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Tolerance and Threat Revisited

Chapter · January 2020

DOI: 10.4324/9780429351549-7

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 Tolerance and Threat Revisited:
The Dynamics of Political Tolerance Under Persistent Terrorism

Michal Shamir, Marc L. Hutchison, Mark Peffley, Yu Ouyang

Chapter in At the Forefront of Political Psychology: Essays in Honor of John L. Sullivan

(Routledge Studies in Political Psychology)
Edited by Eugene Borgida, Christopher M. Federico and Joanne Miller

One of the most consistent findings of political tolerance studies is that threat is a powerful force
in pushing people away from tolerance, defined classically by Sullivan et al. (1982, 2) as a
“willingness to permit the expression of ideas or interests one opposes.” In the first systematic
study of tolerance, Stouffer (1955, 13) acknowledged that Communism, Conformity, and Civil
Liberties was about the "reactions [of Americans] to the Communist threat.” But it was not until
a quarter century later that John Sullivan and his colleagues, in Political Tolerance and
American Democracy (1982), established a post-Stouffer paradigm for explaining political
tolerance and what became a routine finding of tolerance research—that citizens’ perceptions of
threat from highly disliked groups strongly undermine tolerance and thereby put liberal
democracies at risk.

Sullivan et al’s work on political tolerance inspired a generation of research on a core democratic
value. Certainly, John Sullivan’s legacy lives on in our own work on political tolerance. Shamir
and Peffley both worked with Sullivan as graduate students at Minnesota. In fact, Shamir
coauthored one of the classic works on tolerance in Israel with Sullivan in 1983. Hutchison
worked with Peffley at Kentucky and after meeting Shamir the three of them made early plans to
work eventually on the Israeli terrorism and political tolerance project, of which this chapter is a
part. Yu Ouyang, who also received his PhD at Kentucky, assumes responsibility for the misuse
of statistics by the first three authors.

Our chapter reexamines the substantial work on tolerance by Sullivan and others to first clarify
the role of both subjective and objective threat in motivating political intolerance and then to
show empirically how the two types of threat influence tolerance. Our study is unique in its
ability to disentangle the connections between objective threat, subjective threat and political
tolerance toward disliked groups. We do so by examining the role of terror attacks in shaping
perceptions of threat and undermining political tolerance in Israel during an extended period
when all three variables were in flux.

Despite the strong and consistent role of threat in motivating political intolerance, conundrums
abound on the how, why and when of the relationship between threat and tolerance. In his essay
on “Enigmas of Intolerance,” Gibson (2006, 21), discussed “Threat as an Unexplained Variable”
first, noting that “[t]he single most important predictor of intolerance—perceptions of the threat
posed by one’s domestic political enemies—is an unexplained variable in nearly all studies of
intolerance. Thus, the key determinant of intolerance is itself poorly understood.” In other words,
studies using Sullivan et al.'s least-liked tolerance measure regularly find that threat perceptions
are essentially exogenous –i.e., unexplained by other individual-level variables.

1
A related conundrum concerning threat is posed by Sullivan and Hendricks (2009, 379) in their
review of political tolerance research before and after 9/11: "… the role that political threat plays
in shaping levels of political tolerance appears to be largely a subjective one, as perceived levels
of threat often do not correspond well with more objective measures, and it is increases in this
subjectively felt level of threat that seem primarily to diminish levels of tolerance…”. This view
of threat as subjective and enigmatic prevails in much of the political tolerance literature, despite
the authors’ acknowledgment (in the same paragraph) that objective levels of national threat to
“economic and political security (such as during open warfare)” clearly influence tolerance too.

Our chapter takes aim at both conundrums –i.e., the inability to predict perceived threat and the
ambiguity of the relationship between two types of threat--objective and subjective, and political
tolerance. We do so by studying the dynamics of terrorism and perceived threat and political
tolerance toward least-liked groups in Israel over a thirty-year period.

CONTEXT AND THREAT IN POLITICAL TOLERANCE STUDIES

The seminal study of political tolerance by Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus (1982) emerged from
the political context of the late 1970s in the U.S., which was very different from the McCarthy
Red Scare of the 1950s when Stouffer studied tolerance (also see Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus
1979). Sullivan et al. argued that the political context of their study was one of pluralistic
intolerance, where intolerance is high and target groups selection is diverse, whereas the
McCarthy era was best described as focused intolerance, where more consensus exists on the
selection of highly disliked groups, like American Communists and fellow travelers. Sullivan
and others (e.g., Marcus, Gibson and Sniderman) expanded this pioneering research in two
directions. One direction extended the study of tolerance cross-nationally; the other manipulated
contextual conditions using survey experiments.

