BRAHMASóTRA-CATUÈSóTRÊ

The First Four Aphorisms of the Brahmasötras along with

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ìaßkarÂcÂrya’s Commentary and English Explanation ‘ìreyaskari’

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The most compassionate God has given every living being three statesó

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jågrat, swapna and su¶upti. In the jågrat state, the j∂va obtains praj¤a of vi¶ayas which
are outside him; hence he is called bahi¶pæaj¤a. Transacting with vi¶ayas in this way,
he gets tired and goes to sleep. In sleep, when the j∂va is no more in association
with his body and the indriyas, he experiences the dream state. Våsanås of the objects
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experienced in the jågrat state serve as vi¶ayas during swapna. Since in dreams these
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våsanås are experienced within, the j∂va in the swapnåvasthå is called anta¨praj¤a.
Praj¤a means knowledge. In jågrat, the j∂vaís praj¤a is obtained with the help of
external light, but in swapna the light is from within.*
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In swapnåvasthå it is the mind which becomes both the vi¶aya and vi¶ay∂ in turns.
Constantly becoming vi¶aya and vi¶ay∂ in this manner, the mind gets tired and
becomes inactive; then the j∂va loses connection even with the mind and enters
su¶upti. In this nirµupådhic (adjunctless - without upådhi) state, the ‹åstra gives j∂va the
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name pråj¤a [j∂va is the name at the individual level (vya¶¢i) and pråj¤a is the name
at the cosmic level (sama¶¢i)]. In this state, the j∂va is all alone and becomes
ånandamaya. The light which illuminates the indriyas (sense organs) in both jågrat
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*Where is the light in the dream coming from? It is not coming from the sun, moon
or stars. Some may say that the light is contained in the våsanås themselves. But this is
not so because there is a great difference between the external light and its impression on
the våsanås. Impressions are photos which have to be exposed to light in order to be seen.
Similarly, the mind containing the våsanås has to be illumined to see the dream. This
light does not belong to the mind because it is an object for the observer. How? Because
its absence is experienced by the observer in deep sleep. So, the dream light is not of the
mind. Since its absence is noted by the observer in deep sleep, the light has to be of the
observer only.
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and swapna is that of this pråj¤a. Waking up from su¶upti the j∂va says: ìIn the absence
of the mind and sense organs, I enjoyed the bliss of deep sleep.î This proves that
the light on the basis of which the j∂va experiences the absence of the mind and the
indriyas has to be his swadharma (intrinsic feature). Therefore, the upådhis* mind etc.
are inert; they are objects for his knowledge; they are of the nature of tamas
(darkness). In this way we see that j¤åtætva (knowership), kartætva (doership), bhoktætva
(enjoyership) and luminosity are the features of the nirµupådhic pråj¤a only.

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This analysis of jågrat, swapna, su¶upti, brings out a surprising information: In
jågrat, taking the body as Self, everyone very naturally considers himself to be ëa

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man, a youthí etc. Such an identity, which is on the basis of the body, creates no

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doubt in anyoneís mind. However, when asked about his dream experience, he
encounters a difficulty: He says: ëIn my dream, I was swimming in the poolí. If you
ask him further, ëWho were you when you were dreaming? Were you the one on
the bed or the one in the swimming pool?í, he would be in confusion. It is very
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clear that the one swimming in the pool cannot at the same time be the one lying on
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the bed. In this way, an analysis of the dream state creates a sa≈‹aya j¤åna (doubtful
knowledge) about himself, in place of the unambiguous knowledge of jågrat (ëI am
a maní etc). If you ask him further, ëWhat were you in your su¶upti? Where were
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you?í. He would say, ëI do not know what I was during su¶upti, nor where I was.í So
it is clear that in su¶upti, when he is not connected with the mind and other upådhis,
but is all alone, the j∂va has aj¤åna (ignorance) about his own Self. But, despite this
aj¤åna, it is at least clear to him that during deep sleep he was free from all upådhis
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*An unknown object is sometimes recognised through a known object. For e.g., a
nearly invisible glass wall is known by a red patch on it. In this connection it is said that
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the known object is an upådhi for the unknown object and the unknown object is the
adhi¶¢håna of the known object. Without adhi¶¢håna, there is no meaning in upådhi - it
does not exist. However, the adhi¶¢håna exists even without the upådhi. In su¶upti there is
no upådhi like the body, indriyas or mind. But the observer Self exists, certifying the
absence of all upådhis in su¶upti. We can only identify the adhi¶¢håna with the upådhi, but
cannot know what exactly is the nature of the adhi¶¢hana. In fact, we may even get a
wrong understanding of it. For e.g., in association with the upådhis of the body and
mind, we understand the adhi¶¢håna Self as man/woman, active/inactive etc. But everyone
knows that the upådhi-free Self in deep sleep is neither man/woman nor active/inactive.
The only way to understand the Self in deep sleep is through ‹ruti.
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like the mind, indriyas, body etc. and was alone. However, no one says that he was
not there during su¶upti. Therefore, when it is explained to him that his
understanding of himself in the form of a ëman or youthí during jågrat is mithyå
j¤åna, he would have no difficulty in recognising his mistake. It is another matter
that it is very difficult for him to give up this mithyå j¤åna. This is a well known fact.
In this manner, not knowing who he is, is the aj¤åna or avidyå of the j∂va. On the
basis of his own experience in su¶upti, he knows very well that he has no connection

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with the body etc. Yet in jågrat, he does have the false knowledge that he is the
body etc. This false knowledge is adhyåsa. On the basis of this false understanding

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only does he create the difference of ëI' and ëYouí, and mixing it up with råga-dve¶a,

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gets caught up in the cycle of worldly activities (sa≈såra). Although worldly
activities are natural, the purpose of Adhyåsa Bhå¶ya is to show that for all such
activities, the basis is only adhyåsa.

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Without using a word beyond the universal experience of the three states, the
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Bhå¶yakåra presents his summary so that everyone can understand oneís fault of
avidyå. In this, we get a glimpse of the incomparable teaching skill and utmost
compassion of Bhagawån ›a∆karåcårya. By even just listening to the Adhyåsa Bhå¶ya,
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an intelligent person understands his grievous mistake. After this, the seeker is
naturally desirous of listening to the following ‹år∂raka m∂må≈så (sacred discussion
of the j∂va) whose benefit is åtmaikatva avagati (experience of the oneness of the Self).
In this way, Adhyåsa Bhå¶ya is an introduction to ‹åriraka m∂må≈så.
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Some people find fault with the Bhå¶yakåra for not having done ma∆galåcaraƒa
(words invoking auspiciousness), before commencing the Bhå¶ya. Obviously, they
do not understand the context. Ma∆galåcaraƒa is meaningful only for the one who
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has understood his fault of avidyå and not for the fool who hasn't. Adhyåsa Bhå¶ya is
not a part of the main text. It is only a preface which prepares a seeker for the
auspicious message thereafter. Further, hearing the Sµutrakåraís word atha itself is
auspicious for the seeker with sådhana sampatti.
Henceforth, the Bhå¶ya Våkyas would be discussed to the best of our ability:

1. Ùeg<ceomcelHeÇlÙeÙeieesÛejÙees:
1. The two (entities) grasped as ëyouí and ëIí,
(1.1) The word pratyaya means knowledge of an object. When a pot is seen, the
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buddhi takes the shape of the pot and this shape is known as pratyaya. It is only
when the buddhi takes the shape of the pot that one says he has got the knowledge
of the pot. The pot is the object for this pratyaya. All such observed objects are
gocara, i.e that which is available for ëknowingí. All the objects which can be known
are grouped in the word ëyu¶mat-pratyaya-gocaraí and the knower is referred to by
the word ëasmat-pratyaya-gocaraí. In the words of Bhagawån ›r∂ K涃a, the meaning
of the word ëyu¶mat-pratyaya-gocaraí is k¶etra (observable) and the word ëasmat-

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pratyaya-gocaraí means k¶etraj¤a (observer) [G∂tå 13.1].
Question: The word yu¶mat means ëyou' which is sentient. However, the k¶etra

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is jada (inert). So, how can the inert ëk¶etraí be referred to as the sentient 'yu¶mat'?

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Answer: It is not like that. Since k¶etra is insentient, had it been referred to as
ëidam -thisí instead of yu¶mat, then one would not have understood that the k¶etra
(including his body) is actually different from himself. We have already seen how

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the inert body is accepted by the j∂va as himself which however is not his true Self.
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Here the purpose is to convey that the k¶etra (which includes his body) and
k¶etraj¤a (his true Self) are of very different natures. Unless this difference is conveyed
through something the people experience themselves they will not understand it.
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The experience here is that of su¶upti. In his current understanding however, k¶etra
and k¶etraj¤a are not different. He thinks of himself and others as non-different
from their inert-bodies. But at the same time, he very naturally feels himself to be
different from others. Therefore, if the k¶etra is called yu¶mat, it becomes clear to
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him that it includes all the observable world. He also understands that the asmat
has to be different from it. But even then, the task of separating the k¶etraj¤a from
his own inert body still remains. Therefore, in the very next word, k¶etra-k¶etraj¤a
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are respectively called vi¶aya (observable) and vi¶ay∂ (observer) respectively. In this
way, by first including the k¶etra in yu¶mat and then calling it vi¶aya, the difference
in the nature of k¶etra-k¶etraj¤a is brought to attention in two steps. From this it is
very clear that the whole world (including oneís body) is yu¶mat pratyaya gocara
while ëI' am asmat pratyaya gocara.*

*Any observable is yu¶mat pratyaya gocara. Sthµula‹ar∂ra - the gross body and
sµuk¶ma‹ar∂ra - the subtle body, both are observables. The latter consists of 5 j¤anendriyas
(ears, skin, eyes, tongue and nose), 5 karmendriyas (motor organs - våk, påƒi, påda, påyu,
and upastha), 5 praƒas (pråƒa, apåna, vyåna, udåna and samåna) and the four divisions of
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2. efJe<eÙeefJe<eefÙeCees:
2. which are respectively the observed and the observer,
(2.1) The word vi¶aya comes from the root ¶i¤ bandhane - ^fofluksfr fucéukfr fo"kf;.ke~
bfr fo"k;%* - that which binds the vi¶ay∂ is called the vi¶aya.
The one who grasps a vi¶aya is the vi¶ay∂. ›abda, spar‹a, rµupa, rasa and gandha are
the vi¶ayas. They get determined only when the different indriyas of the vi¶ay∂ come

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in contact with their respective vi¶ayas. This is the bond which binds the vi¶ay∂ to

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the vi¶aya. The whole jagat belongs to the vi¶aya category. Who is the vi¶ayi who
grasps a vi¶aya? For the vi¶ayas ‹abda, spar‹a etc, the respective indriyas are the vi¶ayis.

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For these indriyas, the manas is the vi¶ay∂. For manas, the buddhi (intellect) is the vi¶ay∂
and for the buddhi, aha≈kåra is the vi¶ay∂. What is ahamkåra? It is the feeling: ëI am the
knower of the buddhi pratyayasí. This aha≈kåra is clear in jågrat and swapna. But now

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the question arises: ëIs there a vi¶ay∂ for this aha≈kåra also? If so, who is it? Indeed,
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aha≈kåra is also a vi¶aya. For whom? For me. ëWho am I?í I am that Pråj¤a, who, in
su¶upti, cognizes the absence of everything starting from aha≈kåra upto the jagat
consisting of sound, touch etc.
Pa

Question: In su¶upti, no one has the experience of identifying the absence of

jagat. So, how then can it be established that pråj¤a is the vi¶ay∂
Answer: It is not like that. It is true that during su¶upti there is no anubhava of
any vi¶aya. But the statement, ëIn su¶upti there was no vi¶ayaí, made after waking up,
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is the experience identifying the absence of the jagat. Keeping this in mind, it is
said that pråj¤a is the vi¶ayi for ahamkåra also. ^HkwrHkfo";Kkr`Roa loZfo"k;Kkr`Roe~ vL; ,o bfr
izkK%A lq"kqIr% vfi fg HkwriwoZxR;k izkK mP;rs* - He is the j¤åtæ (knower) of all the vi¶ayas - of the
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past and the future; therefore, he is called pråj¤a. Even though he is in deep sleep
(not recognising the presence or absence of anything) he is called pråj¤a
retrospectively (Må. Bh. 5).

anta¨karaƒa (manas, buddhi, citta and aha≈kåra). All these are observables. Observer is
the asmat pratyaya gocara. Bahi¶pæaj¤a in association with the gross and subtle bodies,
and anta¨praj¤a in association with the anta¨karaƒa are only intermediate observers.
Their ranges of observables are limited. It is only the self in deep sleep who is the ultimate
observer who is asmat pratyaya gocara for bahi¶pæaj¤a}
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(2.2) In this way the båhyajagat - indriya-manas-buddhi-aha≈kåra- pråj¤a form the

chain of j¤åna-kriya (the act of knowing). In this chain, jagat is always the vi¶aya and
pråj¤a is always the vi¶ay∂. However, each one of the indriya-manas-buddhi-aha≈kåra
is a vi¶ay∂ for the previous one, but a vi¶aya for the subsequent one. In fact, they
become vi¶ay∂ only in the presence of pråj¤a - not independently. Since a knower
even deeper inside of the pråj¤a is not in anyoneís experience, pråj¤a is deemed to
be the ultimate vi¶ay∂. From the jagat to aha≈kåra, the entire k¶etra is its vi¶aya;

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therefore, pråj¤a is the k¶etraj¤a.

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3. lece:HeÇkeâeMeJeefÉ®æmJeYeeJeÙees:

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3. being opposite to each other in their nature like darkness and lightó
(3.1) K¶etra is tamorµupa (of the nature of darkness) while the k¶etraj¤a is prakå‹arµupa
(of the nature of light)*.

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Question: How is k¶etraj¤a of the nature of light?
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Answer: In jågrat, an external light, like that of sun etc., is needed to gain the
knowledge of an external object. But in swapna, the act of recognising shapes
continues even in the absence of an external light. Which is the light in swapna? It
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has to be internal because there is no scope for an external light. One who thinks he
is the body may deny this and say: ëSince mind alone is there in dreams, the light
there should be of the mind onlyí. However, this is not tenable because even the
mind is inert, since its absence is also experienced in su¶upti. Therefore, the mind is
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also an observable object. It belongs to the category of the observed and hence is
tamorµupa. It is not of the nature of prakå‹a. Pråj¤a alone has prakå‹a-dharma because
he is not becoming vi¶aya.
Ma

(3.2) Normally people understand by ëprakå‹a 'only the light of the sun etc.,
which is necessary for identifying the shapes and colours of objects in the external

*Here it is shown that vi¶aya is of the nature of darkness and vi¶ay∂ is of the nature
of light. The analysis is as follows: An object is identified by light, but not the other way
round. Here light is the identifier and object is the identified. Further on, the eye becomes
the identifier and the light the identified. Similarly, mind is the identifier and the eye is
the identified. Ultimately, it is the Self who is the identifier and all else are identified. So,
the ultimate identifier is the vi¶ay∂ - the Self in deep sleep and all else are vi¶ayas - the
identified - so of the nature of darkness. Only the Self is the nature of light.
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world. Therefore, they find it difficult to understand the statement of the ‹åstra that
pråj¤a is prakå‹arµupa. So what is prakå‹a? It will be explained: Another word for
prakå‹a is jyoti - ^-;r~ ;r~ dL;fpr~ voHkkldÏ rr~ rr~ T;ksfr% 'kCnsu vfHkékh;rs* - Whatever
illuminates something is called jyoti (Sµu. Bh. 1.1.24). Just as light enables one to
identify an object by its rµupa, similarly ‹abda, spar‹a, rasa and gandha also help one
to know an object. For example, even though it may be dark, we are able to reach
the village by hearing a dog's bark. Similarly, through touch we are able to recognise

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a book etc. Therefore, ‹abda, spar¶a, rasa and gandha are also prakå‹a. The prakå‹a of
all these prakå‹as is of pråj¤a.

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(3.3) The example of tamas-prakå‹a is given to explain the opposite natures of

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vi¶aya-vi¶ay∂. For making this example completely meaningful, some people say
that tamas (darkness) is a stuff (bhåva-rµupa) like prakå‹a. This is not correct because:
It is only when illumined by prakå‹a that the shape of an object is known, and not in
darkness. Therefore, tamas-prakå‹a are indeed opposite to each other. But though
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‹abda, spar¶a, rasa and gandha are also prakå‹a and knowledge of objects is obtained
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through them too, they do not have their opposites. Therefore, there is no use in
trying to prove that tamas is bhåva-rµupa.
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Tamas-Prakå‹a are only examples for showing the difference in the nature of
insentience-sentience of k¶etra-k¶etraj¤a. Confirming this contention the Bhå¶yakåra
says ëvi¶ayini cidåtmakeí in the very next sentence, separating the sentient vi¶ay∂ from
the jaŒa jagat.
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(3.4) Question: Though pråj¤a is the pratyagåtman (the inner atman), the tur∂ya/
›uddhåtman is the åtman even inside the pratyagåtman This being so, is it not proper
to take the ›uddhåtman himself as the ultimate observer?
Ma

Answer: No. Because the one who is caught in the mire of adhyåsa is the k¶etraj¤a
only and not the tur∂ya ›uddhåtman. That is why Bhå¶yakåra takes k¶etraj¤a as the
vi¶ay∂, and not the tur∂ya. This has been clearly stated in the G∂tå Bhå¶ya. ^{ks=k{ks=kK;ks%
fo"k;fo"kf;.kks% fHk¬kLoHkko;ks% brjsrjrºekZé;kly{k.k% la;ksx% {ks=k{ks=kKLo:ifoosdkHkkofucUéku%A
jTtq'kqfDrdknhuka rf}osdKkukHkkokr~ vé;kjksfirliZjtrkfnla;ksxor~ l% v;e~ vé;klLo:i% {ks=k{ks=kKla;ksxks
feF;kKkuy{k.k%* - K¶etra-k¶etraj¤a are vi¶aya and vi¶ay∂ and of different natures. In them
the features of one are mixed up with those of the other due to adhyåsa. This is the
coupling of k¶etra and k¶etraj¤a. The reason for this coupling is the lack of knowledge
of their intrinsic natures. Therefore, this adhyåsa is mithyå j¤åna (false understanding).
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[G. Bh 13.26]. This is the same sentence as the first sentence of the Adhyåsa Bhå¶ya.
^;q"enLeRizR;;xkspj;ks% fo"k;fo"kf;.kks% re% izdk'kor~ fo#ºLoHkko;ks% brjsrj HkkokuqiiŸkkS flºk;ke~*,
which is under consideration here. This should be noticed. Therefore, who should
be kept in the place of vi¶ay∂ should not be decided on the basis of our limited
buddhi. The serious consequences of considering ›uddhåtman as the vi¶ay∂ will be
analysed later*.
(3.5) Question: No vi¶ay∂ is its own vi¶aya. Therefore, the pratyagåtman pråj¤a

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cannot also become its own vi¶aya; so, how can he be the object of understanding as

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ìI" i.e. asmat pratyaya gocara? If he is gocara, he becomes an object.
Answer: That is right. Unlike jågrat and swapna, there is no ìIî awareness in

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su¶upti. That is why pråj¤a is not vi¶aya for pråj¤a himself. But for the bahi¶praj¤a who

*In deep sleep, pråj¤a does not recognise anything. Nevertheless, Bhå¶yakåra says
that he (pråj¤a) is the knower in the wakeful and dream states. The reason is: K¶etraj¤a is
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the knower of the k¶etra. He has to be different from k¶etra; otherwise, the action of
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knowing the k¶etra is impossible. The j∂va gets totally separated from the k¶etra only in
su¶upti. Therefore, the j∂va in su¶upti, viz. pråj¤a, is the k¶etraj¤a - the knower.
Pa

Answer: True. But he can know only the external world, but not his own body
with which he is associated.
Question: But he can know his eyes and ears?
Answer: But when he is knowing them, he is different from them, but associated
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with mind and so on. Therefore the true observer of the k¶etra has to be different from it
totally.
Objection: The assertion that pråj¤a who is asleep and who is not knowing is the
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j¤åta and the denial that Åtman who never sleeps and who is always knowing is not the
j¤åta - both statements are wrong.
Resolution: That ëpråj¤a is asleep and therefore he is not knowing anythingí are
mutually contradictory. If pråj¤a were asleep, he cannot know that he was not knowing
anything. Since he was knowing that he was not knowing anything, he could not have
been sleeping. This contradictory statement of bahi¶praj¤a is a consequence of his adhyåsa,
which is itself a contradiction. Next, it is true that Åtman never sleeps. But He cannot be
j¤åta. A j¤åta is one who observes something other than himself. But there is nothing
other than Åtman. So, He is not a j¤åta. Therefore, what is right is only asserted and
what is wrong is only denied.
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is able to get a buddhi pratyaya, pråj¤a becomes an object. How? Listen: Anyone
getting up from su¶upti says, ^u fdÏfpnosfn"ka lq[kegeLokIle~* ëI slept well. I did not know
anythingí, pointing to the pråj¤a only. Since he (pråj¤a) is grasped in this way in the
wakeful state, he is indeed experienced as an object. ëchtkoLFkkfi ^u fdf¸nosfn"ke~* bfr
mfRFkrL; izR;;n'kZukr~ nsgsøuqHkw;r ,o* (Må. Kå. Bh. 1.2). This is everyoneís experience.
However, just as bahi¶praj¤a knows himself clearly (as ëmaleí, ëyouthí etc.), he does
not know the pråj¤a clearly. Therefore, anyone will be naturally interested in

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knowing about him. Let us leave this issue here. Later we will analyse how the

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pråj¤a who is not a vi¶aya becomes a vi¶aya.

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(3.6) In this way it is well known that the k¶etra, which is vi¶aya and tamorµupa is
very different from the k¶etraj¤a who is vi¶ay∂ and prakå‹arµupa. It is also well-known
that the pråj¤a and the jagat are pratyaya gocara. In this way, there is only one similarity
between the two, that they are both vi¶aya.
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4. Flejslej YeeJeevegHeHeòeew efmeæeÙeeb leæcee&CeeceefHe meglejeced FlejslejYeeJeevegHeHeefòe:~
4. are known to be mutually dissimilar; so the features of one can never be
of the other.
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(4.1) J¤ånakriya (the activity of knowing) is possible only when the vi¶aya and
vi¶ay∂ are different from each other. If they are not different, j¤ånakriya is impossible.
Everyone knows that k¶etraj¤a is vi¶ay∂ and k¶etra is vi¶aya. Therefore, it is well known
that one becoming the other or the features of one being the features of the other is
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impossible.
Ma

5. FlÙele: DemcelHeÇlÙeÙeieesÛejs efJe<eefÙeefCe efÛeoelcekesâ Ùeg<celHeÇlÙeÙeieesÛejmÙe efJe<eÙemÙe

leæcee&Ceeb Ûe DeOÙeeme:~
5. Therefore, adhyåsa, the superimposition of the entity ëyouí and its features
on the conscious observer ëIí,
(5.1) Nevertheless the k¶etra and k¶etraj¤a are mixed up. Man, woman etc. are
the properties of the body; listening etc. are the properties of the indriyas; j¤ånakriya
is the property of the buddhi; All these are the k¶etra and its properties. Jåntætva is
the property of the k¶etraj¤a. In this way the properties of the k¶etraj¤a are very
different. It is everybodyís experience that the j¤åta pråj¤a has no connection with
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the k¶etra. No one is unfamiliar with this. Yet sometimes one says, ëMy buddhi, my
eyes, my body etcí, separating himself from the buddhi-indriyas-body etc. and at
other times says, ëI am intelligent, I am blind, I am a maní, identifying himself with
the buddhi-indriyas-body respectively and correspondingly carries out his
transactions (vyavahåra) with the world. In other words, he wrongly thinks of the
k¶etra as himself. In the same way, by identifying with the buddhi-indriyas-body etc.,
he says, ëI decide, I see, I am dark complexionedí etc. Not only this -

k a
6. leefÉHeÙe&ÙesCe efJe<eefÙeCe: leæcee&Ceeb Ûe efJe<eÙes DeOÙeeme:
6. and conversely, the superimposition of the observer and its features on

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the observed,
(6.1) Conversely, dharma of the pratyagåtman is also superimposed on the k¶etra.
How? It is not unknown that in su¶upti the ånanda is without any vi¶aya. Therefore,
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it is clear that ånanda is the inherent feature of the pråj¤a. Instead of knowing this
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through viveka, one argues: ëIn su¶upti, I was not aware of any ånanda. How then can
I say that I was in ånanda at that time? It could be just a dukha-free state?í Thus he
doubts his own experience and after getting up seeks vi¶aya sukha in jågrat. He
Pa

considers himself happy when he gets enjoyment through vi¶ayas, otherwise

considers himself unhappy. The import is that ånanda, which is actually the dharma
of the vi¶ayi, is superimposed on the vi¶aya. Similarly, even though sarva vi¶aya
j¤åtætva is the svadharma of pråj¤a, he says, ìI did not know anything in su¶upti. So
ha

how can I be the j¤åta?í With this doubt, he superimposes the j¤åtætva on the buddhi.
He considers himself a j¤åta only when connected with the buddhi; when not
connected with the buddhi he thinks he is non-existent. In this way, he does adhyåsa
Ma

of his j¤åtætva dharma on the buddhi. From this it is clear that adhyåsa of vi¶aya- vi¶ay∂
in both the directions is not done unknowingly, but knowingly. That is, even after
the Guru explains where the mistake lies, he is still unable to correct himself.
Therefore this adhyåsa has to be mithyå-j¤åna only.

7. efceLÙee YeefJelegb Ùegòeâced~

7. can rightly be deemed illusory.
(7.1) Just as even after being told that ëThis is not silver, but shellí, instead of
making an effort to examine it and understanding it as shell, the continuation of
 11

the wrong idea that it is silver would be an obstinate wrong knowledge; so is this
adhyåsa also very obstinate. To see in pråj¤a the dharmas of the body etc. which are
not in him (pråj¤a) or to see sukha and j¤åtætva in the vi¶aya and buddhi which are not
in them - are all mithyå-j¤åna only. The object of mithyå-j¤åna is mithyå i.e., even
though seen, it is asat (does not exist). For example, silver not existing in the shell
but seen, is mithyå, i.e. asat. Here it is important to remember that the object silver
per se is not mithyå; but the silver seen in the shell is mithyå. Water seen in a mirage

a
is mithyå - it is asat. Here the mirage is pråtibhåsika satya, water is vyåvahårika satya.
Both are satya - not mithyå.Therefore, understanding that which is in front of us is

k
not actually water but a mirage which appears like water is right knowledge. To

aja
know it as water is wrong knowledge. The object of this wrong knowledge viz.
water - is asat, because there is no water there. In the same way, world and its
dharmas or pråj¤a and his dharmas - they are vyåvahårika satyas, not false. But seeing
the dharma of the world in the pratyagåtman and seeing the dharma of the pratyagåtman
r
in the world is mithyå only, because the world is not in the pratyagåtman nor is
riv
pratyagåtman in the world. On the other hand, if it is asserted that all superimposed
things are mithyå as a rule, and that the world seen in pratyagåtman is mithyå, it is
wrong. The reason being that in the reverse adhyåsa where the pratyagåtman is adhyasta,
Pa

he (pratyagåtman) will become asat, which is impossible. It should be remembered

that the statement ^vé;kl% feF;k Hkforqa ;qDre~*, implies only that adhyåsa is mithyå-j¤åna;
that is, only the adhyåsa between the observable and the observer is mithyå, not the
observer-observable themselves.
ha

8. leLeeefHe DevÙeesvÙeefmceved DevÙeesvÙeelcekeâleeced DevÙeesvÙeOecee˧e DeOÙemÙe Flejsleje-

efJeJeskesâve DelÙevleefJeefJeòeâÙees: Oece&Oeefce&Cees: efceLÙee%eeveefveefceòe: melÙeeve=les efceLegveerke=âlÙe
Ma

‘‘Denefceoced'', ‘‘cecesoced'' Fefle vewmeefie&keâesÓÙeb ueeskeâJÙeJenej:~

8. Nevertheless, superimposing one entity and its features on the distinctly
differing other entity and its features indiscriminately due to wrong
understanding, mixing up the changing and the unchanging, there is this
natural usage in people ëI am thisí, ëThis is mineí.
(8.1) In this way, when adhyåsa is taking place in both directions, at least this
much is clear: just as ignorance of the shell is the cause for the silver being
superimposed on it, the ignorance of the swarµupa of the pratyagåtman is the cause of
12

the adhyåsa of the body on him and the ignorance of the swarµupa of the jagat is the
cause of the adhyåsa of the pratyagåtman on it. This means that the j∂va does not
know the swarµupa of either the pratyagåtman or the jagat. Without knowing their
swarµupa, he recognises them through their activity only. Although the activity cannot
exist without the swarµupa, the swarµupa does exist without the activity. It is essential
to know the swarµupa to get rid of adhyåsa. There is no doubt that even the aj¤ån∂
knows that pråj¤a has no activity. In spite of this, he does the adhyåsa of the activity

a
of jågrat and swapna on pråj¤a. Even though activity leaves him, he does not leave
activity.

k
Following this, ‹åstra also talks of his knowership etc for the purpose of teaching

aja
etc. ^rsuso fg vgad=kkZ vgaizR;; fo"k;s.k izR;f;uk lokZ% fÿ;k% fuoZR;ZUrs] rRQya p l ,o v'ukfr*- It is
only by him who has the conceit ëIí, who is the object of ëI-awarenessí, who is the
knower that all actions are performed. He alone enjoys their fruit (Sµu. Bh. 1.1.4).
Here change, inertia, limitation and the activity based on them are the dharmas of
r
the world, while the world is the dharm∂. Knowership, doership and enjoyership
riv
are dharmas of pråj¤a and pråj¤a is the dharm∂. Here dharma-dharm∂ relation is not of
non-difference as in fire and heat. It is in the sense that ^dk;ZL; dkj.kkReRoa u rq dkj.kL;
Pa

dk;kZReRoe~* - The effect is not different from the cause but the cause is different from
the effect (Sµu. Bh. 2.1.9). That is, the dharma does not exist without the dharm∂, but
dharm∂ does exist without the dharma. The dharma is seen in the dharm∂ only through
an upådhi. In nirupådhic dharm∂, there is no dharma. Both the jagat and the pratyagåtman
ha

appear with activity only through their upådhis. In their nirupådhic state they are
actionless. For action in jagat, shapes (vikåras) are the upådhi. In its nirupådhic state,
jagat is Åtman only. For action in pratyagåtman, the body and senses etc. are upådhis.
Without them, pratyagåtman too is nothing but the actionless Åtman. The cause for
Ma

this mixing up of satya (unchanging) with the anæta (changing), leading to the adhyåsa
of ëme and mineí, is not knowing their inherent nirupådhic nature and seeing them
only with upådhis.
(8.2) What is satya? That which does not change. ^;n~ :is.k ;u~ fu'fpra rn~ :ia u
O;fHkpjfr rr~ lR;e~* - Known in one form, that which does not change from it, is satya.
What is anæta? That which changes. ^;n~ :is.k ;u~ fuf'pra rn~ :ia O;fHkpjr~ vu`re~ bfr mP;rs*-
Known with one form, that which changes from it is anæta (also called asatya). (Tai.
Bh. 2.1). Here pråj¤a's unchangingness and the jagatís changefulness are well known.
 13

One who knows the meanings of the words satya and anæta will not contest this
because there is no vikåra in pråj¤a which could cause change in him.*
(8.3) Question: How can pråj¤a be satya? Everyone is pråjna in su¶upti, antahpraj¤a
in swapna and bahi¶pæaj¤a in jågrat that is, he is changing. Not only this. Even at any
one time, j∂vas are in different statesóif one is in su¶upti, another is in swapna and
yet another in jagrat. This also contradicts the claim that pråj¤a is unchanging.
Answer: It is not so. Pråj¤a is always pråj¤a only. Through the upådhi of mind

a
alone he becomes anta¨pæaj¤a and with the upådhi of mind and body becomes

k
bahi¶pæaj¤a. Though he appears different when he is with upådhis, his inherent nature
never changes. For example, seeing a cook preparing food with the upådhi of a

aja
ladle, no one says ëwithout the ladle, he is not a cookí. Further, even with the
difference in bodies, there is no difference in pråj¤a. The reason is this: Following
the bodies, there is difference in the experience of bahi¶praj¤a. In jagrat, the experience

r
of one person cannot be understood by another person without asking him. To
riv
know the experience, one has to ask the experiencer, that is, in bahi¶praj¤a, there is
multiplicity. Similarly, the experiences of antahpraj¤a are also different. Oneís
experience in swapna cannot be known by another without asking him. But it is not
Pa

so in the case of pråj¤a. One understands the experience of su¶upti of another person
without asking him. Therefore, unlike in the case of puru¶a of the Så≈khyas, there
is no multiplicity in pråj¤a, he is only one. Therefore, pråj¤a is satya.

*At this point it would be important to understand the definitions of satya, anæta,
ha

mithyå, sat, asat and anæta. Satya means unchanging, asatya means changing. Sat means
existence, asat means that which does not exist (example given is of a barren womanís
son which is impossible). Satya and sat are used interchangeably by some. But this creates
Ma

confusion. Whatever is satya is undoubtedly also sat because that which does not change
definitely has to exist. But whatever is sat (exists), it could be either satya (unchanging)
or asatya (changing). Thus Brahman is both satya and sat, while the jagat is sat, yet
asatya. Many people define Brahman as sat, but if only this is said, the problem is that the
jagat also is sat; so, we will not be able to differentiate Brahman from the jagat. Therefore,
it would be proper to say that Brahman is satyam. But afterwords, we will see that
Brahman is not only satyam, but also j¤ånam and anantam. Therefore to say that Brahman
is ërealí is not enough, because this definition takes into account only one feature of
Brahman and not the other two. Mithyå means that which is seen, but does not exist.
Anæta in the bhå¶ya means asatya and not mithyå. Jagat is not mithyå but anæta or asatya.
14

(8.4) Inspite of this, the mixing up of pråj¤a who is satya with the body which is
anæta, and saying, ëI am a man, I am a womaní etc. and ëHe is my friend, he is my
enemyí etc, and acting on the basis of this wrong understanding is well known.
The mixing of satya and anæta is what constitutes adhyåsa. The vyavahåra taking place
on the basis of this is spontaneous and natural (vewmee|iekeâ:); i.e it is not done after being
taught by someone.

a
9. Deen~ keâesÓÙeceOÙeemees veece Fefle? GÛÙeles~ mce=efle¤He: Hej$e HetJe&Â<šeJeYeeme:~
9. If asked ëWhat is this thing called adhyåsa?í the reply is ëit is the memory

k
of a previously seen (object) appearing as another (object)í.

aja
(9.1) This sentence gives the definition of adhyåsa. It can be understood by the
silver-shell example. Silver is pµurva-dæ¶ta, i.e. seen earlier. When a shell is seen on
the road, one gets an elementary knowledge that it is something, but not exactly

r
what it is. Its shine brings the memory of silver. Without bothering to examine the
riv
shell, one concludes that it is silver. This wrong knowledge is adhyåsa. That which
is not seen previously cannot come to memory, and that which does not come to
memory cannot be superimposed. That is, for adhyåsa, it is necessary that one should
Pa

have seen the superimposed thing previously. If silver had not been seen
previously, it would not have come to memory and one could not have
superimposed it on the shell. Not only this. The adhi¶¢håna in which it is
superimposed should also have been seen previously; otherwise, after examining
ha

the shell, one will only know that it is some object, but not that it is shell.
(9.2) The memory of a previously seen object appears only as a mental
modification, the corresponding object will not be there physically before a person.
Ma

The word ësmætirµupaí in the bhå¶ya above means such a mental modification of a
previously seen object. When the object is actually in front, then the knowledge is
produced ëThis is that object onlyí. This knowledge is called pratyabhij¤a, which is
of two typesóindividual pratyabhij¤a and category pratyabhij¤a. When the cow named
Kålåk¶∂, whom one has seen previously, is seen again at some later time, one
recognises her and the knowledge is produced that ëthis is the same Kålåk¶∂ seen
earlierí. This is individual pratyabhij¤a. When one sees another cow named Swastimati
and recognises that this is also a cow like Kålåk¶∂, this knowledge is known as
category pratyabhij¤a. Here, Kålåk¶∂ is the previously seen cow and Swasthimati is
another cow. Therefore, recognising Swastimati as Kålåk¶∂ is wrong knowledge.
 15

But, recognising Swasthimati as another cow like Kålåk¶∂ is not wrong knowledge,
it is right knowledge. The reason being that for this knowledge the object is not the
individual cow but ëcownessí. The ëcowness' in Kålåk¶∂ is recognised in Swastimati
also. This is category pratyabhij¤a and not adhyåsa. In this way, if pratyabhij¤a is right
knowledge of a perviously seen object, adhyåsa is wrong knowledge of a previously
seen object. Therefore, adhyåsa is also called avabhåsa meaning the rejection of
incorrect knowledge after examining the adhi¶¢håna.

a
(9.3) Question: Even a small child has category pratyabhij¤a. When the mother
shows a cow to her child, calling it as ëcowí, the child recognises another different

k
looking cow also as a ëcowí. Through one individual cow, how does the child come

aja
to know the ëcowness' in another cow?
Answer: Yes, it is true that even a small child has category recognition. This is
due to the impressions of previous births. Bæhadåraƒyaka ›ruti calls this ëpµurva
praj¤åí. (Br. 4.4.2)
r
riv
(9.4) Question: The body one gets in this birth has not seen previously.
Therefore, in this new body, how does adhyåsa arise such as ëthis is meí? Is not
adhyåsa in the body one with a beginning?
Pa

Answer: Yes. Adhyåsa in the present body has to happen now; that is, it has a
beginning; it is not beginningless. But the våsanå of deha-adhyåsa is beginningless.
^v;e~ vfi cqfºlEcUék% 'kDR;kReuk fo|eku ,o lq"kqfIrizy;;ks% iqu% izcksék izlo;ks% vkfoHkZofrA ,oa fg
,rr~ ;qT;rs] u fg vkdfLedh dL;fpr~ mRifŸk% laHkofr* - This connection with the buddhi remains
ha

potentially in su¶upti and pralaya and manifests again in jågrat and sæ¶ti because
nothing can be produced accidentally (Sµu Bh. 2.3.31). Even though children have
adhyåsa in buddhi, there is no adhyåsa in the new body. It can be understood like this:
Ma

When a child is beaten by its mother, it does not feel insulted; its behaviour with
her continues as before. The thought of wearing clothes or decorating oneself are
not entertained. There is no desire related to sex. These things show clearly that
there is no deha-adhyåsa in children. That is why the ‹ruti also tells the j¤åni ^ckY;su
fr"Bklsr~* - Stand in childhood (Br. 3.5.1), i.e. he must have the same innocence as that
of a child.
If children have no deha-adhyåsa when they are born, how then does the deha-
adhyåsa develop in them later? It is like this: When there is an injury to the body,
the buddhi understanding and then feeling the pain are the acts of prakæti ^bPNk }s"k%
16

lq[ka nq%[ka lƒ~?kkr'psruk ék`fr% ,rr~ {ks=ke~* - Desire, aversion, pleasure, grief, body,
consciousness and dhæti (the quality in buddhi which firms up the body when it is
falling for some reason) - all these are k¶etra (G∂tå 13.6). Since in the child, the relation
with the buddhi is beginningless, it feels that the injury is to itself. When such
experiences coming through the gross body happen frequently, a childís body
consciousness starts growing.
After this adhyåsa is firmly established, and by a misfortune if one loses any

a
part of the body, he continues to have adhyåsa in that part for quite sometime even

k
after losing that part. For example, when somebodyís leg starts decaying due to
gangrene, it is amputated to save the rest of the body from getting infected. Even

aja
after this amputation, a person continues to feel itching and pain in that area even
though the leg is not there. This is called phantom pain. For nearly a year the
person gets the imaginary sensation of itching and pain. As the realisation of the
absence of the leg becomes firm in the experience, the pain also goes. It is based on
r
such adhyåsa in the body that the ‹åstras prescribe post-death rites.
riv
(9.5) Question: How does the connection with buddhi, which is snapped during
su¶upti, come back on waking up?
Pa

Answer: Since the buddhi rests in the nåŒ∂s during su¶upti, the j∂va cannot engage
in the act of knowing. The j∂va merges in ∫‹wara while retaining his knowership
(potential to know).
That is, even at the time of su¶upti there is avidyå, but no adhyåsa. Following
ha

this indicator, ∫‹wara once again connects him with the same buddhi.
(9.6) Question: But in pralaya, all modifications are destroyed and only ∫‹wara
remains. How then can the j∂va get connected to the same buddhi in the next cycle of
Ma

creation?
Answer: The creation of the world by ∫‹wara each time is as it was in the previous
creation - ^lw;kZpUÊelkS ékkrk ;FkkiwoZedYi;r~* (°Rg Veda 10.190.3). The omniscient and
omnipotent ∫‹wara creates the necessary upådhis like buddhi etc. for the j∂va along
with the rest of creation and gives the connections to the corresponding j∂vas.*

*ëHow is that each j∂va gets up in the same body after sleep, even though as per the
‹åstras he had merged in Brahman?í The process of wakefulness starts as follows -J∂va is
asleep as long as his karma permits. Then he will get up according to his karma.
 17

In the foregoing, the sequence of how adhyåsa gets created in the new body
was explained. Presently, how the different schools define adhyåsa will be analyzed.
The three schools, according to their definition of adhyåsa are: anyathå khyåti, åkhyåti
and asat khyåti.

10. leb kesâefÛeled DevÙe$e DevÙeOecee&OÙeeme Fefle Jeoefvle~

10. Some (say), it is superimposing of the features of the one on another;

a
(10.1) Anyåthakhyåti: This is the one agreed upon by the Naiyåyikas and the

k
Bh墢as. According to them, the adhyåsa of silver on the shell happens in the following
steps: On seeing the shell, an elementary knowledge i.e. ëit is somethingí is

aja
produced and not the unique knowledge that ëit is a shellí. Because of the similarity
of glitter, the previously seen silver comes to memory. It is the nature of the mind
to get memory of a previously seen object whenever something similar is seen.
This is not the memory of a silver vessel seen earlier in a shop; it is the memory of
r
riv
the category ësilverí. Then the shell is wrongly understood as silver. After examining
the shell, the correct knowledge that ëthis is not silver, it is shellí - arises. Then the
realisation occurs that the silver seen is non-existent. By non-existent it does not
Pa

mean that ëthere is no silver anywhereí; it only means that ëthere is no silver in the
shellí. If silver were nowhere, its adhyåsa in the shell would not have been possible
because it would not have been previously seen and so it couldnít have come to
memory at all.
ha

11. kesâefÛeled leg Ùe$e ÙeoOÙeeme: leefÉJeskeâeieÇnefveyebOeveesYeüce Fefle~

11. it is the delusion resulting from not discriminating the two.
Ma

ëBut how does he get connection with his body?í Brahman is sarvaj¤a (omniscient)
and sarva‹akta (omnipotent); so, even though the j∂va cannot recognise, Brahman can.
Like the swan has the ability to separate milk from water, Brahman can separate the
j∂vas. This is called ha≈sa-k¶∂ra nyåya. What happens in pralaya is more complicated
because in deep sleep, even though the connection with body and mind is lost, yet they
are there; but in pralaya all vikåras (forms) are gone; therefore, there is no buddhi to
connect to. So how is it again connected? It is as follows: ∫‹wara remakes the universe
just like the previous one - ^lw;kZpUnzelkS /kkrk ;FkkiwoZedYi;r~* (°Rg Veda 10.190.3). The omniscient
and omnipotent ∫‹wara creates the buddhis and the bodies at the end and connects them
with the respective j∂vas.
18

(11.1) Akhyåti: This is propounded by Pråbhåkara School. As in anyathåkhyåti

here also there are two j¤ånas - elementary j¤åna of the shell (the adhi¶¢håna), and
the memory of silver. Both are correct. But because of non-discrimination between
the two, an illusion is created that ëit is silverí. This illusory knowledge is adhyåsa.
That is, it is not wrong to see the shell as silver, but understanding the shell as
silver without separating the two is wrong.
(11.2) Question: Even though yellow conch is never seen, how is that to some

a
a white conch appears as yellow?
Answer: Only the one who has jaundice sees the white conch as yellow. Here

k
also, two knowledges are involved. The knowledge of the conch derecognizing its

aja
whiteness and the knowledge of yellowness without knowing that one has jaundice.
Not differentiating the two knowledges leads to the wrong knowledge of yellow
color in the white conch. Ignorance of one's jaundice is the fault here. When he
comes to know that he has jaundice, he gets the right the right knowledge that ëthis
r
is a white conch, appearing as yellow only to me.í
riv
12. DevÙes leg Ùe$e ÙeoOÙeeme: lemÙewJe efJeHejerle Oece&lJekeâuHeveeced DeeÛe#eles~
12. Others say, wherever there is adhyåsa of one on another, it is
Pa

imagination of the opposite features of the other on the one.

