Culture and Competence CONTEXTS OF LIFE SUCCESS EDITED BY Robert J. Sternberg and Elena L. Grigorenko AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION WASHINGTON, DECopyright the American Paychologcal Asoctavon ll-ghe reserve Except 2 permite tr the United Sates Copyright Acc of 1976, no par ofthis publication nay be repiaced or iserbuted in any form by any manor ered ina database retteval ste, ehout the prior weten permison che publish Published by ‘American Paycholoplel Association 1750 Fs Sweet, NE ‘Washington, DC 20002 wap ong Toner APA Onder Deparncat PO. Box 92955 Washington, DC 200902984 ‘Te: (@00) 374-272; Drece: (202) 336-5510 Fe (202) 36-5502; TDD/TTY: (202) 36-6123, Online: wwicapacrgtooks) Email eder@spa.cy Inthe UK., Euope Afi, and che Middle Est, copes may be odes from ‘American Poyholeyicl Asexiaion 5 Henverta Seer ‘Covent Garden, London ‘WC2E SLU England “Typeset in Gow by Stephen MeDaxgal, Mechanical, MD Printer: Sheridan Books, le, An Arbor, ML t (Cover Designer: Berg Design, Albany, NY “Technica/Produetin Editor Dan Bracheornde ‘The opinions and statements published athe reponiility ofthe vathos and such pinions and statements donot nccesslly represen he polices ofthe American Prychoogial Asse tion, Library of Congress Cataloging in Publiation Data CClture and competence content of if sues ited by Rost Stemborg and Elena LGrigivenko pen. Incl bibiogrphca ferences and index ISBN 1-59197-0978 1. Cognition andeultre 1. Serberg, Robt J. Grigoreno, Hens. ‘BPSUL.C845 2004 1539 —dez2 2003016804 [Brits Library Catsloguing in Publication Data ACIP eco arn fro the Bish Library rid nthe United States of America Fis EdinWHY CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY IS NECESSARY AND NOT JUST NICE: THE EXAMPLE OF THE STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE [ROBERT J. STERNBERG AND ELENA L. GRIGORENKO I's possible to live ina microworld without having much or any sense of what is going on in the macroworld at lange. For example, for most of human history, diverse aggregations of people lived together but in splendid izolation from one another. Not only were they unaware ofthe similarities and differences among them but they were also not even aware that each other existed. In roday’s world, of course, such splendid isolation is impos- sible, ae least in the developed world. Yer psychologists in the developed world often do research as though they were living in an isolated microworld with litte or no contact with the other microworkls that together constitute the macroworld. Drawing universal conclusions from research in just one country, and often jus a single culture within that country constitutes such Freprtion f h ook wa urpedby Gre REC 9979545 fo he National Scene Foon ‘eutya goverment gone usr he es Act Program (Gt No ROSRCCED) a mise jit of Eval Reach an Improve, US. Orpen of Edvatan Gres ne th per ae ensue ay tas acl alpen Th et, bee “Tarnar eco pra the pasos othe paler ny the ding ech. 207isolation. This research continues despite pervasive evidence that people in sdifferene cultures think and act differently (eg., Greenfield, 1997; Labora- tory of Comparative Human Cognition, 1982; Nisbett, in press Serpell, 2000). ‘Consider for example, expert conceptions of intelligence in the United States. ‘TWO SYMPOSIA ON AMERICAN EXPERT (CONCEPTIONS OF INTELLIGENCE Probably the most well-known study of American expert definitions ‘of intelligence was one done by the editors of the Journal of Educational Psy- chology (“Intelligence and its measurement," 1921), Contributors to the sym- onium wee asked to adres two isu (a) wha they conceived inal gence to be and how it best could be measured by group tests, and (b) what the most cll next steps would be in research Fourteen experts gave tit wicws on the nature of inelligence, with paraphrased dfinisons sch asthe Falowing * the power of good responses from the point of view of ruth or fects (E- L. Thorndike); * the ability ro carry on abstract chinking (L. M. Terman); * sensory capacity, capacity for perceptual recognition, quickness, range oF flexibility of asociation, facility and imagination, span ofattention, quickness or alertness in response (FN. Freeman}; + having learned o¢ ability to lear to adjust oneself tothe envi- ronment (S.. Colvin); * the ability to adape oneself adequately to relatively new si tions in life (R. Pintner), * the capacity for knowledge and knowledge possessed (B.A. C. Henmon); abiologial mechanism by which the effects ofa complexity of stimuli are brought together and given a somewhat unified ef fect in behavior (J. Peterson); * the capacity to inhibit an instinctive adjustment, the capacity, to redefine the inhibited instinctive adjustment in the light of imaginally experienced trial and error, and the capacity to real- ize the modified instinctive adjustment in overt behavior to the advantage of the individual as a social animal (L. L. Thurstone); * the capacity to acquite capacity (H. Woodrow); ‘hecapaciey to leam orto profit by experience (W. F. Dearbom); and sensation, perception, association, memory, imagination, dis crimination, judgment, and reasoning (NE. Haggerty) 208 STERWAERG AND GRIGORENKO (Other contributors to :he symposium did not provide clea definitions of intelligence but rather concentrated on how to tex it. B, Ruml refused to presenta definition of intelligence, anguing that not enough was known about the concept. S.L. Pressey described himself as uninterested in the question, although he became well krown for his tests of intelligence. Of course, there have been many definitions of intelligence since those represented in the journal symposium, and an essay even has been written on, the nature of definitions of intelligence (Miles, 1957). One well-known set (of definitions, also American, was published in 1986 explicely as a follow-up to the 1921 symposium (Sternberg & Detterman, 1986). Stemberg and Berg (1986) attempted a comparison ofthe views ofthe experts in 1986 (including P Baltes, J Baron, J. Beery, A. Brown, J. Campione, E, Butterfield }. Carroll, J.P. Das, D. Detterman, W. Estes, H. Eysenck, H. Gardner, R. Giaser, J. Goodnow, J. Hom, L: Humphreys, E. Hunt, A Jensen, J. Pellegrino, R. Schank, R. Snow, R. Stemberg, and E. Zigler) with those of the experts in 1921. They reached three general conclusions. First, there was at least some general agreement across the two sympo- sia regarding che nature of iatelligence. When attributes were listed for fre- ‘quency of mentiit ir the Evo symposia, the correlation was 50, indicating moderate overlap. Attributes such as adapeation to the environiment, basic mental processes, higher-order thinking (e.g, reasoning, problem solving, sand decision making) were prominent in both symposia, ‘Second, central themes occurred in both symposia. One theme was the ‘one versus the many: Is intelligence one thing or is it multiple things? How [broadly should intelligence be defined? What should be the respective roles ‘f biological versus behavioral attributes in seeking an understanding of in- telligence? ‘Third, despite the similarities in views over the 65 years, some salient differences could also be found. Metacognition—conceived of as both know|- ‘edge about and control of cagnition—played a prominent role in the 1986 symposium but virtually no role at all in the 1921 symposium. The later symposium also placed a greater emphasis on the role of knowledge and the interaction of mental process with dhs knowledge LAY IMPLICIT THEORIES OF INTELLIGENCE AROUND THE WORLD. In some cases, Western notions about intelligence are not shared by ‘other cultures. For example, at the mental level, che Western emphasis on speed of mental processing (Sternberg, Conway, Ketron, & Bernstein, 1981) iS not shared in many cultures. Other cultures may even be suspicious of the ‘quality of work that is done very quickly, Indeed, other cultures emphasize depth rather chan speed of processing. They are not alone: Some prominent WAY CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY ISNECESSARY 209‘Wester theorists have pointed out the importance of depth of processing for full command of material (e.g, Craik & Lockhart, 1972). ‘Yangand Sternberg (19972) have teviewed Chinese philosophical con- ceptions of intelligence. The Confucian perspective emphasizes the charac- |fettc of benevolence and of doing what right. Asin the Wester nocon, | the intelligent person spends a great deal of effort in learning, enjoys learn- | ing, and persists in lifelong learning wih a great deal of enthusiasm. The “Taoist eradition, in contrast, emphasizes the importance of humility, fee- ) dom from conventional standards of judgment, and full knowledge of oneself as wel as of extemal conditions. “The difference between Eastern and Western conceptions of intel gence may persist even in the present day. Yang and Stemberg (1997b) studied contemporary Taiwanese Chinese conceptions of intelligence and found five factors underlying chese conceptions: (a) a general cognitive factor, much like the g factor in conventional Western tests; (b)interper- al intelligence: (c) intrapersonal intelligence; (d) intellectual sel- ion; and (@) invellectual self-ffaeement. In a related study bue with different results, Chen (1994) found three factors underlying Chinese Conceptualisations of intelligence: nonverbal reasoning ability, verbal rea- soning ability, and rote memory. The difference may be due to different subpopulations of Chinese, differences in methodology, or differences in ‘when the studies were done ‘The factors uncovered in both studies differ substantially from those | identified in U.S. people's conceptions of intelligence by Sternberg, Conway, ‘Ketron, and Bemstein (1981) —which include (a) practical problem solving, (b) verbal ability, and (c) social competence—although in both cass, people's Jmplicie theories of intelligence seem to go quite far beyond what conven- | onal psychometric inceligence ests measre. Of ours, comaringthe Chen | (1994) co the Sternberg and colleagues (1981) study simultaneously varies both language and culture ‘Chen and Chen (1988) varied only anguage. They explicitly compared the concepts of intelligence of Chinese graduates from Chinese-language versus English-language schools in Hong Kong, They found that both groups considered nonverbal reasoning skills asthe most relevant skill for measur- ing intelligence. Verbal reasoning and social skills came next, and then au- ‘merical skill. Memory was seen as least important. The Chinese-language- schooled group, however, tended to rate verbal skis as less important than did che English-language-schooled group. Moreover, in an earlier study. hen, Braithwaite, and Huang (1982) found that Chinese students viewed memory for facts at important for intelligence, whereas Australian students viewed these skills as of only trivial importance. Das (1994), also reviewing Eastern notions of intelligence, has suggested thac in Buddhist and Hindu philosophies, intelligence involves waking up, noticing recognizing, understanding, and comprehending, but aso includes 210 STERNBERG AND GRIGORENKO such things as determination, nental effore, and even feelings and opinions in addieion to more intellectual elements. Differences among cultures in conceptions of intelligence have been recognized for some time. Gill and Keats (1960) noted that Australian Uni- versity students value academi: skills and the ability to-adape to new events as critical to intelligence, whereas Malay students value practical sll, ‘as well as speed and creativity. Dasen (1984) found that Malay students ‘emphasize both social and cagnitive attributes in their conceptions of incelligence. The diferences beaween East and West may be duc to differences in the Kinde of skills valued by the wo kinds of culeures (Srivastava & Misra, 1996). Western cultures and their schools emphasize what might be called “technological intelligence” (Mundy-Castle, 1974), and so things like artifi- cial intelligence and so-called smart bombs are viewed, in some sense, as ancelligent or smart. ‘Western schooling also emphasizes