Our work falls squarely into the first camp. In fact, Michal Shamir and John Sullivan (1983)
undertook the first large-scale comparative study using the least-liked approach in Israel in 1980,
two years after Sullivan et al.’s first survey in the States. In the three democracies that
constituted Political Tolerance in Context (1985), which added New Zealand to the mix, Israel
was selected in large part because of its exceptional threat context, where “a high level of
political threat, both internal and external…to the regime, to the values of most Israeli citizens,
and to their very existence is far more objective and immediate than is the case for Americans”
(Sullivan, Shamir, Roberts, and Walsh 1984, 321; see also Sullivan, Shamir, Walsh, and Roberts
1985). Over the next three decades, Shamir and other Israeli scholars conducted a multitude of
tolerance surveys using the least-liked measure, from which we draw in this study.1

While Political Tolerance in Context produced important insights, the ability to study systemic
differences in the level of objective threat was understandably limited by the use of cross-
sectional surveys in three democracies. Several other studies expanded tolerance research to
more countries with a wider range of objective threat levels, including the former Soviet Union,

1
See also Caspi and Seligson’s study of political tolerance in Israel (1983). We are grateful to Yochanan Peres,
Eppie Yuchtman-Yaar, and Noah Lewin-Epstein for sharing their survey data with us. We are indebted to Yasmin
Alkalai, Yael Proaktor and Jason Kehrberg for their technical assistance in the preparation of the data.

2
Russia, South Africa, Denmark and Canada (for a partial review, see Gibson 1998a, 1998b;
Gibson and Gouws 2003; Sniderman et al. 1996, 2014).2 In addition, Hutchison (2014;
Hutchison and Gibler 2007) undertook a more systematic cross-national analysis using the 1995-
1997 World Values Survey, which included a least-liked measure of political tolerance, and
found that political tolerance was much lower in countries that experienced higher levels of state-
level conflict. Collectively, these cross-national studies shed important light on the types of
objective threat that reduce tolerance among mass publics, but their cross-sectional nature makes
it difficult to unravel various causal influences. Theoretically, both political tolerance and threat
should be assessed over time to allow for a dynamic analysis of how variation in the level of
threat explains fluctuations in political tolerance over time (Peffley, Hutchison and Shamir 2015;
Gibson and Gouws 2003).

The use of experiments—both in the lab and embedded in surveys, opened a second line of
investigation for studying the power of different types of threat to lower forbearance. In Malice
Toward Some (1995), Marcus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse and Wood manipulated threat, as well as a
variety of other conditions (democratic norms, persuasion, source credibility) to enhance our
understanding of tolerance. Survey and laboratory experiments have also been employed outside
the U.S. using a variety of “treatment” conditions (e.g., information, counter-arguments, local
contexts and characteristics of groups) (e.g. Gibson 1998a; Gibson and Gouws 2003; Sniderman
1996, 2014). Moreover, following 9/11, several U.S. studies manipulated various aspects of
terrorist threat (e.g., its salience, imagery, and association with particular groups) to demonstrate
that, indeed, increasing threat invariably erodes tolerance, typically measured as support for
restrictions on civil liberties (e.g., Merolla and Zechmeister 2009; Albertson and Gadarian 2015,
117-124; Malhotra and Popp 2012).

Experimental studies have certainly enriched our understanding of how threatening conditions
influence political tolerance. Nevertheless, while experiments doubtless enhance causal
inference, manipulations of threatening conditions are unlikely to produce the kind of real,
palpable existential threat experienced in countries like South Africa and Israel, or in the U.S.
after 9/11. As Gibson and Gouws (2003) found, for example, manipulating the situational
characteristics of civil liberties disputes in South Africa had almost no impact on political
tolerance levels because the high levels of objective threat in the country created entrenched
views on political tolerance that were not subject to experimental manipulation. If high levels of
systemic threat operating in the background in some contexts can over-power experimental
manipulations of threat and other conditions, it seems premature to conclude that subjective
threat is generally more powerful than objective threat (e.g., Sullivan and Hendricks [2009]).

In summary, despite advances in research on political tolerance, few studies have examined the
impact of large changes in the objective threat environment on either individual perceptions of
threat or the influence of both types of threat on political tolerance. We take up this question in a
specific context: Israel. We know from our prior study that fluctuations in the number of terrorist
attacks are strongly associated with the rise and fall of political tolerance assessed with the least-
liked method over a 30-year period from 1980 to 2011 (Peffley, Hutchison, and Shamir 2015).

2
American cross-sectional survey studies conducted following 9/11 provide a similar extension of tolerance
research to varying conditions of threat (e.g. Huddy et al. 2005; Davis and Silver 2004; Sullivan and Hendricks
2009).

3
We also found that much of the downturn in tolerance occurring after an upsurge in terrorist
attacks in Israel was due to the reactions of individuals on the Right moving toward intolerance.

Peffley, Hutchison and Shamir (2015) did not examine individual-level threat perceptions,
however, since several of the surveys did not include a measure of perceived threat from least-
liked groups (LLGs). Here we examine the 13 surveys3 that include such a measure of perceived
threat to investigate the relationship between fluctuating levels of terror attacks (objective
threat), subjective threat perceptions and political tolerance toward least-liked groups.