(12.1) Asatkhyåti: Because of the elementary knowledge of the shell and the
memory of silver similar to it - imagining the feature of silver in the shell is adhyåsa.
This is called dharma adhyåsa.Understanding the shell itself as silver is dharmi adhyåsa.
ha

Some reject this saying that this is the Buddhistís asatkhyåti. Their thinking is this:
ëThough the object is not there it is seen due to sa≈skåraí, this is what the Vij¤ånavåd∂
Buddhists say. Here, if the silver is asat in the sense of ërabbitís horní which cannot
Ma

be found anywhere, then it could be the Vij¤ånavåd∂ís view. But if we understand

it just to mean the ësilver which is not in the shellí then it could be renamed as
mithyå khyåti.
Bhagawan Bhå¶yakåra would not have mentioned it if it were wrong. The
bhå¶ya våkya which justifies it is ^'kqfDrdka jtre~ bfr izR;sfr bfr v=k 'kqfDropu ,o 'kqfDrdk'kCn%A
jtr'kCn% rq jtrizrhfry{k.kkFkZ%A izR;sfr ,o fg dÍoya jtre~ bfr] u rq r=k jtre~ vfLr* - In the
sentence ëshell is understood as silverí, the word shell means shell itself but the
word silver refers only to the apparent silver because it is the object of wrong
knowledge. There is no silver at all in that place (Sµu. Bh. 4.1.15).
 19

13. meJe&LeeefHe leg DevÙemÙe DevÙeOecee&JeYeemeleeb ve JÙeefYeÛejefle~

13. Whatever it be, there is no deviation (from the rule) that the dharma
of one is seen in another,
(13.1) Now it is being told that the essential meaning of all the three definitions
is the same, the difference is only in delineating how the mithyåj¤åna is produced.
None of them deviates from the definition of adhyåsa viz; ^Le`fr:i% ij=k iwoZn`"VkoHkkl%*

a
and the description of adhyåsa viz, formulated by Bhå¶yakåra in the sentence ^vU;L;
vU;ékekZoHkklrka u O;fHkpjfr* in this sentence.

k
aja
14. leLee Ûe ueeskesâ DevegYeJe: ‘‘Megefòeâkeâe efn jpeleJeled DeJeYeemeles'', ‘‘Skeâ§evõ:
meefÉleerÙeJeled'' Fefle~
14. and it is in the universal experience that ëshell appears like silverí,
ëone moon as if with a secondí. r
riv
(14.1) Bhå¶yakåra has given two examples for adhyåsa. It is important to
remember that both of them describe the situation after the imposed dharma is
rejected as a result of having obtained the right knowledge of the adhi¶¢håna. After
Pa

examining the shell and even after understanding that it is not silver, the shell
continues to look like silver. Therefore, the knowledge ëshell looking like silverí is
correct, not wrong, because knowledge of the shell separates it from the silver in
the memory - ^'kqfDrdk fg jtror~*] ^,d% pUÊ% lf}rh;or~*. In both the examples, ëshell
ha

looking like silverí and ëone moon looking like with a secondí, the ëvat' suffix refers
to the rejection of a wrong knowledge after the right knowledge of the adhi¶¢håna
has been gained.*
Ma

(14.2) Now we should turn our attention to the roles of these two different
examples. They are respectively associated with the foretold two types of adhyåsa.
That is why Bhå¶yakåra has used the phrase ëtad viparyayeƒaí in the beginning and
*(Question) ëIt is clear that the adhyåsa of k¶etra in k¶etraj¤a is a case of mistaken
identity. But is the adhyåsa of k¶etraj¤a in the k¶etra a case of seeing one in many?í (Answer)
It has already been shown that praj¤a is not different from person to person like bahispraj¤a
and antapraj¤a, but only one in everybody (see sec. 8.3). But due to adhyåsa, even though
there is one pråj¤a only, a different pråj¤a is associated with each person. This is a case of
seeing many in one.
20

also in the end of the this introduction. The cause of the first adhyåsa from outside
to inside is the ignorance of the nature of pratyagåtman. When one gets the
knowledge that he is the fourth Åtman, then there arises in him the following
realization: Though he appears to be transacting in the proximity of the upådhis,
he is actually the transactionless Åtman. The purpose of the shell-silver example is
to confirm this only. ëEven though it looks like silver, it is only shellí, is correct
knowledge. Similarly, understanding that ëeven though he appears as if coupled

a
with the features of the k¶etra, the k¶etraj¤a is actually different from the k¶etra. He is
tur∂ya onlyí is the correct knowledge.

k
The cause of the second adhyåsa from inside to outside, is the ignorance of the

aja
real nature of the k¶etra. Multiplicity is seen in the k¶etra when viewed through
forms, but in its true nature k¶etra is also the fourth Åtman only. ^,rS% izk.kkfnfHk% vkReu%
vi`Fkx~HkwrS% vi`Fkx~HkkoSjs"k vkRek jTtqfjo likZfn fodYiuk:iS% i`FkxsosR;fHkYkf{krks fuf'prks ew<S%A foosfduka

r
rq jTTokfeo dfYirk% likZn;% ukReO;frjsds.k izk.kkn;LlfUr* - These forms of pråƒa etc. which
riv
are not different from Åtman are viewed as different by ignorant people. But for
the intelligent they are not different from the Åtman just as the imagined serpent is
not different from the rope (Må. Kå. Bh. 2.30).
Pa

For the one who knows this, the multiplicity seen through the indriyas is
sublated in the Åtman and therefore the k¶etra is seen by him as the non dual Åtman
only. This is sarvåtmabhåva, i.e. realising that nothing is different from himself. To
confirm this, the example of one moon is given : ^,dfLeu~ pUÊs frfej—rkusdpUÊiziapor~
ha

vfo|k—rks cz„f.k uke:iiziap% fo|;k izfoykif;rO;%* - Just as one moon is seen as many
due to cataract, the world of multiplicity of names and forms cognised in Brahman
is due to avidyå. This is to be sublated by vidyå (Sµu. Bh. 3.2.21). One who has cataract
Ma

in the eye sees two moons even though actually there is only one moon. He who
does not have cataract sees only the one moon. In the same way, one who has
avidyå sees multiplicity in the world of forms. But the realised j¤ån∂, who has
sublated the multiplicity, understands only oneness. This is because ^dk;kZdkjksøfi
dkj.kL; vkReHkwr ,o* - The forms of the effect, in their intrinsic nature, are nothing but
the cause only (Sµu. Bh. 2.1.18). The world is kårya and Åtman is its kåraƒa. Therefore,
the j¤åni sees only the non-dual Self in the jagat.
(14.3) In this way, the benefit of the ‹år∂raka m∂må≈så i.e. discussion on the
j∂vaóis the obtainment of the vidyå of the oneness of Åtman. That is, from the point
 21

of view of the effect, it is onlyÅtman which is appearing in the two forms as k¶etra
and k¶etraj¤a respectively, through parå and aparå prakæti. However, from the point
of view of the cause, it is the unchangingly eternal, all pervading (like åkå‹a), devoid
of all modifications, eternally satisfied, without parts, self-illumined Åtman.
Obtaining the vidyå of the oneness of Åtman means realising that this Åtman is
himself.
(14.4) Anirvacaniyakhyåti: This is the khyåti propounded by some others. Their

a
thinking is as follows: One sees silver in the shell. If the silver were not there, it
would not be possible to see it. ìThings are seen though they are not presentí, is

k
the opinion of the Vijnånavåd∂ Budhists. But this is not acceptable. Since one makes

aja
an effort to pick up the silver, it must be there. However, on examination of the
shell it is realised that the silver is not there. Therefore, the silver seen in the shell
is of the nature which cannot be described unambiguously such as ëit isí or ëit is
notí. In the same way the world superimposed on the pratyagåtman is sadasadbhyåm
r
anirvacan∂yå - that which cannot be described unambiguously as ëit isí or ëit is notí.
riv
This is not in accordance with the Bhå¶ya because in the previous section the
Bhåshyakara has clearly said ^izR;sfr ,o fg dÍoya jtre~ bfr u rq r=k jtre~ vfLr* - That there
is silver is wrong knowledge. Silver is not at all in the shell. Therefore, the silver
Pa

seen in the shell is asat and that it is seen is wrong knowledge. This is the
unambiguous description of silver. So how can the statement that ëthis is mithyå
silver about which it cannot be said whether it is there or notí be made? A thing
does not admit of options like ëthus, not thusí, ëexists, does not existí. Options are
ha

a product of the buddhi. The actual knowledge about an object is not dependent on
the buddhi, but only on the object itself. Indeed, in respect of one and the same
pillar, the true cognition cannot be of the type: ëIt is a pillar, or something else, or a
Ma

maní. In this case, ësomething else or a maní is mithyå j¤åna. ëIt is certainly a pillarí
is the true cognition because this knowledge depends only on the object itself and
not the buddhi of the viewer - ^u rq oLRosoe~ uSoe~ vfLr u vfLr bfr ok fodYI;rsA fodYiuk% rq
iq#"kcqn~é;is{kk%A u oLrq;kFkkRE;Kkua iq#"kcqº‘is{ke~A fdÏ rfgZ\ oLrqrU=ke~ ,o rr~A ufg LFkk.kkS ,dfLeu~
LFkk.kqokZ iq#"kks ok vU;ks ok bfr rŸoKkua HkofrA r=k iq#"k% vU;ks ok bfr feF;kKkue~A LFkk.kq% ,o bfr
rŸoKkuea oLrqrU=kRokr~* (Sµu Bh. 1.1.2). In the objects j∂va etc. in one and the same dharm∂
there cannot be two opposing dharmas simultaneously like existence and non-
existence. If there is the dharma of existence, there cannot be the other dharma of
non-existence. Similarly, non-existence cannot be reconciled with existence. So, this
22

arhata siddhånta is not rational - ^thokfn"kq inkFksZ"kq ,dfLeu~ /kfeZf.k lŸoklŸo;ks% fo#º/keZ;ks%
vlaHkokr~] lŸos pSdfLeu~ /kesZ vlŸoL; /kekZUrjL; vlEHkokr~] vlŸos p ,oaa lŸoL; vlEHkokr~ vlaxrfena
vgZra ere~* (Sµu. Bh. 2.2.23). For same reason, this khyåti is also irrational.
Therefore sadasadbhyam anirvacan∂yatva - ambiguity in the description of
existence or non-existence - is a meaningless imagination born out of the mixing
up of right and wrong knowledge; it is not the knowledge of an existent object. If
the silver seen in the shell is of a third variety which is neither existent nor non-

a
existent, then its determination requires a seventh pramåƒa (other than the six

k
available pramåƒas). For an existent object, its existence is fixed by one of the five
pramåƒas - direct perception, inference, analogy, presumption or ‹ruti and that which

aja
is not not an object for any of these five pramåƒas is deemed to be non-existent -
^miyfCék y{k.k izkIrL; vuqiyCéks% vHkko% olRoUrjL;* (Sµu. Bh. 2.2.17).
For some people, there is another pramåƒa which determines the non-existence
r
of a thing - the anupalabdhi pramåƒa. Agreeing on this, there are a total of six pramåƒas,
riv
five for existence and one for non-existence. This ambiguous silver being neither,
its existence can be fixed only by a seventh pramåƒa. But it is not right to search for
a pramåƒa to decide the existence of an imagined object. ^u v;a lkékq% vé;olk;% ;r%
Pa

izek.kizo`Ÿ;izo`fŸkiwoZdkS laHkoklaHkokS voékk;Zsrs u iqu% laHkoklaHkoiwfoZdÍ izek.kizo`Ÿ;izo`Ÿkh* - Such a

decision is not proper because it is through the functioning or non-functioning of a
pramåƒa that the existence or non-existence of an object is established and not vice-
versa, i.e. from existence or non-existence the functioning or non-functioning of a
ha

pramåƒa is to be decided (Sµu. Bh. 2.2.28).

ëThere is no need for a seventh pramåƒa; the existence of this ambiguous silver
is established through direct perception, inference, presumption and ‹ruti alsoí, he
Ma

thus continues with his obstinate claim.

ëThis is wrong because, these pramåƒas are applicable only to things which
exist. If they were applicable to even objects which are neither existing nor non-
existing, who will have faith in these pramåƒas? Moreover, when the existence of an
object is proved through one pramåƒa, one does not look for another pramåƒa to
prove it. Your saying that all the four pramåƒas can prove its existence shows that
you yourself have doubts about its existence.*
*But Naiyayikas (logicians) say that there could be several pramåƒas for the same
object; they are therefore called pramåƒa samplavavådis.
 23

ëFor you, there is another question: you say that the jagat, superimposed on
the pratyagåtman is sadasadbhyåm anirvacan∂ya. Conversely, when the pratyagåtman is
superimposed on the jagat, is he also sadasadbhyåm anirvacan∂ya? Is pratyagåtman
also subject to the ambiguity whether he exists or does not exist? Such imaginations
are absurd.'*
Objection: ëIt is well known that the jagat is tatvånyatvåbhyam anirvacan∂ya
(Sµu.Bh.2.1.27). Here tat is sat and anyat is asat.Therefore, if we say we have not said

a
anything new, then?í

k
Answer: Tatvånyatvåbhyåm anirvacan∂yatwa propounded by Bhå¶yakåra is in
no way related to the sadasadbhyam anirvacan∂yatwa propounded by you. It is entirely

aja
different. In Bhå¶yakåraís kårya-kåraƒa- ananyatva (the non-difference between effect
and cause) tat represents the upådåna kåraƒa (the material cause) while anyat refers
to its kårya (effect). Ananyatva (non-difference) is the relation between the two ^dk;ZL;

r
dkj.kkReRoa u rq dkj.kL; dk;kZReRoe~* & Effect is not different from cause but cause is different
riv
from effect (Sµu. Bh. 2.1.19). This kårya is not asat like the silver seen in the shell; it is
only anæta; that is, subject to change; it is vyavahårayogya (capable of transacting)
and even when its form is changing it is ananya from its non-changing (satya) cause.
Pa

That is why at any one moment there are two ways of viewing the same object:
from the point of view of the cause and from point of view of the effect. From the
causal point of view, a pot is unchanging-satya, i.e. it is nothing but clay only. From
the point of view of effect it is anæta (changing) pot. That is why Bhå¶yakåra has
ha

called the kårya pot tatvånyatvåbhyam anirvacan∂ya ^rŸokU;Rofu:i.kL; v'kD;Roe~* -

meaning thereby that there is ambiguity in expressing whether it is tatva or anyatva
(different from tatva). But there is no cause-effect relationship between shell and
Ma

*(Doubt): ëIn the G∂tå (13.12), it is said that Brahman cannot be described as either
existing or non-existing - u lŸkUuklnqP;rs. How is this to be understood in terms of the
above discussion? (Answer): In the shell-silver issue, it is a matter of pratyak¶a - in wrong
understanding it is silver and in correct understanding it is shell. But Brahman is a matter
for ‹ruti only and not any other pramåƒa. However, its import can be understood by
reflecting on pråj¤a experienced in su¶upti. His existence cannot be conveyed through
any word representing some category (jåti), action (kriyå), quality (guƒa) or connection
(sambandha). However, his existence cannot be denied because it is oneís own Self. So, in
this sense, it is either sat nor asat.
24

silver. The silver seen in the shell cannot be made into different types of ornaments,
i.e., it is not vyavahåra-yogya. A fool running to pick up that silver does not bestow
on it vyavahåra-yogyata. ^dk;± f=k"kq dkys"kq lŸoa u O;fHkpjfr* - Karya in all the three times
never ceases to exist (Sµu. Bh. 2.1.16). But the silver seen in the shell never existed. If
it did not exist even while seen in the shell, then, when else could it have existed?

15. keâLeb Hegve: HeÇlÙeieelceefve DeefJe<eÙes DeOÙeemees efJe<eÙe leæcee&Ceeced? meJees& efn HegjesÓJeefmLeles

a
efJe<eÙes efJe<eÙeevlejceOÙemÙeefle~ Ùeg<celed HeÇlÙeÙeeHeslemÙe Ûe HeÇlÙeieelceefve DeefJe<eÙelJeb yeÇJeeref<e?

k
15. ëIf so, how can there be adhyåsa of an observable or its features on the
inner Self which is not an observable? All do adhyåsa of an observable on

aja
another observable perceived in front. You also assert unobservability of the
Self.í
(15.1) Earlier, after defining adhyåsa, its feature was described as ëthe dharma of
r
one superimposed on anotherí. Two examples were given, one for each of the two
riv
adhyåsas. But when these examples are used to explain the adhyåsa of the k¶etra on
k¶etraj¤a, then two objections are raised: In the shell-silver example, both shell and
silver are pratyak¶a. Therefore, while seeing the shell, the adhyåsa of silver on it is
Pa

possible. But the pratyagåtman pråj¤a, unlike the shell, is not available for pratyak¶a.
Therefore, the adhyåsa of k¶etra on k¶etraj¤a is not possible. This is the first objection.
The second objection is as follows: The pratyagåtman is not a vi¶aya but only the
vi¶ayi. He is unrelated to all vi¶ayas. Therefore, adhyåsa is not possible.
ha

16. GÛÙeles~ ve leeJeled Skeâevlesve DeefJe<eÙe: DemcelHeÇlÙeÙeefJe<eÙelJeeled DeHejes#elJeeÛÛe

HeÇlÙeieelceHeÇefmeæs:~
Ma

16. The reply is - Not unobservable as a rule because, it is the well known
experience of everyone that he is an object of I-awareness.
(16.1) The siddhånti answers: The objection that because the pråj¤a is not a vi¶aya
and therefore adhyåsa is not possible, is taken up first. It is true that pråj¤a is the
vi¶ay∂ and not a vi¶aya - but not as a rule; because, pråj¤a is being known through ëI
- awarenessí. It is true that in su¶upti there is no awareness of any type. Therefore,
when anyone is asked, ëHow were you in su¶upti?í He would only say ëI do not
knowí. Indra also said: ^ukg [kYo;esoa lEizR;kRekua tkukfr v;e~ vge~ vfLe bfr uks ,oekfu HkwrkfuA
 25

fouk'ke~ ,o vihrks HkofrA ukge=k HkksX;a i';kfe* - At that time he does not know himself nor
other things. He gets destroyed. I do not see anything useful here (Cå. 8.11.1). Indra
is very intelligent. Therefore, he said to Prajåpati: ëHe is not understanding anythingí
etc., making pråj¤a an object. But ordinary people say, ëI did not know anythingí,
making pråj¤a an object non-different from oneself. That is, the pråj¤a who is not an
object for ëI-awareness', is made an object of ëI-awarenessí.Thus, pråj¤a for the very
intelligent is knowable only, but for the unintelligent, he is the knower and also a

a
knowable. Irrespective of the fact that one is intelligent or not, the pråj¤a is in the
immediate awareness of both. He is aparok¶a, i.e., neither directly perceived as an

k
object nor indirectly conjectured; but well known as the inside Self.

aja
(16.2) Question: How can pråj¤a, who is the knower, become a known?
Answer: The j∂va does not know the pråj¤a clearly though he is himself. J∂va
identifies himself as the knower only through his activity of knowing during

r
wakefulness or dreams and enjoys material pleasures or their memories
riv
respectively. In su¶upti, there is neither the activity of knowing nor the activity of
enjoying. Therefore, he gets the feeling that he does not exist or is destroyed.
Actually, knowership in the absence of the activity of knowing and being blissfully
Pa

happy in the absence of the activity of enjoyment are his natures. Not knowing
this, and accustomed to his adhyåsa in the buddhi, he grasps himself negatively in
su¶upti through non-action saying ëI did not know anything. I slept happilyí*.
An example for this is as follows: When a person loses his eyes, he will be
ha

seeing the loss of the eyes and the consequent loss of the activity of seeing. But due
to his habit of the superimposition of the eyes on himself he says: ëI am blind, I
cannot seeí. In the same way, when he is awake, he understands himself in su¶upti
Ma

negatively through inaction because of not knowing his inherent nature. As a result
of making himself a knowable object in this way, the adhyåsa of the body etc. on
himself is possible.

17. ve ÛeeÙeceefmle efveÙece: HegjesÓJeefmLele SJe efJe<eÙes efJe<eÙeevlejced DeOÙeefmeleJÙe-

efceefle~ DeHeÇlÙe#esÓefHe efn DeekeâeMes yeeuee: leueceefueveleeefo DeOÙemÙeefvle~
17. (And) there is no rule that an observable can be superimposed only on
*In this way he superimposes knowership and enjoyership on the pråj¤a, who is
actually neither knower nor enjoyer.
26

an observable perceived in front; children do adhyåsa of (a) surface and

impurity on the sky even though the sky is not perceived in front.
(17.1) Even if the adhi¶¢håna is not pratyak¶a, adhyåsa is possible. For example,
åkå‹a has no shape or colour; so, unlike the shell it is not pratyak¶a. Without any
upådhi (like air), åkå‹a is not an object for the ear also. Yet, ignorant people
superimpose on the åkå‹a a blue color and the shape of an inverted hemisphere. In
actuality, when dust, smoke etc. present in the åkå‹a scatter the sunlight, only then

a
does the predominant blue color become visible (Må. Kå. 3.8). Then, just like a

k
transparent crystal appears blue because of a blue flower in the background, this
scattered blue color makes the colourless åkå‹a seem blue. Ignorant people then

aja
understand the åkå‹a to be blue. This is adhyåsa because it is actually not blue.
Similarly, though the åkå‹a appears like an inverted hemisphere, it has actually no
shape. Therefore, that åkå‹a is like an inverted hemisphere is also adhyåsa only.

r
riv
18. SJeced DeefJe®æ: HeÇlÙeieelcevÙeefHe DeveelceeOÙeeme:~
18. In this way, there is no contradiction in the adhyåsa of the non-Self on
the inner-Self.
Pa

(18.1) Two objections had been raised about adhyåsa on the pratyagåtman. They
are: That pratyagåtman is not a vi¶aya and that he is not pratyak¶aóand so adhyåsa is
not possible. After refuting them, it was proved that the adhyåsa of anåtman in pråj¤a
is possible. Here, anåtman means the k¶etra of body etc, distinctly different from the
ha

pråj¤a.

19. lecesleced SJeb ue#eCeb DeOÙeemeb Hebef[lee DeefJeÅesefle cevÙevles~ leefÉJeskesâve Ûe

Ma

JemlegmJe¤HeeJeOeejCeb efJeÅeeceeng:~ le$e SJeb meefle Ùe$e ÙeoOÙeeme: lelke=âlesve oes<esCe iegCesve Jee
DeCegcee$esCeeefHe me ve mebyeOÙeles~
19. Scholars consider adhyåsa of this nature as avidyå. Recognition of its
distinctiveness and the determination of the nature of that thingóthey call as
vidyå. This being so, where there is adhyåsa of one on another, even an iota of
the good or the bad of the one does not stick to the other.
(19.1) The aj¤åna of the shell is the cause of the adhyåsa of silver in it. In the
same way, it is the aj¤åna of the adhi¶¢håna which is the cause of adhyåsa anywhere.
 27

Adhyåsa is the effect of this aj¤åna. But here adhyåsa itself is called avidyå. How is it
possible? It is like this: Just as an act of madness is also called madness, many
times a kårya is often given the name of its kåraƒa. It is in this sense that adhyåsa has
been called avidyå here. However, when it is said that avidyå is the kåraƒa of adhyåsa,
it does not mean that it is the nimitta or upadåna; the word kårana is used in the sense
of reason. Because of the reason that the inherent nature of the adhi¶¢håna is unknown,
one wrongly understands it on the basis of some similarity. Not knowing the

a
inherent nature of the adhi¶¢håna is aj¤åna - the absence of the knowledge of its
inherent nature. This aj¤åna is lost with the knowledge of the adhi¶¢håna; with this

k
the adhyåsa is also lost. Bhå¶yakåra conveys this as follows: ^;fn KkukHkko% ;fn la'k;Kkua

aja
;fn foijhrKkua ok mP;rs vKkue~ bfr] lo± fg rr~ Kkusu ,o fuoR;Zrs* - Whether it is the absence of
j¤åna, or doubtful j¤åna, or wrong j¤åna, whichever of these is called aj¤åna, all of
them are destroyed by j¤åna only (Br Bh 3.3.1). Here j¤ånåbhåva is the literal meaning
of the word aj¤åna, that it is j¤åna-virodh∂ is its intended meaning. Further, aj¤åna
r
and avidyå are one and the same. ^Hkko izfr;ksxh fg vHkko%* - Vidyå pratiyogi is avidyåí
riv
(Taittriya Bhå¶ya Introduction).
(19.2) Next, determination of the swarµupa of the object is vidyå. Now which is
the object spoken of here? That which is the adhi¶¢håna for adhyåsa. In the first adhyåsa,
Pa

pråj¤a is the adhi¶¢håna, in the reverse adhyåsa, jagat is the adhi¶¢håna. Both these are
the same Åtman. He is the object whose swarµupa is to be known to get rid of adhyåsa.
Jagat and pråj¤a i.e. k¶etra and k¶etraj¤a, are both two forms of this same Åtman.
These forms are not superimposed by the k¶teraj¤a on the åtman; it is impossible for
ha

the j∂va to do adhyåsa in Åtman. This will be discussed later (section 25.1). These
two are forms willingly taken up by Åtman for the bhoga and apavarga of k¶etraj¤a.
K¶etra is kårya-rµupa, while k¶etraj¤a is akårya-rµupa. Just as clay appears in the form of
Ma

pots etc, Åtman manifesting through forms is k¶etra. Just as clay continues to be
clay though appearing in the form of pots etc, k¶etra continues to be Åtman though
appearing with forms.
Further, k¶etraj¤a is the manifestation of Åtman, conditioned by the upådhi of
pråƒa. Just as the crystal continues to be transparent though appearing as coloured
because of the upådhi of a flower, k¶etraj¤a is indeed nirupådhik-åtman, though
appearing otherwise in association with upådhi. This k¶etraj¤a has done the adhyåsa
of the distinctly different k¶etra on himself, due to avidyå. This is clearly visible in
his activities during jågrat and swapna. In su¶upti there is no adhyåsa because there is
28

no connection of the k¶etraj¤a with the k¶etra. ^lq"kqIrdkys Losu vkReuk lrk laiUu% lu~ lE;d~
izlhnrhfr tkxzRLoIu;ks%fo"k;sfUnz;la;ksxtkra dkyq";a tgkfr* & During su¶upti (the j∂va) is totally
contented because he is merged in his own sad-åtman. Therefore, he is free from all
faults which appear in jågrat and swapna due to his association with vi¶aya and
indriyas (Cå. Bh. 8.3.4). However, the absence of the vidyå that he is Åtman remains.
For obtaining the j¤åna of Åtman, this is the only obstruction. ^rŸo vizfrcks/kek=keso fg
chta izkKRos fufeŸke~* - The only reason for pråj¤atva is the ignorance of tattva (Må. Kå.

a
Bh. 1.11). The moment he understands that he is Åtman through ‹ravaƒa, manana
and nididhysåna of ‹åstra sentences, his pråj¤atva is also lost. This is the vidyå of

k
vastu-swarµupa-avadhåraƒa discussed here.

aja
Question: Is not agrahaƒa (absence of vidyå), a k¶etradharma? How can there be
agrahaƒa in the k¶etraj¤a who is not at all connected with the k¶etra?
Answer: ^vxzg.kla'k; foijhrizR;;k% lfufeŸkk% dj.kL;So dL;fpn~ Hkforqe~ vgZfUr] u Kkrq% {ks=kKL;* -

r
The pratyayås of lack of knowledge, wrong knowledge and doubtful knowledge
riv
are all dharmas of some karaƒas only and not of k¶etraj¤a. Not only this. The
vidyåpratyaya which is the destroyer of all these three types of avidyå, is also a dharma
of the k¶etra (G. Bh. 2.21), because it is obtained only through the mind ^eulSokuqnz"VO;e~*
Pa

(Br.Bh. 4.4.16).
Objection: ëëNo. Avidyå is of k¶etraj¤a. Since he is the j¤åta of vidyå, avidyå has to
be his. For example, when one is unable to see an object in front, he understands
that he is blind. Similarly, k¶etraj¤a who is in grief is the one who is having avidyå.î
ha

Clarification: It is not like that because, the cause for not seeing the object
could be different. If the knower is to be decided as blind when an object in front is
not being seen, the connection of the knower with the object is to be determined by
Ma

the knower himself. It cannot be determined by some other knower. When he is

engaged in looking at the object, he cannot simultaneously determine his connection
with it also. So, it is not possible to conclude that the knower is blind. If he wants to
infer his blindness he must simultaneously engage himself in looking at the eye
and his own connection with it. This is again not possible. So, he has to take the
next steps of simultaneously engaging himself in seeing the mind and his connection
with it, the buddhi and his connection with it and so on. This is an endless regression.
To avoid it, he has to concede that he is always the seer and the cause for not seeing
the object lies somewhere only in the k¶etra. Nevertheless, as long as adhyåsa is
present in his jågrat and swapna, agrahaƒa in k¶etraj¤a is accepted. (G.Bh. 13.2)
 29

(19.3) Next point we note is this: Just as the shell remains undefiled by the
adhyåsa of silver in it, the anåtmanís adhyåsa does not bring about even a tinge of
defilement in the swarµupa of pratyagåtman. That is, the faults of anætatva, jaŒatva and
parichinatva of the anåtman do not even touch the pratyagåtman. Similarly, in the
reverse case, the adhyåsa of the dharmas of the pratyagåtman on the anåtmabuddhi and
outside objects does not bring åtmatva in them. That is, the ånandamayatva and j¤åtæva
of the pratyagåtman are not acquired by them.

a
20. lecesleced DeefJeÅeeKÙeced DeelceeveelceveesefjlejslejeOÙeemeb Hegjmke=âlÙe meJex HeÇceeCeHeÇcesÙe

k
JÙeJeneje ueewefkeâkeâe Jewefokeâe§e izo`Ÿkk:~ meJee&efCe Ûe MeeŒeeefCe efJeefOeHeÇefle<esOecees#eHejeefCe~

aja
keâLeb Hegve: DeefJeÅeeJeefÉ<eÙeeefCe HeÇlÙe#eeoerevf e HeÇceeCeeefve MeeŒeeefCe Ûe Fefle? GÛÙeles~ osnes vf õÙeeefo<eg
Denb ceceeefYeceeve jefnlemÙe HeÇceele=lJeevegHeHeòeew HeÇceeCeHeÇJe=òÙevegHeHeòes:~ ve efn FefvõÙeeefCe
DevegHeeoeÙe HeÇlÙe#eeefoJÙeJenej: mebYeJeefle~ ve Ûe DeefOe<"evecevlejsCe FefvõÙeeCeeb JÙeJenej:
r
riv
mebYeJeefle~ ve Ûe DeveOÙemleelceYeeJesve osnsve keâef§eled JÙeeefHeÇÙeles~ ve Ûe Sleefmceved meJe&efmceved
Demeefle DemebiemÙe Deelceve: HeÇceele=lJecegHeHeÅeles~ ve Ûe HeÇceele=lJecevlejsCe HeÇceeCe-HeÇJe=efòejefmle~
lemceeled DeefJeÅeeJeefÉ<eÙeeCÙesJe HeÇlÙe#eeoerefve HeÇceeCeeefve MeeŒeeefCe Ûe~
Pa

20. All worldly and Vedic activities involving the valid means of
knowledge (pramåƒa) and the corresponding objects (prameya) are indulged
only presupposing this mutual superimposition called avidyå; so also the
‹åstras - scriptures - dealing with injunction (vidhi), prohibition (ni¶edha) and
ha

emanicipation (mok¶a). How again, pramåƒas like pratyak¶aódirect perception

etc. and ‹åstras are matters applicable (only) to one with avidyå?í We say:
Ma

pramåƒas do not work in the case of one who cannot have knowership, because
of the lack of conceit of ëIí and ëmineí in the body, in the sense organs etc.
Activity of direct perception etc. is not possible without employing the sense
organs. Sense organs cannot function without the body. (Therefore) no one
without adhyåsa (in them) can function through the body. When none of these
is present, the unattached Åtman cannot become a knower. Without the
knower, the pramåƒa cannot function. Therefore, pramåƒas such as direct
perception etc. and the ‹åstra are matters related only to one with avidyå.
30

20.1 The purpose of this section is to show that all vyavahåra takes place only
on the basis of adhyåsa. Adhyåsa of what on whom? ^vkRekukReuks% brjsrjk/;kl%* - of the
Åtman on the anåtman and converselyí. Here it is very clear that the Åtman is k¶etraj¤a
and the anåtman is k¶etra. ^vkRe'kCnL; fu#iinL; izR;xkRefu xokfn 'kCnor~ fu:<Rokr~* & Like
the word cow etc, the word Åtman without any prefix refers only to pratyagåtmaní
(Cå. Bh. 6.8.7). In phrases like Åtma-anåtma viveka etc the same rule applies. The
literal meaning of Åtman without a prefix cannot refer to the ›uddhåtman because,

a
being sarvåtman there is nothing like anåtman for him. Every vyavahåra, is meant for
hånaói.e. rejecting something disliked or upådånaóobtaining something which is

k
liked. One who does not have such desires, will not be engaging himself in any

aja
vyavahåra. Before starting a vyavahåra, one has to first decide through pramåƒa what
is heya (that which is to be rejected) and upådeya (to be accepted). The one who
takes decision about the prameya on the basis of the pramåƒa is called the pramåta.
Pramåtætva (sense of being the pramåta) is born out of adhyåsa only. How? In this
r
way: The one who does adhyåsa of karaƒakriya (activity of the karaƒas like eyes, ears
riv
mind etc) on himself is the pramåta who says ëI saw, I heard, I decidedí etc. That is,
only one who has abhimåna (attachment to the body, senses and buddhi) can alone
become the pramåta. The k¶etraj¤aís abhimåna in the k¶etra is adhyåsaóthe union of
Pa

k¶etra and k¶etraj¤a. This is the basis of all vyavahåra. That is why all vyavahåra is
avidyaka (due to avidya). Therefore, they are only for the ignorant. Later, by comparing
with the behavior of beasts, that the vyavahåra of human beings is also avidyaka is
reinforced.*
ha

21. HeMJeeefoefYe§e DeefJeMes<eeled~ ÙeLee efn HeMJeeoÙe: MeyoeefoefYe: ßees$eeoerveeb

Ma

mebyevOes meefle Meyoeefo efJe%eeves HeÇefleketâues peeles lelees efveJele&vles, Devegketâues Ûe HeÇJele&vles~ ÙeLee
ob[esÅelekeâjb Heg®<eced DeefYecegKecegHeueYÙe ceeb nvlegceÙeefceÛÚefle Fefle HeueeefÙelegceejYevles~ nefjlele=Ce
HetCe&HeeefCecegHeueYÙe leb HeÇefle DeefYecegKeer YeJeefvle~ SJeb Heg®<ee DeefHe JÙeglHeVeefÛeòee: ›etâjÂ<šerved
Dee›eâesMele: Ke[dieesÅelekeâjeved yeueJele: GHeueYÙe lelees efveJele&vles, leefÉHejerleeved HeÇefle HeÇJele&vles~
Dele: meceeve: HeMJeeefoefYe: Heg®<eeCeeb HeÇceeCeHeÇcesÙe JÙeJenej:~ HeMJeeoerveeb Ûe HeÇefmeæ:

*In this paragraph of the Bhå¶ya, the meaning of the word vyutpanna-cittå¨ is
ëintelligent people with discriminating abilityí and not j¤ån∂s - as some say ñ because of
their similarily with beasts in their behavioral pattern.
 31

DeefJeJeskeâHegjmmej: HeÇlÙe#eeefo JÙeJenej:~ lelmeeceevÙeoMe&veeled JÙeglHeefòeceleeceefHe Heg®<eeCeeb

HeÇlÙe#eeefo JÙeJenej: lelkeâeue: meceeve: Fefle efve§eerÙeles~
21. Also because not being different from beasts etc. Just like when the
ears etc. come into contact with sound etc. if the cognition of sound etc. is
unfavourable they withdraw from it and if the sound is favorable they proceed
towards it, just as (when) they see a man with a raised stick in hand they run

a
away thinking ëhe desires to kill meí, but approach him when they see him

k
with his hand full of green grass. In the same way, men - even the intelligent -
recede in the presence of shouting sturdy (people) of fierce looks with raised

aja
swords, but approach men of opposite nature. Therefore, the pramåƒa-prameya
activity of men is the same as that of the beasts. It is well-known that the
activity of beasts with regard to direct perception etc, is without discrimination.
r
Because of this apparent similarity, it can be concluded that during the activity
riv
of pratyak¶a etc of even wise people, the vyavahåra is the same.
(21.1) Question: If all vyavahåra is due to avidyå, how to explain the vyavahåra
Pa

that is seen in a j¤åni?

Answer: It happens through prakæti and not due to avidyå. ^iz—fr% p f=kxq.kkfRedk
loZdk;Zdj.k fo"k;kdkjs.k ifj.krk iq#"kL; HkksxkioxkZFkZdrZO;r;k nsgsfUÊ;k|kdkjs.k lagU;rs* - The prakæti
of three guƒas modifies into the shapes of all the kårya, karaƒa and objects and
ha

manifests as the body, indriyas etc for manís worldly enjoyment and mok¶a (G. Bh.
Introduction to 13th Chapter). ^;fn rkor~ HkkSfrdkfu dj.kkfu rr% HkwrksRifŸk izy;kH;ke~ ,o ,"kke~
mRifŸkizy;kS Hkor%* - The physical karaƒas of the body are created along with the creation
Ma

of the other objects (Sµu. Bh 2.3.15). Some people say that the karaƒas are made of
tanmåtras. This is not correct. The tanmåtras belong to prakæti, while the karaƒas are
products of the trivætkæta vikæti. ëKaraƒa and vi¶aya belong to same category, not to
different categoriesí (Br. Bh. 2.4.11). That is why the karaƒas interact only with their
respective vi¶ayas. When the anæta rµupa and the anæta netra come in contact, the anæta
pratyaya of the rµupa is born in anæta buddhi. The pratyayas of ‹abda etc are also born in
the same way. This is an activity of the prakæti, not of the pµuru¶a. Prakætistha puru¶a
i.e. one who thinks he is the prakæti, i.e. the one having avidyåóconsiders himself a
pramåta. But the j¤ån∂ understands that ^bfUÊ;kf.k bfUÊ;kZFks"kq orZUrs bfr ékkj;u~* & The indriyas
32

are interacting with their corresponding objects (G∂tå 3.28), and remains as a witness
for this action. This means that the vyavahåra in his body happens without his
doership. ^yksdO;ogkj lkekU;n'kZusu rq ykSfddÎ% vkjksfirdr`ZRos fHk{kkVuknkS deZf.k drkZ Hkofr LokuqHkosu
rq 'kkL=kizek.ktfursu vdrkZ ,o* - Since it appears as the vyavahåra of common people, in
their view, while roaming around for his bhik¶a, he too is a doer; But in his personal
realization brought about by the ‹åstra pramåƒa he is a non-doer only (G. Bh. 4.22).
21.2 In this way, prakæti is the cause for the execution of karma. Further, how the

a
motivation for starting an action is produced in his karaƒas is to be told. Motivation

k
to initiate karma is due to his prårabdha. ^'kjhjkjEHkdL; deZ.k% fu;rQyRokr~ lE;XKkuizkIrkS
vfi vo';EHkkfouh izo`fŸk% okƒ~eu%dk;kuke~ yCéko``Ÿks% deZ.k% cyh;LRokr~ eqDrs"okfn izo`fŸkor~* - The

aja
prårabdha that is the cause for the body, surely brings about its fruit even though
there is right knowledge and that is responsible for the motivation seen in his
speech, mind and body. This is because the karma is more powerful like a released
arrow (Br.Bh. 1.4.7).
r
riv
(21.3) Question: Since motivation is caused by avidyå, can it be said that there
is a remnant of avidyå in j¤ån∂?
Answer: It is not so. In the case of the j¤åni, the motivation occurs only in his
Pa

karaƒas; not in him. As long as the momentum of prårabdha exists - i.e., till the present
body falls offóthe vyavahåra, which is k¶etra dharma continues. Seeing this, if others
think that he may not have Åtma-j¤åna, it is meaningless. ^dFka fg ,dL; Lo‚n;izR;;a
cz„osnua nsgékkj.ka p vijs.k izfr{ksIrqa 'kD;sr\ JqfrLe`fr"kq p fLFkrizKy{k.kfunsZ'ksu ,rr~ ,o fu#P;rs* -
ha

How can some other person deny the coexistence of Brahman-realization with the
bodily activity which is his personal experience. It is precisely this situation that is
explained as the features of sthithapraj¤a in ‹rutis and smætis (Sµu. Bh. 4.1.15).
Ma

(21.4) In this way in vyavahåra, whether it is a j¤ån∂ or an aj¤ån∂, pravætti and

prakæti both are there. What is the contribution of each and how much? To decide
this we move forward. Pravætti is the cause for starting of any karma. But for the
karma to happen, prakæti is the cause. That is for the karma, pravætti is the nimitta
kåraƒa (essential cause) and prakæti is the upådåna kåraƒa (material cause). Avidyå
produces pravætti in the form ëI have to do this karmaí and, when the karma is over, it
generates kartætwa (doership) in the form ëI have done this karmaí. But during the
process when karma is being done avidyå is not be the cause, since any kårya takes
place because of prakæti. ^iz—rs% fÿ;ek.kkfu xq.kS% dekZf.k loZ'k%A vgÔkj foew<kRek drkZ vge~ bfr
 33

eU;rs* (G∂tå 3.27). Therefore, a sådhaka has to decide on the basis of the ‹åstras which
karma is worth doing ^rLekr~ 'kkL=ka izek.ka rs dk;kZdk;ZO;ofLFkrkS* (G∂tå16.24). Then for that
karma, he has to become only the nimitta (instrument to carry it out) ^fufeŸkek=ka Hko*
(G∂tå 11.33). He should not be attached to the fruits of the karma ^ek deZQygsrqHkZw%* (G∂tå
2.47). As a result of this he gains citta ‹uddhi (purity of mind, buddhi and citta) which
prepares the way for his obtaining vidyå.
(21.5) In this way both avidyå and prakæti are jointly responsible for any activity.

a
This combination, whether in the activity of j∂va or ∫‹wara, is called avidyå-lak¶aƒa

k
prakæti (G. Bh 5.14). Referring to ∫‹waraís activity of creation etc, it is also called
avidyå-sa≈yukta prakæti i.e. avidyå coupled with prakæti ^vfo|kla;qDre~ vO;Dre~* (G. Bh.

aja
7.4). ∫‹wara does not have pravætti because He has no avidyå. Therefore, ‹ruti says -
^vusu thosukReuk vuqizfo'; uke:is O;kdjokf.k* & I will create the names and forms by
entering into the j∂va-åtmaní (Cå. 6.3.2). Thus getting pravætti through j∂va, ∫‹wara
r
handles the activity of creation etc. This combination of j∂vaís avidyå with måyå is
riv
known as ∫‹waraís aha≈kåra. Incidentally, this demonstrates that avidyå and prakæti
are not synonymous.
By now it has been established that all worldly activities (vyavahåra) are based
Pa

on avidyå. But, the Vedic activities are of a different type; i.e. they are based on an
awareness that the k¶etraj¤a is different from the k¶etra. In the next section it is
demonstrated that though it is of a different type, even Vedic activities are based
on avidyå.
ha

22. MeeŒeerÙes leg JÙeJenejs ÙeÅeefHe yegefæHetJe&keâejer ve DeefJeefolJee Deelceve: Hejueeskeâ-

mebyebOeced DeefOeef›eâÙeles, leLeeefHe ve JesoevleJesÅeced DeMeveeÙeeÅeleerleced DeHesle yeÇÿe#e$eeefoYesoced
Ma

Demebmeejer DeelceleòJeced DeefOekeâejs DeHes#Ùeles~ DevegHeÙeesieeled DeefOekeâej efJejesOeeÛÛe~ HeÇekeäÛe

leLee YetleelceefJe%eeveeled HeÇJele&ceeveb MeeŒeced DeefJeÅeeJeefÉ<eÙelJeb veeefleJele&les~ leLee efn
‘‘yeÇeÿeCees Ùepesle'' FlÙeeoerefve MeeŒeeefCe Deelceefve JeCee&ßeceJeÙeesÓJemLeeefo efJeMes<eeOÙeemeced
DeeefßelÙe HeÇJele&vles~
22. It is true, that one who does not know that he can have contact with
other worlds, could get the eligibility to do scriptural activities intentionally.
Nevertheless, the eligibility does not require (the knowledge of) the essence
34

Åtman known only through Vedånta which transcends hunger etc, is free from
differentiations of Bråhmaƒa K¶atriya etc, free from birth and deathóbecause,
it is not useful and also opposed to the eligibility (for doing karma). ݌stras
which operate earlier to the knowledge of the Åtman, cannot be the topic of
one other than the ignorant. That is why ‹åstras like ëBråhmaƒa shall do yaj¤aí
etc proceeds on the basis of adhyåsa in the Åtman like caste, state of life, age,

a
condition etc.
(22.1) It is very clear that adhyåsa in the body is responsible for all worldly

k
activities because they are based on the desire for woman, home etc. But in Vedic

aja
activities it is not so; there is some difference. For activities prescribed by the ‹ruti
like Jyoti¶¢oma etc done with the desire of heaven etc and activities prescribed by
the smætis like ‹råddha, tarpaƒa etc done with desire of pitæ-loka etc, are based on the
faith that one is different from the body. This is a faith developed on the basis of
r
‹åstra. But, that one is different from the body is actually experienced in su¶upti.
riv
Just as adhyåsa continues after waking up inspite of the experience of su¶upti, it
continues even for him who is having this faith. For that matter, the desire for a
superior body which gives greater pleasure and comforts is the basis for performing
Pa

the activities prescribed by ‹ruti and smæti. With a resolution to obtain swarga etc
one does these activities intentionally. For such people, ‹åstras prescribe a karma
for each such desire. The competence for karma is prescribed like this - ^vFkhZ leFkksZ
fo}ku~ 'kkL=ks.k vfoi;qZnLr%* & One who is desirous of the fruit, capable of performing the
ha

karma, knows the correct procedures to be followed and one not prohibited by the
‹åstra, can perform that particular karma.
Therefore, karma is based on differences like oneís varƒa (bråhmaƒa etc), å‹rama
Ma

(brahmacarya etc), oneís age, situation etc. For example, a widower is not competent
to do many of these activities. A bråhmaƒa cannot do the Råjasµuya yaj¤a etc. Therefore,
Vedic karma is also based on avidyå, i.e. it is meant only for one who has avidyå.
Åtma-vidyå is not useful for karma. It is indeed even against karma. There is meaning
for karma till he has not understood that he is the Åtman, which is known only
through the Upani¶ads, which is free from the problems of the body like hunger
etc, above the differences of bråhmaƒa, k¶atriya etc and free from worldly life; not
after he has understood the Åtman. To grasp the meaning of these statements, it is
sufficient to remember the features of pråj¤a during su¶upti. He has no instruments,
 35

no coming and going and he is brimful of ånanda. How can he do karma? Why
would he do it? In this way, when one is becoming free from karma even by staying
in pråj¤atva, how is it possible to have any connection with karma, when one stays
in the Åtman who is såk¶i even for the pråj¤a. It is impossible.
(22.2) Next is about ni¶kåma karma. Karma done with desire strengthens adhyåsa;
conversely, karma done without desire helps to destroy adhyåsa. Karma done without
a desire to enjoy its fruit and done exclusively for pleasing ∫‹wara bestows the

a
grace of ∫‹wara which is absolutely necessary for Åtma-vidyå. From this results
vairågya. Later on, ‹åstras prescribe dhyåna karma as internal sådhana. Though ni¶kåma

k
karma and dhyåna both are karma, they purify the buddhi and facilitate the obtaining

aja
of knowledge. In this way, whatever the karma, it concerns only the one with avidyå;
not the one having vidyå.

23. DeOÙeemees veece Deleefmceved leôgefæ: FlÙeJeesÛeece~ leÅeLee Heg$eYeeÙee&efo<eg efJekeâues<eg

r
riv
mekeâues<eg Jee DencesJe efJekeâue: mekeâuees Jee Fefle yee¢e Oecee&ved Deelceefve DeOÙemÙeefle~ leLee
osnOecee&ved mLetueesÓnced ke=âMeesÓnced ieewjesÓnced efle<"eefce ieÛÚeefce uebIeÙeeefce Ûe Fefle~ leLee
FbefõÙeOecee&ved cetkeâ: keâeCe: keäueerye: yeefOej: DevOeesÓnced Fefle~ leLee Devle:keâjCe Oecee&ved
Pa

keâece mebkeâuHe efJeefÛeefkeâlmee DeOÙeJemeeÙeeoerved~ SJeced DenbHeÇlÙeefÙeveced DeMes<emJeHeÇÛeejmeeef#eefCe

HeÇlÙeieelceefve DeOÙemÙe leb Ûe HeÇlÙeieelceeveb meJe&meeef#eCeb leefÉHeÙe&ÙesCe Devle:keâjCeeefo<eg DeOÙemÙeefle~
23. We said that adhyåsa is the cognition as ëthatí which it is not. It is like:
ha

features of persons outside, like son, wife etc who are ill or well are
superimposed on himself (and he says) ëI am myself ill or wellí. Similarly, the
features of the body in ëI am fatí, ëI am leaní, ëI am fairí, ëI standí, ëI goí, ëI
Ma

jumpí. Similarly, the features of the senses in ëI am dumb, one-eyed, impotent,

deaf, blindí. Similarly, the features of the internal organ viz desire, resolve,
doubt, determination. In this way, imposes the ëconceited Ií on the inner Åtman
which is the witness of all his thoughts and in the reverse way, superimposes
the all-witnessing inner Åtman on the internal organs etc.
(23.1) {In this section, Bhå¶yakåra is pinpointing the adhyasta, the adhi¶¢håna
and the adhyåsaka in the adhyåsas of k¶etra in k¶etraj¤a and of k¶etraj¤a in k¶etra}.
Concluding the discussion on the adhyåsa which is done in pråj¤a, Bhå¶yakåra
36

describes its variety step by step starting from the outside son, wife etc, who literally
belong to the yu¶mat-pratyaya-gocara class, to the innermost anta¨karaƒa. ëWho is
doing this adhyåsa?í The aha≈-pratyayi. ëIn whom is he doing it?í In the pratyagåtman.
ëWho are these two (aha≈-pratyayi and pratyag-åtman)? People have imagined that
aha≈kåra is the aha≈-pratyayi and pratyag-åtman is the ›uddha-åtman. To justify their
imagina-tion, they are putting forward peculiar arguments. Obviously, they are
not agreeing with the sentences of the Bhå¶ya. So, their imaginations are plainly

a
wrong. Though it is true that the aham-pratyaya appears in the anta¨akaraƒa, the
latter cannot itself become the aha≈-pratyay∂ because it is jaŒa. ëThem who is the

k
aha≈-pratyay∂?íóAtasmin tadbuddhi¨ adhyåsa. ëThe buddhi of that which it is not is

aja
adhyåsaí. This is a mithyå pratyaya. It is born in the anta¨akaraƒa. Therefore, the
k¶etraj¤a who is having the upådhi of the anta¨karaƒa with this pratyaya is the aha≈-
pratyay∂. Since all these pratyayas are occurring in jagrat, he is the bahi¶praj¤a. It is he
who is doing adhyåsa. ëIn whom?í In the a‹e¶a-svapracåra-såk¶∂ pratyagåtman. ëWhat is
r
swapracåra?í Mithyå pratyayas are freely coming and going in the anta¨karaƒa. This
riv
free movement is pracåra. The aha≈-pratyayi considers the anta¨karaƒa to be himself.
Therefore, the bahi¶praj¤aís desire, volition and doubt is the swåpracaraóhis own
pracåra. To say that the pratyågatman, who is the såk¶∂ to this is Åtman, is not correct
Pa

because a witness needs something different from him which is to be witnessed.

But there is nothing different from the Åtman; everything is Åtman only. Therefore,
Åtman cannot be såk¶∂. Not only this; starting from the external son, wife etc. when
Bhå¶yakåra is telling in a sequence the body, the indriyas, the anta¨akaraƒa, and
ha

then pointing out that the pratyagåtman is the såk¶∂ for all these, then suddenly to
jump to the ›uddhåtman skipping the pråj¤a is not proper also. Pråj¤a is the såk¶∂ i.e.
the bahi¶praj¤a is doing adhyåsa of himself in the pråj¤a. ëHow is he doing it?í He
Ma

does it by saying: ëI am the knower. I am pråj¤a. But during su¶upti, there was no
anta¨karaƒa. Therefore, I did not know anything at that time.í If he had slept leaving
his connection with the karaƒas intentionally out of his own will, then pråj¤a could
have been the knower; but it is not so. The karaƒas, which cannot even touch pråj¤a,
have dropped out by themselves. Therefore, to ascribe knowership to pråj¤a is not
correct. ëThen, how does ‹åstra ascribe knowership to him?í Following the adhyåsa
done by the bahi¶praj¤a due to avidyå it tells so for the purpose of teaching. Pråj¤a is
indeed Åtman only; but avidyå is the only obstacle in obtaining this knowledge of
the oneness of Åtman. Due to avidyå, the knowership without the action of knowing
 37

is superimposed on pråj¤a. Had the bahi¶praj¤a analyzed using presumption

(arthåpatti) like this: ëKnower should obviously have j¤åna to know anything. Yet if
I did not know anything during su¶upti, what could be the reason? Is it the absence
of anta¨karaƒa or something else?í Then with the help of the ‹åstra, he would have
realized the oneness of Åtman beyond knowership. But how can the fool who sees
pleasure in adhyåsa have a peaceful mind necessary to do this higher thinking?

a
24. SJeced DeÙeced Deveeefojvevlees vewmeefie&keâes DeOÙeeme:efceLÙeeHeÇlÙeÙe¤He: keâle=l& JeYeesòeâ=lJe-

k
HeÇJele&keâ: mekeâueueeskeâHeÇlÙe#e:~ DemÙe DeveLe& nslees: HeÇneCeeÙe DeelcewkeâlJeefJeÅeeHeÇefleHeòeÙes
meJex Jesoevlee DeejYÙevles~ ÙeLee Ûe DeÙeceLe&: meJex<eeb Jesoevleeveeced, leLee JeÙeced DemÙeeb

aja
MeejerjkeâceerceebmeeÙeeb HeÇoMe&efÙe<Ùeece:~
24. In this way, the adhyaså of the nature of an illusory cognition which
has no beginning, no end, is natural, causing doership and enjoyership, is
r
directly noticed by all. It is for the destruction of this cause of all meaningless
riv
nonsense by providing the vidyå of the oneness of Åtman that all the Vedåntas
start off. That this is the purport of all the Vedåntas, we will demonstrate in
Pa

this ›år∂raka Mimå≈så.