other things (Srivastava & Misra, 1996), suchas or going bes mation given (Connolly ‘S Bruner, 1974; Goodnow, 1976), speed (Sternberg, 1985), minimal moves to.a solution (Newell & Simon, 1972), and creative thinking (Goodnow, 1976). Moreover silence is interpreted asa lack of knowledge (Irvine, 1978). In contrast, the Wolof tribe in Africa views people of higher social class and sistinction as speaking less (Irvine, 1978). This ference between the Wolof and Western notions suggests the usefulness of looking at African notions of intelligence asa possible contiast to U.S. notions. ‘Studies in Aftica in fact provide yet another window on the substantial differences, Ruzgis and Grigorenko (1994) have argued thar, in Affi ‘ceptions of intelligence revolve largely around skills that help ro acilirate ‘and mainain harmonious and stable intergroup relations, intragroup rela- tions are probably equally important and at times more important. For ex- ample, Serpell (1974, 1982, 1996) found that Chewa adults in Zambia em- pphasize social responsibilities, cooperativeness, and obedience as important to intelligence; intelligent children are expected to be respectful of adults ‘Kenyan parents also emphasize responsible participation in family and social lifeas important aspects of intelligence (Super & Harkness, 1982, 1986, 1993) In Zimbabwe, the word for intelligence, ngware, actually means to be pr dent and cautious, particularly in social relationships. Among the Baoule, service to the family and communicy and politeness toward and respect for elders are seen as key to intelligence (Dasen, 1984). ‘Similar emphasis on social aspects of intelligence has been found as well among two other African groups, the Songhay of Mali and the Samia of Kenya (Putnam & Kilbride, 1980). The Yoruba, another African tribe, em: haste the Importance of degth—of listening rather than just talking —ro clligence, and of being able o see all aspects ofan ise and of being able to place the issue in its proper overall context (Durojaiye, 1993). WHY CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY IS NECESSARY 21“The emphasis on the social aspects of intelligence is not limited to ‘Afvican cultutes. Notions of intelligence in many Asian culture also em- phatze the social aspect of inclligence more than does the conventional ‘Wester or IQ-Gased definition (Azuma & Kashiwagi, 1987; Lut, 1985; Poole, 1985; White, 1985). Ie should be noted chat neither Affican nor Asian notions emphasie exclusively social notions of intelligence. These conceptions of intelligence ‘much more emphasize social skills than do conventional conceptions of incel- ligence in the United Stats, a the same time chat they recognize the impor- tance of cognitive aspects of intelligence. In a study of Kenyan conceptions of ieweligence (Grigorenko etal, 2001); i was found tha there are four distinct terms constituting conceptions of intelligence among rural Kenyans—rieko (nowedge and sil), lun (respect), inj (comprehension of ow tohandle real-life problems), paro (initiative)—with only che first directly refering t0 knowledge-based skills (including but not limited to the academic). Tis important ro realize, again, that there is no one overall conception of intelligence in the United States. Indeed, Okagaki and Stemberg (1993) found that different ethnie groups in San Jose, California, had rather differ cent conceptions of what it means to be intelligent. For example, Latino parents of schoolchildren tended to emphasize the importance of sc competence sills in their conceptions of intelligence, whereas Asian par- _ents tended rather heavily to emphasize the importance of cognitive sil ‘Anglo parents also more heavily emphasized cognitive skills. Teachers, rep- resenting the dominant culture, gave more emphasis to gognitive- than so- cial-compecence skills The rank order of children of vatious groups perfor- ‘mance (including subgroups within the Latino and Asian groups) coud be perfectly predicted by the extent to which their parents shared the teachers! ception of intelligence. In other words, eachers tended to reward those children who were socialized into a view of iitelligence that happened to correspond to the teacher’ own. Yet, as we shall argue later, social aspects of intelligence, broadly defined, may be as important as or even more impot- tant than cognitive aspects of intelligence in later life. Some, however pre- fer co study intelligence not in its social aspect, but in its cognitive one. EXPLICIT THEORETICAL INVESTIGATIONS OF INTELLIGENCE AROUND THE WORLD Many times, investigations of intelligence conducted in settings out- side the developed world can yield a picture of intelligence that is quite at variance with the picture one would obtain from studies conducted only in the developed world. Ina study in Usenge, Kenya, near the town of Kisumu, ‘Stenberg and his colleagues were incerested in school-age children’s ability to adape co their indigenous environment. They devised a test of practical intelligence for adaptation tothe environment (see Sternberg & Grigorenko, 212 STERNBERG ANDGRIGORENKO 1997; Sternberg, Nokes, etal, 2001). The est of practical intelligence mea- sured children's informal racit knowledge for natural herbal medicines that the villagers believe can be used to fight various types of infections. Children in the villages use their knowledge of these medicines an average of once a week in medicatng themselves and others. Thus, tests of how to use these medicines constitute effective measures of one aspect of practical intelligence as defined by the villagers as well as their life circumstances in their environ- rental contexts. Middle-lass Westerners might find it quite a challenge to thrive or even survive in these contexts, of, for that matter, inthe contexts of urban ghettos often not distant from their comfortable homes. ‘The researchers measured the Kenyan children's ability to identify he medicines, where they come from, what they aze used for, and how they are dosed. On the basis of work the researchers