Republic v.

Sereno
DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

Quo warranto as a remedy to oust an ineligible public official may be availed of when the subject act or
omission was committed prior to or at the time of appointment or election relating to an official’s
qualifications to hold office as to render such appointment or election invalid. Acts or omissions, even if
it relates to the qualification of integrity being a continuing requirement but nonetheless committed
during the incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected official cannot be the subject of
a quo warranto proceeding, but of impeachment if the public official concerned is impeachable and the
act or omission constitutes an impeachable offense, or to disciplinary, administrative or criminal action,
if otherwise.

FACTS:

From 1986 to 2006, Sereno served as a member of the faculty of the University of the Philippines-
College of Law. While being employed at the UP Law, or from October 2003 to 2006, Sereno was
concurrently employed as legal counsel of the Republic in two international arbitrations known as the
PIATCO cases, and a Deputy Commissioner of the Commissioner on Human Rights.

The Human Resources Development Office of UP (UP HRDO) certified that there was no record on
Sereno’s file of any permission to engage in limited practice of profession. Moreover, out of her 20 years
of employment, only nine (9) Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN) were on the records
of UP HRDO. In a manifestation, she attached a copy of a tenth SALN, which she supposedly sourced
from the “filing cabinets” or “drawers of UP”. The Ombudsman likewise had no record of any SALN filed
by Sereno. The JBC has certified to the existence of one SALN. In sum, for 20 years of service, 11 SALNs
were recovered.

On August 2010, Sereno was appointed as Associate Justice. On 2012, the position of Chief Justice was
declared vacant, and the JBC directed the applicants to submit documents, among which are “all
previous SALNs up to December 31, 2011” for those in the government and “SALN as of December 31,
2011” for those from the private sector. The JBC announcement further provided that “applicants with
incomplete or out-of-date documentary requirements will not be interviewed or considered for
nomination.” Sereno expressed in a letter to JBC that since she resigned from UP Law on 2006 and
became a private practitioner, she was treated as coming from the private sector and only submitted
three (3) SALNs or her SALNs from the time she became an Associate Justice. Sereno likewise added that
“considering that most of her government records in the academe are more than 15 years old, it is
reasonable to consider it infeasible to retrieve all of those files,” and that the clearance issued by UP
HRDO and CSC should be taken in her favor. There was no record that the letter was deliberated upon.
Despite this, on a report to the JBC, Sereno was said to have “complete requirements.” On August 2012,
Sereno was appointed Chief Justice.

On August 2017, an impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon against Sereno, alleging that
Sereno failed to make truthful declarations in her SALNs. The House of Representatives proceeded to
hear the case for determination of probable cause, and it was said that Justice Peralta, the chairman of
the JBC then, was not made aware of the incomplete SALNs of Sereno. Other findings were made: such
as pieces of jewelry amounting to P15,000, that were not declared on her 1990 SALN, but was declared
in prior years’ and subsequent years’ SALNs, failure of her husband to sign one SALN, execution of the
1998 SALN only in 2003

On February 2018, Atty. Eligio Mallari wrote to the OSG, requesting that the latter, in representation of
the Republic, initiate a quo warranto proceeding against Sereno. The OSG, invoking the Court’s original
jurisdiction under Section 5(1), Article VIII of the Constitution in relation to the special civil action under
Rule 66, the Republic, through the OSG filed the petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writ
of quo warranto to declare as void Sereno’s appointment as CJ of the SC and to oust and altogether
exclude Sereno therefrom. [yourlawyersays]

Capistrano, Sen. De Lima, Sen. Trillianes, et. al., intervened. Sereno then filed a Motion for Inhibition
against AJ Bersamin, Peralta, Jardeleza, Tijam, and Leonardo-De Castro, imputing actual bias for having
testified against her on the impeachment hearing before the House of Representatives.

Contentions:

Office of the Solicitor General (petitioner):

OSG argues that the quo warranto is an available remedy because what is being sought is to question
the validity of her appointment, while the impeachment complaint accuses her of committing culpable
violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust while in office, citing Funa v. Chairman Villar,
Estrada v. Desierto and Nacionalista Party v. De Vera.  OSG maintains that the phrase “may be removed
from office” in Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution means that Members of the SC may be removed
through modes other than impeachment.

OSG contends that it is seasonably filed within the one-year reglementary period under Section 11, Rule
66 since Sereno’s transgressions only came to light during the impeachment proceedings. Moreover,
OSG claims that it has an imprescriptible right to bring a quo warranto petition under the maxim nullum
tempus occurit regi (“no time runs against the king”) or prescription does not operate against the
government. The State has a continuous interest in ensuring that those who partake of its sovereign
powers are qualified. Even assuming that the one-year period is applicable to the OSG, considering that
SALNs are not published, the OSG will have no other means by which to know the disqualification.

Moreover, OSG maintains that the SC has jurisdiction, citing A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC which created a
permanent Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards, tasked to investigate complaints involving graft
and corruption and ethical violations against members of the SC and contending that this is not a
political question because such issue may be resolved through the interpretation of the provisions of the
Constitution, laws, JBC rules, and Canons of Judicial Ethics.

OSG seeks to oust Sereno from her position as CJ on the ground that Sereno failed to show that she is a
person of proven integrity which is an indispensable qualification for membership in the Judiciary under
Section 7(3), Article VIII of the Constitution. According to the OSG, because OSG failed to fulfill the JBC
requirement of filing the complete SALNs, her integrity remains unproven. The failure to submit her
SALN, which is a legal obligation, should have disqualified Sereno from being a candidate; therefore, she
has no right to hold the office. Good faith cannot be considered as a defense since the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act (RA No. 3019) and Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees (RA No. 6713) are special laws and are thus governed by the concept of malum prohibitum,
wherein malice or criminal intent is completely immaterial.
Sereno (respondent):

Sereno contends that an impeachable officer may only be ousted through impeachment, citing Section 2
of Article XI of the Constitution, and Mayor Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, Cuenca v. Hon. Fernan, In Re:
First lndorsement from Hon. Gonzales, and Re: Complaint-Affidavit for Disbarment Against SAJ Antonio
T. Carpio.  Sereno contends that the clear intention of the framers of the Constitution was to create an
exclusive category of public officers who can be removed only by impeachment and not otherwise.
Impeachment was chosen as the method of removing certain high-ranking government officers to shield
them from harassment suits that will prevent them from performing their functions which are vital to
the continued operations of government. Sereno further argues that the word “may” on Section 2 of
Article XI only qualifies the penalty imposable after the impeachment trial, i.e., removal from office.
Sereno contends that the since the mode is wrong, the SC has no jurisdiction.

Sereno likewise argues that the cases cited by OSG is not in all fours with the present case because the
President and the Vice President may, in fact, be removed by means other than impeachment on the
basis of Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution vesting in the Court the power to be the “sole
judge” of all contests relating to the qualifications of the President and the Vice-President. There is no
such provision for other impeachable officers. Moreover, on the rest of the cases cited by the OSG, there
is no mention that quo warranto may be allowed.

Sereno also argues that since a petition for quo warranto may be filed before the RTC, such would result
to a conundrum because a judge of lower court would have effectively exercised disciplinary power and
administrative supervision over an official of the Judiciary much higher in rank and is contrary to
Sections 6 and 11, Article VIII of the Constitution which vests upon the SC disciplinary and administrative
power over all courts and the personnel thereof.

Sereno likewise posits that if a Member of the SC can be ousted through quo warranto initiated by the
OSG, the Congress’ “check” on the SC through impeachment would be rendered inutile.

Furthermore, Sereno argues that it is already time-barred. Section 11, Rule 66 provides that a petition
for quo warranto must be filed within one (1) year from the “cause of ouster” and not from the
“discovery” of the disqualification.

Moreover, Sereno contends that the Court cannot presume that she failed to file her SALNs because as a
public officer, she enjoys the presumption that her appointment to office was regular. OSG failed to
overcome the presumption created by the certifications from UP HRDO that she had been cleared of all
administrative responsibilities and charges. Her integrity is a political question which can only be
decided by the JBC and the President.

Regarding her missing SALNs, Sereno contends that the fact that SALNs are missing cannot give rise to
the inference that they are not filed. The fact that 11 SALNs were filed should give an inference to a
pattern of filing, not of non-filing.

Intervenors’ arguments:

The intervenors argue that it is not incumbent upon Sereno to prove to the JBC that she possessed the
integrity required by the Constitution; rather, the onus of determining whether or not she qualified for
the post fell upon the JBC. Moreover, submission of SALNs is not a constitutional requirement; what is
only required is the imprimatur of the JBC. The intervenors likewise contend that “qualifications” such as
citizenship, age, and experience are enforceable while “characteristics” such as competence, integrity,
probity, and independence are mere subjective considerations.

ISSUES:

Preliminary issues:

1. Whether the Court should entertain the motion for intervention

2. Whether the Court should grant the motion for the inhibition of Sereno against five Justices

Main Issues:

3. Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant petition for quo
warranto.

4. Whether Sereno may be the respondent in a quo warranto proceeding notwithstanding the fact
that an impeachment complaint has already been filed with the House of Representatives.

5. Whether Sereno, who is an impeachable officer, can be the respondent in a quo

warranto proceeding, i.e., whether the only way to remove an impeachable officer is
impeachment.

6. Whether to take cognizance of the quo warranto proceeding is violative of the principle of
separation of powers

7. Whether the petition is outrightly dismissible on the ground of prescription

8. Whether the determination of a candidate’s eligibility for nomination is the sole and exclusive
function of the JBC and whether such determination. partakes of the character of a political
question outside the Court’s supervisory and review powers;

9. Whether the filing of SALN is a constitutional and statutory requirement for the position of Chief
Justice.

10. If answer to ninth issue is in the affirmative, whether Sereno failed to file her SALNs as
mandated by the Constitution and required by the law and its implementing rules and
regulations

11. If answer to ninth issue is in the affirmative, whether Sereno filed SALNs are not filed properly
and promptly.

12. Whether Sereno failed to comply with the submission of SALNs as required by the JBC

13. If answer to the twelfth issue is in the affirmative, whether the failure to submit SALNs to the
JBC voids the nomination and appointment of Sereno as Chief Justice;

14. In case of a finding that Sereno is ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice, whether the
subsequent nomination by the JBC and the appointment by the President cured such
ineligibility.
 15. Whether Sereno is a de jure or a de facto  officer.

[READ: Justice Leonen’s dissenting opinion: Q&A Format]

HELD:

Anent the first issue: The intervention is improper.

Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a
litigant therein for a certain purpose: to enable the third party to protect or preserve a right or interest
that may be affected by those proceedings. The remedy of intervention is not a matter of right but rests
on the sound discretion of the court upon compliance with the first requirement on legal interest and
the second requirement that no delay and prejudice should result. The justification of one’s “sense of
patriotism and their common desire to protect and uphold the Philippine Constitution”, and that of the
Senator De Lima’s and Trillanes’ intervention that their would-be participation in the impeachment trial
as Senators-judges if the articles of impeachment will be filed before the Senate as the impeachment
court will be taken away is not sufficient. The interest contemplated by law must be actual, substantial,
material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent or expectant. Moreover, the petition of quo
warranto is brought in the name of the Republic. It is vested in the people, and not in any private
individual or group, because disputes over title to public office are viewed as a public question of
governmental legitimacy and not merely a private quarrel among rival claimants.

Anent the second issue: There is no basis for the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to inhibit in
the case.

It is true that a judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner
completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity. However, the right of a party to
seek the inhibition or disqualification of a judge who does not appear to be wholly free, disinterested,
impartial and independent in handling the case must be balanced with the latter’s sacred duty to decide
cases without fear of repression. Bias must be proven with clear and convincing evidence. Those justices
who were present at the impeachment proceedings were armed with the requisite imprimatur of the
Court En Banc, given that the Members are to testify only on matters within their personal knowledge.
The mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for inhibition, especially when the charge
is without basis. There must be acts or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before it
can brand them with the stigma of bias or partiality. Sereno’s call for inhibition has been based on
speculations, or on distortions of the language, context and meaning of the answers the Justices may
have given as sworn witnesses in the proceedings before the House.

Moreover, insinuations that the Justices of the SC are towing the line of President Duterte in
entertaining the quo warranto petition must be struck for being unfounded and for sowing seeds of
mistrust and discordance between the Court and the public. The Members of the Court are beholden to
no one, except to the sovereign Filipino people who ordained and promulgated the Constitution. It is
thus inappropriate to misrepresent that the SolGen who has supposedly met consistent litigation
success before the SG shall likewise automatically and positively be received in the present quo
warranto action. As a collegial body, the Supreme Court adjudicates without fear or favor. The best
person to determine the propriety of sitting in a case rests with the magistrate sought to be
disqualified. [yourlawyersays]
Anent the third issue: A quo warranto petition is allowed against impeachable officials and SC has
jurisdiction.

The SC have concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and RTC to issue the extraordinary writs, including quo
warranto. A direct invocation of the SC’s original jurisdiction to issue such writs is allowed when there
are special and important reasons therefor, and in this case, direct resort to SC is justified considering
that the action is directed against the Chief Justice. Granting that the petition is likewise of
transcendental importance and has far-reaching implications, the Court is empowered to exercise its
power of judicial review. To exercise restraint in reviewing an impeachable officer’s appointment is a
clear renunciation of a judicial duty. an outright dismissal of the petition based on speculation that
Sereno will eventually be tried on impeachment is a clear abdication of the Court’s duty to settle actual
controversy squarely presented before it. Quo warranto proceedings are essentially judicial in character
– it calls for the exercise of the Supreme Court’s constitutional duty and power to decide cases and
settle actual controversies. This constitutional duty cannot be abdicated or transferred in favor of, or in
deference to, any other branch of the government including the Congress, even as it acts as an
impeachment court through the Senate.

To differentiate from impeachment, quo warranto involves a judicial determination of the eligibility or

validity of the election or appointment of a public official based on predetermined rules while
impeachment is a political process to vindicate the violation of the public’s trust. In quo
warranto proceedings referring to offices filled by appointment, what is determined is the legality of the
appointment. The title to a public office may not be contested collaterally but only directly, by quo
warranto proceedings. usurpation of a public office is treated as a public wrong and carries with it public
interest, and as such, it shall be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic
of the Philippines through the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor. The SolGen is given permissible
latitude within his legal authority in actions for quo warranto, circumscribed only by the national
interest and the government policy on the matter at hand.

Anent the fourth issue: Simultaneous quo warranto proceeding and impeachment proceeding is not
forum shopping and is allowed.

Quo warranto and impeachment may proceed independently of each other as these remedies are
distinct as to (1) jurisdiction (2) grounds, (3) applicable rules pertaining to initiation, filing and dismissal,
and (4) limitations. Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively availed of several judicial
remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same
issues, either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court, to increase his chances of
obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in another. The test for determining forum
shopping is whether in the two (or more) cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights or causes of
action, and reliefs sought. The crux of the controversy in this quo warranto proceedings is the
determination of whether or not Sereno legally holds the Chief Justice position to be considered as an
impeachable officer in the first place. On the other hand, impeachment is for respondent’s prosecution
for certain impeachable offenses. Simply put, while Sereno’s title to hold a public office is the issue in
quo warranto proceedings, impeachment necessarily presupposes that Sereno legally holds the public
office and thus, is an impeachable officer, the only issue being whether or not she committed
impeachable offenses to warrant her removal from office.
Moreover, the reliefs sought are different. respondent in a quo warranto proceeding shall be adjudged
to cease from holding a public office, which he/she is ineligible to hold. Moreover, impeachment, a
conviction for the charges of impeachable offenses shall result to the removal of the respondent from
the public office that he/she is legally holding. It is not legally possible to impeach or remove a person
from an office that he/she, in the first place, does not and cannot legally hold or occupy.

Lastly, there can be no forum shopping because the impeachment proceedings before the House is not
the impeachment case proper, since it is only a determination of probable cause. The impeachment case
is yet to be initiated by the filing of the Articles of Impeachment before the Senate. Thus, at the
moment, there is no pending impeachment case against Sereno. The process before the House is merely
inquisitorial and is merely a means of discovering if a person may be reasonably charged with a crime.

Anent the fifth issue: Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly appointed or
invalidly elected impeachable official may be removed from office.

The language of Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not foreclose a quo warranto action against
impeachable officers: “Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court,
the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on
impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.” The provision uses the permissive term “may”
which denote discretion and cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect, indicative of a mere
possibility, an opportunity, or an option. In American jurisprudence, it has been held that “the express
provision for removal by impeachment ought not to be taken as a tacit prohibition of removal by other
methods when there are other adequate reasons to account for this express provision.”

The principle in case law is that during their incumbency, impeachable officers cannot be criminally
prosecuted for an offense that carries with it the penalty of removal, and if they are required to be
members of the Philippine Bar to qualify for their positions, they cannot be charged with disbarment.
The proscription does not extend to actions assailing the public officer’s title or right to the office he or
she occupies. Even the PET Rules expressly provide for the remedy of either an election protest or a
petition for quo warranto to question the eligibility of the President and the Vice-President, both of
whom are impeachable officers.

Further, that the enumeration of “impeachable offenses” is made absolute, that is, only those
enumerated offenses are treated as grounds for impeachment, is not equivalent to saying that the
enumeration likewise purport to be a complete statement of the causes of removal from office. If other
causes of removal are available, then other modes of ouster can likewise be availed. To subscribe to the
view that appointments or election of impeachable officers are outside judicial review is to cleanse their
appointments or election of any possible defect pertaining to the Constitutionally-prescribed
qualifications which cannot otherwise be raised in an impeachment proceeding. To hold otherwise is to
allow an absurd situation where the appointment of an impeachable officer cannot be questioned even
when, for instance, he or she has been determined to be of foreign nationality or, in offices where Bar
membership is a qualification, when he or she fraudulently represented to be a member of the Bar.

Anent the sixth issue: The Supreme Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over a quo warranto petition is not
violative of the doctrine of separation of powers.
The Court’s assumption of jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto involving a person who would
otherwise be an impeachable official had it not been for a disqualification, is not violative of the core
constitutional provision that impeachment cases shall be exclusively tried and decided by the Senate.
Again, the difference between quo warranto and impeachment must be emphasized. An action for quo
warranto does not try a person’s culpability of an impeachment offense, neither does a writ of quo
warranto conclusively pronounce such culpability. The Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over quo
warranto proceedings does not preclude Congress from enforcing its own prerogative of determining
probable cause for impeachment, to craft and transmit the Articles of Impeachment, nor will it preclude
Senate from exercising its constitutionally committed power of impeachment.

However, logic, common sense, reason, practicality and even principles of plain arithmetic bear out the
conclusion that an unqualified public official should be removed from the position immediately if indeed
Constitutional and legal requirements were not met or breached. To abdicate from resolving a legal
controversy simply because of perceived availability of another remedy, in this case impeachment,
would be to sanction the initiation of a process specifically intended to be long and arduous and compel
the entire membership of the Legislative branch to momentarily abandon their legislative duties to focus
on impeachment proceedings for the possible removal of a public official, who at the outset, may clearly
be unqualified under existing laws and case law.

For guidance, the Court demarcates that an act or omission committed prior to or at the time of
appointment or election relating to an official’s qualifications to hold office as to render such
appointment or election invalid is properly the subject of a quo warranto petition, provided that the
requisites for the commencement thereof are present. Contrariwise, acts or omissions, even if it relates
to the qualification of integrity, being a continuing requirement but nonetheless committed during the
incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected official, cannot be the subject of a quo
warranto proceeding, but of something else, which may either be impeachment if the public official
concerned is impeachable and the act or omission constitutes an impeachable offense, or disciplinary,
administrative or criminal action, if otherwise.

Anent the seventh issue: Prescription does not lie against the State.

The rules on quo warranto provides that “nothing contained in this Rule shall be construed to authorize
an action against a public officer or employee for his ouster from office unless the same be commenced
within one (1) year after the cause of such ouster, or the right of the petitioner to hold such office or
position, arose”. Previously, the one-year prescriptive period has been applied in cases where private
individuals asserting their right of office, unlike the instant case where no private individual claims title
to the Office of the Chief Justice. Instead, it is the government itself which commenced the present
petition for quo warranto and puts in issue the qualification of the person holding the highest position in
the Judiciary.

Section 2 of Rule 66 provides that “the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, when directed by the
President of the Philippines, or when upon complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe that
any case specified in the preceding section can be established by proof must commence such action.” It
may be stated that ordinary statutes of limitation, civil or penal, have no application to quo warranto
proceeding brought to enforce a public right. There is no limitation or prescription of action in an action
for quo warranto, neither could there be, for the reason that it was an action by the Government and
prescription could not be plead as a defense to an action by the Government.
That prescription does not lie in this case can also be deduced from the very purpose of an action
for quo warranto. Because quo warranto serves to end a continuous usurpation, no statute of
limitations applies to the action. Needless to say, no prudent and just court would allow an unqualified
person to hold public office, much more the highest position in the Judiciary. Moreover, the Republic
cannot be faulted for questioning Sereno’s qualification· for office only upon discovery of the cause of
ouster because even up to the present, Sereno has not been candid on whether she filed the required
SALNs or not. The defect on Sereno’s appointment was therefore not discernible, but was, on the
contrary, deliberately rendered obscure.

Anent the eighth issue: The Court has supervisory authority over the JBC includes ensuring that the JBC
complies with its own rules.

Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution provides that “A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created
under the supervision of the Supreme Court.” The power of supervision means “overseeing or the
authority of an officer to see to it that the subordinate officers perform their duties.” JBC’s absolute
autonomy from the Court as to place its non-action or improper· actions beyond the latter’s reach is
therefore not what the Constitution contemplates. What is more, the JBC’s duty to recommend or
nominate, although calling for the exercise of discretion, is neither absolute nor unlimited, and is not
automatically equivalent to an exercise of policy decision as to place, in wholesale, the JBC process
beyond the scope of the Court’s supervisory and corrective powers. While a certain leeway must be
given to the JBC in screening aspiring magistrates, the same does not give it an unbridled discretion to
ignore Constitutional and legal requirements. Thus, the nomination by the JBC is not accurately an
exercise of policy or wisdom as to place the JBC’s actions in the same category as political questions that
the Court is barred from resolving. [yourlawyersays]

[READ: Justice Leonen’s dissenting opinion: Q&A Format]

With this, it must be emphasized that qualifications under the Constitution cannot be waived or
bargained by the JBC, and one of which is that “a Member of the Judiciary must be a person
of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence. “Integrity” is closely related to, or if not,
approximately equated to an applicant’s good reputation for honesty, incorruptibility, irreproachable
conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards.” Integrity is likewise imposed by the New
Code of Judicial Conduct and the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Court has always viewed
integrity with a goal of preserving the confidence of the litigants in the Judiciary. Hence, the JBC was
created in order to ensure that a member of the Supreme Court must be a person
of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence.

Anent the ninth issue: The filing of SALN is a constitutional and statutory requirement.

Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution states that “A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption
of office and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his
assets, liabilities, and net worth.” This has likewise been required by RA 3019 and RA 6713. “Failure to
comply” with the law is a violation of law, a “prima facie evidence of unexplained wealth, which may
result in the dismissal from service of the public officer.” It is a clear breach of the ethical standards set
for public officials and employees. The filing of the SALN is so important for purposes of transparency
and accountability that failure to comply with such requirement may result not only in dismissal from
the public service but also in criminal liability. Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713 even provides that  non-
compliance with this requirement is not only punishable by imprisonment and/or a fine, it may also
result in disqualification to hold public office.

Because the Chief Justice is a public officer, she is constitutionally and statutorily mandated to perform a
positive duty to disclose all of his assets and liabilities. According to Sereno herself in her dissenting
opinion in one case, those who accept a public office do so cum onere, or with a burden, and are
considered as accepting its burdens and obligations, together with its benefits. They thereby subject
themselves to all constitutional and legislative provisions relating thereto, and undertake to perform all
the duties of their office. The public has the right to demand the performance of those duties. More
importantly, while every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater
demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the Judiciary.

Noncompliance with the SALN requirement indubitably·reflects on a person’s integrity. It is not merely a
trivial or a formal requirement. The contention that the mere non-filing does not affect Sereno’s
integrity does not persuade considering that RA 6713 and RA 3019 are malum prohibitum and
not malum in se. Thus, it is the omission or commission of that act as defined by the law, and not the
character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been violated. Malice or
criminal intent is completely immaterial.

Anent the tenth issue: Sereno chronically failed to file her SALNs and thus violated the Constitution, the
law, and the Code of Judicial Conduct.

In Sereno’s 20 years of government service in UP Law, only 11 SALNs have been filed. Sereno could have
easily dispelled doubts as to the filing or nonfiling of the unaccounted SALNs by presenting them before
the Court. Yet, Sereno opted to withhold such information or such evidence, if at all, for no clear reason.
The Doblada case, invoked by Sereno, cannot be applied, because in the Doblada case, there was a letter
of the head of the personnel of the branch of the court that the missing SALN exists and was duly
transmitted and received by the OCA as the repository agency. In Sereno’s case, the missing SALNs are
neither proven to be in the records of nor was proven to have been sent to and duly received by the
Ombudsman as the repository agency. The existence of these SALNs and the fact of filing thereof were
neither established by direct proof constituting substantial evidence nor by mere inference. Moreover,
the statement of the Ombudsman is categorical: “based on records on file, there is no SALN filed by
[Sereno] for calendar years 1999 to 2009 except SALN ending December 1998.” This leads the Court to
conclude that Sereno did not indeed file her SALN.

For this reason, the Republic was able to discharge its burden of proof with the certification from UP
HRDO and Ombudsman, and thus it becomes incumbent upon Sereno to discharge her burden of
evidence. Further, the burden of proof in a quo warranto proceeding is different when it is filed by the
State in that the burden rests upon the respondent.

In addition, contrary to what Sereno contends, being on leave does not exempt her from filing her SALN
because it is not tantamount to separation from government service. The fact that Sereno did not
receive any pay for the periods she was on leave does not make her a government worker “serving in an
honorary capacity” to be exempted from the SALN laws on RA 6713. [yourlawyersays]

Neither can the clearance and certification of UP HRDO be taken in favor of Sereno. During the period
when Sereno was a professor in UP, concerned authorized official/s of the Office of the President or the
Ombudsman had not yet established compliance procedures for the review of SALNs filed by officials
and employees of State Colleges and Universities, like U.P. The ministerial duty of the head of office to
issue compliance order came about only on 2006 from the CSC. As such, the U.P. HRDO could not have
been expected to perform its ministerial duty of issuing compliance orders to Sereno when such rule
was not yet in existence at that time. Moreover, the clearance are not substitutes for SALNs. The import
of said clearance is limited only to clearing Sereno of her academic and administrative responsibilities,
money and property accountabilities and from administrative charges as of the date of her resignation.

Neither can Sereno’s inclusion in the matrix of candidates with complete requirements and in the
shortlist nominated by the JBC confirm or ratify her compliance with the SALN requirement. Her
inclusion in the shortlist of candidates for the position of Chief Justice does not negate, nor supply her
with the requisite proof of integrity. She should have been disqualified at the outset. Moreover, the JBC
En Banc cannot be deemed to have considered Sereno eligible because it does not appear that Sereno’s
failure to submit her SALNs was squarely addressed by the body. Her inclusion in the shortlist of
nominees and subsequent appointment to the position do not estop the Republic or this Court from
looking into her qualifications. Verily, no estoppel arises where the representation or conduct of the
party sought to be estopped is due to ignorance founded upon an innocent mistake

Anent the eleventh issue: Sereno failed to properly and promptly file her SALNs, again in violation of the
Constitutional and statutory requirements    .

Failure to file a truthful, complete and accurate SALN would likewise amount to dishonesty if the same is
attended by malicious intent to conceal the truth or to make false statements. The suspicious
circumstances include: 1996 SALN being accomplished only in 1998; 1998 SALN only filed in 2003; 1997
SALN only notarized in 1993; 2004-2006 SALNs were not filed which were the years when she received
the bulk of her fees from PIATCO cases, 2006 SALN was later on intended to be for 2010, gross amount
from PIATCO cases were not reflected, suspicious increase of P2,700,000 in personal properties were
seen in her first five months as Associate Justice. It is therefore clear as day that Sereno failed not only in
complying with the physical act of filing, but also committed dishonesty betraying her lack of integrity,
honesty and probity. The Court does not hesitate to impose the supreme penalty of dismissal against
public officials whose SALNs were found to have contained discrepancies, inconsistencies and non-
disclosures.

Anent the twelfth issue: Sereno failed to submit the required SALNs as to qualify for nomination
pursuant to the JBC rules.

The JBC required the submission of at least ten SALNs from those applicants who are incumbent
Associate Justices, absent which, the applicant ought not to have been interviewed, much less been
considered for nomination. From the minutes of the meeting of the JBC, it appeared that Sereno was
singled out from the rest of the applicants for having failed to submit a single piece of SALN for her years
of service in UP Law. It is clear that JBC did not do away with the SALN requirement, but still required
substantial compliance. Subsequently, it appeared that it was only Sereno who was not able to
substantially comply with the SALN requirement, and instead of complying, Sereno wrote a letter
containing justifications why she should no longer be required to file the SALNs: that she resigned from
U.P. in 2006 and then resumed government service only in 2009, thus her government service is not
continuous; that her government records are more than 15 years old and thus infeasible to retrieve; and
that U.P. cleared her of all academic and administrative responsibilities and charges.
These justifications, however, did not obliterate the simple fact that Sereno submitted only 3 SALNs to
the JBC in her 20-year service in U.P., and that there was nary an attempt on Sereno’s part to comply.
Moreover, Sereno curiously failed to mention that she did not file several SALNs during the course of her
employment in U.P. Such failure to disclose a material fact and the concealment thereof from the JBC
betrays any claim of integrity especially from a Member of the Supreme Court. [yourlawyersays]

Indubitably, Sereno not only failed to substantially comply with the submission of the SALNs but there
was no compliance at all. Dishonesty is classified as a grave offense the penalty of which is dismissal
from the service at the first infraction. A person aspiring to public office must observe honesty, candor
and faithful compliance with the law. Nothing less is expected. Dishonesty is a malevolent act that puts
serious doubt upon one’s ability to perform his duties with the integrity and uprightness demanded of a
public officer or employee. For these reasons, the JBC should no longer have considered Sereno for
interview.

Moreover, the fact that Sereno had no permit to engage in private practice while in UP, her false
representations that she was in private practice after resigning from UP when in fact she was counsel for
the government, her false claims that the clearance from UP HRDO is proof of her compliance with
SALNs requirement, her commission of tax fraud for failure to truthfully declare her income in her ITRs
for the years 2007-2009, procured a brand new Toyota Land Cruiser worth at least P5,000,000, caused
the hiring of Ms. Macasaet without requisite public bidding, misused P3,000,000 of government funds
for hotel accommodation at Shangri-La Boracay as the venue of the 3 rd ASEAN Chief Justices meeting,
issued a TRO in Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines v. COMELEC contrary to the
Supreme Court’s internal rules, manipulated the disposition of the DOJ request to transfer the venue of
the Maute cases outside of Mindanao, ignored rulings of the Supreme Court with respect to the grant of
survivorship benefits which caused undue delay to the release of survivorship benefits to spouses of
deceased judges and Justices, manipulated the processes of the JBC to exclude then SolGen, now AJ
Francis Jardeleza, by using highly confidential document involving national security against the latter
among others, all belie the fact that Sereno has integrity.

Anent the thirteenth issue: Sereno’s failure to submit to the JBC her SALNs for several years means that
her integrity was not established at the time of her application

The requirement to submit SALNs is made more emphatic when the applicant is eyeing the position of
Chief Justice. On the June 4, 2012, JBC En Banc meeting, Senator Escudero proposed the addition of the
requirement of SALN in order for the next Chief Justice to avoid what CJ Corona had gone through.
Further, the failure to submit the required SALNs means that the JBC and the public are divested of the
opportunity to consider the applicant’s fitness or propensity to commit corruption or dishonesty. In
Sereno’s case, for example, the waiver of the confidentiality of bank deposits would be practically
useless for the years that she failed to submit her SALN since the JBC cannot verify whether the same
matches the entries indicated in the SALN.

Anent the fourteenth issue: Sereno’s ineligibility for lack of proven integrity cannot be cured by her
nomination and subsequent appointment as Chief Justice.

Well-settled is the rule that qualifications for public office must be possessed at the time of appointment
and assumption of office and also during the officer’s entire tenure as a continuing requirement. The
voidance of the JBC nomination as a necessary consequence of the Court’s finding that Sereno is
ineligible, in the first place, to be a candidate for the position of Chief Justice and to be nominated for
said position follows as a matter of course. The Court has ample jurisdiction to do so without the
necessity of impleading the JBC as the Court can take judicial notice of the explanations from the JBC
members and the OEO. he Court, in a quo warranto proceeding, maintains the power to issue such
further judgment determining the respective rights in and to the public office, position or franchise of all
the parties to the action as justice requires.

Neither will the President’s act of appointment cause to qualify Sereno. Although the JBC is an office
constitutionally created, the participation of the President in the selection and nomination process is
evident from the composition of the JBC itself.

An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the
only condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. While the Court
surrenders discretionary appointing power to the President, the exercise of such discretion is subject to
the non-negotiable requirements that the appointee is qualified and all other legal requirements are
satisfied, in the absence of which, the appointment is susceptible to attack.

Anent the fifteenth issue: Sereno is a de facto officer removable through quo warranto

The effect of a finding that a person appointed to an office is ineligible therefor is that his presumably
valid appointment will give him color of title that confers on him the status of a de facto officer. For lack
of a Constitutional qualification, Sereno is ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice and is merely
holding a colorable right or title thereto. As such, Sereno has never attained the status of an
impeachable official and her removal from the office, other than by impeachment, is justified. The
remedy, therefore, of a quo warranto at the instance of the State is proper to oust Sereno from the
appointive position of Chief Justice. [yourlawyersays]

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Quo Warranto is GRANTED.

Sereno is found DISQUALIFIED from and is hereby adjudged GUILTY of UNLAWFULLY HOLDING and

EXERCISING the OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE. Accordingly, Sereno
is OUSTED and EXCLUDED therefrom.

The position of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is declared vacant and the Judicial and Bar
Council is directed to commence the application and nomination process.

This Decision is immediately executory without need of further action from the Court.

Sereno is ordered to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days from receipt hereof why she should not be
sanctioned for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Code of Judicial Conduct for
transgressing the sub judice rule and for casting aspersions and ill motives to the Members of the
Supreme Court.
Re: COA Opinion on the Computation of the Appraised Value of the Properties
Purchased by the Retired Chief/Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, A.M. No.
11-7-10-SC
ISSUE:  Whether or not  COA’s interference, in this case, violates the judiciary’s autonomy. 

FACTS:  Office of the General Counsel of the Commission on Audit (COA) found that an
underpayment amounting to P221,021.50 resulted when five retired Supreme Court justices
purchased from the Supreme Court the personal properties assigned to them during their
incumbency in the Court. The COA attributed this underpayment to the use by the Property
Division of the Supreme Court of the wrong formula in computing the appraisal value of the
purchased vehicles. According to the COA, the Property Division erroneously appraised the
subject motor vehicles by applying Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) Joint
Resolution No. 35 and its guidelines, in compliance with the Resolution of the Court En Banc in
A.M. No. 03- 12-01, when it should have applied the formula found in COA Memorandum No.
98-569-A4. Atty. Candelaria, Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief Administrative Officer,
recommended that the Court advise the COA to respect the in-house computation based on the
CFAG formula, noting that this was the first time that the COA questioned the authority of the
Court in using CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 and its guidelines in the appraisal and disposal of
government property since these were issued in 1997. As a matter of fact, in two previous
instances involving two retired Court of Appeals Associate Justices, the COA upheld the in-
house appraisal of government property using the formula found in the CFAG guidelines. More
importantly, the Constitution itself grants the Judiciary fiscal autonomy in the handling of its
budget and resources. 

DECISION:  Yes 

RATIO DECIDENDI:  The COA’s authority to conduct post-audit examinations on constitutional

bodies granted fiscal autonomy is provided under Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the 1987
Constitution. This authority, however, must be read not only in light of the Court’s fiscal
autonomy, but also in relation with the constitutional provisions on judicial independence and
the existing jurisprudence and Court rulings on these matters. Any kind of interference on how
these retirement privileges and benefits are exercised and availed of, not only violates the fiscal
autonomy and independence of the Judiciary, but also encroaches upon the constitutional duty
and privilege of the Chief Justice and the Supreme Court En Banc to manage the Judiciary’s
own affairs.  

In the matter of: Save the Supreme Court Judicial Independence against the
Abolition of JDF and Reduction of Autonomy
ISSUE:  Whether or not petitioner Rolly Mijares has sufficiently shown grounds for this court to
grant the petition and issue a writ of mandamus. 

FACTS:  Petitioner Rolly Mijares (Mijares) prays for the issuance of a writ of mandamus in order
to compel this court to exercise its judicial independence and fiscal autonomy against the
perceived hostility of Congress. In the letter-petition, Mijares alleges that he is "a Filipino citizen,
and a concerned taxpayer. He filed this petition as part of his "continuing crusade to defend and
uphold the Constitution" because he believes in the rule of law. He is concerned about the
threats against the judiciary after this court promulgated Priority Development Assistance Fund.
The complaint implied that certain acts of members of Congress and the President after the
promulgation of these cases show a threat to judicial independence. Petitioner argues that
Congress "gravely abused its discretion with a blatant usurpation of judicial independence and
fiscal autonomy of the Supreme Court. Petitioner points out that Congress is exercising its
power "in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility by
abolishing the ‘Judiciary Development Fund’ (JDF) of the Supreme Court. With regard to his
prayer for the issuance of the writ of mandamus, petitioner avers that Congress should not act
as "wreckers of the law" by threatening "to clip the powers of the High Tribunal[.]" Congress
committed a "blunder of monumental proportions" when it reduced the judiciary’s 2015 budget.
Petitioner prays that this court exercise its powers to "REVOKE/ABROGATE and EXPUNGE
whatever irreconcilable contravention of existing laws affecting the judicial independence and
fiscal autonomy as mandated under the Constitution to better serve public interest and general
welfare of the people." 

DECISION:  No 

RATIO DECIDENDI:  The power of judicial review, like all powers granted by the Constitution, is
subject to certain limitations. Petitioner must comply with all the requisites for judicial review
before this court may take cognizance of the case. The requisites are: (1) there must be an
actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging
the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise
stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained,
or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very
lis mota of the case. The court held that there is no actual case or controversy and that the
petitioner has no legal standing to question the validity of the proposed bill.  

Estrada v. Desierto
FACTS:
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President.
Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner,
went on air and accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions
of pesos from jueteng lords.
House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by 115
representatives, or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of
Representatives to the Senate. This caused political convulsions in both houses of
Congress. Senator Drilon was replaced by Senator Pimentel as Senate President.
Speaker Villar was unseated by Representative Fuentebella.
Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. 21 senators took
their oath as judges with Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
presiding.
When by a vote of 11-10 the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the 2nd
envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3
billion in a secret bank account under the name "Jose Velarde." The public and
private prosecutors walked out in protest of the ruling. In disgust, Senator
Pimentel resigned as Senate President. By midnight, thousands had assembled at
the EDSA Shrine and speeches full of sulphur were delivered against the
petitioner and the 11 senators.
January 18, 2001 saw the high velocity intensification of the call for petitioner's
resignation. A 10-km line of people holding lighted candles formed a human chain
from the Ninoy Aquino Monument on Ayala Avenue in Makati City to the EDSA
Shrine to symbolize the people's solidarity in demanding petitioner's resignation.
January 19, 2001, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable.
Petitioner agreed to the holding of a snap election for President where he would
not be a candidate. Secretary of National Defense Orlando Mercado and General
Reyes, together with the chiefs of all the armed services went to the EDSA Shrine.
General Angelo Reyes declared that "on behalf of Your Armed Forces, the 130,000
strong members of the Armed Forces, we wish to announce that we are
withdrawing our support to this government.” A little later, PNP Chief, Director
General Panfilo Lacson and the major service commanders gave a similar stunning
announcement.
January 20, 2001 Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent
Arroyo as President of the Philippines. Petitioner and his family hurriedly left
Malacañang Palace.
January 22, 2001, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo
immediately discharged the powers the duties of the Presidency.
February 5, 2001, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for prohibition with a
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent
Ombudsman from "conducting any further proceedings in any other criminal
complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as
President is over and only if legally warranted."
February 6, 2001, Thru another counsel, petitioner filed for Quo Warranto. He
prayed for judgment "confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent
President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the
duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be
holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution."

ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioner resigned as president.
Whether or not petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while respondent
Arroyo is an Acting President.

HELD:
Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its
elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent
must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not
government by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be
written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it
must be given legal effect.
In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter
of resignation before he evacuated Malacañang Palace in the afternoon of
January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently,
whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his act and
omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior,
contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a
material relevance on the issue.
Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.
An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides:
Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a
written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by
the Vice-President as Acting President xxx.
What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress
have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that
recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer
temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner's claim of inability.
In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot
successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely
unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and
the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal
branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
Kilsobayan v. Guingona, Jr.
FACTS:

The PCSO decided to establish an online lottery system for the purpose of
increasing its revenue base and diversifying its sources of funds. Sometime
before March 1993, after learning that the PCSO was interested in operating on
an online lottery system, the Berjaya Group Berhad, with its affiliate, the
International Totalizator Systems, Inc. became interested to offer its services and
resources to PCSO. Considering the citizenship requirement, the PGMC claims
that Berjaya Group undertook to reduce its equity stakes in PGMC to 40% by
selling 35% out of the original 75% foreign stockholdings to local investors. An
open letter was sent to President Ramos strongly opposing the setting up of an
online lottery system due to ethical and moral concerns, however the project
pushed through.

ISSUES:
Whether the petitioners have locus standi (legal standing); and
Whether the Contract of Lease is legal and valid in light of Sec. 1 of R.A. 1169 as
amended by B.P. Blg. 42.
RULING:

The petitioners have locus standi due to the transcendental importance to the
public that the case demands. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably
affect the social, economic and moral well-being of the people. The legal standing
then of the petitioners deserves recognition, and in the exercise of its sound
discretion, the Court brushes aside the procedural barrier.
Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, prohibits the PCSO from
holding and conducting lotteries “in collaboration, association or joint venture
with any person, association, company, or entity, whether domestic or foreign.”
The language of the section is clear that with respect to its franchise or privilege
“to hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar
activities,” the PCSO cannot exercise it “in collaboration, association or joint
venture” with any other party. This is the unequivocal meaning and import of the
phrase. By the exception explicitly made, the PCSO cannot share its franchise with
another by way of the methods mentioned, nor can it transfer, assign or lease
such franchise.
Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol
FACTS:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by
Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an
investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former
President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide
Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of
the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T.
Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the House
Committee. The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment
complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being
insufficient in substance. To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the
House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. Four
months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23,
2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment
complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on
the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This
second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment"
signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.