(24.1) After having shown the swarµupa of adhyåsa, Bhå¶yakåra is now showing
the swarµupa of vidyå which destroys adhyåsa. Here adhyåsa is said to be beginningless.
ëHow?í analyzing oneís own experience of su¶upti the fault of adhyåsa is easily
ha

understood. Therefore, experience is the pramåƒa for adhyåsa. Karma is due to adhyåsa
and birth is because of karma. Therefore, the karma of the previous lives is the cause
of the present birth. The previous livesí karma is also due to adhyåsa. In this way,
Ma

however far one may go back, adhyåsa is seen to be present. Therefore, adhyåsa is
both known by pramåƒa and is also beginningless. It is also endless. ëHow is it
endless? Is it not destroyed by the vidyå of the oneness of Åtman?í Some people
answer this question by saying that endless means till one gets j¤åna. This is not
correct because it does not agree with the meaning of the word 'endless'. Even
though someone loses avidyå by vidyå, others still continue to have it. Therefore it
is endless.
ëWill adhyåsa not come to an end when everyone has obtained vidyå?í Such a
thing can never happen; because, the number of j∂vas is infinite - ^v;a oS n'k p lglzkf.k
38

cgwfu p vuUrkfu p] izkf.k HksnL; vkuUR;kr~* & He is himself ten, thousands, many, infinite;
because living beings are infinite (Br. Bh. 2.5.19). ^'kra lglze;qraU;cqZnela[;s;a LoefLeu~
fufo"Ve~* & Hundreds, thousands, lakhs, crores, infinite j∂vas are placed in him (Atharva
Sa≈hitå 10.8.24), says the ‹ruti. Therefore, though many j∂vas get liberated by vidyå,
the unliberated continue to exist. ëIf all j∂vas are liberated at once?í This is not
possible. Had it been possible, it would have already happened in the infinite
time that has already passed. Therefore, ∫‹wara will continue giving births to the

a
j∂vas with avidyå, who will always continue to be there in the world. This takes
place due to His måyå. Therefore, just as adhyåsa is beginningless and endless,

k
måyå too should be beginningless and endless.

aja
Naisargika means natural; because it is beginningless it has to be natural.
Sakala-loka pratyak¶a: This adhyåsa is pratyak¶a i.e., directly perceived because,
as already said, experience being the pramåƒa for adhyåsa, it is immediately
r
understood. This is not possible if ›uddhåtman is kept in place of pratyagåtman.
riv
Åtma-Ekåtva-Vidyå-Pratipatti¨: Adhyåsa is destroyed only with this. This is
because: Adhyåsa is the buddhi of that which it is not. Therefore, adhyåsa expects the
duality of ëthatí and ënot thatí. Here k¶etraj¤a is ëthatí and k¶etra is ënot thatí. In the
Pa

reverse adhyåsa these also get reversed. Since both these are previously seen things
(pµurva-d涢a) there is scope for adhyåsa. But not so in the case of ‹uddha-åtman. Both
ëthatí and ënot thatí are Åtman. ^xzg.kxzkgdkHkkla fo"kf;fo"k;kHkkla foKkuLifUnra LifUnrfeokfo|;k* &
Vij¤åna spandita is the manifestation of the knower and the known, i.e. the immovable
ha

Åtman himself appears as these two due to avidyå (Må.Kå.Bh.4.47). Therefore, one
who understands that he is Åtman has no duality. Therefore, there is no adhyåsa.
Therefore, there is no karma. Therefore, there is no birth. This Åtman who is
Ma

synonymous with mok¶a is to be understood only through the Upani¶ads. He is

Aupani¶ada Puru¶a. The beginning of Veda is karma k僌a, which addresses people
with adhyåsa. The end part of Veda, i.e., Vedånta are the Upani¶ads. These are
addressed to those who want to destroy their adhyåsa. Knowing that this Åtman is
oneself is mok¶a.
›år∂raka means the j∂va who has accepted the ‹årira i.e. the body as himself.
Mimå≈så means a sacred discussion. It is sacred because it is a discussion about
Brahman. The purport of ›år∂raka Mimå≈så is this: In the first two chapters known as
samanvaya and avirodha respectively, it is established that k¶etra is Brahman. In the
 39

third chapter entitled sådhana it is shown that k¶etraj¤a is also the same Brahman and
it also tells about upåsanås helpful in getting this knowledge. In the last chapter of
phala, the fruit and features of mok¶a are discussed.
(24.2) The steps taken by the ›år∂raka Mimå≈så to convey the knowledge of the
oneness of Åtman are as follows: Through a critical analysis of adhyåsa the k¶etraj¤a
is separated from the k¶etra. With this, the meaning of the word twam ëyouí in the
ultimate lesson Tat-twam-asi is determined to be the pratyagåtman who is pråj¤a. It is

a
everyoneís experience that pråj¤a does not know who he is. To make one realize
this fault is the first step.

k
Similarly, the essence of the jagat is to be taught, separating the k¶etra jagat

aja
from its features of change(anætatva), inertia (jaŒatva) and finiteness (parichinatva).
For this purpose, the ‹ruti gives the example of pot, clay etc to show the cause-
effect relationship between this essence and the jagat. The features of change etc

r
are seen in jagat through the forms which are mere wordsóvåcårambhaƒa. These
riv
forms are an effect, and their cause can only be determined through themselves;
there is no other way. What are the features of the cause? There are no features of
the effect in the cause. To get the knowledge of the cause, it is not possible to
Pa

destroy the effect nor is it meaningful to say that one should wait till it gets
destroyed on its own. Therefore, even when the effect is visible the cause hidden
in it has to be separated from the features of the effect. What is meant by ëseparating
it?í
ha

It means that through the ‹ruti pramåƒa one has to understand that the visible
form should also be the cause itself; otherwise it cannot come into existence at all -
^dk;kZdkjksøfi dkj.kL; vkReHkwr ,o vukReHkwrL; vukjH;Rokr~* (Sµu. Bh. 2.1.18). This is the non-
Ma

difference of cause and effect. The asymmetry in this law has to be noted. Namely
^vuU;Rosøfi dk;Zdkj.k;ks% dk;ZL; dkj.kkReRoa] u rq dkj.kL; dk;kZReRoe~* - Though non-difference
of effect-cause is told, effect is of the form of cause, but the cause is not of the form
of the effect (Sµu. Bh. 2.1.9). This understanding comes from paramårthad涢i, i.e.
recognizing the effect as nothing but the cause. The moment this understanding is
obtained, one will understand that k¶etra is nothing but its upådåna Brahman even
though the indriyas experience the features of change etc in k¶etra. The meaning of
the word ëtatí in the great sentence tat twa≈ asi is this Brahman. Though pots are
many, they are all one and the same clay, ^cz„Sosna fo'oe~* - The whole world is Brahman
40

only (Mu 2.2.12). This Brahman, contrary to the effect, is satyam, j¤ånam and anantam.
After this is determined, one has to realize ^rŸoefl* - You are that (Cå. 6.8.7) through
nididhyåsana. This realization of oneness of Åtman is vidyå ^ck·kdkj& Hksncqfºfuo`fŸkjso
vkReLo:ikoyEcu dkj.ke~* - Taking support of the swarµupa of the Åtman, the sense of
difference is lost even when seeing the outside forms (G. Bh. 18.50). It is precisely
this sarvåtmabhåvaóI am everythingóthat is mok¶a (Br. 4.3.21).
Additional Comments on the Adhyåsa Bhå¶ya

a
(25.1) After this commentary on the Adhyåsa Bhå¶ya, some additional comments

k
have to be made. The asmat-pratyaya-gocara pratyagåtman told in Adhyåsa Bhå¶ya

aja
cannot be the fourth ›uddhåtman, i.e. he is not the pratyagåtman who is in the
experience of the aj¤ån∂. The reason is as follows: ^lksøUosëO;% l foftKkflrO;%* - He is to
be sought after, to be discussed (Cå. 8.7.1). Therefore, he is not pµurva-d涢a, i.e. not
seen earlier. Therefore, he cannot be recalled by memory, hence he cannot be smæti-
r
rµupa. ^vkReSosna loZe~* & All this is Åtman (Cå. 7.25.2). Therefore, there is nothing other
riv
than Him. Hence, the sentence defining adhyåsa namely smæti-rµupa paratra pµurvad涢a
avabhåsa ^Le`fr:i% ij=k iwoZn`ëkoHkkl%* - The appearance elsewhere of a recollected form
of a thing seen before is not applicable to ›uddhåtman. The ›uddhåtman is invisible,
Pa

actionless, ungraspable, featureless, unthinkable, indescribable (Må. 7), i.e. He is

without any dharma. Therefore, the sentence that ëadhyåsa is seeing the dharma of
one in anotherí anyatra anya dharma avabhåsana is also not applicable to ›uddhåtman.
As a rule, He is vi¶ay∂ and never vi¶aya . He never becomes vi¶aya for anybody. ^;% rq
ha

vkRe'kCnL; bfrij% iz;ksx% l vkRe'kCnizR;;ks% vkRerŸoL; ijekFkZrksøfo"k;RoKkiukFkZ%* - The use of

the suffix ëitií for the word Åtman is intended to remind that really either the word
Åtman or the åtma-pratyaya cannot represent an object (Br. Bh. 1.4.7). One who is not
Ma

an object even for a j¤ån∂, how can He become an object of ëIóawarenessí for the
aj¤ån∂?
Question: 'Due to adhyåsa, can he not become an object for ëIóawarenessí?í
Answer: No. For adhyåsa, såmånya j¤åna - just the elementary knowledge of the
existence of the adhi¶¢håna, is necessary. Aj¤ån∂ does not have even that. This is the
unobservability (avi¶ayatva)of the Åtman. On the contrary, that everyone has this
elementary knowledge of the existence of pråj¤a is a common experience. Therefore,
only he is asmat pratyaya gocara (object for 'Ióawareness'). On the other hand, the
Åtman is his witness. Bhå¶yakåra has said this directly as follows: ^uuq vkRek
 41

vgaizR;;fo"k;Rokr~ mifu"kRlq ,o foKk;rs bfr vuqiiUue~\ u_ rr~ lkf{kRosu izR;qDrRokr~* - Since Åtman
is an object for ëIóawarenessí how is it right to say that He is understood only
through the Upani¶ads? Not like that. Because, He is witness even for him (Sµu. Bh
1.1.4). In this way, the unobservable (avi¶aya)Åtman is as a rule of the nature of
light; if He were an vi¶aya He would be of the nature of darkness.
Further, since He is the fourth ^,dkReizR;;lkj%* - ekåtma-pratyaya-såra (Må. 7) He
can never be pratyaya gocara. Though the fourth Åtman is pratyagåtman also, He is

a
not in the experience of the ignorant people. Therefore ^izR;xkReizflºs%* - pratyagåtma-

k
prasidde¨ the well-known pratyagåtmaní does not apply to Him. Not only that, He is
not only pratyagåtman; He is sarvåtman, He is everywhere. One easily understands

aja
when one is told that pråj¤a is not at all related to the body etc, though one is doing
adhyåsa in the wakeful state. Therefore, adhyåsa is obviously known to everybody.
But if we make the statement that ëadhyåsa has occurred in Åtmaní, it can never be
understood by anybody. Therefore, such adhyåsa is not sakala-loka-pætayak¶a. Hence,
r
riv
this statement does not motivate the seeker to destroy adhyåsa; it remains only as
the imagination of the person saying it. Not only this, in the adhyåsa made in the
reverse direction, the body is the adhi¶¢håna and the pratyagåtman is the adhyåsta. If
Pa

this pratyagåtman is the fourth Åtman there can be no adhyåsa of His dharmas on the
body etc; because He is without any dharma. ëCanít His j¤åna and ånanda be
superimposedí? Impossible. They are His swarµupa, not dharmas which an aj¤ån∂ can
see.
ha

(25.2) In this way, after demonstrating that it is not possible to take the fourth
Åtman in place of pratyagåtman, it is necessary also to discuss what havoc has been
wrecked on the siddhånta by doing so. With the assumption of ›uddhåtman in the
place of pratyagåtman, whatever is adhyasta becomes asat - non existent. If this is
Ma

agreed upon, only buddhi, indriyas, body, son, wife etc. being adhyasta in the case of
pråj¤a, only that many become non-existent; however the rest of the world like sun,
moon etc., which are not adhyasta could be saved from going non existent. But in
the case of ›uddhåtman it is not so. Saying that ›uddhåtman is the adhi¶¢håna and the
whole world is adhyasta in Him, they assert that the whole world is non-existent. If
one asks, ëHow can it be non existent when it is being known through the indriyas?í
They say, ëJust as the serpent seen in the rope is non existent, the world
superimposed in Åtman also is non existent (asat). Therefore, in hundreds of places
Bhå¶yakåra has referred to the jagat as mithyå, imagined due to avidyå (avidyå-kalpita).
42

This is plainly wrong because, taking the same analogy of rope and snake,
Bhå¶yakåra has explained that the jagat is not asat: - ^rnS{kr cgqL;ka iztk;s;sfr* & That
(Brahman) thought of becoming many and being born. Commenting on this ‹ruti
sentence he has saidó^;Fkk e`n~?kVk|kdkjs.k] ;Fkk ok jTTokfn likZ|kdkjs.k cqfºifjdfYirsuA vlnso
rfgZ lo± ;n~x`·rs jTtqfjo likZ|kdkjs.k\ uA lr ,o }Sr Hksnu vU;Fkk x`·ek.kRokr~ u vlŸoa dL;fpr~
Dofpr~* - Just as the rope etc. take birth as the conceived serpent etc., similarly, I will
be born in many forms. (Objection) If so, the world that is perceived is non existent

a
just like the snake perceived in the rope? (Answer) It is not like that. The existent
(Brahman) itself appears as another because of the sense of duality. Nothing at any

k
time is non existent (Cå. Bh. 6.2.23).

aja
Therefore, the statement that like the non existent serpent in the rope, the world
seen is also non existent, is directly opposite to the ‹ruti statement that Brahman
Itself is standing in the form of the world out of Its own volition and also opposite

r
to the Bhå¶ya. When the ‹ruti is saying -^ln~ ,o lksE; bne~ vxz vklhr~* & Somya! In the
riv
beginning, this (world) was sat only (Cå. 6.2.1), implying that the world was sat
even when it was not available for the senses. Does it become asat when it is available
to the senses?
Pa

Objection: Bhå¶yakåra has clearly said that ^tkxzn~ n`';kukefi---- vlŸoa LoIun`';or~
vuk'kaduh;e~-----feF;So rs* - There can be no doubt that the world is asat like the world of
dreams. It is mithyå only (Må. Kå. Bh. 2.7). How do you reconcile this statement?
Answer: It is true. It is possible to say this after the oneness of the Åtman has
ha

been determined. This is because, the world is not different from this Åtman.
Therefore, there can never be an observable for the Åtman. However, the aj¤ån∂
puts forward his doubt after listening to the oneness of Åtman, that he is seeing the
Ma

world. If he is seeing it then it must be different from the Åtman, because we can
only see things which are different from us. Hence, it has to be asat. It is asat just
like the chariots etc. seen in dreams. But before establishing the oneness of Åtman
^rnsrr~ lR;a vforFke~A fda rr~\---eU=ks"kq-----dekZf.k-----* - The jagat that is observed is avitathaónot
mithyå,í i.e. it is a transactional reality (Mu.Bh.1.2.1). Jagat will never be lost; it always
exists. ^;Fkk p dkj.ka cz„ f=k"kq dkys"kq lŸoa u O;fHkpjfr ,oa dk;Ze~ vfi txr~ f=k"kq dkys"kq lŸoa u
O;fHkpjfr* - Just as Brahmanís existence is not affected in either of the three times
(past, present and future), the existence of the world also is not affected in either of
the three times (Sµu Bh 2.1.16).
 43

Doubt: If we accept the existence of names and forms, will it not contradict the
advaita ‹rutis, ëThis is one without a secondí, ëThere is not the least multiplicity
hereí etc.?
Answer: No. This has already been resolved through the example of pot, clay
etc. Seen from the causal point of view, just as the forms of clay are not different
from clay, the world of multiplicity is not different from Brahman. On the basis of
this understanding one gets the realisation, ëThis is one without a secondí, ëThere

a
is not the least multiplicity hereí etc. When due to avidyå one is seeing only the
multiplicity of names and forms then only these transactions occur - ^;nk rq ijekFkZn`"V~;k-

k
--oLRoUrjkfLrRo O;ogkj%* (Br. Bh. 3.5.1).

aja
For the knowledge of 'there is not the least multiplicity hereí (Br. 4.4.19), namely
for the oneness of Brahman, ‹ruti is the pramåƒa, not the indriyas. For the multiplicity
of the world, indriyas are the pramåƒa and not the ‹ruti.íOne pramåƒa does not
r
contradict another pramåƒa, in fact, the other pramåƒa gives the knowledge of an
riv
object which cannot be known by the first pramåƒaí (Br. Bh. 2.1.20). Therefore, for
the oneness of Brahman taught by ‹ruti, the multiplicity seen through the indriyas
need not be rejected. What exists all through this multiplicity is only Brahman in
Pa

which there is no multiplicity. Therefore, fault is only in viewing the object and not
in the object itself. Brahman is Åtman. Hence, there is no multiplicity in Him.
However, even after the realisation of Åtmanís oneness, the world does not become
invisible for the j¤ån∂. Then how does he see it? Before he had obtained vidyå, the
ha

world appeared as different from him; now the same world appears non-different.
So what is lost by vidyå is what was produced by avidyå. ëAnotherness, being the
result of avidyå, can be realised as a non-object by vidyå. Is not the non-existence of
Ma

the second moon the one that is seen by eyes without cataractí - ^vU;L; p vfo|k—rRos
fo|;k voLrqRon'kZuksiifŸk%A rfº f}rh; pUÊL;klŸoa ;nrSfefjds.k p{kq"erk u x`·rs* (Tai. Bh.
2.8).Therefore, what becomes invisible after getting vidyå is the one which appeared
different from himself because of avidyå. One who sees the jagat as different from
himself is mithyå-dar‹∂, i.e., one with wrong knowledge. The ‹ruti says that such a
person is unfit for mok¶a. ëThe one who views bråhmaƒa, k¶atriya (the worlds, devatås
etc) as different from Åtman, and having existence independent of the Åtman is a
mithyå-dar‹∂; and those objects seen as mithyå are mithyå-dæ¶ta. The mithyå-dæ¶ta world
rejects the mithyå-dar‹∂. In this way, seeing difference in the world is ridiculed and
44

it is asserted that all objects are non-different from the Åtman and all this is Åtman
itselfí - ‘Ùees efn yeÇÿe#e$eeefokebâ peieled DeelceveesÓvÙe$e mJeelev$ÙeCe ueyOe meÆeJeb heMÙeefle, leb efceLÙeeoe|Meveb leosJe
efceLÙee°b yeÇÿe#e$eeefokebâ peieled hejekeâjesefle Fefle YesoÂef°ceheesÅe Fob meJeË ÙeoÙeceelcee (ye=. 2.4.6) Fefle meJe&mÙe
JemlegpeelemÙe DeelceeJÙeeflejskeâceJeleejÙeefle~’ (Sµu. Bh. 1.4.19). Therefore, the statement that the
jagat is mithyå is directly opposite to the ‹ruti.
(25.3) Suppose it is asked ëthat which is mithyå is not available for transaction;
but the changing jagat is available for transaction. How is this possible?í They say

a
ëTransaction is also mithyå.í They do not see any differences in the words anæta

k
(changing), mithyå (illusory), anirvacn∂ya (ambiguous for description), pråtibhåsika
satya (apparent reality), vyåvahårika satya (transactional reality). Anæta is transactional

aja
reality, not illusion. Commenting on Tai. 2.6 Bhå¶yakåra saysó^,de~ ,o fg ijekFkZlR;a
cz„A bg iqu% O;ogkjfo"k;e~ vkisf{kdÏ lR;a e`xr`f".kdk|u`rkis{k;k mndkfn lR;e~ mP;rsA vu`ra p rn~
foijhre~A fdÏ iqu% ,rr~ loZe~ vHkor~\ lR;a ijekFkZlR;e~* - Ultimate reality is Brahman only.
r
Water which is transactional reality is compared with the mirage which is apparent
riv
reality. Here the water is called satya and the mirage which is different from water
is called anæta. Both these are in their nature the ultimate reality. Further, transaction
is also not mithyå. For the j¤ån∂ ^lnkReuk lR;Ro vH;qixekr~-------loZO;ogkjk.kka loZfodkjk.kka p
Pa

lR;Roe~* - All transactions and all forms are real because they are viewed as Brahman
(Cå. Bh. 6.3.2). ^izkd~ lnkRefoKkukr~ LokReu% vU;Lekr~ lr%----------mRifŸkizy;kS vHkwrke~A lnkRefoKkus rq
lfr LokRer ,o lao`ŸkkSA rFkk loksZøI;U;ks O;ogkj% vkReu% ,o fonq"k%* - Prior to Åtmanís knowledge
creation, destruction etc were happening from someone different from him. But
ha

after getting Åtma-vij¤åna everything is happening from Åtman only. In this way,
for the j¤ån∂, all transactions are from Åtman onlyí (Cå. Bh. 7.26.1).
(25.4) There is indeed a chain of imaginations done to protect the concept that
Ma

jagat is mithyå. Firstly, about the pair måyå-avidyå: If the world is treated as non-
existent, måyå which is the cause for the creation, sustenance and destruction of the
world as described in ‹ruti, smæti and puråƒas, loses its place. When it is said that
though it is non-existent it is seen due to avidyå, the latter usurps the place of måyå.
To reconcile with this imagined equivalence of måyå and avidyå, they have to
imagine an ambiguous description (anirvacn∂yatva) for avidyå also, mimicking the
anirvacn∂yatva of måyå. Then for some, the ›uddha-Brahman gets coupled with avidyå
(avidyå-‹abala).For some others, måyå and avidyå are synonyms. For yet others, måyå
is avidyå-kalpita. For some others, when avidyå is lost by acquiring vidyå, måyå is also
 45

lost. Yet others see remnants of avidyå even in the j¤ån∂. For others, avidyå is the
effect of måyå - it misleads us by using åvaraƒa-‹akti and åk¶epa-‹akti. Since it is said
that during pralaya, Brahman alone exists, måyå cannot exist in pralaya.Therefore for
them, måyå becomes anitya. Since ∫‹wara is coupled with måyå, for some, ∫‹wara also
goes out of existence during pralaya etc. These are the so called prakriyås, i.e.,
alternatives for siddhånta. What siddhånta? That jagat is mithyå - not for the advaita
propounded by ›a∆kara. But none of these statements is correct.

a
First about Brahman being coupled with avidyå (avidyå-‹abala). J∂va is the one

k
with avidyå. He is not different from nitya-‹uddha-buddha-mukta Brahmanóthis is the
siddhånta. Paramåtman is different from the j∂va, but j∂va is not different from

aja
Paramåtman - ^ijekReu% thokn~ vU;Roa] thoL; rq u ijLekn~ vU;Roe~* (Sµu. Bh. 1.3.19). Further,
Bhå¶yakåraís commentary for the sentenceóëHe understood himself as Brahmaní
is as follows: -^vkRekue~ ,okosr~ vga cz„kfLe bfr---cz„f.k vfo|kuqiifŸk% bfr psr~ u] cz„f.k fo|k

r
foékkukr~A--------u czwe%------------cz„f.k vrºekZé;kjksi.kk ukLrhfrA fdÏ rfgZ u cz„ LokRefu vrºekZé;kjksi.k
riv
fufeŸke~ vfo|kdr`Z p bfrA Hkorq ,oa u vfo|kdr`Z HkzkUra p cz„A fdÏrq u ,o vcz„ vfo|kdrkZ psru%
HkzkUr% vU;% b";rs* - ëHow is it right to say that there is avidyå in Brahman?í It is not like
that. Vidyå has been prescribed in Brahman. ëWe are not saying that there is adhyåropa
Pa

of a dharma in Brahman which is not in It.í Then what are you saying? 'That Brahman
is not the cause for the adhyåropa of this dharma. Nor does it create avidyå by itself.í
Let it be that Brahman is not the imposer of avidyå and also not confused. But the
j∂va who is the imposer of avidyå and confused - he is not different from Brahman
ha

(Br. Bh. 1.4.10). So, avidyå ‹abalam Brahma is a seditiously wrong imagination.
Further about måyå and avidyå being synonymous: ^nsgkfn la?kkrk% vkReek;k
folftZrk%A vkReu% ek;k vfo|k] r;k izR;qiLFkkfirk%* - The body etc. are åtma-måyå-visarjita.
Ma

Here åtmanís måyå means avidyå, and the physical body etc are projected by this
avidyå (Må. Kå. 3.10) and in the next ‹lokaís commentary ^ij ,o vkRek;% iwo± lR;e~
KkueuUre~ cz„ bfr iz—r%A ;LeknkReu%-----la?kkrk% vkReek;k folftZrk% lR;a Kkua vuUra* - Satyam J¤ånam
Anantam Brahman is the Åtman in present context. From this åtman only, body etc.
are created by His måyå (Må. Kå. 3.11). In this way, the same word måyå when
applied to the j∂va is called avidyå and when applied to the Brahman is called måyå.
In this way, måyå and avidyå are separated in the kårikå. ^vgadkj bfr vfo|kla;qDre~
vO;Dre~* - Aha≈kåra means avidyå coupled with avyakta (G. Bh. 7.4); ^vfo|kfn
46

vusdlalkjchte~ vUrnksZ"kor~ ek;k* - Måyå in which the many seeds of sa≈såra like avidyå
etc are concealed (G. Bh. 7.3); ^iz—frLFkRok[;k vfo|k lalkjL; dkj.ke~* - The coupling with
prakæti due to avidyå is sa≈såra (G. Bh. 13.20); ^iz—R;k------vfo|k:i% la;ksx% lalkj%* - The
avidyå concealed in prakæti, is the cause of sa≈såra (G.Bh. 13.21) etc. sentences clearly
deny the synonymity of avidyå and mayå.
In order to satisfy the imagined synonymity between the two, an ambiguous
description of avidyå is also propounded (see 14.4). But after a detailed analysis

a
avidyå is described only as ^vfo|kfoijhrxzkgd% la'k;ksiLFkkid% vxzg.kkRedks ok* - non-

k
comprehension (agrahaƒa), doubtful (sa≈‹aya) and wrong comprehension (anyathå
grahaƒa) (G.Bh. 13.2). ^;fn KkukHkko% ;fn la'k;Kkua ;fn foijhrKkua ok mP;rs vKkue~ bfr] lo± fg

aja
rr~ Kkusu ,o fuoR;Zrs* - Whether absence of knowledge or doubtful knowledge or wrong
knowledge, whatever is called aj¤åna, all that will be removed by jnåna onlyí (Br.
Bh. 3.3.1). This is the unambiguous description of avidyå. Therefore, the bhå¶ya does
r
not approve of this avidyå of ambiguous description.
riv
Next, the idea that måyå is misleading the j∂vas by its two powers of åvaraƒa
and vik¶epa. This is totally unacceptable because it is only through måyå that Brahman
assumes multiple forms. Why? ^:ia :ia izfr:iks cHkwo] rnL; :ia izfrp{k.kk;* - For every
Pa

form, it assumed a co-form in order to make its inherent form known (Br. 2.5.19).
The bhå¶ya comments on this sentence like this - ^;fn fg uke:is u O;kfÿ;srs] rnk vL;
vkReuks fu#ikfékdÏ :ia izKku?kuk[;a u izfr[;k;sr* - Had It not carved out these names and
forms, then, that the adjunctless form of the Åtman is just solid awareness could
ha

never have been understood (Br. Bh. 2.5.19). ^iz—fr% p f=kxq.kkfRedk loZdk;Zdj.kfo"k;kdkjs.k
ifj.krk iq#"kL; HkksxkioxkZFkZdrZO;r;k nsgsfUÊ;k|kdkjs.k lagU;rs* & This prakæti of three qualities
gets modified to the forms of kårya, karaƒa and objects and gets finally organized in
Ma

the forms of bodies, indriyas etc for the purpose of prosperity and/or mok¶a of the
j∂vaí (G. Bh. Introduction to chapter 13). Therefore, it is unreasonable to hold måyå
responsible for the j∂vaís lustful extrovert response to the world.
Next, that måyå is non-eternal is clearly opposite to the bhå¶yaó^fuR;s'ojRokn~
bZ'ojL; rRiz—R;ks% vfi ;qDra fuR;Rosu Hkforqe~A iz—fr};oRoe~ ,o fg bZ'ojL; bZ'ojRoe~* & Since ∫‹wara
is always ∫‹wara His two prakætis have to be eternal. This is because, being coupled
with these two prakætis is the ∫‹waraness of ∫‹wara (G. Bh. 13.9). Some people twist
the meaning of the word ëeternalí to mean ëa very long timeí to suit their imaginations.
 47

This is not possible. However long this time may be, sinceó^ékkrk ;FkkiwoeZdYi;r~* &
∫‹wara created this world just like in previous times (°Rgveda Sa≈hitå 10.190.3),
måyå is necessary for the creation that happens even after this long time. So, saying
that måyå is non-eternal is wrong.
Then about the remnants of avidyå in a j¤ån∂: ^; ,o vfo|kfnnks"k fuo`fŸk Qy—RizR;;%
vk|% vUR;% lUrr% vlUrrks ok l ,o fo|k* - Whether the first or the last thought, whether
it is a result of continuous or discontinuous thinking, the knowledge which removes

a
all the faults of avidyå etc. is vidyå (Br. Bh. 1.4.10). ^vkRefo"k;a foKkua ;Rdkye~] rr~ dkys ,o

k
rf}"k;kKkufrjksHkko% L;kr~A vr% cz„fo|k;ka lR;ke~ vfo|kdk;kZuqiiŸks% iznhi bo re% dk;ZL;* - The
moment the knowledge of Åtman dawns, that moment itself, its (Åtman's) ignorance

aja
is removed. So, with the rise of Brahma-vidyå, the effects of avidyå vanish just as
darkness vanishes the moment light comes (Br. Bh. 1.4.10). So, there can never be
remnants of avidyå in a j¤ån∂.
r
(25.5) Then sarvåtmabhåva spoken by ‹ruti i.e. the awareness that everything is
riv
Himselfóis an uncomfortable statement for those who proclaim that the world is
non-existent. So, they totally abandon it. ^vge~ v¬ke~ vge~ v¬kkn% vga 'yksd—r~* - I am the
food, I am the eater, I am that ∫‹wara who pairs up the eater and his food (Tai. 3.10).
Pa

^vga euq% vHkoa lw;Z% p* - I am Manu, I am the sun (Br. 1.4.10), ^fo|kfou;lEiUus czk„.ks xfo
gfLrfuA 'kqfu pSo 'oikdÍ p if.Mrk% lenf'kZu%* - J¤ån∂s view the learned and gentle bråhmaƒa,
the cow, elephant, the dog, and the c僌åla all equally (G∂tå 5.18)ósuch are the
sentences of sarvåtmabhåva. If the food, the eater, ∫‹wara, Manu, Sµurya, bråhmaƒa are
ha

all non-existentóthere is no meaning for such sentences. For this reason too, the
non-existence of the world is absurdly wrong.
(25.6) In this way, a limitless number of ideas are superimposed on the bhå¶yas
Ma

of ›a∆kara, damaging what is heard from there and imagining the unheard. They
have assumed such importance that common people think that this is what has
been taught by ›a∆kara. Therefore, a study of the bhå¶ya is not producing the correct
understanding in seekers. Such ideas have created opponents for the otherwise
blemishless bhå¶ya. Moreover, they are mutually contradictory also. Some people
offer solace by saying ëhe says like this, the other one says like that; but these are
all only alternative proofs for arriving at the one and the same conclusioní. But this
pacification does not achieve its intended purpose; on the other hand, it creates
more confusion, because ëthisí and ëthatí proofs are opposite to each other. In some
48

intermediate steps of ‹åstra, one could perhaps say ëpa¤cikaraƒa is one way and
trivætkaraƒa another of arriving at this resultí. But for the ultimate message (siddhånta)
there can never be alternative proofs, that too proofs contradicting each other.
Therefore, for the advaita propounded by the ‹ruti, there is only one proof and
that is, given by ›a∆kara himself. ^u vU;% iUFkk v;uk; fo|rs* - There cannot be another
proof. True. Though the bhå¶yas of ›a∆kara are pleasant to study, the meaning in a
certain place may be difficult to understand because they are guiding a wide

a
spectrum of seekersólike people doing karma, intelligent students, sannyåsis etc;

k
doubts can arise. To get the right answer for any doubt, the point to remember is
the following: the topic is vast. Solutions for all doubts cannot be available in a

aja
single place for everyone. But, for each and every doubt, there is certainly the
solution somewhere else in the bhå¶yas. There is no exception to this rule at all.
This is the omniscience of Bhagavan Bhå¶yakåra. In the Vedas, it becomes
necessary in several places to interpret passages going against other pramåƒas. That
r
is done by treating them as arthavåda in praise of injunctions. But in the ›a∆kara
riv
Bhå¶ya, one never comes across such situations where an interpretation is necessary,
because their very purpose is to explain things clearly without any ambiguity.
Pa

Therefore, one should never subject the ununderstood words and sentences to
squeezing, bending and twisting or adding and dropping ideas to extract the
meaning one wants. This is unacceptable. One should understand their meaning
only by the other sentences of the bhå¶ya said in that context. If one does not follow
this concept and introduces new ideas therein, they will invariably be damaging
ha

what is heard or they will only remain unheard imaginations.

It is extremely regrettable that one such painful example should be there in
Ma

the very first word of Vedånta ›åstra. Who would interpret the word ëasmat -Ií in
^;q"enLeRizR;;xkspj;ks% fo"k;fo"kf;.kks%* - yu¶mat asmat pratyaya gocarayo¨ in Adhyåsa Bhå¶ya
as the ›uddhaåtman when he has read and remembers the sentence k¶etra-k¶etraj¤ayo¨
^{ks=k{ks=kK;ks% fo"k;fo"kf;.kks%* in G∂tå Bhå¶ya? Is it not because of this Himalayan blunder
that the world had to become 'asatónon-existent'? After assuming that the world is
non-existent, who would not drop the assumption when he notices the negative
reply to the objection ^vln~ ,o rfgZ lo± ;r~ x`·rs-----* - Then, is the whole world non-
existent like the serpent seen in the snake? Is it not because of continuing with this
assumption instead of dropping it that måyå and avidyå became synonyms? Who
 49

will continue with this synonymity the moment he reads the sentences like ^vgadkj
bfr vfo|kla;qDre~ vO;Dre~* - Aha≈kåra is avidyå coupled with måyå etc? In this way,
making a new imagination to cover up or justify the damage done by the previous
imagination, has led to a limitless cascade of fanciful imaginations of the bhå¶ya.
The purport of the bhå¶ya has gone out of sight and heated debates between the so
called alternative proofs have occupied its place. If the word ëasmat-Ií in Adhyåsa
Bhå¶ya had been interpreted as k¶etraj¤a in accordance with G∂tå Bhå¶ya, only

a
difference between the world and its knower k¶etraj¤a could have been demonstrated
and the idea of the non-existence of the world could have been avoided. Is it not

k
so? Consequently, would not the whole of the cascade of consequent imaginations

aja
been avoided? In this way, these imaginations have wrought havoc in the ‹åstra
instead of making it intelligent. ›a∆kara Bhå¶ya is pure and complete in itself. It
does not suffer from any faults which need to be removed, nor does it require the
addition of any virtues. ›a∆kara is Para-Brahman, and his bhå¶yas are the Vedas.
This must never be forgotten. r
riv
888
Pa
ha
Ma
 A Birdsí Eyeview of the Brahmasµutras
(1) Bhå¶yakåra has clearly stated at the end of the Adhyåsa Bhå¶ya that getting
the knowledge of the oneness of Åtman is the purport of ›år∂raka M∂må≈så. There is

a
advantage in knowing the sequence of steps followed by the ‹åstras for this purpose.

k
This is only a brief pointer, just enough to meet the goal of this book:
ëTatí in the great sentence ëTat twa≈ asióThat you areí is only pure existenceó

aja
i.e. Brahman alone. To know that as oneís self is the knowledge of the oneness of
Åtman. True. It cannot be gotten by speech, mind, eyes or any other sense. Though
it is so attributeless, it does exist because it is known to be the cause of the worldó
r
^uSo okpk u eulk u p{kq"kk u vU;S% vfi bfUÊ;S% izkIrqa 'kD;rs bR;FkZ%A rFkkfi loZfo'ks"kjfgr% vfi txr%
riv
ewye~ bfr voxrRokr~ vfLr ,o (cz„)* (Ka. Bh.2.3.12).
So, Brahman has to be understood only through the world. Therefore, the
discussion of Brahman starts with ëCreation etc.í sµutra. Though Brahman as the
Pa

material cause of the world is implied in this sµutra, its main discussion is in the
first påda of the second chapter. Using the examples of clay etc, it is shown there
that the ëworld is Brahmaní, but Brahman is different from the worldí through the
law of non-difference of effect and cause (kårya kåraƒa ananyatva nyåya). With this,
ha

the oneness of Brahman who is Satyam, J¤ånam and Anantam, is established. Next
about its efficient causeness: In order to teach that the Åtman is the Satyam- J¤ånam
-Anantam Brahman, all the transactions like becoming many, creation, entering (in
Ma

j∂va form), obtaining pleasure, fearlessness, sa≈kramaƒa (higher knowledge) etc.

are conceived of in Brahman - ^lR;a Kkue~ vuUra cz„ bfr ;FkksDry{k.k vkReizfriŸ;FkZeso cgqHkou
lxZ&izos'k&jlykHk&vHk;&laÿe.kkfn ifjdYI;rs cz„f.k lo± O;ogkj fo"k;s* (Tai. Bh. 2.8).
In this way, in the first step of teaching Brahman-Åtman oneness, transaction
(vyavahåra), which is not actually in Brahman, is conceived in Brahman. This is called
adhyåropa. The moment Brahman is understood through this, adhyåropa becomes
apavåda. i.e. withdrawn; the conceived transaction is withdrawn.
ëDoes it mean that the vyavahåra which is conceived in Brahman is imagined
 51

due to avidyå (avidyå -kalpita)?í No; what is avidyå -kalpita has already been explained
(Adhyåsa Bhå¶ya 25.2). From the causal point of view, even vyavahåra is true (Cå. Bh.
7.26.1), not false. It should never be forgotten that nothing is asat - non-existent, at
any time - ^u vlŸoa dL;fpr~ Dofpr*~& (Cå. Bh. 6.2.23). ëIf so, how is the vyavahåra of
creation etc. possible in Brahman who is only pure existence? It is wrong to ask this
question when the ‹ruti tells us it is so. ëThis was the one only without a second satí
^lnso lksE;snexzklhr~ ,desokf}rh;a--------rnS{kr cgqL;ka iztk;s;fs r rŸkstksøl`tr* - That (Brahman) reflected

a
to be born in many forms. It created fire (Cå. 6.21.23) says the ‹ruti, which should be
understood as such.

k
ëSaying that other pramåƒas also apply to Brahman since it is an existent object,

aja
is wishful thinking. Brahman, like dharma, can be understood only through ‹ruti.í
ëWho knows clearly? Who can say from where this multifaceted creation has come
out from?í says the ‹ruti that even highly evolved souls have difficulty in
understanding the cause of the world. So there is no scope for dry logic here. Pråj¤a
r
riv
detached from the world becomes sat-åtman in deep sleep. This worldless Åtman
Himself is creating (the dream world. How?). Though world born out of Brahman
is not different from it, is not Brahman even now the same as it always is? - ^;r~ rq mDra
Pa

ifjfu"i¬kRokr~ cz„f.k izek.kkUrjkf.k laHkos;q% bfr rnfi euksjFkek=ke~A -------vkxeek=k lefékxE; ,o rq v;e~
vFkZ% ékeZor~A -------dks vºk osn d bg izokspr~] b;a fol`f"V;Zr vkcHkwo bfr pSrs ΩpkSs flºkuke~ vfi bZ'ojk.kka
nqckséZ krka txRdkj.kL; n'kZ;r% -----u vusu fe"ks.k 'kq"drdZL; v=k vkReykHk% laHkofr* -----LoIukUrcqºkUr;ks#Hk;ks%
brjsrjO;fHkpkjkr~ vkReu% vuUokxrRoe~A laizlkns p izi¸ifjR;kxsu lnkReuklaiŸks% fu"izi¸ lnkReRoa iziapL;
ha

cz„izHkoRokr~ dk;Zdkj.kkuU;U;k;su cz„kO;frjsd* (Sµu. Bh. 2.1.6).

(2) Continuing this discussion of Brahman being the cause of the world and
refuting the view of those who oppose this causality, later sµutras deal with the
Ma

process of creation. Afterwards comes the discussion of ëtwam-youí. Just as

Brahmanís nature was determined by starting with the creation of the world, the
j∂va's inherent nature is fixed by starting from his doership etc.
So first comes the discussion of the doer j∂va. Next, in the second påda of the
third chapter, ëtwam-youí is decided as pråj¤a, using the mahå-tarka (great logic) of
the three states* of universal experience. This pråj¤a does not know who he is. To
provide this knowledge, his deep sleep experience of ëI did not know anything, I

*waking, dreaming and deep sleep

52

slept happilyí is investigated. It is shown that the reason for his happiness and not
knowing anything is the oneness that he obtained with Brahman in his deep sleep.
So the sµutras decide that pråj¤a is indeed Brahman. By reflection and contemplation
of this message ëThat you areí, one gets the realisation of Åtmanís oneness. When
this realisation illumines the intellect, it shows up in the wakeful and dream states
as the feeling ëEverything is myselfí, because everything is Brahman. The rest of the
Brahma Sµutras discuss the methods of obtaining vidyå, its fruit mok¶a, the destruction

a
of all karma in a j¤ån∂ and his påpa and puƒya etc.
There are four chapters in the Brahma Sµutras: Reconciliation - leUo;ké;k;] non-

k
conflict-vfojksékké;k;] practice - lkékuké;k;] fruit - Qyké;k;. In each, there are four pådas

aja
- sub-chapters and in each påda several adhikaraƒas (groups of sµutras dealing with a
single topic). There are 192 adhikaraƒas in total. Some adhikaraƒas have only one
sµutra; the total number of sµutras is 555. In each adhikaraƒa, there are five steps:

r
(1) Sa∆gati: Meaning connection with the previous topic. For example, the sa∆gati
riv
for the first sµutra is Adhyåsa Bhå¶ya.
(2) Vi¶aya: The subject under discussion.
(3) Sa≈‹aya: Doubts about the subject.
Pa

(4) Pµurvapak¶a: Opposite views

(5) Siddhånta: Final decision derived after refuting the opposite views.

888
ha
Ma
 efpe%eemeeefOekeâjCeced
Jij¤åsådhikaraƒam

a
At the beginning of every book are delineated four things - Its topic (vi¶aya); Its

k
use (prayojana) connection, i.e. how the vi¶aya and prayojana are connected;

aja
competence (adhikår∂), i.e. the one who is entitled to study the book. These are
known as anubandhacatu¶¢aya. Here Brahman is the topic; mok¶a - total liberation is
the use of studying this topic (Adhyåsa Bhå¶ya has the purpose of motivating the
student for mok¶a). The connection between Brahman and mok¶a is Brahma-J¤åna.
r
The one who is competent (for this text adhikår∂), should have the following qualities:
riv
(a). Viveka: Discrimination between the eternal and non eternal; (b). Vairågya:
Dispassion towards pleasure here or in the other worlds; (c). A group of six qualities:
‹åma - control over mind, dama - control over sense organs, uparati - enjoying the
Pa

intimacy of God, tit∂k¶åóforbearance, ‹raddhå - faith in God, Veda and guru,

samådhåna - keeping the mind balanced. (d). Mumuk¶å - Intense desire for mok¶a. All
these are contained in the bhå¶ya to the first sµutra.
ha

DeLeelees yeÇÿeefpe%eemee (1.1.1)

atha = afterwards, ata¨ = therefore, Brahma-jij¤åså = discussion of
Brahman
Ma

1. JesoevleceerceebmeeMeeŒemÙe JÙeeefÛeKÙeeefmelemÙe Foced Deeefoceb met$eced~ le$e DeLe Meyo:

DeevebleÙee&&Le&: Heefjie=¢eles ve DeefOekeâejeLe&:~ yeÇÿeefpe%eemeeÙee: DeveefOekeâeÙe&lJeeled~ cebieuemÙe Ûe
JeekeäÙeeLex mecevJeÙeeYeeJeeled~ DeLee&vlej SJe efn DeLeMeyo: ßeglÙee cebieue HeÇÙeespevees YeJeefle~
1. This is the first sµutra of the Vedånta mimå≈så ‹åstra which is being
commented upon. Here the word ëathaí is used in the sense of ëafterí not in the
sense of ëcommencementí; because Brahma-jij¤åså is not something which can
be commenced. And ëma∆galaí meaning auspicious has no syntactical relation
54

with the meaning of the sentence. Besides, ëathaí used in another sense can
achieve the purpose of auspiciousness by its mere sound.
(1.1) The word ëatha' has four meanings, three of which are: beginning,
auspiciousness, and after the study of dharma. The fourth will be explained at the
end. Which of the first three meanings are implied in this word? The study of
Grammar starts with the sµutra ëatha ‹abdånu‹åsanam'. The study of Yoga starts with
ëatha yoganu‹åsanam - beginning of the discipline of yogaí. Similarly, does the sµutra

a
here mean ëbeginning Brahma-jij¤åsåí? No; because jij¤åså means 'desire to knowí.

k
Such a desire is either there or not there. ëBeginning a desireí has no meaning.
Next, auspiciousness also cannot be the meaning of the word ëatha' here,

aja
because then the sµutra would become 'auspiciouness Brahma-jij¤åsåí, which are two
disconnected phrases. But traditionally, great writers commence their books with
auspicious words. here also it is true. However, though used for a different purpose,
r
the very utterance of ëatha' plays the role of auspiciousness. Smæti says it like this:
riv
¨dkjˇkFk'kCnˇ }kosrkS cz„.k% iqjkA d.Ba fHkRok fofu;kZrkS rLekUekıfydkoqHkkSAA
Before creation ëOm' and ëatha' by themselves emanated from the throat of
Brahma; so, both are auspiciousí.
Pa

2. HetJe&HeÇke=âleeHes#eeÙee§e Heâuele: DeevebleÙee&JÙeeflejskeâeled~ meefle Ûe DeevebleÙee&&Le&lJes ÙeLee

Oece&efpe%eemee HetJe&Je=òeb JesoeOÙeÙeveb efveÙecesve DeHes#eles SJeb yeÇÿeefpe%eemeeÓefHe Ùeled HetJe&Je=òeb
ha

efveÙecesve DeHes#eles leÉòeâJÙeced~ mJeeOÙeeÙeevevleÙe± leg meceeveced~

2. The reference to what has gone before, does not contradict the meaning
ëafterwardsí. When the meaning is ëafterwardsí, just as the desire to know
Ma

dharma is preceded by the learning of the Vedas, what precedes the desire to
know Brahman is to be said. However, ëafter learning of oneís own Vedaí is
common to both dharma-jij¤åså and Brahma-jij¤åså.
(2). Here pµurvaprakætåpek¶åyå¨ means with respect to the previous discussion
of dharma i.e. some people say that ëBrahma-jij¤åså is to be done only after dharma-
jij¤åsåí. Here only the word ëafterí is acceptable to us - but not ëafter dharma-jij¤åsa'.
The reason for this becomes clear in the fourth sµutra. Of course, learning the Vedas
is mandatory before dharma-jij¤åså. Similarly, we have to say ëafter whatí does
Brahma-jij¤åså have to start? This will be specified later. However, the study of
 55

Vedas is mandatory for Brahma-jij¤åså too. Dharma-jij¤åså is based on the Sa≈hitå

and the Bråhmaƒa parts of Vedas and Brahma-jij¤åså is based on the Åra∆yakas and
Upani¶ads.
Question: There are some who are not authorised to study the Vedas. How
can they get knowledge of Brahman?
Answer: They can get it through the puråƒas and itihåsas (Sµu. Bh. 1.3.34-38).
Any common man becomes entitled for this knowledge through special duties

a
like japa, upavåsa and arådhana (worship of God) - ^iq#"kek=klEcfUékfHk% tiksioklnsorkjkékukfnfHk%

k
ékeZfo'ks"kS% vuqxzg% fo|k;k% lEHkofr* (Sµu. Bh.3.4.38).

aja
3. veefvJen keâcee&JeyeesOeevevleÙe± efJeMes<e:? ve, Oece&efpe%eemeeÙee: HeÇeieefHe DeOeerle
JesoevlemÙe yeÇÿeefpe%eemeesHeHeòes:~ ÙeLee Ûe ùoÙeeÅeJeoeveeveeced DeevevleÙe&evf eÙece: ›eâcemÙe efJeJeef#ele-

r
lJeeled, ve leLee Fn ›eâcees efJeJeef#ele:~ Mes<eMesef<elJes DeefOeke=âleeefOekeâejs Jee HeÇceeCeeYeeJeled~
3. Could ëthe knowledge of karmaí qualify the word ëathaí? (i.e, Brahma-
riv
jij¤åså is to be done after acquiring the knowledge of karma). No. Even prior to
the discussion of karma, discussion of Brahman is possible for one who has learnt
Pa

Vedånta. For example, just as there is an intention to tell a sequence in the

cutting of the heart etc, there is no intention of telling any sequence here. There
is no evidence for a sequential relationship of (the type of) subsidiary (karma)
and principal (karma) or of (the type of) eligibility of the person already eligible.
ha

(3). The opponentís point of view, with respect to the previous discussion of
dharma-jij¤åså etc. left unfinished, is picked up again here. The opponentís argument
is: ëLearning the Vedas is necessary for both dharma-jij¤åså and Brahma-jij¤åså. After
Ma

getting the knowledge of karma from dharma-jij¤åså based on the Sa≈hitås and
Bråhmaƒas, Brahma-jij¤åså, based on the Åranyakas and Upani¶ads has to start.í

It is not so. He who has studied the Upani¶ads - i.e. Vedånta - can start Brahma-
jij¤åså even prior to dharma-jij¤åså. Bhå¶yakåra gives three arguments for this: In
cutting the body of an animal sacrificed in Vedic yaj¤as, the ‹ruti says: First the
heart, next the tongue and then the chest is to be cut – ^‚n;L; vxzs vo|fr vFk ftg~ok;k
vFk o{kl%* (Tai. Sa≈. 6.3.10.10). No such sequence is said anywhere in the ‹ruti for
dharma Brahma-jij¤åså. Jåbåla ‹ruti says that one can go straight from brahmacarya to
56

sannyåsa without passing through the gæhastha stage (Jå. 4). This means that one can
commence Brahma-jij¤åså earlier to knowledge of karma which is to be got as a
gæhastha.