had done elsewhere, they ex- pected thar scores'on this test would not correlate with scores on conven tional rests of intelligence. To test this hypothesis, they also administered to the 85 children a measure of fluid or abstract-reasoning-based abil well 35 2 vocabulary scale, which was a measure of crystallized or formal- knovledge-Pased abilities. n addition, they gave the chikiren a comparable test of vocabulary in their own Dholuo language. The Dholuo language s spoken in the home, English in the school "The researchers did indeed find-no correlation between the test of indigenous tacit knowledge and scores on the Auid-ability tess. But to their surprise, they found statistically significant corelations ofthe eae knowledge tests with the tests of crystallized abilities. The correlations, how- ‘eve, were negative. In other words, the higher the children scored on the test ‘of tacit knowledge, the lower they scored, on average, on the tests ofcrystal- lized abilities. This surprising resule can be interpreted in various ways, but based on the ethnographic observations ofthe anthropologists on the team, Geissler and Prince, the researchers concluded that plausible scenario takes ino account the expectations of families for their children. Many children drop our of sehool before graduation, for financial or other reasons, and many families in the village do not particularly value for- ‘mal Western schooling. There is no reason they should, asthe children of ‘many families will for che most part spend thet lives farming or engaged in other occupations that make little oF no use of Western schooling. These families emphasize eaching their children the indigenous informal know- edge that will lead to succesfil adaptation in the environments in which they will ive. Children who spend theie time learning the indigenous practi- cal knowledge ofthe communiey generally do not invest chemselves heavily indoing well in school, whereas children who do well in school generally do not invest themselves as heavily in learning the indigenous knowledge— hhence the negative correlations. ‘The Kenya study suggests that the identification of a general factor of ‘human intelligence may tell us more about how abilities ineract with patteras WHY CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY IS NECESSARY 213|) of schooling and especially Westem parers of shestcture of human abilities. In Wester school \ variety of subject martes from an early age and thus develop skills ina var- cy of hil areas. This kind of schooling prepares the children to take atest of intelligence, which typically measures kil in a variety of areas Often intelli- sence tests measure sills that children were expected to acquice a few years before taking the intelligence test. Bucas Rogoff (1990) and others have noted this pattem of schooling i no universal and has not even been common for hvof the Ristory of hurhankind: Throughout history and in many places Ball schooling, especially for Boys, takes the form of apprenticeships in which, children leam a craft from an early age. They leam what they will need to kknow to succeed in a trade, but not a lot more. They are not simultaneously engaged in tasks that require the development of the particular blend of skills ‘measured by conventional intelligence test. Hence itis les likely that one would observe a general factor in thee scores, much asthe investigators dis covered in Kenya. Some years back, Vernan (1971) pointed out that the axes cof factor analysis do not necessarily reveal a Intent structure of the mind but rather representa convenient way of characterizing the organization of mental abilities. Vemon believed that there was no one right orientation of axes, and indeed, mathemacically, an infinite number of orientations of axescan be ficto ‘any solution in an exploratory factor analysis. Vernon's point seems pethaps to have been forgotten oF at least ignored by later theorists. We have found related although cerainly not identical results in study we have done among Yup'ik Eskimo children in soythwestern Alaska {Grigorenko etal, 2002). We assessed the importance of academic and prac- tical intelligence in rural and urban Alaskan communities. A total of 261 children were rated for practical skills by adults or peers in the study: 69 in Sth grade, 69 in LOch grade, 45 in 11th grade, and 37 in 12th grade. Of these children, 145 were girls and 116 were boys, and they were from seven differ tent communities, six rural and one relatively urban, We measured academic intelligence with conventional measures of fluid and crystallized intelligence. ‘We measured practical intelligence with atest of tacit knowledge as 29 in rural Alaskan Yup'tk communities. The urban children generally outper- formed the rural children on a measure of crystallized intelligence, but the rural children generally outperformed the urban children on the measure of Yupik tacie knowledge. The test of tacie knowledge was superior to the tests ‘of academic intelligence in predicting practical skills of the rural children (Coe whom the tet was created), but not ofthe urban ones. “The test of practical inceligence develope for use in Kenya, swell as some of the other practically based tests described in this book, may seem more like texts of achievement or of developing expertise (see Ericsson, 1996; Howe, Davidson, & Sloboda, 1998) ¢ ntelligence. But it can be ar- sued that intelligence is itself form of developing expertise and that there is ‘no clear-cut distinction between the two constructs (Sternberg, 1998, 1999). ong than ic does about 214 STERNBERG AND GRIGORENKO Indeed, all measures of intelligence, one might argue, measure a form of de- veloping experi at n example of how tests of intelligence measure developing expertise rather chan some fixed quantity emanates from work we have done with «colleagues in Tanzania, Onestucly (see Sternberg & Grigorenko, 1997, 2002; ‘Stemberg, Grigorenk, etal, 2002) poins ou the risks of giving tests, scoring ‘them, and interpreting the results as measures of some