TERRORISM, PERCEPTIONS OF THREAT, AND TOLERANCE: HYPOTHESES

Our study combines repeated cross-sections of political tolerance surveys with data on terror
attacks that fluctuate dramatically over time, allowing us to investigate the following questions:
To what extent do fluctuations in terrorism influence citizens’ perceptions of threat from their
least-liked groups? Are shifts in perceived threat driven by reality or do they reside largely in the
eye of the beholder? Relatedly, to what extent do individual-level predispositions moderate the
translation of objective threat to subjective threat? And finally, how do objective and subjective
threat interact to influence political tolerance?

As such, our study is uniquely situated to disentangle the connections between objective threat,
subjective threat and political tolerance. Much of the work on political tolerance is based on
single cross-sectional surveys, which naturally focus on individual-level differences. Indeed,
such studies find substantial variation in subjective threat perceptions -- under presumably fixed
levels of systemic threat. It is therefore not surprising that perceived threat emerges as a strong
predictor of intolerance, even though both theory and research acknowledge the importance of
objective threat conditions. The advantage of studying a single country where objective threat
levels vary significantly over time is clear enough.

Moreover, several developments in Israel since the 1980 survey by Shamir and Sullivan (1983)
make it likely that the connection between terrorism and intolerance in Israel is strongest among
Jewish citizens on the political Right. As was true in 1980, the major cleavage dimension
separating the Left and the Right in Israel is defined primarily by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
After 1980 and up through our final tolerance survey in 2011, Israel faced chronic and persistent
terrorism, with over 1,500 attacks and two organized terror campaigns –the first and second
Intifadas – perpetrated mostly by Palestinian terrorist groups in the occupied territories. Since
1980, Jews on the Right and the Left have become even more polarized on the Israeli-Palestinian
issue, with the Right now more entrenched in its unwillingness to negotiate with the Palestinians
in the occupied territories and its tendency to view Israeli Arabs as a threatening “fifth column,”
while those on the Left attach higher priority to the values of democracy, including minority
rights and peace (Shamir and Arian 1999). Furthermore, political identities are now more aligned
with religious identities, with orthodox and ultra-orthodox Jews consistently identifying with the
Right, while Jews on the Left are more often secular.

3
See Stegmueller (2013) who demonstrates that the use of as few as 12 units in multilevel analysis still produces
robust results.

4
We are not aware of any study that has examined empirically the joint impact of systemic threat
and individual threat perceptions on political tolerance over a prolonged period of time. Two
small-scale studies were conducted in Israel during the second (Al-Aqsa) Intifada. Shamir and
Sagiv-Schifter’s (2006) case study investigated the impact of the Intifada on tolerance using 5 of
our 13 surveys, immediately before and after the onset of atrocities (2000-2002). And Canetti-
Nisim and colleagues (2009) used a 3-wave panel in 2004-2005 to explore the impact of
exposure to terrorism on threat perceptions and intolerance (i.e., what they term, “exclusionary
attitudes”) toward Israeli minority groups. In their model, exposure to terrorism significantly (but
not strongly) influences threat perceptions, although the effects of exposure largely vanish a year
later.

By contrast, our research design exploits the chronic, yet fluctuating reality of terrorism in Israel
over 30 years by combining surveys assessing perceived threat and tolerance toward least-liked
groups with terrorism data assessed three months prior to each of the 13 surveys.

Consistent with the discussion above, we test the following hypotheses:

H1: Terror attacks should increase individuals’ threat perceptions from LLGs, and for
reasons outlined above, this effect should be stronger among Israeli Jews on the Right
than those in the Center or Left. Terrorism should have its maximum impact on perceived
threat when individuals on the Right select Arab groups as least-liked.

H2: Both objective threat (terror attacks) and subjective threat perceptions of LLGs are
expected to increase political intolerance. But, terror attacks can increase intolerance both
indirectly, by elevating subjective threat perceptions, and directly, independent of
perceptions of threat. In the latter case, political, cultural and media elites may activate
preexisting threat perceptions and connect them to tolerance judgments (e.g., Nacos et al.
2011). If so, the direct impact of terrorism on tolerance is unlikely to be mediated by citizens’
perceptions of threat.

H3: Because individuals on the Right tend to be more sensitive to social and political
threats from a range of outgroups, due to political, personality and value orientations
(e.g., Johnston, Levine and Federico 2017; Stenner 2005; Feldman 2003), the impact of
both objective and perceived threat on tolerance is likely to be stronger for Jews on the
Right versus the Left and Center.

MEASURES AND METHODS

METHOD
As noted, we test our hypotheses using 13 national surveys representative of Jewish citizens
from 1980 to 2011.4 Table A1 in the Appendix lists the 13 surveys (for more details on the
surveys, see Peffley et al. 2015). Given that individuals are nested within surveys conducted at
different points in time in this study, we test our hypotheses using a linear multilevel model to
account for the “nested” nature of our data (Snijders and Bosker 2011).

4
Our analysis relies on Jewish respondents because several surveys in our data set included only Jews , who
presently constitute 75% of Israel's population, while Arab or Palestinian citizens are about 20%.