Similarly, there is no pramåƒa for ‹e¶a-‹e¶itva also. ›e¶a means main karma and
‹e¶i is karma subsidiary to it, helpful to the ‹e¶a karma. For example, Dar‹a-
pµurƒamåsayåga is the main, prayåjayåga is the subsidiary. Main karma is incomplete
without the performance of the subsidiary karma. However, there is no pramåƒa for

a
a similar sequence between dharma-Brahma-jij¤åså. Again, there is no pramåƒa for

k
adhikæta-adhikår∂ type also. Adhikæta is one who is authorised for a particular karma
because he has the necessary competencies for it. One who is entitled for the main

aja
karma alone is entitled for subsidiary karma also. For example, íCamasaí is a wooden
vessel. Filling it with ap (water) is known as ap-praƒayana. Go-dohana is vessel in
which cowís milk is milked. Doing ap-praƒayana in go-dohana is subsidiary karma in

r
dar‹apµurƒamåsayåga. One who is adhikæta for dar‹apµurƒamåsayåga only is competent
riv
for doing ap-praƒayana in go-dohana if he desires to have a lot of cows. There is no
such pramåƒa in the ‹åstras saying that the adhikår∂ of karma alone is adhikår∂ for
Brahmanís knowledge.
Pa

4. Oece&yeÇÿe efpe%eemeÙees: Heâueefpe%eemÙe YesoeÛÛe~ DeYÙegoÙeHeâueb Oece&%eeveced, leÛÛe

Deveg<"eveeHes#eced~ efve:ßesÙemeHeâueb leg yeÇÿe%eeveced, ve Ûe Deveg<"eveevlejeHes#eced~ YeJÙe§e Oecees&
efpe%eemÙe: ve Kkudkys Deefmle, Heg®<eJÙeeHeejlev$elJeeled~ Fn leg Yetleb yeÇÿe efpe%eemÙeb, efvelÙelJeeled
ha

ve Heg®<eJÙeeHeejlev$eced~
4. Between the discussion of dharma and Brahman, there is also difference
in the fruits and objects of enquiry. The result of dharma is prosperity which
Ma

depends on any performance of (karma). But the knowledge of Brahman has

mok¶a as its fruit and it does not depend on any performance. The topic in
dharma discussion (viz, karma) is not there at the time of knowing, because, it
is dependent on the personís performance (of karma). But here the topic of
discussion is existent Brahman which does not depend on human performance.
(4). To refute the rule that ëBrahma-jij¤åså is only after dharma-jij¤åsåí the second
reason is given. For example, the knowledge of the karma of jyoti¶¢omayåga is obtained
through dharma-jij¤åså. The fruit of jyoi¶¢omayåga is heaven, which depends on the
 57

performance of the yåga by the person. However, this fruit is not obtained by the
mere knowledge of the karma; it depends only on the performance of the karma
(yåga). The fruit is also not obtained immediately after the yåga, one has to wait for
it. This fruit is also short-lived. But Brahma-jij¤åså is the exact opposite of this. Its
fruit is mok¶a, which does not depend on any performance by the person after he
has received the knowledge of Brahman. There is no waiting time either; mok¶a is
the immediate fruit of Brahma-j¤åna. Mok¶a is eternal. Therefore, knowing this

a
difference through ‹ruti pramåƒa, the one desirous of mok¶a, will not be interested at
all in dharma-jij¤åså. Next comes the third reason:

k
aja
5. ÛeesoveeHeÇJe=efòeYesoeÛÛe~ Ùee efn Ûeesovee Oece&mÙe ue#eCeced, mee mJeefJe<eÙes efveÙegÀeevewJe
Heg®<eced DeJeyeesOeÙeefle~ yeÇÿeÛeesovee leg Heg®<eced DeJeyeesOeÙelÙesJe kesâJeueced~ DeJeyeesOemÙe
ÛeesoveepevÙelJeeled ve Heg®<eesÓJeyeesOes efveÙegpÙeles~ ÙeLee De#eeLe&meefVekeâ<exCe DeLee&JeyeesOes, leÉled~
r
lemceeled efkeâceefHe JeòeâJÙeb Ùeovevlejb yeÇÿeefpe%eemee GHeefoMÙeles Fefle~
riv
5. There is also difference in the response (on listening) to the Vedic
sentences. The features of the sentence explaining dharma is that it engages
Pa

the person in its topic (of karma). But Brahman-related sentences merely inform
the person (about Brahman). Since knowledge is produced from the sentence
itself, the person is not directed to get the knowledge. This is as in the case of
knowing an object when it is in contact with the sense organ. Therefore, it is to
ha

be told, what is it after which (we are) instructed to take up the discussion of
Brahman.
(5.1) It is the difference in the motivation generated by codanå. Codanå is a
Ma

Vedic sentence and lak¶aƒa is pramåƒa. The sentences which are a pramåƒa for dharma
direct one towards injunction and prohibition (vidhi-ni¶edha). But the sentences of
the Upani¶ads, which are pramåƒa for the knowledge of Brahman, just narrate the
Brahman-Åtman oneness; they do not direct a person to do anything. Really speaking,
no pramåƒa - except the karma part of the Vedas - orders or motivates a person to do
anything. For example, following the contact of the eye with an object, the eye only
informs that 'the object is so and soí; it does not direct a person to do anything.
(5.2) Some other objections and refutations are as follows:
58

Objection: Some sentences from ‹ruti and smæti say that j¤åna should be
attempted only after doing karma. For example, ^resra osnkuqopusu czkgkz.kk fofofn"kfUr ;Ksu
nkusu rilkuk'kdÍu* & Bråhmaƒas desire to know him after Vedånuvacana, yaj¤a, dånaó
gifting and the penance called anå‹aka (Br. 4.4.22), ^u deZ.kke~ vukjEHkkr~ uS"dE;Ze~ v'uqrs* -
By not doing karma, man does not get mok¶a (G∂tå 3.4) etc. One has to do karma to
know that its fruit is not eternal.
Answer: It is not like that. As the result of the karma performed in previous

a
lives, one can get the eligibility for knowledge of Brahman without performing

k
karma again in this life.
(5.3) Objection: Is it not mandatory that one should free oneself from the three

aja
debts: gods, æ¶is and the manes (pitæas)?
Answer: Repaying the three debts is mandatory for the householder. Since the
previously quoted Jåbåla ‹ruti allows for sannyåsa straight from student life, this
duty is not inevitable for getting j¤åna. r
riv
(5.4) Objection: In upåsanås like udg∂ta etc, one has to view them as Brahman by
injunction. Brahma-jij¤åså is necessary for that. So, Brahma-jij¤åså is subsidiary to
upåsanå.
Pa

Answer: No. These upåsanås need the knowledge of saguƒa Brahman. If these
upåsanås are done without desire, the intellect becomes clean and so help in getting
knowledge of nirguƒa Brahman.
This sµutra is however discussing the nirguƒa Brahman (determined in the second
ha

chapter of the Brahma Sµutras). This can never be subsidiary to karma. Bhå¶yakåra
proves this in the fourth sµutra.
Ma

6. GÛÙeles, efvelÙeeefvelÙeJemlegefJeJeskeâ: Fneceg$eeLe&YeesieefJejeie: MeceeefomeeOevee mebHeled

cetceg#eglJeb Ûe~ les<eg efn melmeg HeÇeieefHe Oece&efpe%eemeeÙee: TOJe± Ûe MekeäÙeles yeÇÿe efpe%eeefmelegb %eelegb
Ûe, ve efJeHeÙe&Ùes~ lemceeled DeLeMeyosve ÙeLeesòeâmeeOevemebHeòÙeevevleÙe&ced GHeefoMÙeles~
6. It will be told: discrimination of things eternal and non-eternal,
dispassion for things of enjoyment here and in other worlds, the wealth of
practices such as control of mind, control of senses etc., and desire for mok¶a. If
they are present, it is possible to discuss Brahman and also know It even prior
to the discussion of dharma and after it too; not otherwise. Therefore, the word
 59

ëafterí intimates that ëafter (the possession) of the wealth of practices mentioned
aboveí.*
(6) In this way, after giving three reasons, the objection that Brahma-jij¤åså should
come only after dharma-jij¤åså - is refuted. Since it has been accepted that the meaning
of the word ëatha' is afterwards, the question arises ëafter what?íThe answer is:

7. Dele: Meyoes nslJeLe&:~ Ùemceeled Jeso SJe Deefivenes$eeoerveeb ßesÙe:meeOeveeveeced

a
DeefvelÙeHeâueleeb oMe&Ùeefle ‘‘leÅeLesn keâce&efpelees ueeskeâ: #eerÙele SJecesJeeceg$e HegCÙeefpelees ueeskeâ:

k
#eerÙeles'' (Úeb. 8.1.6) FlÙeeefo:~ leLee yeÇÿeefJe%eeveeoefHe Hejb Heg®<eeLe&b oMe&Ùeefle ‘‘yeÇÿeefJeoeHveeself e

aja
Hejced'' (lew. 2.1) FlÙeeefo:~ lemceeled ÙeLeesòeâmeeOevemebHeòÙevevlejb yeÇÿeefpe%eemee keâle&JÙee~
7. (The word) ëthereforeí signifies reason. Veda itself shows that agnihotra
etc which are means to prosperity have an impermanent fruit (by saying that)
r
ëëAs here (the enjoyment) acquired by karma perishes, that acquired elsewhere
riv
through karma also perishesíí etc. Similarly, it shows also that the supreme
goal of man results from the knowledge of Brahman (by saying) ëëOne who
knows Brahman attains the Supremeíí etc. Therefore, after acquiring the
Pa

aforesaid wealth of means, discussion of Brahman is to be done.

(7) There are some sentences like ëafter sipping soma, we become deathlessí,
meaning that the fruits of heaven etc are eternal. Veda itself clarifies by saying that
they are in praise of that karma; but the fruit of that karma is certainly not eternal. On
ha

the other hand mok¶a, which is the fruit of the knowledge of Brahman, is indeed

*Section 6 refers to four qualifications required for receiving Brahma-j¤åna. They

Ma

are 1. Nityånitya vastu viveka ability to discriminate eternal and ephemeral things, 2.
Ihåmutrartha bhogavirågaódisinterest in the pleasures of this world and other worlds
like heaven etc., 3. ›amådi ¶a¢sampatti (six kinds of wealth). They are : (a) ›ama - controlling
the mind from wandering outwards, (b) Dama - Controlling the sense organs from contact
with their respective sensuous object and the motor organs from indulging in unnecessary
activity (c) Uparati - Enjoying initimacy with God alone (d) Tit∂k¶å - putting up with
three types of troubles viz, ådhyåtmika - bodily and mental, ådhidaivikaódue to nature
like heat/cold etc, ådhibhoutika - caused by other creatures. (e) ›raddhå - Total faith in
God, scriptures and the guru, (f) Samådhåna - mental poise in the midst of ups and
downs of life and finally 4. Mumuk¶utva - an ordent desire for mok¶a.
60

eternal. Therefore, one with the qualities of viveka etc (mentioned above in 2.1)
should get into Brahma-jij¤åså.
8. yeÇÿeCees efpe%eemee yeÇÿeefpe%eemee~ yeÇÿe Ûe Je#ÙeceeCe ue#eCeced ‘‘pevceeÅemÙe Ùele:''
Fefle~ Dele SJe ve yeÇÿeMeyomÙe peelÙeeÅeLee&vlejced DeeMeef¿leJÙeced~
8. Brahma-jij¤åså is discussion of Brahman. Brahman is defined by the feature
to be specified later as ë(That) by which the creation etc of this (world)í. For

a
this very reason, there cannot be the doubt of any other meaning like jåti etc

k
for the word ëBrahmaní.

aja
(8) The word Brahman has several meanings in ‹ruti and smæti like the brahmin
caste, the four-headed Brahmå, Vedas and even j∂va. Here the word is not used in
any of these senses. It is used for the cause of the creation, sustenance and destruction
of the world, indicated in the next sµutra.
r
riv
9. yeÇÿeCe: Fefle keâce&efCe <e<"er ve Mes<es, efpe%eemÙeeHes#elJeeled efpe%eemeeÙee: efpe%eemÙeevlej
DeefveoxMeeÛÛe~ veveg Mes<e<e<"erHeefjieÇnsÓefHe yeÇÿeCees efpe%eemeekeâce&lJeb ve efJe®OÙeles, mebyebOe
Pa

meeceevÙemÙe efJeMes<eefve<"lJeeled? SJeceefHe HeÇlÙe#eb yeÇÿeCe: keâce&lJeced Glme=pÙe meeceevÙeÉejsCe

Hejes#eb keâce&lJeb keâuHeÙelees JÙeLe&: HeÇÙeeme: mÙeeled~ ve JÙeLe&:, yeÇÿeeefßele DeMes<eefJeÛeej-
HeÇefle%eeveeLe&lJeeled Fefle Ûesled? ve~ HeÇOeeveHeefjieÇns leoHesef#eleeveeced DeLee&ef#eHlelJeeled~ yeÇÿe efn
ha

%eevesve DeeHlegecf e<šlecelJeeled HeÇOeeveced~ leefmceved HeÇOeeves efpe%eemee keâce&eCf e Heefjie=nerles Ùewepf e&%eeefmeleweJf e&vee
yeÇÿe efpe%eeefmeleb ve YeJeefle leeefve DeLee&ef#eHleevÙesJe Fefle ve He=Lekedâ met$eefÙeleJÙeeefve~ ÙeLee
‘‘jepeemeew ieÛÚefle'' FlÙegòeâs meHeefjJeejmÙe je%ees ieceveced Gòeâb YeJeefle, leÉled~
Ma

9. ëOf Brahmaní is in the Sixth Case in accusative sense and not in the
residuary senseóbecause, discussion requires what is desired to be known
and nothing else is indicated for discussion. ëEven accepting the Sixth Case in
the residuary sense, Brahman being the object of discussion is not violated
because, the general relationship has to end in the principal object itselfí. Even
thus, discarding the direct objectness of Brahman and imagining indirect
objectness is a vain effort. ëIt is not in vain if it is said that it has the premise of
enquiring into everything dependent on Brahman without exception.í No. with
 61

the acceptance of the principal, whatever is dependent on it will also be

covered. Brahman is the principal because it is most desired to be attained by
knowledge. If the principal is accepted as the object of discussion, those things
without discussing which the discussion of Brahman will not be complete, will
all be implied; hence, they need not be stated separately in the sµutraójust as,
when it is said ëHere goes the kingí, the going of the king along with his retinue

a
is implied.
(9) Kkrqe~ (to know) bPNk (desire) is ftKklk jij¤åså. In Brahmaƒojij¤åså, the word

k
Brahmaƒo stands for ëof Brahmaní. This is in the sixth case, which is used in two

aja
contexts: (a) The desire to know things related to Brahman; this is called ‹e¶a¶a¶¢h∂;
(b) The desire to know Brahman itself directly; this is called karma¶a¶¢h∂. The question
is: In this sµutra, the sixth case is used in which sense? Is it ‹e¶a¶a¶¢hi or karma ¶a¶¢h∂?
i.e., is the jij¤åså for things related to Brahman? or Brahman Itself?
r
riv
The Opponentís View: In the first sense, Brahman is also included in things
related to Brahman. So, there is nothing wrong in accepting ‹e¶a ¶a¶¢h∂ here.
Vedantin: What you say is true. But in ‹e¶a, the related things become important
Pa

and Brahman secondary. In karma ¶a¶¢h∂, it is not like that. The importance is for the
knowledge of Brahman Itself and related things are secondary but do not get
included. It is because with the knowledge of Brahman, the knowledge of related
things are also obtained. But with the knowledge of related things, the knowledge
ha

of Brahman is not obtained. So, by taking the second sense, unnecessary effort is
avoided.
Question: What are the things related to Brahman?
Ma

Answer: We say the objects of the world. In the example given by Bhå¶yakåra
above, the king is Brahman and objects of the world are his retinue. This is explained
in Bæhadåraƒyaka bhå¶ya like this: ëNot knowing being common, Åtman is to be
known and also unåtman. When it is so, why is stress given (in ‹åstra) to contemplate
on Åtman only? We reply that Åtman which is our concern is what we have to
obtain and not the other. The phrase ëof all thisí is used in the sixth case of fixing
(the object of the desire to know) amongst all this. This Åtman - this Åtmatattwam -
the inherent nature of the j∂våtman (is the one to be known). ëIs not the other thing to
be known?í It is not like that. Though it is to be known, its knowledge does not
62

need anything other than Åtmanís knowledge. ëHow?í It is because, knowing Åtman,
one will known the un-Åtman also - everything. vfuKkZrRolkekU;kr~ vkRek KkrO;% vukRek
pA r=k dLekr~ vkReksiklus ,o ;Ru vkLFkh;rs ^vkResR;soksiklhr* bfr\ u brj foKkus bfr\
v=k mP;rsµrr~ ,rr~ ,oa iz—ra inuh;a xeuh;a u vU;r~A ^vL; loZL;* bfr fuékkZj.kkFkkZ "k"BhA vfLeu~
loZfLeu~ bfr vFkZ%A ^;n;ekRek* ;nsrnkRerŸoe~A fdÏ u foKkrO;e~ ,o vU;r~\ uA fdÏ rfgZ\ KkrO;Ros vfi u
i`FkXKkukUrje~ vis{krs vkReKkukr~A dLekr~\ vusukReuk Kkrsu fg ;Lekr~ ,rr~ loZe~ vukRetkre~ vU;r~ ;r~
lo± leLra osn tkukfr (Br. Bh. 1.4.7). Åtman in these sentences is pråj¤a (who is really

a
Brahman) and un-Åtman is the world which is also Brahman. It is because of not

k
knowing these two that one is doing adhyåsa - superimposing in both directions.

aja
The world indeed is Åtman only, but the ignorant person thinks it is un-Åtman. So
its un-Åtmanness, imagined due to avidyå is illusory - ^vfo|;So vukReRoa ifjdfYira] u rq
ijekFkZr% vkRe O;frjsds.k vfLr fdafpr~* (Br. Bh. 2.4.14). So, the knowledge of things related
to Brahman is not the big desire; the big desire is to know Brahman itself.
r
In this way, since knowledge of Brahman subsumes the knowledge of things
riv
related to it, the sµutra does not have to say it separately. The features of a sµutra are
described as follows:
Pa

vYik{kjelfUnXéka lkjon~ fo'orkseq[ke~A vLrksHkeuo|¸ lw=ka lw=kfonks fonq%AA

Without using unnecessary words (astobham), giving scope to see the issue
from different angles (vi‹watomukham) a sµutra speaks about a very significant matter
(såravat), in a faultless way (anavadyam), unambiguously (asandigdham) and in a few
ha

letters (alpåk¶aram).

10. ßeglÙevegieceeÛÛe~ ‘‘Ùelees Jee Fceeefve Yetleeefve peeÙevles'' (lew.3.1) FlÙeeÅee:

Ma

ßegleÙe: ‘‘leefÉefpe%eememJe, leodyeÇÿe'' (lew. 3.1) Fefle HeÇlÙe#ecesJe yeÇÿeCees efpe%eemeekeâce&lJeb

oMe&Ùeefvle~ leÛÛe keâce&efCe <e<"erHeefjieÇns met$esCe Devegieleb YeJeefle~ lemceeled yeÇÿeCe: Fefle keâce&efCe
<e<"er~
10. This is also in conformity with ‹ruti. ›rutis like ëëfrom where these beings
originateí etc explicitly show that Brahman is the principal object of discussion
(by saying) ëDiscuss that; that is Brahmaníí. That will conform to the sµutra if
the Sixth Case is accepted in the accusative sense. Therefore, ëOf Brahmaní is
in the Sixth Case in the accusative sense.
 63

11. %eelegced FÛÚe efpe%eemee~ DeJeieefleHeÙe&vleb %eeveb mevJeeÛÙeeÙee FÛÚeÙee: keâce&~

HeâueefJe<eÙelJeeefoÛÚeÙee:~ Kkusu efn HeÇceeCesve DeJeievlegb F<šb yeÇÿe~ yeÇÿeeJeieefleefn& Heg®<eeLe&:~
efveMMes<e-mebmeejyeerpe-DeefJeÅeeÅeveLe&-efveyen&Ceeled~ lemceeodyeÇÿe efJeefpe%eeefmeleJÙeced~
11. Jij¤åså is the desire to know. The knowledge culminating in experience
is the object of desire expressed by the san-suffix, because the fruit is the object
of desire. The knowing of Brahman is the pramåƒaói.e., the valid means of

a
knowledgeóthrough which experience is desired. The experience of Brahman

k
is the human goal because it destroys tracelessly all the evil seeds of sa≈såraó
transmigration or worldly life in generalólike avidyå etc. Therefore, Brahman

aja
has to be discussed.
(11.1) Desire to know is jij¤åså. The så here is called san suffix. So, the meaning
of this suffix is desire and knowledge is the object of this desire. What is knowledge?
r
It is the modification of the intellect in accordance with the object. This has been
riv
said even in the beginning. The knowledge of all limited objects generates a
corresponding modification in the intellect. When this is so, the question that arises
in knowing Brahman is: Brahman is formless. So how can a corresponding
Pa

modification occur in the intellect? Following this objection, ‹ruti also says ^vizkI;
eulk lg* - Unapproachable even by mind (Tai. 2.4). However, another ‹ruti says
^eulSokuqn"z VO;e~* - It has to be grasped by the mind alone (Br.4.4.19). These two sentences
are contradictory. How to reconcile them? The sentence in the text ^voxfri;ZUra Kkua
ha

lUokP;k;k bPNk;k% deZ* - The knowledge culminating in avagati is the object of desire
indicated by the san suffix shows the way.
(11.2) In order to know them, the intellect is constantly interacting with
Ma

changing, inert and limited objects. This has been happening since the infinite past.
So, the intellect has become dirty, coloured and blunt. Such an intellect cannot
grasp Brahman which is unchanging, conscious and unlimited. However, a
competent person - i.e. with the qualities of viveka, vairågya etc. mentioned in the
beginning of this sµutra - can get the knowledge of Brahman when his intellect
becomes clean, transparent and sharp by constant practice. That is, his intellect
becomes as formless and motionless like Brahman with Its understanding (G. Bh.
6.20) - ^vR;UrfueZyRo vfrLoPNRo vfrlw{eRo miiŸks% vkReu% cqºs% p vkReleuSeZY;kr~ miiŸks%
vkRepSrU;kdkjkHkklRo miifŸk%* & Åtman is totally clean, transparent and extremely sharp.
64

If the intellect also is equally clean etc, the intellect does reflect Åtmanís features
(G. Bh. 18.50) (The Åtman in this sentence is Brahman)*.
This formless, motionless ëmodification' of the intellect represents the
knowledge of Brahman ^vdYida loZdYiukoftZra----Kkua&Ks;su ijekFkZlrk cz„.kk vfHkUua----lR;a Kkua
vuUre~ bR;kfn JqfrH;%* - This formless knowledge is not different from the object
Brahman. That the ‹ruti says Brahman is satyam, j¤ånam and anantam is the pramåƒa
for this (Må. Kå. 3.33).

a
Next, what is avagati? How is avagati obtained starting from this knowledge?

k
These questions need answers.

aja
(11.3) The answer to these questions is shown by the sentence: ^Kkusu fg izek.ksu
voxUrqe~ b"Va cz„* - The desire is to realize Brahman through the pramåƒa of Its
knowledgeí. For this pramåƒa, what is the prameya - object? Who is the pramåta -
knower? The object has to be Brahman because, when the aspirant was in search of
r
the unchanging, conscious and limitless Brahman, this extraordinary modification
riv
of the intellect occurred. At least, during that time, this modification is changeless
and timeless. It also has the feature of consciousness, because: Any modification of
the knowledge of finite objects has an adjective and a noun. For example, in the
Pa

ëknowledge of the potí, ëof the potí is the adjective and ëknowledgeí is the noun.
These qualified knowledges are changing according to the objects. But the noun
ëknowledgeí is unchanging. This is called ëconsciousness' which is the second
characteristic of Brahman - also called j¤apti (Tai. Bh. 2.1) by Bhå¶yakåra. This
ha

formless, motionless ëmodification' being attributeless is not different from j¤apti.

Therefore, the object of this knowledge is Brahman. ^cz„ Ks;a ;L; LoL; rfnna cz„ Ks;e* -
Brahman which is the object for him is the object-Brahman (Må. Kå. 3.33). Next, who
Ma

Is the knower of this Brahman? The extrovert wakeful aspirant (bahispraj¤a) who is
having this special modification is the knower.

*Here ëcleaní means free from universally accepted bad qualities like lust, anger,
greed etc. This cleanliness is not sufficient for Brahma-j¤åna; the intellect should be
ëtransparentí also, i.e. without any prejudice or bias. Only then it would know anything
as it is. Further, it also needs ësharpnessí. The intellect loses its ability to grasp subtle
ideas - becomes blunt - if it is used for understanding crude things. Brahman is the subtlest.
So, to grasp it, the intellect must be extremely pure, extremely transparent and extremely
subtle - like Brahman Itself.}
 65

(11.4) What is avagati? It is the experience of the oneness of Brahman-Åtman.

The aforesaid knowledge is the pramåƒa for it. Himself is the knower and Brahman
is the known. Therefore, in this transaction of knower and the known, there is
oneness. How to obtain oneness starting from this duality? It is like this: Brahman
is always j¤apti - consciousness. But the ëmodification' of the intellect corresponding
to Brahman is a reflection of Brahman in the intellect - not Brahman Itself, not
consciousness itself. Since it does not always stay in formlessness, it is not

a
immutable. So, it is not right to know it as Oneself. It is also impossible for a knower
to feel oneness with the known. But the pråj¤a, who is between the knower and the

k
known, is Himself and also Brahman. ëHow?í It is like this: Pråj¤a has all the features

aja
of Brahman, he is not an image of Brahman, he is Brahman itself. ëHe is clean like
water, he is without a second. Therefore, this is fearless, this is Paramåtman. This is
the ultimate goal the j∂va has to reach, this is the greatest wealth, this is the greatest
heaven. This is the greatest bliss - ^lfyy ,dks Ê"Vk}Srks Hkofr-----,"kkL; ijekxfr% ,"kkL; ijeklair~
r
,"kksøL; ijeks yksd%A ,"kksøL; ije vkuUn%* (Bæ. 4.3.32).
riv
Further, pråj¤a is himself also, because he has avidyå which is the absence of
the realisation that he is Brahman. Indeed, he is the Brahman who is yet to realize ëhe
Pa

is Brahmaní. Since he has already understood Brahman directly through j¤åna-pramåƒa

and also since all the features of Brahman are being experienced in su¶upti, it is not
impossible to realise his oneness with Brahman. It is being experienced within the
body - ^nsgs"oso foHkkO;ekuRokr~* (G.Bh. 13.16).
ha

^rsu vkReLo:is.k vtsu Kkusu vta Ks;e~ vkRerŸoa Lo;eso cq/;rs* & From that unborn
consciousness which is his ineherent nature åtmatattwaói.e, pråj¤a - realizes himself
as the unborn Brahman (Må. Kå. 3.33). Therefore, the aspirant should keep his
Ma

intellect continuously flowing towards Åtman with the awareness ëI am Brahmaní

generated by ‹ruti. This is called nididhyåsana or j¤åna-ni¶¢hå. With this, the
relationship of adhyåsa with the intellect drops off; along with this, pråj¤atwa also
drops off. Proceeding in this way, when j¤åna-ni¶¢hå which started with j¤åna-pramåƒa
culminates in the realization of Brahman-Åtman oneness, the aspirant settles down
in the oneness of Åtman. Therefore, without feeling tired, one should pursue in
j¤åna-ni¶¢hå for realization. Since Brahman is the goal of everything, this realisation
expresses itself in waking and dreaming states as sarvåtmabhåva - everything is
himself. This may happen very quickly for great people, for others it may require
66

several lives. The G∂tå says: ^cgwuka tUeukeUrs Kkuoku~ eka izi|rsA oklqnso% loZfefr* - The man
with j¤åna reaches me at the end of many lives and realizes that everything is
Våsudev' (G∂tå 7.19). With this realization, both the entities grasped as ëyou' and ëI'
(first words in the Adhyåsa Bhå¶ya) drop off; all nonsense (anartha) comes to an end.
Therefore, this is the highest human goal. So, one desirous of Åtman, should discuss
about Brahman*.
(11.5) Another question: In part (7) of the bhå¶ya it is said: ^cz„ftKklk drZO;k*&

a
Brahma-jij¤åså should be done. In (11), the same is said - ^cz„ foftKkflrO;e~*A In

k
Taittar∂ya Bhå¶ya it is said ^cz„ foftKklLo* - Desire the clear knowledge of
Brahman.The meaning of all these is the same: Do or have the desire for Brahma-

aja
j¤åna. But this does not reconcile with the former sentences because: ^rLekr~ fde~ vfi
oDrO;a ;n~ vuUrjaa cz„ftKklk mifn';rs bfr*- Having said ëtherefore it is to be told after
what is Brahma-jij¤åså to be taught?' (section 5 of text), the answer is given as ëafter
r
sådhana-sampattií - i.e., the qualities of discrimination, dispassion etc., which make
riv
one competent for Åtmanís knowledge (section 6 of text). Desire for mok¶a is included
in these set of qualities. Hence, to one who is already having desire for mok¶a, the
advice to have desire for knowledge or mok¶a is not meaningful. So, what is the
Pa

*Question: It is a strange situation: While demonstrating that adhyåsa is mithyåj¤åna,

clear separation is shown between k¶etra and k¶etraj¤a, using the shell-silver example.
But after realising that k¶etraj¤a is Brahman, k¶etra is shown to be non-different from
Brahman (though Brahman is different from k¶etra) using the gold-ornament example.
ha

What exactly is happening?

Answer: Adhyåsa is the relation between the k¶etra and the Self and effect-cause is
the relation between k¶etra and Brahman. Therefore, either way, during avidyå or vidyå,
Ma

Self is different from k¶etra. But clarity is needed only in the reverse direction, viz., what
is the relation of the k¶etra with the Self? The answer is: During avidyå, k¶etra is different
from Self - but not as a rule; there is a sense of oneness with some selected parts of k¶etra
- like oneís own body and the difference in some other parts - like his enemies. But
during vidyå, k¶etra is non-different from Self as a rule. To remove the inconsistency in
the ignorant person, ‹åstra proceeds as follows: It is clear that pråj¤a has all the
characteristics of Brahman, viz., satya, j¤åna, ananta, ånanda and oneness. So, pråj¤a is
Brahman. After realising this, he is different from k¶etra as he was before. Now with the
help of ‹ruti he realises that the whole of k¶etra is himself and his previous inconsistency
is removed.
 67

meaning of the sentences in the beginning of this paragraph? Answer is this: Jij¤åså
has two meanings: (1). Desire to know and (2). Discussion. The second meaning is
in common usage. So the three sentences above mean ëdo discuss about Brahmaní.
For knowledge of Brahman, Its discussion is necessary. For discussion of dharma,
‹ruti etc. are the only pramåƒas; not so in the case of discussion on Brahman. ›ruti
and experience are pramåƒas as the occasion arises, because knowledge of Brahman
has to culminate in its experience and it is an existent object - ^u ékeZftKklk;ke~ bo

a
JqR;kn;% ,o izek.ka cz„ftKklk;ke~ fdUrq JqR;kn;% vuqHkokn;% p ;FkklEHkoe~ bg izek.ke~A vuqHkokolkuRokn~
HkwroLrqfo"k;Rokr~ p cz„KkuL;A* (Sµu. Bh.1.1.2)

k
aja
12. leled HegveyeÇ&ÿe HeÇefmeæceHeÇefmeæb Jee mÙeeled~ Ùeefo HeÇefmeæced, ve efpe%eeefmeleJÙeced~
DeLe DeHeÇefmeæced, vewJe MekeäÙeb efpe%eeefmelegefceefle~ GÛÙeles~ Deefmle leeJeod yeÇÿe efvelÙe-
MegæyegæcegòeâmJeYeeJeced, meJe&%eced, meJe&MeefòeâmeceefvJeleced~ yeÇÿeMeyomÙe efn JÙeglHeeÅeceevemÙe
r
efvelÙeMegælJeeoÙe: DeLee&: HeÇleerÙevles~ ye=bnlesOee&lees: DeLee&vegieceeled~ meJe&mÙe DeelcelJeeÛÛe
riv
yeÇÿeeefmlelJeHeÇefmeefæ:~ meJees& efn DeelceeefmlelJeb HeÇlÙesefle, ve veenceefmce Fefle~ Ùeefo efn
veelceeefmlelJe HeÇefmeefæ: mÙeeled meJees& ueeskeâes veenceefmce Fefle HeÇleerÙeeled~ Deelcee Ûe yeÇÿe~
Pa

12. ëThat Brahman again could be well-known or unknown. If well-known,

it need not be discussed; if unknown, it cannot be discussed.í We say: There
does exist Brahman which is by nature eternally pure, enlightened and free,
omniscient and endowed with all powers. If the word Brahman is extracted in
ha

conformity with the meaning of the root ëBrahmí, the meanings of eternal
purity etc. will emerge. Also because of being the Åtman of all, the existence of
Brahman is well known. Everyone indeed cognizes his existence, None says ëI
Ma

do not existí. Had not the existence of Åtman been well known, everyone would
have said ëI do not existí. That Åtman is Brahman.
(12.1) It has been said that discussion of Brahman has to be done. This leads to
the following objection: If Brahman is famous i.e., already known to everyone, then
discussion is unnecessary. If It is not famous i.e., unknown to everyone, discussion
is not possible. So how can discussion be done?
Answer: Brahman is not famous; so discussion is necessary and Brahman is
famous, so discussion is possible. It is famous in the sense that everyone has some
68

faint knowledge that ëthere is some such thingí. It is not famous in the sense that
there is no clear knowledge of Brahman.
Objection: Common people will not have even heard of the word Brahman.
How do you say It is famous?
Answer: This is the answer to those who know the word Brahman. The
origination of the world itself establishes an eternal, clean, enlightened, free
Brahmanís existence. Starting from the root ^c`fg o`ºkS* & Grown unrestrictedlyí if the

a
word is constructed as ^càg.kkn~ cz„* - It means that Brahman is limitless, grown without

k
damaging its inherent nature. This leads to Its features: After growth also, It remains
as It was before growth, so It is eternally clean. Since It grows by Itself, It has to be

aja
a conscious activity. So, It is eternally enlightened. Though grown unrestrictedly,
It has not left Its cleanliness and enlightenment. So, It is eternally free. Therefore, it
follows that there is the object Brahman following the meaning of the word Brahman.
r
(12.2) Next, it is shown that Brahman is famous amongst all - those who know
riv
the meaning of the word Brahman or those who do not know, whether scholars or
laymen: Pråj¤a, the inner Åtman, is in the experience of all. No one says that he is
not existing ëthough he is not understanding the world or even himselfí (Cå. 8.11.1).
Pa

No one says ëI was dead in su¶upti, I was not aliveí. It is true that during su¶upti
itself, nobody is aware that he was not knowing anything and that he was happy.
Nevertheless, after waking up, everyone says: ^u fdÏpnosfn"ka lq[kegeLokIle~* - I was not
knowing anything, I slept happily. In this way, pråj¤a is famous. This Åtman Itself
ha

is Brahman - ëÅtmå ca Brahmaí - says Bhå¶yakåra. This is because, during that time,
the reason for not knowing anything and for the experience of extreme bliss is the
oneness that he had obtained with Brahman - says the ‹ruti. So Brahman is famous.
Ma

(12.3) It is to be noticed that this proof for the fame of Brahman (in the form of
pråj¤a), cannot apply to the fourth Åtman because, he is as unknown as Brahman.
So, it is also wrong to take fourth Åtman in place of the entity grasped as ëI' - k¶etrajna
the pratyagåtman (inside Åtman). Not only that. Even in this section of the bhå¶ya the
Åtman referred to is pråj¤a only. Just as in the sentences like ^v;ekRek czzgkz* - This
Åtman is Brahman etc, here too, the Åtman in ^vkRek p cz„* - is pråj¤a only: ^cz„ v;e~
vkRekA dksølkS\ ;% izR;xkRek Ê"Vk Jksrk eUrk cksºk foKkrk - This Åtman is Brahman. Who is He?
Pratyagåtman the seer, the listener, the thinker, the knower (Bæ. Bh. 2.5.19).
 69

(12.4) Question: How is that in su¶upti, the pratyagåtmanís oneness was the reason
for his not knowing anything and his experience of extreme happiness?
Answer: During the waking state, the mind, eyes and the outside forms are
posed as separate due to avidyå. Therefore, there are qualified knowledges of forms,
i.e., seeing the forms with eyes, grasping them with his mind etc.. But in the case of
Brahman, none of these is different from It. So, though Brahman is of the nature of
consciousness, there are no qualified knowledges in It. Therefore, if pratyagåtman

a
does not have qualified knowledges in su¶upti, the reason is the oneness he had
with Brahman - ^;n~ fg rn~ fo'ks"kn'kZudkj.ke~ vUr%dj.ka p{kq% :ia p] rnfo|;k vU;Rosu

k
izR;qiLFkkfireklhr~A rnsrfLeu~ dkYks ,dhHkwre~ vkReu% ijs.k ifj"oıkr~A ----v;a rq lokZReuk laifj"oDr% Losu

aja
ijs.k izkKsu vkReuk fiz;;so iq#"k%A rsu u i`FkDRosu O;ofLFkrkfu dj.kkfu fo"k;k'pA rnHkkokn~ fo'ks"kn'kZua
ukfLr*A (Bæ. Bh.4.3.23). Further, Brahman is also of the nature of bliss (Paramånanda).
So, during su¶upti, pratyagåtman experiences that bliss also.
r
riv
13. Ùeefo leefn& ueeskesâ yeÇÿe DeelcelJesve HeÇefmeæceefmle lele: %eelecesJe Fefle Deefpe%eemÙelJeb
HegvejeHeVeced~ ve~ leefÉMes<eb HeÇefle efJeHeÇefleHeòes:~ osncee$eb ÛewlevÙeefJeefMe<šced Deelcee Fefle HeÇeke=âlee
Pa

pevee: ueeskeâeÙeeflekeâe§e HeÇefleHeVee:~ FefvõÙeeCÙesJe Ûesleveeefve Deelcee FlÙeHejs~ ceve FlÙevÙes~

efJe%eevecee$eb #eefCekeâefcelÙeskesâ MetvÙeefcelÙeHejs~ Deefmle osneefoJÙeefleefjòeâ: mebmeejer keâlee& Yeesòeâe
FlÙeHejs~ YeesòeâwJe kesâJeueb ve keâlee& FlÙeskesâ~ Deefmle leÉŸeefleefjòeâ F&MJej: meJe&%e: meJe&Meòeâ:
Fefle kesâefÛeled~ Deelcee me Yeesòeâe FlÙeHejs~ SJeb yenJees efJeHeÇefleHeVee: Ùegefòeâ-JeekeäÙe-leoe-
ha

Yeeme-meceeßeÙee:mevle:~ le$e DeefJeÛeeÙe& ÙeeflkebâefÛelHeÇefleHeÅeceeve: efve:ßesÙemeeled HeÇeflenvÙesle~

DeveLe± Ûe FÙeeled~ lemceeled yeÇÿeefpe%eemeesHevÙeemecegKesve JesoevleJeekeäÙeceerceebmee leoefJejesOelekeâesH& ekeâjCee
Ma

efve:ßesÙemeHeÇÙeespevee HeÇmletÙeles~
13. ëIf Brahman is well-known to people as the Self, then, since it is already
known, the objection that it need not be discussed comes back!í No, because,
there are conflicting views as to Its unique nature. Common people and
Lokåyatikas conceive of Åtman as the mere body qualified by animation; others
conceive of Åtman as animated sense organs; yet others as mind; others as
mere momentary cognition; others as void; still others say there is a sa≈sår∂ -
(one leading a worldly life)ódifferent from the body who is doer and enjoyer.
70

Some say that, he is enjoyer alone and not doer. Some say, there is, as different
from him, an omniscient and omnipotent ∫‹wara. He, the Åtman, is the enjoyer,
say others. Thus, there are different views based on reasoning, quotations (both
sound and) fallacious. Accepting any one of these without enquiry would
deprive one of mok¶a and one may also end up in grief. Therefore, by saying
that discussion of Brahman should be done, a holy enquiry into Vedånta

a
sentences is begun with reasoning not inconsistent therewith, and whose
purpose is mok¶a.

k
(13) In this way, if it is said that Brahman is well-known, once again the objection

aja
that it need not be discussed props up. ëIf each day, Brahman is coming to the
experience of everyone, what is there to discuss about Brahman?í It is not like that.
Everyone experiences only Its existence, no one knows Its nature - what exactly It
is. That is, there is only a vague idea of It, not Its full knowledge. So Bhå¶yakåra says
r
^rf}'ks"ka izfr foizfriŸks%* - Here are contradictory opinions about its characteristicsí among
riv
thinkers. (Notice that if Åtman is referred to here is not pråj¤a, but the fourth Åtman,
these sentences cannot be reconciled; nobody has even a vague knowledge of that
Pa

Åtman). Therefore, non-believers in God, Veda etc, Vij¤ånavådis and nihilists among
Buddhists, Logicians, Mimå≈sakås, Så≈khyas etc- describe the pratyagåtman (who is
Brahman) in different ways. Dualists who disagree with the statement ^vkRek p
cz„* & This Åtman is ∫‹wara, describe that the omnicient and omnipotent ∫‹wara is
ha

different from this Åtman. Some thinkers say He is the enjoyer. All of them use
logic and some even ‹ruti sentences for proving their point. Obviously everybody
cannot be right, because one and the same thing cannot have mutually contradictory
characteristics. Therefore, without discussing, if someone accepts one of them out
Ma

of blind faith and respect, he will miss mok¶a. Not only that; he may end up even in
distress. So, people who desire mok¶a, should discuss about Brahman. How? They
should use a logic not contradictory to the ‹ruti. Brahmasµutras and its bhå¶ya by
›å∆karåcårya do precisely this.

888
 pevceeÅeefOekeâjCeced
Jammådyadhikaraƒam

a
1. yeÇÿe efpe%eeefmeleJÙeefcelÙegòeâced~ efkebâ ue#eCeb HegvemleodyeÇÿe Fefle? Dele Deen YeieJeeved

k
met$ekeâej:-

aja
1. It has been said that Brahman is to be discussed. The question now arises
what the characteristics of that Brahman are. Hence the venerable author of
the sµutras says:

r
pevceeÅemÙe Ùele: (met. 1.1.2)
riv
(It is that) yata¨=from which, janmådi = creation etc, asya = of this
universe (happen).
Pa

(1.1) Question: ›ruti says that Brahman is not an object for knowing - ^,rr~ vize;e~*
(Br. 4.4.20); It is not visible, cannot be grasped - ^vÊs';e~ vxzk·e~* (Mu. 1.1.15);
inaccessible even to the mind - ^vizkI; eulk lg* (Tai. 2.4). Further, creation etc are
features of the world, not of Brahman. Brahman is absolutely unrelated to the world.
ha

How can these features of the world be characteristics - lak¶aƒa - of Brahman, through
which It could be known?
Answer: True. It cannot be grasped by speech, mind, eye or any other sense
Ma

organ. Though so much featureless, It is known to be the cause of the world. So, it
must have characteristics related to the features of the world - ^uSo okpk u eulk u
p{kq"kk u vU;S% vfi bfUÊ;S% izkIrqa 'kD;rsA rFkkfi loZfo'ks"kjfgr% vfi txr% ewye~ bfr voxrRokr~ vfLr ,o
(cz„)*A (Ka. Bh. 2.3.12)
Question: The fourth Åtman (who is Brahman), is said to be without
characteristics - alak¶aƒam. So, what sort of lak¶aƒa are creation etc?
Answer: What we know are features like creation etc and properties like
change, inertness, limitedness; these belong to the world. But what we are actually
looking at is Brahman. If we shift our attention gradually from creation etc to the
72

world of change and move on to Brahman, we can recognise It. In Brahman, there are
neither creation etc nor change. In this way, though these features are absent in
Brahman, they are indicators of It - the so called ta¢astha lak¶aƒa.
(1.2) One definition of ta¢astha lak¶aƒa is: An accidental occurrence showing the
object by separating it from others ^dnkfpRdRos lfr O;korZdÏ rVLFky{k.ke~*a - For example,
a crow sitting on Devadattaís house is an indicator (lak¶aƒa ) of the house. But creation
etc of the world are not ta¢astha lak¶aƒa in that sense because they will be occurring

a
periodically from infinite past to infinite future. ›ruti says: ^lw ; kZ p UÊelkS ékkrk

k
;FkkiwoZedYi;r~* - God created the universe of sun, moon etc just like previously (°Rg.
Sam. 10.190.3), ^vkReu% LFkkojtıea txr~ bne~ vfXufoLQËfyıor~ O;qPpjfr vfu'ke~] ;fLeu~ ,o p

aja
izyh;rs tycqn~cqnor~ ;nkRedÏ p orZrs fLFkfrdkys* - The universe of moving and unmoving
objects are coming out continuously like sparks of fire from the Åtman, getting
dissolved like bubbles in water staying as a form of Åtman during sustenance (Bæ.
r
Bh. 2.1.20). Another definition of this lak¶aƒa is: ^Lo:ikUrHkwrZ Ros lfr brjO;korZdÏ rVLFky{k.ke~* -
riv
Any indicator of the object other than its inherent characteristics is ta¢astha lak¶aƒa.
In this sense, creation etc are ta¢astha lak¶aƒas, because they are not Brahmanís inherent
characteristics (swarµupa lak¶aƒa). ëHow can they bring Brahman to our attention?í
Pa

^:ia :ia izfr:iks cHkwo rnL; :ia izfrp{k.kk;* - Because these forms were assumed by
Brahman to make us recognise It (Br. 2.5.19). Just as man expresses his meaning
through speech.
Brahman took up these forms to let us know It. There is a one way identity
ha

between the world and Brahman, just like that of speech and meaning. It is one way
because: Speech is not different from meaning, but meaning is different from speech.
So, creation etc and change etc of the world convey Brahman though they are not in
Ma

Brahman.