latent intellectual abil- ity or abilities. The investgater administered o 358 school children between ‘the ages of I and 13 years near Bagamayo, Tanzania, ests including a form: board classification tes, a linear syllogism test, and a Twenty Questions Test, which measure the kinds of sills required on conventional tests of incelli- agence. OF course, the investigators obtained scores thae they could analyze and ‘evaluate, ranking the children in terms oftheir supposed general or other abili- ties. However, they administered the tests dynamically rather than statically (Brown & Ferrara, 1985; Budoff, 1968; Day, Engelharde, Maxwell, & Bolg, 1997; Feuerstein, 1979; Grigorenko & Stemberg, 1998; Guthke, 1993; Haywood ‘& Taurel, 1992; Lids, 1987, 1991; Taurel, 1995; Vygoesky, 1978). Dynamic resting is like conventional satc testing in that individuals are tested and inferences about thei abilities made. But dynamic tests dif in that children ate given some kind of feedback to help them improve their scores. Vygotsky (1978) suggested thatthe chbiren's ability to profic from such guided instruc- during the testing sesion could serve as a measure of children's zone of al development, or the diffrence berween their developed abilities and ‘their latene capacities. In other words, testing and instruction are treated as being of one piece rather than as being distinct processes. This integration makes sence in tems of traditional definitions of intelligence asthe abi to lear (“Intelligence and its measurement,” 1921; Stemberg & Detterman, 1986) ‘What a dynamic test does is directly measure processes of laring in the con text of testing rather than measuring these processes indiectl asthe product ‘of gast Fearing Such measurement is especially important if not all children Jhave had equal opportunities learn in the past. ~~ Inthe assessments, chiléren were fist given che ability tests. Then they "were given a brief period of instruction in which they were able to learn skills that would potentially enable them to improve their scores. Then they were in. Because the instruction for each test lasted only about 5to 10 minutes, one would not expect dramatic gains. Yet, on average, the gains were statistically significant, More important, scores on the pretest shoved ‘only weak although signifientcortelations with scores on the posttest. These ‘corcelations, at about the 3 level, suggested that if tests are administered ‘statically to children in developing countries, chey may be rather unstable and easily subject co influences of training. The reason could be that the children are not accustomed to taking Western-style tests, and so proftquikly even from small amount of instruction as to what is expected from them. OF course, the more important question is not whether the scores changed oF WHYCULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY ISNECESSARY 215‘even correlated with each other, but rather how they corelated with other ‘cognitive measures, In other words, which text wasa better predictor of wansfer ‘other cognitive performance, the pretest score or the pastes score? The investigators found the postet score tobe che beter predictor Tn inerpreting results, whether from developed or developing culeures, icisalways important co rake into account che physical health of the partici fans one testing. Inastadywe dd in Jamaica (Sternberg Powell, McGrane, & McGregor, 1997), we found that Jamaican schoolchildren who exper enced parasitic illneses (for the most part, whipworm or Ascaris) did more poorly on higher-level cognitive tests (such as of working memory and rea- Soning) than did children who didnot experience these illnesses, even after controlling for socioeconomic status. Why might such a physical illness cause a deficit in higher-level cognitive skills? ‘Ceci (1996) has shown tha increased levels of schooling ae associated with higher IQ. Why would there by such a relation? Presumably, in pat because schooling helps children develop the kinds of skills that are mea sured by IQ test, and that are important in tur for survival in school. Chil dren with whipworm-induced illnesses and related illneses are less able to profi frm school chan ae children without cheseillneses. Every day they 9 t school, chey are likely to be experiencing symptoms such as listlessness, Stomachache, and dificults in concentrating, These symptoms reduce the extent t0 which they are able co profit ftom instruction and in turn reduce their ultimate performance on higher-level cognitive test. CCoystllsed-ability tests, such a tests of vocabulary and general informa tior, certainly measure developing and aleady-developed knowledge bases. ‘Avlable data suggest cha Nuld-abiiy tests, suc as tests of abstract reason- ing, measure developing and developed expertise even more strongly than do crysallized ability texte, Probably the bee evidence for ths lai shat fll “blir ests have shown much greater increases in scores over the past several sthanl abil tes (Flynn, 1984, 1987, 1998; Nese, 1998). The if perio of time during which ches increases have ccesed (about 9 points of IQ per generation) suggests an environmental rather than a genetic cause ofthe increases. And the substantially greater increase for fluid chan for crystallized vests suggests that uid ests, hike all other tests, actu allymeasue an expetse acquired through interactions with the envionment. “This not to say that genes do not influence ineligence: Almost eerainly the; do (Bouchard, 1997; Plomin, 1997, Scary, 1997). Rather, the points that theenvironment always mediates their influence and tes of inceligence me sure gene-environment interaction effects. The measurement of inceligence {ely asesament of varius forms of developing expertise. “The forms of developing expertise chat are viewei as practically or oth- ce intelligene may differ from one society to another or fom one sector of agiven vciety toanother For example, procedural knowledge about natural hrertal medicines, on the one hand, of Wester medicines, onthe cher, nay 216 STERNBERG AND