5
MEASURES
Perceptions of Threat. Given the nature of threat in Israel, respondents in various surveys were
asked questions assessing the level of threat their LLG posed toward the government—variously
phrased as the state, the regime, security, or democracy. For the Israeli case, this more direct
measure is an improvement over Sullivan et al’s proxy measure of perceived threat toward LLGs
based on ratings of six semantic differentials (e.g., good-bad, safe-dangerous). Although the
wording of the items varies slightly, all emphasize perceptions of sociotropic or national threat,
which has consistently been found to be a much stronger predictor of intolerant responses than
egocentric threats to the personal safety of oneself or one’s family (e.g. Gibson 2006; Davis and
Silver 2004; Huddy et al. 2005). Responses were coded on a 5-point scale ranging from ‘not very
dangerous at all’ (0) to ‘very dangerous’ (4).5

Political Tolerance. Political tolerance is measured using Sullivan et al’s least-liked approach,
where respondents are first asked to select the group they like the least from a list of groups (or
to suggest a group not on the list) and then asked two political tolerance questions to indicate
their willingness to allow the group to “give a speech on TV” and to “demonstrate,” each
assessed on a Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree (0) to strongly agree (4), with the
resulting additive scale ranging from 0 (low tolerance) to 8 (high).

Political Identification. Left-Right political identification remains one of the most important
predictors and moderators of political tolerance in Israel, with individuals on the Left being more
willing to extend civil liberties to their least-liked group than those on the Right (e.g., Shamir
and Sagiv-Schifter 2006; Peffley et al. 2015). Political Identification is coded on a 5-point scale:
Right (0), Moderate Right (1), Center (2) Moderate Left (3), and Left (4). For further details on
this and other measures, see the online appendix (Section 1) in Peffley et al. (2015).

We also include several social-demographic variables in the analyses as controls: religiosity,

education, age, female, and income.6

Terrorism. Our measure of objective or systemic threat is the total number of terror attacks
perpetrated within the internationally-recognized borders of Israel three months prior to the
survey. The terrorism data are from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) provided by the
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (2014). The GTD
data are the most widely used data of its kind, which allows for greater comparability across
studies of terrorism. Terrorist Attacks is the number of attacks that occurred within 3 months
prior to the start of the survey, which for the surveys in the analysis ranges from 0 to 27, with a
mean of 12 attacks.

Other Macro Control Variables. Because past research shows that political tolerance is higher in
countries with longer uninterrupted democratic governance, where mass publics experience more

5
In the seven surveys that asked respondents whether their LLG posed a threat to the security of the country and to
democracy, responses to the two items were combined (r = .47) and coded to a 0 to 4 scale.
6
We note that due to data limitations, we do not include controls for several individual-level predictors of tolerance,
such as democratic norms and psychological security. Based on prior studies using the least-liked approach, we are
confident that our results do not suffer from omitted variable bias; however, we acknowledge that the omission
limits our ability to identify important micro-level causal mechanisms (see Peffley et al. 2015).

6
democratic learning (e.g., see Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003; Hutchison and Gibler 2007;
Peffley et al. 2015), we include first- and second-order quadratic terms to capture the non-
monotonic effects of Continuous Democracy, measured as the number of months Israel had been
a democratic state by the time of the survey, along with adjustments to make the coefficient more
easily interpreted.7 Also, to control for the possibility that the performance of the economy could
influence either perceived threat or political tolerance, we include a measure of Economic
Growth, the percentage change in GDP per capita one year prior to the survey, based on annual
World Development Indicators (World Bank 2014), which ranges from 0% to 9.2%.

ANALYSIS

Our prior analysis of the entire set of 18 surveys found that as the number of terror attacks rose,
support for political tolerance toward least-liked groups among Israeli Jews declined (Peffley et
al. 2015). To get a rough visual sense of the relationship between terrorism (objective threat) and
tolerance over the 30 years of our study, Figure 1 from the 2015 article charts the average level
of tolerance across the surveys (1980 to 2011) versus the total number of terror attacks per year
(1979 to 2010, the years prior to the first and last surveys). We see that terror attacks in Israel
have been chronic, persistent and quite variable over time, fluctuating between 6 and 131 yearly
attacks, and that fluctuations in tolerance appear to coincide roughly with the rise and fall of
terrorism.

~Figure 1 about here~

TERRORISM AND SUBJECTIVE THREAT PERCEPTIONS

The purpose of our analysis is twofold—first, to determine how fluctuations in terror attacks
influence perceived threat from individuals’ least-liked groups, and, second, to investigate how
objective and subjective threat jointly influence political tolerance. Models 1 through 5 in Table
1 present the results of several multilevel models testing Hypotheses 1 through 3.