2. pevce: GlHeefòe: Deeefo: DemÙe Fefle leûgCemebefJe%eevees yeng›eerefn:~ pevceefmLeefleYebieb

meceemeeLe&:~ pevceve§e DeeefolJeb ßegefleefveoxMeeHes#eb JemlegJe=òeeHes#eb Ûe~ ßegefleefveoxMemleeJeled ‘‘Ùelees
Jee Fceeefve Yetleeefve peeÙevles’’ (lew. 3.1) FlÙeefmceved JeekeäÙes pevceefmLeefleHeÇueÙeeveeb ›eâceoMe&veeled~
JemlegJe=òeceefHe pevcevee ueyOemeòeekeâmÙe Oeefce&Ce: efmLeefleHeÇueÙemebYeJeeled~
2. JanmaóCreation; adihóetc. (meaning existence and destruction),
janma ådi asya is Tadguƒasamvij¤åna Bahuvr∂hi compound (meaning creation,
 73

existence and destruction taken together). The meaning of the compound is

creation, existence and destruction. Creation being mentioned first is according
to the ‹ruti and also the nature of things. It is thus stated in scripture ëThat
from which these beings are createdí. In this sentence, the sequence shown is
creation, existence and destruction. The nature of a thing is also such that
existence and destruction can happen only to a thing which has come into

a
existence through creation.
(2.1) Creation etc mean creation, sustenance and dissolution. Separating the

k
three in any way does not convey the purport of ‹ruti; they have to be taken together

aja
as a compound word to imply ‹rutiís purport. ëCreation' is not an adjective of the
compound word. If the word is understood without separating the adjective, the
compounding is called tadguƒasa≈vij¤åna bahuvr∂hi¨; if separated, it is called
atadguƒasa≈vij¤åna bahuvr∂hi¨. If the latter is taken, then that could imply one animate
r
cause for creation and another inanimate cause for sustenance and dissolution.
riv
The first could be the efficient cause and the second the material cause such as the
pradhåna of the Så≈khyas etc. This would not be according to ‹ruti, which says that
Brahman is both the efficient and material cause of the world. So, the first
Pa

compounding is accepted. Another point about the sequence of creation, sustenance

and destruction is as follows: When the world is not visible, we cannot talk of the
latter two. Therefore, the sequence is taken as mentioned. ›ruti also speaks of the
same sequence with respect to the creatures.
ha

(2.2) This sµutra considers the creation etc of both the inert and animate world,
i.e., both k¶etra and k¶etraj¤a. ^vkRek ·kdk'koTthoS% ?kVkdk'kSfjoksfnr%A ?kVkfnoPp la?kkrS%
tkrkosrfUun'kZue~* - Åtman is born in the form of j∂vas like åkå‹a in the form of the space
Ma

inside pots and also in the form of bodies like pots etc. This is the example for His
birth (Må. Kå. 3.3). The k¶etra coming out of aparåprakæti is Brahman; ^lR;a p vu`ra p
lR;e~ vHkor~* - Changing unchanging and apparent truth are only forms of the absolute
truth (Tai. 2.7) is pramåƒa for this. K¶etraj¤a coming out of paråprakæti is also Brahman -
^{ks=kKa p vfi eka fofº* (G∂tå 13.2) ëYou are thatí (Cå. 6.8.7) etc. are pramåƒa for this.
Though two pairs viz., aparå-k¶etra and parå-k¶etraj¤a are mentioned, Hiraƒyagarbha
appearing through aparåprakæti is the first born k¶etraj¤a, and k¶etraj¤as appear through
paråprakæti i.e. pråƒaówhich is k¶etra.
74

For creation of nåma-rµupa the qualified knowledge (of the forms) and contact
with matter is necessary. These two can be found only in a j∂va with avidyå, not
∫‹wara. Hence, motivation for creation is in j∂va and not ∫‹wara . Paramåtman is passive
in His inherent nature, but motivated in association with måyå - ^ijekReu% rq Lo:i-
O;ikJ;e~ vkSnklhU;a ek;kO;ikJ;a p izoRkZdRoe~* (Sµµu. Bh. 2.2.7). Here måyå means ego- aha≈kåra
- which is the cause of the motivation - which is avyakta in conjunction with avidyå -
^vgadkj% bfr vfo|kla;qDre~ vO;Dre~----] izorZdRokr~ vgadkjL;* (G. Bh. 7.4). In this way, the

a
material cause of creation etc. of effects is the måyå of ∫‹wara and the cause for
motivation is avidyå. That is the reason why Brahman enters in j∂va form to create

k
nåma-rµupa - ^vusu thosukReuk vuqizfo'; uke:is O;kdjokf.k* (Cå. 6.3.2). With His icchå-‹akti,

aja
j¤åna- ‹akti and kriyå- ‹akti (powers of desire, knowledge and action), ∫‹wara enters
into the j∂va through His paråprakæti pråƒa and transacts the creation etc.
Question: Rather than this, why donít we just say that måyå is the material

r
cause of the world and Hiraƒyagarbha the efficient cause and thereby retain Brahman
riv
in Its essentially passive nature?
Answer: No. Knowledge of Brahman is not possible without imposing
causeness of the world on Brahman. The vidyå of the oneness of Åtman is not possible
Pa

without the knowledge of Brahman; otherwise Brahman will remain parok¶a.

Therefore, to teach Brahman, the imposition of both the efficient and material
causeness is inevitable.
Question: If the vyavahåra of creation etc, which does not exist in Brahman, is
ha

imposed on It, does it not amount to telling a lie?

Answer: It is not a lie, since both Hiraƒyagarbha and måyå are not different
from Brahman. Hiraƒyagarbha handles the transaction of creation etc only through
Ma

Brahmanís power måyå. For e.g., though it is only the mason who does the actual
building of a house, people point to the owner as the builder. Similarly, in the case
of Brahman, the imposition of causeness is in the secondary sense; it is adhyåropa -
imposition done by ‹åstra to teach Brahman. Not a lie, it is not even adhyåsa - wrong
knowledge.

3. ‘‘DemÙe'' Fefle HeÇlÙe#eeefomebefveOeeefHelemÙe Oeefce&Ce: Focee efveoxMe:~ <e<"er

pevceeefoOece&mebyebOeeLee&~
3. (In the expression) ëëOf thisíí (the word) ëthisí refers to the thing (i.e.,
 75

universe) seen through perception etc. The sixth case refers to its relation to
creation etc.
(3.1) Here ëasya' means ëof the worldí. Creation etc are the dharmas of the world
and the world is the dharmi, i.e. in which the dharmas are seen. Dharma cannot exist
without dharmi, but dharmi does exist without dharma. This is because the world
always exists; when it is not seen, it is only unmanifest - ^dk;Ze~ vfi txr~ f=k"kq dkys"kq lŸoaa
u O;fHkpjfr* (Sµu. Bh. 2.1.16). Manifestation is creation, existing in the manifest form

a
is sustenance and becoming unmanifest again is destruction. This implies that the

k
dharmi (world), is independent of the dharma (creation etc). Similarly in the next
step, change, inertia and limitedness are dharmas of the world; and the dharm∂

aja
independent of them is its material cause viz., Brahman. World is not free from
Brahman, but Brahman is free from the world. It is like the changing pot which is not
free from clay, but clay, which is unchanging, is free from the pot. This dharma-
r
dharmi relation is nothing but effect-cause relation (Sµu. Bh. 2.1.9). In this way,
riv
creation etc are not free from the world, and the world is not free from Brahman; so,
creation etc and the world can become features of Brahman.
Creation etc are upa-lak¶aƒa - more distant features; change, inertia, limitedness
Pa

of the world are dharma-lak¶aƒa - nearer features and immutability (satyam),

awareness (j¤åna) and limitlessness (anantam) are swarµupa-lak¶aƒa, viz., inherent
features of Brahman. Similarly, birth, living and death of k¶etraj¤a are upa-lak¶aƒa,
his different levels of pleasures are the dharma-lak¶aƒa and bliss is swarµupa-lak¶aƒa -
ha

of Brahman. That is why the Brahma Sµutras start the discussion of Brahman from
creation etc in the janmådi section and then show that the world is non-different
from the immutable Brahman in the vilak¶aƒa ( Sµu. 2.1 sec3) and årambhaƒa (Sµu. 2.1
Ma

sec. 6) sections and finally in ubhayali∆ga section (Sµu 3.2 sec. 5) establish its inherent
nature of attributelessness. Similarly, in tadabhåva section, the inherent nature of
k¶etraj¤a is shown to be Brahman (Sµu. Bh. 3.2 sec. 2). In this way, the vidyå of the
oneness of Åtman is to know the inherent nature of the world which is Brahman,
which is also the inherent nature of the individual soul k¶etraj¤a; vidya is not to
know that the world is an illusion. In fact, Bhå¶yakåra has warned that the one who
understands the world as illusory is unfit for mok¶a (see Adhyåsa Bhå¶ya 25.2 end
part)*.
*Because: If what is seen by the eyes is to be rejected by the mind as mithyå, it needs
76

K¶etra (world) and k¶etraj¤a (individual soul) are described as of different

natures. If k¶etra is non-existent, this sentence does not make sense. If it is non-
existent, how could the Sµutrakåra and Bhå¶yakåra have taken so much pains to
establish that the inherent nature of k¶etra is Brahman? If the features of k¶etra are not
in Brahman, the reason is that Brahman is its material cause. This featureless Brahman
is pråj¤a. The characteristic features of Brahman viz., immutability, awareness,
limitlessness, oneness, bliss are experienced by everyone in deep sleep. There-

a
fore, when informed, anyone easily understands that adhyåsa is wrong knowledge.

k
4. ‘‘Ùele:'' keâejCeefveoxMe:~ DemÙe peiele: veece¤HeeYÙeeb JÙeeke=âlemÙe Deveskeâ keâle=Y& eesòeâ=-

aja
mebÙegòeâmÙe ØeefleefveÙele-osMe-keâeue-efveefceòe-ef›eâÙeeHeâueeßeÙemÙe cevemeeHÙeefÛevlÙejÛevee¤HemÙe
pevceefmLeefleYebieb Ùele: meJe&%eeled meJe&Meòeâs: keâejCeeod YeJeefle ‘‘leod yeÇÿe’’ Fefle JeekeäÙeMes<e:~
4. ëëFrom whichíí designates the cause. That omniscient and omnipotent
r
cause from which occur the creation, existence and destruction of this universe;
riv
a universe differentiated by name and form, containing many doers and
enjoyers, the support of the fruit of action regulated by place, time and
causation, the nature of whose design cannot even be conceived by the mind;
Pa

ëëthat is Brahmaníí is the remaining part of the sentence (in the sµutra).
(4.1) The gist of this section is that the omniscient, omnipotent Brahman alone
is the cause of the world. For confirming it, some comments may be made using
ha

inference -
(a) The world of names and forms could not have come from an inert cause.
The cause has to be animate. ›ruti puts it like this: ^lokZf.k :ikf.k fofpR; ékhj% ukekfu —Rok
Ma

vfHkonu~ ;nkLrs* & That brave one creating forms, is calling them by their names (Tai.
Ar. 3.12.7) ^l% vdke;r* & He desires (to create) (Tai. 2.6), ^l% bZ{kr] l% bZ{kkapÿs* & He saw
(Ai. 1.1.1) etc.
(b) The world is full of doers and enjoyers. The one enjoying the fruit of karma
done in this life is both the doer and enjoyer. When enjoying past karma, he is not a
doer but only an enjoyer. Since doers and enjoyers are included in creation, there
cannot be doership or enjoyership in the cause Brahman.
knowership in the doer and this separates him from Brahman. Knowership is lost only
when what is seen by the eyes is accepted by the seer as himself.
 77

(c) The doerís karma is his action (kriyå). The fruit of karma that he enjoys later is
the fruit (phala) of action. This enjoyment has to follow the rules of space, time and
causation. As this space, time and causation are effects, they cannot exist in the
cause.
(d) The complexity of the world is beyond imagination. Scientists of
extraordinary brilliance have been breaking their heads since centuries to unravel
the mystery of the world using inference (anumåna). They are succeeding only in

a
discovering some intermediate causes, never the ultimate one. It is impossible to
determine the ultimate cause by inference. Why? The reason is: Seeing vyåpya (the

k
pervaded), the vyåpaka (the pervader) is conjectured on the basis of the knowledge

aja
of vyåpti (pervasion) in anumåna pramåƒa. The knowledge of vyåpti is possible in
determining an intermediate cause, but it is impossible in the case of the ultimate
cause; because neither itself nor something similar to it is already known. Therefore,
the ultimate cause never be determined by inference.
r
riv
(4.2) Question: In (4.1c) above, time has been mentioned as a created item.
Time is what is referred to as earlier, now, later etc when the world is being seen; it
is the time recognised during sustenance. Dissolution is when it goes unseen.
Pa

Therefore, creation etc are possible only when time is accepted, i.e. time has to be
the cause. How is it that it is included among the created?
Answer: Times are really two: one is countable like earlier, now later etc. This
is relative time. Another is its cause, which is uncountable. This is the absolute
ha

time. Relative time changes from place to place; it is of decaying type and countable
like day and night. Absolute time is immutable, so not countable, so not decaying
type - like the time of one on the sun, where there is no setting or rising of sun.
Ma

Countable relative time is Brahman - ^dky% dy;rke~ vge~* (G∂tå 10.30). So also
uncountable absolute time - ^vge~ ,o v{k;% dky%* (G∂tå 10.33). When this appears as
standing grown up, it becomes relative time - ^dky% vfLe yksd{k;—r~ izo`º%* (G∂tå 11.32).
Therefore, relative time is the effect and absolute time is its material cause. Absolute
time belonging to the causal category appears like relative time through the event
of creation. So also space. Indeed, even space and time are undivided before
creation - ^ns'kdkykifjfPNUu* (Lalitå Sahasranåma 701)*.
*We can show that the space (de‹a), time (kåla) and direction (dik) are all effects.
Space, time and direction are also created along with the jagat. Actually, there is no
78

(4.3) Objection: In accordance with the names and forms already existing in
his mind, the pot maker creates the pots etc. But Brahman has no mind (Mu. 2.1.2).
How then can It be the efficient cause of the names and forms of the world?
Answer: J∂vas are alpaj¤as (vYiK). For creating anything, they need instruments
(karaƒas). Based on this, if it is conjectured that the omniscient (sarvaj¤a) and
omnipotent Brahman also needs instruments for creation is not right. It is known
that people with special powers (siddhas) create things without the usual instruments

a
(Sµu. Bh. 2.1.25). Another example is of the dreaming Åtman, which though one,

k
creates the several forms seen in dreams. Knowing all this, it is not right to use the
logic of other pramåƒas to make objections on ‹ruti. Indeed, ‹ruti tells us only about

aja
those things which are not available for other pramåƒas. Actually, that the
instrumentless Brahman is the cause of this mysterious creation shows Its
omniscience and omnipotence.

r
(4.4) Objection: One cannot say that Brahman is always knowing something or
riv
the other and doing something or the other; because, there is nothing to know or
do in pralaya. Therefore, how is it possible to say that Brahman of mere awareness -
kevala j¤ånaswarµupa - is omniscient and omnipotent?
Pa

space, time and direction in objects themselves, but we as j¤åta (knower) see them always
together. For example, when we see a pot, we see it along with the space where it is.
When something is moving we say ëthení and ënowí. Similarly with direction. Objects
belong to one class, while space, time and direction to another. As observers we are
ha

aware of the object as well as space, time and direction. For knowing the object we use
the sense organs but not so to know space, time and direction. These we get to know
only along with the object. If one is grasping the object, they must be there. Similarly, the
Ma

question arises: ëWhere are space, time and direction existing?í Since we get their pratyaya
in the buddhi, they must be existing somewhere. However, if we remove all the objects,
then there wonít be space, time or direction. But whenever the object is seen, they are
also noticed. Therefore, the cause of the objects and space, time, direction should be the
same. That is Brahman. Therefore, space, time and direction are also effects of Brahman
and not a cause. Space, time are the shadows of the object in the mind. Originally,
space-time are one undivided, but are produced distinctly along with the objects by
∫‹wara. In Brahman they are undivided, in creation, they seem to get divided. Since we
observe space, time etc, therefore they have to be there. Therefore, there is a time (kåla)
before creation; it is absolute time (nirapek¶a kåla), which is not measurable. We are
 79

Answer: It is omniscient precisely because it is j¤ånaswarµupa. The statement

that one which has the eternal capacity of j¤åna which can illumine (know)
everything is not omniscient is self-contradictory - ^;L; fg loZfo"k;koHkklu{kea Kkua fuR;e~
vfLr l% vloZK% bfr foizfrf"kºe~* (Sµu.Bh.1.1.5), Omniscience is its inherent nature - ^l%
loZKLoHkko%* (Ai. Bh. 1.1). But it does not have the transaction of omniscience, because
transaction is possible only through the adjuncts (upådhis) of intelligence etc.
Without adjuncts, transaction is not possible and Brahman has no adjuncts.

a
However, it is omniscient in its very nature; omniscience is not its attribute.
Omnipotence is also to be understood similarly.

k
(4.5) Objection: Omniscience and omnipotence are in Brahman, not j∂va. Then

aja
how is Brahman- j∂va oneness possible?
Answer: Since the vyavahåra of omniscience and omnipotence are not there in
j∂va; so ∫‹wara is different from him. Bhå¶yakåra indeed says later that j∂va cannot
r
engage in the vyavahåra of creating the world etc. But in his inherent adjunctless
riv
nature, j∂va is certainly omniscient - ^loZKrk fg loZ=k Hkorhg egkf/k;%* (Må.Kå.4.89).
Therefore, in the case of j¤ån∂, creation etc are through him only.This has already
been said (Adhyåsa Bhå¶ya 25.3).
Pa

Objection: Then would it not lead to several ∫‹waras?

Answer: This fault arises only when the j¤ån∂ is cognised through the adjuncts
of body etc. Such a cognition is wrong, because he is the Åtman unrelated to the
body. That Åtman is one and is ∫‹wara.
ha

measuring time with respect to the sun. In sun itself it is not measurable. Absolute time
manifests as relative time with respect to objects. Similarly, there is absolute space also
Ma

that is åkå‹a; before that it was in the form of Brahman.

All divisions are like this. What were previously of the nature of Brahman, show up
as modifications graspable by the intellect - without losing their inherent nature of
Brahmanness. This is just like clay appearing like pots etc - not at all different. ëThe world
which was in an undifferentiated form earlier to creation, was an object for only one
word and one concept i.e. Åtman. Now, after differentiation of names and forms, it is
available for several words and concepts and also for one word and one concept i.e.
Åtman - ^izkxqRiŸks%vO;k—ruke:iHksne~ vkReHkwre~ vkReSd'kCnizR;;xkspja txr~ bnkuha O;k—ruke:iHksnRokr~
vusd'kCnizR;;xkspje~ vkReSd'kCnizR;;xkspja p* (Ai. Bh.1.1.1). This sentence knocks out the
statement that the world is an illusion.
80

Question: How to know that ∫‹wara is only one ?

Answer: Unchangeability, awareness (j¤åna) and limitlessness are the
characteristics of ∫‹wara. Here j¤åna is not the qualified j¤åna appearing in the
intellect as a result of the action of knowing. It is mere awareness. This is only one;
it cannot be more than one. If it is, the other one becomes the known. Similarly for
ånanda of ∫‹wara. It is also free of adjuncts; it is not that which is experienced through
objects. This oneness of j¤åna and ånanda is directly experienced by everyone in

a
deep sleep. The ∫‹wara of the characteristics of j¤åna and ånanda is one only.

k
Question: It is said that parå and aparå prakætis are eternal. So they exist even in
pralaya. Does this not contradict the oneness of Brahman in pralaya?

aja
Answer: No. Even during existence when multiplicity is seen, there is only
one Brahman from the causal point of view. What to say during pralaya? Even then
it is one because prakæti is non-different from Brahman - ^lk 'kfDr% cz„ ,o vga
r
'kfDr'kfDrerks% vuU;Rokr~* (G.Bh.14.27) My måyå is of My own nature - ^ee Lo:i Hkwrk
riv
enh;k ek;k* (G. Bh. 14.3).

5. DevÙes<eeceefHe YeeJeefJekeâejeCeeb ef$e<JesJe DevleYee&Je: Fefle pevceefmLeefleveeMeeveeced Fn

Pa

ieÇnCeced~ Ùeemkeâ HeefjHeef"leeveeb leg peeÙeles Deefmle FlÙeeoerveeb ieÇnCes les<eeb peiele: efmLeeflekeâeues
mebYeeJÙeceevelJeeled cetuekeâejCeeled GlHeefòeefmLeefleveeMee: peielees ve ie=nerlee: mÙeg: FlÙeeMe¿Ÿesle~
levceeMeef¿ Fefle Ùee GlHeefòe: yeÇÿeCe: le$ewJe efmLeefle: HeÇueÙe§e le SJe ie=¢evles~
ha

5. Creation existence and destruction are to be understood here, because

all other modifications of being are included in these three. If (those)
enumerated by Yåska viz., ëborn, existsí etc were taken, they could occur even
Ma

during the existence of the universe and there could arise a doubt that the
creation existence and destruction of the universe by the ultimate cause are
not to be taken here. To prevent that doubt, existence and destruction are also
taken in the same Brahman from which creation has happened.
(5.1) Creation, sustenance and destruction mentioned in this sµutra apply to the
world as a whole. Yaska mentions six modifications for things: jåyate-born, asti-
exists, vipariƒamate-transforms, vardhate-grown, apak¶iyate-decays, vina‹yati-dies. All
these modifications could be observed in things we see during the sustenance of
 81

the world; for e.g. in a plant. For a plant, the cause could be the earth, not necessarily
Brahman. In that case, the earth would be an intermediate cause. So, a doubt could
arise whether this sµutra is referring to the ultimate cause or to some penultimate
cause like the earth in the example here. In order to rule out an intermediate cause
and keep only the ultimate cause, sustenance and destruction are also included as
happening from the Brahman from which creation happens. This is done by
absorbing Yaskaís six modifications in sustenance alone.

a
Question: What is the pramåƒa for the ultimate causeness of Brahman?

k
Answer: The mantra: í∫‹wara created the sun moon earth (the whole universe)
as it was previouslyó^lw;kZpUÊelkS ékkrk ;FkkiwoZedYi;r~ fnoa p i`fFkoha pkUrfj{keFkks Lo%* (°Rg

aja
Veda 10.190.3), says clearly that the world as a whole is subject to the cycle of
creation etc and that ∫‹wara is its cause.

r
6. ve ÙeLeesòeâ efJeMes<eCemÙe peiele: ÙeLeesòeâefJeMes<eCeced F&MJejb cegòeâdJee DevÙele:
riv
HeÇOeeveeled DeÛesleveeled, DeCegYÙe: DeYeeJeeled mebmeeefjCees Jee GlHeòÙeeefo mebYeeJeefÙelegb MekeäÙeced~
ve Ûe mJeYeeJele: efJeefMe<š osMekeâeueefveefceòeeveeced Fn GHeeoeveeled~
6. Apart from ∫‹wara having the above mentioned qualities, the creation
Pa

etc of the universe having the above mentioned qualities can never happen
from anything else like the insentient pradhåna or atoms or vacuum or j∂va;
nor by its own nature because (it) needs specific space-time-causation (relation).
ha

(6.1) This section tells us that none other than the omniscient and omnipotent
∫‹wara is the ultimate cause of this complex universe. The Såmkhyas say that their
pradhåna of the three guƒas changes by itself and gets the form of the world. There
Ma

is no example of such an inert stuff doing this sort of work. Even agreeing that the
inert pradhåna could assume the form of the world like milk becoming curd, it can
never allot the fruits of karmas to the j∂vas because of its inertness. So, inert pradhåna
could never be the cause (Sµu. Bh. 2.2. sec. 1).
Further, Vai‹e¶ikas say that atoms are the material cause of the world and a
doer-enjoyer Åtman conceived by them is the efficient cause. It has been shown
that this theory is full of contradictions (Sµu. Bh. 2.2.12-17).
Next come the nihilist Buddhists. They say ëa plant grows with the death of
the seed. So, absence of the seed is the cause of the plant. Similarly, this world too
82

comes from void.í They have no answer for the question: ëHow only absence of
mango seed is the cause of a mango tree and not the absence of a tamarind seed?í
Moreover, it is directly seen that the sprout of the tree is hidden in the seed and as
it starts growing, the seed is lost. So, their logic is irresponsible; no one agrees with
it.
Also, the world cannot come from j∂va either - ^u p fxfjunhleqÊkfn"kq ukukfoéks"kq uke:is"kq
vuh'ojL; thoL; O;kdj.klkeF;Ze~ vfLr* (Sµu. Bh. 2.4.20).

a
Next, whether something could spontaneously generate the world by its

k
inherent nature. What is inherent nature working spontaneously? It should be
something which works without the expectation of any particular place, time or an

aja
animate agent. Even milk cannot become curd without taking recourse to place
and time. Even a straw cannot move without an animate agent. An inert thing is
that which cannot work by itself. So, without an animate agent, it is impossible for
r
the world to come into existence. Therefore, this mysterious universe can come
riv
only from the omniscient, omnipotent ∫‹wara.
(6.2) Question: Starting off with a discussion of Brahman, how is it that suddenly
an omniscient and omnipotent ∫‹wara is introduced as the cause of the world? Who
Pa

is He? How is He related to Brahman?

Answer: Brahman is mere j¤åna and transactionless. It is impossible to know It.
In order to teach It, ‹åstras take the following sequence as steps: Prakæti is actually
non-different from Brahman. However, it is treated as different, and is supposed to
ha

be an adjunct of Brahman. This is an imposition (adhyåropa) on Brahman, made by

‹åstra. With this adjunct, Brahman is called ∫‹wara. One part of prakæti called avyaktaó
the inert poweróis material cause of the world; the other is pråƒaóthe action power
Ma

that activates the world. This sustains the whole world of k¶etra-k¶etraj¤a (G∂tå 7.5)
This pråƒa is the vibrating force in all (Sµu. Bh.1.3.39). Avyakta contains in it the
defects of avidyå of j∂vas - ^vfo|k|usdlalkjcht :ieUrnks"Z kor~ ek;k* (G.Bh.12.3), which creates
motivation in ∫‹wara. Creation is meant for j∂vasí experiencing the fruits of their
karma and also mok¶a. Brahman Itself is described as the agent of this activity in the
form of ∫‹wara. In the avidyå view of j∂vas, themselves, world and Brahman are all
different. But from the causal point of view, world is not different from prakæti and
prakæti is not different from Brahman - ^dkj.kL; vkReHkwrk 'kfDr% 'kDrsˇ vkReHkwra dk;Ze~* (Sµu.
Bh. 2.1.18) including j∂va.
 83

To teach this oneness of Åtman and Brahman, a difference is presupposed in

the otherwise one and alone Brahman: The prakæti, non-different from It, is conceived
as Its adjunct to reconcile with the world of vyavahåra. This is adhyåropa, which if
not done, Brahman cannot be taught. The moment Brahman is understood through
the effect-non-difference law, this adhyåropa automatically drops off. In this way,
Brahman-∫‹wara difference is just a verbal one (våcårambhaƒa)*.

a
7. SleosJe Devegceeveb mebmeeefj-JÙeefleefjòeâ-F&MJej-DeefmlelJeeefomeeOeveb cevÙevles F&MJej-
keâejefCeve:~ veveg FneefHe leosJe GHevÙemleb pevceeefomet$es? ve~ JesoevleJeekeäÙe kegâmegceieÇLeveeLe&lJeeled

k
met$eeCeeced~ JesoevleJeekeäÙeeefve efn met$ew: GoeùlÙe efJeÛeeÙe&vles JeekeäÙeeLe&-efJeÛeejCe-

aja
DeOÙeJemeeveefveJe=&òee efn yeÇÿeeJeieefle: ve Devegceeveeefo HeÇceeCeevlejefveJe=&òee~
7. Those who accept ∫‹wara as the cause, regard this very inference as the
proof for the existence of an ∫‹wara different from j∂va. ëIs not the same
r
presented here also in (this) sµutra ëCreation etc?í No, because the sµutras are
riv
intended to string together the Vedånta sentences like flowers. Sµutras
investigate quoting only the Vedånta Sentences. Realization of Brahman occurs
at the end of the investigation of the sentences, and not by other pramåƒas like
Pa

anumåna etc.
(7.1) Till now, the material causeness of Brahman is hidden in the acceptance of
the tadguƒasa≈vij¤ånabahuvr∂hi compounding of creation etc, and only Its efficient
ha

causeness has been discussed. Since this could be established even by anumåna, a
doubt arises whether in this sµutra also, ∫‹wara is portrayed using anumåna. The
answer is no. An Efficient ∫‹wara, established by anumåna is only an object for the
Ma

knower j∂va - not accessible for the experience of oneness with the knower. So, such
an ∫‹wara is always indirect. But Brahman spoken of by the ‹ruti is not so. Though it
is just existence alone - sanmåtra, it is the cause of the world; though the cause of
the world, it is sanmåtra. This deeply dignified Brahman spoken of by ‹ruti is satyam,
j¤åna, anantam and ånanda, which can be experienced by pråj¤a as himself. This
changelessness separates it from change and limitlessness from limitedness. These
two are Its relative characteristics with respect to the world derived by its material

*Apara Brahma, Saguƒa Brahma and Kårya Brahma are the other names of Hiraƒya-
garbha - the First Born (Sµu. BH. 4.3.7 and 4.3.10). This ∫‹wara is not Apara Brahma.
84

causeness. Change and limitedness are not illusions, they are transactional truths.
Further, j¤åna separates It from the adhyåropita - the imposed agency - and ånanda
from the illusory ånandamaya etc åtmans; these are absolute characteristics. Through
reflection and contemplation, one obtains the knowledge of Brahman. When this
knowledge culminates in the experience of oneness, the fruit is this: When without
thoughts, the intellect stays in existence-alone Åtman and when with thoughts, stays
in the experience of oneness of Åtman with everything. The sense of difference is

a
totally destroyed.

k
In this way, the gulf of difference between anumåna etc and ‹ruti is this: Till the
end, there will be the multiplicity of knower-knowledge-known and the associated

aja
transaction in the former. ›ruti however, though starting with multiplicity,
demolishes it gradually but tracelelssly, transforms even its gross form like
camphor, to spread light and becomes one with it. Brahma Sµutras is a garland of
the flowers of such ‹ruti sentences.
r
riv
8. melmeg leg JesoevleJeekeäÙes<eg peielees pevceeefokeâejCeJeeefo<eg leoLe&ieÇnCeoe{Ÿee&Ùe Deveg-
ceeveceefHe JesoevleJeekeäÙe-DeefJejesefOe HeÇceeCeb YeJeled ve efveJeeÙe&les~ ßeglÙewJe Ûe meneÙelJesve
Pa

leke&âmÙe DeYÙegHeslelJeeled~ leLee efn ‘‘ßeesleJÙees cevleJÙe:'' (ye= 2.4.5) Fefle ßegefle: ‘‘Hebef[lees
cesOeeJeer ievOeejevesJe, GHemebHeÅesle SJecesJe Fn DeeÛeeÙe&Jeeved Heg®<ees Jeso'' (Úeb 6.14.2)
Fefle Ûe Heg®<eyegefæmeeneÙÙeced Deelcevees oMe&Ùeefle~ ve Oece&efpe%eemeeÙeeefceJe ßeglÙeeoÙe SJe
ha

HeÇceeCeb yeÇÿeefpe%eemeeÙeeced, efkebâleg ßeglÙeeoÙe: DevegYeJeeoÙe§e~ ÙeLeemebYeJeefcen HeÇceeCeced

DevegYeJeeJemeevelJeeled YetleJemlegefJe<eÙelJeeÛÛe yeÇÿe%eevemÙe~ keâle&JÙes efn efJe<eÙes ve DevegYeJeeHes#ee
Ma

Deefmle Fefle ßeglÙeeoerveecesJe HeÇeceeCÙeb mÙeeled~ Heg®<eeOeerveelceueeYelJeeÛÛe keâle&JÙemÙe keâleg&ced

Dekeâleg&ced DevÙeLee Jee keâlegË MekeäÙeb ueewefkeâkebâ Jewefokebâ Ûe keâce& ÙeLee DeMJesve ieÛÚefle, HeÆŸeeced
DevÙeLee Jee ve Jee ieÛÚefle Fefle~ leLee ‘‘Deefleje$es <ees[efMeveb ie=þeefle'', ‘‘veeefleje$es
<ees[efMeveb ie=þeefle'', ‘‘Gefoles pegnesefle'', ‘‘Devegefoles pegnesefle'' Fefle efJeefOeHeÇefle<esOee§e De$e
DeLe&Jevle: mÙeg:~ efJekeâuHe-Glmeie&-DeHeJeeoe§e~ ve leg Jemleg ‘‘SJeb’’ ‘‘vewJeced'',
‘‘Deefmle'', ‘‘veeefmle'' Fefle Jee efJekeâuHÙeles~ efJekeâuHeveemleg Heg®<eyegæŸeHes#ee:~ ve
JemlegÙeeLeelcÙe%eeveb Heg®<eyegæŸeHes#eced~ efkebâ leefn&~ Jemleglev$ecesJe leled~ ve efn mLeeCeew Skeâefmceved
mLeeCegJee& Heg®<e: DevÙees Jee Fefle leòJe%eeveb YeJeefle~ le$e Heg®<e: DevÙees Jee Fefle efceLÙee%eeveced~
 85

mLeeCegjsJe Fefle leòJe%eeveced~ Jemleglev$elJeeled~ SJeb YetleJemleg efJe<eÙeeCeeb HeÇeceeCÙeb Jemleglev$eced~

le$e SJeb meefle yeÇÿe%eeveceefHe Jemleglev$ecesJe, YetleJemlegefJe<eÙelJeeled~
8. In order to confirm the apprehended meaning of the Vedånta Sentences
which discuss the creation etc. of the world, an inference unopposed to the
Vedånta sentences is not be excluded as a valid pramåƒa; for the upani¶ads
themselves accept reasoning as a help. ëë(The self is) to be heard, it is to be

a
thought aboutíí and ëëa learned intelligent person reaches Gandhåra, in the

k
same way, a man with an åcårya understandsíí show that one is helped by the
human intellect. In the discussion of Brahman, ‹ruti etc are not the only pramåƒa

aja
as they are on the discussion of dharma. But rather, ‹ruti etc. and experience
etc are pramåƒa as occasion arises because, the knowledge of Brahman
culminates in experience and it (Brahman) is an existent object. In the case of
r
karma which does not expect experience, ‹ruti etc are the only pramåƒa. Since
riv
coming into existence of karma depends on the person, worldly and Vedic
karma may be done, not done, or done in a different way. For e.g. one goes on
Pa

horseback or on foot or otherwise or does not go at all. Similarly, ëëIn the atiråtra
he takes the sixteenth cupíí, ëëIn the atiråtra he does not take the sixteenth
(cup)íí; ëëAs sun rises, he does the oblationíí, ëëBefore sunrise he does the
oblationíí. Prescriptions and prohibitions are meaningful here; also options,
ha

general rules and exceptions. But an object does not admit of options like ëëthus,
not thusíí, ëëexists, does not existíí. Options are dependent on human intellect
(i.e. subjective). The knowledge of the true nature of an object is not dependent
Ma

on the human intellect, What then? It depends on the object itself (i.e. objective).
In the case of one post, true cognition cannot be as ëëIt is a post or something
else or a maníí. In this case ëëa man or something elseíí is an illusory cognition;
ëëIt is certainly a postíí is the true cognition, because it depends on the object.
Thus, in the case of existent things, the validity of the pramåƒa is objective.
Therefore, the knowledge of Brahman also is objective as it is an existent object.
(8.1) Though inference etc are blamed in this manner, they cannot be rejected
because in the process of knowing Brahman they too have a role since ultimately,
86

Brahman too is an existent object to be experienced. Just as in the case of other

objects, Brahman's knowledge too is objective - to be understood as it is. It is not
subjective; i.e., the knower cannot know it as he likes. The example of the stump
given by Bhå¶yakåra has been discussed in (Adhyåsa Bhå¶ya 14.4). So, ‹ruti etc and
experience etc are pramåƒas in the discussion of Brahman as the occasion arises.
›ruti etc means ‹ruti, ‹mæti, puråƒa, itihåsa; and experience etc means experience
obtained through other pramåƒas and the logic necessary to remove doubts.

a
(8.2) This is not so in the discussion of dharma (dharma-jij¤åså). Karma taught
there is not objective. So, there is room for injunction-prohibition, choice-general

k
rule-exceptions. Unlike Brahma-jij¤åså, experience is not a criterion in the discussion

aja
of dharma.
(8.3) After rejecting inference etc for Brahmanís experience, if it is said that they
also have a role besides ‹ruti, the question arises ëWhen are other pramåƒas also

r
acceptable? Why? When are they not acceptable? Why?í In the absence of clear
riv
answers to this question, one will not know the method of discussing Brahman.
One will argue when one should not argue and will not argue when one should
argue. These defects will hamper the discussion of Brahman. To prevent it, we will
Pa

take up its examination.

(8.4) Things are of two types: available to the senses and not available. Pramåƒas
are five: direct perception (pratyak¶a ), inference (anumåna), analogy (upamåna),
presumption (arthåpatti), Vedas (‹ruti). Those available for the senses are objects
ha

for the first four, since all of them depend on direct perception. Though inference
concerns a thing which is indirect at that particular moment, finally its existence
has to be verified only by direct perception; otherwise the concept is rejected. On
Ma

the other hand, ‹ruti speaks only of things that are not perceptible to the senses.
Dharma/adharma and things beyond prakæti are not available for sense perception;
they are topics exclusively for ‹ruti. Nevertheless, dharma/adharma meant for the
prosperity of the j∂vas, are not unrelated to the objects of perception. So, though the
dharma part of the Vedas discusses only things beyond perception, it cannot speak
against other pramåƒas. ëEven if 100 ‹rutis say that fire is cold and without light,
they cannot be pramåƒa. If ‹ruti at all says that ëfire is cold, without lightí, then
another intended meaning has to be conceived. Otherwise, it will not be valid. The
conceived meaning should not contradict either the pramåƒa in question or ‹ruti - ^u
 87

fg Jqfr'kre~ vfi 'khr% vfXu% vizdk'kks ok bfr cqzor~ izkek.;e~ miSfrA ;fn czw;kr~ 'khr% vfXu% vizdk'kks ok
bfr rFkkfi vFkkZUrja Jqrs% foof{kra dYI;a izkek.;&vU;Fkk&vuqiiŸks% u rq izek.kkUrjfo#ºa Loopufo#ºa
ok* (G.Bh. 18.66).
(8.5) Next, in Brahmanís discussion, how can there be room for other pramåƒas?
›ruti itself encourages them because Brahman has to be understood only through
the perceived world; there is no other way. Therefore, upto the point of conveying
the knowledge of Brahman, ‹ruti uses other pramåƒas also and never speaks

a
contradictory to them. ëOne pramåƒa can never contradict another pramåƒa. A pramåƒa

k
objectifies only that which is not an object for other pramåƒas. Without resorting to
the words and objects of the world, even ‹ruti cannot convey another unknown

aja
thing - ^u p izek.ka izek.kkUrjs.k fo#é;rs] izek.kkUrjkfo"k;e~ ,o fg izek.kkUrja Kki;frA u p
ykSfddininkFkkZJ;kO;frjsdÍ.k vkxesu 'kD;e~ vKkra oLRoUrje~ voxef;rqe~* (Br. Bh. 2.1.20). So,
there is certainly profit derived from other pramåƒas in the process of getting the
r
knowledge of Brahman. After getting this knowledge, one crosses the limits of
riv
multiplicity and enters into the region of oneness. After this there is no room for
other pramåƒas, not even for that part of the ‹ruti dealing with the prosperity of the
j∂vas.*
Pa

Here, Upani¶ads are the only pramåƒa. Therefore, after learning about Brahman
through the world, one cannot ask questions in the reverse direction based on
inference etc. For e.g., there is no meaning in asking the questions: ëHow can the
world emerge from a Brahman which is alone without a second? How can the
ha

immutable Brahman handle transactions like creation etc?í Even as the compassio-
nate Bhå¶yakåra cautions the questioner that these are unusable questions, he
simultaneously makes the effort of pacifying him with an appropriate answer as
Ma

follows: ëIt has indeed been said that other pramåƒas are also possible of application
since Brahman is an existent object'. This thought is merely a fancy. Brahman is not

*Question: A ‹ruti against pratyak¶a is interpreted reconciling both pramåƒas. Should

the same be done if the ‹ruti is against inference?
Answer: No, because: Whether inference or ‹ruti, its validity is only by direct
experience. In the case of the first five pramåƒas, experience is only by pratyak¶a. So, the
other four pramåƒas cannot go against pratyak¶a. But in the case of ‹ruti, the object to be
experienced is not pratyak¶a; so it need not conform to pratyak¶a. But the validity of ‹ruti
does hold since the object propounded by it is experienceable - though not by pratyak¶a.
88

available for perception by the senses because it has no form etc. It is not available
for inference etc because It has no signs. Like dharma, Brahman too is to be understood
only through ‹ruti - ^;r~ rq mDre~ ifjfu"i¬kRokr~ cz„f.k izek.kkUrjkf.k laHkos;q% bfr rnfi euksjFkek=ke~A
:ik|Hkkokfº u v;e~ vFkZ% izR;{kL; xkspj%A fyık|Hkkokr~ p u vuqekuknhuke~A vkxeek=klefékxE; ,o rq
v;e~ vFkZ% ékeZor~*A (Sµu. Bh. 2.1.6).
One has to carefully examine the phrase ëlike dharma, to be understood only
by ‹rutií in the above quotation and the sentence ë‹ruti etc are not the only pramåƒa

a
in the discussion of Brahman as in the discussion of dharmaí in the bhå¶ya text section

k
being discussed presently. Questions raised above in the reverse direction belong
to the former category. They are answered by a logic not contradictory to the ‹ruti

aja
as follows: ëWaking and dreaming states come and go, leaving the pråj¤a untouched.
In deep sleep he is the worldless Åtman because he leaves the world and merges in
Brahman; the world is a product of Brahman and so non-different from Brahman by

r
the law of non-difference of effect-cause - ^JqR;uqx`ghr ,oa rdZ% vuqHkokıRosu vkJh;rsA
riv
LoIukUrcqºkUr;ks% mHk;ks% brjsrjO;fHkpkjkr~ vkReu% vuUokxrRoe~] laizlkns p izi¸ifjR;kxsu lnkReuk
laiŸks% fu"izi¸lnkReRoe~] izi¸L; cz„izHkoRokr~ dk;Zdkj.kkuU;U;k;su cz„kO;frjsd bfr ,oa tkrh;d%*A
(Sµu. Bh. 2.1.6).
Pa

9. veveg YetleJemleglJes yeÇÿeCe: HeÇceeCeevlejefJe<eÙelJecesJe Fefle JesoevleJeekeäÙeefJeÛeejCee DeveefLe&kewâJe

HeÇeHlee? ve~ Fbeõf ÙeDeefJe<eÙelJesve mebyebOeeieÇnCeeled~ mJeYeeJelees efJe<eÙeefJe<eÙeeefCe Fbeõf ÙeeefCe ve
yeÇÿeefJe<eÙeeefCe~ meefle efn Fbeõf ÙeefJe<eÙelJes yeÇÿeCe: Fob yeÇÿeCee mebyeæb keâeÙe&ecf eefle ie=¢esle~
ha

keâeÙe&cee$ecesJe leg ie=¢eceeCeb efkebâ yeÇÿeCee mebyeæb efkeâcevÙesve kesâveefÛeÉe mebyeæefceefle ve MekeäÙeb
efve§eslegced~ lemceeled pevceeefo met$eb veevegceeveesHevÙeemeeLe&ced, efkebâ leefn?
& JesoevleJeekeäÙeHeÇoMe&veeLe&ced~
Ma

9. ëIf Brahman is an existing thing, it would be an object for other pramåƒas

and so would it not become meaningless to investigate Vedånta sentences to
know Brahman?í No, because, as It is not an object for the senses the connection
cannot be known. Senses by nature cognize things and cannot cognize Brahman.
If It were cognizable by the senses, then, Its connection with this effect (world)
could be grasped. When effect alone is being grasped, it is not possible to
determine whether it (the effect) is connected with Brahman or with something
else. Therefore, the sµutra ëcreation etcí could not be speaking of inference. ëWhat
then?í It is conveying the meaning of the Vedånta sentences.
 89

(9.1) By the law of non-difference of effect-cause, ëthe world, which is an effect,

is one with its cause, which is Brahmaní (Sµu. Bh. 2.2.38) - this is the former part of the
law. But Brahman is different from the world - this is the latter part of the law. ›ruti
discusses the former part through the examples of clay-pot etc and thereby teaches
about Brahman. During this step, it uses a logic not in disagreement with other
pramåƒas. But in the region of the latter part, apart from superimposing (adhyåropa)
of causeness of the world on Brahman, it does not say anything more. Indeed no

a
theory, professing to discuss the issue, tells us anything more than this, because it
is just not possible. This becomes obvious when one has understood Brahman.

k
Nevertheless common people, who are influenced by other pramåƒas, do ask the

aja
unaskable question ëHow is is possible that from Brahman, who is ëmerely existenceí
(sanmåtra), the world could be produced?í It is to clear this doubt that the bhå¶ya
uses the rope-snake example. ëThough this appears as snake, it is rope only.
Similarly, though it appears like the world, it is Brahman only. There is Brahman
r
alone. There is nothing like a world different from Brahmaní. Therefore factually,
riv
there is no scope for this question. This is the logic, uncontradictory to ‹ruti, which
is employed by the bhå¶ya to answer the above question.
In this way, while explaining Brahman though the world, the clay-pot examples
Pa

are used and after teaching, to remove doubts about the understood Brahman, the
example of snake and rope is given. But those who are stuck firmly to the illusoriness
(jagat-mithyåtva) of the world, caused by the blunder of associating ëasmat-pratyaya-
gocaraí, the very first word of Adhyåsa Bhå¶ya with the fourth Åtman - not bothering
ha

to investigate the roles of the extremely dissimilar examples of clay-pot and rope-
snake - ditch the example of clay-pot which shows the cause-effect relation - hold
on firmly to the rope-snake example which does not show the cause-effect relation
Ma

- cook up the word vivartopådåna whatever it is, to explain the cause-effect relation
of Brahman and the world. If they are ascribing vivartopådånaness to Brahman to
reconcile the creation of the world with the immutability of Brahman - it is
unnecessary, because the clay-pot example itself reconciles it since ëclay alone is
immutable - ^e`fŸkdÍR;so lR;*. But the effort of their ëlogic' is aimed at proving that the
world is non-existent. This is discardable outright. No one who has studied the
ëpot-bhå¶yaí of Bæhadåraƒyaka Upanisad (Br. Bh. 1.2.1) will accept that the world is
non-existent. This section of the bhå¶ya is also not convenient for these illusionists.
It is like this: In the rope-snake example, both the rope and the snake are objects for
90

the eyes. Though a snake is being seen, on examining the rope with the same eyes
one realises ëthis is not a snake, it is a ropeí. But in the case of Brahman-jagat, only
the jagat is an object for the eyes and not Brahman, which is the cause of jagat (world).
Therefore, Brahman cannot be taught through the world by saying that ëthe support
- adhi¶¢håna - of this illusory world is Brahmaní.

10. efkebâ HegvemleÉsoevleJeekeäÙeb Ùeled met$esCe Fn efueue#eefÙeef<eleced? ‘‘Ye=iegJez Jee®efCe:~

a
Je®Ceb efHelejcegHememeej~ DeOeerefn YeieJees yeÇÿesefle''FlÙegHe›eâcÙe Deen ‘‘Ùelees Jee Fceeefve

k
Yetleeefve peeÙevles~ Ùesve peeleeefve peerJeefvle~ Ùeled HeÇÙevlÙeefYemebefJeMeefvle~ leefÉefpe%eememJe~

aja
leodyeÇÿesefle'' (lew. 3.1) lemÙe Ûe efveCe&ÙeJeekeäÙeced ‘‘DeevevoeæŸesJe KeefuJeceeefve Yetleeefve
peeÙevles~ Deevevosve peeleeefve peerJeefvle~ Deevevob HeÇÙevlÙeefYemebefJeMeefvle''(lew. 3.6) Fefle~
DevÙeevÙeefHe SJeb peeleerÙekeâeefve efvelÙeMegæyegæcegòeâmJeYeeJe-meJe&%emJe¤He-keâejCeefJe<eÙeeefCe
Goenle&JÙeeefve~
r
riv
10. ëWhich then is the Vedånta Sentence which this sµutra draws attention
to?í Beginning with ëëBhægu, the son of Varuƒa, approached his father and
asked, ëTeach me Brahman, venerable oneíî, the reply was ëëThat from which
Pa

these beings originate, being originated they live, that to which they return.
Discuss that. That is Brahmaníí. And the answer settling the question is ëëVerily
from bliss alone these beings originate. Unto bliss do they returníí. There are to
be quoted other sentences too of this nature, which speak of the cause which is
ha

eternally pure, enlightened, free and omniscient.