GRIGORENKO be critical to survival in one society, and irelevant to survival in another (eg, in which one or the other type of medicine isnot available): Whereas ‘what constitutes components of intelligence is universal, the content that ‘constines €5< application of these components to adapearion to and dap ing afd selection of environments is culturally and ever subculeurally vai- able. But practical spects of intelligence ate important everywhere, as shown ina study we conducted in Russa ~ “Ta this study (Crigorenko & Sternberg, 2001), we tested 511 Russian school children (ranging in age from 8-17 years) as well as 490 mothers and [328 fathers of these children. We used entirely distinct measures of analyti- ‘cal, creative, and practical intelligence. Consider, for example, the rests used for adults. Similar tests were used for children. ‘We measured fluid analytical intelligence by two subtests of atest of ‘nonverbal intelligence. The Testo g Cultue Fair, Level I (Catcell & Cattell, 1973) is atest of fluid intelligence designed to reduce, as much as possible, the influence of verbal comprehension, culture, and educational level, al though no test eliminates such influences. In the fist subtest, Series, we presented individeals with an incomplete, progressive series of figures. The participants’ task was to select, from among the choices provided, the answer that best continued the series. nthe Matrices subtest, the task was to com- plete the matrix presented atthe left ofeach row. ‘The tes” of crystallized intelligence was adapted from existing tradi- tional tests of analogies and synonyms and antonyms used in Russia. We used ‘adaptations of Rusian rather than American tests because the vocabulary used in Russia differs from that used in the United States. The first part of the test included 20 verbal analogies (KR20 = 0.83). An example i cirle= ball = squre-? (a) quadrangular, (b) figure, (c) rectangular, (2) soli, (e) cube. “The second part included 30 pairs of words and the participants’ task was to specify whether the words in the pair were synonyms or antonyms (KR20 0.74), Examples ate latent-hidden, and systematic-chaoic tive intelligence also comprised two parts. The frst part asked the participants ro describe the world through the eyes of insect. “The second part ased participants to describe who might liveand what might ‘nature of che planet was specified. Each part of the test was scored in three differene ways to yield three differene scores. The fist score was for original- Lity (novelty); the second Was for the amount of development in the plot “Tqualty): and the third was for creative use of prior knowledge in these rela- tively novel kinds of tasks (sophistication). The mean interstory reliabilities ‘were 69,75, and 75 forthe three respective scores al of which were statis- tically significane a che p< 001 level. ‘The measureof practical intelligence was self-eport and also comprised wo pars, We designed the first part as « 20-item, self-report instrument assessing practical skills in the social domain (eg. effective and successful WHYCULTURALPSICHOLOGY IS NECESSARY 217‘communication with other people), in the family domain (e.g, how to fox hhouschold items, how co run the family Budget), and inthe domain of effec tive resolution of sudden problems (e-., organizing something that has be= ‘coine chaotic). For the subscales, intemal consistency estimates varied from 10.50 to 0.77. In this study, only the total practical intelligence selfrepore scale was used (Cronbach's alpha =.71), The second part had four vignettes, based on themes that appeared in popular Russian magazines in the context of dicusion of dopa nthe cue society. The four theres wee respectively, how tb maintain the value of one's savings, what to do if one makes a purchase and discovers thatthe item one has purchased is broken, how to locate medical assistance in a time of need, and how to manage & salary bonus one his received for oustanding work. Each vignette was ac- companied by five choices and participants had to select the best one. Obvi- ‘ously, there is no ene right answer inthis type of situation. Hence We used the most frequently chosen response asthe keyed answer. To the extent that ‘his response was suboptimal, this Suboptimality would work against the e- searchers in subsequent analyses relating scores on this test to other predic- tor and criterion measures. In this study, exploratory principal-component analysis for both chil- dren and adults yielded very similar factor structures. Both varimax and oblimin rotations yelded clear-cut analytical, creative, and practical factors for che tests. Thus, with a sample ofa different nationality (Russian), a differ cent set of tests ané a different method of analysis (exploratory rather than confirmatory analysis) again supported the theory of succesful intelligence. Tn this same study, the analytical, creativ 1 Rests the in setignorsemployed were wate predict metal and phil health smong the Russian adults. Mental health was measured by widely used paper-and- pencil tes of depression and anxiety, and physical health was measured by “seffrepore. The best predictor of mental and physical health was the practi- “eal intelligence measure. Analytical intelligence came second and creative ied. All three contributed to prediction, however. Thus, the researchers agsin concluded that a theory of intelligence encompassing three el rovides better prediction of success in life than does a ‘theory comprising just the analytical element. CONCLUSION ‘We have argued in this chapter chat doing research in microworkls ean tell you a lot~abaut those microworle Iedoes nor rel you mich about the :macroworld of which the various microworlds area pat. People rom devel- ~ountries,atd especially Wester ones, can show and have shown a certain kind of arrogance in assuming that concept (such as implicit theo- ties of intelligence) or sults (euch as of studies based on explici theories of 218 STERNBERG AND GRICORENKO intelligence) obtained in one culrure—usually their