ISSUES: 
1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the
Constitution.

2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question – has resulted in a political crisis. 

HELD:
1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint
and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of
Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the
foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period
following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first impeachment
complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along
with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on
Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates
the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same
impeachable officer within a one-year period.

2.From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear
that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the
mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion
hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly
political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political
questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions." Truly
political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of
separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political in nature.

Brillantes v. Commission on Elections

Facts:
Comelec issued resolutions adopting an Automated Elections System including the assailed
resolution, Resolution 6712, which provides for the electronic transmission of  advanced result
of “unofficial” count. Petitioners claimed that the resolution would allow the preemption and
usurpation of the exclusive power of Congress to canvass the votes for President and Vice-
President and would likewise encroach upon the authority of NAMFREL, as the citizens’
accredited arm, to conduct the "unofficial" quick count as provided under pertinent election
laws. Comelec contended that the resolution was promulgated in the exercise of its executive
and administrative power "to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections”
Comelec added that the issue is beyond judicial determination.

Issue:
Whether or not Comelec's promulgation of  Resolution 6712 was justified.

Ruling:

The Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing Resolution 6712. The issue squarely fell within the ambit of the expanded jurisdiction of
the court.

Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution, further bolstered by RA 8436, vest upon Congress the
sole and exclusive authority to officially canvass the votes for the elections of President and
Vice-President. Section 27 of Rep. Act No. 7166, as amended by Rep. Act No. 8173, and
reiterated in Section 18 of Rep. Act No. 8436, solely authorize NAMFREL, the duly-accredited
citizen’s arm to conduct the “unofficial counting of votes for the national or local elections. The
quick count under the guise of an “unofficial” tabulation would not only be preemptive of the
authority of congress and NAMFREL, but would also be lacking constitutional and/or statutory
basis. Moreover, the assailed COMELEC resolution likewise contravened the constitutional
provision that "no money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law." It being “unofficial”, any disbursement of public fund would be
contrary to the provisions of the Constitution and Rep. Act No. 9206, which is the 2003 General
Appropriations Act. 

The Omnibus Election Code in providing the powers and functions of the Commission subjects
the same to certain conditions with respect to the adoption of the latest technological and
electronic devices, to wit: (1)consideration of the area and available funds (2) notification to all
political parties and candidates. The aforementioned conditions were found to have not been
substantially met.

Resolution 6712 was null and void.

National Artist for Literature Virgilio Alamario, et al. v. The Executive Secretary
FACTS: On April 27, 1972, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 1001and, upon recommendation of the Board of Trustees of the
Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP), created the category of Award and
Decoration of National Artist to be awarded to Filipinos who have made distinct
contributions to arts and letters. In the same issuance, Fernando Amorsolo was
declared as the first National Artist.

On April 3, 1992, Republic Act No. 7356, otherwise known as the Law Creating
the National Commission for Culture and the Arts, was signed into law. It
established the National Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA) and gave it
an extensive mandate over the development, promotion and preservation of the
Filipino national culture and arts and the Filipino cultural heritage.

CCP Board of Trustees and the NCCA have been mandated by law to promote,
develop and protect the Philippine national culture and the arts, and authorized
to give awards to deserving Filipino artists, the two bodies decided to team up
and jointly administer the National Artists Award.

On April 3, 2009, the First Deliberation Panel met. A total of 87 nominees were
considered during the deliberation and a preliminary shortlist of 32 names was
compiled.

On April 23, 2009, the Second Deliberation Panel shortlisted 13 out of the 32
names in the preliminary shortlist.On May 6, 2009, the final deliberation was
conducted by the 30-member Final Deliberation Panel comprised of the CCP
Board of Trustees and the NCCA Board of Commissioners and the living National
Artists.From the 13 names in the second shortlist, a final list of four names was
agreed upon namely: Manuel Conde, Ramon Santos, Lazaro Francisco and
Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz.

CCP and NCCA submitted this recommendation to the President. According to

respondents, the aforementioned letter was referred by the Office of the
President to the Committee on Honors. Meanwhile, the Office of the President
allegedly received nominations from various sectors, cultural groups and
individuals strongly endorsing private respondents Cecile Guidote-Alvarez, Carlo
Magno Jose Caparas, Francisco Masa and Jose Moreno. The Committee on
Honors purportedly processed these nominations and invited resource persons to
validate the qualifications and credentials of the nominees.

Acting on this recommendation, Proclamation No. 1823 declaring Manuel Conde

a National Artist was issued on June 30, 2009. Subsequently, on July 6, 2009,
Proclamation Nos. 1824 to 1829 were issued declaring Lazaro Francisco, Federico
AguilarAlcuaz and private respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and
Moreno, respectively, as National Artists. This was subsequently announced to
the public by then Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita on July 29, 2009.

Convinced that, by law, it is the exclusive province of the NCCA Board of

Commissioners and the CCP Board of Trustees to select those who will be
conferred the Order of National Artists and to set the standard for entry into that
select group, petitioners instituted this petition for prohibition, certiorari and
injunction (with prayer for restraining order) praying that the Order of National
Artists be conferred on Dr. Santos and that the conferment of the Order of
National Artists on respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and Moreno be
enjoined and declared to have been rendered in grave abuse of discretion.

All of the petitioners claim that former President Macapagal-Arroyo gravely

abused her discretion in disregarding the results of the rigorous screening and
selection process for the Order of National Artists and in substituting her own
choice for those of the Deliberation Panels. According to petitioners, the
Presidents discretion to name National Artists is not absolute but limited. In
particular, her discretion on the matter cannot be exercised in the absence of or
against the recommendation of the NCCA and the CCP.
ISSUE: Was there grave abuse of discretion committed by former
President Arroyo?

HELD: Legal Standing. The parties who assail the constitutionality or legality

of a statute or an official act must have a direct and personal interest. They must
show not only that the law or any governmental act is invalid, but also that they
sustained or are in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result
of its enforcement, and not merely that they suffer thereby in some indefinite
way.

In this case, the petitioning National Artists will be denied some right or privilege
to which they are entitled as members of the Order of National Artists as a result
of the conferment of the award on respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa
and Moreno. In particular, they will be denied the privilege of exclusive
membership in the Order of National Artists.

Equal Protection. It should be recalled too that respondent Guidote-Alvarez

was disqualified to be nominated for being the Executive Director of the NCCA at
that time while respondents Masa and Caparas did not make it to the preliminary
shortlist and respondent Moreno was not included in the second shortlist. Yet,
the four of them were treated differently and considered favorably when they
were exempted from the rigorous screening process of the NCCA and the CCP
and conferred the Order of National Artists.

The special treatment accorded to respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa

and Moreno fails to pass rational scrutiny. No real and substantial distinction
between respondents and petitioner Abad has been shown that would justify
deviating from the laws, guidelines and established procedures, and placing
respondents in an exceptional position. The undue classification was not
germane to the purpose of the law. Instead, it contradicted the law and well-
established guidelines, rules and regulations meant to carry the law into effect.
While petitioner Abad cannot claim entitlement to the Order of National Artists,
he is entitled to be given an equal opportunity to vie for that honor. In view of the
foregoing, there was a violation of petitioner Abads right to equal protection, an
interest that is substantial enough to confer him standing in this case.

Limits of the President's Discretion. The "power to recommend" includes

the power to give "advice, exhortation or indorsement, which is essentially
persuasive in character, not binding upon the party to whom it is made."

Thus, in the matter of the conferment of the Order of National Artists, the
President may or may not adopt the recommendation or advice of the NCCA and
the CCP Boards. In other words, the advice of the NCCA and the CCP is subject to
the President's discretion.

Nevertheless, the Presidents discretion on the matter is not totally unfettered,

nor the role of the NCCA and the CCP Boards meaningless. The Presidents power
must be exercised in accordance with existing laws. Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution prescribes faithful execution of the laws by the President

The President's discretion in the conferment of the Order of National Artists

should be exercised in accordance with the duty to faithfully execute the relevant
laws. The faithful execution clause is best construed as an obligation imposed on
the President, not a separate grant of power.

In this connection, the powers granted to the NCCA and the CCP Boards in
connection with the conferment of the Order of National Artists by executive
issuances were institutionalized by two laws, namely, Presidential Decree No.
208 dated June 7, 1973 and Republic Act No. 7356. In particular, Proclamation
No. 1144 dated May 15, 1973 constituted the CCP Board as the National Artists
Awards Committee and tasked it to "administer the conferment of the category of
National Artist" upon deserving Filipino artists with the mandate to "draft the
rules to guide its deliberations in the choice of National Artists".

By virtue of their respective statutory mandates in connection with the

conferment of the National Artist Award, the NCCA and the CCP decided to work
together and jointly administer the National Artist Award. They reviewed the
guidelines for the nomination, selection and administration of the National Artist
Award. An administrative regulation adopted pursuant to law has the force and
effect of law. Thus, the rules, guidelines and policies regarding the Order of
National Artists jointly issued by the CCP Board of Trustees and the NCCA
pursuant to their respective statutory mandates have the force and effect of law.
Until set aside, they are binding upon executive and administrative
agencies,including the President himself/herself as chief executor of laws.

In view of the various stages of deliberation in the selection process and as a

consequence of his/her duty to faithfully enforce the relevant laws, the discretion
of the President in the matter of the Order of National Artists is confined to the
names submitted to him/her by the NCCA and the CCP Boards. This means that
the President could not have considered conferment of the Order of National
Artists on any person not considered and recommended by the NCCA and the
CCP Boards. That is the proper import of the provision of Executive Order No.
435, s. 2005, that the NCCA and the CCP "shall advise the President on the
conferment of the Order of National Artists." Applying this to the instant case,
the former President could not have properly considered respondents Guidote-
Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and Moreno, as their names were not recommended by
the NCCA and the CCP Boards. Otherwise, not only will the stringent selection
and meticulous screening process be rendered futile, the respective mandates of
the NCCA and the CCP Board of Trustees under relevant laws to administer the
conferment of Order of National Artists, draft the rules and regulations to guide
its deliberations, formulate and implement policies and plans, and undertake any
and all necessary measures in that regard will also become meaningless.

Proclamation Nos. 1826 to 1829 dated July 6, 2009 proclaiming

respondents Cecile Guidote-Alvarez, Carlo Magno Jose Caparas,
Francisco Masa, and Jose Moreno, respectively, as National Artists
are declared INVALID and SET ASIDE for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion.

Philippine Migrants Rights Watch, Inc. v. Overseas Workers Welfare Administration

Before the Court is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to reverse and set aside the Orders dated August 31, 2004 [1] and
January 14, 2005[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch
CXI (111), in Civil Case No. 04-0077 dismissing the same for lack of
jurisdiction.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

On September 19, 2003, respondent Overseas Workers Welfare

Administration (OWWA) issued Board Resolution No. 038[3] entitled
the OWWA Omnibus Policies to provide guidelines on matters concerning
OWWA membership and its coverage, collection of contributions, and
availment of benefits.

On February 18, 2004, petitioners Philippine Migrants Rights Watch, Inc.,

on behalf of its member-overseas Filipino workers, together with Jesus P.
Reyes and Rodolfo B. Macorol, returned overseas Filipino workers, filed a
Complaint[4] before the RTC of Pasay City seeking to annul the Omnibus
Policies, specifically Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 of Article II, Sections 5(C) (H)
of Article III, and Articles IV, V, VI, VII,VIII, the pertinent portions of
which provide:

Article II
OWWA Mandate

xxxx

Section 7. Clientele. The clients of OWWA are its member-OFWs.

Article III
Organization and Management

x x x x

Section 5. Board Proceedings. The Board proceedings shall be guided by the

following rules:

x x x x

c.) Attendance of Proxies. The Board members may designate their

permanent alternate in writing subject to the acceptance of the Board.
The designated alternate shall have voting rights. His decision shall be
deemed the decision of his principal.

The Alternate cannot further delegate such representation. However, in the

event that the member and his permanent alternate are absent, any
representative sent shall be on observer status.

x x x x

h.) Records Management and Archiving of Board Documents. The Board

Secretary shall ensure a thorough recording of all proceedings during a
Board meeting. The minutes of the previous meeting shall be made
available for approval during the scheduled Board Meeting. The Minutes of
the Meeting shall basically contain the attendance, business arising from
the minutes, major agreements reached, corresponding resolutions, and
other items noted or discussed, and instructions issued by the Board. All
minutes, tapes, and other documents pertaining to the business of the
Board shall be kept and archived pursuant to standard records
management systems and procedures. The minutes, transcripts and
tapes are classified confidential and are not for public
circulation unless otherwise authorized by the
Board/Administrator.

Article IV
MEMBERSHIP

Section 1. Membership. Membership in OWWA may be obtained in two

ways:

(a) By enrollment upon processing of contract at the POEA; and

(b) By voluntary registration of OFWs at job-sites overseas.

Section 2. Proof of Membership. All members shall be issued Official
Receipt upon payment of contribution. They shall likewise be
issued an OWWA E-Card.

POEA and OWWA are required to maintain database of member-

OFWs and to update this regularly. 

Section 3. Effectivity of Membership. OWWA membership, either

through the compulsory or voluntary coverages, shall be
effective upon payment of membership contribution until
expiration of the employment contract.

In case of voluntary members who register on-site, membership

coverage shall not exceed two (2) years.   

Section 4. Renewal of Membership. Membership shall be renewed

upon payment of contribution on contract renewal/issuance of
new contract. In the case of voluntary membership, coverage
shall be renewed upon payment of contribution.

Article V
COLLECTION POLICY

Section 1. Legal Basis for Collection of Membership Contribution. Letter of

Instructions (LOI) No. 537 mandates the compulsory payment of
OWWA membership contribution in the amount of US$25.00 or
its equivalent.

x x x x

Section 3. Frequency of Membership Collection. The membership

contribution shall be collected on a per contract basis.

x x x x

Article VIII
BENEFITS AND SERVICES

Section 1. Guiding Principle. In pursuance of its mandate, it shall deliver

social insurance benefits, loan assistance, education and training, social
services and family welfare assistance subject to the qualification
requirements and availability of OWWA funds. All benefits and services
shall be over and above the provisions of the employment contract, offer of
employers, or the laws of the receiving country.

Section 2. Benefits and Services for OWWA Members. For a US$25.00

membership contribution, an OWWA member shall be entitled to the
following benefits and services: x x x[5]
According to petitioners, respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Omnibus Policies,
the provisions of which are contrary to the Constitution and its enabling
laws. Petitioners alleged that the OWWA was created by law to provide
welfare services to all Filipino overseas contract workers, without limiting
the same to member-contributors only. However, because of the passage of
the Omnibus Policies, the OWWA benefits shall be available only to those
overseas contract workers who have paid their monetary contribution on a
per contract basis.  It imposed on the overseas workers the compulsory
payment of OWWA membership contribution in the amount of US$25.00,
which was originally collected from their employers. This, petitioners
contend, is violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution for it
created a distinction between Filipino overseas workers who contributed to
the OWWA Fund and those who have not. Moreover, petitioners likewise
assailed as invalid the provisions which allow the OWWA Board members
to designate their proxies to vote in their stead in the Board meetings as
well as those which classify the minutes, transcripts, and other documents
of the OWWA as confidential and cannot be publicly circulated without
authorization from the Board.

Respondents countered that the assailed Omnibus Policies do not violate

the equal protection clause for the same is germane to the purpose of the
law, which requires registration and documentation of overseas workers for
their protections from exploitation in foreign countries. Moreover, the
prescribed membership fees chargeable to the employers had long been
implemented pursuant to Letter of Instructions (LOI) No. 537 signed by
then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on May 1, 1977, which was formalized
by the issuance of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1694 on May 1, 1980, as
amended by PD No. 1809 issued on January 16, 1981, creating the Welfare
Fund for Overseas Workers (hereinafter referred to as the "Welfund").
According to respondents, these issuances expressly instructed the
collection of fees for the promotion of Filipino overseas workers' interests.
Hence, there was no undue implementation of the law. Furthermore, the
Omnibus Policies do not violate petitioners' right to free access to
information as the approved minutes and official resolutions of the OWWA
were made available upon legitimate request by the public, pursuant to
OWWA Resolution No. 006, Series of 2004.

On August 31, 2004, the RTC promulgated its Order dismissing the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction. According to the lower court, the
determination of constitutionality of the assailed resolution rests, not
within its jurisdiction, but within the jurisdiction of this Court. As such, it
ruled that the appropriate remedy to annul and set aside the subject
issuance was a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court. Thus, for reasons of law, comity and convenience, the lower court
held that it could not arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve the
constitutionality of the administrative act.
On February 18, 2005, petitioners filed the instant petition essentially
invoking the following argument:

I.

THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF

LAW IN DISMISSING CIVIL CASE NO. 04-0077 ON THE GROUND OF
LACK OF JURISDICTION FOR REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS HAVE
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND DECIDE CASES INVOLVING
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OR VALIDITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE
RULES AND REGULATIONS.
Petitioners fault the RTC for abruptly dismissing their complaint for lack of
jurisdiction when it is well established in law and jurisprudence that
Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction over cases involving the
constitutionality or legality of administrative rules and regulations, such as
the Omnibus Policies promulgated by respondents herein. The reliance on
our ruling in Fortich v. Corona, petitioners posit, is misplaced for the same
involves a resolution issued by the Office of the President in the exercise of
its quasi-judicial functions. Hence, the special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is not the appropriate
remedy in the instant case.

In their Comment, respondents counter that petitioners, in filing the

instant action with this Court, committed serious procedural error for
violating the doctrine of judicial hierarchy of courts. According to
respondents, petitioners should have first filed an appeal before the Court
of Appeals (CA), pursuant to Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
[6]
 Respondents further reiterated the validity of the subject Omnibus
Policies.

We rule in favor of petitioners.

Section 2(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that the mode of appeal
in all cases involving only questions of law shall be by petition for review
on certiorari to the Supreme Court in accordance with Rule 45.[7]

Time and again, this Court has distinguished cases involving pure questions
of law from those of pure questions of fact in the following manner:
A question of fact exists when a doubt or difference arises as to the truth or
falsity of alleged facts. If the query requires a re-evaluation of the credibility
of witnesses or the existence or relevance of surrounding circumstances and
their relation to each other, the issue in that query is factual. On the other
hand, there is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to
what the law is on certain state of facts and which does not call for an
existence of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-
litigants. In a case involving a question of law, the resolution of the issue
rests solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances.[8]
In the present petition, the appeal interposed by petitioners stems from the
Orders of the RTC dismissing their complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The
issue raised herein is one of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
specifically, whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over petitioners'
complaint challenging the constitutionality of the Omnibus Policies issued
by respondents.

Jurisdiction is the right to act or the power and authority to hear and
determine a case.[9] It is conferred only by the Constitution or by statute.
[10]
 The question as to whether or not the dismissal by the lower court for
lack of jurisdiction is proper involves the determination of whether,
admitting the facts alleged in the complaint to be true, the trial court has
jurisdiction over the same in light of the laws governing jurisdiction. [11] As
such, jurisdiction is neither a question of fact or of fact and law but a matter
of law. For this reason, We have consistently held that a court's jurisdiction
over the subject matter of a case is a question of law,[12] and have, in fact,
affirmed dismissals by the CA of appeals brought to them involving pure
questions of law.[13] Considering that only questions of law was raised in this
petition, direct resort to this Court is proper.[14]

We cannot, therefore, give credence to the lower court's contention that the
appropriate remedy to annul and set aside the issuance subject of this case
is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. Certiorari, as a special civil action, is available only if: (1) it is
directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[15]

In this case, respondents did not act in any judicial or quasi-judicial

capacity in issuing the assailed resolution. They were not called upon to
adjudicate the rights of contending parties to exercise, in any manner,
discretion of a judicial nature. Instead, their issuance of the challenged
resolution was done in the exercise of their quasi-legislative and
administrative functions within the confines of the granting law.  Hence,
contrary to the lower court's contention, certiorari is not the proper
remedy in the instant case.

As to whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter involved in
this case, it is settled in law and jurisprudence that the RTC has jurisdiction
to resolve the constitutionality of a statute, presidential decree, executive
order, or administrative regulation, as recognized in Section 2(a), Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:

SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

x x x x

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or

certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide final judgments
and orders of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,

international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question.[16]
In view of the foregoing provision, the jurisdiction of regular courts
involving the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation cannot be
denied. We have had several occasions wherein We affirmed the power of
the RTC to take cognizance of actions assailing a specific rule or set of rules
promulgated by administrative bodies for the power of judicial review is
vested by the Constitution not only in this Court but in all Regional Trial
Courts.[17]  It was, therefore, erroneous for the RTC to abruptly dismiss the
complaint filed by petitioners on the basis of lack of jurisdiction since said
court clearly had the power to take cognizance of the same. In so doing, the
lower court failed to ascertain factual issues necessary to determine
whether the subject issuance is, indeed, invalid and violative of the
Constitution. Considering the settled rule that this Court is not a trier of
facts,[18] a remand of this case to the RTC for the proper determination of
 the merits of the complaint is just and proper.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. 

The Orders of the Regional Trial Court, dated August 31, 2004 and January
14, 2005, in Civil Case No. 04-0077, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
This case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXI
(111), Pasay City, for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.
The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections

FACTS:

                On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private
compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was
approximately six feet (6′) by ten feet (10′) in size. They were posted on the front walls
of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA
RH Law” referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354.
The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the
heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with
a check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The
electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic
Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the
law were classified by petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted
against it form “Team Buhay.”

                Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by
any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates
for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law
but were not candidates for that election.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin is a
political question, hence not within the ambit of the Supreme Court’s power of review.
2. Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies as the case was not brought first before the COMELEC En Banc
or any if its divisions.
3. Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private citizens.
4. Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin
violated petitioners’ fundamental right to freedom of expression.
5. Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or content-
neutral regulation.
6. Whether or not there was violation of petitioners’ right to property.
7. Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious speech.

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: No.

                The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the exercise of prudence
or modesty. There is no political question. It can be acted upon by this court through the
expanded jurisdiction granted to this court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the
Constitution..

                The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review when the act
of a constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental individual or collective right.
Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC did have the discretion to choose the
manner of regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by abridging the
fundamental right to expression.

                Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an
issue involves a truly political and non-justiciable question lies in the answer to the
question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions
conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine
whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such
limits.

                A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no

constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies.
Hence, the existence of constitutionally imposed limits justifies subjecting the official
actions of the body to the scrutiny and review of this court.

                In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to free
speech. Any instance that this right may be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does
not fall squarely into any doubt that a political question brings.

SECOND ISSUE: No.

                The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies is
not proper in this case.

                Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that

the controversy is already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is the “prerequisite that
something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch or in this case,
organ of government before a court may come into the picture.”
                Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the message and
their medium, had understandable relevance especially during the elections.
COMELEC’s letter threatening the filing of the election offense against petitioners is
already an actionable infringement of this right. The impending threat of criminal
litigation is enough to curtail petitioners’ speech.

                In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as

COMELEC suggested in their pleadings prolongs the violation of their freedom of
speech.

THIRD ISSUE: No.

                Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their
position that they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin. However, the Court held that
all of these provisions pertain to candidates and political parties. Petitioners are
not candidates. Neither do they belong to any political party. COMELEC does not have
the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression
exercised by a non-candidate in this case.

FOURTH ISSUE: Yes.

                The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political consequences
enjoys a high degree of protection.

                Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is election propaganda,
being petitioners’ way of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and
rejecting those who voted for it, holds no water.

                The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of
the named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election
propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return for consideration” by
any candidate, political party, or party-list group.

                By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not included, while
sponsored messages are covered.

The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech

Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a contribution to public
deliberation about some issue,” “fostering informed and civic minded deliberation.” On
the other hand, commercial speech has been defined as speech that does “no more than
propose a commercial transaction.” The expression resulting from the content of the
tarpaulin is, however, definitely political speech.

FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation.

                Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions “based on the
subject matter of the utterance or speech.” In contrast, content-neutral regulation
includes controls merely on the incidents of the speech such as time, place, or manner of
the speech.

                The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The
tarpaulin content is not easily divorced from the size of its medium.

                Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this

court has used the clear and present danger rule as measure.

                Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be
substantive, ‘extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.’” “Only
when the challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass
constitutional muster, with the government having the burden of overcoming the
presumed unconstitutionality.”

                Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the
regulation. There is no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the
posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the right of freedom of expression.
There is no reason for the state to minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to
post the tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the tarpaulin does not affect
anyone else’s constitutional rights.

SIXTH ISSUE: Yes.

                The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the
tarpaulin remains the private property of petitioners. Their right to use their property is
likewise protected by the Constitution.

                Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private

property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights is
void, because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal
protection of the laws.

                The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates where decals and
stickers should be posted is “so broad that it encompasses even the citizen’s private
property.” Consequently, it violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which
provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.

SEVENTH ISSUE: No.

                The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not
binding upon this court. The position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as
regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members of a
tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis. The enumeration of candidates on the
 face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech with political
consequences and not religious speech.

Doctrine of benevolent neutrality

                With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent
neutrality allows accommodation of religion under certain circumstances.
Accommodations are government policies that take religion specifically into account not
to promote the government’s favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and
groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is
to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or institution’s religion.

                As Justice Brennan explained, the “government may take religion into account .
. . to exempt, when possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation
individuals whose religious beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed,
or to create without state involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious
exercise may flourish.”

Lemon test

A regulation is constitutional when:

1. It has a secular legislative purpose;

2. It neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
3. It does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.

Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tanon Strait, et.al. v. Reyes,
et. al.
FACTS:
June 13, 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the DOE,
entered into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with
JAPEX. This contract involved geological and geophysical studies of the Tañon
Strait.
May 9 to 18, 2005, JAPEX conducted seismic surveys in and around the Tañon
Strait. A multi-channel sub-bottom profiling covering approximately 751
kilometers was also done to determine the area's underwater composition.
January 31, 2007, the Protected Area Management Board of the Tañon Strait
(PAMB-Tañon Strait) issued Resolution No. 2007-001, wherein it adopted the
Initial Environmental Examination (IEE) commissioned by JAPEX, and favorably
recommended the approval of JAPEX's application for an ECC.
March 6, 2007, the EMB of DENR Region VII granted an ECC to the DOE and JAPEX
for the offshore oil and gas exploration project in Tañon Strait. Months later, on
November 16, 2007, JAPEX began to drill an exploratory well, with a depth of
3,150 meters, near Pinamungajan town in the western Cebu Province. This drilling
lasted until February 8, 2008.
Petitioners then applied to this Court for redress, via two separate original
petitions both dated December 17, 2007, wherein they commonly seek that
respondents be enjoined from implementing SC-46 for, among others, violation of
the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the service contract is prohibited on the ground that there is no
general law prescribing the standard or uniform terms, conditions, and
requirements for service contracts involving oil exploration and extraction.

HELD:
No, the disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, and utilization of
indigenous petroleum in the Philippines are governed by Presidential Decree No.
87 or the Oil Exploration and Development Act of 1972. This was enacted by then
President Ferdinand Marcos to promote the discovery and production of
indigenous petroleum through the utilization of government and/or local or
foreign private resources to yield the maximum benefit to the Filipino people and
the revenues to the Philippine Government.
Contrary to the petitioners' argument, Presidential Decree No. 87, although
enacted in 1972, before the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, remains to be a
valid law unless otherwise repealed.
Moreover, in cases where the statute seems to be in conflict with the
Constitution, but a construction that it is in harmony with the Constitution is also
possible, that construction should be preferred. This Court, in Pangandaman v.
Commission on Elections expounding on this point, pronounced: It is a basic
precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony
with the Constitution and that the spirit, rather than the letter of the law
determines its construction; for that reason, a statute must be read according to
its spirit and intent.
Note that while Presidential Decree No. 87 may serve as the general law upon
which a service contract for petroleum exploration and extraction may be
authorized, as will be discussed below, the exploitation and utilization of this
energy resource in the present case may be allowed only through a law passed by
Congress, since the Tañon Strait is a NIPAS area.

Mercado v. Hon. Lopena

Mercado v. Hon. Lopena

FACTS: The root of this controversy is a domestic dispute between estranged spouses petitioner
Mercado and private respondent Go. Such dispute eventually led to the filing of numerous suits by both
parties against each other. Petitioner avers that the cases filed by private respondents against them (the
subject cases) arel forms of SLAPP intended to harass, intimidate, and silence them. Petitioners claim
that the subject cases are false and baseless complaints that were filed to emotionally, psychologically,
and financially drain them and ultimately to pressure them to give up custody of petitioner Mercado's
minor children. Petitioners also argue that the filing of the subject cases falls within the definition of
"abuse" and "violence against women" under R.A. No. 9262. In this regard, petitioners claim that public
respondents committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in taking
cognizance of the subject cases even though petitioner Mercado is a "judicially declared victim of
domestic violence" and in whose favor a PPO has been issued. Public respondents stress several
procedural infirmities in the Petition, namely: (i) that the requisites for judicial review are not present in
this case; (ii) that the filing of the Petition is premature because there are other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedies available to petitioners; and (iii) that there was also a failure to observe the
hierarchy of courts.

With respect to the substantive issue, public respondents further aver that they did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of the subject cases as the same cannot be considered as
SLAPPs because such rule applies specifically to environmental cases only. ISSUE: 1) Whether the
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was proper. 2) Whether the
cases filed against the petitioner constitutes SLAPP. RULING: 1) No. The writs of certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 are extraordinary remedies that may be availed of when any tribunal, board,
or officer exercising judicial or quasi judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of jurisdiction amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The term grave abuse of
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to excess, or a lack of jurisdiction. The
abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised
in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion

or hostility Based on the foregoing standards, the Court finds that petitioners herein utterly failed to
establish their entitlement to a corrective writ of certiorari or prohibition. 2) No. The concept of SLAPP is
inapplicable to cases of domestic violence against women and children under RA No 9262 The concept
of SLAPP was first introduced to this jurisdiction under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases
(A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC). SLAPP refers to an action whether civil, criminal or administrative, brought against
any person, institution or any government agency or local government unit or its officials and
employees, with the intent to harass, vex, exert undue pressure or stifle any legal recourse that such
person, institution or government agency has taken or may take in the enforcement of environmental
laws, protection of the environment or assertion of environmental rights SLAPP, as a defense, is a mere
privilege borne out of procedural rules; accordingly, it may only be exercised in the manner and within
the scope prescribed by the Court as a rule making body. Here, petitioners cannot, under the guise of
substantial justice, rely on a remedy that is simply not available to them In fact, by invoking the Court's
rule-making power in their Petition, petitioners have admitted that the instant action has no basis under
any of the rules promulgated by the Court The Court takes this occasion to remind petitioners that rules
of procedure are not a "one size fits-all" tool that may be invoked in any and all instances at the whim of
the litigant as this would be anathema to the orderly administration of justice.

Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals, et. Al

FACTS:
– The Ombudsman’s argument against the CA’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition, and
her corollary prayer for its dismissal, is based on her interpretation of Section 14, RA 6770, or the Ombudsman
Act, which reads in full:

Section 14. Restrictions. – No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation being
conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of
the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.

No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman,
except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.

– The Ombudsman’s maintains that the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 textually prohibits courts from
extending provisional injunctive relief to delay any investigation conducted by her office. Despite the usage of
the general phrase “[n]o writ of injunction shall be issued by any court,” the Ombudsman herself concedes that
the prohibition does not cover the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Are the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 14 of R.A. No. 6770, valid and constitutional?

RULING: The first paragraph is declared INEFFECTIVE until the Court adopts the same as part of the rules of
procedure through an administrative circular duly issued; The second paragraph is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND INVALID.
The Court rules that when Congress passed the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 and, in so doing, took
away from the courts their power to issue a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin an investigation conducted by the
Ombudsman, it encroached upon this Court’s constitutional rule-making authority. Through this provision,
Congress interfered with a provisional remedy that was created by this Court under its duly promulgated rules
of procedure, which utility is both integral and inherent to every court’s exercise of judicial power. Without the
Court’s consent to the proscription, as may be manifested by an adoption of the same as part of the rules of
procedure through an administrative circular issued therefor, there thus, stands to be a violation of the
separation of powers principle.

In addition, it should be pointed out that the breach of Congress in prohibiting provisional injunctions, such as in
the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, does not only undermine the constitutional allocation of powers; it
also practically dilutes a court’s ability to carry out its functions. This is so since a particular case can easily be
mooted by supervening events if no provisional injunctive relief is extended while the court is hearing the same.

Since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 limits the remedy against “decision or findings” of the
Ombudsman to a Rule 45 appeal and thus – similar to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770- attempts
to effectively increase the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction without its advice and concurrence, it is
therefore concluded that the former provision is also unconstitutional and perforce, invalid. Contrary to the
Ombudsman’s posturing, Fabian should squarely apply since the above-stated Ombudsman Act provisions are
in part materia in that they “cover the same specific or particular subject matter,” that is, the manner of judicial
review over issuances of the Ombudsman.

Note that since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is clearly determinative of the existence of the
CA’s subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, including all subsequent
proceedings relative thereto, as the Ombudsman herself has developed, the Court deems it proper to resolve
this issue ex mero motu (on its own motion):
Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial are ordinarily rejected
unless the jurisdiction of the court below or that of the appellate court is involved in which case it may be raised
at any time or on the court’s own motion. The Court ex mero motu may take cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at
any point in the case where that fact is developed. The court has a clearly recognized right to determine its own
jurisdiction in any proceeding.

Loloy Unduran, et. al. v. Ramon Aberasturi

FACTS:

         This is a Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for

Reconsideration of the Court’s En Banc Decision dated October 20, 2015, which
the petition was denied and affirmed the Court of Appeals decision. In the
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, they maintain their contention believing
that it is the National Commission of Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) not the regular
courts, which has jurisdiction over disputes and controversies involving ancestral
domain of the Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICC’s) and Indigenous Peoples
(IP’s) regardless of the parties involved.
         In their Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners stress that:

1. The NCIP and not the regular courts has jurisdiction over the case under the
principle that jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case is determined
by the allegations in the complaint, and pursuant to jurisprudence allowing
exemptions thereto;
2. The jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case rests upon the NCIP as
conferred by the IPRA;
3. The IPRA is a social legislation that seeks to protect the IPs not so much
from themselves or fellow IPs but more from non-IPs;
4. The IPRA created the NCIP as the agency of government mandated to
realize the rights of IPs;
5. In the exercise of its mandate, the NCIP was created as a quasi-judicial body
with jurisdiction to resolve claims and disputes involving the rights of IPs;
6. The jurisdiction of the NCIP in resolving claims and disputes involving the
rights of IPs is not limited to IPs of the same tribe;
7. Harmonizing the related provisions of the IPRA supports the argument that
the NCIP has jurisdiction over cases involving IP rights whether or not the
parties are IPs or non-ICCs/IPs;
8. The NCIP as quasi-judicial agency provides IPs mechanisms for access to
justice in the fulfillment of the State's obligations to respect, protect and
fulfill IP's human rights;
9. The NCIP has the competence and skill that would greatly advance the
administration of justice with respect to protection and fulfillment of ICC/IP
rights/human rights; and
10.(Recognition and enforcement of customary laws and indigenous justice
systems fulfill the State's obligations as duty bearers in the enforcement of
human rights.
    
ISSUE:
        Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has the jurisdiction over the disputes
and controversies involving the ancestral domain of the ICC and IP regardless of
the parties involved not the NCIP.
HELD:
         Yes. It is the court of general jurisdiction has the power or authority to hear
and decide cases whose subject matter does not fall within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
function. In contrast, a court of limited jurisdiction, or a court acting under special
powers, has only the jurisdiction expressly delegated.  An administrative agency,
acting in its quasi-judicial capacity, is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction which could
wield only such powers that are specifically granted to it by the enabling statutes.
Limited or special jurisdiction is that which is confined to particular causes or
which can be exercised only under limitations and circumstances prescribed by
the statute.
         Meanwhile, the NCIP's jurisdiction is limited under customary laws presents
two important issues: first, whether it is legally possible to punish non-ICCs/IPs
with penalties under customary laws; and second, whether a member of a
particular ICC/IP could be punished in accordance with the customary laws of
another ICC/IP.
         Therefore, the Court finds no merit in petitioners' contention that
jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of a case is not merely based on
the allegations of the complaint in certain cases where the actual issues are
evidenced by subsequent pleadings. It is well settled that the jurisdiction of the
court cannot be made to depend on the defenses raised by the defendant in the
answer or a motion to dismiss; otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would
depend almost entirely on the defendant. Suffice it also to state that the Court is
unanimous in denying the petition for review on certiorari on the ground that the
CA correctly ruled that the subject matter of the original and amended complaint
based on the allegations therein is within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Re Letter of Court of Appeals Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso nasa PDF
Film Development Council v. Colon Heritage Realty Corporation
FACTS:

 1993: Cebu City passed City Ordinance No. LXIX: Revised Omnibus Tax Ordinance of the
City of Cebu, Sections 42 and 43, Chapter XI of the Ordinance required proprietors, lessees or
operators of theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia and other places of
amusement to pay amusement tax equivalent to 30% of the gross receipts of the admission fees
to the Office of the City Treasurer of Cebu City.
 June 7, 2002: Congress passed RA 9167 creating FDCP.  Sections 13 and 14 thereof
provide that the amusement tax on certain graded films which would otherwise accrue to the
cities and municipalities in Metropolitan Manila and highly urbanized and independent
component cities in the Philippines during the period the graded film is exhibited, should be
deducted and withheld by the proprietors, operators or lessees of theaters or cinemas and
remitted to the FDCP which shall reward the same to producers of the graded films.  
 RTC: Granted Cebu City and CHRC separate petition for declaratory relief before the RTC
Cebu City which sought to declare Sections 13 and 14 of RA 9167 invalid and unconstitutional.
ISSUE: W/N doctrine of operative fact in relation to the declaration of Sections 13 and 14 of RA 9167
as invalid and unconstitutional.

HELD:  YES.  The operative fact doctrine equally applies to the non-remittance by proprietors since
the law produced legal effects prior to the declaration of the nullity of Sections 13 and 14 of RA
9167.

 The operative fact doctrine recognizes the existence and validity of a legal provision prior its
being declared as unconstitutional and legitimizes otherwise invalid acts done pursuant thereto
because of considerations of practicality and fairness. 
 In this regard, certain acts done pursuant to a legal provision which was just recently
declared as unconstitutional by the Court cannot be anymore undone because not only would it
be highly impractical to do so, but more so, unfair to those who have relied on the said legal
provision prior to the time it was struck down.
 The right to receive the amusement taxes accrued the moment the taxes were deemed
payable under the provisions of the Omnibus Tax Ordinance of Cebu City. 
 Taxes, once due, must be paid without delay to the taxing authority
 Taxes are the lifeblood of Government and their prompt and certain availability is an
imperious need.  This flows from the truism that without taxes, the government would be
paralyzed for lack of the motive power to activate and operate it.  
 The prompt payment of taxes to the rightful authority, cannot be left to the whims of
taxpayers.  To rule otherwise would be to acquiesce to the norm allowing taxpayers to reject
payment of taxes under the supposition that the law imposing the same is illegal or
unconstitutional.  This would unduly hamper government operations. 

FASAP vs PAL PDF again
Tanada v. Angara

FACTS
The Philippines joined World Trade Organization as a founding member with the goal of improving Philippine
access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports. The
President also saw in the WTO the opening of new opportunities for the services sector, the reduction of costs and
uncertainty associated with exporting and the attraction of more investments into the country. On April 15, 1994,
respondent Navarro, then DTI Secretary, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final Act Embodying the Results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations. On December 14, 1994, the Senate concurred in the ratification of the
President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the WTO which includes various agreements and
associated legal instruments. On December 16, 1994,the President signed the Instrument of Ratification.

ISSUES

1. Whether the WTO Agreement violated the mandated economic nationalism by the Constitution

2. Whether the provisions of the WTO Agreement restricts and impairs Philippine sovereignty, specifically the
legislative power vested in the Congress

3. Whether the Senate concurrence in the WTO Agreement and its annexes but not in the other documents referred
to in the Final Act is defective and insufficient and thus constitutes abuse of discretion

RULING

1. No. The Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods
and services in the development of the Philippine economy. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality
and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair. The constitutional policy of a self-reliant and
independent national economy does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It
contemplates neither economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the international community.

2. No. While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic level, it is
however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a
member of the family of nations. Unquestionably, the Constitution did not envision a hermit-type isolation of the
country from the rest of the world. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted
principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part of our laws. A treaty engagement is not
a mere moral obligation on the parties. By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of
sovereignty. The Philippines has effectively agreed to limit the exercise of its sovereign powers of taxation, eminent
domain and police power. The underlying consideration in this partial sovereignty is the reciprocal commitment of
the other contracting states in granting the same privilege and immunities to the Philippines, its officials and its
citizens. The same reciprocity characterizes the same commitments under WTO-GATT. The point is that a portion
of sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution, based on the rationale that the Philippines adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law as part  of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of
cooperation and amity with all nations.

3. No. The petitioners submit that concurrence in the WTO Agreement alone is flawed because it is in effect a
rejection of the Final Act. The Court held that a final act is an instrument which records the winding up of the
proceedings of a diplomatic conference and not the treaty itself. On the other hand, the WTO Agreement itself
expresses what multilateral agreements are deemed included as its integral parts. It should be added that the Senate
was well-aware of what it was concurring in as shown by the member’s deliberation.

Bayan v. Zamora
I.      THE FACTS

The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an agreement
called the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The agreement was treated as a treaty by the Philippine
government and was ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada with the concurrence of 2/3 of the
total membership of the Philippine Senate.

The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It
provides for the guidelines to govern such visits, and further defines the rights of the U.S. and the
Philippine governments in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft,
importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.

Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates §25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution,
which provides that “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines
except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate . . . and recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting State.” 

II.    THE ISSUE

Was the VFA unconstitutional?

III.   THE RULING

[The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions, held that the petitioners did not commit
grave abuse of discretion, and sustained the constitutionality of the VFA.]

NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional.

Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country,
unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty
must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by congress, ratified by a majority
of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the
other contracting state.

There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA.  The
concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the provisions
of the Constitution . . . the provision in [in §25, Article XVIII] requiring ratification by a majority of the
votes cast in a national referendum being unnecessary since Congress has not required it.

xxx                              xxx                              xxx

This Court is of the firm view that the phrase “recognized as a treaty” means that the other
contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the other
contracting state, the United States of America in this case, to submit the VFA to the United States
Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase.

 Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus
attached to them prevails. Its language should be understood in the sense they have in common
use.

Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an
executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a
treaty. To be sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under international
law, the said agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty.

xxx                              xxx                              xxx

The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador Thomas C.
Hubbard, has stated that the United States government has fully committed to living up to the terms
of the VFA. For as long as the United States of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a
treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked
compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.

Cayetano v. Monsod

FACTS:
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the
position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the
Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner Renato Cayetano opposed
the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification
of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Atty. Monsod has
worked as a lawyer in the law office of his father (1960-1963); an operations officer with
the World Bank Group (1963-1970); Chief Executive Officer of an investment bank
(1970-1986); legal or economic consultant on various companies (1986); Secretary
General of NAMFREL (1986); member of Constitutional Commission (1986-1987);
National Chairman of NAMFREL (1987); and member of the quasi-judicial Davide
Commission (1990).

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of

Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On
the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.Challenging the validity
of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod’s nomination,
petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and
prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod
as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent posseses the required qualification of having engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years.

HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that Atty. Monsod possessed the required qualification. In
the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava: The practice of law is not limited
to the conduct of cases or litigation in court. In general, all advice to clients, and all
action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation services, contemplating an appearance before judicial
body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of
estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice.

Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. “To engage in the practice of law
is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. In general, a
practice of law requires a lawyer and client relationship, it is whether in or out of court.
As such, the petition is dismissed.

Kilosbayan v. Ermita

FACTS:

Petitioner filed a petition to set aside the appointment of Gregory Ong

as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. Petitioner alleged that Ong is not a natural-
born citizen and thus, is disqualified to become a member of the Supreme Court.
Respondent Ermita, on the other hand, contended that Ong was appointed from a list
of candidates given by the JBC and they have referred the matter back to the latter for
the determination of the issue regarding Ong’s citizenship. Respondent Ong contended
that he is truly a natural-born citizen, following a series of changes in nationalities and
whatnot with respect to his ancestors. He also contended that the petitioner has no
standing to file the said petition.

HELD:

First, on the issue of standing, the petitioners have standing as the issue involved is of
utmost importance—the citizenship of a person to be appointed as a member of the
Supreme Court.
Second, on the principal issue of the case, the Court took judicial notice of Ong’s petition
to be admitted to the Philippine Bar. In his petition to be admitted to the Philippine bar,
respondent alleged that he is qualified to be admitted because among others he is a
Filipino citizen, and that he became a citizen because his father became a naturalized
Filipino citizen and being a minor then, thus he too became a Filipino citizen. As part of
his evidence, he submitted his birth certificate and the naturalization papers of his
father.
It was on basis of these allegations under oath and the submitted evidence of no less
than Ong that the Court allowed him to take his oath as a lawyer. It is clear therefore,
that from the records of this Court, Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged
subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration and the
DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial court stating that Ong and his mother
were naturalized along with his father. Furthermore, as the petitioner correctly
submitted, no substantial change in an entry in the civil register can be made without a
judicial order. Change in the citizenship status is a substantial change. The long string of
events that Ong alleged leading to him being a natural-born citizen, all entail factual
assertions that need to be threshed out in proper judicial proceedings.
NOTE: In this case, there has been no ouster from an appointment. There
may be approval of the appointment but it lacks other acts that will
complete the appointment.
The last act in an appointment is the delivery of the commission. It is now up to the
appointee—he must accept the appointment, take an oath of office, assume office, etc. It
doesn’t end here. The CSC can either reject or approve of the appointment. When the
appointee doesn’t pursue all the acts to assume office, the question is whether or not he
can be held liable. The law doesn’t provide really that there is a period to accept or reject
an appointment.

Topacio v. Justice Ong

Petitioner Ferdinand Topacio implored the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to

initiate post-haste a quo warranto proceeding against Gregory Santos Ong. He points
out that natural-born citizenship is also a qualification for appointment as member of
the Sandiganbayan and that Ong has failed to meet the citizenship requirement. Ong,
on the other hand, avers that the RTC already granted his petition and recognized him
as a natural-born citizen. The decision having become final, he caused the
corresponding annotation thereof in his Certificate of Birth. The OSG informed Topacio
that it cannot favorably act on request for the filing of a quo warranto petition until the
RTC case shall have been terminated with finality. Topacio assails this position of the
OSG as being tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the OSG committed grave abuse of discretion in deferring the filing of a
petition for quo warranto.

HELD:

The Court appreciates no abuse of discretion, much less, a grave one, on the part of the
OSG in deferring action on the filing of a quo warranto case until after the RTC case has
been terminated with finality. A decision is not deemed tainted with grave abuse of
discretion simply because the affected party disagrees with it. The Solicitor General is
the counsel of the government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and its officials or
agents. In the discharge of its task, the Solicitor General must see to it that the best
interest of the government is upheld within the limits set by law. In
the exercise of sound discretion, the Solicitor General may suspend or turn down the
institution of an action for quo warranto where there are just and valid reasons. Upon
receipt of a case certified to him, the Solicitor General exercises his discretion in
the management of the case. He may start the prosecution of the case by filing the
appropriate action in court or he may opt not to file the case at all. He may do
everything within his legal authority but always conformably with the national interest
and the policy of the government on the matter at hand. It appears that after studying
the case, the Solicitor General saw the folly of re-litigating the same issue of Ong‘s
citizenship in the quo warranto case simultaneously with the RTC case, not to mention
the consequent risk of forum-shopping. In any event, the OSG did not totally write finis
to the issue as it merely advised petitioner to await the outcome of the RTC case.

Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council

Facts: 

In 1994, instead of having only 7 members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as
two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.
Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow
the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote
each. Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr.
(respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is
this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. Respondents argued that the
crux of the controversy is the phrase “a representative of Congress.” It is their theory
that the two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives, are permanent and
mandatory components of “Congress,” such that the absence of either divests the term
of its substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution. Bicameralism, as the
system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective
powers in the performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when
Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of “a representative from Congress,”
it should mean one representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire
Congress.

Issue:

1.  Are the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of judicial review have
been met in this case?

2. Is the JBC’s practice of having members from the Senate and the House of
Representatives making 8 instead of 7 sitting members unconstitutional?

3. What is the effect of the Court's finding that the current composition of the JBC is
unconstitutional?

Held: 

1. Yes. The Courts’ power of judicial review is subject to several limitations, namely: (a)
there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b)
the person challenging the act must have “standing” to challenge; he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (c) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be
the very lis mota of the case. Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when
these conditions sine qua non are present, especially when the constitutionality of an
act by a co-equal branch of government is put in issue.

The Court disagrees with the respondents’ contention that petitioner lost his standing to
sue because he is not an official nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true
that a “personal stake” on the case is imperative to have locus standi, this is not to say
that only official nominees for the post of Chief Justice can come to the Court and
question the JBC composition for being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens and
nominates other members of the Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this regard, the
JBC’s duty is not at all limited to the nominations for the highest magistrate in the land.
A vast number of aspirants to judicial posts all over the country may be affected by the
Court’s ruling. More importantly, the legality of the very process of nominations to the
positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of the controversy. The claim that the
composition of the JBC is illegal and unconstitutional is an object of concern, not just for
a nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens who have the right to seek judicial
intervention for rectification of legal blunders.

2.  Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the
Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of
Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative
of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector.
From a simple reading of the above-quoted provision, it can readily be discerned that
the provision is clear and unambiguous. The first paragraph calls for the creation of a
JBC and places the same under the supervision of the Court. Then it goes to its
composition where the regular members are enumerated: a representative of the
Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired member of the Court and a representative
from the private sector. On the second part lies the crux of the present controversy. It
enumerates the ex officio or special members of the JBC composed of the Chief
Justice, who shall be its Chairman, the Secretary of Justice and “a representative of
Congress.”

The use of the singular letter “a” preceding “representative of Congress” is unequivocal
and leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative of what the members of
the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate only one
(1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than one (1)
representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no
uncertain terms, so provided.

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a
statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional
construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words
of the Constitution should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it
says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and
negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and
the people mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum – from the words of a
statute there should be no departure.

Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word
“Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic
sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House
of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular
representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC.

It is worthy to note that the seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical
purpose, that is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate in voting. This
underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that a single vote may not be divided into
half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress, or among any of the sitting
members of the JBC for that matter. This unsanctioned practice can possibly cause
disorder and eventually muddle the JBC’s voting process, especially in the event a tie is
reached. The aforesaid purpose would then be rendered illusory, defeating the precise
mechanism which the Constitution itself createdWhile it would be unreasonable to
expect that the Framers provide for every possible scenario, it is sensible to presume
that they knew that an odd composition is the best means to break a voting deadlock.

The respondents insist that owing to the bicameral nature of Congress, the word
“Congress” in Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution should be read as including
both the Senate and the House of Representatives. They theorize that it was so worded
because at the time the said provision was being drafted, the Framers initially intended
a unicameral form of Congress. Then, when the Constitutional Commission eventually
adopted a bicameral form of Congress, the Framers, through oversight, failed to amend
Article VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution.

It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary
function in government – to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit
in the distinction of the role of each house in the process. The same holds true in
Congress’ non-legislative powers. An inter-play between the two houses is necessary in
the realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply
discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no
liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term
“Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative department.
3. As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes
no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not
been passed at all. This rule, however, is not absolute. Under the doctrine of operative
facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized.
They are not nullified. This is essential in the interest of fair play.

The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a
matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by
recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality
is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The
past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The doctrine is applicable
when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who
have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration
of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the
acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.3

Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable in this case and
holds that notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of
the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid. 

Ombudsman v. Civil Service Commission

Melchor Carandang, Paul Elmer Clemente and Jose Tereso De Jesus, Jr., were

appointed Graft Investigation Officers III of the Office of the Ombudsman. The Civil
Service Commission (CSC) approved the appointments on the condition that for the
appointees to acquire security of tenure, they must first obtain a Career Executive
Service (CES). The Ombudsman requested to the CSC for the change of status from
temporary to permanent, of the appointments of Carandang, Clemente and De Jesus,
emphasizing that since the Office of the Ombudsman is not governed by the Career
Executive Service Board, security of tenure can be granted despite the absence of CES
eligibility. CSC changed the status of Carandang‘s and Clemente‘s appointments to
permanent but not with respect to De Jesus on the ground that he “has not met the
eligibility requirements. Hence, this petition for ceritiorari filed by the Office of the
Ombudsman seeking to nullify the CSC Resolution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the general power of the Civil Service Commission to administer civil
service cannot validly curtail the specific discretionary power of appointment including
the grant of security of tenure by the Office of the Ombudsman

HELD:

Book V, Title I, Subtitle A of the Administrative Code of 1987 provides persons

occupying positions in the CES are presidential appointees. A person occupying the
position of Graft Investigation Officer III is not, however, appointed by the President
but by the Ombudsman as provided in Article IX of the Constitution. To classify the
position of Graft Investigation Officer III as belonging to the CES and require an
appointee thereto to acquire CES or CSE eligibility before acquiring security of tenure
would be absurd as it would result either in 1) vesting the appointing power for said
position in the President, in violation of the Constitution; or 2) including in the CES a
position not occupied by a presidential appointee, contrary to the Administrative
Code. It bears emphasis that that under P.D. No 807, Sec. 9(h) which authorizes the CSC
to approve appointments to positions in the civil service, except those specified therein,
its authority is limited “only to [determine] whether or not the appointees possess the
legal qualifications and the appropriate eligibility, nothing else.”11 It is not disputed
that, except for his lack of CES or CSE eligibility, De Jesus possesses the basic
qualifications of a Graft Investigation Officer III, as provided in the earlier quoted
Qualification Standards. Such being the case, the CSC has the ministerial duty to grant
the request of the Ombudsman that appointment be made permanent effective
December 18, 2002. To refuse to heed the request is a clear encroachment on the
discretion vested solely on the Ombudsman as appointing authority. It goes without
saying that the status of the appointments of Carandang and Clemente, who were
conferred CSE eligibility pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 03-0665 dated June 6, 2003,
should be changed to permanent effective December 18, 2002 too.

Civil Service Commission v. Department of Budget

Facts: “Automatic release” of approved annual appropriations to Civil Service

Commission, a constitutional commission which is vested with fiscal autonomy, should
thus be construed to mean that no condition to fund releases to it may be imposed. The
total funds appropriated by General Appropriations Act of 2002 (GAA) for Civil Service
Commission (CSC) was P285,660,790.44. CSC complains that the total funds released
by Department of Budget and Management (DBM) was only P279,853,398.14, thereby
leaving an unreleased balance of P5,807,392.30. CSC contends that the funds were
intentionally withheld by DBM on the ground of their ―no report, no release‖ policy.
Hence, CSC filed a petition for mandamus seeking to compel the DBM to release the
balance of its budget for fiscal year 2002. At the same time, it seeks a determination by
this Court of the extent of the constitutional concept of fiscal autonomy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not DBM‘s policy, ―no report, no release‖ is constitutional.

HELD:

DBM‘s act of withholding the subject funds from CSC due to revenue shortfall is hereby
declared unconstitutional.
The no report, no release policy may not be validly enforced against offices vested with
fiscal autonomy is not disputed. Indeed, such policy cannot be enforced against offices
possessing fiscal autonomy without violating Article IX (A), Section 5 of the
Constitution, which provides that the Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy and that
their approved appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released. The Court
held in the case of, Batangas v. Romulo, ―automatic release‖ in Section 6, Article X of
the Constitution is defined as ―an automatic manner; without thought or
conscious intention.‖ Being ―automatic,‖ thus, connotes something mechanical,
spontaneous and perfunctory. As such the LGUs are not required to perform any act to
receive the ―just share‖ accruing to them from the national coffers. By parity of
construction, ―automatic release‖ of approved annual appropriations to petitioner, a
constitutional commission which is vested with fiscal autonomy, should thus be
construed to mean that no condition to fund releases to it may be imposed. This
conclusion is consistent with the Resolution of this Court which effectively prohibited
the enforcement of a ―no report, no release‖ policy against the Judiciary which has also
been granted fiscal autonomy by the Constitution. Furthermore, the Constitution grants
the enjoyment of fiscal autonomy only to the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions,
of which petitioner is one, and the Ombudsman. To hold that the CSC may be subjected
to withholding or reduction of funds in the event of a revenue shortfall would, to that
extent, place CSC and the other entities vested with fiscal autonomy on equal footing
with all others which are not granted the same autonomy, thereby reducing to naught
the distinction established by the Constitution.

ABS-CBN v. Commission on Elections

Facts : Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing Commission on Elections
(Comelec) en banc Resolution No. 98-14191 dated April 21, 1998. In the said Resolution, the poll body
RESOLVED to approve the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS-CBN or any other groups, its
agents or representatives from conducting such exit survey and to authorize the Honorable Chairman to
issue the same. The Resolution was issued by the Comelec allegedly upon "information from [a] reliable
source that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV
coverage of the elections . . . and to make [an] exit survey of the . . . vote during the elections for national
officials particularly for President and Vice President, results of which shall be [broadcast] immediately."
The electoral body believed that such project might conflict with the official Comelec count, as well as the
unofficial quick count of the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that it had not
authorized or deputized Petitioner ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey. On May 9, 1998, this Court
issued the Temporary Restraining Order prayed for by petitioner. We directed the Comelec to cease and
desist, until further orders, from implementing the assailed Resolution or the restraining order issued
pursuant thereto, if any. In fact, the exit polls were actually conducted and reported by media without any
difficulty or problem.

Issue : WON the Comelec acted with grave abuse of discretion in prohibiting ABS CBN in conducting exit
polls during the election

Held : two theoretical test in determining the validity of restrictions to such freedoms, as follows: These
are the "clear and present danger" rule and the "dangerous tendency" rule. means that the evil
consequence of the comment or utterance must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence
extremely high" before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the
"substantive evil" sought to be prevented. . . . The "dangerous tendency" rule, on the other hand, . . if the
words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are
punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be
advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the
language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is
sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil
which the legislative body seeks to prevent A limitation on the freedom of expression may be justified only
by a danger of such substantive character that the state has a right to prevent. Unlike in the "dangerous
tendency" doctrine, the danger must not only be clear but also present. "Present" refers to the time
element; the danger must not only be probable but very likely to be inevitable.33 The evil sought to be
avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a restraint of a writing
instrument By the very nature of a survey, the interviewees or participants are selected at random, so that
the results will as much as possible be representative or reflective of the general sentiment or view of the
community or group polled. Second, the survey result is not meant to replace or be at par with the official
Comelec count. It consists merely of the opinion of the polling group as to who the electorate in general
has probably voted for, based on the limited data gathered from polled individuals. Finally, not at stake
here are the credibility and the integrity of the elections, which are exercises that are separate and
independent from the exit polls. The holding and the reporting of the results of exit polls cannot undermine
those of the elections, since the former is only part of the latter. If at all, the outcome of one can only be
indicative of the other. With the foregoing premises, The SC conclude that the interest of the state in
reducing disruption is outweighed by the drastic abridgment of the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the
media and the electorate. Quite the contrary, instead of disrupting elections, exit polls — properly
conducted and publicized — can be vital tools for the holding of honest, orderly, peaceful and credible
elections; and for the elimination of election-fixing, fraud and other electoral ills.

Gaminde v. Commission on Audit

Facts: Thelma Gaminde was appointed by the President of the Philippines as

Commissioner of the Civil Service Commission, ad interim and assumed office
on June 22, 1993 after oath of office. The Commission on Appointments (COA)
and the Congress of the Philippines confirmed the appointment on September 7,
1993. Gaminde, on February 24, 1998, sought the Office of the President for
clarification on the expiry date of her term of office. In response to her request,
the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel opined that her term office will expire on
February 2, 2000 instead of February 2, 1999. Relying on said advisory opinion,
Gaminde remained in office after February 2, 1999. However, on February 4,
1999, Chairman Corazon Alma de Leon wrote COA requesting opinion whether
or not Gaminde and her co-terminus staff may be paid their salaries
notwithstanding the expiration of their appointments on February 2, 1999. The
General Counsel of COA issued an opinion on February 18, 1999 that “the term
of Commissioner Gaminde has expired on February 2, 1999 as stated in her
appointment conformably with the constitutional intent.” Consequently, on
March 24, 1999, CSC Resident Auditor Flovitas Felipe issued a Notice of
Disallowance, disallowing in audit the salaries and emoluments of Gaminde and
her co-terminus staff effective February 2, 1999. Gaminde appealed COA’s
disallowance but it was dismissed, and affirmed the propriety of the
disallowance; and held that the issue of Gaminde’s office term may be properly
addressed by mere reference to her appointment paper which set the expiration
date of February 2, 1999, and that the Commission was bereft of power to
recognize an extension of her term, not even with the implied acquiescence of
the Office of the President. Gaminde moved for reconsideration, but was denied
by COA.

Issue: Whether the term of office of Thelma Gaminde, as Commissioner, Civil

Service Commission, to which she was appointed on June 11, 1993, expired on
February 2, 1999, as stated in the appointment paper, or on February 2, 2000, as
claimed by her.

Held: The term of office of Thelma P. Gaminde as the CSC Commissioner, as

appointed by President Fidel V. Ramos, expired on February 2, 1999. However,
she served as de-facto officer in good faith until February 2, 2000. The term of
office of the Chairman and members of the Civil Service Commission is
prescribed in the 1987 Constitution under Article IX-D, Section 1 (2):

“The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President

withthe consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years
without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office
for seven years, a Commissioner for five years, and another Commissioner for
three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only
for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.”

Therefore, COA erred in disallowing in audit such salary and other emoluments.
Gaminde and her co-terminus staff are entitled to receive their salary and other
emoluments for actual service rendered.