(10.1) Here, Vedanta sentences considered in janmådi sµutra are quoted which
Ma

teach the cause Brahman. As already mentioned, the world contains both k¶etra and
k¶etraj¤a. The sentence quoted above teaches us Brahman through k¶etraj¤a. Just as
the characteristics changelessness (satya), j¤åna and limitlessness (ananta) of Brahman
were separated from the inert world of change and limitedness, the ånanda
characteristic is to be separated from the material pleasures of k¶etraj¤a. These
pleasures are really not related with materials at all. The ånanda of deep sleep of
the adjunctless k¶etraj¤a appears as material pleasure due to the adhyåsa in wakeful
state. ›ruti says ^;Fkk fiz;;k laifj"oDrks u ck·a fdapu osnukUrja* - (Man) embraced by woman
not knowing anything inside or outside (Br. 4.3.23). Further, Bliss of deep sleep
 91

itself is the bliss characteristic of Brahman - ^,"kksøL; ije vkuUn%* (Br. 4.3.32). That is
why anyone getting up from deep sleep describes his experience by saying ëI did
not know anythingí from his mindís point of view and but from the point of view
of his inherent nature of ånanda he says ëI slept happilyí.Other sentences of ‹ruti
which teach Brahman through k¶etraj¤a are ^lR;a Kkue~ vuUra cz„-----rLekr~ ok ,rLekr~ vkReu%
vkdk'k% lEHkwr%* - Immutable, j¤åna, limitless is Brahman. From that this Åtman, åkå‹a
was created (Tai. 2.1), ^lnso lksE;snexz vklhr~ ,deso vf}rh;e~-----rnS{kr cgqL;ka iztk;s;sfr]

a
rŸkstksøl`tr* - Somya, previously this was the second-less only one sat. That reflected

k
ëI will become many, I will be born.í It created fire (Cå. 6.2.1-3). ^fnO;ks fg vewrZ% iq#"k%---
-----vizk.kks f·euk% 'kqHkz%----------,rLekr~ tk;rs izk.k% eu% losZfUÊ;kf.k p* - The lustrous formless

aja
Puru¶a. without pråƒa, without mind, clean. from him are born pråƒa, mind, all
indriyas (sense and motor ëorgansí) (Mu. 2.1,2-3), ^vkRek ok bnesd ,okxz vklhr~--------l
bekYyksdkul`tr* - Previously this was Åtman alone.. He created these worlds (Ai. 1.1.1-
r
2) etc. After fixing the nature of Brahman starting from the world, ‹ruti gives the
riv
final message that it is the inherent nature of j∂va. Since this results in his inherent
ånanda, Brahmanís sentence is quoted mainly and the other sentences have been
included in íothersí.
Pa

888
ha
Ma
 MeeŒeÙeesefvelJeeefOekeâjCeced
›åstrayonitvådhikaraƒam

a
1. peielkeâejCelJeHeÇoMe&vesve meJe&%eb yeÇÿe Fefle GHeef#eHleced~ leosJe õ{Ùeved Deen~
1. Demonstrating that Brahman is the cause of the universe, Its omniscience

k
was indicated. To strenghten this itself, it is said:

aja
MeeŒeÙeesefvelJeeled (met. 1.1.3)
›åstrayonitvåt = Of the ‹åstra, It is the cause (So, Brahman is omniscient).
r
Bhå¶yakåra has written two commentaries for this sµutra. This is the first one:
riv
(1.1) The ‹åstra is omniscient since it teaches varƒa/å‹rama, dharma/adharma
necessary for the prosperity of the j∂vas, the lessons necessary for their mok¶a, the
inherent nature of k¶etra/ k¶etraj¤a and so on. Only the Vedas can tell us about the
Pa

methods to be followed for prosperity/mok¶a for all types of people of all times;
humans cannot tell it because they cannot decide them. In order to make the meaning
of the Vedas clear, many disciplines magnify the Vedas. These are the puråƒas,
mimå≈så, dharma‹åstras, logic, and the six limbs of Veda (¶aŒaƒga).* The creation of
ha

such an omniscient Veda is possible only by the omniscient (sarvaj¤a) ∫‹wara and
not by the j∂vas who know but little (alpaj¤å). This means that the Vedas are apauru¶eya
- not of human origin.
Ma

(1.2) Question: The Vedas are eternal. The writer of the Brahma Sµutras himself
says so later (1.3.29). Then what is the meaning of saying ëthe creation of the Vedas'?
Answer: ëCreationí is a formal way of saying ëmanifestationí. In this aspect,
there is no difference between the creation of the world and the Vedas: Before
creation, this world was Brahman only - ^lnso lksE;snexzklhr~* (Cå. 6.2.1), J∂vas were
earlier unmanifest, became manifest in the middle and became unmanifest after
death - ^vO;Drknhfu Hkwrkfu O;Dr eé;kkfu Hkkjr] vO;Drfuékkfu ,o* (G∂tå. 2.28). The world
*viz., rules of recitation, details of karma, grammar, dictionary, meter and astronomy.
 93

dissolves retaining its potential and is reborn from that potential - ^izyh;ekuefi p bna
txr~ 'kDR;o'ks"ke~ ,o izyh;rsA 'kfDrewye~ ,o p izHkofr* (Sµu. Bh. 1.3.30) etc speak of eternality
with the same meaning, even for the world of k¶etra-k¶etraj¤a.
Uttered Veda is also like this. This does not mean that even during pralaya it
retains its wordness. If it were so, it is not pralaya at all; it would also violate the
‹ruti ëOnly one without a second - ^,desokf}rh;*- So it means that during pralaya, world
or Veda is one with Brahman and in creation It manifests without leaving Its

a
Brahmanness. With the grace of ∫‹wara, Veda enters into the mind of the seers and

k
manifests itself in sound-tone-word-sentence-form (Tai. Bh. 2.3). Indeed, the world
itself manifests starting from Vedic sound. ëPrajåpati created devatås with the word

aja
ayte, men with asægram, manes with indava¨, grahas with tirapavitram, stotra with
å‹va¨, ‹åstra with vi‹våni and other beings with abhisoubhagaíó^,rs bfr oS iztkifr%
nsokul`tr] vl`xzfefr euq";ku~] bUno bfr fir`u~] frj%ifo=kfefr xzgku~] vk'ko bfr Lrks=ka] fo'okfu bfr
r
'kL=ke~] vfHklkSHkxsfr vU;k% iztk%* (T僌ya Brahman 6.9.15). Just because manifestation
riv
happens through Prajåpati, no one says that the world is man-made. Similarly
Veda too. ëThis creation (of Veda) is just the continuation of the tradition, because,
no other sort of creation is possible for the Veda which has no beginning or end -
Pa

^mRlxZ% vfi v;a okp% laiznk;izorZukRed% Ê"VO;% vukfn fuékuk;k% vU;kn`'kL; mRlxZL; vlEHkokr~* (Sµu.
Bh. 1.3.28). ëOne who first creates Brahma, then communicates the Veda to him,
who reveals the knowledge of Åtman - to Him I surrender (›w. 6.18), i.e., Brahman
makes use of Brahma for the manifestation of Veda. It is just like Brahman entering
ha

into the j∂va, creating the world through him. If Brahman is not exhausted by creating
the universe and whirling it from beginning to the end of kalpa, does it get exhausted
by entering into j∂va? No. It creates the Veda effortlessly. Therefore, It is omniscient
Ma

and omnipotent.
(1.3) Some say that omniscience and omnipotence appear in the Paramåtman
due to the beginingless avidyå. Some say that transactions of omniscience and
omnipotence are imagined in Him due to avidyå. They say so because, in their
concept, omniscience and omnipotence cannot exist in the adjunctless Brahman.
But these concepts are wrong, which has been mentioned (janmådi 4.4-5). Adjunctless
Brahman Itself is indeed omniscient (Sµu. Bh. 1.1.5). Further, Even though j∂va has
features equal to ∫‹waraís, they are covered due to his defects of avidyå etc - ^thoL;-
----------bZ'oj lekuékeZRoa----------fo|ekue~ vfi] rr~ frjksfgre~ vfo|kfn O;oékkukr~* (Sµu. Bh. 3.2.5), Since
94

∫‹wara is eternally free from avidyå - ^bZ'ojL; fuR;fuo`Ÿkkfo|Rokr~* (Sµu. Bh. 3.2.9). So, their
concepts that omniscience and omnipotence appear in ∫‹wara due to the beginingless
avidyå or due to j∂vaís avidyå, are plainly contradictory to bhå¶ya. They do not know
that omniscience etc which are in Brahman express themselves as a transaction due
to the adjunct of måyå in ∫‹wara; so they entertain these concepts. Omniscience etc
are not due to avidyå, but their transactions are due to avidyå because these
transactions are not in adjunctless Brahman. Actually, even transactions appear due

a
to avidyå only when they are viewed independently; when viewed from the point
of view of a cause, even they are true.

k
(1.4) Question: What is the difference between human literature and the Vedas?

aja
Answer: An author writes books according to his mental make up and ability.
He picks up only a few aspects of the world and discusses them. His books are like
small lamps illuminating only a few nearby items. They could contain errors,

r
confusion and even half truths. If not these defects, they at least have the defect of
riv
incompleteness. The Veda is unlike this. It sphere is the entire creation of the
inanimate and animate and their cause. Indeed, the inherent nature of Veda is
Brahman. ^bes osnk% ;n;ekRekµ These Vedas are Åtman onlyí (Br. 2.4.6). Since Veda
Pa

discusses the entire creation without leaving its inherent nature, it is complete and
faultless. It is a dazzling light illuminating everything. This is its omniscience. So,
its cause Brahman has to be omniscient too.
(1.5) Question: The omniscience of ∫‹wara has already been established in the
ha

previous sµutra; why then does it need to be confirmed here?

Answer: The M∂må≈sakås, interpreting the eternality of the world and the Veda
in their own way, deny an omniscient creator. The first commentary of the sµutra is
Ma

intended to show that their concepts are contradictory to ‹ruti.

2. cenle: $e+iJesoeos: MeeŒemÙe DeveskeâefJeÅeemLeeveesHeye=eb nf lemÙe HeÇoerHeJeled meJee&L& ee&JeÅeeself eve:

meJe&%ekeâuHemÙe Ùeesefve: keâejCeb yeÇÿe~ ve efn F&ÂMemÙe MeeŒemÙe $e+iJesoeefo ue#eCemÙe meJe&%e
iegCeeefvJelemÙe meJe&%eeled DevÙele: mebYeJeesÓefmle~ ÙeÅeod efJemlejeLe± MeeŒeb Ùemceeled Heg®<eefJeMes<eeled
mebYeJeefle, ÙeLee JÙeekeâjCeeefo HeeefCevÙeeos: %esÙewkeâosMeeLe&ceefhe, me leleesÓefHe DeefOekeâlejefJe%eeve:
Fefle HeÇefmeæb ueeskesâ, efkeâceg JeòeâJÙeced DeveskeâMeeKeeYesoefYeVemÙe osJeefleÙe&*dceveg<ÙeJeCee&ßeceeefo
HeÇefJeYeeienslees: $e+iJesoeÅeeKÙemÙe meJe&%eeveekeâjmÙe DeHeÇÙelvesvewJe ueerueevÙeeÙesve Heg®<eefve:-
 95

MJeemeJeod Ùemceeled cenlees YetleeÅeesves: mebYeJe: ‘‘DemÙe cenlees YetlemÙe efve:MJeefmelecesleÅeod

$e+iJeso:''(ye=. 4.5.11) FlÙeeefo ßegles:, lemÙe cenlees YetlemÙe efvejefleMeÙeb meJe&%elJeb
meJe&MeefòeâceòJeb Ûe Fefle~
2. Brahman is the yoniócause of the greatest ‹åstra comprising of °RgVeda
etc, elaborated by many disciplines, which illuminates many topics like a
powerful torch and is omniscient. Nothing but an omniscient being could be

a
the cause for such a ‹åstra comprising of the °RgVeda etc with omniscient

k
features. For it is a well recognized fact in the world that the person, from
whom scriptures expanding upon various subjects emerge, has more extensive

aja
knowledge than the scripture itself. For example, Påƒini (has more knowledge)
than his scripture on grammar. What then to say that the great Being has
absolute omniscience and omnipotence, since from him emerge the °RgVeda
r
etc.ówhich is divided into many branches, which is the cause of such
riv
distinctions like gods, lower animals, men, castes and orders of life, which is
the ocean of all knowledgeóhas originated from that great Being effortlessly
Pa

like sport, like human breath. The ‹ruti says ëëOf that great Being is this breath,
which is the °RgVedaíí.
The second commentary on this sµutra is as follows:
›åstrayonitvåt = Only Vedaóbeing yoni (pramåƒa)
ha

(Brahman has to be understood only through the Veda)

Ma

3. DeLeJee ÙeLeesòeâb $e+iJesoeefo MeeŒeb Ùeesefve: keâejCeb HeÇceeCeced DemÙe yeÇÿeCe: ÙeLeeJeled
mJe¤HeeefOeieces~ MeeŒeeosJe HeÇceeCeeled peielees pevceeefokeâejCeb yeÇÿe DeefOeiecÙeles FlÙeefYeHeÇeÙe:~
MeeŒeced Goeùleb HetJe&met$es ‘‘Ùelees Jee Fceeefve Yetleeefve peeÙevles'' (lew. 3.1) FlÙeeefo~
fdeFk± rfgZ bna lw=ka] ;kork iwoZlw=ks ,o ,oa tkrh;da 'kkL=ke~ mnkgjrk 'kkL=k;ksfuRoa
cz„.kks nf'kZre~\ mP;rsA r=k iwoZlw=kk{kjs.k Li"Va 'kkL=kL; vuqiknkukr~ tUekfn dsoya
vuqekue~ miU;Lre~ bR;k'kÔ;sr rke~ vk'kÔka fuorZf;rqe~ bna lw=ka izoo`rs 'kkL=k;ksfuRokn~
bfrAA
3. Or, the ‹åstra comprising of the °RgVeda etc as described above, is the
96

yoniói.e. the pramåƒa for understanding the nature of Brahman as it is. The
intended meaning is: It is only from the scripture as pramåƒa that Brahman
which is the cause of the creation etc. of the jagat, is to be understood. The
‹åstra cited in the previous sµutra is ëëFrom which these beings originateíí. ëWhat
is the purpose of the present sµutra when ‹åstra of the same class has been cited
in the previous sµutra itself, to show that Brahman is to be understood only

a
through ‹åstra as pramåƒa?í There, the ‹åstra is not stated in clear words of the
sµutra. So, it could be doubted that in the sµutra only inference is said. This sµutra

k
ëonly Veda being yoni (pramåƒa)í intends to remove such a doubt.

aja
(3.1) Question: In the previous sµutra, it was said that ë‹ruti etc and experience
etc are pramåƒa for Brahmanís causeness of the worldí. Here it is said that ë‹åstra is
the only pramåƒaí. How are the two to be reconciled?

r
Answer: When understanding Brahmanís causeness from ‹rutis like ëEarlier all
riv
this was Brahmaní, it becomes necessary to depend on experience etc because ëidam
- this worldí is a matter of pratyak¶a etc. So, ‹ruti cannot give up other pramåƒas. But
in the ‹ruti quoted here ëfrom where these creatures are taking birthí, the swarµupa of
Pa

Brahman is ånanda. That ånanda is the cause of the world is not a matter for other
pramåƒas or logic; it is a matter for ‹ruti only. So, in this context, ‹ruti is the only
pramåƒa. If one doubts whether this could also be handled by inference, this sµutra is
intended to remove that doubt. Therefore, this ‹ruti sentence, though already quoted
ha

there, is quoted again here.

888
Ma
 mecevJeÙeeefOekeâjCeced
Samanvayådhikaraƒam
In this way, Brahman is established from ‹åstra pramåƒa. This Brahman is totally

a
unrelated with karma. So M∂må≈sakås, who speak only of karma, oppose this. The
following sµutra is intended to refute these arguments. For an understanding of the

k
bhå¶ya on it, a knowledge of some of the issues of pµurvam∂må≈så is necessary; a

aja
brief summary is presented here.
(S1) An objection of purvam∂må≈saka is that Vedic sentences unrelated to karma
are meaningless. Answering it, the mimå≈så ‹åstra says that apparently meaningless

r
sentences are to be understood only after being reconciled with karma. For e.g.,
riv
^ok;O;a 'osrekyHksr Hkwfrdke%* - One desirous of prosperity should sacrifice a male-
goat to the god Våyu (Tai. Sam. 2.1.1), is an injunction sentence (vidhi-våkya).
Following it, there is another sentence about Våyu ^ok;qoSZ {ksfi"Bk nsork ok;qeso Losu
Pa

Hkkxéks;suksiékkofr l ,oSua Hkwfra xe;fr* - Våyu is the fastest god. With portion of his karma
(the person) reaches Våyu himself. (Våyu) himself gets him prosperity (Tai. Sam.
2.1.1). If one says, ëthis sentence is unrelated to the injunctive sentence quoted earlier.
It is meaningless and so not validí, how to establish its validity?
ha

Reply: It is valid when you view it as praising the injunction and the relation
is seen. Such sentences in praise of the injunction are called arthavåda. In the same
way, passages in denigration of prohibition (of an act) are also arthavåda. For e.g.,
Ma

^lksøjksnhr~ ;njksnhr~ rn~#ÊL; #ÊRoe~* - He cried; because he cried, he became Rudra (Tai.
Sam. 1.5.1) is a sentence. In a situation, it appears, Rudra cried. His tears which fell
on the earth became silver. This sentence is apparently meaningless when viewed
independently, i.e. unrelated to karma. But by context, this is interpreted as a
denigrating passage to prohibit the gifting of silver in barhiyåga. In this way does
the passage get its validity. The summary is: Arthavåda appear meaningless when
not related to karma. Taking arthavåda sentences together with injunction/prohibition
as passages in praise/denigration respectively, they become meaningful and so
get their validity (Jai. Sµu. 1.2.7).
98

Arthavåda is of three kinds: anuvåda, guƒavåda, bhµutårthavåda. ^vfXu% fgeL; Hks"kte~* -

Fire is the cure for cold weather is a matter verifiable by another pramåƒa, namely
direct perception. Such an arthavåda, which can be verified by another pramåƒa, is
called anuvåda.
An example of guƒavåda is as follows: Yµupa is a wooden stump cut with eight
faces. ^vkfnR;ks ;wi%* - Yµupa¨ is the sun is a sentence contrary to direct perception.
However, when we take its meaning as ëYµupa is lustrous like the suní it becomes a

a
valid sentence. Such an arthavåda - contrary to another pramåƒa - but reconciled

k
with another meaning, is called guƒavåda.

aja
Finally, an arthavåda, which is neither a matter for nor contradictory to other
pramåƒas, is called bhµutårthavåda. For e.g., Vedic statements which say that: ëgods
have formsí. It is unreasonable to question the validity of such statements on the
basis of any other pramåƒa. So, Vaidikas accept them as they are (Sµu. Bh. 1.3.33).
r
(S2) There are mantras which speak of an act or a devatå. The discussion is
riv
about their intended meaning. For e.g., a branch of a particular tree is cut for use in
the dar‹apµurnamåsayåga . While cutting it, the mantra ^b"ksRok* - for strength you is to
be uttered. By context - the word ^fNuf¡* - I will cut is to be added to it. Consequently,
Pa

^b"ksRok fNuf¡* - for strength I will cut you is the meaning of the mantra. It might be
that it is only an instruction to cut the branch; it is not necessary to utter it while
thinking about its meaning. ëIs the meaning of the mantra intended or not during
the action of cutting?í is the question. M∂må≈så ‹åstra answers it like this: The action
ha

is to be performed thinking about the meaning because, it has an unseen (adæ¶ta)

fruit. Similarly, in mantras like ëagnirmµurdhåí etc, the intended meaning of the mantra
is the devatå - which is an instrument of action. Uttering while thinking about its
Ma

meaning has an unseen fruit. In summary: just as arthavåda gets its validity through
praise/denigration of injunction/prohibition, mantras get their validity only
through speaking of an action or an instrument of action. Otherwise, they have no
meaning (as per the M∂må≈sakas).
(S3) Injunctive and prohibitory (vidhi and ni¶edha) sentences are of two types:
Aj¤åtaj¤åpaka are those sentences which teach unknown matters. These teach details
of karma and the means for it. The sentences which prompt those who are not
prompted into karma are known as apravættapravartaka. Such sentences motivate the
unmotivated by describing the attractive fruits of the karma. The former kind of
 99

passages, unaccompanied by the latter, are meaningless; they will have no validity.
They are valid only when they are together, because, only then do they serve the
purpose of man.
The following passage is the preface of the Bhå¶yakåra to the discussion of the
next sµutra.

1. keâLeb HegveyeÇ&ÿeCe: MeeŒeHeÇceeCekeâlJecegÛÙeles ÙeeJelee ‘‘DeecveeÙemÙe ef›eâÙeeLe&lJeeled

a
DeeveLe&keäÙeced DeleoLee&veeced’’ (pew. met. 1.2.1) Fefle ef›eâÙeeHejlJeb MeeŒemÙe HeÇoefMe&leced?

k
Dele: Jesoevleeveeced DeeveLe&keäÙeced~ Deef›eâÙeeLe&lJeeled~ keâle=&osJeleeefo HeÇkeâeMeveeLe&lJesve Jee ef›eâÙee-

aja
efJeefOeMes<elJeced~ GHeemeveeefo ef›eâÙeevlej efJeOeeveeLe± Jee~ ve efn Heefjefveef<"leJemlegHeÇefleHeeoveb
mebYeJeefle~ HeÇlÙe#eeefo efJe<eÙelJeeled Heefjefveef<"leJemlegve:~ lelHeÇefleHeeoves Ûe nsÙeesHeeosÙejefnles
Heg®<eeLee&YeeJeeled~ Dele SJe ‘‘meesÓjesoerled'' (lew. meb. 5.1.1) FlÙesJeceeoerveeced DeeveLe&keäÙeb
r
cee Yetled Fefle ‘‘efJeefOeveelJeskeâJeekeäÙelJeeled mleglÙeLexve efJeOeerveeb mÙeg:'' (pew. met. 1.2.7)
riv
Fefle mleeJekeâlJesve DeLe&JeòJecegòeâced~ cev$eeCeeb Ûe ‘‘F<es lJee'' (lew. meb. 1.1.1) FlÙeeoerveeb
ef›eâÙeelelmeeOeveeefYeOeeefÙelJesve keâce&meceJeeefÙelJeced Gòeâced~ ve keäJeefÛeoefHe JesoJeekeäÙeeveeb efJeefOe-
Pa

mebmHeMe&cevlejsCe DeLe&Jeòee Â<še GHeHeVee Jee~ ve Ûe Heefjefveef<"les JemlegmJe¤Hes efJeefOe:

mebYeJeefle~ ef›eâÙeeefJe<eÙelJeeled efJeOes:~ lemceeled keâcee&Hesef#ele keâle=&mJe¤He osJeleeefo HeÇkeâeMevesve
ef›eâÙeeefJeefOeMes<elJeb Jesoevleeveeced~ DeLe HeÇkeâjCeevlejYeÙeeled vewleled DeYÙegHeiecÙeles, leLeeefHe,
ha

mJeJeekeäÙeiele-GHeemeveeefo-keâce&HejlJeced~ lemceeled ve yeÇÿeCe: MeeŒeÙeesevf elJeced Fefle HeÇeHles GÛÙeles~

1. ìHow again can it be said that Brahman is to be understood through
‹åstra when ‹åstra shows it implies action as in ëSince ‹åstra is for the purpose
of action, (sentences) not conveying that meaning are futile?íí Therefore, futile
Ma

are Vedåntas since they do not speak action. Or else, they could be subsidiaries
to the injunction of action with the purpose of telling about the doer, deity etc,
or presenting other actions like upåsanåómeditation etc. (Just) narration of
existent things cannot happen (in Veda) because, existent things are objects
for the senses. There is no human purpose served in such a narration because,
there is no rejecting or taking. Therefore, to prevent futility in cases like ëëHe
criedíí etc, they are stated to be meaningful as praise: ëBut by syntactical unity
with injunction, they have the meaning of praising the injunctioní. Mantras
100

like ëëyou for strengthíí etc are said to be related to karma because they tell
action and the instruments therefor. Meaningfulness of the Vedic Sentences
without connection with injunction is not seen anywhere, nor is it reasonable.
Injunction cannot be related with the nature of an existent thing, because
injunction is a matter of action. Therefore, by enlightening the nature of the
doer, the deity (devatå) etc, Vedånta sentences are only subsidiary to acts of
injunction. If this is not accepted for fear of being different, even then, they

a
have the purport of the act of upåsanå present in their own sentences. Therefore,

k
the ‹åstra cannot be the pramåƒa for knowing Brahmanî. When confronted like

aja
this the reply is:-
(1) The implications of the first sentence here are summarised in (S1) above.
Stating the opposition view viz, ëSentences unrelated to action are futileí, pµurva-
m∂må≈så demonstrates that ‹åstra has content only in action. Brahman taught in
r
Vedånta is unrelated to action. So, the m∂må≈sakåís objection is this: ëSentences in
riv
Vedånta are unrelated to action and hence futile. At least, had they said something
about the doer, devatå etc, which are the means of action, it would have been
Pa

purposeful. It does not do that either. It does not speak even of the action of upåsanå.
It just speaks of an existent thing, which serves no purpose. Such an object, being
an object for other pramåƒas, the Veda need not speak about it. It does not have any
injunction or prohibition; so, it is of no use (S2). Therefore, Vedånta sentences are
ha

futileí. The Vedåntin may say: ëThis is the j¤åna portion of the Veda. So, it is not
right to apply the arguments of the karma portion here.í To this the M∂må≈saka
replies: ëThe j¤åna portion viz, the Upani¶ads, do talk of upåsanå. So, these sentences
Ma

must be speaking of upåsanå, which is a mental karma. Otherwise, they cannot have
any validity. So, ‹åstra is not pramåƒa for Brahmaní. Now it is replied:

leòeg mecevJeÙeeled (1.1.4)

TuóBut, Tat - Brahman (knowledge is through ‹åstra because of),
Samanvayåtóperfect agreement.

2. leg Meyo: HetJe&He#eJÙeeJe=òÙeLe&:~ leod yeÇÿe meJe&%e meJe&Meefòeâ peieoglHeefòeefmLeefleueÙekeâejCeb

JesoevleMeeŒeeosJe DeJeiecÙeles~ keâLeced? mecevJeÙeeled~ meJex<eg efn Jesoevles<eg JeekeäÙeeefve leelHeÙexCe
 101

SlemÙeeLe&mÙe ØeefleHeeokeâlJesve mecevegieleeefve ‘‘meosJe meescÙesoceieÇemeerled SkeâcesJeeefÉleerÙeced’’ (Úeb.

6.2.1), ‘‘Deelcee Jee Foceskeâ SJeeieÇ Deemeerled'' (Ss. 1.1.1), ‘‘leosleod yeÇÿe DeHetJe&ced
DeveHejced Devevlejced Deyee¢eced DeÙeceelcee yeÇÿe meJee&vegYet:'' (ye=. 2.5.19), ‘‘yeÇÿewJesoced
Dece=leb Hegjmleeled'' (ceg.b 2.2.12) FlÙeeoerevf e~ ve Ûe leûleeveeb Heoeveeb yeÇÿemJe¤HeefJe<eÙes
efveef§eles mecevJeÙes DeJeiecÙeceeves DeLee&vlejkeâuHevee Ùegòeâe~ ßeglenevÙeßeglekeâuHevee HeÇmeÁeled~
2. The word ëbutí is to refute the pµurvapak¶a (the opposite view). Brahman,

a
the omniscient, omnipotent cause of the creation, existence and destruction of

k
the universe is understood from Vedic scripture alone. How? Because of the

aja
samanvayaó(i.e., all the Vedånta Sentences closely follow this same meaning
in the assertion of the summary)óas in: ëëThis was SatóBeing-onlyóin the
beginningíí, ëëOne alone without a secondíí, ëëThis was the one Åtman alone in
the beginningíí, ëëThat this Brahman is uncaused, devoid of effect, without an
r
interior, without an exterioríí, ëëThis Self is Brahman, the experience of allíí,
riv
ëëBrahman alone, the immortal in frontíí etc. When the samanvaya of the words
in theses sentences is clearly being understood in fixing the nature of Brahman,
Pa

it is not proper to imagine other meanings because it would result (in the fault
of ) giving up what is heard and imagining the unheard.
(2) In the sµutra, ëtatí stands for Brahman. Which Brahman? The omniscient,
omnipotent cause for the creation, sustenance and destruction of the universe
ha

established in the janmådi sµutra. This is ‹åstrayoni - ^JqR;oxk·e~ ,o bne~ vfrxEHkhja cz„] u
rdkZoxk·e~* - To be understood only through ‹ruti, not by logic (Sµu. Bh. 2.1.31). The
sentences in all the Upani¶ads and their words are perfectly reconciling in this
Ma

Brahman only. To substantiate this, one sentence is quoted from each of the four
Vedas.
^lnso lksE;-----* is from Chåndogya of Såma Veda. Its summary is: ëBrahman - the
one alone without a second - is standing in the form of the universe of k¶etra - the
observable, and the k¶etraj¤a - the observer k¶etraj¤a is Brahman.í
^vkRek ok bne~-----* is from the Aitareya of °Rg Veda. Its summary is: Earlier, there
was Åtman alone. He created the whole universe and entered into the bodies of of
beings in the form of individual souls. All this is Himself. This is Praj¤ånam Brahma
-which is mere j¤ånaí.
102

^rnsrn~ cz„* - is from the Bæhadåraƒyaka of ›ukla Yajurveda. Its summary is: ëTo
let us know its inherent nature, Brahman has stood as the universe of countless
forms. It is experiencing everything through the j∂vas - the individual souls. This
Åtman is that Brahmaní.
^cz„Sosnee`ra-----* is from MuƒŒaka of the Atharva Veda. ëEverything noticed in
front in the forms of the universe and the j∂va are Brahman only. One who realises it
becomes Brahmaní is its summary.

a
These sentences and their words are unambiguously proclaiming Brahman

k
and Brahman-Åtman oneness. When such perfect reconciliation of the message is
directly visible, to imagine unheard meanings damaging the heard ones is wrong.

aja
3. ve Ûe les<eeb keâle=&mJe¤HeHeÇefleHeeoveHejlee DeJemeerÙeles~ ‘‘lelkesâve kebâ HeMÙesled'' (ye=. 2.
4.13) FlÙeeefo ef›eâÙeekeâejkeâHeâue-efvejekeâjCe ßegles:~ ve Ûe Heefjefveef<"leJemlegmJe¤HelJesÓefHe
r
HeÇlÙe#eeefo efJe<eÙelJeb yeÇÿeCe:~ ‘‘leòJeceefme'' (Úeb. 6.8.7) Fefle yeÇÿeelceYeeJemÙe MeeŒe-
riv
cevlejsCe DeveJeiecÙeceevelJeeled~ Ùeòeg nsÙeesHeeosÙe jefnlelJeeled GHeosMeeveLe&keäÙeefceefle, vew<e oes<e:~
nsÙeesHeeosÙeMetvÙe-yeÇÿeelcelee-DeJeieceeosJe meJe&keäuesMeHeÇneCeeled Heg®<eeLe&efmeæs:~ osJeleeefo
Pa

HeÇefleHeeovemÙe leg mJeJeekeäÙeiele-GHeemeveeLe&lJesÓefHe ve keâef§eefÉjesOe:~ ve leg leLee yeÇÿeCe:

GHeemevee efJeefOeMes<elJeb mebYeJeefle~ SkeâlJes nsÙeesHeeosÙe MetvÙeleÙee ef›eâÙeekeâejkeâeefo ÉwleefJe%eeve-
GHeceoes&HeHeòes:~ ve efn SkeâlJe efJe%eevesve GvceefLelemÙe ÉwleefJe%eevemÙe Hegve: mebYeJeesÓefmle Ùesve
ha

GHeemevee-efJeefOeMes<elJeb yeÇÿeCe: HeÇefleHeÅesle~ ÙeÅeefHe DevÙe$e JesoJeekeäÙeeveeb efJeefOemebmHeMe&cevlejsCe

HeÇceeCelJeb ve Â<šced, leLeeefHe-DeelceefJe%eevemÙe HeâueHeÙe&vlelJeeled ve leefÉ<eÙemÙe MeeŒemÙe
HeÇeceeCÙeb MekeäÙeb HeÇlÙeeKÙeelegced~ ve Ûe DevegceeveiecÙeb MeeŒeHeÇeceeCÙeced, Ùesve DevÙe$eÂ<šb
Ma

efveoMe&veced DeHes#esle~ lemceeled efmeæb yeÇÿeCe: MeeŒeHeÇceeCekeâlJeced~

3. Nor is their purport to teach the nature of the doer, the deity etc because,
there are ‹rutis like ëëThen by what, whom could one see?íí etc which refute
action, instrument of action and fruit of action. Though of the nature of an
existent thing, Brahman is not an object for perception etc, because that Brahman
is the SelfóëëThat you areíí which cannot be understood by any means except
by ‹åstra. What was said that being devoid of rejection and acceptance the
teaching is futile, this is no defect, because, the realization of Self as Brahman
 103

which is devoid of rejection and acceptance results in the destruction of all

sufferingówhich is attainment of human goal. There is nothing objectionable
even in telling about the deity etc for the sake of upåsanå in its own sentences.
But it cannot be subsidiary to the injunction of upåsanå in the case of Brahman
because being one and devoid of rejection and acceptance, the sense of duality
such as action, instrument etc is annihilated. The cognition of duality once
destroyed by the knowledge of the oneness of Brahman cannot return; (if it

a
could) Brahman could be taught as subsidiary to the injunction of upåsanå.

k
Though in other places Vedic sentences are not seen to be pramåƒa except in

aja
conjunction with injunction, the pramåƒa nature of the ‹åstra in that topic
cannot be denied since the knowledge of Åtman culminates in the fruit. The
pramåƒa nature of the ‹åstra is not to be concluded by inference, because, that

r
would need an example seen elsewhere. Therefore, it is established that the
riv
scripture (‹åstra) is the pramåƒa for Brahman.
(3.1) The reason for the absence of any connection to karma in Brahman--Åtman
oneness is being explained here. Karma is possible only in the presence of the duality
Pa

of the doer, instruments of doing etc; it is impossible in their absence. Doership in

Brahman-Åtman oneness is rejected by the ‹ruti saying ^;=k loZe~ vkRek ,o vHkwr~ rr~ dÍu dÏ
i';sr~] rr~ dÍu dÏ ‹k`.kq;kr~* - One who has himself become everything, with what can he
see and whom can he see? With what can he hear and whom can he hear? etc. How
ha

can there be any possibility of karma in him?

ëIn saying about the deity etcí: It is true that upåsanå has been said in the
Upani¶ads. But later they say that the Self of the upåsaka (one who does upåsanå) is
Ma

Brahman. Therefore, Brahman cannot be subsidiary to the injunction of upåsanå,

because upåsanå is also based on duality. But Brahman is one alone without a second.
ëThough in other places Vedic sentences etcí: In the portion dealing with karma,
there is no validity for sentences unrelated to injunction. But it is not so in portions
dealing with j¤åna. Here, the Brahman-Åtman oneness told by ‹ruti is directly
experienced in su¶upti. Based on this experience, when the enquirer gets into the
meditation of staying in this ultimate j¤åna, it ends in the fruit of Åtmanís realization.
This demonstrates the validity of the Upani¶adic sentences. Validity of a pramåƒa
is indeed established only by experience. Therefore, one need not conceive of the
104

validity of the Upanisads by the inference of extending the logic of the karma-portion
to them.
(3.2) Based on the Brahman-Åtman oneness resulting from Brahman realisation,
relation of Brahman with action - either of karma or upåsanå - was refuted above. But
some oppose this by arguing that Brahman is taught by ‹ruti not for showing the
oneness of Brahman and Åtman but as a subsidiary to upåsanå. Their arguments are
as follows:

k a
4. De$e DeHejs HeÇlÙeJeefle<"vles~ ÙeÅeefHe MeeŒeHeÇceeCekebâ yeÇÿe, leLeeefHe HeÇelf eHeefòeefJeefOe efJe<eÙe-
leÙewJe MeeŒesCe yeÇÿe meceHÙe&les~ ÙeLee ÙetHe-DeenJeveerÙeeoerevf e Deueewekf eâkeâevÙeefHe efJeefOeMes<eleÙee

aja
MeeŒesCe meceHÙe&les, leÉled~ kegâle Sleled? HeÇJe=eòf eefveJe=eòf eHeÇÙeespeveHejlJeeled MeeŒemÙe~ leLee efn
MeeŒeleelHeÙe&eJf eo: Deeng: ‘‘Â<šes efn lemÙeeLe&: keâcee&JeyeesOeveced'' (Mee.Yee. 1.1.1) Fefle~

r
‘‘Ûeesoveself e ef›eâÙeeÙee: HeÇJele&kebâ JeÛeveced’’ (Mee. Yee. 1.1.2), ‘‘lemÙe %eevecegHeosMe:...''
riv
(Mee. Yee. 1.1.2), ‘‘leÆtleeveeb ef›eâÙeeLexve meceecveeÙe:'' (pew. met. 1.1.25), ‘‘Deecvee-
ÙemÙe ef›eâÙeeLe&lJeeled DeeveLe&keäÙeced DeleoLee&veeced....'' (pew. met. 1.2.1) Fefle Ûe~ Dele:
Heg®<e: keäJeefÛeled efJe<eÙeefJeMes<es HeÇJele&Ùeled kegâleef§eled efJe<eÙeefJeMes<eeled efveJele&ÙeÛÛe DeLe&Jeled
Pa

MeeŒeced~ leÛÚs<eleÙee Ûe DevÙeled GHeÙegòeâced~ lelmeeceevÙeeled JesoevleeveeceefHe leLewJe DeLe&JeòJeb

mÙeeled~ meefle Ûe efJeefOeHejlJes ÙeLee mJeiee&efo keâecemÙe Deefivenes$eeefo meeOeveb efJeOeerÙeles SJeced
Dece=lelJekeâecemÙe yeÇÿe%eeveb efJeOeerÙeles Fefle Ùegòeâced~
ha

4. Here some others confront (like this): Though ‹åstra is the pramåƒa for
Brahman, yet Brahman is taught only as an object for the injunction of upåsanå,
just as the yµupaósacrificial post, the åhavan∂ya (fire) etc. unknown to common
Ma

people are intimated by the ‹åstra only as subsidiary to injunction. Why so?
Because the purport of the ‹åstra is to instigate to act or to restrain from it. So,
those who know the purport of the ‹åstra say ëëIts purport is seen to be
knowledge of actioníí, ëëCodana means (Vedic) Sentence urging actioníí, ëëIts
(dharmaís) knowledge comes from injunctioníí, ëëWords denoting things to be
attained should be connected with those denoting actioníí, ëëPurport of Veda
being action, passages without it are meaninglessíí. Therefore, ‹åstra is
purposeful either in prompting a person to do something or in refraining him
 105

from doing something else. If the purport is injunction, then it would be correct
to say that, just as agnihotra etc are prescribed as means desirous of heaven,
similarly, knowledge of Brahman is prescribed for one desiring immortality.
(4) Pratipatti means upåsanå. ›åstra teaches Brahman for upåsanå. Just as the
unknown yµupa, åhvan∂ya etc are taught inthe karma portion as instruments of karma,
unknown Brahman in the j¤åna part of the Vedas is also taught for the sake of upåsanå;
because, the very purpose of the Vedas is to teach karma. Codana is a sentence of

a
‹ruti asking one to do karma. ëIts knowledge comes fromí: Tasya j¤ånam knoweldge,

k
i.e. Veda teaches dharma i.e., karma. For e.g., one desirous of heaven should perform
jyoti¶¢oma- yaj¤a. Upade‹a is any injunctive sentence. When the two go together,

aja
sentences of ‹åstra become valid. ëWords denoting thingsí: Unknown things are
made known by the Veda using words and objects which are known. Why? For the
sake of action. ëÅmnåyasyaí etc: Raising the question of the purposelessness of ‹ruti

r
sentences not talking about karma, ‹åstra answered by saying that those sentences
riv
are to be understood in relation to action. The gist of these sentences is: Injunction
and prohibition are the principals. Other sentences are either praise and denigration
or subsidiary to injunction. The same rule applies to Vedånta also because
Pa

Upani¶ads are part of Veda only. So, knowledge of Brahman is a part of the upåsanå
of Brahman. Other sentences concerning Brahman are subsidiary to this injunction.
Later on, the M∂må≈saka replies to a counterargument of the Vedåntin, and extends
his arguments of the same nature.
ha

5. veefvJen efpe%eemÙeJewue#eCÙeced Gòeâced keâce&keâeb[s YeJÙees Oecees& efpe%eemÙe:, Fn leg Yetleb

efvelÙeefveJe=&òeb yeÇÿeefpe%eemÙeefceefle? le$e Oece&%eeveHeâueeled Deveg<"eveeHes#eeled efJeue#eCeb yeÇÿe%eeve-
Ma

Heâueb YeefJelegcen&efle~ veen&lÙesJeb YeefJelegced~ keâeÙe&efJeefOeHeÇÙegòeâmÙewJe yeÇÿeCe: HeÇefleHeeÅeceevelJeeled

‘‘Deelcee Jee Dejs õ<ÙeJÙe:'' (ye=. 2.4.5) Fefle~ ‘‘Ùe Deelcee DeHenleHeeHcee meesÓvJes<šJÙe:
me efJeefpe%eeefmeleJÙe:'' (Úeb. 8.7.1), ‘‘DeelceslÙesJeesHeemeerle'' (ye=. 1.4.7),
‘‘DeelceevecesJe ueeskeâcegHeemeerle'' (ye=. 1.4.15), ‘‘yeÇÿeJeso yeÇÿewJe YeJeefle'' (cegb. 3.2.9)
FlÙeeefo efJeOeeves<eg melmeg keâesÓmeew Deelcee? efkebâ leod yeÇÿe? FlÙeekeâeb#eeÙeeb lelmJe¤He meceHe&Cesve
meJex Jesoevlee GHeÙegòeâe: ‘‘efvelÙe: meJe&%e: meJe&iele: efvelÙele=Hle: efvelÙeMegæyegæcegòeâ-
mJeYeeJe:'', ‘‘efJe%eeveceevevob yeÇÿe’’ FlÙesJeceeoÙe:~ leogHeemeveeÛÛe MeeŒeÂ<šesÓÂ<š: cees#e:
Heâueb YeefJe<Ùeleerefle~
106

5. (Vedåntinís counter argument): Was it not said that the topics of

discussion are different: viz. the topic in karmak僌a is dharma which is yet to
happen, but here (in j¤ånak僌a) the topic is existent eternal Brahman? Of these,
should not the fruit of the knowledge of Brahman be different from the fruit of
the knowledge of dharma which requires observance? (M∂må≈saka says) It
cannot be that.. Brahman is taught only for injunction: ëëÅtman is to be seeníí,
ëëThat Åtman which is free from sin is to be sought for and discussedíí, ëëMeditate

a
on it as Åtmaníí, ëëMeditate on the world as Åtmaníí, ëëKnower of Brahman

k
becomes Brahman Itselfíí, etc. When there are such injunctions, there will arise

aja
a desire to know ëWho is Åtman?í ëWhat is that Brahman?í All Vedåntas are
useful in intimating Its nature as ëëEternal, omniscient, all pervasive, eternally
contented, eternally pure and enlightened and free by nature, knowledge, blissíí
and so on. From that upåsanå will result the unseen fruit of mok¶a shown in the
‹åstra. r
riv
(5) Vedåntinís Question: The topics discussed in the karma/j¤åna parts of the
Veda are dharma/Brahman respectively. In this part, dharma is yet to happen, since
Pa

it needs performance of karma. But Brahman is eternal. This has already been said.
Therefore, their fruits should also be different. Is it not?
M∂må≈saka's Reply: No. In the karma part, first comes the knowledge of karma,
then its performance and finally the fruit. So also in the j¤åna part: first is knowledge
ha

of Brahman, then upåsanå and finally the unseen (ad涢a) fruit of mok¶a. After clearly
stating the injunction for upåsanå ëMeditate on it as Åtmaní, as subsidiary to it, ‹ruti
says: ëHe is unhit by påpa, free from old age, death, grief, hunger thirst etcí, ëBrahman
Ma

is pure j¤ånaí describing Brahman which is to be meditated upon. In this way,

adjusting the meaning of Upani¶adic sentences to the act of upåsanå, the M∂må≈saka
takes his objection further by saying that the narration of an existing thing unrelated
to action is futile.

6. keâle&JÙeefJeOÙevevegHeÇJesMes Jemlegcee$ekeâLeves neveesHeeoeve DemebYeJeeled ‘‘meHleÉerHee Jemegceleer’’,

‘‘jepeemeew ieÛÚefle’’ FlÙeeefo JeekeäÙeJeled JesoevleJeekeäÙeeveeced DeeveLe&keäÙecesJe mÙeeled~ veveg Jemleg-
cee$ekeâLevesÓefHe ‘‘jppegejf Ùeb veeÙeb meHe&:'' FlÙeeoew YeüeefvlepeefveleYeerelf eefveJele&vesve DeLe&JeòJeb Â<šced?
leLee FneefHe DemebmeeÙee&lceJemlegkeâLevesve mebmeeefjlJeYeüeefvleefveJele&ves DeLe&JeòJeb mÙeeled~ mÙeeosleosJeb
 107

Ùeefo jppeg mJe¤HeßeJeCes FJe meHe&Yeüeefvle: mebmeeefjlJeYeüeefvle: yeÇÿemJe¤He ßeJeCecee$esCe efveJelexle~

ve leg efveJele&les~ ßegleyeÇÿeCeesÓefHe ÙeLeeHetJe± megKeog:Keeefo mebmeeefjOece& oMe&veeled~ ‘‘ßeesleJÙees
cevleJÙees efveefoOÙeeefmeleJÙe:'' (ye=. 2.4.5) Fefle Ûe ßeJeCeesòejkeâeueÙees: ceveveefveefo-
OÙeemeveÙees:efJeefOeoMe&veeled~ lemceeled HeÇefleHeefòeefJeefOeefJe<eÙeleÙee SJe MeeŒeHeÇceeCekebâ yeÇÿe
DeYÙegHeievleJÙeefceefle~
6. Disallowing injunction of duty, (and making a) mere statement of a thing

a
where there is no give and take, the Vedånta Sentences too will be meaningless

k
like the sentences ëëThe earth has seven islandsíí, ëëThere goes the kingíí etc.

aja
(Vedåntin intervenes): Even the case of a mere statement of fact as in ëëThis is a
rope, this is not a snakeíí etc, meaningfulness is seen because of the removal of
fear generated by delusion. So also here, the statement of the fact that Åtman is
not a sa≈sår∂, could be meaningful through the removal of the delusion of his
r
riv
being a sa≈sår∂. (M∂må≈saka retorts): This would be so, if the delusion of his
sa≈sår∂ís nature is removed by merely hearing about the nature of Brahman, like
the delusion of snake by merely hearing about the nature of the rope. But it is not
Pa

removed. Even in him who has heard of Brahman, the attributes of a sa≈sår∂ like
happiness and grief are found as before. That is why subsequent to hearing, the
injunction of reflection and meditation are found (in ‹åstra) as in ëëHe is to be
heard, reflected and meditated uponíí. Therefore, it must concluded that ‹åstra
ha

is pramåƒa for Brahman only as the object on the injunction of upåsanå.

(6.1)ëThis is a rope, this is not a snakeí etc (Doubt): The fear generated by the
Ma

snake goes only with the knowledge of the rope and not just by saying ëthis is a
rope, not a snakeí. How can this be a counter objection?
(Reply): True. After listening to that statement, the listener has to examine the
rope and get its true knowledge to get out of fear. But what happens by the teacher,
is only the narration ëthis is rope, not snakeí. Similarly, after listening to ‹rutiís
narration of the nature of Brahman, those specially intelligent who are free from
ignorance, doubt and wrong knowledge may experience the meaning of the sentence
You are That - ^;s"kka iqu% fuiq.kerhuka u vKkula'k;foi;Z;y{k.k% inkFkZfo"k;% izfrcUék% vfLr rs
'kDuqofUr l—r~ mDre~ ,o rŸoeflokD;kFkZe~ vuqHkforqe~* (Sµu. Bh. 4.1.2). But the less intelligent
108

have to do thinking and meditation. We will reserve to a later part the discussion
whether they are injunctions are not. For the present, according to the opposite
opinion, ëJust listening to the message is fruitless. The Brahman listened to should
be meditated on for fruit. So, thinking and meditation told by ‹ruti are injunctions
for upåsanå. In this way, ‹åstra is pramåƒa for Brahmanís knowledge only as subsidiary
to the injunction of upåsanåí.
(6.2) Next, each of M∂må≈saka's objections are refuted and the final verdict is

a
given. This is the list of objections: (1) The rules of argument for fixing the meaning
should be the same in both parts of karma and j¤åna, because both are parts of Veda

k
only. (2) Such an application is possible through the injunction of upåsanå (3)

aja
Upani¶ads have indeed spoken of upåsanå. (4) Mok¶a is the unseen fruit of upåsanå.
(5). Mere narration of an existent thing is purposeless. (6) Worldly activity is seen
even after the knowledge of Brahman; it is not lost.

r
riv
7. De$eeefYeOeerÙeles ve~ keâce&yeÇÿe-efJeÅeeHeâueÙees:Jewue#eCÙeeled~ Meejerjb JeeefÛekebâ ceevemeb
Ûe keâce& ßegeflemce=efleefmeæb Oecee&KÙeced, ÙeefÉ<eÙee efpe%eemee ‘‘DeLeelees Oece&efpe%eemee'' (pew. met.
1.1.1) Fefle metef$elee~ DeOecees&ÓefHe efnbmeeefo: HeÇefle<esOeÛeesovee ue#eCelJeeled efpe%eemÙe:-
Pa

HeefjnejeÙe~ leÙees: Ûeesoveeue#eCeÙees: DeLee&veLe&Ùees: Oecee&Oece&Ùees: Heâues HeÇlÙe#es megKeog:Kes

MejerjJee*dceveesefYejsJe GHeYegpÙeceeves efJe<eÙesefvõÙemebÙeesiepevÙes yeÇÿeeefo<eg mLeeJejevles<eg HeÇefmeæs~
ceveg<ÙelJeeoejYÙe yeÇÿeevles<eg osnJelmeg megKeleejlecÙeced DevegßetÙeles~ lele§e leæsleesOe&ce&mÙe
ha

leejlecÙeb iecÙeles~ Oece&leejlecÙeeled DeefOekeâejleejlecÙeced~ Øeefmeæb Ûe Dee|LelJe meeceLÙee&efo

ke=âleced DeefOekeâeefjleejlecÙeced ~ leLee Ûe ÙeeieeÅeveg<"eefÙeveecesJe efJeÅeemeceeefOeefJeMes<eeled GòejsCe
HeLeeieceveced, kesâJeuew: F<šeHetle&oòemeeOevew: Oetceeefo ›eâcesCe oef#eCesve HeLeeieceveced, le$eeefHe
Ma

megKeleejlecÙeb lelmeeOeveleejlecÙeb Ûe MeeŒeeled ‘‘ÙeeJelmebHeelecegef<elJee'' (Úeb. 5.10.5)

FlÙemceeled iecÙeles~ leLee ceveg<Ùeeefo<eg veejkeâmLeeJejevles<eg megKeueJe: Ûeesoveeue#eCeOece&meeOÙe
SJe Fefle iecÙeles leejlecÙesve Jele&ceeve:~ leLee TOJe&ieles<eg DeOeesieles<eg Ûe osnJelmeg og:Ke-
leejlecÙeoMe&veeled leæsleesjOece&mÙe HeÇefle<esOeÛeesoveeue#eCemÙe leoveg<"eefÙeveeb Ûe leejlecÙeb
iecÙeles~ SJeced DeefJeÅeeefo oes<eJeleeb Oecee&Oece&leejlecÙeefveefceòeb MejerjesHeeoeveHetJe&kebâ megKe-
og:KeleejlecÙeb DeefvelÙeb mebmeej¤Heb ßegeflemce=eflevÙeeÙeHeÇefmeæced~ leLee Ûe ßegefle: ‘‘ve n Jew
meMejerjmÙe mele: efHeÇÙeeefHeÇÙeÙees: DeHeneflejefmle'' (Úeb. 8.12.1) Fefle ÙeLeeJeefCe&leb
mebmeej¤Heced DevegJeoefle~
 109

7. Here is the reply: No, because there is difference in the fruits of

knowledge of karma and knowledge of Brahman. Karma performed by body
speech and mind is well-known as dharma in ‹ruti and smæti. The discussion
of which is in the sµutra ëëThen, therefore, the discussion of dharmaíí. Adharma
too, like killing etc, are to be discussed for rejection. Directly noticeable
happiness/griefóresulting from good/evil (acts)ówhich are fruits of dharma/

a
adharma as defined by Vedic Sentences are born out of object/sense contact
and are felt by body, speech, mind; this is well-known in (beings) right down

k
from Hiraƒyagarbha to the unmoving (plants). A gradation of happiness is

aja
heard (in scriptures) in all embodied beings starting from man to Brahmå
(Hiraƒyagarbha). And therefrom can be understood the gradation of its cause
dharma. From the gradation of dharma follows the well-known gradation of
r
eligible persons brought about by the desire for fruit, capacity, learning etc.
riv
Thus, only those who perform yåga etc can go by the Northern Path on account
of the excellence of knowledge and mental poise. Through only i¶¢a (agnihotra
etc), pµurta (like constructing water tank etc which bring happiness to others
Pa

and eventually to oneself), datta (giving away wealth to appropriate people),

persons go by the Southern Path through smoke etc. Here too the gradation of
the means for that are understood from ‹åstra ëëLiving there till the fruit of
karma is expendedíí. Similarly, it is understood that the gradation in the little
ha

bit of happiness is possible for beings starting from man down to those in naraka
(hell) and plants only due to dharma defined by ‹åstra. In the same way, the
Ma

gradation of grief for embodied beings who go upwards or downwards show

a gradation in its cause viz adharma defined by prohibitory injunctions and
also in those who committed them. In this way, those who have defects of
avidyå etc experience by embodiment the gradations of happiness/grief due
to gradations of dharma/adharma in impermanent worldly life. This is well-
known from ‹ruti, smæti and logic. Following this ëëFor the embodied person
there cannot be the destruction of pleasure/displeasureíí says the ‹ruti about
the worldly life described above.
110

(7) There is a great difference between the fruits of karma and the knowledge of
Brahman. Details of the fruits of karma are given here. Karma happens through body,
speech and mind. ›ruti defines good/bad karma as dharma/adharma. Their fruits are
directly experienced as happiness/grief - through body, speech and mind. They
have gradations. There is also gradation in the eligibility for doing karma.
The reason is: The eligible person must have desire, knowledge, ability and
be unprohibited by the ‹åstra - ^vFkhZ leFkZ% fo}ku~ 'kkL=ks.k vfoi;ZqnLr%* - There is certainly

a
a gradation in desire, knowledge and ability. In this way, there cannot be the

k
destruction of pleasure/displeasure. Here, sa‹ar∂r∂ means the one embodied - one
who has adhyåsa in the ‹ar∂ra (body). It is he who does karma and experiences its

aja
fruits. He is never free from pleasure/displeasure.