culture—apply anywhere Inallikelihood, they do noc: Ora least, iteannot be asumed they do until this assumption is ested, Many ofthe results we have described here are a variance with sesults typically obtained in Western counties. Other investigators, a well, have obtained results that differ dramatically fom those obtained in the devel- oped West. We believe, therefore, that cult cal constructs, such as intelligence, REFERENCES ‘Azuma, H., & Kashiwa, K. (1987). Desriptions for an intelligent person: A Japa nese sudy. Japanese Psychological Research, 29, 17-26. Bouchard, T, Jt (1997). IQ similarity in twins reaed apart: Findings and responses twcrites. In RJ Stemberg & EL, Grigorenko (Eds), Iligence, heredity, and envionment (pp. 126-160). New York: Cambridge University Pres. Brown, A. L, & Ferrara, R. A. (1985). Diagnosing ones of proximal development. In]. V. Weresch (Ea), Culture, commusicaten, end conan: Vygotskian pe. spectves (pp. 273-305), New York: Cambridge University Pres. Budoff, M. (1968). Learning potential as a supplementary assessment procedure. In |: Hello (Ed), Learn dirs (Vo 3p, 295-34) Sette, WA: Spe cial Chil CCarcll,R. B, & Cattell, H. E.P. (1975). Measuring intligence wih he Cure Fait Teas. Champaign, IL: Institue fr Peronality and Ability Testing. (Ceci, S.J. (1996). On inllence... more or ls (Expanded ed). Cambridge, MA: ~ Harvard Univesity Pres. (Chen, M.J (1994). Chinese and Australian concepts of nelligence. Peychology and Developing Societies, 6, 101-117 Chen, M. J. Brathwaite, V., & Huang, J. T. (1982). Autsibutes of intelligent behaviour: Perceived relevance and difeulty by Australian and Chinese stu- dents. Journal of Cross-Cultural Pschology, 13, 139-156 Chen, M. Jn, & Chen, H.C. (1988). Concepts of inelligence: A comparison of Chinese graduater fom Chinese and Englich schools in Heng Kong. Inter tional Journal of Psychology, 223, 471-487 (Connolly, H., 6 Bruner J (1974). Competence: Is nature and nurture. In K.Connelly 6) Bruner (Es), The grout of commence (3-10), NewYork: Acaenic Cat, FI. Ms & Lockhart, RS. (1972). Levels of processing: A framework for smemoey research Journal of Verbal Learning an Verbal Behavior, 11, 671-684, Das J.P. (1994). Easter views of intelligence In RJ. Sternberg (Ed), Encylopedia of human ineligence (Vol. 1, pp. 387-391). New York: Mscmilla. Dasen, P, (1984). The cross-cultural study of intelligence: Piaget and the Baoule, IruernationalJouralof Psychology, 19, 407-434 WHYCULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY IS NECESSARY 219Day, J: Da Bngetharit, J. L, Maxwell, S. E., & Bolig, EE. (1997), Comparison of ‘atic and dynamic assesment procedures and their relation to independent performance. Jaunal of Educational Psychology, £9, 358-368, Durojaiye, M. O. A. (1993) Indigenous psychology in Afeea. In U. Kim & J. W. Berry (Fa), Indigenous psschalgies: Research and experience ix cultural context (pp. 211-220). Newbury Park, CA: Sage Ericsson, K. A. (Ed). (1996). The rad excellence. Mahwah, N): Erlbaum. Feuerstein, R (1979). The dynamic assessment of euaded performers: The learning po- terlaiesment device cheory, instreenss, and techniques. Balinore, MD: Uni- versity Park Press Flynn, J.R. (1984). The mean IQ of Americans: Massive gains 1932 t0 1978. Paycho- logical Buln, 95, 29-51 Flynn, J-R, (1987). Massive IQ gains in 14 nacons. Psychological Bulletin, 101, 171 191 Flynn J-R. (1998). WAIS-Il and WISC-AN guns inthe United Sete from 1972 0 1995: How ro compensate for obsolete norms, Perceptual nd Motor Sail, 86, 1231-1239. Gill R, & Keats, D.M, (1980). Elements of incellecrusl competence: Judgments by ‘Acatralian and Malay university sents, Jouralof Crost-Culnral Pigchology, 1, 233-283 ‘Goodinow, J} (1976). The nature of intelligent behavioe: Questions ased by cross: cultural seudies. In L- Resnick (Ed), The nanue of intligence (pp. 169-188). Hillsdale, NJ: Efbaum. ‘Greenfield, P.M (1997). You can‘ take ic with you: Why pilcies asexsments don't eros cultures, American Psychologist, 52, 1115-1124 ‘Grigoreoko, EL, Geisler, P. W., Prince, R. Okscha, F, Nokes, C, Kenny, D. An ‘etal. (2001). The onguntsarion of Luo conceptions of intelligence: A study of impliciecheores in a Kenyan village. Inematonal Journal of Beaver Develo mont, 25(4), 367-378 ‘Grigorenko, E. L, Meier, E, Lipka, J Mohare,G., Yanes, ., & Sternberg, R. J (2002). The relationship between academic an racial intligene: A case study of the ait knowledge of Naive American Yup'k people in Alaska. Manuscript sub snited for publeation ‘Grigorenko, EL, & Sternberg, RJ. (1998). Dynamic testing, Psycolgia Bulletin, 124, T5111 ‘Grigorenko, E. Ly & Sternberg, R. J. (2001). Analytical, creative, and practical ine telligence ae peditoes of sell-reported adaptive hunetioning: A ease study in Russa. Ineligence, 29, 57-23. ‘Guthke]. (1993). Current tends in theories and assessment of ineligence In JH. M. Hamers, K.Sijsma, & A. J J. M. Ruijsenaars (Eds), Lezming potential as- sessment (pp. 13-20). Amsterdam: Swets & Zeitinge. Haywood, H. C., S. Tzuriel, D. (Eds). (1992). Interactive asessnent. New York: ‘Springer-Verlag. 220 STERNBERG AND GRIGORENKO Howe, M. J, Davition, . W & Sloboda, J. A. (1998). Innate talents: Really oF ‘myth! Behaviral and Brain Sciences, 21, 399-442 Incelligence and its measurement: A symposium. (1921). Journal of Educational Psy- chology, 12, 123-147, 195-216, 271-275. levine, J.T. (1978), "Wolof mageal thinking’: Culture and conservation revisited. Iousnal of Cros-Cultural Psychology, 9, 300-310. Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognition. (1982). Culture and intelligence. ln RJ. Stemberg (Ed), Handbook of human ineligence (pp. 642-719). New York Cambridge University Pres. Lids, CS. (Ed). (1987). Dynamic asesoment. New York: Guilford Pes. Lids, CS. (1991). Pacone's guilt dynamic aseesment. New York: Guilford Pres. Laz, C. (1985). Ethnopsychology compared to what? Explaining behaviour and con- sciousness among the Haluk. In G. M. White & J. Kiekpatrick (Eds), Person, sel, and experience: Exploring Pacific ethnopsychologes (pp. 35-79). Berkley University of California Pres. Miles, TR. (1957]. On defining intelligence, Bris Joumal of Educeonal Peychol- ony, 27, 153-165 Mundy-Casts, A.C. (1974). Social and technological intelligence in Western or [Nonwestern cultures. Universita, 4, 46-52. [Neisser, U, (Ed) (1998). Thersing curve, Washington, DC; American Paycholog cal Assoctaton Newell, A. & Simon, H. A. (1972), Honan problem soluing. Englewood Clif, NI Prentice-Hall Nisbett, RE. (in press). The geography of hough Why we think the wu we do. New York: Free Pres, ‘Oka 6 Stemberg, RJ. (1993), Parencal beliefs and children’s choo pesfor- ‘mance. Child Development, 64(1), 36-56. Plomin, R. (1997). Mentfying genes fr cognitive abilities ond disabilities. In RJ Stemberg & E L, Grigorenko (Eds) nlgence, heredity, and enionment (pp. 89-104). New York: Cambridge Universicy Pres. Poole, FJ P. (1985). Coming neo soctal being: Culural images of infants in Bimin- Kuskusmin fol paychology. In G. M. White & J. Kirkpatrick (Eds), Person, sel and experience: Exploring Pacific ehnopeychlogies (pp. 183-248). Berkeley. University of California Pres Putnam, DB Kari, P.L. (1980). A selaivisi undrsanding of scl eligence ‘among the Songiay of Mal and Smaizof Kenya. Paper presented atthe meeting of the Society fr Cross-Cultural Research, Philadelphia, Rogof, B. (1990). Apprenticeship in thinking: Cognitive development in sca context New York: Oxiord University Pres Rurgis, P.M, & Grigorenko, EL. (1994). Culeurl meaning systems incellgence ‘and personality In RJ. Stemberg& P. Rugs (Eds), Personas and lgenc (pp. 248-270) New York: Cambridge Univetsicy Pres WHY CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY ISWEGESSARY 22Seay, (1997). Behavior genet ond sotlstion thor of inllence: Trace and reconciliation. In R. }. Sternberg & E. L. Grigorenko (Eds.), Invelligence, heredity and environment (pp. 341). New York: Cambridge University Press. Sepa, R. (1974). Aspects of intelligence ina developing country, Afcan Social Reach, 17, 5762598 Serpe. (1982)-Measres of perception. sil, ad inellignc. In W-W. Harup (EA), Review of child development rexcrch (Vol. 6,pp- 392-440). Chicago: Une verity of Chicago Pr. Serpe, R. (1996), Cultural medels of childhood in indigenous scnsaton and forma schooling in Zain In C. P. Hwang SM Lam (Es), Inge of childhood (pp. 129-142). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. ‘Serpell, R. (2000). Intelligence and culture. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), Handbook of ‘intelligence (pp. 549-580). New York: Cambridge University Press. Srivastava, A. K, & Misa, G. (1996), Changing perspectives on understanding i tellgnce: An appraisal idan Pycholea Asa nd Review, 3, 1-34 ‘Stemberg, R. J. (1985). Beyond 1Q: A triarchic theory of human intelligence. New Yor Cambridge University Press. ‘Stemberg, R. J. (1998). Abilities are forms of developing expertise. Educational Re- ‘eather, 27, 11-20. Seembrg RJ (Ed). (1999). Hank of erent. New York Cambridge Univer sy Pres ‘Stemberg, R. J.. & Berg, C. A. (1986). Quantitative integration: Definitions of in- telligence: A comparison of the 1921 and 1986 symposia, In R. J. Stermberg & DK. Deeeran (Eds), Whats ineligece? Contemporary vicapoms om is ar ture and definition (pp. 155-162). Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing. Seemberg, RJ, Cony, BE, Ketron, JL Bern, M. (1981). Peoples on ceptions of intelligence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 41, 37-55. ‘Stemberg, R. J., & Detterman, D. K. (1986). What is incelligence? Norwood, NJ: Ablex Pblishing Sermberg, RJ, & Origoreo, EL. (1997, Fall). The cognitive cous of phscl ‘and mencal ill heslth: Applying the psychology of the developed world eo che problems of the developing world. Eye on Psi Chi, 2(1), 20-27. ‘Sternberg, R. J., & Grigorenko, E. L. (2002). Just because we “know” it’s truc doesn't ‘mean it’s really true: A cnse study in Kenya. Psychological Science Agenda, 15(2), a0. Swembrg,.J, Grigorenko, EL, Narosho,D, Tana, E»Mbise, A. Nokes. C, ‘al (2002). Asssngivlleal potential incur Tanzanian school chile ren, Fligees, 30, 141-162 tember RJ, Nokes K, Gels PW. Prine, Okatcha, F, Bundy, D. A, & Grigrenko, EL (2001). The relconahip between academic and prctcl intelligence: A case study in Kenya. Intelligence, 29, 401-418. ‘Sternberg, R. J., Powell, C., McGrane, P. A., & McGregor, S. (1997). Effects of a ‘parasitic infection on cognitive functioning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 3, 67-76. 222, STERNBERG AND GRIGORENKO ‘Super, C.M.,& Harkness S (1982). The development of affet in infaney and ely childhood. In D. Wagnet & H. Stevenson (Ed), Cultal perspectives on child development (pp. 1-19), San Francisco: Freeman, ‘Super, C.M.,S Harkness S. (1986). Thedevelopmental niche: A conceptualiation the icerface of child and cukute. eration Journal of Behavioral Develop- sent, 9, 545-569. ‘Super, CM, & Harkness, (1993). The developmental niche: A concepralisation ac the inverface of child and culture. In R.A. Perce & M. A. Black (Eds), ife- span devdlopment: A diversity reader (pp. 61-77), Dubuque, IA: Kendall/Hunt ‘Tautiel, D. (1995). Dynamic-ineratve assessment: The legacy of L. S. Vagosky and current developments. Unpublished manuscript Vernon, P.E.(1971). The smucnure of human ables. London: Methuen. “Vygotsky, L. 8. (1978). Mind in society: The development of higher psychological pro- ‘czses. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ‘White, G.M, (1985). Premises and purposes in a Solomon Islanesethnopsychology: InG. M, White & J. Kikpateick (Eds), Person, self, and experience: Exploring Pacific esapsychologies (pp. 328-366). Berkeley: University of California Press. Yang, S. & Seemberg, RJ. (1997s). Conceptions of iteligencein ancient Chinese ‘Philosophy. Joumal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 17(2), 1O1-L19. Yang, S., 6 Sternberg, R. J. (1997b). Taiwanese Chinese people's conceptions of intelligence. Intligence, 25(1), 21-36. ‘WHY CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY IS NECESSARY 223