 
Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau v. Court of Appeals WALEY
Gamogamo v. PNOC Shipping
Facts:
On 23 January 1963, Petitioner Cayo F. Gamogamo was first employed with the
Department of Health (DOH) as Dental Aide.  On 22 February 1967, he was promoted to
the position of Dentist 1.  He remained employed at the DOH for fourteen years until he
resigned on 2
November 1977.[1]
On 9 November 1977, petitioner was hired as company dentist by Luzon Stevedoring
Corporation (LUSTEVECO), a private domestic corporation.[2] Subsequently, respondent
PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation (hereafter Respondent) acquired and took over
the... shipping business of LUSTEVECO, and on 1 August 1979, petitioner was among
those who opted to be absorbed by the Respondent.[3] Thus, he continued to work as
company dentist.  In a letter dated 1 August 1979, Respondent assumed without
interruption... petitioner's service credits with LUSTEVECO,[4] but it did not make reference
to nor assumed petitioner's service credits with the DOH.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed petitioner's complaint.[11] On appeal, however, the NLRC
reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.  In its decision[12] of 28 November 1997, the
NLRC ruled:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated May 30, 1997 is hereby SET ASIDE
and another judgment is hereby rendered
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.[13]
Unsatisfied with the reversal, Respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil
action for certiorari which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 51152.  In its decision[14] of 8
November 1999, the Court of Appeals set aside the NLRC judgment... and decreed:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE and the writ prayed for
GRANTED. Consequently, the Decision and Resolution of the National Labor Relations
Commission (Second Division) dated  November 28, 1997 and May 15, 1998, respectively,
are hereby SET
ASIDE AND NULLIFIED, without prejudice to private respondent Cayo F. Gamo-gamo's
recovery of whatever benefits he may have been entitled to receive by reason of his
fourteen (14) years of service with the Department of Health.
Issues:
his years of service with the DOH must be considered as creditable service for the...
purpose of computing his retirement pay
Ruling:
We rule in the negative the issue of whether petitioner's service with the DOH should be
included in the computation of his retirement benefits.
It is clear therefrom that the creditable service referred to in the Retirement Plan is the
retiree's continuous years of service with Respondent.
Retirement results from a voluntary agreement between the employer and the employee
whereby the latter after reaching a certain age agrees to sever his employment with the
former.[20]
Since the retirement pay solely comes from Respondent's funds, it is but natural that
Respondent shall disregard petitioner's length of service in another company for the
computation of his retirement benefits.
Petitioner was absorbed by Respondent from LUSTEVECO on 1 August 1979.   Ordinarily,
his creditable service shall be reckoned from such date.  However, since Respondent took
over the shipping business of LUSTEVECO and agreed to assume without interruption all
the... service credits of petitioner with LUSTEVECO,[21] petitioner's creditable service must
start from 9 November 1977 when he started working with LUSTEVECO[22] until his day of
retirement on 1 April 1995.  Thus, petitioner's... creditable service is 17.3333  years.
We cannot uphold petitioner's contention that his fourteen years of service with the DOH
should be considered because his last two employers were government-owned and
controlled corporations, and fall under the Civil Service Law.
It is not at all disputed that while Respondent and LUSTEVECO are government-owned and
controlled corporations, they have no original charters; hence they are not under the Civil
Service Law.
Obviously, totalization of service credits is only resorted to when the retiree does not qualify
for benefits in either or both of the Systems.  Here, petitioner is qualified to receive benefits
granted by the Government Security Insurance System (GSIS), if such right has... not yet
been exercised.
In any case, petitioner's fourteen years of service with the DOH may not remain
uncompensated because it may be recognized by the GSIS pursuant to the aforequoted
Section 12, as may be determined by the GSIS.
Since petitioner may be entitled to some benefits from the GSIS,... he cannot avail of the
benefits under R.A. No. 7699.
We discern nothing from the record that would suggest that petitioner was coerced,
intimidated or deceived into signing the Release and Undertaking. Neither are we convinced
that the consideration for the quitclaim is... unconscionable because it is actually the full
amount of the retirement benefit provided for in the company's retirement plan.
WHEREFORE, no reversible error on the part of the Respondent Court of Appeals having
been shown, the petition in this case is DENIED and the appealed decision in CA-G.R. SP
No. 51152 is hereby AFFIRMED.
Principles:
ARTICLE IV
RETIREMENT BENEFITS
SEC 4.1. Normal Retirement Date/Eligibility. -- The normal retirement date of an employee
shall be the first day of the month next following the employee's sixtieth (60th) birthday.  To
be eligible for the retirement benefit described under Sec.
4.2, the employee must have rendered at least ten (10) years of continuous service with the
Company.  In case the retiring employee has rendered less than ten (10) years of service
with the Company, he shall be entitled to one (1) month's final monthly basic salary
(12/12)... for every year of service.
SEC. 4.2. Normal Retirement Benefit. -- The retirement benefit shall be payable in lump
sum upon retirement which shall be determined on the basis of the retiree's final monthly
basic salary (14/12) as follows:
(a) One (1) month's pay for every year of service for those who have completed at least
twenty (20) years of continuous service with the Company.
(b) One and one-half (1 1/2) months' pay for every year of service for those who have
completed twenty-one (21) to thirty (30) continuous years of service with the Company.
(c) Two (2) months' pay for every year of service for those who have completed at least
thirty-one (31) years of service with the Company.
Article IX(B), Section 2 paragraph 1 of the
1987 Constitution states --
Sec. 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and
agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters.
SEC. 12 Old Age Pension. -- (a) xxx
(b) A member who has rendered at least three years but less than fifteen years of service at
the time of separation shall, upon reaching sixty years of age or upon separation after age
sixty, receive a cash payment equivalent to one hundred percent of his average monthly...
compensation for every year of service with an employer (Presidential Decree No, 1146, as
amended, otherwise known as the Government Service Insurance Act of 1977).
SEC. 4.  All contributions paid by such member personally, and those that were paid by his
employers to both Systems shall be considered in the processing of benefits which he can
claim from either or both Systems: Provided, however, That the amount of benefits to be...
paid by one System shall be in proportion to the number of contributions actually remitted to
that System (Republic Act No. 7699).

Dimayuga v. Denedicto II, - PDF

Pabillo, et. al., v. Commission on Elections – PDF

Nacionalista Party v. Commission on Elections, WALA

People v. Judge Inting

FACTS:
1. February 6, 1988 | Mrs. Editha Barba filed a letter-complaint against OIC-
Mayor Dominador Regalado of with the (COMELEC), for allegedly transferring her,
a permanent Nursing Attendant, Grade I, in the office of the Municipal Mayor to a
very remote barangay and without obtaining prior permission or clearance from
COMELEC as required by law.

2. COMELEC, acting on the complaint, directed the Provincial Election Supervisor

of Dumaguete City:
a. (1) to conduct the preliminary investigation of the case;
b. (2) to prepare and file the necessary information in court;
c. (3) to handle the prosecution if the evidence submitted shows a prima facie
case and
d. (4) to issue a resolution of prosecution or dismissal as the case may be.

3. After a preliminary investigation of Barba's complaint, Atty. Lituanas filed with

the respondent trial court a criminal case for violation of Omnibus Election Code
against the OIC-Mayor.

RTC: issued a warrant of arrest against the accused OIC Mayor.

4. But before the accused could be arrested, the trial court set aside its order on
the ground that Atty. Lituanas is not authorized to determine probable cause
pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
5. The court stated that it "will give due course to the information filed in this
case if the same has the written approval of the Provincial Fiscal after which the
prosecution of the case shall be under the supervision and control of the latter."

6. Atty. Lituanas failed to secure the written approval of the Provincial Fiscal.
RTC quashed the information.

7. MR - DENIED

ISSUE: W/N A preliminary investigation conducted by a Provincial Election

Supervisor involving election offenses have to be coursed through the Provincial
Prosecutor, before the RTC may take cognizance of the investigation and
determine whether or not probable cause exists?

HELD: NO

[ART 9C SEC2] In effect the 1987 Constitution mandates the COMELEC not only to
investigate but also to prosecute cases of violation of election laws.

This means that the COMELEC is empowered to conduct preliminary

investigations in cases involving election offenses for the purpose of helping the
Judge determine probable cause and for filing an information in court. This power
is exclusive with COMELEC.
Hence, the Provincial Fiscal, as such, assumes no role in the prosecution of
election offenses. If the Fiscal or Prosecutor files an information charging an
election offense or prosecutes a violation of election law, it is because he has
been deputized by the COMELEC. He does not do so under the sole authority of
his office.

Prosecution. The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have
exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses
punishable as provided for in the preceding section, and to prosecute the same:
Provided, That in the event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint
within two (2) months from filing, the complainant may file the complaint with
the Office of the Fiscal or with the Department of Justice for proper investigation
and prosecution, if warranted.

The Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the
government.

It is only after a preliminary examination conducted by the COMELEC through its

officials or its deputies that section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution comes in.
This is so, because, when the application for a warrant of arrest is made and the
information is filed with the court, the judge will then determine whether or not a
probable cause exists for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
DIFF BET. PROBABLE CAUSE determined by a Judge and Public Prosecutor
ART 3 SEC 2 PROVIDES: “no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge ... "
First, the determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge. It is not for
the Provincial Fiscal or Prosecutor nor for the Election Supervisor to ascertain.
Only the Judge and the Judge alone makes this determination.
Second, the preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. It
merely assists him to make the determination of probable cause. The Judge does
not have to follow what the Prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the Prosecutor's
certification of probable cause is ineffectual.
It is the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all
other supporting documents behind the Prosecutor's certification which are
material in assisting the Judge to make his determination.
And third, Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry
which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the
preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be
held for trial or released.
The determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the
Judge (JUDICIAL IN NATURE). The preliminary investigation proper-whether or not
there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense
charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense,
rigors and embarrassment of trial is the function of the Prosecutor (EXECUTIVE IN
NATURE).

National Press Club v. Commission on Elections

Facts: It is principally argued by petitioners that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646
invades and violates the constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression.
Petitioners maintain that the prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to censorship,
because it selects and singles out for suppression and repression with criminal sanctions,
only publications of a particular content, namely, media-based election or political
propaganda during the election period of 1992. It is asserted that the prohibition is
in derogation of media’s role, function and duty to provide adequate channels of public
information and public opinion relevant to election issues.
Further, petitioners contend that Section 11 (b) abridges the freedom of speech of
candidates, and that the suppression of media-based campaign or political propaganda
except those appearing in the Comelec space of the newspapers and on Comelec time of
radio and television broadcasts, would bring about a substantial reduction in the quantity or
volume of information concerning candidates and issues in the election thereby curtailing
and limiting the right of voters to information and opinion.

The statutory text that petitioners ask to strike down as unconstitutional is that of Section 11
(b) of Republic Act No. 6646, known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987:

“Sec. 11. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. – In addition to the forms of election

propaganda prohibited under Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be unlawful:
x x x                                      x x x                                         x x x

881. b)  for any newspapers, radio broadcasting or television station, other mass

media, or any person making use of the mass media to sell or to give free of charge print
space or air time for campaign or other political purposes except to the Commission as
provided under Section 90 and 92 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Any mass media columnist,
commentator, announcer or personality who is a candidate for any elective public office shall
take a leave of absence from his work as such during the campaign period.”
Issue: Whether Section 11 of Republic Act No. 6646 is valid/constitutional
Held: Yes.
It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of Rights which enshrines
freedom of speech, freedom of expression and freedom of the press (Article III [4],
Constitution) has to be taken in conjunction with Article IX(C)(4) which may be seen to be a
special provision applicable during a specific limited period — i.e., “during the election
period.” It is difficult to overemphasize the special importance of the rights of freedom of
speech and freedom of the press in a democratic polity, in particular when they relate to the
purity and integrity of the electoral process itself, the process by which the people identify
those who shall have governance over them. Thus, it is frequently said that these rights are
accorded a preferred status in our constitutional hierarchy. Withal, the rights of free speech
and free press are not unlimited rights for they are not the only important and relevant values
even in the most democratic of polities. In our own society, equality of opportunity to proffer
oneself for public office, without regard to the level of financial resources that one may have
at one’s disposal, is clearly an important value. One of the basic state policies
given constitutional rank by Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution is the egalitarian
demand that “the State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and
prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.”
 The essential question is whether or not the assailed legislative or administrative provisions
constitute a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the operations
of communication and information enterprises during an election period, or whether such
act has gone beyond permissible supervision or regulation of media operations so as to
constitute unconstitutional repression of freedom of speech and freedom of the press. The
Court considers that Section 11 (b) has not gone outside the permissible bounds of supervision
or regulation of media operations during election periods.
Section 11 (b) does, of course, limit the right of free speech and of access to mass media of the
candidates themselves. The limitation, however, bears a clear and reasonable connection with
the constitutional objective set out in Article IX(C)(4) and Article II (26) of the Constitution.
For it is precisely in the unlimited purchase of print space and radio and television time that
the resources of the financially affluent candidates are likely to make a crucial difference.
Here lies the core problem of equalization of the situations of the candidates with deep
pockets and the candidates with shallow or empty pockets that Article IX(C)(4) of the
Constitution and Section 11 (b) seek to address. That the statutory mechanism which
Section 11 (b) brings into operation is designed and may be expected to bring about
or promote equal opportunity, and equal time and space, for political candidates to inform all
and sundry about themselves, cannot be gainsaid.
(In relation to PRIOR RESTRAINT, the concept is found in the Dissenting Opinion of Justice
Cruz)
But the most important objection to Section 11(b) is that it constitutes prior restraint on the
dissemination of ideas. In a word, it is censorship. It is that officious functionary of the
repressive government who tells the citizen that he may speak only if allowed to do so, and no
more and no less than what he is permitted to say on pain of punishment should he be so rash
as to disobey. In his “Appeal for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing,” Milton deplored the
impossibility of finding a man base enough to accept the office of censor and at the same
time good enough to perform its duties. Yet a pretender to that meddler is in our midst
today, smugly brandishing the threat of this miserable law.
One could perhaps concede some permissible instances of censorship, as where private
mail is screened during wartime to prevent deliberate or unwitting disclosure of sensitive or
classified matters that might prejudice the national security or where, to take a famous
example, a person is prohibited from shouting “Fire!” in a crowded theater. But these
exceptions merely make and bolster the rule that there should be no prior restraint upon a
person’s right to express his ideas on any subject of public interest. The rule applies
whether the censorship be in the form of outright prohibition, as in the cases before us, or in
more subtle forms like the imposition of a tax upon periodicals exceeding a prescribed
maximum number of copies per issue or allowing the circulation of books only if they are
judged to be fit for minors, thus reducing the reading tastes of adults to the level of juvenile
morality.

I remind the Court of the doctrine announced in Bantam Books v. Sullivan that “any system
of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its
validity.” That presumption has not been refuted in the cases sub judice. On the contrary,
the challenged provision appears quite clearly to be invalid on its face because of its
undisguised attempt at censorship. The feeble effort to justify it in the name of social justice
and clean elections cannot prevail over the self-evident fact that what we have here is an
illegal intent to suppress free speech by denying access to the mass media as
the most convenient instruments for the molding of public opinion. And it does not matter
that the use of these facilities may involve financial transactions, for the element of the
commercial does not remove them from the protection of the Constitution.

Social Weather Stations, Inc. v. Commission on Elections

Facts: Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the

Commission on Elections from enforcing §5.4 of RA. No.9006 (Fair
Election Act), which provides Surveys affecting national candidates
shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys
affecting local candidates shall not be published seven (7) days before
an election. Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of
election survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of
freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify
such restraint. They claim that SWS and other pollsters conducted and
published the results of surveys prior to the 1992, 1995, and 1998
elections up to as close as two days before the election day without
causing confusion among the voters and that there is neither empirical
nor historical evidence to support the conclusion that there is an
immediate and inevitable danger to tile voting process posed by
election surveys. They point out that no similar restriction is imposed
on politicians from explaining their opinion or on newspapers or
broadcast media from writing and publishing articles concerning
political issues up to the day of the election. Consequently, they
contend that there is no reason for ordinary voters to be denied
access to the results of election surveys, which are relatively objective.

Issue: Whether COMELEC restriction on survey during the Election

period constitute a violation of the Freedom of Expression.

Held: Yes, the court hold that §5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a
prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total
suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression
is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought
to be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of
freedom of expression.

This form of ad hoc balancing predictably results in sustaining the

challenged legislation and leaves freedom of speech, expression, and
the press with little protection. For anyone who can bring a plausible
justification forward can easily show a rational connection between the
statute and a legitimate governmental purpose.

In enunciating a standard premised on a judicial balancing of the

conflicting social values and individual interests competing for
ascendancy in legislation which restricts expression, the court laid the
basis for what has been called the “balancing-of-interests”, the
“balancing” test requires a court to take conscious and detailed
consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given
situation or type of situation.

In the actual application of the “balancing-of-interests” test, the crucial

question is: how much deference should be given to the legislative
judgment?

Although the urgency of the public interest sought to be secured by

Congressional power restricting the individual’s freedom, and the
social importance and value of the freedom so restricted, “are to be
judged in the concrete, not on the basis of abstractions,” a wide range
of factors are necessarily relevant in ascertaining the point or line of
equilibrium. Among these are:

(a) the social values and importance of the specific aspect of the
particular freedom restricted by the legislation;

(b) the specific thrust of the restriction, i.e., whether the

restriction is direct or indirect, whether or not the persons
affected are few;

(c) the value and importance of the public interest sought to be

secured by the legislation — the reference here is to the nature
and gravity of the evil which Congress seeks to prevent;

(d) whether the specific restriction decreed by Congress is

reasonably appropriate and necessary for the protection of such
public interest; and
(e) whether the necessary safeguarding of the public interest
involved may be achieved by some other measure less restrictive
of the protected freedom.

Maliksi v. Commission on Elections

FACTS:

During the 2010 Elections, Saquilayan was proclaimed as winner for the position
of Mayor of Imus, Cavite. Maliksi, the candidate who garnered the second highest
number of votes, brought an election protest in the RTC in Imus, Cavite alleging
that there were irregularities in the counting of votes in 209 clustered precincts.
Subsequently, the RTC held a revision of the votes, and, based on the results of
the revision, declared Maliksi as the duly elected Mayor of Imus commanding
Saquilayan to cease and desist from performing the functions of said office.
Saquilayan appealed to the COMELEC. In the meanwhile, the RTC granted
Maliksi's motion for execution pending appeal, and Maliksi was then installed as
Mayor.

The COMELEC First Division, without giving notice to the parties, decided to
recount the ballots through the use of the printouts of the ballot images from the
CF cards. Thus, it issued an order dated requiring Saquilayan to deposit the
amount necessary to defray the expenses for the decryption and printing of the
ballot images. Later, it issued another order for Saquilayan to augment his cash
deposit.

The First Division nullified the decision of the RTC and declared Saquilayan as
the duly elected Mayor.

Maliksi filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that he had been denied his
right to due process because he had not been notified of the decryption
proceedings. He argued that the resort to the printouts of the ballot images,
which were secondary evidence, had been unwarranted because there was no
proof that the integrity of the paper ballots had not been preserved.

The COMELEC En Banc denied Maliksi's MR.

Maliksi then came to the Court via petition for certiorari, reiterating his
objections to the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images
without prior notice to him, and to the use of the printouts of the ballot images in
the recount proceedings conducted by the First Division.

The Supreme Court via petition for certiorari dismissed the same. The Court then
pronounced that the First Division did not abuse its discretion in deciding to use
the ballot images instead of the paper ballots, explaining that the printouts of the
ballot images were not secondary images, but considered original documents
with the same evidentiary value as the official ballots under the Rule on
Electronic Evidence; and that the First Divisions finding that the ballots and the
ballot boxes had been tampered had been fully established by the large number of
cases of double-shading discovered during the revision.

ISSUE: Whether the Supreme Court erred in dismissing the instant petition
despite a clear violation of petitioner's constitutional right to due process of law
considering that decryption, printing and examination of the digital images of
the ballots were done inconspicuously upon motu propio directive of the
COMELEC First Division sans any notice to the petitioner and for the first time
on appeal.

HELD: The decision of the court a quo is granted.

POLITICAL LAW notice to parties

Based on the pronouncement in Alliance of Barangay Concerns (ABC) v.

Commission on Elections, the power of the COMELEC to adopt procedures that
will ensure the speedy resolution of its cases should still be exercised only after
giving to all the parties the opportunity to be heard on their opposing claims. The
parties right to be heard upon adversarial issues and matters is never to be
waived or sacrificed, or to be treated so lightly because of the possibility of the
substantial prejudice to be thereby caused to the parties, or to any of them. Thus,
the COMELEC En Banc should not have upheld the First Divisions deviation
from the regular procedure in the guise of speedily resolving the election protest,
in view of its failure to provide the parties with notice of its proceedings and an
opportunity to be heard, the most basic requirements of due process.

The picture images of the ballots are electronic documents that are regarded as
the equivalents of the original official ballots themselves.In Vinzons-Chato v.
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 199149, January 22,
2013the Court held that "the picture images of the ballots, as scanned and
recorded by the PCOS, are likewise official ballots that faithfully capture in
electronic form the votes cast by the voter, as defined by Section 2(3) of R.A. No.
9369. As such, the printouts thereof are the functional equivalent of the paper
ballots filled out by the voters and, thus, may be used for purposes of revision of
votes in an electoral protest."

That the two documents the official ballot and its picture image are considered
"original documents" simply means that both of them are given equal probative
weight. In short, when either is presented as evidence, one is not considered as
weightier than the other.

But this juridical reality does not authorize the courts, the COMELEC, and the
Electoral Tribunals to quickly and unilaterally resort to the printouts of the
picture images of the ballots in the proceedings had before them without notice to
the parties. Despite the equal probative weight accorded to the official ballots and
the printouts of their picture images, the rules for the revision of ballots adopted
for their respective proceedings still consider the official ballots to be the primary
or best evidence of the voters will. In that regard, the picture images of the ballots
are to be used only when it is first shown that the official ballots are lost or their
integrity has been compromised.

Regio v. Commission on Elections

FACTS: Petitioner Regio and private respondent Co, among other candidates,

ran in the October 25, 2010 barangay elections in District III of the City of Manila
for the position of punong barangay. Immediately following the counting and
canvassing of the votes, from 7 clustered precincts in the adverted barangay,
Regio, who garnered highest votes was proclaimed winner for the contested post.

On November 4, 2010, Co filed an election protest before the MeTC. He claimed,

among other things, that the Board of Election Tellers (BET) did not follow
COMELEC Resolution No. 9030, as it ignored the rules on appreciation of
ballots, resulting in misreading, miscounting, and misappreciation of ballots.

Of the seven clustered precincts (CPs) initially protested, Co would later exclude
CP Nos. 1304A and 1305A from the protest. During the preliminary conference,
the trial court allowed the revision of ballots. During his turn to present evidence,
Co limited his offer to the revision committee report, showing that he garnered
the highest number of votes. Regio, on the other hand, denied that the elections
were tainted with irregularities. He claimed that the results of the revision are
products of post-elections operations, as the ballots were tampered with,
switched, and altered drastically to change the results of the elections.

The trial court dismissed Cos protest and declared Regio as the duly-elected
punong barangay.