8. ‘‘DeMejerjb JeeJemevleb ve efHeÇÙeeefHeÇÙes mHe=Mele:'' (Úeb. 8.12.1) Fefle efHeÇÙeeefHeÇÙe-

r
mHeMe&veHeÇefle<esOeeled Ûeesoveeue#eCeOece&keâeÙe&lJeb cees#eeKÙemÙe DeMejerjlJemÙe HeÇefleef<eOÙeles Fefle
riv
iecÙeles~ Oece&keâeÙe&lJes efn efHeÇÙeeefHeÇÙemHeMe&veHeÇefle<esOees veesHeHeÅeles~ DeMejerjlJecesJe Oece&keâeÙe&efceefle
Ûesled? ve~ lemÙe mJeeYeeefJekeâlJeeled~ ‘‘DeMejerjb Mejerjs<eg DeveJemLes<JeJeefmLeleced~ cenevleb
Pa

efJeYegceelceeveb celJee Oeerjes ve MeesÛeefle'' (keâ. 1.2.2), ‘‘DeHeÇeCees¢ecevee: MegYeü:'' (cegb.

2.1.2), ‘‘Demebiees¢eÙeb Heg®<e:'' (ye=. 4.3.15) FlÙeeefo ßegefleYÙe:~ Dele SJe Deveg<"sÙe
keâce&HeâueefJeue#eCeb cees#eeKÙeced DeMejerjlJeb efvelÙeefceefle efmeæced~
8. On the other hand ëëPleasure/displeasure do not touch the unem-
ha

bodied.íí That this unembodiment, called mok¶a, is not an effect of dharma

defined by injunction, is confirmed by this denial of contact of pleasure/
Ma

displeasure with the unembodied. If it were an effect of dharma, the denial of

contact of pleasure/displeasure is not reconciled. (Question) ëIf it is said that
unembodiment is the effect of dharma?í No, because, it is natural. ›ruti says
ëëKnowing Åtman which is unembodied residing in the changing bodies, great,
all-pervasiveóthe wise man does not grieveíí, ëëHe is indeed without pråƒa,
without mind, pureíí, ëëThis person indeed is unattachedíí. Therefore, unem-
bodiment called mok¶a, which is distinct from the fruit of performed karma, is
established to be eternal.
 111

(8) In the previous section it was said that ëfor the embodied person there
cannot be destruction of pleasure/displeasureí. Therefore, the word ëunembodiedí
here cannot mean ëwhen the body is lost, i.e. after deathí, because, these sentences
are comparing unliberated and liberated j∂vas. Also, others cannot know whether
there is displeasure/pleasure after death. Not only that, unembodidness is not the
fruit of the observance of dharma because, dharma does generate the fruit of pleasure.
Further, it is clear from the quoted ‹ruti sentences that unembodiment is indeed

a
mok¶a. So, mok¶a is not unseen fruit - nor something that is got after death, Further,
it is eternal too; because, if it were to decrease with experience like the fruit of

k
karma, grief should come back. But the Katha ‹ruti which is quoted rules out grief

aja
for the liberated.

9. le$e efkebâefÛeled HeefjCeeefceefvelÙeb Ùeefmceved efJeef›eâÙeceeCesÓefHe leosJesoefceefle yegefæ: ve

r
efJenvÙeles~ ÙeLee He=efLeJÙeeefo peieefVelÙelJeJeeoerveeced~ ÙeLee Ûe meebKÙeeveeb iegCee:~ Fob leg
riv
HeejceeefLe&kebâ ketâšmLeefvelÙeb JÙeesceJeled meJe&JÙeeefHe meJe&efJeef›eâÙeejefnleb efvelÙele=Hleb efvejJeÙeJeb mJeÙeb-
pÙeesefle: mJeYeeJeced~ Ùe$e Oecee&Oeceew& menkeâeÙexCe keâeue$eÙeb Ûe veesHeeJelexles~ leosleled DeMejerjlJeb
cees#eeKÙeced~ ‘‘DevÙe$e Oecee&led DevÙe$eeOecee&led DevÙe$eemceeled ke=âleeke=âleeled~ DevÙe$e YetleeÛÛe
Pa

YeJÙeeÛÛe'' (keâ. 1.2.14) FlÙeeefo ßegefleYÙe:~ Dele: leod yeÇÿe ÙemÙe FÙeb efpe%eemee
HeÇmleglee~ leÅeefo keâle&JÙeMes<elJesve GHeefoMÙesle, lesve Ûe keâle&JÙesve meeOÙe§esled cees#ees DeYÙegHeiecÙesle,
DeefvelÙe SJe mÙeeled~ le$e SJeb meefle: ÙeLeesòeâkeâce&Heâues<JesJe leejlecÙeeJeefmLeles<eg DeefvelÙes<eg
ha

keâef§eled DeefleMeÙees cees#e: Fefle HeÇmepÙesle~ efvelÙe§e cees#e: meJez: cees#eJeeefoefYe: DeYÙegHeiecÙeles~
Dele: ve keâle&JÙeMes<elJesve yeÇÿeesHeosMees Ùegòeâ:~
9. Of these, some are eternal though changing; i.e. though subject to
Ma

change, the cognition ëThis is but thatí is not destroyed: like earth etc for those
believers in the eternality of the universe, or as the guƒas for the Så≈khyas.
This (mok¶a) however is absolute without change, all-pervasive like åkå‹a,
devoid of all modifications, eternally contented, without parts, self-luminous
by nature, where dharma/adharma with action do not apply in the three times
(past, present and future). This is unembodiment called mok¶a because ‹rutis
say ëDifferent from dharma, different from adharma, different from effect (and)
cause, different from what has been and what has to be.í Therefore, such is
112

Brahman whose discussion is presented (here). If that be taught as subsidiary

to duty, if mok¶a is agreed to be a result of duty, it would amount to mok¶a
being only something special among the graded non-eternal fruits of karma
described above. But mok¶a is accepted to be eternal by all who discuss about
mok¶a. Therefore, (to say that) the teaching of Brahman is subsidiary to duty is
not correct.

a
(9) In this section, Bhå¶yakåra is speaking about the nature of the eternality of
mok¶a. The river, for example, is eternal though changing i.e., though the water is

k
different in each place, the cognition of the sameness of the river - its eternality - is

aja
not lost. Mok¶a is not like that. It is eternal without change. Like åkå‹a, it is all
pervading and is the same anywhere at any time etc. These being precisely the
features of Brahman, mok¶a is Brahman. Had Brahman been subsidiary to karma or
upåsanå and mok¶a were their fruit, it would be transient like the fruit of karma.
r
Therefore, knowledge of Brahman can never be subsidiary to any type of action.
riv
10. DeefHe Ûe ‘‘yeÇÿeJeso yeÇÿewJe YeJeefle'' (cegb. 3.2.9), ‘‘#eerÙevles ÛeemÙe keâcee&efCe
Pa

leefmceved Â<šs HejeJejs'' (cegb. 2.2.9), ‘‘Deevevob yeÇÿeCees efJeÉeved ve efyeYesefle kegâle§eve''
(lew. 2.9), ‘‘DeYeÙeb Jew pevekeâ HeÇeHleesÓefme'' (ye=. 4.2.4), ‘‘leoelceevecesJeeJesled Denb
yeÇÿeemceerefle, lemceeòelmeJe&ceYeJeled'' (ye=. 1.4.10), ‘‘le$e keâes ceesn: keâ: Meeskeâ: Skeâl-
ha

JecevegHeMÙele:'' (F&. 7) FlÙesJeceeÅee: ßegleÙe: yeÇÿeefJeÅeevevlejb cees#eb oMe&ÙevlÙe: ceOÙes

keâeÙee&vlejb JeejÙeefvle~ leLee ‘‘leæwleled HeMÙeved $e+ef<eJee&ceosJe: HeÇefleHesos Denb cevegjYeJeb metÙe&§e’’
(ye=. 1.4.10) Fefle yeÇÿeoMe&ve-meJee&lceYeeJeÙeesce&OÙes keâle&JÙeevlej JeejCeeÙe GoeneÙe&ced~
Ma

ÙeLee ‘‘efle<"ved ieeÙeefle'' Fefle efle<"efle ieeÙelÙeesce&OÙes lelkeâle=&kebâ veemleerefle iecÙeles~

10. Further, there are ‹rutis showing that mok¶a follows the knowledge of
Brahman, precluding any other action to be done in between: ëëHe who knows
Brahman becomes Brahman Itself,íí ëëHis karma perishes when Heóthe higher
cause and the lower (effect) is seeníí, ëëHe who knows the ånanda of Brahman
has no fear from anywhereíí, ëëVerily, Oh Janaka you have obtained fearless-
nessíí, ëëIt understood itself as ëI am Brahmaní and so it became everythingíí,
ëëWhat delusion is there and what grief for one who has seen onenessíí etc.
 113

Similarly, ëë°R¶i Våmadeva seeing It realized, ëI am Manu and also the Suníí
would also be quoted to preclude some other action between realizing Brahman
and the oneness of the Self with allójust as in ëëHe sings standingíí, there is
nothing else for him to do between standing and singing.
(10) After explaining that the knowledge of Brahman is not subsidiary to duty,
Bhå¶yakåra is establishing to make it firm that mok¶a results immediately with the
knowledge of Brahman and between the two there is nothing to be done. But the

a
upåsaka cannot become Brahman by Its upåsanå. When by ëk¶iyante (karmas) perishí,

k
the ‹ruti is clearly speaking of the complete destruction of all karma, how can there

aja
be scope for karma at all? In the sentence, ëknower of the ånanda of Brahman has no
fearí, the destruction of fear is for the j¤ån∂ who is alive. In the sentence ëOh Janaka,
you have obtained fearlessnessí says that fearlessness is obtained immediately
with realization; it does not say ëpråpsyasi - you will obtain (in the future)í. Similarly
r
in other sentences also, refutation of any duty between knowledge and mok¶a is
riv
clear.

11. ‘‘lJeb efn ve: efHelee ÙeesÓmceekeâceefJeÅeeÙee: Hejb Heejb leejÙeefme’’ (HeÇ. 6.8),
Pa

‘‘ßegleb ¢esJe ces YeieJeodÂMesYÙe: lejefle MeeskeâceelceefJeefoefle, meesÓnb YeieJe: MeesÛeeefce leb cee
YeieJeeved MeeskeâmÙe Heejb leejÙeleg'' (Úeb. 7.1.3), ‘‘lemcew ce=efolekeâ<eeÙeeÙe leceme: Heejb
oMe&Ùeefle YeieJeeved mevelkegâceej:''(Úeb. 7.26.2) Fefle ÛewJeceeÅee: ßegleÙe: cees#eHeÇefleyebOe-
ha

efveJe=efòecee$ecesJe Deelce%eevemÙe Heâueb oMe&Ùeefvle~ leLee Ûe DeeÛeeÙe&HeÇCeerleb vÙeeÙeesHeye=befnleb met$eced

‘‘og:Ke-pevce-HeÇJe=efòe-oes<e-efceLÙee%eeveeveeced GòejesòejeHeeÙes leovevlejeHeeÙeeled DeHeJeie&:''
(vÙee.met. 1.1.2) Fefle~ efceLÙee%eeveeHeeÙe§e yeÇÿeelcewkeâlJeefJe%eeveeled YeJeefle~
Ma

11. ìYou are indeed our father who carries us to the other side of avidyåî,
ìI have heard from those like your reverence that knower of the Åtman crosses
grief. Your reverence I am in grief. You should take me across griefî, ìThe
revered Sanatkumåra shows the other side of darkness to him whose sins are
destroyedîóthese and such other ‹rutis show that the fruit of Åtmaj¤åna is
only the removal of the obstacles to mok¶a. There is also one sµutra written by
the åcårya supported by reason: ëëGrief, birth, motivation, defect and illusory
cognitionó(is the sequence in which) the destruction of the subsequent, causes
114

the destruction of earlier one, resulting in mok¶aíí. And destruction of illusory

cognition results only from the knowledge of the oneness of Brahman and
Åtman.
(11.1) After refuting duty in between knowledge and mok¶a in the previous
section, how exactly mok¶a results directly from the knowledge of Brahman is is
being said here. The sentence ëyou carry us to the other side of avidyåí makes it
clear that avidyå - lack of the knowledge of Brahman is the only obstruction for

a
mok¶a and so, knowing Brahman is itself mok¶a. That ëSanatkumåra taught Nåradaí

k
etc also means the same thing. Gautama, the teacher of logic, tells us the sequence
of the steps of mok¶a in the sµutra: The ignorance of oneís nature is the cause of

aja
wrong knowledge about oneself; wrong knowledge leads to the defects of love
and hate; these defects cause motivation for karma; from that results birth and
consequently grief. Therefore, destruction of avidyå leads to destruction of wrong
r
knowledge and in that sequence the destruction of defects, of motivation, of birth
riv
and grief, leading to mok¶a.
Question: The Gautam sµutra is saying that the destruction of birth leads to
destruction of grief; does it mean that mok¶a results only after death?
Pa

Answer: Not like that. The destruction of adhyåsa equals destruction of birth
because, the body of the knower of Brahman is already ëdead like the slough of a
snake which is cast off on the ant-hillí (Br. 4.4.7). So, mok¶a is even while alive.
ha

12. ve Ûe Fob yeÇÿeelcewkeâlJeefJe%eeveb mebHeõtHeced~ ÙeLee ‘‘Devevleb Jew ceveesÓvevlee efJeMJes-

osJee DevevlecesJe me lesve ueeskebâ peÙeefle'' (ye=. 3.1.9) Fefle~ ve Ûe DeOÙeeme¤Heced ÙeLee
Ma

‘‘cevees yeÇÿeslÙegHeemeerle'' (Úeb. 3.18.1), ‘‘DeeefolÙees yeÇÿeslÙeeosMe:'' (Úeb. 3.19.1)

Fefle Ûe ceve DeeefolÙeeefo<eg yeÇÿeÂ<šdÙeOÙeeme:~ veeefHe efJeefMe<šef›eâÙeeÙeesieefveefceòeced ‘‘JeeÙegJee&Je
mebJeie&:'' (Úeb. 4.3.1) ‘‘HeÇeCees JeeJe mebJeie&:'' (Úeb. 4.3.3) FefleJeled~ veeefHe
DeepÙeeJes#eCeeefo keâceeËiemebmkeâej¤Heced~ mebHeoeefo¤Hes efn yeÇÿeelcewkeâlJe efJe%eeves DeYÙegHeiecÙeceeves
‘‘leòJeceefme'' (Úeb. 6.8.7), ‘‘Denb yeÇÿeeefmce'' (ye=. 1.4.10), ‘‘DeÙeeceelcee
yeÇÿe'' (ye=. 2.5.19) FlÙesJeceeoerveeb JeekeäÙeeveeb yeÇÿeelcewkeâlJe JemlegHeÇefleHeeoveHej:
HeomecevJeÙe: Heer[Ÿesle~ ‘‘efYeÅeles ùoÙeieÇbefLe: efÚÅevles meJe&mebMeÙee:'' (cegb. 2.2.8) Fefle
ÛewJeceeoerefve DeefJeÅeeefveJe=efòeHeâueßeJeCeeefve GHe®OÙesjved~ ‘‘yeÇÿeJeso yeÇÿewJe YeJeefle'' (cegb.
 115

3.2.9) Fefle ÛewJeceeoerefve leÆeJeeHeefòeJeÛeveeefve mebHeoeefo He#es ve meeceÀemÙesve GHeHeÅesjved~

lemceeled ve mebHeoeefo¤Heb yeÇÿeelcewkeâlJeefJe%eeveced~
12. This cognition of Brahman-Åtman oneness is not of the nature of
sampadrµupa (‹åstra imposed identification) as in the case of ëëMind is indeed
infinite, the vi‹wedevatås (gods of this name) are infinite. (Meditating on this
identification) he conquers an infinite worldíí. Nor is it of the nature of

a
superimposition (done by ‹åstra) as in ëëMeditate (on the identity that) the

k
mind is Brahmaníí, ëëThe sun is Brahman, this is the teachingíí in which
contemplation involves in viewing mind, sun etc as Brahman. Nor is it (an

aja
identification) with a distinctive action as in ëëVåyu (air) is the devoureríí
ëëPråƒa is the devoureríí. It is also not of the nature of a subsidiary act of
purification like looking at the ghee. If the knowledge of the Brahman- Åtman
r
oneness is admitted to be of the form of sampadrµupa etc, it would violate the
riv
syntactical relation of words in sentences like ëëThat you areíí, ëëI am Brahmaníí,
ëëThis Self is Brahmaníí etc which assert the oneness of Brahman and Åtman. It
Pa

would contradict (scriptural passages) like ëëThe knot of the heart is cut, all
doubts are clearedíí, which declare the fruit of the removal of avidyå. If it were
of sampadrµupa etc, the statements of (j¤ån∂) becoming Brahman in ëëHe who
knows Brahman becomes Brahman Itselfíí would not satisfactorily reconcile.
ha

Therefore, the knowledge Brahman-Åtman oneness is not of the nature of

sampadrµupa etc.
(12) Another Point: Though Bhå¶yakåra is quoting a sutra of logic for mok¶a,
Ma

the theses of logicians and Vedånta are very different. According to the logicians,
knowing Åtman as unatman is wrong knowledge and separating the two is right
knowledge. If here, by Åtman is meant the k¶etraj¤a who is pråj¤a and unåtman is the
body and the rest of the world, their indiscrimination is certainly wrong
knowledge.This is made explicit in the Adhyåsa Bhå¶yå. However, this Åtman is
getting separated from ëunåtman ' everyday in deep sleep; this is everyoneís
experience. But no enlightenment has dawned. Wrong knowledge is returning as
soon as one gets up. So ëÅtman-unåtmaní discrimination in the logicianís thesis is
not the knowledge that Vedånta speaks of. Discrimination arises because of not
116

knowing Brahman. Both ëÅtman ' and ëunåtman ' are Brahman. So, the moment one
realizes the Brahman-Åtman oneness, avidyå is lost and there arises the realisation
that ëunåtmaní is not different from me, but I am different from ëunåtmaní. This is
sarvåtmabhåva which is mok¶a - already spoken of in a previous section (Sµutra 1.1.1,
sec 11-14). Sarvåtmabhåva is sarva-åtma-bhåva - the realisation that everything is
ëÅtmaní. This does not, however, involve the multiplicity of the world; it is sublated.
This is called prapa¤ca-vilaya. Therefore, it is not different from the inherent non-

a
dual oneness of Åtman.
(12) That knowledge of Brahman-Åtman oneness destroys wrong knowledge -

k
this has already been explained. Now it is shown that this knowledge is not a

aja
mental action. Mental action can be of four types: sampadrµupa, adhyåsarµupa,
kriyayogarµupa, samskårarµupa.
Details of Sampadrµupa: There is similarity between the inferior mind and the

r
superior vi‹wedevatås; both are infinite. On this basis, mind is meditated upon as
riv
vi‹wedevatås.
Adhyåsarµupa: Thinking of the mind or the sun as Brahman and meditating on
them. This is not wrong knowledge born out of indiscrimination. The difference
Pa

between the mind or the sun and Brahman is known.

Kriyåyogarµupa: In su¶upti (deep sleep), speech etc of oneís self are devoured by
pråƒa; in pralaya i.e., dissolution of the world, the presiding deities of speech etc
viz., Agni - i.e., fire etc are devoured by Våyu. Based on the similarity of this special
ha

action, ‹åstra prescribes meditation on the presumed oneness of pråƒa; and Våyu.
Sa≈skårarµupa: By looking at it, the wife purifies the ghee to be used in the yåga
as a subsidiary act. But knowledge of Brahman-Åtman oneness is not any of these
Ma

types of mental actions, because there is duality in all of them till the end.

13. Dele: ve Heg®<eJÙeeHeejlev$ee yeÇÿeefJeÅee~ efkebâ leefn&? HeÇlÙe#eeefoHeÇceeCeefJe<eÙeJemleg-

%eeveJeled Jemleglev$ee~ SJebYetlemÙe yeÇÿeCe: lep%eevemÙe Ûe ve keâÙeeefÛeled ÙegòeâdÙee MekeäÙe:
keâeÙee&vegHeÇJesMe: keâuHeefÙelegced~ ve Ûe efJeefoef›eâÙeekeâce&lJesve keâeÙee&vegHeÇJesMees yeÇÿeCe:~ ‘‘DevÙeosJe
leefÉefoleeoLees DeefJeefoleeoefOe'' (kesâ. 1.4) Fefle efJeefoef›eâÙeekeâce&lJe HeÇefle<esOeeled, ‘‘Ùesvesob
meJeË efJepeeveeefle leb kesâve efJepeeveerÙeeled'' (ye=. 2.4.14) Fefle Ûe~ leLee GHeeefmle ef›eâÙee-
keâce&lJeHeÇefle<esOeesÓefHe YeJeefle ÙeÉeÛeeÓvegYÙegefoleb Ùesve JeeieYÙegÅeles (kesâ. 1.5) FlÙeefJe<eÙelJeb
 117

yeÇÿeCe GHevÙemÙe ‘‘leosJe yeÇÿelJeb efJeefæ vesob ÙeefoocegHeemeles'' (kesâ. 1.5) Fefle~ DeefJe<eÙelJes
yeÇÿeCe: MeeŒeÙeesefvelJeevegHeHeefòeefjefle Ûesled~ ve~ DeefJeÅeekeâefuHele-YesoefveJe=efòeHejlJeeled MeeŒemÙe~
ve efn MeeŒeced FobleÙee efJe<eÙeYetleb yeÇÿe HeÇefleefHeHeeoefÙe<eefle~ efkebâ leefn&? HeÇlÙeieelcelJesve
DeefJe<eÙeleÙee HeÇefleHeeoÙeled DeefJeÅeekeâefuHeleb JesÅe-Jesefole=Jesoveeefo YesoceHeveÙeefle~ leLee Ûe
MeeŒeced ‘‘ÙemÙeeceleb lemÙe celeb celeb ÙemÙe ve Jeso me:~ DeefJe%eeleb efJepeeveleeb efJe%eelece-

a
efJepeeveleeced'' (kesâ. 2.3), ‘‘ve Â<šsõ&<šejb HeMÙes: ve efJe%eelesefJe&%eeleejb efJepeeveerÙee:'' (ye=.
3.4.2) Fefle ÛewJeceeefo~ Dele: DeefJeÅeekeâefuHelemebmeeefjlJeefveJele&vesve efvelÙecegòeâelcemJe¤He-

k
meceHe&Ceeled ve cees#emÙe DeefvelÙelJe oes<e:~

aja
13. Therefore, the knowledge of Brahman is not subjective. What then is it?
It is objective like the knowledge of the objects of the sense perception etc.
Imagining the allowance of action in such Brahman or Its knowledge is
r
impossible by any reasoning. Brahman cannot be deemed to come into the field
riv
of action though It is an object for the act of cognition, because of the denial of
Its being an object of knowing in ëëIt is different from the known and also the
unknowníí, ëëBy whom one knows all this, by what one can know Him?íí
Pa

Similarly, there is also the denial of Its being an object of the act of upåsanå:
after telling the non-objectness of Brahman in ëëThat which is not expressed by
speech, that by which speech is expressedíí ‹åstra says ëëKnow then that alone
ha

is Brahman (and) not as ëthisí whose upåsanå is doneíí. (Objection) ëIf it be said
that Brahman is not an object, (then) ‹åstra cannot be the source (for its
knowledge)?í No, for ‹åstra has the purport of removing the difference
Ma

imagined by avidyå. Indeed, the ‹åstra does not intend to propound Brahman
as an object like ëthisí. What then? It propounds Brahman as the non-object
inner self and removes the differences like known-knower and knowledge
imagined in the inner self by avidyå. Thus says the ‹åstra: ëëBy whom It is not
known, for him It is known, by whom It is known , for him It is not known. (It
is) not known to them who know, known to them who do not knowíí, ëëYou
cannot see the seer of sight, cannot know the knower of the knoweríí, etc.
Because of the restoration of Åtmanís nature of eternal freedom through the
118

removal (in this way) of sa≈såra imagined (in Him) due to avidyå, mok¶a is
free from the fault of non-eternality.
(13.1) All the sampadrµupa etc actions are dependent on the one who has to
perform them, i.e., they are subjective. Unlike them, knowing Brahman is objective,
i.e., dependent on the object, which has to be understood as it is - just as in
understanding a pot only as a pot. ëIs knowing also not a mental act?í In the case of
Brahman, it is not even that because, It is different from the known and the unknown.

a
It is not an object for the mind to understand. Since It is the inherent nature of the

k
knower, It cannot be an object for knowing. Kenopani¶ad clearly states that It cannot
be an object for upåsanå either. ëThen what is meant when it is said that ‹åstra is the

aja
pramåƒa for knowing It?í Indeed, even ‹åstra cannot teach Brahman directly. ›åstraís
validity is only up to the point of telling one that Brahman is not that which one is
seeing. Knowledge of Brahman is to be obtained only in this manner. The seeker
first searches for Brahman in something which It is not. In this action of searching
r
riv
there is multiplicity of the known-knower-knowledge. This difference is seen due
to avidyå. ›åstra only prevents him from entertaining this illusory difference and
provokes him to look at himself. Since the ever-present Åtman is Brahman, mok¶a is
Pa

eternal.
(13.2) The sentence, ^vfo|kdfYira os|osfnr`osnukfnHksne~ viu;fr* - Which removes the
differences like known-knower-knowledge imagined in the inner self by avidyå,
needs a closer look. None among the three is imagined due to avidyå; only the
ha

difference seen in them is due to avidyå. The ignorant person, only looking at the
forms, sees differences and understands only what he sees. The j¤ån∂ will also see
the differences with his senses, but he understands the oneness permeating all of
them which is himself. The seeker takes support of Åtman to remove the sense of
Ma

difference in outside forms - ^ck·kdkjHksncqfºfuo`fŸk% ,o vkReLo:ikyEcudkj.ke~*A ( G∂tå

Bh. 18.50). In this way, sarvåtmabhåva itself is mok¶a.

14. ÙemÙe leg GlHeeÅees cees#e: lemÙe ceevemeb JeeefÛekebâ keâeefÙekebâ Jee keâeÙe&ceHes#eles Fefle
Ùegòeâced~ leLee efJekeâeÙe&lJes Ûe~ leÙees: He#eÙees: cees#emÙe OeÇgJeced DeefvelÙelJeced~ ve efn oOÙeeefo
efJekeâeÙe&ced GlHeeÅeb Jee Iešeefo efvelÙeb Â<šb ueeskesâ~ ve Ûe DeeHÙelJesveeefHe keâeÙee&Hes#ee~ mJeelce¤HelJes
meefle DeveeHÙelJeeled~ mJe¤HeJÙeefleefjòeâlJesÓefHe yeÇÿeCees veeHÙelJeced~ meJe&ielelJesve efvelÙeeHle-
mJe¤HelJeeled meJexCe yeÇÿeCe: DeekeâeMemÙesJe~ veeefHe mebmkeâeÙees& cees#e: Ùesve JÙeeHeejced DeHes#esle~
 119

mebmkeâejes efn veece mebmkeâejmÙe iegCeeOeevesve Jee mÙeeled, oes<eeHeveÙevesve Jee~ ve leeJeled
iegCeeOeevesve mebYeJeefle, DeveeOesÙe DeefleMeÙe yeÇÿemJe¤HelJeeled cees#emÙe~ veeefHe oes<eeHeveÙevesve,
efvelÙeMegæyeÇÿemJe¤HelJeeled cees#emÙe~
14. For him (who says) mok¶a is produced, it is reasonable that for him,
there is the need for mental, verbal or physical action. So also, if it be a
modification. (But) for these two views, the non-eternality of mok¶a is certain.

a
Neither modifications like curd etc, nor things produced like pot etc are found

k
to be eternal in the world. Even for attainability (of mok¶a), there is no need for
action, because, it is of the nature of oneís own Self. Even if it is different from

aja
oneís own nature, Brahman is not what is to be attained because, being all-
pervasive, Brahman by nature is ever-attained by all like åkå‹a. Nor is mok¶a (a
result of) purification in which case it expects an activity. Indeed, what is called
r
purification may be either of merit or by subtraction of defect. It cannot be
riv
addition of merit since mok¶a is the unsurpassed excellence of Brahman to which
no merit can be added; nor by the removal of defect, since mok¶a is of the nature
Pa

of eternally pure Brahman.

(14) Fruit of karma is of four types: Obtained by producing, modifying, attaining
or purifying. Mok¶a is like none of them. It is not produced like a pot. If it were, it
should be absent earlier and lost later and so non-eternal. Mok¶a being eternal, it is
ha

not produced. It is not modified like milk into curd. The M∂må≈sakas say that karma/
upåsanå modify to the form of apµurva - something unseen, and are then experienced
as fruit in due course. This is also non-eternal. So mok¶a is not of this type. It is not
Ma

something to be attained either, like swarga (heaven). It being oneís own inherent
nature, it is not attained. Even granting it is different, it is still not attainable because
Brahman is all-pervading. Mok¶a is not something to be purified. Purification means
adding a merit or removing a demerit. But Brahman, which is of unsurpassed
excellence, is faultless. So, mok¶a is not a result of purification. Next is a long analysis
of this last feature.

15. mJeelceOece& SJe meved eflejesYetlees cees#e: ef›eâÙeÙee Deelceefve mebefm›eâÙeceeCes DeefYe-
JÙepÙeles~ ÙeLee DeeoMex efveIe<e&Ceef›eâÙeÙee mebefm›eâÙeceeCes YeemJejlJeb Oece&: Fefle Ûesled? ve~
120

ef›eâÙeeßeÙelJe DevegHeHeòes: Deelceve:~ ÙeoeßeÙee ef›eâÙee leced DeefJekegâJe&leer vewJe Deelceeveb ueYeles~
Ùeefo Deelcee ef›eâÙeÙee efJeef›eâÙesle, DeefvelÙelJeced Deelceve: HeÇmepÙesle~ ‘‘DeefJekeâeÙees&ÓÙecegÛÙeles’’
(ieer. 2.25) Fefle ÛewJeceeoerefve JeekeäÙeeefve yeeOÙesjved~ leÛÛe Deefve<šced~ lemceeled ve mJeeßeÙee
ef›eâÙee Deelceve: mebYeJeefle~ DevÙeeßeÙeeÙeemleg ef›eâÙeeÙee: DeefJe<eÙelJeeled ve leÙee Deelcee
mebefm›eâÙeles~ veveg osneßeÙeÙee mveeve-DeeÛeceve-Ùe%eesHeJeerleeefokeâÙee ef›eâÙeÙee osner mebefm›eâÙeceeCees

a
Â<š:? ve~ osneefo mebnlemÙewJe DeefJeÅeeie=nerlemÙe Deelceve: mebefm›eâÙeceeCelJeeled~ HeÇlÙe#eb efn
mveeveeÛeceveeos: osnmeceJeeefÙelJeced~ leÙee osneßeÙeÙee lelmebnle SJe keâef§eled DeefJeÅeÙee

k
DeelcelJesve Heefjie=nerle: mebefm›eâÙeles Fefle Ùegòeâced~ ÙeLee osneßeÙeefÛeefkeâlmeeefveefceòesve Oeeleg

aja
meecÙesve lelmebnlemÙe leoefYeceeefveve DeejesiÙeHeâueced ‘‘Dencejesie:'' Fefle Ùe$e yegefæ®lHeÅeles~
SJeb mveeve-DeeÛeceve-Ùe%eesHeJeerleeefovee Denb Megæ: mebmke=âle: Fefle Ùe$e yegefæ: GlHeÅeles me
mebefm›eâÙeles~ me Ûe osnsve mebnle SJe~ lesvewJe efn Denbkeâ$ee& DenbHeÇlÙeÙeefJe<eÙesCe HeÇlÙeefÙevee
r
riv
meJee&: ef›eâÙee: efveJe&lÙe&vles~ lelHeâueb Ûe me SJe Deëveeefle~ ‘‘leÙeesjvÙe: efHeHHeueb mJeeÉefòe
DeveëveVevÙees DeefYeÛeekeâMeerefle’’ (cegb. 3.1.1) Feflecev$eJeCee&led, ‘‘DeelcesefvõÙeceveesÙegòeâb
YeesòeâslÙeengce&veeref<eCe:'' (keâ. 1.3.4) Fefle Ûe~ leLee Ûe ‘‘Skeâes osJe: meJe&Yetles<eg iet{:
Pa

meJe&JÙeeHeer meJe&Yetleevlejelcee, keâcee&OÙe#e: meJe&YetleeefOeJeeme: mee#eer Ûeslee kesâJeuees efveieg&Ce§e''

(MJes. 6.11) Fefle~ ‘‘me HeÙe&ieeled Meg›eâcekeâeÙece›eCeced DemveeefJejb MegæceHeeHeefJeæced''
(F&. 8) Fefle Ûewleew cev$eew DeveeOesÙe DeefleMeÙeleeb efvelÙeMegæleeb Ûe yeÇÿeCees oMe&Ùele:~
ha

yeÇÿeYeeJe§e cees#e:~ lemceeled ve mebmkeâeÙees&ÓefHe cees#e:~ DeleesÓvÙeved cees#eb HeÇefle ef›eâÙeevegHeÇJesMe-

Éejb ve MekeäÙeb kesâveefÛeled oMe&efÙelegced~ lemceeled %eeveceskebâ cegkeälJee ef›eâÙeeÙee iebOecee$emÙeeefHe
Ma

DevegHeÇJesMe: Fn veesHeHeÅeles~
15. ëIf it be said that mok¶a, though being oneís own nature, yet being
obscured is manifested by a purification act, just as the luster of a mirror
purified by the act of scrubbing?í No; because, (saying that) the Self is an object
of actionóis irreconcilable. An action which does not modify its object cannot
exist. If Åtman is modifiable by action, its results in non-eternality of Åtman.
Sentences like ëëThis is spoken of as non-modifiableíí would be affected. That
is unacceptable. Therefore, Åtman being an object of action is not possible. If
something else is the object of action, Åtman is not purified since it is not the
 121

object (for purification). (Details:) ëIs not the embodied seen to be purified by
body-based acts such as bathing, åcamana (sipping of water) and wearing
yaj¤opav∂ta (the sacred thread etc)?í No. Only that Åtman is purified which is
associated with the body etc under the grip of avidyå. Indeed, it is clearly seen
that bathing, åcamana etc inhere in the body. It stands to reason that what is
purified by the body-based act is something that is associated with it and is

a
accepted as the Self due to avidyå. It is like this: With equilibrium of the humours
brought about by the body based treatment, there is fruit of health for him

k
who is associated with the body and has the conceit of it as himself; in him

aja
arises the feeling ëëI am free from diseaseíí. Similarly, he who gets the feeling ëI
am clean, purifiedí through bathing, åcamana, wearing of the yaj¤opav∂ta etc,
is purified. He is certainly associated with the body. It is only by him who has
r
the conceit ëI am the doerí, who is the object of the concept ëIí and supporter of
riv
all thoughtsóthat all actions are performed. Their fruit he alone enjoys, because
mantra passage says ëëOne of them eats the fruit, the other looks on, not eatingíí
and also ëëOne associated with the body, senses and the mind is called the
Pa

enjoyer by wise meníí. Similarly, ëëThe one God concealed in all beings and
pervading all beings, the watcher of actions, living in all beings, the witness,
the intelligent, alone and free from all qualitiesíí, ëëHe pervades all, is effulgent,
unembodied, free from wounds, free from nerves, pure and unafflicted by siníí.
ha

These two mantras show that Brahman cannot have anything (excellence) added
to It and that It is eternally pure. Becoming Brahman is mok¶a. Therefore, mok¶a
Ma

is not one to be purified. Other than these (four) no one can show a door for
action to enter into mok¶a. Therefore, apart from (this) one knowledge, there
cannot be an entrance here even for a smell of action.
(15) Objection: Can the inherent nature of Åtman which is eternal mok¶a be
revealed by purification, just like the mirror which when scrubbed shows its shine?
Answer: No; because scrubbing modifies the mirror. If Åtman is modified like
that by karma, He becomes non-eternal.
Further Objection: ëWhat if by scrubbing we mean the wiping of the mirror?í
122

Answer: In that case, the purification is not of the mirror. Similarly, purification
is there by bathing and åcamana for one who has adhyåsa in the body. He is pråj¤a
who is the object of the aham-pratyaya and is the witness of all pratyayas. It is he who,
with the adjuncts of body mind etc, does all the actions in wakeful and dreaming
states and experiences their fruit. But the Åtman who is his witness is untouched
by these purification processes. Really speaking, even pråj¤a is untouched by them.
Since pråj¤a, due to avidyå, does not know that he is Åtman, he appears to get purified.

a
This avidyå is the only obstruction to mok¶a and is not lost by any purificatory action.
Avidyå is lost only by vidyå - knowledge.

k
aja
16. veveg %eeveb veece ceevemeer ef›eâÙee? ve, Jewue#eCÙeeled~ ef›eâÙee efn veece mee Ùe$e
JemlegefvejHes#ewJe ÛeesÅeles, Heg®<e efÛeòeJÙeeHeejeOeervee Ûe~ ÙeLee ‘‘ÙemÙew osJeleeÙew nefJe: ie=nerleb
mÙeeòeeb cevemee OÙeeÙesÉ<ešdkeâefj<Ùeved'' (Ss. yeÇe. 3.1.8), ‘‘mevOÙeeb cevemee OÙeeÙesled'' Fefle
r
ÛewJeceeefo<eg~ OÙeeveb efÛevleveb ÙeÅeefHe ceevemeb, leLeeefHe Heg®<esCe keâleg&cekeâleg&ced DevÙeLee Jee keâlegË
riv
MekeäÙeced~ Heg®<elev$elJeeled~ %eeveb leg ØeceeCepevÙeced~ HeÇceeCeb Ûe ÙeLeeYetleJemlegefJe<eÙeced~ Dele:
%eeveb keâleg&cekeâleg&ced DevÙeLee Jee keâleg&ceMekeäÙeced~ kesâJeueb Jemleglev$ecesJe leled~ ve Ûeesoveelev$eced,
Pa

veeefHe Heg®<elev$eced~ lemceeled ceevemelJesÓefHe %eevemÙe cenÉwue#eCÙeced~ ÙeLee Ûe ‘‘Heg®<ees JeeJe

ieewleceeefive:'' (Úeb. 5.7.1) ‘‘Ùees<ee JeeJe ieewleceeefive:'' (Úeb. 5.8.1) FlÙe$e
Ùeesef<elHeg®<eÙees: Deefiveyegefæcee&vemeer YeJeefle~ kesâJeue ÛeesoveepevÙelJeeled ef›eâÙewJe mee Heg®<elev$ee
ha

Ûe~ Ùee leg HeÇefmeæs Deiveew Deefiveyegefæ:, ve mee Ûeesoveelev$ee veeefHe Heg®<elev$ee efkebâ leefn&?
HeÇlÙe#eefJe<eÙeJemleglev$ewJe Fefle %eevecesJewleled, ve ef›eâÙee~ SJeb meJe&HeÇceeCe-efJe<eÙe-Jemleg<eg
JesefoleJÙeced~ le$ewJeb meefle ÙeLeeYetle yeÇÿeelceefJe<eÙeceefHe %eeveb ve Ûeesoveelev$eced~ leefÉ<eÙes efue*eoÙe:
Ma

ßetÙeceeCee DeefHe DeefveÙeespÙe-efJe<eÙelJeeled kegâC"er YeJeefvle, Gheueeefo<eg HeÇÙegòeâ#egjlew#CÙeeefoJeled~

DensÙe-DevegHeeosÙe JemlegefJe<eÙelJeeled~
16. ëIs not knowledge a mental act?í No, because of difference. An act is
that which is enjoined without regard to the nature of the thing and dependent
on mental activity. For example: ëëThat deity for whom oblation is to be offered,
should be contemplated in mind and then should be uttered, the word va¶a¢íí,
ëëThe evening (deity) should be contemplated in the mindíí etc. Contemplation,
viz. thinking about, is mental; it may be done or not done or done in a different
 123

way by the person since it is subjective. Knowledge, on the other hand, is

generated by pramåƒa i.e. valid means of knowledge. Pramåƒa objectifies the
thing as it is. Therefore, knowledgeóthough mentalóis very different in nature
(from an act). In cases like ëëMan is fire, oh Gautamaíí, ëëWoman is fire, oh
Gautamaíí, there arises the cognition of fire in man and in woman. This
however, is an act generated solely by injunction and subjective. But the

a
cognition of the well-known fire is not dependent on imagination nor is it
subjective. What then? It is knowledge only, not an act, because, it is objective

k
(knowledge) of an object of perception. The same is to be understood in respect

aja
of all things which are objects of pramåƒa. This being the case, even knowledge
of Brahman which is the Self as it is, is not dependent on Vedic injunction. Hence,
although imperative etc referring to the knowledge of Brahman are found in
r
the Vedic texts, yet they are ineffective because they refer to something which
riv
cannot be enjoined, just as the edge of a razor becomes blunt when it is applied
to a stone. The reason is that It is a thing where there is no giving and taking.
(16) That j¤åna is not a mental act is being demonstrated in this section. Action
Pa

is injunctory - prescribed independent of the nature of the object and dependent

on the mind. For e.g., the meditation prescribed in the sentence ëafter meditating in
the mind on the devatå, when the hotå shouts íva¶a¢í, the adhvaryu should offer the
oblation to the devatåí is subjective.
ha

Doubt: Quoting the same mantra ëthe deity for whom.í etc the Bhå¶yakåra has
said ëInjunctions prescribing the oblations expect Indra etc devatås to have an inherent
form. Devatås like Indra etc cannot be grasped by the mind if they donít have a
Ma

form - ^fofékfHk% ,o bUÊkfn nSoR;kfu gohf"ka pksn;n~fHk% visf{kre~ bUÊknhuka Lo:ie~A u fg Lo:ijfgrk
bUÊkn;% psrfl vkjksif;rqa 'kD;Urs*A (Sµu. Bh. 1.3.33). Since the mental form during meditation
has to be similar to the inherent form of the devatå, is it not j¤åna - knowledge of the
devatå? If it is j¤åna, it cannot be an injunction. Therefore, what does it mean to say
that ëinjunction is prescribed independent of the nature of the object?í
Answer: Not like that. In the sentence above, the meditation implies a mental
form similar to the inherent form of the devatå.But the adhyåsarµupa meditation (see
sec. 12) is dissimilar to the form of the object. Therefore, meditation could be similar
124

or dissimilar to the form of the object. This is the implication when it is said that
the injunction of meditation is without regard to the nature of the object of
meditation. Therefore, meditation is not j¤åna. The j¤åna that is produced when
the devatå is actually seen is not subjective. But the meditation of remembering the
devatå not in front, is subjective.
Doubt: When seeing the pot, its mental form that is produced is subject to
change. Therefore, isn't knowing the pot also an action?

a
Answer: No; because there is no effort on part of the knower in knowing the

k
pot. Production of the mental form of the object as a consequence of the object-
sense contact is the nature of the k¶etra. This is subject to change. The one who

aja
notices it is the knower. Knowing is not his action; it is his nature.
Doubt: Let not j¤åna of sense perception be an act. Is not effort involved in
knowing things by inference and Veda?
r
Answer: It is not so. Whatever may be the pramåƒa, j¤åna obtained has to be
riv
right knowledge. But effort is needed, while knowing things beyond perception,
to remove the doubts obstructing right knowledge. But this does not mean that
j¤åna is produced by this effort; because the object of the effort is not j¤åna, but the
Pa

removal of doubt. One who does not distinguish the role of pramåƒa in this way,
may imagine that j¤åna is obtained by effort like cooking. This is not correct. If one
remembers that the knower is pråj¤a who is adjunctless, it is easy to understand
the j¤åna is not his action, but his nature. Therefore, Brahman-Åtman j¤åna also is
ha

neither injunctive nor subjective.

17. efkeâceLee&efve leefn& ‘‘Deelcee Jee Dejs õ<šJÙe: ßeesleJÙe:'' (ye=. 2.4.5) FlÙee-
Ma

oerefve efJeefOeÛÚeÙeeefve JeÛeveeefve? mJeeYeeefJekeâ-HeÇJe=efòeefJe<eÙe-efJecegKeerkeâjCeeLee&efve Fefle yeÇtce:~

Ùeesefn yeefnceg&Ke: HeÇJele&les Heg®<e: F<šb ces YetÙeeled, Deefve<šb cee Yetefoefle, ve Ûe le$e DeelÙeefvlekebâ
Heg®<eeLe± ueYeles, leced DeelÙeefvlekeâHeg®<eeLe&Jeeef_Úveb mJeeYeeefJekeâ-keâeÙe&keâjCemebIeeleHeÇJe=efòe-
ieesÛejeled efJecegKeerke=âlÙe HeÇlÙeieelceœeeslemleÙee HeÇJele&Ùeefvle ‘‘Deelcee Jee Dejs õ<šJÙe:’’ FlÙeeoerevf e~
lemÙe DeelceevJes<eCeeÙe HeÇJe=òemÙe DensÙecevegHeeosÙeb Ûe DeelceleòJeced GHeefoMÙeles ‘‘Fob meJe±
ÙeoÙeceelcee'' (ye=. 2.4.6), ‘‘Ùe$e lJemÙe meJe&ceelcewJeeYetled lelkesâve kebâ HeMÙesled kesâve kebâ
efJepeeveerÙeeled’’, ‘‘efJe%eeleejcejs kesâve efJepeeveerÙeeled'' (ye=. 4.5.15), ‘‘DeÙeceelcee yeÇÿe''
(ye=. 2.5.1) FlÙeeefoefYe:~
 125

17. ëWhat then are the meanings of passages like ëëÅtman should be seen,
should be heard aboutíí etc which have the shade of injunctions?í We say,
they are intended to turn back (the mind) from objects of natural inclination.
The person who is inclined outwards (thinks) ëLet me have desirable things,
let me not have undesirable thingsí but does not attain the final goal there.
(When the same person) desires the final goal, passages like ëëÅtman is to be
seeníí etc turn him away from the objects of natural inclination which attract

a
the union of the body and the senses and make his (attention) flow towards

k
the inner Åtman in a continuous current. For him who engages himself in the

aja
quest of Åtman, ‹ruti teaches the true nature of Åtman which is free from any
giving and taking: ëëAll this is Åtmaníí, ëëWhere all of this is only Åtman, by
what whom can see ? By what whom can one know!íí ëëBy what one can the
knower?íí ëëThis Åtman is Brahmaníí etc.
r
riv
(17) Which have the shade of injunctions etc: Should be done, to be done, must
be done have injunctory meaning. Though the word ëto be seen, to be heard, to be
thought about, to be meditated oní are injunctions, they cannot be injunctions when
Pa

used in the case of Åtman. ëThen what is their purpose?í It is this: Man by nature is
extrovert in trying to get happiness and getting rid of grief. One who is in search of
Åtman knows that the ultimate happiness is not obtained from outside.
Nevertheless, his mind is frequently pushed outside due to the power of the
ha

impressions acquired from previous lives. His mind is to be withdrawn from

outside and turned inwards towards the Åtman. Who is this Åtman? It is he who is
all this. Therefore, when he comes to know that he is the all pervading Åtman, the
Ma

mind stops going outside. These injunctive words are used to turn his attention
towards the Åtman. Rest of the discussion in this connection is in the end section.