~Table 1 about here~

We begin by examining the impact of the number of terror attacks on perceptions of threat from
least-liked groups in Models 1 and 2. Model 1 regresses perceived threat on several micro-level
variables (political identity, religiosity, education, income, age and female) and the three macro-
level predictors. Of special interest are the effects of Terrorist Attacks and the cross-level
interaction between political identity (coded as Right to Left) and the number of terror attacks
(Political Identity*Terrorist Attacks). The significant coefficient for Terror Attacks gives the
impact of attacks among Jews on the Right (where Political Identity = 0).8. The negative

7
Specifically, we convert the months to years by dividing by 12, and set the first survey in 1980 to 0, which means
the last survey in 2011 equals 30.4 years. We set the first survey to 0 to give the constant in the multilevel models a
meaningful interpretation (i.e., when all predictors equal 0).
8
The coefficient of .018 indicates that moving from the minimum to the maximum number of attacks (i.e., from 0 to
27) shifts perceptions of threat from LLGs among right-wingers about one half of one point on the 5-point threat
scale.

7
coefficient for the interaction term indicates that the impact of terror attacks on perceived threat
is significantly stronger for those on the Right versus the Center or Left, consistent with H1.

The full test of H1 is provided in Model 2, where we add a dummy variable to distinguish
whether the respondent selected an Arab or a non-Arab (i.e., Jewish) LLG, as well as a three-way
interaction between political identity, terror attacks and the Arab LLG dummy variable in
addition to all lower-order terms. The significant coefficient associated with the Arab LLG
dummy indicates that among right-wing Jews, Arab LLGs are viewed as more threatening than
non-Arab groups even when the number of terror attacks prior to the survey equals 0.

Because coefficients associated with three-way interactions are difficult to interpret, we plot the
effects of the interactions between political identity and terror attacks separately for Arab (right-
hand panel) and non-Arab LLGs (left-hand side) in Figure 2, based on the coefficients from
Model 2. Focusing on the right-hand panel, terrorism clearly has the greatest impact in increasing
perceptions of threat toward Arab LLGs among Jews on the Right. Calculating the slopes for
terrorism, the coefficients decrease from the Right (.016, p = .001) to the Center (.009, p = .04)
and become small and insignificant for those on the Left (.002, p = .75). Thus, consistent with
H1, terrorism has its greatest impact in elevating perceptions of threat among Jews on the Right
who select Arab political groups as most disliked.

~Figure 2 about here~

Also, judging from the graph on the left-hand side of Figure 2, even among individuals who
selected Jewish (i.e., non-Arab) LLGs, terrorism again has its greatest impact in elevating
perceptions of threat among right-wing Israelis.9 Comparing the effects of terrorism among right-
wingers across the two panels of Figure 2, terrorism elevates perceived threat toward least-liked
Arab groups more than Jewish groups, and this difference is significant. What is most telling is
that among right-wingers, terrorism also significantly raises perceptions of threat toward Jewish
least-liked groups, most of whom are leftist groups that are ideological “fellow travelers” of Arab
groups because they support equal political rights for Israeli Arabs and negotiation with the
Palestinians in the occupied territories (Peffley et al. 2016).

To summarize, in line with our first hypothesis, subjective perceptions of threat are clearly a
function of the objective threat context (i.e., terror attacks), but the power of terrorism to move
threat perceptions is moderated by individuals’ political identities as well as the types of
domestic groups they view as enemies. Thus, subjective threat perceptions are not completely
exogenous, nor are they impervious to real-life threat conditions. Fluctuations in the number of
terror attacks help drive the ups and downs in perceived threat from LLGs, at least among the
Right in Israel.

On the other hand, our results should not be interpreted as a repudiation of the oft-noted finding
that individual-level characteristics are not strong predictors of perceived threat from LLGs. For

9
Among centrists, the flat slope (b = .000) in Figure 2 shows that terrorism has no real effect on perceived threat
from Jewish LLGs, and the slope for left-wing Jews is negative. Leftists select mostly right-wing Jews as least-liked,
which they do not associate with terrorism. Centrists select Jewish LLGs on both the Left and the Right. For the
distribution of LLGs by political identity, see Table A3 in the online appendix in Peffley et al. (2015).

8
example, if we regress perceived threat on the six micro-level predictors for each of the 13
surveys, few predictors emerge as significant in either a statistical or substantive sense (results
not shown). Thus, while perceptions of threat from LLGs are shaped by fluctuations in terrorism
and this impact is moderated by political identity, a large portion of the variance in subjective
threat remains unexplained, consistent with Sullivan's work.

TERRORISM, SUBJECTIVE THREAT PERCEPTIONS AND POLITICAL TOLERANCE

A second question is whether threat—either objective or subjective, helps explain fluctuations in
political tolerance over time, particularly among right-wingers. To test hypotheses 2 and 3, we
estimated multilevel Models 3, 4, and 5 in Table 1, where least-liked political tolerance is a
function of all the macro and micro predictors in Model 2, including the interaction between
terrorism and Left-Right identity, which we know from prior research is significant (Peffley et al.
2015). Model 4 adds the 5-point scale assessing perceived threat from LLGs. By comparing the
coefficient for terrorism in Models 3 with that of Model 4, after perceived threat is added, we can
make a rough assessment of whether subjective threat mediates the effects of terrorism on
political tolerance.