According to the trial court, before it can accord credence to the results of the
revision, it should first be ascertained that the ballots found in the box during the
revision are the same ballots deposited by the voters. In fine, the court "should
first be convinced that the ballots counted during the revision have not been
tampered with before it can declare the ballots a) as superior evidence of how the
electorate voted, and b) as sufficient evidence to set aside the election returns.
For the ballots to be considered the best evidence of how the voters voted, their
integrity should be satisfactorily established."Invoking Rosal v. COMELEC, G.R.
Nos. 168253 & 172741, March 16, 2007the trial court ruled that Co failed to
sufficiently show that the integrity of the contested ballots had been preserved. It
then cited the presumption that election returns are genuine, and that the data
and information supplied by the board of election inspectors are true and correct.

The trial court said that the misreading, miscounting, and misappreciation of
ballots should be proven by other independent evidence. Without any evidence,
the allegation of misreading, miscounting, and misappreciation of ballots
remains a mere allegation without any probative value.

Aggrieved, Co filed an appeal before the COMELEC,

The COMELEC First Divisiondismissed the appeal, noting, as the MeTC did, that
Co failed to show that the integrity of the ballots in question was in fact
preserved.

Co then filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The COMELEC En Banc

reconsidered the Resolution of the First Division, and accordingly declared Co as
the duly elected punong barangay.

Thus, the present recourse, on the argument that the COMELEC En Banc
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when it arbitrarily set aside the Decision of the MeTC and the Resolution of the
COMELEC First Division. Petitioner further argues that the COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion when it demanded from protestee direct proof of actual
tampering of ballots to justify consideration of the use of the election returns in
determining the winning candidate in the elections. In fine, petitioner questions
the ruling of the COMELEC giving precedence to the results of the revision over
the official canvassing results.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that Co had
successfully discharged the burden of proving the integrity of the ballots
subjected to revision.

HELD: The decision of the COMELEC Division is reinstated.

POLITICAL LAW moot and academic

At the outset, it must be noted that the protest case is dismissible for being moot
and academic. A case becomes moot when there is no more actual controversy
between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the
merits. Generally, courts will not determine a moot question in a case in which no
practical relief can be granted. Baldo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176135, June 16,
2009

In Malaluan v. COMELEC, 324 Phil. 676, (1996),this Court settled the matter on
when an election protest case becomes moot and academic: When the appeal
from a decision in an election case has already become moot, the case being an
election protest involving the office of mayor the term of which had expired, the
appeal is dismissible on that ground, unless the rendering of a decision on the
merits would be of practical value.

In the case at bar, the position involved is that of a punong barangay. The
governing law, therefore, is Republic Act No. (RA) 9164, as amended by RA 9340.
Sec. 4 of the law states that xxx the term of office of the barangay and
sangguniang kabataan officials elected in the October 2007 election and
subsequent elections shall commence at noon of November 30 next following
their election.
In fine, with the election of a new punong barangay during the October 28, 2013
elections, the issue of who the rightful winner of the 2010 barangay elections has
already been rendered moot and academic.

COMELEC En Banc, committed grave abuse of discretion by the specifically

ignoring the rules on evidence, merits consideration. Still in line with the Courts
decision in Malaluanto the effect that the Court can decide on the merits a moot
protest if there is practical value in so doing, We find that the nullification of the
COMELEC En Bancs Resolution is in order, due to its gross contravention of
established rules on evidence in election protest cases.

POLITICAL LAW election protest

The doctrine in Rosal v. COMELEC and considering the results of the revision
vis-vis the results reflected in the official canvassing In Rosal, this Court
summarized the standards to be observed in an election contest predicated on the
theory that the election returns do not accurately reflect the will of the voters due
to alleged irregularities in the appreciation and counting of ballots.

The Rosal ruling does not involve issues merely related to the appreciation or
calibration of evidence; its critical ruling is on the propriety of relying on the
revision of ballot results instead of the election returns in the proclamation of a
winning candidate.

The Rosal doctrine ensures that in election protest cases, the supreme mandate of
the people is ultimately determined. In laying down the rules in appreciating the
conflicting results of the canvassing and the results of a revision later made, the
Court has no other intention but to determine the will of the electorate. The Rosal
doctrine is also supplemented by A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC establishing the following
disputable presumptions.

Private respondent Co has not proved that the integrity of the ballots has been
preserved applying Rosal, viewed in conjunction with A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, this
Court rules that the COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion in
ruling that private respondent had successfully discharged the burden of proving
that the ballots counted during the revision proceedings are the same ballots cast
and counted during the day of the elections.

What the protestant should endeavor to prove, however, in presenting evidence

of preservation, is not that the ballots themselves are genuine or official, but that
they are the very same ones cast by the electorate. The Report, therefore, cannot
be considered as evidence of the preservation, as required by Rosal.

The fact of preservation is not, as respondent Co claims, "incontrovertible." In

fact, there is total absence of evidence to that effect. The incontrovertible fact is
that private respondent, during the proceedings before the trial court, did not
present any independent evidence to prove his claim. Without any independent
evidence, the trial court, the COMELEC, as well as this Court, is constrained to
affirm as a fact the disputable presumption that the ballots were properly
counted during the counting and canvassing of votes.

In sum, We find that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in ruling that
private respondent had discharged the burden of proving the integrity of the
ballots.

Petitioner need not prove actual tampering of the ballots Corollarily, the
COMELEC En Banc had ruled that petitioner, as protestee, failed to adduce
evidence that the ballots found inside the ballot boxes were compromised and
tampered. This strikes us as baseless and a clear departure from the teachings of
Rosal.

The duty of the protestee in an election contest to provide evidence of actual

tampering or any likelihood arises only when the protestant has first successfully
discharge the burden or providing that the ballots have been secured to prevent
tampering or susceptibility of charge, abstraction or substitution. Such need to
present proof of tampering did not arise since protestant himself failed to provide
evidence of the integrity of the ballots.

Development Bank of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit, wala 1994, 2002 to.
Facts:
In 1986, the Philippine government, under the administration of then President Corazon C.
Aquino, obtained from the World Bank an Economic Recovery Loan
The ERL was intended to support the recovery of the Philippine economy
As a condition for granting the loan, the World Bank required the Philippine government to
rehabilitate the DBP which was then saddled with huge non-performing loans.
he DBP was expected to continue "providing principally medium and long-term financing to
projects with risks higher than the private sector may be willing to accept under
reasonable... terms.
he Monetary Board adopted Resolution No. 1079 amending the Central Bank's Manual of
Regulations for Banks and other Financial Intermediaries, in line with the government's
commitment to the World Bank to require a private external auditor for
DBP.
he Audit of a Government-owned or controlled bank by an external independent auditor
shall be in addition to and without prejudice to that conducted by the Commission on Audit
in the discharge of its mandate under existing law.
pursuant to Central Bank Circular No. 1124 and the government's commitment to the World
Bank, DBP Chairman Jesus Estanislao wrote the COA seeking approval of the DBP's
engagement of a private external auditor in addition to the COA.
he COA Chairman's reply stated that:
"x x x the Commission on Audit (COA) will interpose no objection to your engagement of a
private external auditor as required by the Economic Recovery Program Loan
Agreements... owever, a change in the leadership of the COA suddenly reversed the course
of events.
Howe... wrote the Central Bank Governor protesting the Central Bank's issuance of Circular
No. 1124 which allegedly encroached upon the
COA's constitutional and statutory power to audit government agencies.
hat the COA resident auditors were under instructions to disallow any payment to the
private auditor whose... services were unconstitutional, illegal and unnecessary.[15]... the
DBP paid the billings of the private auditor in the total amount of P487,321.14[17] despite
the objection of the COA.
To allow private firms to interfere in this governmental audit domain would be to derogate
the Constitutional supremacy of State audit as the Government's guardian of the people's
treasury, and as... the prime advocate of economy in the use of government resources.'
Issues:
whether or not the constitutional power of the COA to examine and audit the DBP is
exclusive and precludes a concurrent... audit of the DBP by a private external auditor.
The DBP's petition raises the following issues:
Does the Constitution vest in the COA the sole and exclusive power to examine and audit
government banks so as to prohibit concurrent audit by private external auditors under any
circumstance?
Is there an existing statute that prohibits government banks from hiring private auditors in
addition to the COA? If there is none, is there an existing statute that authorizes
government banks to hire private auditors in addition to the COA?
If there is no legal impediment to the hiring by government banks of a private auditor, was
the hiring by the DBP of a private auditor in the case at bar necessary, and were the fees
paid by DBP to the private auditor reasonable, under the circumstances?
Ruling:
The DBP's petition is meritorious.
First Issue:  Power of COA to Audit under the Constitution
The resolution of the primordial issue of whether or not the COA has the sole and exclusive
power to examine and audit government banks involves an interpretation of Section 2,
Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution.
The COA vigorously asserts that under the first paragraph of Section 2, the COA enjoys the
sole and exclusive power to examine and audit all government agencies, including the DBP.
The COA contends this is similar to its sole and exclusive authority, under the second
paragraph... of the same Section, to define the scope of its audit, promulgate auditing rules
and regulations, including rules on the disallowance of unnecessary expenditures of
government agencies. The bare language of Section 2, however, shows that the COA's
power under the first paragraph... is not declared exclusive, while its authority under the
second paragraph is expressly declared "exclusive."  There is a significant reason for this
marked difference in language.
The clear and unmistakable conclusion from a reading of the entire Section 2 is that the
COA's power to examine and audit is non-exclusive. On the other hand, the COA's authority
to define the scope of its audit, promulgate auditing rules and regulations, and disallow...
unnecessary expenditures is exclusive.
as the constitutionally mandated auditor of all government agencies, the COA's findings and
conclusions necessarily prevail over those of private auditors, at least insofar as
government agencies and officials are concerned.
The mere fact that private auditors may audit government agencies does not divest the
COA of its power to examine and audit the same government agencies.  The COA is neither
by-passed nor ignored since even with a private audit the COA will still conduct its usual...
examination and audit, and its findings and conclusions will still bind government agencies
and their officials. A concurrent private audit poses no danger whatsoever of public funds or
assets escaping the usual scrutiny of a COA audit.
the COA's power to examine and audit government banks must be reconciled with the
Central Bank's power to supervise the same banks. 
The inevitable conclusion is that the COA and the Central Bank have concurrent jurisdiction,
under the Constitution, to examine and audit government banks.
However, despite the Central Bank's concurrent jurisdiction over government banks, the
COA's audit still prevails over that of the Central Bank since the COA is the constitutionally
mandated auditor of government banks
Second Issue:  Statutes Prohibiting or Authorizing Private Auditors
The COA argues that Sections 26, 31 and 32 of PD No. 1445, otherwise known as the
Government Auditing Code of the Philippines, prohibit the hiring of private auditors by
government agencies.
Section 26 is a definition of the COA's "general jurisdiction."  Jurisdiction may be exclusive
or concurrent.  Section 26 of PD No. 1445 does not state that the COA's jurisdiction is
exclusive, and there are other laws providing for concurrent jurisdiction. Thus,... Section 26
must be applied in harmony with Section 58[32] of the General Banking Law of 2000 (RA
No. 8791) which authorizes unequivocally the Monetary Board to require banks to hire
independent auditors.  S
Third Issue: Necessity of Private Auditor and Reasonableness of the Fees... he hiring of a
private auditor was not only necessary based on the government's loan covenant with the
World Bank, it was also necessary because it was... mandated by Central Bank Circular No.
1124 under pain of administrative and penal sanctions.
Principles:
During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Commissioner Serafin Guingona
proposed the addition of the word "exclusive" in the first paragraph of Section 2, thereby
granting the COA the sole and exclusive power to examine and audit all government
agencies. 
However, the Constitutional Commission rejected the addition of the word "exclusive" in the
first paragraph of Section 2 and Guingona was forced to withdraw his proposal. 
Commissioner Christian Monsod explained the rejection in this manner:
"MR. MONSOD.  Earlier Commissioner Guingona, in withdrawing his amendment to add
"EXCLUSIVE" made a statement about the preponderant right of COA.
"For the record, we would like to clarify the reason for not including the word. First, we do
not want an Article that would constitute a disincentive or an obstacle to private investment.
There are government institutions with private investments in them, and some of these...
investors -  Filipinos, as well as in some cases, foreigners -  require the presence of private
auditing firms, not exclusively, but concurrently.  So this does not take away the power of
the Commission on Audit.  Second, there are certain instances... where private auditing
may be required, like the listing in the stock exchange.  In other words, we do not want this
provision to be an unnecessary obstacle to privatization of these companies or attraction of
investments."[22] (Emphasis... supplied)... the Central Bank has been conducting periodic
and special examination and audit of banks to determine the soundness of their operations
and the safety of the deposits of the public.  Undeniably, the Central Bank's  power of
"supervision" includes the... power to examine and audit banks, as the banking laws have
always recognized this power of the Central Bank.[31] Hence, the COA's power to examine
and audit government banks must be reconciled with the Central Bank's power to supervise
the same banks. 
The inevitable conclusion is that the COA and the Central Bank have concurrent jurisdiction,
under the Constitution, to examine and audit government banks.
However, despite the Central Bank's concurrent jurisdiction over government banks, the
COA's audit still prevails over that of the Central Bank since the COA is the constitutionally
mandated auditor of government banks.   And in matters falling under the second...
paragraph of Section 2, Article IX-D of the Constitution, the COA's jurisdiction is exclusive. 
Thus, the Central Bank is devoid of authority to allow or disallow expenditures of
government banks since this function belongs exclusively to the COA.
The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, which succeeded the Central Bank, retained under the
1987 Constitution and the General Banking Law of 2000 (RA No. 8791) the same
constitutional and statutory power the Central Bank had under the Freedom Constitution...
and the General Banking Act (RA No. 337) with respect to the independent audit of banks.
this Court has held consistently that the rules and regulations issued by the Central Bank
pursuant to its supervisory and regulatory powers have the force and effect of... law.

Parreno v. COA

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for certiorari[1] assailing the 9 January 2003 Decision[2] and 13
January 2004 Resolution[3] of the Commission on Audit (COA).

The Antecedent Facts

Salvador Parreño (petitioner) served in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) for 32 years.
On 5 January 1982, petitioner retired from the Philippine Constabulary with the rank of 2nd
Lieutenant. Petitioner availed, and received payment, of a lump sum pension equivalent to three
years pay. In 1985, petitioner started receiving his monthly pension amounting to P13,680.

Petitioner migrated to Hawaii and became a naturalized American citizen. In January 2001, the
AFP stopped petitioner's monthly pension in accordance with Section 27 of Presidential Decree
No. 1638[4] (PD 1638), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1650.[5] Section 27 of PD 1638,
as amended, provides that a retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship shall be removed from the
retired list and his retirement benefits terminated upon loss of Filipino citizenship. Petitioner
requested for reconsideration but the Judge Advocate General of the AFP denied the request.

Petitioner filed a claim before the COA for the continuance of his monthly pension.

The Ruling of the Commission on Audit

In its 9 January 2003 Decision, the COA denied petitioner's claim for lack of jurisdiction. The
COA ruled:

It becomes immediately noticeable that the resolution of the issue at hand hinges upon the
validity of Section 27 of P.D. No. 1638, as amended. Pursuant to the mandate of the
Constitution, whenever a dispute involves the validity of laws, "the courts, as guardians of the
Constitution, have the inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the
legislature transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law. Where the statute violates the
Constitution, it is not only the right but the duty of the judiciary to declare such act as
unconstitutional and void." (Tatad vs. Secretary of Department of Energy, 281 SCRA 330) That
being so, prudence dictates that this Commission defer to the authority and jurisdiction of the
judiciary to rule in the first instance upon the constitutionality of the provision in question.

Premises considered, the request is denied for lack of jurisdiction to adjudicate the same.
Claimant is advised to file his claim with the proper court of original jurisdiction. [6]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. Petitioner alleged that the COA has the power and
authority to incidentally rule on the constitutionality of Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended.
Petitioner alleged that a direct recourse to the court would be dismissed for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. Petitioner further alleged that since his monthly pension involves
government funds, the reason for the termination of the pension is subject to COA's authority
and jurisdiction.

In its 13 January 2004 Resolution, the COA denied the motion. The COA ruled that the doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply if the administrative body has, in the
first place, no jurisdiction over the case. The COA further ruled that even if it assumed
jurisdiction over the claim, petitioner's entitlement to the retirement benefits he was previously
receiving must necessarily cease upon the loss of his Filipino citizenship in accordance with
Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended.

Hence, the petition before this Court.

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues:

1. Whether Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended, is constitutional;

2. Whether the COA has jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality of
Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended; and
3. Whether PD 1638, as amended, has retroactive or prospective effect.[7]
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.

Jurisdiction of the COA

Petitioner filed his money claim before the COA. A money claim is "a demand for payment of a
sum of money, reimbursement or compensation arising from law or contract due from or owing
to a government agency."[8] Under Commonwealth Act No. 327,[9] as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1445,[10] money claims against the government shall be filed before the COA.[11]

Section 2(1), Article IX(D) of the 1987 Constitution prescribes the powers of the COA, as
follows:

Sec. 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine,
audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or
uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any
of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters, and on a post-audit basis; (a) constitutional bodies,
commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution; (b)
autonomous state colleges and universities; (c) other government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d) such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or
equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the Government, which are required by law or the
granting institution to submit such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity. However, where the
internal control system of the audited agencies is inadequate, the Commission may adopt such
measures, including temporary or special pre-audit, as are necessary and appropriate to correct
the deficiencies. It shall keep the general accounts of the Government and, for such period as
may be provided by law, preserve the vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining thereto.
The jurisdiction of the COA over money claims against the government does not include the
power to rule on the constitutionality or validity of laws. The 1987 Constitution vests the power
of judicial review or the power to declare unconstitutional a law, treaty, international or executive
agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in this Court and in
all Regional Trial Courts.[12] Petitioner's money claim essentially involved the constitutionality of
Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended. Hence, the COA did not commit grave abuse of discretion
in dismissing petitioner's money claim.

Petitioner submits that the COA has the authority to order the restoration of his pension even
without ruling on the constitutionality of Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended. The COA actually
ruled on the matter in its 13 January 2004 Resolution, thus:

Furthermore, assuming arguendo that this Commission assumed jurisdiction over the instant
case, claimant's entitlement to the retirement benefits he was previously receiving must
necessarily be severed or stopped upon the loss of his Filipino citizenship as prescribed in
Section 27, P.D. No. 1638, as amended by P.D. No. 1650.[13]
The COA effectively denied petitioner's claim because of the loss of his Filipino citizenship.

Application of PD 1638, as amended

Petitioner alleges that PD 1638, as amended, should apply prospectively. The Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) agrees with petitioner. The OSG argues that PD 1638, as amended,
should apply only to those who joined the military service after its effectivity, citing Sections 33
and 35, thus:

Section 33. Nothing in this Decree shall be construed in any manner to reduce whatever
retirement and separation pay or gratuity or other monetary benefits which any person is
heretofore receiving or is entitled to receive under the provisions of existing law.

xxxx

Section. 35. Except those necessary to give effect to the provisions of this Decree and to
preserve the rights granted to retired or separated military personnel, all laws, rules and
regulations inconsistent with the provisions of this Decree are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.
The OSG further argues that retirement laws are liberally construed in favor of the retirees.
Article 4 of the Civil Code provides: "Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
provided." Section 36 of PD 1638, as amended, provides that it shall take effect upon its
approval. It was signed on 10 September 1979. PD 1638, as amended, does not provide for its
retroactive application. There is no question that PD 1638, as amended, applies prospectively.
However, we do not agree with the interpretation of petitioner and the OSG that PD 1638, as
amended, should apply only to those who joined the military after its effectivity. Since PD 1638,
as amended, is about the new system of retirement and separation from service of military
personnel, it should apply to those who were in the service at the time of its approval. In fact,
Section 2 of PD 1638, as amended, provides that "th[e] Decree shall apply to all military
personnel in the service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines." PD 1638, as amended, was
signed on 10 September 1979. Petitioner retired in 1982, long after the approval of PD 1638, as
amended. Hence, the provisions of PD 1638, as amended, apply to petitioner.

Petitioner Has No Vested Right to his

Retirement Benefits

Petitioner alleges that Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended, deprives him of his property which
the Constitution and statutes vest in him. Petitioner alleges that his pension, being a property
vested by the Constitution, cannot be removed or taken from him just because he became a
naturalized American citizen. Petitioner further alleges that the termination of his monthly
pension is a penalty equivalent to deprivation of his life.

The allegations have no merit. PD 1638, as amended, does not impair any vested right or
interest of petitioner. Where the employee retires and meets the eligibility requirements, he
acquires a vested right to the benefits that is protected by the due process clause.[14] At the time
of the approval of PD 1638 and at the time of its amendment, petitioner was still in active
service. Hence, petitioner's retirement benefits were only future benefits and did not constitute a
vested right. Before a right to retirement benefits or pension vests in an employee, he must
have met the stated conditions of eligibility with respect to the nature of employment, age, and
length of service.[15] It is only upon retirement that military personnel acquire a vested right to
retirement benefits. Retirees enjoy a protected property interest whenever they acquire a right to
immediate payment under pre-existing law.[16]

Further, the retirement benefits of military personnel are purely gratuitous in nature. They are
not similar to pension plans where employee participation is mandatory, hence, the employees
have contractual or vested rights in the pension which forms part of the compensation.[17]

Constitutionality of Section 27 of PD 1638

Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended, provides:

Section 27. Military personnel retired under Sections 4, 5, 10, 11 and 12 shall be carried in the
retired list of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The name of a retiree who loses his
Filipino citizenship shall be removed from the retired list and his retirement benefits terminated
upon such loss.
The OSG agrees with petitioner that Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended, is unconstitutional.
The OSG argues that the obligation imposed on petitioner to retain his Filipino citizenship as a
condition for him to remain in the AFP retired list and receive his retirement benefit is contrary to
public policy and welfare, oppressive, discriminatory, and violative of the due process clause of
the Constitution. The OSG argues that the retirement law is in the nature of a contract between
the government and its employees. The OSG further argues that Section 27 of PD 1638, as
amended, discriminates against AFP retirees who have changed their nationality.
We do not agree.