18. ÙeoefHe Dekeâle&JÙeHeÇOeeveced Deelce%eeveb neveeÙe GHeeoeveeÙe Jee ve YeJeefle Fefle, leled
leLewJe DeYÙegHeiecÙeles~ Deuebkeâejes ¢eÙeced Demceekebâ Ùeled yeÇÿeelceeJeieleew melÙeeb meJe&keâle&JÙelee
neefve: ke=âleke=âlÙelee Ûe Fefle~ leLee Ûe ßegefle: ‘‘Deelceeveb ÛesefÉpeeveerÙeeled DeÙecemceerefle Het®<e:,
efkeâefceÛÚved keâmÙe keâeceeÙe MejerjcevegmebpJejsled'' (ye=. 4.4.12) Fefle~ ‘‘Sleod yegodOJee
yegefæceeved mÙeeled ke=âleke=âlÙe§e Yeejle’’ (ieer. 15.20) Fefle mce=efle:~ lemceeled ve HeÇefleHeefòe-
efJeefOeefJe<eÙeleÙee yeÇÿeCe: meceHe&Ceced~
126

18. (As for the objection that) the knowledge of Åtman which is free from
action does not have any giving and takingówe accept it as it is. This indeed
constitutes our glory that with the realization of Åtman as Brahman, there is
the destruction of all duties and the accomplishment of everything that is to
be accomplished. So too says ‹ruti: ëëIf man realizes that Åtman is himself (then),
desiring what for whoís sake will he suffer in sympathy with the body?íí smæti
also says ëëKnowing that, one becomes intelligent and would have accom-

a
plished all that is to be accomplished, oh Bhårataíí. Therefore, Brahman is not

k
said as subsidiary to upåsanå.

aja
(18) That there is no giving and taking in the knowledge of Brahman-Åtman
oneness, is not a defect; it is our glory. We accept this feature of the realisation of
Åtman as it is because, what give and take could be there in that bliss whose tiny
fractions are the happiness of beings starting from man upto the supermost devatå
r
Brahma? (Tai. 2.8; Br. 4.3.33). With this, all duties come to an end and all the work
riv
is over. That there is no higher bliss is indicated even to the unrealised in blissful
and griefless deep sleep where connection with outside world is completely
snapped. Therefore, it is obvious that the realised one has no connection with either
Pa

karma or upåsanå.

19. ÙeoefHe kesâefÛeoeng: HeÇJe=efòeefveJe=efòeefJeefOeleÛÚs<eJÙeeflejskesâCe kesâJeue JemlegYeeiees

ha

veemleerefle, leVe~ DeewHeefve<eomÙe Heg®<emÙe DevevÙeMes<elJeeled~ ÙeesÓmeew GHeefve<elmJesJe DeefOeiele:

Heg®<e: Demebmeejer yeÇÿe GlHeeÅeeefo-ÛelegefJe&Oe-õJÙeefJeue#eCe: mJeHeÇkeâjCemLe: DevevÙeMes<e:
veemeew veeefmle veeefOeiecÙeles Fefle Jee MekeäÙeb Jeefolegced~ ‘‘me S<e vesefle veslÙeelcee'' (ye=.
Ma

3.9.26) Fefle DeelceMeyoeled~ Deelceve§e HeÇlÙeeKÙeelegb DeMekeäÙelJeeled~ Ùe S<e efvejekeâlee&

lemÙewJe DeelcelJeeled~ veveg Deelcee DenbHeÇlÙeÙeefJe<eÙelJeeled GHeefve<elmJesJe efJe%eeÙeles Fefle
DevegHeHeVeced? ve, lelmeeef#elJesve HeÇlÙegòeâlJeeled~ ve efn DenbHeÇlÙeÙe efJe<eÙekeâle=&JÙeeflejskesâCe lelmee#eer
meJe&YetlemLe: mece: Skeâ: ketâšmLeefvelÙe: Heg®<e: efJeefOekeâeb[s leke&âmeceÙes Jee kesâveefÛeled DeefOe-
iele: meJe&mÙe Deelcee~ Dele: me ve kesâveefÛeled HeÇlÙeeKÙeelegb MekeäÙe: efJeefOeMes<elJeb Jee veslegced~
DeelcelJeeosJe Ûe meJex<eeb ve nsÙe: veeefHe GHeeosÙe:~ meJe± efn efJeveMÙele efJekeâejpeeleb Heg®<eevleb
efJeveMÙeefle~ Heg®<ees efJeveeMenslJeYeeJeeled DeefJeveeMeer~ efJeef›eâÙeenslJeYeeJeeÛÛe ketâšmLeefvelÙe:,
Dele SJe efvelÙeMegæyegæcegòeâmJeYeeJe:~ lemceeled ‘‘Heg®<eeVeHejb efkebâefÛeled mee keâe<"e mee
 127

Hejeieefle:'' (keâ. 1.3.11), ‘‘leb lJeewHeefve<eob Heg®<eb He=ÛÚeefce'' (ye=. 3.9.26) Fefle
Ûe DeewHeefve<eolJeefJeMes<eCeb Heg®<emÙe GHeefve<elmeg HeÇeOeevÙesve HeÇkeâeMÙeceevelJes GHeHeÅeles~ Dele:
YetleJemlegHejes JesoYeeiees veemleerefle JeÛeveb meenmecee$eced~
19. Some say, there is no portion of the Veda telling about mere things
different from injunctions which motivate and demotivate and what is
subsidiary to them. That is not so because, the Person (Åtman) propounded in

a
the Upani¶ads is not subsidiary to anything else. This Person is understood

k
from the Upani¶ads alone; He is not sa≈sår∂; He is of the nature of Brahman,
who is distinct from the four kinds of substances which are produced etc, Who

aja
occurs in a topic of His own, not subsidiary to another. It cannot be said that
such a one does not exist or that He cannot be known, because there is the
word ëÅtmaní in ëëThat Åtman is not like this, not like thisíí and it is not possible
r
to deny Åtman, for he who denies is himself Åtman. (Objection) ëSince (it has
riv
been said) that Åtman is the object of ëI-thoughtí, is it not wrong to say that He
is to be understood from the Upani¶ads alone?í No, because, it has been said
Pa

that He is the witness of the Åtman grasped as ëIí. As distinct from the doer
Åtman grasped as ëIí, His witness who is present in all, equal, one, immutably
eternal, the Person who is the self of all, is not known by anyone either in the
injunctional part (of the Veda) or in the system of logic. Therefore, He cannot
ha

be refuted by anyone, nor link (him) as subsidiary to injunction. Being the Åtman
of all, He is not something either to be given up or taken up. All the produced
effects perish leaving this Person. This Person is imperishable because, there is
Ma

nothing in Him to perish. He is immutably eternal because, there is nothing to

be modified (in Him). For this reason, He is by nature eternally pure,
enlightened and free. Therefore, in (sentences like) ëëThere is nothing higher
than this Person: that is the limit, that is the highest goalíí, ëëBut I ask about the
Person propounded in the Upanishadsíí,óthe qualification ëpropounded in
the Upani¶adsí predominantly speak about this Person. Therefore, the statement
that there is no part of the Veda dealing with existing things is mere rashness.
(19) It is wrong to say that the Vedas do not teach anything which has no
128

connection with karma; Upani¶ads do teach of such a soul. In this section it is shown
with evidence that He is to be taught only by the Upani¶ads because, He is not
related to karma. The sentence since Åtman is the subject of the aha≈-pratyaya - ^uuq
vkRek vgaizR;;fo"k;Rokr~---* has already been discussed in Adhyåsa Bhå¶ya (25.1).
Doubt: Till now it has been said that the inner self is the subject of the I-thought
(aha≈-pratyaya) and is well-known in everyoneís experience. Now suddenly it is
being said that ^mifu"kRlq ,o foKk;rs* - He is to understood only through the Upani¶ads.

a
How is it?

k
Answer: Not like that. The inner Self, spoken of previously, is k¶etraj¤a-pråj¤a
-doer-enjoyer - who could be purified by action - discussed in logic and also the

aja
part of the Vedas dealing with karma. He is not one; he is different in each body.
The one being said by the Upani¶ads is the same in everyone, the President without
attributes and the witness to all karma. Therefore, it is wrong to say that the Vedas
do not speak of existent things*.
r
riv
20. ÙeoefHe MeeŒeleelHeÙe&efJeoeced Deveg›eâceCeced ‘‘Â<šes efn lemÙeeLe&: keâcee&JeyeesOeveced''
(Mee. Yee. 1.1.1) FlÙesJeceeefo, leled Oece&efpe%eemeeefJe<eÙelJeeled efJeefOeHeÇefle<esOeMeeŒeeefYeHeÇeÙeb
Pa

õ<šJÙeced~ DeefHe Ûe ‘‘DeecveeÙemÙe ef›eâÙeeLe&lJeeoeveLe&keäÙeced DeleoLee&veeced'' (pew. met. 1.2.1)

FlÙesleled Skeâevlesve DeYÙegHeieÛÚleeb YetleesHeosMe DeeveLe&keäÙe HeÇmebie:~ HeÇJe=eòf eefveJe=eòf eefJeefOeJÙeeflejskesâCe
Yetleb Ûesled Jemleg GHeefoMeefle YeJÙeeLe&lJesve, ketâšmLeb efvelÙeb Yetleb veesHeefoMeefle Fefle keâes nsleg:? ve
ha

efn Yetleced GHeefoMÙeceeveb ef›eâÙee YeJeefle~ Deef›eâÙeelJesÓefHe YetlemÙe ef›eâÙeemeeOevelJeeled ef›eâÙeeLe&

SJe YetleesHeosMe: Fefle Ûesled? vew<e oes<e:~ ef›eâÙeeLe&lJesÓefHe ef›eâÙeeefveJe&le&ve Meefòeâceod Jemleg
GHeefo<šcesJe~ ef›eâÙeeLe&lJeb leg HeÇÙeespeveb lemÙe~ ve Ûe SleeJelee Jemleg DevegHeefo<šb YeJeefle~ Ùeefo
Ma

veece GHeefo<šb efkebâ leJe lesve mÙeeefoefle? GÛÙeles~ DeveJeiele-DeelceJemletHeosMe§e leLewJe

YeefJelegcen&efle~ leoJeielÙee efceLÙee%eevemÙe mebmeejnslees: efveJe=efòe: HeÇÙeespeveb ef›eâÙeles Fefle
DeefJeefMe<šced DeLe&JeòJeb ef›eâÙeemeeOeveJemletHeosMesve~
20. (The sayings of) those who know the purport of the ‹åstra viz, ëëThe
visible use of Veda is the teaching of actioníí etc refer to the discussion of
*The sentence ^uuq vkRek vgaizR;;fo"k;Rokr~--- izR;qDrRokr* - Makes it crystal clear that
^vLer~izR;;xkspj* - the first word in the Adhyåsa Bhasya refers only to k¶etraj¤a and not to
his witness, the fourth Åtman.
 129

dharma. Therefore, they have to be understood as the opinion of the ‹åstra of

prescriptions and prohibitions. Further, for those who accept unexceptionally
(the statement) ëëSince the purpose of the Veda is action, (sentences) not
conveying that meaning are futileíí, the teaching of existents become futile. If
it teaches existent things different from injunctions for motivation and
demotivation for the sake of dharma which is yet to occur, what is the reason

a
for saying that it does not teach the immutable eternal existent? The existent
that is taught is not an act. ëIf it is said that though the existent itself is not an

k
act, its teaching is for the sake of an act, because it is instrumental to an act?í

aja
This is not a defect. Though for the sake of an actóthe thing which has the
capacity to perform an act is certainly taught; that it is for the sake of an act is
its usefulness. Just because of that, the thing does not turn out to be untaught.
r
ëAgreeing it is taught, what do you gain from it?í We will say: The teaching of
riv
the unknown Åtman is also of the same kind. By its knowledge the use would
be the removal of the wrong knowledge which is the cause of sa≈såra. Hence,
it is the same as the teaching of objects that are instrumental to an act in respect
Pa

of its usefullness.
(20) That the Vedas do not speak of existent things was rejected in the previous
section. Now it is being shown, using the M∂må≈sakaís arguments, that the Vedas
do speak of about things unrelated to karma. Do they not speak of yµupa, åhvan∂ya
ha

etc? ëThey do, but for the sake of actioní. Though its usefulness is in action, it is an
existent. So, the teaching of an existent object without use could be meaningless;
not if it has use. ëThen what is the use for teaching about Åtman?í It is that Its
Ma

knowledge destroys the adhyåsa which is responsible for all evil.

21. DeefHe Ûe ‘‘yeÇeÿeCees ve nvleJÙe:'' FlÙesJeceeÅee efveJe=efòe: GHeefoMÙeles~ ve Ûe mee

ef›eâÙee, veeefHe ef›eâÙeemeeOeveced~ Deef›eâÙeeLee&veecegHeosMe: DeveLe&keâ§esled ‘‘yeÇeÿeCees ve nvleJÙe:''
FlÙeeefo efveJe=òÙegHeosMeeveeced DeeveLe&keäÙeb HeÇeHleced~ leÛÛe Deefve<šced~ ve Ûe mJeYeeJeHeÇeHle-
nvlÙeLe&-DevegjeiesCe ve_e: MekeäÙeced DeHeÇeHleef›eâÙeeLe&lJeb keâuHeefÙelegb nveve-ef›eâÙeeefveJe=efòe-
DeewoemeervÙe JÙeeflejskesâCe~ ve_e§e S<e mJeYeeJe: Ùeled mJemebyebefOeveesÓYeeJeb yeesOeÙeefle Fefle~
DeYeeJeyegefæ§e DeewoemeervÙekeâejCeced~ mee Ûe oiOesvOeveeefiveJeled mJeÙecesJe GHeMeecÙeefle~
130

lemceeled HeÇmeòeâef›eâÙeeefveJe=efòe-DeewoemeervÙecesJe ‘‘yeÇeÿeCees ve nvleJÙe:'' FlÙeeefo<eg HeÇefle<esOeeLe±±

cevÙeecens DevÙe$e HeÇpeeHeefle›eleeefoYÙe:~ lemceeled Heg®<eeLe&-DevegHeÙeesefie-GHeeKÙeeveeefo-YetleeLe&-
Jeeo efJe<eÙeced DeeveLe&keäÙeeefYeOeeveb õ<šJÙeced~
21. Further, ëëA bråhmaƒa is not to be killedíí etc teach desisting from action.
This is not an act or even a means to act. If the teaching of not acting is futile,
then the teachings of desisting from activity like ëëA bråhmaƒa is not to be killedíí

a
would also be futile. That is not desirable. The word ënotí related to the act of

k
killing which is naturally inherent (in one), makes (him) desist from killing
and (eventually) generates (only) a passivity in him. Therefore, imagining a

aja
meaning of non-existent act (for the word ënotí) is not possible. The nature of
the word ënotí is that it teaches the non-existence to which it is related. The
cognition of non-existence is the cause of passivity. That subsides on its own
r
accord like the fire whose fuel has been consumed. Therefore we think that the
riv
passivity generated by desisting from the act for which there is scope, is the
meaning of the prohibition ëëA bråhmaƒa is not to be killedíí etc, in all cases
Pa

other than the Prajåpati - vow etc. Therefore, the claim of futility must be
understood in the case of legends which are praises of the existent not serving
the human goal.
(21) That sentences unrelated to action are futile is the opponentís view in the
ha

sµutra ëSince ‹åstra is for the purpose of actioní. The counter question of the Vedåntin
is this: Right. It is true in the case of injunctory sentences intended to motivate
person to action. What about prohibitory sentences intended to demotivate?
Ma

Opponent: Even in the prohibitory sentences, connection with action is implied.

For e.g., in Prajåpati vow, the brahmacårin is prohibited to see the sun while it is
setting or rising. Puråƒas prohibit seeing the moon on a certain day of the year. In
these prohibitions, effort is needed by the person not to see the sun or the moon.
Vedantin: What about the prohibitory sentence ëA bråhmaƒa should not be
killedí? It is neither action nor an implement for action.
Opponent: No; there is the action of effort not to kill.
Vedåntin: But this sentence is not an injunction for making that effort. The
 131

only use of the sentence is to produce the awareness of not killing. Later on, even
this awareness ends up in being passive. As for e.g., if the intention of killing is the
fuel, then this awareness is fire. Just like fire gets extinguished after burning the
fuel, this awareness also ends up in passivity after removing the motivation to kill.
This means that there are Vedic passages which are useful things not related with
action. Similarly, sentences about Brahman have the use of removing adhyåsa which
is responsible for all worldly problems.

a
22. ÙeoHÙegòeâced keâle&JÙeefJeOÙevegHeÇJesMeced DevlejsCe Jemlegcee$ecegÛÙeceeveced DeveLe&kebâ mÙeeled

k
‘‘meHleÉerHee Jemegceleer'' FlÙeeefoJeled Fefle, lelHeefjùleced~ ‘‘jppegefjÙeb veeÙeb meHe&:'' Fefle

aja
Jemlegcee$ekeâLevesÓefHe HeÇÙeespevemÙe Â<šlJeeled~ veveg ßegleyeÇÿeCeesÓefHe ÙeLeeHetJe± mebmeeefjlJeoMe&veeled
ve jppegmJe¤HekeâLeveJeled DeLe&JeòJeefcelÙegòeâced? De$eesÛÙeles~ ve DeJeiele-yeÇÿeelceYeeJemÙe ÙeLee-
HetJeË mebmeeefjlJeb MekeäÙeb oMe&efÙelegced, JesoHeÇceeCepeefveleyeÇÿeelceYeeJeefJejesOeeled~ ve efn
r
riv
MejerjeÅeelceeefYeceeefveve: og:KeYeÙeeefoceòJeb Â<šefceefle lemÙew JesoHeÇceeCepeefvele-yeÇÿeelceeJeieces
leoefYeceeve efveJe=òeew leosJe efceLÙee%eeveefveefceòeb og:KeYeÙeeefoceòJeb YeJeleerefle MekeäÙeb keâuHeefÙe-
legced~ ve efn Oeefvevees ie=nmLemÙe OeveeefYeceeefveve: OeveeHenejefveefceòeb og:Keb Â<šefceefle lemÙewJe
Pa

HeÇJeÇefpelemÙe OeveeefYeceevejefnlemÙe leosJe OeveeHenejefveefceòeb YeJeefle~ ve Ûe kegbâ[efueve: kegbâ[efue-

lJeeefYeceeveefveefceòeb megKeb Â<šefceefle lemÙewJe kegbâ[ueefJeÙegòeâmÙe kegbâ[efuelJeeefYeceevejefnlemÙe leosJe
kegbâ[efuelJeeefYeceeveefveefceòeb megKeb YeJeefle~ leogòeâb ßeglÙee ‘‘DeMejerjb JeeJemevleb ve efHeÇÙeeefHeÇÙes
ha

mHe=Mele:'' (Úeb. 8.12.1)~

22. It was said that the speaking of a bare thing without entry of injunction
is futile like (saying) ëëThe earth has seven islandsíí etc. This has been refuted;
Ma

because, use is seen even in the narration of a bare objection like ëëThis is rope,
this is not a snakeíí. (Opponent)óëEven in him who has heard about Brahman,
the features of a sa≈sår∂ (worldly person) is seen as before; therefore, it is not
purposeful as in the narration of the nature of the rope.í Here we say: It is not
possible to show features of sa≈sår∂ as before in one who has realization of
Brahman as himself; because it is opposed to the realization of BrahmanóÅtman
identification generated by Veda pramåƒa. In a man with the conceit of self in
the body etc, association with grief, fear etc are found. Because of that, it is not
132

possible to imagine in the man the association of grief, fear etc caused by illusory
knowledge, after the Brahman- Åtman realization produced by Veda pramåƒa
(and so) the conceit is removed. The grief of theft of wealth is found in the rich
house-holder with the conceit of wealth; the same grief caused by the theft of
wealth is not produced in the same man when he renounces and becomes freed
from the conceit of wealth. Happiness is seen in one having earrings who has

a
the conceit of having earrings; for the same person, the happiness in having
earrings is not there, when he gives up the earrings and is freed from the conceit

k
of having earrings. This is declared by ‹ruti: ëHim who is unembodied, pleasure

aja
and displeasure do not touch.í.
(22) Earlier the objection was raised that the narration of an existent thing is
useless, like the sentence ëThe earth has seven islandsí. Countering it, the Vedåntin

r
said that the narration of the rope has the use of removing the fear of the serpent
riv
(see the same adhikaraƒa, sec. 6). Continuing it, the effect of the realisation of Brahman-
Åtman oneness on the j¤ån∂ is being discussed. A detailed commentary on this has
already been made in the Adhyåsa Bhå¶ya (21.1-3). The gist is: ^'kjhjkEHkdL; deZ.kks
Pa

fu;rQyRokr~ lE;XKkuizkIrkS vfi vo';EHkkfouh izo`fŸk% okƒ~eu%dk;kuke~ yCéko`Ÿks% deZ.kks cyh;LRokr~

eqDrs"okfnizo`fŸkor~* (Br. Bh. 1.4.7). Though activity takes place in body, speech, mind
etc, one with this realisation is aware that he is unrelated to it. There is no meaning
in others finding a contradiction in it. Since there is no adhyåsa in him, pleasure/
ha

displeasure do not touch him even when the body is alive. The objection of the
opponent who does not agree with this and the Vedåntinís answer to it is as follows:
Ma

23. Mejerjs Heefleles DeMejerjlJeb mÙeeled ve peerJele: Fefle Ûesled? ve, meMejerjlJemÙe
efceLÙee%eeveefveefceòelJeeled~ ve efn Deelceve: MejerjelceeefYeceeveue#eCeb efceLÙee%eeveb cegòeâdJee DevÙele:
meMejerjlJeb MekeäÙeb keâuHeefÙelegced~ efvelÙeb DeMejerjlJeb Dekeâce&efveefceòelJeeefoefle DeJeesÛeece~ lelke=âle
Oecee&Oece&efveefceòeb meMejerjlJeefceefle Ûesled? ve, MejerjmebyebOemÙe DeefmeælJeeled Oecee&Oece&Ùees: Deelce-
ke=âlelJeeefmeæs:~ MejerjmebyebOemÙe Oecee&Oece&Ùees: lelke=âlemÙe Ûe FlejslejeßeÙelJeHeÇmebieeled DevOe-
HejbHeje S<ee DeveeefolJekeâuHevee~ ef›eâÙeemeceJeeÙeeYeeJeeÛÛe Deelceve: keâle=&lJeevegHeHeòes:~
meefVeOeevecee$esCe jepeHeÇYe=leerveeb Â<šb keâle=&lJeced, Fefle Ûesled? ve, Oeveoeveeefo-GHeeefpe&le
Ye=lÙemebyebefOelJeeled les<eeb keâle=&lJeesHeHeòes:~ ve leg Deelceve: OeveoeveeefoJeled MejerjeefoefYe: mJemJeeefce-
 133

mebyebOeefveefceòeb efkebâefÛeled MekeäÙeb keâuHeefÙelegced~ efceLÙeeefYeceevemleg HeÇlÙe#e: mebyebOensleg:~ Slesve

ÙepeceevelJeced Deelceve: JÙeeKÙeeleced~
23. ëIf it is said that unembodiment happens when the body is lost (and)
not when alive?í No, because, embodiment is due to illusory knowledge. It is
not possible to imagine embodiment for Åtman in any other way than through
illusory knowledge of the conceit of Åtman as the body. We have already said

a
that unembodiment is eternal since it is not caused by action. ëIf it is said that

k
embodiment is due to dharma and adharma acquired by him?í No. That dharma
and adharma are acquired by him is not established because, his relation with

aja
the body is not established. (To avoid this difficulty) assuming beginninglessness
(of the relation between body and dharma/adharma) is (like) a chain of blind
men, because there is mutual dependence between the relation with the body,
r
and the acquisition of dharma and adharma by him. Åtmanís doership is also
riv
irreconcilable since he has no samavåya relation - with action. ëIs not mere
proximity seen as causing doership in kingly persons?í No; their doership comes
Pa

through their relationship with the servants procured through gifting of money
etc. It is not possible to conceive of any relation produced by gifting of money
which could produce master-servant relationship between Åtman and the body
etc. It is directly seen that illusory conceit is the cause of relation. With this is
ha

also explained the doership of Åtman in sacrifice.

(23) The opponentís view is that unmebodiment is only after death and not
while alive. But this is wrong. Whether Åtman has pleasure/displeasure after the
Ma

fall of the body or not, cannot be determined by others; only the Vedas can tell it.
The Vedas say that after death j∂va goes to heaven/hell. This means that even after
death there is no freedom from pleasure/displeasure. Therefore, the opponentís
view is not correct. But it is the direct experience of everybody that in su¶upti one is
untouched by pleasure/displeasure. The reason for this feature is that j∂va is one
with Brahman at that time. ›ruti says - ^lrk rnk lEiUuks Hkofr Loeihrks Hkofr* - He is one
with Brahman, he is dissolved in his Åtman (Cå. 6.8.1). ëij vkRefu laizfr"Brs* - He is one
with paramåtman (Pr. 4.7). Therefore, it is clear that the embodiment experienced in
the wakeful state is only because of wrong knowledge.
134

Opponent: There is another way to reconcile embodiment; we say, it is the

result of dharma/adharma.
Vedantin: That is not possible; because, body is caused by dharma/adharma
and dharma/adharma are caused by the body. This mutual dependence prevents us
from deciding which of them is the cause which is the effect. You cannot also
overcome this difficulty by saying that this mutual relationship is beginningless
like that of seed and tree; that would be like a chain of blind men: One blind man

a
says that ëmilk is whiteí to another blind man. When the latter asks for pramåƒa, he
is told that ëanother blind man told meí. This cannot prove that embodiment is due

k
to dharma/adharma. But in su¶upti there is neither body nor dharma/adharma. If one

aja
remembers the reason for this given by the ‹ruti quoted above, it is conclusively
proved that the embodiment of Åtman is only because of mithyå-j¤åna.
Doubt: Is it not possible that karma can happen by the mere presence of Atman?

r
Answer: No. ›ruti trumpets that the Åtman is non-doer. Indeed, non-doership
riv
experienced in su¶upti is due to his oneness with Brahman at that time. But it
reappears the moment he gets back to wakefulness. It is because of adhyåsa that
Åtman gets doership in a sacrifice.
Pa

24. De$eeng: osneefoJÙeefleefjòeâmÙe Deelceve: DeelceerÙes osneoew DeefYeceeve: ieewCe:, ve

efceLÙee Fefle~ leVe, HeÇefmeæJemlegYesomÙe ieewCelJecegKÙelJeHeÇefmeæs:~ ÙemÙe efn HeÇefmeæes Jemleg-
Yeso: ÙeLee kesâmejeefoceeved Deeke=âefleefJeMes<e: DevJeÙeJÙeeflejskeâeYÙeeb efmebnMeyoHeÇlÙeÙeYeekedâ cegKÙe:
ha

DevÙe: HeÇefmeæ: lele§e DevÙe: Heg®<e: HeÇeefÙekewâ: ›eâewÙe&MeewÙee&efoefYe: efmebniegCew: mebHeVe: efmeæ:
lemÙe Heg®<es efmebnMeyoHeÇlÙeÙeew ieewCeew YeJele:, ve DeHeÇefmeæJemlegYesomÙe~ lemÙe leg DevÙe$e
Ma

DevÙeMeyoHeÇlÙeÙeew YeüeefvleefveefceòeeJesJe YeJele:, ve ieewCeew~ ÙeLee cevoevOekeâejs mLeeCegjÙeefceefle

Deie=¢eceeCe efJeMes<es Heg®<eMeyoHeÇlÙeÙeew mLeeCegefJe<eÙeew~ ÙeLee Jee MegefòeâkeâeÙeeced Dekeâmceeled
jpeleefceefle efveef§eleew MeyoHeÇlÙeÙeew~ leÉled osneefomebIeeles Denefceefle efve®HeÛeejsCe MeyoHeÇlÙeÙeew
DeelceeveelceeefJeJeskesâve GlHeÅeceeveew keâLeb ieewCeew MekeäÙeew Jeefolegced? DeelceeveelceefJeJesefkeâveeceefHe
Hebef[leeveeced DepeeefJeHeeueeefceJe DeefJeefJeòeâew MeyoHeÇlÙeÙeew YeJele:~ lemceeled osneefoJÙeefleefjòeâ
DeelceeefmlelJeJeeefoveeb osneoew DenbHeÇlÙeÙees efceLÙewJe, ve ieewCe:~
24.Here it is said ëThe conceit of ëIí in his own body etc. of Åtman which is
different from the body etc, is secondary (and) not illusory.í No. It is well-
 135

known that secondariness and primariness are (only) for him to whom the
difference between the things is well-known. For example: A particular form
with mane etc known throughóanvaya-vyatirekaóco-presence and co-
absence, as the meaning of the word and concept ëlioní is mukhyaóprimary;
and as different from that is a man possessing mostly lionine qualities of cruelty,
courage etc. For this latter one, however, the word and concept of one (thing)

a
in place of (the word and concept) of another (thing) is only due to delusion,
not secondary. In twilight, when it is not clearly grasped as ëThis is a postí, the

k
word and concept of ëmaní in the post or the word and the concept of silver

aja
occurring accidentally in shellóare illusory. In the same way, how can the
non-figurative use of the word and concept of ëIí in the bundle of the body etc,
born out of indiscrimination of Åtman and un-Åtman, use the word and concept
r
indiscriminately just like goatherds? Therefore, for those who agree that Åtman
riv
is distinct from the body etc, the concept of ëIí in the body etc is illusory and
not secondary.
(24) M∂må≈sakas, who disagree with this conclusion about the cause of
Pa

embodiment, object like this: ëAs the ‹åstras speak about heaven/hell after death,
Åtman has to be different from the body. Even a common man does not say ëI am
eyes, I am legsí. He says only ëmy eyes, my legsí. Therefore, the use of ëI-nessí in
the body is in the secondary sense, it is not wrong knowledge.í This is not correct.
ha

If one looks into the situation where the secondary usage is employed, it will be
clear that the ëIí description of the body is not secondary. For e.g, looking at a man
with cruelty and courage similar to that of a lion, he is addressed as ëlioní. One
Ma

who uses this word is fully aware of the differences between the man and lion.
Here the word ëlion' is in secondary sense because of the similarities of the qualities
in him. This is a figurative usage. But while calling a stump as a man or a shell as
silver, the person will not be knowing the difference between stump/man and
shell/silver. Therefore, that usage is not secondary, it is clearly wrong knowledge.
Similarly, not knowing the difference between the Self and the body when one
says ëI am a maní, it is wrong knowledge only. Even intelligent persons who know
about pråj¤a-body difference talk like this. Therefore, it can never be in the secondary
sense.
136

25. lemceeled efceLÙeeHeÇlÙeÙeefveefceòelJeeled meMejerjlJemÙe efmeæb peerJeleesÓefHe efJeog<e:

DeMejerjlJeced~ leLee Ûe yeÇÿeefJeefÉ<eÙee ßegefle: ‘‘leÅeLee efn efveuJe&Ùeveer Jeuceerkesâ ce=lee HeÇlÙemlee
MeÙeerle SJecesJe Fob Mejerjb Mesles~ Dele DeÙeceMejerjesÓce=le: HeÇeCees yeÇÿewJe lespe SJe'' (ye=.
4.4.7) Fefle, ‘‘meÛe#egjÛe#egefjJe mekeâCees&ÓkeâCe& FJe meJeeieJeeefieJe mecevee Decevee FJe
meHeÇeCeesÓHeÇeCe FJe’’ Fefle Ûe~ mce=elf ejefHe ‘‘efmLeleHeÇ%emÙe keâe Yee<ee'' (ieer. 2.54) FlÙeeÅee

a
efmLeleHeÇ%eue#eCeeefve DeeÛe#eeCee efJeog<e: meJe&HeÇJe=òÙemebyebOeb oMe&Ùeefle~ lemceeled ve DeJeiele-
yeÇÿeelceYeeJemÙe ÙeLeeHetJe± mebmeeefjlJeced ÙemÙe leg ÙeLeehetJeË mebmeeefjlJeced, veemeew DeJeieleyeÇÿeelce-

k
YeeJe: Fefle DeveJeÅeced~

aja
25. Therefore, embodiment being due to illusory knowledge, it is established
that for the j¤ån∂, even while alive there is unembodiment. Thus there is ‹ruti
about the one who knows Brahman: ëëJust as the slough of a snake lies dead and
r
cast off on the ant-hill, in the same way lies this body; then that un-embodied
riv
is immortal, is pråƒa, is Brahman alone, is light aloneíí; ëëThough with eyes, he
is like without eyes, though with ears, like without ears; though with speech,
like without speech; though with mind, like without mind; though with pråƒa,
Pa

like without pråƒaíí. Speaking of the features of sthitapraj¤aóone steady in

knowledgeósmæti also says ëëWhat is sthitapraj¤aís languageíí? etc, showing
that the knower is unconnected with all actions. Therefore, with the realization
ha

of Brahman as Åtman, there is no sa≈såra as before. The one who remains sa≈sår∂
as before has not realized Brahman as Åtman, Therefore (our stand) is faultless.
(25) As wrong knowledge is destroyed by the realisation of Brahman-Åtman
Ma

oneness, the imagined relation with the body is lost. Even while alive one becomes
unembodied. Just as the snake loses relation with the slough after its detachment,
the j¤ån∂ too loses body-relation and becomes Brahman. This does not however
mean that there was a relation earlier. It was not there even earlier. Therefore, there
is no scope for imaginations like ítrace of avidyå, true liberation is after deathí etc.›ruti
says - ^cz„So lu~ cz„kIuksfr* - Being Brahman he merges in Brahman. ëEven with eyes, he
is like without eyesí, i.e. his eyes too see multiplicity like the eyes of an ignorant
person; but do not recognise multiplicity and so are like the one without eyes.
Some people have interpreted this as ëThough without eyes, he is like with eyesí,
 137

i.e., though he is the adjunctless Åtman, he appears as if working with adjuncts.

The first literal interpretation is the j¤ån∂ís personal experience; the second is his
appearance for others. These are the features of the sthitapæj¤a (Adhyåsa Bhå¶ya 21.3).
One without the realisation of Brahman-Åtman sees multiplicity outside and
considers himself as observer. The one with realization, though seeing multiplicity
with physical eyes, does not understand himself as observer of multiplicity, but as
the Brahman which is the cause of both, observed and observer. That is, the j¤åna of

a
multiplicity produced by sense-object contact is the feature of the k¶etra - the
observable; and Åtman is its real nature (swarµupa). The feature is not independent

k
of the swarµupa; but the swarµupa is featureless. Therefore, the adhyasa relation with

aja
the k¶etra produces motivation for action in the ignorant; with the snapping of the
adhyåsa relation, motivation drops off in the j¤ån∂. K¶etra is not non-existent, it is
Åtman; adhyåsa with it is non-existent, imagined.

r
26. Ùeled Hegve®òeâced ßeJeCeeled HejeÛeerveÙees: ceveveefveefoOÙeemeveÙees:oMe&veeled efJeefOeMes<elJeb
riv
yeÇÿeCe: ve mJe¤HeHeÙe&JemeeefÙelJeefceefle~ ve, DeJeielÙeLe&lJeeled ceveveefveefoOÙeemeveÙees:~ Ùeefo efn
DeJeieleb yeÇÿe DevÙe$e efJeefveÙegpÙesle, YeJesòeoe efJeefOeMes<elJeced~ ve leg leoefmle~ ceveve-
Pa

efveefoOÙeemeveÙeesjefHe ßeJeCeJeled DeJeielÙeLe&lJeeled~

26.Again it was said: ëSince reflection and meditation are seen subsequent
to hearing, Brahman must be subsidiary to injunction and does not stop with
(the teaching of) its nature.í It is not so; because like hearing, reflection and
ha

meditation are for the purpose of realization. If the realized Brahman were
used elsewhere, then there would be subsidiariness to injunction. But it is not
so, because like hearing, reflection and meditation are also for the purpose of
Ma

realization.
(26) In the opinion of the opponent, ëreflection (manana) after hearing (‹ravaƒa)
is for clear understanding of Brahman and nididhyåsana is nothing but upåsanå
(meditation). After death the fruit of upåsanå, i.e., mok¶a is obtainedí. This is not
correct; because, after ‹ravaƒa, the understood Brahman is not used for something
else; there is no scope for that either, because, the process yields the realisation of
Brahman-Åtman oneness and the distinction of meditator-meditated upon is lost.
How can upåsanå happen? Therefore, reflection and meditation are for realisation
only.
138

27. lemceeled ve HeÇefleHeefòeefJeefOeefJe<eÙeleÙee MeeŒeØeceeCekeâlJeb yeÇÿeCe: mebYeJeefle~

FlÙele: mJelev$ecesJe yeÇÿe MeeŒeHeÇceeCekebâ JesoevleJeekeäÙemecevJeÙeeled Fefle efmeæced~ SJeb Ûe meefle
‘‘DeLeelees yeÇÿe efpe%eemee'' Fefle leefÉ<eÙe: He=Lekedâ MeeŒeejbYe: GHeHeÅeles~ HeÇefleHeefòe-efJeefOe-
HejlJes efn ‘‘DeLeelees Oece&efpe%eemee'' FlÙesJe DeejyOelJeeled ve He=LekeäMeeŒeced DeejYÙesle~
DeejYÙeceeCeb Ûe SJeceejYÙesle ‘‘DeLeele: HeefjefMe<šOece&efpe%eemee'' Fefle~ ‘‘DeLeele: ›eâlJeLe&

a
Heg®<eeLe&Ùeesefpe&%eemee'' (pew. met. 4.1.1) FefleJeled~ yeÇÿeelcewkeäÙeeJeieeflemleg DeHeÇefle%eelee Fefle
leoLees&Ùegòeâ: MeeŒeejbYe: ‘‘DeLeelees yeÇÿeefpe%eemee’'~

k
27. Therefore, ‹åstra is not pramåƒa for the knowledge of Brahman as

aja
subsidiary to an injunction of upåsanå. So now, that ‹åstra is the pramåƒa for
Brahman independently is established because of the uniformity in the meaning
of the Vedånta sentences. This being the case, the commencement of a distinct
r
‹åstra dealing with that in the form ëëThen therefore the discussion of Brahmaníí
riv
is reconciled. Had it been for an ëinjunction of upåsanå, then since this had
been already stated in the sµutra ëëthen therefore the discussion of dharmaíí a
different ‹åstra would not have been commenced. Or if it had been begun, it
Pa

should have been commenced with ëëThen therefore the discussion of rest of
dharmaíí like ëëThen, therefore, the discussion of what subserves the purpose
of the sacrifice and of the goal of maníí. The realization of Brahman- Åtman
oneness is not propounded (in that ‹åstra); hence it is but right that (another)
ha

‹åstra is begun for that purpose in ëëThen, therefore, the discussion of Brahmaníí.
(27) í›åstra is not pramåƒa for Brahman through injunction; it is pramåƒa directlyí
Ma

- this is proved by logic in this section. Upåsanå being a mental karma, it has to come
under the discussion of dharma. So, it could have come there as a subsidiary to
injunction of upåsanå, ^vFkkr% ifjf'k"V ékeZftKklk* & Another ‹åstra is not needed. Suppose
one says ëNo, context being different, upåsanå cannot be discussed under dharmaí.
In that case, upåsanå being karma of a different type, it could have been dealt with in
another sub-section within dharma-jij¤åså. Instead, a separate ‹åstra has been
formulated. Why? Because, Brahman-Åtman oneness cannot be discussed in that
‹åstra; that ‹åstra is based on duality.

28. lemceeled ‘‘Denb yeÇÿeeefmce'' FlÙesleoJemeevee SJe meJex efJeOeÙe: meJee&efCe Ûe

 139

FlejeefCe HeÇceeCeeefve~ ve efn DensÙe-DevegHeeosÙe-DeÉwleelce-DeJeieleew efveefJe&<eÙeeefCe DeHeÇceele=keâeefCe

Ûe HeÇceeCeeefve YeefJelegcen&efvle~ DeefHe Ûe Deeng:
28. Therefore all the injunctions and pramåƒas terminate with (the
realization) ëëI am Brahmaníí. With the realization of non-dual Åtman where
there is no rejecting and taking, pramåƒa cannot but drop because objects and
the knower drop out. Further they say:

a
(28.1)Therefore, all the injunctions etc: 'The knowledge of Åtmaní(Åtma-j¤åna)

k
will become non-eternal if it is a fruit of injunction. Imperative etc used in respect
of it become blunt, they have only the shade of injunctioní- this shows that ‹ravana,

aja
manana and nididhyåsana are not injunctions.
Doubt: But they too drop out after the realization of the oneness of Åtman -
Brahman. In that case, does the first sentence in this section not imply that these
three have once again been treated as injunctions?r
riv
Answer: It is not explicit here that it is so. The sentence may be referring to
injunction of dharma‹åstra only. It is because of the word ëvidhií that this doubt has
arisen. So it will be discussed again: Meaning of ëknowledge of Brahmaní has been
Pa

explained by saying ëThe intellectual knowledge of Brahman is the pramåƒa through

which experience is gained' (see Jij¤åså-adhikaraƒa, sec. 11). The end result of
experience starts with hearing (‹ravaƒa) of ‹åstras. Experience is not produced
immediately after hearing. ›vetaketu is an example of this. After ‹ravaƒa, reflection
ha

(manana) of the knowledge of Brahman is necessary. In this knowledge obtained

after manana, Brahman is the known and prajna is the knower. This is duality. But
the ‹ruti says ëPråj¤a is Brahmaní and Åtman is pråj¤a, who is in fact, Brahman only.
Ma

Therefore, the knower (of the wakeful state) should keep his mind continuously
flowing towards Åtman. This is meditation - nididhyåsana - which has to end in
experience. How long should one meditate? Till experience is got! Whether the
first or the last, whether (meditation is) continuous or discontinuous, the grasp
that ends in total removal of the defects of avidya etc is experience - ^; ,o
vfo|kfnnks"kfuo`fŸkQy—RizR;;% vk|% vUR;% lUrr% vlUrrks ok l ,o fo|k* (Br. Bh. 1.4.10). There
is nothing wrong in treating ‹ravaƒa, manana and nididhyåsana as injunctions till
then.í This is just like getting the fruit of karma according to the injunction of the
karma part of the Veda.
140

Doubt: Then why are they described as ëwith shade of injunction? Why not
say injunction itself?í
Answer: The reason for not treating it as injunction is this: Injunctive karma
and fruit are very different. Here it is not so. Manana and nididhyåsana do not yield
a knowledge different from what was heard. Nevertheless, experience does not
come without them. So ëthey have the shade of injunctioní.
(28.2) With Åtman-experience, knowership of pråj¤a drops off. It is wrong to

a
say it drops off because the known (world) ceases to exist due to this experience.

k
It drops off because of the knowledge that the known is not different from the

aja
knower. As a result of the teaching of the ‹åstras by the guru, when one reminds
oneself that everything is the unborn Brahman, then he ceases to see duality which
is its opposite, because such duality is non-existent - ^vta cz„ loZfeR;srr~ 'kkL=kkpk;ksZins'kr%
vuqLe`R; rf}ijhra tkrqa uSo rq i';fr] vHkkokr~* (Må. Kå. 3.43). With the realisation of the non-
r
dual Åtman, nothing appears different from oneself. One obtains the world-sublated
riv
sarva-åtma-bhåva, the experience of everything as himself, while there is no giving
or taking. Quoting the songs of the realised souls, this is explained below.
Pa

(28.3) Due to the sublation of son, body etc: Here sublation does not mean that
son, body etc become invisible, get destroyed. If such a thing happens to the body,
the tradition of Vedanta cannot continue. Sublation of the world means the
realisation that its inherent nature is Åtman itself. In this awareness of sarva-åtma-
bhåva , son etc are ënot hisí and body etc are ënot himselfí. Son etc are secondary
ha

atmans and body etc are illusory åtmans. They are non-existent in sarva-åtma-bhåva.
Since all actions take place on the premise of secondary and illusory åtmans which
are absent on realisation, they (actions) cease to exist.
Ma

(28.4) Prior to cognition etc: Åtman being different from and unknown to the
ignorant person He is to be sought, He is to be discussed - ^lksøUos"VO;% l% foftKkflrO;%*
(Cå. 8.7.1); The ignorant person has to search for Him. After He is realised, naturally,
knowership of the seeker drops off. Since sin and virtue occur only when there is
knowership, they too drop off with Åtmanís realization.
(28.5)The cognition of Åtman etc: Pramåƒa is the base for the knower-known
vyavahåra of knowing. The validity for pramåƒa comes from experience, which is
based on identifying the body as the knower, i.e., adhyåsa. This is natural only as
 141

long as there is knowership. When this is lost with Åtmanís realisation, one comes
to know that the validity of the pramåƒa and of the activities was illusory.
(28.6) What does it mean to say that the ëvalidity of pramåƒa is illusory?í If ‹ruti
pramåƒa is illusory, how is it possible to have faith in the transactionless Åtman it
teaches? Even granting that somehow one gets the knowledge of the Åtman taught
by ‹ruti, how to verify that it is right knowledge? - These are the questions; here are
the answers:

a
Vyavahåra is found only in the effects and not in the cause. And the effect cannot
exist without the cause. Vyavahåras like ëthe pot is big, small, brokení etc are possible

k
only in the pot, not clay. But at the same time, a pot without clay is non-existent - ^u

aja
fg fujkRedÏ Hkwra fdÏfpr~ O;ogkjk; vodYirs* (G. Bh. 9.4). So, also, the vyavahåra of knower-
known-knowledge is possible only between k¶etra and k¶etraj¤a; not at all in the
Åtman. Vyavahåra is impossible in a k¶etra and k¶etraj¤a who are independent of
Åtman, since they would be non existent - ^dkj.k O;frjsdÍ.k vHkko% dk;ZL;* (Sµu. Bh. 2.1.14).
r
When the pramåƒa, the eye, comes in contact with the object, the knowledge of the
riv
latter is produced in the buddhi. All this is k¶etra dharma. One who has adhyåsa in the
body,senses and buddhi, feels that he is the knower. Since the knowledge of an
object is the same for all knowers, including the one whop has realised the Åtman,
Pa

this vyavahåra between k¶etra and k¶etraj¤a is true - not illusory. What is illusion?
^vU;L; p vfo|k—rRos fo|;k voLrqRon'kZuksiifŸk%A rfº f}rh;L; pUÊL; vlŸoa ;nrSfefjdÍ.k p{kq"erk
u x`·rs* - Another thing (different from Åtman) which is imagined due to Avidyå, is
non existent; it can be understood as non-existing by vidyå. Is not the second moon,
ha

not seen by one without cataract, the non-existent? (Tai. Bh. 2.8). ëIf so, what exactly
is illusory in the transaction between k¶etra and k¶etraj¤a?í - Knowership of Åtman.
ëWho is this Åtman?í Pråj¤a , also called k¶etraj¤a. ëWhy?í- Because pråj¤a is really
Ma

not pråj¤a; he is the Åtman without knowership. Therefore, the moment pråj¤a
realises that he is Åtman, all transactions stay bound in the k¶etra; in no way do they
touch him.
Question: In that case, after one obtains j¤åna, who handles the activity seen in
the inert k¶etra of the j¤åni?
Answer: It is ∫‹wara, who is passive in His swarµupa, but active in association
with måyå - ^ijekReuLrq Lo:iO;ikJ;e~ vkSnklhU;e~A ek;kO;ikJ;a p izorZdRoe~*A (Sµu. Bh. 2.2.7),
who handles the body of the j¤ån∂ according to his prårabdha - which is the karma
brought with him to be experienced in this life (Adhyåsa Bhå¶ya 21.1-3).
142

Question: The vyavahåra of creation etc of the world are of ∫‹wara, not of a j¤ån∂.
Is this not a difference between j¤ån∂ and ∫‹wara?
Answer: No. The aforesaid answer is given keeping in view the ignorant (aj¤ån∂)
who sees difference. Actually, j¤ån∂ is Paramatman only, without any difference.
Prior to the realisation of Åtman, the creation and destruction of the world, starting
from pråƒa upto the (objects with) names, were happening by one different from
himself. With the realisation of Åtman, they were all by himself - In this way, for the

a
j¤ån∂, all transactions are by Åtman only - ^izkd~ lnkRefoKkukr~ LokReu% vU;Lekr~ lr% izk.kkns%

k
ukekUrL;ksRifŸkizy;kS vHkwrke~A lnkRefoKkus rq lfr bnkuha LokRer ,o lao`ŸkkSA rFkk loksZøI;U;ks O;ogkj%
vkReu ,o fonq"k%*A (Cå. Bh. 7.26.1).

aja
ieewCeefceLÙeelceveesÓmeòJes Heg$e osneefo yeeOeveeled~~1~~
meodyeÇÿeelceenefcelÙesJeb yeesOes keâeÙe± keâLeb YeJesled~~1~~
r
DevJes<šJÙeelceefJe%eeveeled HeÇekedâ HeÇceele=lJeceelceve:~~1~~
riv
DeefvJe<š: mÙeeled HeÇceelewJe HeeHceoes<eeefoJeefpe&le:~~2~~
osnelceHeÇlÙeÙees ÙeÉled HeÇceeCelJesve keâefuHele:~~1~~
Pa

ueewefkeâkebâ leÉosJesob HeÇceeCeb lJeelceefve§eÙeeled~~3~~

bfr prq%lw=kh lekIrkA
(1) Due to the sublation of son, body etc, the secondary and the illusory
ha

Åtmans becoming non-existent and with enlightenment ëI am Brahman of the

nature of sheer existenceíóhow can there be action?
(2) Prior to the cognition of the ëÅtman to be knowní, there is knowership
Ma

for Åtman. After knowing, the knower himself becomes free from sin, defect
etc.
(3) The cognition of Åtman as the body is imagined to be pramåƒa. So also
is this wordly (transaction imagined to be) pramåƒa until the ascertainment of
Åtman (as Brahman).
Thus ends the catu¨sµutr∂

888