The results for Model 3 confirm that terrorism has a greater impact on political tolerance for
Israeli Jews on the Right than those in the Center or on the Left. Also, as predicted, in Model 4,
the impact of perceived threat on political tolerance is substantial (-.46, p = .001); moving one
full point on the 5-point threat scale is associated with a half-point reduction in the 9-point
tolerance scale. More importantly for current purposes, once we add perceived threat to Model 4,
the coefficient for terrorism among right-wingers (-.035), while still significant, is about 20%
smaller than in Model 3 (-.044), before perceived threat is added. This means that while some of
the impact of terrorism on tolerance is mediated by perceptions of threat from LLGs, much of the
power of terrorism to move people toward intolerance is independent of perceived threat,
consistent with H2.

To test H3, which predicts that the impact of both terrorism and perceived threat on political
tolerance should be greater among the Right, we estimate Model 5, which includes a three-way
interaction between perceived threat, terrorism and political identity (LLG Threat
Perception*Terrorist Attacks*Political ID), plus all lower-order terms. Perceived threat in this
model is measured as a dummy variable indicating low and high threat (split at 2.5) to simplify
the interpretation of its effects. In Model 5, as expected, the impact of the perceived threat
dummy on political intolerance is relatively strong. The coefficient for threat (-1.09) indicates
that even when terrorism equals 0, those on the Right are a full point less tolerant toward their
LLG if they think their group poses a high versus a low threat to the state.

To gain a better sense of how the effects of terrorism vary across political identity and perceived
threat, Figure 3 plots predicted values of tolerance across terror attacks for individuals who
perceive low versus high threat toward their LLG among three political identity groups: the
Right, Center and Left (based on Model 5). Several results stand out in the Figure. First,
confirming prior analysis, terrorism takes its greatest toll in eroding tolerance toward LLGs
among right-wingers compared with centrists and left-wingers. The slope coefficients for
terrorism are about half the size among centrists as they are for right-wingers, and among leftists

9
the effect of terrorism on tolerance is not significantly different from 0. Second, the impact of
perceived threat does not vary significantly across Left-Right groups, which runs counter to H3.
Moreover, the slope for terrorism does not vary across levels of perceived threat among any of
the three Left-Right groups. Although perceiving higher threat clearly reduces forbearance
toward LLGs, the effect of terrorism is approximately the same at high and low levels of
subjective threat.10

~Figure 3 about here~

To summarize our findings, terrorism affects threat perceptions, although there is far from a one-
to-one correspondence between rising terrorism levels and increasing perceptions of threat. Thus,
we can say that perceived threat is “exogenous” only in the sense that individual characteristics
do not move it. We also find that both terrorism and perceived threat influence tolerance. While
some of the impact of terrorism on tolerance is mediated by threat perceptions, most of its
influence in driving tolerance appears independent of subjective threat perceptions, a result we
discuss further in the conclusions.

For now, we note that our findings show that political identity moderates the impact of terrorism
on both perceived threat and political tolerance (Figures 2 and 3). Those on the Right are far
more likely to shift their views in response to terrorism than centrists or leftists. Part of the
reason that right-wingers move more in response to terrorism is they are more likely to select
Arab than Jewish LLGs. But this is not the whole story. Neither centrists nor leftists who select
Arab LLGs respond to terrorism as strongly as right-wingers do in increasing their perceptions of
threat (Figure 2) or lowering their levels of tolerance toward Arab groups (not shown here).
Moreover, Israelis on the Right also downgrade their tolerance toward Jewish LLGs in response
to terrorism, whereas centrists and leftists do not.

On the other hand, political identity does not moderate the effects of perceived threat on
tolerance (Figure 3). Although perceived threat toward LLGs is responsive to fluctuations in
terrorism, a substantial portion of the variance in subjective threat does not appear to move in
response to exogenous forces like terrorism or endogenous forces like political identity.

CONCLUSIONS
The major goal of this chapter is to contribute to our understanding of the seemingly intuitive yet
empirically enigmatic relationship between threat and intolerance. In many ways, our study has
followed in John Sullivan’s footsteps, both theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, we build
on his conceptual innovation of defining tolerance as a willingness to extend basic political
freedoms to groups one opposes, on the pivotal role of threat in explaining variation in tolerance
and on the deep appreciation of context for understanding tolerance judgments. Empirically, we
use his least-liked approach to measure tolerance, and, to the extent that our data allowed, his
now classic individual-level model.

10
We obtain essentially the same results when we estimate Model 5 only for the 3,211 respondents who selected
Arab LLGs.

10
At the same time, our study departs from those of Sullivan and others by focusing on differences
in systemic threat within a single country over time instead of cross-nationally. Moreover, the
variation in the threat environment in our study stems from a particular source—i.e., terrorist
attacks that fluctuate over time. Naturally, the implications of our findings for understanding
tolerance must be viewed in light of the specific context and purpose of our study, which is to
understand how changes in the objective threat environment –i.e., terrorism—influence
subjective threat perceptions as well as political tolerance toward least-liked groups.