The constitutional right to equal protection of the laws is not absolute but is subject to
reasonable classification.[18] To be reasonable, the classification (a) must be based on
substantial distinctions which make real differences; (b) must be germane to the purpose of the
law; (c) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (d) must apply equally to each
member of the class.[19]

There is compliance with all these conditions. There is a substantial difference between retirees
who are citizens of the Philippines and retirees who lost their Filipino citizenship by
naturalization in another country, such as petitioner in the case before us. The constitutional
right of the state to require all citizens to render personal and military service[20] necessarily
includes not only private citizens but also citizens who have retired from military service. A
retiree who had lost his Filipino citizenship already renounced his allegiance to the state. Thus,
he may no longer be compelled by the state to render compulsory military service when the
need arises. Petitioner's loss of Filipino citizenship constitutes a substantial distinction that
distinguishes him from other retirees who retain their Filipino citizenship. If the groupings are
characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated
and regulated differently from another.[21]

Republic Act No. 7077[22] (RA 7077) affirmed the constitutional right of the state to a Citizen
Armed Forces. Section 11 of RA 7077 provides that citizen soldiers or reservists include ex-
servicemen and retired officers of the AFP. Hence, even when a retiree is no longer in the active
service, he is still a part of the Citizen Armed Forces. Thus, we do not find the requirement
imposed by Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended, oppressive, discriminatory, or contrary to
public policy. The state has the right to impose a reasonable condition that is necessary for
national defense. To rule otherwise would be detrimental to the interest of the state.

There was no denial of due process in this case. When petitioner lost his Filipino citizenship, the
AFP had no choice but to stop his monthly pension in accordance with Section 27 of PD 1638,
as amended. Petitioner had the opportunity to contest the termination of his pension when he
requested for reconsideration of the removal of his name from the list of retirees and the
termination of his pension. The Judge Advocate General denied the request pursuant to Section
27 of PD 1638, as amended.

Petitioner argues that he can reacquire his Filipino citizenship under Republic Act No.
9225[23] (RA 9225), in which case he will still be considered a natural-born Filipino. However,
petitioner alleges that if he reacquires his Filipino citizenship under RA 9225, he will still not be
entitled to his pension because of its prior termination. This situation is speculative. In the first
place, petitioner has not shown that he has any intention of reacquiring, or has done anything to
reacquire, his Filipino citizenship. Secondly, in response to the request for opinion of then AFP
Chief of Staff, General Efren L. Abu, the Department of Justice (DOJ) issued DOJ Opinion No.
12, series of 2005, dated 19 January 2005, thus:

[T]he AFP uniformed personnel retirees, having re-acquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to

R.A. No. 9225 and its IRR, are entitled to pension and gratuity benefits reckoned from the date
they have taken their oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. It goes without saying
that these retirees have no right to receive such pension benefits during the time that they have
ceased to be Filipinos pursuant to the aforequoted P.D. No. 1638, as amended, and any
payment made to them should be returned to the AFP. x x x.[24]
Hence, petitioner has other recourse if he desires to continue receiving his monthly pension.
Just recently, in AASJS Member-Hector Gumangan Calilung v. Simeon Datumanong,[25] this
Court upheld the constitutionality of RA 9225. If petitioner reacquires his Filipino citizenship, he
will even recover his natural-born citizenship.[26] In Tabasa v. Court of Appeals,[27] this Court
reiterated that "[t]he repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-
born citizenship x x x."

Petitioner will be entitled to receive his monthly pension should he reacquire his
Filipino citizenship since he will again be entitled to the benefits and privileges of
Filipino citizenship reckoned from the time of his reacquisition of Filipino citizenship. There is no
legal obstacle to the resumption of his retirement benefits from the time he complies again with
the condition of the law, that is, he can receive his retirement benefits provided he is a Filipino
citizen.

We acknowledge the service rendered to the country by petitioner and those similarly situated.
However, petitioner failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality of Section 27 of PD
1638, as amended. Unless the provision is amended or repealed in the future, the AFP has to
apply Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the 9 January 2003 Decision and 13

January 2004 Resolution of the Commission on Audit.

Dingcong v. Guingona, Jr

Facts:
Petitioner, Atty. Praxedio P. Dingcong, was the former Acting Regional Director of Regional Office No. VI
of the Bureau of Treasury in Iloilo City, after public bidding, contracted, admittedly on an "emergency
labor basis," the services of one Rameses Layson, a private carpenter and electrician on "pakyao" basis
for the renovation and improvement of the Bureau of Treasury Office, Iloilo City.
When petitioner retired on 17 January 1984, among the items disallowed by the Resident Auditor was the
amount of P6,574.00 from the labor contracts with Layson, by reducing the latter's daily rate from P40.00
per day to P18.00 daily.
Petitioner appealed to the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, who affirmed the disallowance as being
"excessive and disadvantageous to the government," but increased Layson's daily rate to P25.00 thereby
reducing the total amount disallowed to P4,276.00. Despite petitioner's request for reconsideration,
respondent Commission remained unmoved, hence, the instant appeal.

Issue:
WON the disallowance is invalid for being a usurpation of management function and an impairment of
contract

Held:
the Decision of the Commission on Audit is hereby SET ASIDE
COA is vested with power and authority, and is also charged with the duty to examine, audit and settle all
accounts pertaining to the expenditures or uses of funds owned by, or pertaining to the Govt., or any of its
subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities.
The COA found that the labor contract which they disallowed, was excessive and thus disadvantageous
to the Govt. however, the court found out that that the rate given is not necessarily disadvantageous. The
Bureau of Treasury hired Layson since he was the one submitted the lowest price in the auction for the
contract. Thus, it being found not disadvantageous, the decision of COA was set aside and ordered the
petitioner to refund the disallowed item.

National Housing Corp v. Commission on Audit

Facts:
On April 10, 1981, a Loan and Project Agreement was executed between the Republic of
the Philippines as
"Borrower" and the National Housing Authority (NHA) as "Project Sponsor" on the one
hand, and the Kreditanstalt Fur Weideraufbau (KFW) on the other hand, for Urban Housing
Dagat-Dagatan Project II A/B.[1] The agreement empowered... the NHA and the KFW to
determine the details of the project as well as the goods and services to be financed from
the loan. They hired the services of Engineer Brian W. Murdoch of Kinhill Pty. Ltd. (Kinhill),
a foreign corporation organized under the laws of Australia.
In 1987, the KFW proposed to extend the contract of Engr. Murdoch for another year. The
NHA Board of Directors approved only a 3-month extension, from March 9 to June 9, 1987.
[2] It also directed its management to make... representations with KFW to replace Engr.
Murdoch with a local consultant after June 9, 1987 if the project would still be unfinished.
The 3-month consultancy contract was submitted to the National Economic Development
Authority (NEDA) for approval.[3] On April 1, 1987, NEDA approved the contract
On April 10, 1987, NHA and Kinhill executed the consultancy contract (original) covering the
months of March 9 to June 9, 1987. It involved the amount of US $30,800.00 (foreign cost)
and P123,690.00 (local cost).
The 3-month contract, however, did not satisfy KFW. It wanted a 12-month contract. In June
1987, it got what it wanted. NHA and Kinhill signed a First Supplemental Contract. It
extended the consultancy contract for nine (9) more months from June 9, 1987 to March 8,
1988. Its... total cost was US $85,500.00 (foreign cost) and P332,850.00 (local cost).
The Urban Housing Dagat-Dagatan Project II was not completed as scheduled. On
December 15, 1987, a request was made for an extension of the Loan Agreement for
another year. KFW agreed provided the consultancy contract with Kinhill would be extended
until the end of December

1988. NHA did not appear to have much choice. On May 8, 1988, it signed a
Second Supplemental Contract extending the contract of Kinhill for another eight (8)
months, from April 4 to December 4, 1988. Its total cost was US $78,500.00 (foreign)
and
P315,000.00 (local).
The Loan Agreement was supposed to have expired on December 4, 1988. Nonetheless,
there was another request for its extension for a period of six (6) months. KFW had no
objection but again conditioned its approval on the extension of the... consultancy services
of Kinhill also for a period of six (6) months. This resulted in the signing on February 23,
1987 of the Third Supplemental Contract which extended Kinhill's consultancy services from
January 4 to July 3, 1989. Its cost... was US $58,200.00 (foreign) and P250,000.00 (local).
Issues:
Whether or not the COA acted beyond its constitutionally granted powers by disallowing a
duly entered contract, valid, regular, with all the formalities of law.
whether or not COA acted beyond its constitutionally granted powers by disallowing... a
contract on the basis of its self-proclaimed and considered defects on the contract not
otherwise provided for in its sets of... regulations promulgated pursuant to the mandate of
the Constitution.
Whether or not COA, by virtue of the powers granted to it under the Constitution, substitute
its own judgment or disposition in lieu of the decision of the management or governing body
of government entities.
Ruling:
The power of the Commission on Audit to audit and examine government expenditures is
enshrined in Section 2 (1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, viz.:
"Section 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to
examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and
expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the
Government, or any of its subdivision, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-
owned or controlled corporations with original charters, or on a post audit basis: (a)
constitutional bodies, commissions, and offices that have been granted the fiscal autonomy
under... this Constitution; xxx."
The Constitution also granted to COA the power to "promulgate accounting and auditing
rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of
government funds and... properties."[6]
Pursuant to the said constitutional mandate, COA promulgated Circular No. 88-55-A dated
September 8, 1985 defining the term "unnecessary" expenditures, viz.:
"The term pertains to expenditures which could not pass the test of prudence or the
diligence of a good father of a family, thereby denoting non-responsiveness to the
exigencies of the service. Unnecessary expenditures are those not supportive of the
implementation... of the objectives and mission of the agency relative to the nature of its
operation. This would also include incurrence of expenditure not dictated by the demands of
good government, and those the utility of which cannot be ascertained at a specific time.
An... expenditure that is not essential or that which can be dispensed with without loss or
damage to property is considered unnecessary. The mission and thrust of the agency
incurring the expenditures must be considered in determining whether or not... an
expenditure is necessary." (Italics ours)

Development Bank of the Phils., v. Commission on Audit,

In 1986, the Philippine government, under the administration of then President Corazon C.
Aquino, obtained from the World Bank an Economic Recovery Loan
The ERL was intended to support the recovery of the Philippine economy
As a condition for granting the loan, the World Bank required the Philippine government to
rehabilitate the DBP which was then saddled with huge non-performing loans.
he DBP was expected to continue "providing principally medium and long-term financing to
projects with risks higher than the private sector may be willing to accept under
reasonable... terms.
he Monetary Board adopted Resolution No. 1079 amending the Central Bank's Manual of
Regulations for Banks and other Financial Intermediaries, in line with the government's
commitment to the World Bank to require a private external auditor for
DBP.
he Audit of a Government-owned or controlled bank by an external independent auditor
shall be in addition to and without prejudice to that conducted by the Commission on Audit
in the discharge of its mandate under existing law.
pursuant to Central Bank Circular No. 1124 and the government's commitment to the World
Bank, DBP Chairman Jesus Estanislao wrote the COA seeking approval of the DBP's
engagement of a private external auditor in addition to the COA.
he COA Chairman's reply stated that:
"x x x the Commission on Audit (COA) will interpose no objection to your engagement of a
private external auditor as required by the Economic Recovery Program Loan
Agreements... owever, a change in the leadership of the COA suddenly reversed the course
of events.
Howe... wrote the Central Bank Governor protesting the Central Bank's issuance of Circular
No. 1124 which allegedly encroached upon the
COA's constitutional and statutory power to audit government agencies.
hat the COA resident auditors were under instructions to disallow any payment to the
private auditor whose... services were unconstitutional, illegal and unnecessary.[15]... the
DBP paid the billings of the private auditor in the total amount of P487,321.14[17] despite
the objection of the COA.
To allow private firms to interfere in this governmental audit domain would be to derogate
the Constitutional supremacy of State audit as the Government's guardian of the people's
treasury, and as... the prime advocate of economy in the use of government resources.'
Issues:
whether or not the constitutional power of the COA to examine and audit the DBP is
exclusive and precludes a concurrent... audit of the DBP by a private external auditor.
The DBP's petition raises the following issues:
Does the Constitution vest in the COA the sole and exclusive power to examine and audit
government banks so as to prohibit concurrent audit by private external auditors under any
circumstance?
Is there an existing statute that prohibits government banks from hiring private auditors in
addition to the COA? If there is none, is there an existing statute that authorizes
government banks to hire private auditors in addition to the COA?
If there is no legal impediment to the hiring by government banks of a private auditor, was
the hiring by the DBP of a private auditor in the case at bar necessary, and were the fees
paid by DBP to the private auditor reasonable, under the circumstances?
Ruling:
The DBP's petition is meritorious.
First Issue:  Power of COA to Audit under the Constitution
The resolution of the primordial issue of whether or not the COA has the sole and exclusive
power to examine and audit government banks involves an interpretation of Section 2,
Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution.
The COA vigorously asserts that under the first paragraph of Section 2, the COA enjoys the
sole and exclusive power to examine and audit all government agencies, including the DBP.
The COA contends this is similar to its sole and exclusive authority, under the second
paragraph... of the same Section, to define the scope of its audit, promulgate auditing rules
and regulations, including rules on the disallowance of unnecessary expenditures of
government agencies. The bare language of Section 2, however, shows that the COA's
power under the first paragraph... is not declared exclusive, while its authority under the
second paragraph is expressly declared "exclusive."  There is a significant reason for this
marked difference in language.
The clear and unmistakable conclusion from a reading of the entire Section 2 is that the
COA's power to examine and audit is non-exclusive. On the other hand, the COA's authority
to define the scope of its audit, promulgate auditing rules and regulations, and disallow...
unnecessary expenditures is exclusive.
as the constitutionally mandated auditor of all government agencies, the COA's findings and
conclusions necessarily prevail over those of private auditors, at least insofar as
government agencies and officials are concerned.
The mere fact that private auditors may audit government agencies does not divest the
COA of its power to examine and audit the same government agencies.  The COA is neither
by-passed nor ignored since even with a private audit the COA will still conduct its usual...
examination and audit, and its findings and conclusions will still bind government agencies
and their officials. A concurrent private audit poses no danger whatsoever of public funds or
assets escaping the usual scrutiny of a COA audit.
the COA's power to examine and audit government banks must be reconciled with the
Central Bank's power to supervise the same banks. 
The inevitable conclusion is that the COA and the Central Bank have concurrent jurisdiction,
under the Constitution, to examine and audit government banks.
However, despite the Central Bank's concurrent jurisdiction over government banks, the
COA's audit still prevails over that of the Central Bank since the COA is the constitutionally
mandated auditor of government banks
Second Issue:  Statutes Prohibiting or Authorizing Private Auditors
The COA argues that Sections 26, 31 and 32 of PD No. 1445, otherwise known as the
Government Auditing Code of the Philippines, prohibit the hiring of private auditors by
government agencies.
Section 26 is a definition of the COA's "general jurisdiction."  Jurisdiction may be exclusive
or concurrent.  Section 26 of PD No. 1445 does not state that the COA's jurisdiction is
exclusive, and there are other laws providing for concurrent jurisdiction. Thus,... Section 26
must be applied in harmony with Section 58[32] of the General Banking Law of 2000 (RA
No. 8791) which authorizes unequivocally the Monetary Board to require banks to hire
independent auditors.  S
Third Issue: Necessity of Private Auditor and Reasonableness of the Fees... he hiring of a
private auditor was not only necessary based on the government's loan covenant with the
World Bank, it was also necessary because it was... mandated by Central Bank Circular No.
1124 under pain of administrative and penal sanctions.
Principles:
During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Commissioner Serafin Guingona
proposed the addition of the word "exclusive" in the first paragraph of Section 2, thereby
granting the COA the sole and exclusive power to examine and audit all government
agencies. 
However, the Constitutional Commission rejected the addition of the word "exclusive" in the
first paragraph of Section 2 and Guingona was forced to withdraw his proposal. 
Commissioner Christian Monsod explained the rejection in this manner:
"MR. MONSOD.  Earlier Commissioner Guingona, in withdrawing his amendment to add
"EXCLUSIVE" made a statement about the preponderant right of COA.
"For the record, we would like to clarify the reason for not including the word. First, we do
not want an Article that would constitute a disincentive or an obstacle to private investment.
There are government institutions with private investments in them, and some of these...
investors -  Filipinos, as well as in some cases, foreigners -  require the presence of private
auditing firms, not exclusively, but concurrently.  So this does not take away the power of
the Commission on Audit.  Second, there are certain instances... where private auditing
may be required, like the listing in the stock exchange.  In other words, we do not want this
provision to be an unnecessary obstacle to privatization of these companies or attraction of
investments."[22] (Emphasis... supplied)... the Central Bank has been conducting periodic
and special examination and audit of banks to determine the soundness of their operations
and the safety of the deposits of the public.  Undeniably, the Central Bank's  power of
"supervision" includes the... power to examine and audit banks, as the banking laws have
always recognized this power of the Central Bank.[31] Hence, the COA's power to examine
and audit government banks must be reconciled with the Central Bank's power to supervise
the same banks. 
The inevitable conclusion is that the COA and the Central Bank have concurrent jurisdiction,
under the Constitution, to examine and audit government banks.
However, despite the Central Bank's concurrent jurisdiction over government banks, the
COA's audit still prevails over that of the Central Bank since the COA is the constitutionally
mandated auditor of government banks.   And in matters falling under the second...
paragraph of Section 2, Article IX-D of the Constitution, the COA's jurisdiction is exclusive. 
Thus, the Central Bank is devoid of authority to allow or disallow expenditures of
government banks since this function belongs exclusively to the COA.
The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, which succeeded the Central Bank, retained under the
1987 Constitution and the General Banking Law of 2000 (RA No. 8791) the same
constitutional and statutory power the Central Bank had under the Freedom Constitution...
and the General Banking Act (RA No. 337) with respect to the independent audit of banks.
this Court has held consistently that the rules and regulations issued by the Central Bank
pursuant to its supervisory and regulatory powers have the force and effect of... law.

Technical Education and Skills Development Authority v. Commission on Audit,

FACTS: The TESDA audit team discovered that for the calendar years 2004-
2007, TESDA paid Extraordinary and Miscellaneous Expenses (EME) twice each
year to its officials from two sources: (1) the General Fund for locally-funded
projects and (2) the Technical Education and Skills Development Project
(TESDP) Fund for foreign-assisted projects. Payment of EME was authorized
under the General Provisions of the 2004-2007 General Appropriations Acts
(GAAs) subject to certain conditions.

The audit team disallowed the payment of EME amounting to P5,498,706.60 for
being in excess of the amount allowed in the 2004-2007 GAAs. It was further
discovered that EME were disbursed to TESDA officials whose positions were not
of equivalent ranks as authorized by the Department of Budget and Management.

TESDA, through Director-General Augusto Boboy Syjuco, Jr., appealed and

argued that the 2004-2007 GAAs and the Government Accounting and Auditing
Manual allowed the grant of EME from both the General Fund and the TESDP
Fund provided the legal ceiling was not exceeded for each fund. TESDA argued
further that the General Fund and the TESDP Fund are distinct from each other,
and TESDA officials designated as project officers concurrently with their regular
functions were entitled to separate EME from both funds. The COA denied the
appeal for lack of merit prompting TESDA, through its Director-General to file a
petition for review with COA. The same was denied. The COA ruled that failure of
TESDA officials to conform to the 2004-2007 GAAs negated their claim of good
faith. Hence this petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of temporary
restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction to annul COA decision.

ISSUE: Did the COA properly disallow the payment of excessive EME

by TESDA?
Should the TESDA officials refund the excess EME granted to them?

HELD: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in

pursuance of an appropriation made by law."
COA did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it disallowed the
disbursement of EME to TESDA officials for being excessive and unauthorized by
law. Provisions in the GAA are clear in stating that the EME shall not exceed the
amount fixed therein. Those entitled to claim EME not exceeding the amount
provided in the GAA are as follows: (1) the officials named in the GAA, (2) the
officers of equivalent rank as may be authorized by the DBM, (3) and the offices
under them. However, TESDA had a different interpretation of the law. It
contends that there was no prohibition under the 2004-2007 GAAs regarding the
additional EME chargeable against TESDP Fund. This argument deserves scant
consideration. It is worth noting that TESDA, an instrumentality of the
government established under the TESDA Act of 1994, is accorded with budget
for its implementation which is included in its annual GAA. The TESDP Fund,
which is being sourced from the Treasury, belongs to the government. The
Constitution provides that, o money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law.No law was pointed out by TESDA
authorizing it to grant additional reimbursement for EME from the TESDP Fund,
contrary to the explicit requirement in the Constitution and the law.

The Director-General blatant violation of the clear provisions of the Constitution,

the 2004-2007 GAAs and the COA circulars is equivalent to gross negligence
amounting to bad faith. Hence, he is required to refund the EME he received
from the TESDP Fund for himself. TESDA officials, on the other hand, who had
no participation in the approval of the excessive EME acted in good faith and they
need not refund the excess EME they received. COA AFFIRMED.