-percent increase in productivity is
a result of sorting toward more able workers or
possibly some other factors. Sorting occurs pri-
marily through the hiring process, where a dis-
proportionate share of new hires come from
higher ability groups after the switch to piece
rates. There is no strong evidence that the
change to piece rates increases separations rel-
atively more among lower-output workers. Nor
is there evidence of an increase in range or
variance in underlying ability after the switch to
piecework.
Since the data measure actual productivity,
tenure effects on productivity (rather than
wages) can be estimated. Tenure effects on pro-
ductivity are found to be large. Part reflects
learning on the job, but a significant fraction
reflects sorting that induces the least productive
workers to leave first. Also, time since the
1360 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
introduction of the piecework scheme is posi-
tively associated with productivity.
Workers captured some of the return from
moving to piece rates. The average incumbent
worker’s wages rose by just over 10 percent as
a result of the switch. Over 90 percent of the
workers had higher pay during the piece-rate
period than they did during the hourly wage
period.
APPENDIX
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1:
Output cannot fall below e 0 because of the
firm-imposed constraint at e 0 . But output may
exceed e 0 if for some A, A 0 # A # A h ,
(A1) U~W, X 0 ~A!! , U~bf~X*~A!, A!
2 K, X*~A!!
where X*( A) is the effort level chosen by
worker of type A given piece rate b. As long as
there is some type A for whom output rises,
average output must rise.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2:
If any choose to work in the piece-rate range,
then surely the worker with the highest ability
chooses to work in this range. But the highest-
ability worker cannot, except in the rarest coin-
cidence, be A h . If A h chooses to work in the
piece-rate range, then A h , who was indifferent
to working under hourly wages, is at worst
indifferent to working under piece rates, but
more generally, strictly prefers the piece rate. If
A h earns rents under the new plan, then A h is no
longer the marginal worker. There exists an A *h
with A *h . A h who would now be the marginal
worker, i.e., the worker for whom
U~bf~X*~A *h !, A *h ! 2 K, A *h !
5 U~Ŵ~A!, X̂~A!!
where X*( A *h ) is defined as the effort for type
A *h under piece rates b and where Ŵ, X̂ are the
wage and effort on the alternative job.
Also, if any accept the wage guarantee, then
surely A 0 accepts the guarantee. We know that
DECEMBER 2000
A 0 is willing to work for W at effort e 0 because
A 0 worked under these terms before. Further-
more, since the guarantee has not been made
any more attractive, no one with A , A 0 is
willing to work for the guaranteed wage. Since
the lower bound on ability remains the same and
the upper bound does not fall and generally
rises, average ability does not decrease and gen-
erally increases after the switch to piecework.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3:
From the Proof to Proposition 2, A *h $ A h .
But A 0 cannot rise because the wage guarantee
is still available so A 0 remains willing to work.
This is sufficient to imply that range or variance
in ability rises. Also, since all workers choose to
produce e 0 under the hourly wage, but some
produce in the piece-rate range with the new
scheme, positive variance in A implies positive
variance in e under piece rates.
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627. Katrin Sommerfeld. 2012. Higher and Higher? Performance Pay and Wage Inequality in Germany.
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679. Bo H. Eriksen. 2011. Growing Pains: How Employee Turnover Affects Firm Performance. SSRN
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689. Jessica (Ying) Cao, Calum G. Turvey, Jiujie Ma, Rong Kong, Guangwen He, Jubo Yan. 2011.
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690. Marie-Christine Thaize Challier. 2011. Intrinsic Motivation and Real Individual Piecewise Linear
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