Although we rely on Sullivan et al.’s least-liked group measures, we apply them in a way that
suits our overall research question. We began by examining how a very specific type of threat,
the real-world threat context of terrorism, affects political tolerance. For this type of research
question, groups –both ingroups and outgroups—matter. For our purpose, it was important to
examine relationships separately for particular types of LLGs (i.e., Israeli Arabs and Jewish
leftists) associated with the violence by particular ingroups (i.e., Jews on the Right).11 We find
that among right-wingers, terror attacks decrease tolerance toward Arab and Jewish political
groups because they are assumed to be “fellow travelers” of terrorist groups, when in fact they
are far removed from the actual perpetrators of violence. Thus, changes in the objective threat
environment can greatly expand the breadth of intolerance toward groups farther removed from
the source of threat. Although our analyses here reinforce previous findings (Peffley et al. 2015,
2016) that prolonged terrorist campaigns reduce tolerance, the major contribution of this chapter
is in demonstrating that the impact of terrorism is only partly mediated by an increase in
perceived threat from LLGs. Rising levels of terror attacks have a direct impact in increasing
intolerance toward a range of LLGs.

One important contribution of our study is to challenge the prevailing wisdom of tolerance
studies using the least-liked method that threat perceptions are entirely exogenous. We found that
perceptions of threat from least-liked groups are moved significantly by fluctuations in the
systemic (objective) threat environment. Moreover, the degree to which threat perceptions move
in response to terrorism hinges on individuals’ predispositions, which critically shape the way
they perceive the environment. Specifically, when terrorism escalates, Israeli Jews who identify
with the Right were more likely than leftists or centrists to elevate their perceptions of threat
from least-liked groups.

In a departure from the traditional use of Sullivan et al’s least-liked method, we also showed that
perceptions of threat vary across the characteristics of the least-liked groups people select.
Specifically, we hypothesized and found that because most of the attacks during the 30 years of
our study were perpetrated by Arab terrorist groups in the occupied territories, least-liked Arab
domestic groups were viewed more threateningly when terrorism escalated. And given the
tendency of Israeli elites on the Right to vilify Israeli Arabs as a dangerous “fifth column,” Jews
on the Right were again more likely to increase their perceptions of threat from least-liked Arab
groups when terrorism increased.

11
Sullivan, Walsh, Shamir, Barnum and Gibson (1993) used a strategy similar to examine politicians who selected
Kach vs. other groups (in Israel) and Sinn Fein vs. other groups (in Britain) to explore the sources of political
intolerance among political elites.

11
In addition, we found that increased terror attacks prompted right-wingers to elevate their
perceptions of threat toward Jewish leftist least-liked groups. The tendency for the scope of
intolerance to extend to a range of “fellow traveler” groups was first documented by Stouffer
(1955) during the 1950’s, when he found that the threat from communism extended to socialists,
atheists and other groups on the left. Here we observed a similar tendency in Israel for Jews on
the Right to respond to higher levels of terrorism by magnifying their fears of Arab political
groups and Jewish groups on the Left as well. The fact that we found little evidence of terrorism
increasing either threat perceptions or intolerance among the Center or the Left suggests that in
highly polarized societies like Israel, the condition of “focused intolerance” toward particular
outgroups may exist primarily among particular ingroups, such as the right-wing in Israel.

As to the relationship between objective threat and intolerance, we showed that terror attacks
have both direct and indirect effects. Although we found that terrorism has an indirect effect on
tolerance that is mediated by perceived threat, this is only a minor part of the story, since the
impact of terrorism is only slightly diminished once threat perceptions are taken into account, a
finding that is contrary to our expectations. More importantly, terrorism has a direct impact on
tolerance that is significantly moderated by political identification, with the strongest impact
being among right-wingers.

Putting these two results together—i.e., small mediation and substantial moderation, one likely
interpretation is that social and political processes outside individual threat perceptions play an
important role in shaping public support for tolerance. Political, cultural and media elites likely
play a substantial role in targeting and vilifying domestic groups when threat levels rise. Elites’
public messages, legislative efforts and policy enforcement in response to terrorism likely have a
crucial impact on the climate of opinion that influences citizens’ concerns about terrorism and
forbearance. Contrast, for example, the calming response of Danish elites to the potentially
inflammatory events surrounding the “Cartoon Crisis” (Sniderman et al. 2014) to the incendiary
rhetoric of Republican candidates during the 2016 presidential primaries or right-wing elites in
Israel before and after the 2015 Knesset election. It may be that elite rhetoric often activates
preexisting threat perceptions and connects them to tolerance judgments.

Taken together, our results undermine the claim that it is only subjective threat that matters and
not objective threat. Dramatic shifts in real-world threat conditions, such as an increase in terror
attacks, impact citizens’ support for political tolerance. The fact that this influence is only
partially mediated by perceived threat from LLGs clearly warrants further research by political
scientists.

Finally, we wish to emphasize the value of studies such as ours in research fields with shifting
threat contexts, including existential threat. Notwithstanding the value of experimentally
manipulated situations, one cannot lose sight of the primary importance of a country’s context.
While our study focuses on only one country, Israel offers a real-life laboratory for the study of
political tolerance, and, in particular, how terror attacks influence those attitudes. It is no
coincidence that Israel was one of the first countries where political tolerance was studied using
Sullivan’s methodology and remains an important site of recent innovative work in this area.
Moving forward, further research along these lines within the framework of the Sullivan

12
paradigm is very much needed to provide a clear picture of the complex interplay between
objective threat, threat perception, and political tolerance.

13
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FIGURE 1: Fluctuations in Terrorist Attacks and Political Tolerance (1980-2011)

Note: Source: Peffley et al. (2015), p. 823.

17
FIGURE 2: Effect of Terrorism on Threat Perceptions of Arab & non-Arab LLGs across
Political Identity

non-Arab LLG Arab LLG

3.5
3
2.5
2

0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27
Terror Attacks 3 months prior to survey

Right Center Left

Note: Predicted values are based on the coefficients of Model 2 in Table 1.

18
FIGURE 3: Effect of Terrorism and Threat Perception on Political Tolerance across
Political Identity
Right Center Left
6
5
4
3

0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27
Terror Attacks 3 months prior to survey
Low Threat HighThreat

Note: Predicted values and 95% confidence intervals are based on the coefficients of Model 5 in
Table 1.

19
TABLE 1: Impact of Terrorism on Least-Liked Group Threat Perception and Tolerance in
Israel, 1980-2011
Threat Perception Political Tolerance
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Individual-Level
Religiosity .03† (.02) .02 (.02) -.11 (.03) -.10 (.03) -.10 (.03)
Education -.06 (.02) -.05 (.02) .29 (.03) .26 (.03) .27 (.03)
Income -.02 (.01) -.02† (.01) .10 (.02) .09 (.02) .09 (.02)
Age .02 (.01) .02 (.01) -.08 (.02) -.07 (.02) -.07 (.02)
Gender (Male = 0) .11 (.03) .11 (.03) -.24 (.05) -.19 (.05) -.22 (.05)
Political Identity (Right to Left) .04 (.02) .08 (.02) -.01 (.03) .00 (.03) -.03 (.05)
Arab LLG (= 1) .37 (.07)
LLG Threat Perception (0-5) -0.46 (.02)
LLG Threat Perception (0-1) -1.09 (.13)

Survey-Year
Terrorist Attacks (3 months) .018 (.004) .010 (.005) -.044 (.008) -.035 (.008) -.039 (.010)
Political Identity x Terrorist Attacks -.01 (.001) -.01 (.001) .014 (.002) .011 (.002) .010 (.003)
Continuous Democracy .07 (.01) .07 (.01) .06 (.03) .09 (.03) .09 (.03)
2
Continuous Democracy -.002 (.00) -.002 (.00) -.002† .001 -.002 .001 -.002 .001
Economic Growth .00 (.01) .00 (.01) -.01 (.02) -.01 (.02) -.01 (.02)
Arab LLG x Terrorist Attacks .006 (.00)
Arab LLG x Political ID -.11 (.04)
Arab LLG x Terrorist Attacks x Political ID .002 (.00)
LLG Threat Perception x Terrorist Attacks .001 (.008)
LLG Threat Perception x Political ID .03 (.06)
LLG Threat Perception x Terrorist Attacks x Political ID .004 (.004)

Constant 2.04 (.16) 1.89 (.16) 3.73 (.30) 4.66 (.31) 4.19 (.32)
Random Effects Parameter
Survey .01 (.00) .01 (.00) .03 (.02) .04 (.02) .03 (.02)
Residual 1.34 (.02) 1.31 (.02) 4.70 (.07) 4.42 (.07) 4.49 (.07)
Observations
Surveys 13 13 13 13 13
Individuals 8,557 8,557 8,557 8,557 8,557
All coefficients in the table have p < 0.05 except those listed in bold. † indicates coefficient is significant at the 0.10 level.
Note: Entries are maximum likelihood coefficients estimated for the linear multilevel model with a random coefficient specification using Stata 14,
with standard errors in parentheses. Higher values on the following variables indicate: greater political tolerance, political identity with the left, female,
orthodox religiosity, higher threat perception, GDP growth (1 year lag), number of terrorist attacks in the three months prior to the survey,
and continuous years of democracy.

20
 APPENDIX
TABLE A1: Survey Information

Date Sample Size*

1980 (Sept.) 913
1987 (July) 1,150
1989 (Oct.) 1,120
1996 (Feb.) 505
1996 (Nov.) 607
1997 (Dec.) 511
2000 (Jan.) 536
2001 (Jan.) 419
2001 (July) 514
2001 (Dec.) 532
2002 (June) 408
2005 (July) 843
2011 (Feb.) 500

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